

Title: The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya

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Release date: July 15, 2005 [eBook #16295]

Most recently updated: December 12, 2020

Language: English

Credits: Produced by Srinivasan Sriram, David King, and the Online
Distributed Proofreading Team

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE VEDANTA-SUTRAS WITH THE COMMENTARY BY
SANKARACARYA ***

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VEDANTA-SUTRAS

With the Commentary by

SA@NKARACHARYA

Translated by
GEORGE THIBAUT

Part I

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION

VEDANTA-SUTRAS WITH THE COMMENTARY BY SA@NKARACHARYA.

ADHYAYA I.

Pada I.

Pada II.

Pada III.

Pada IV.

ADHYAYA II.

Pada I.

Pada II.

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Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Translations of
the Sacred Books of the East.

[Transcriber's Note: This book contains many words with one or two
letters in the word printed in italics; those letters are transcribed by
enclosing them in slashes, e.g. "karmaka/nd/a" has the letters "nd" in
italics. Also, the symbol "@" is used before the letter "n" to indicate
a horizontal bar across the top.]

INTRODUCTION.

To the sacred literature of the Brahmins, in the strict sense of the
term, i.e. to the Veda, there belongs a certain number of complementary
works without whose assistance the student is, according to Hindu
notions, unable to do more than commit the sacred texts to memory. In
the first place all Vedic texts must, in order to be understood, be read
together with running commentaries such as Saya/n/a's commentaries on
the Sa/m/hitas and Brahma/n/as, and the Bhashyas ascribed to Sa@nkara on
the chief Upanishads. But these commentaries do not by themselves
conduce to a full comprehension of the contents of the sacred texts,
since they confine themselves to explaining the meaning of each detached
passage without investigating its relation to other passages, and the
whole of which they form part; considerations of the latter kind are at
any rate introduced occasionally only. The task of taking a
comprehensive view of the contents of the Vedic writings as a whole, of
systematising what they present in an unsystematical form, of showing
the mutual co-ordination or subordination of single passages and
sections, and of reconciling contradictions--which, according to the
view of the orthodox commentators, can be apparent only--is allotted to
a separate sastra or body of doctrine which is termed Mima/m/sa, i.e.
the investigation or enquiry [Greek: kat ezochaen], viz. the enquiry
into the connected meaning of the sacred texts.

Of this Mima/m/sa two branches have to be distinguished, the so-called
earlier (purva) Mima/m/sa, and the later (uttara) Mima/m/sa. The former
undertakes to systematise the karmaka/nd/a, i.e. that entire portion of
the Veda which is concerned with action, pre-eminently sacrificial
action, and which comprises the Sa/m/hitas and the Brahma/n/as exclusive
of the Ara/n/yaka portions; the latter performs the same service with
regard to the so-called j/n/anaka/nd/a, i.e. that part of the Vedic
writings which includes the Ara/n/yaka portions of the Brahma/n/as, and
a number of detached treatises called Upanishads. Its subject is not
action but knowledge, viz. the knowledge of Brahman.

At what period these two /s/astras first assumed a definite form, we are
unable to ascertain. Discussions of the nature of those which constitute
the subject-matter of the Purva Mima/m/sa must have arisen at a very
early period, and the word Mima/m/sa itself together with its
derivatives is already employed in the Brahma/n/as to denote the doubts
and discussions connected with certain contested points of ritual. The
want of a body of definite rules prescribing how to act, i.e. how to
perform the various sacrifices in full accordance with the teaching of
the Veda, was indeed an urgent one, because it was an altogether
practical want, continually pressing itself on the adhvaryus engaged in
ritualistic duties. And the task of establishing such rules was moreover
a comparatively limited and feasible one; for the members of a certain
Vedic sakha or school had to do no more than to digest thoroughly their
own brahma/n/a and sa/m/hita, without being under any obligation of
reconciling with the teaching of their own books the occasionally
conflicting rules implied in the texts of other sakhas. It was assumed
that action, as being something which depends on the will and choice of
man, admits of alternatives, so that a certain sacrifice may be
performed in different ways by members of different Vedic schools, or
even by the followers of one and the same sakha.

The Uttara Mima/m/sa-/s/astra may be supposed to have originated considerably later than the Purva Mima/m/sa. In the first place, the texts with which it is concerned doubtless constitute the latest branch of Vedic literature. And in the second place, the subject-matter of those texts did not call for a systematical treatment with equal urgency, as it was in no way connected with practice; the mental attitude of the authors of the Upanishads, who in their lucubrations on Brahman and the soul aim at nothing less than at definiteness and coherence, may have perpetuated itself through many generations without any great inconvenience resulting therefrom.

But in the long run two causes must have acted with ever-increasing force, to give an impulse to the systematic working up of the teaching of the Upanishads also. The followers of the different Vedic sakhas no doubt recognised already at an early period the truth that, while conflicting statements regarding the details of a sacrifice can be got over by the assumption of a vikalpa, i.e. an optional proceeding, it is not so with regard to such topics as the nature of Brahman, the relation to it of the human soul, the origin of the physical universe, and the like. Concerning them, one opinion only can be the true one, and it therefore becomes absolutely incumbent on those, who look on the whole body of the Upanishads as revealed truth, to demonstrate that their teaching forms a consistent whole free from all contradictions. In addition there supervened the external motive that, while the karmaka/nd/a of the Veda concerned only the higher castes of brahmanically constituted society, on which it enjoins certain sacrificial performances connected with certain rewards, the j/n/anaka/nd/a, as propounding a certain theory of the world, towards which any reflecting person inside or outside the pale of the orthodox community could not but take up a definite position, must soon have become the object of criticism on the part of those who held different views on religious and philosophic things, and hence stood in need of systematic defence.

At present there exists a vast literature connected with the two branches of the Mima/m/sa. We have, on the one hand, all those works which constitute the Purva Mima/m/sa-/s/astra--or as it is often, shortly but not accurately, termed, the Mima/m/sa-/s/astra--and, on the other hand, all those works which are commonly comprised under the name Vedanta-/s/astra. At the head of this extensive literature there stand two collections of Sutras (i.e. short aphorisms constituting in their totality a complete body of doctrine upon some subject), whose reputed authors are Jainini and Badarayana. There can, however, be no doubt that the composition of those two collections of Sutras was preceded by a long series of preparatory literary efforts of which they merely represent the highly condensed outcome. This is rendered probable by the analogy of other /s/astras, as well as by the exhaustive thoroughness with which the Sutras perform their task of systematizing the teaching of the Veda, and is further proved by the frequent references which the Sutras make to the views of earlier teachers. If we consider merely the preserved monuments of Indian literature, the Sutras (of the two Mima/m/sas as well as of other /s/astras) mark the beginning; if we, however, take into account what once existed, although it is at present irretrievably lost, we observe that they occupy a strictly central position, summarising, on the one hand, a series of early literary essays extending over many generations, and forming, on the other hand, the head spring of an ever broadening activity of commentators as well as virtually independent writers, which reaches down to our days, and may yet have some future before itself.

The general scope of the two Mima/m/sa-sutras and their relation to the Veda have been indicated in what precedes. A difference of some importance between the two has, however, to be noted in this connexion. The systematisation of the karmaka/nd/a of the Veda led to the elaboration of two classes of works, viz. the Kalpa-sutras on the one hand, and the Purva Mima/m/sa-sutras on the other hand. The former give nothing but a description as concise as possible of the sacrifices enjoined in the Brahma/n/as; while the latter discuss and establish the general principles which the author of a Kalpa-sutra has to follow, if

he wishes to render his rules strictly conformable to the teaching of the Veda. The j/n/anaka/nd/a of the Veda, on the other hand, is systematised in a single work, viz. the Uttara Mima/m/sa or Vedanta-sutras, which combine the two tasks of concisely stating the teaching of the Veda, and of argumentatively establishing the special interpretation of the Veda adopted in the Sutras. This difference may be accounted for by two reasons. In the first place, the contents of the karmaka/nd/a, as being of an entirely practical nature, called for summaries such as the Kalpa-sutras, from which all burdensome discussions of method are excluded; while there was no similar reason for the separation of the two topics in the case of the purely theoretical science of Brahman. And, in the second place, the Vedanta-sutras throughout presuppose the Purva Mima/m/sa-sutras, and may therefore dispense with the discussion of general principles and methods already established in the latter.

The time at which the two Mima/m/sa-sutras were composed we are at present unable to fix with any certainty; a few remarks on the subject will, however, be made later on. Their outward form is that common to all the so-called Sutras which aims at condensing a given body of doctrine in a number of concise aphoristic sentences, and often even mere detached words in lieu of sentences. Besides the Mima/m/sa-sutras this literary form is common to the fundamental works on the other philosophic systems, on the Vedic sacrifices, on domestic ceremonies, on sacred law, on grammar, and on metres. The two Mima/m/sa-sutras occupy, however, an altogether exceptional position in point of style. All Sutras aim at conciseness; that is clearly the reason to which this whole species of literary composition owes its existence. This their aim they reach by the rigid exclusion of all words which can possibly be spared, by the careful avoidance of all unnecessary repetitions, and, as in the case of the grammatical Sutras, by the employment of an arbitrarily coined terminology which substitutes single syllables for entire words or combination of words. At the same time the manifest intention of the Sutra writers is to express themselves with as much clearness as the conciseness affected by them admits of. The aphorisms are indeed often concise to excess, but not otherwise intrinsically obscure, the manifest care of the writers being to retain what is essential in a given phrase, and to sacrifice only what can be supplied, although perhaps not without difficulty, and an irksome strain of memory and reflection. Hence the possibility of understanding without a commentary a very considerable portion at any rate of the ordinary Sutras. Altogether different is the case of the two Mima/m/sa-sutras. There scarcely one single Sutra is intelligible without a commentary. The most essential words are habitually dispensed with; nothing is, for instance, more common than the simple omission of the subject or predicate of a sentence. And when here and there a Sutra occurs whose words construe without anything having to be supplied, the phraseology is so eminently vague and obscure that without the help derived from a commentary we should be unable to make out to what subject the Sutra refers. When undertaking to translate either of the Mima/m/sa-sutras we therefore depend altogether on commentaries; and hence the question arises which of the numerous commentaries extant is to be accepted as a guide to their right understanding.

The commentary here selected for translation, together with Badaraya/n/a's Sutras (to which we shall henceforth confine our attention to the exclusion of Jaimini's Purva Mima/m/sa-sutras), is the one composed by the celebrated theologian /S/a@nkara or, as he is commonly called, /S/a@nkara/k/arya. There are obvious reasons for this selection. In the first place, the /S/a@nkara-bhashya represents the so-called orthodox side of Brahminical theology which strictly upholds the Brahman or highest Self of the Upanishads as something different from, and in fact immensely superior to, the divine beings such as Vish/n/u or Siva, which, for many centuries, have been the chief objects of popular worship in India. In the second place, the doctrine advocated by /S/a@nkara is, from a purely philosophical point of view and apart from all theological considerations, the most important and interesting one which has arisen on Indian soil; neither those forms of the Vedanta which diverge from the view represented by /S/a@nkara nor any of the

non-Vedantic systems can be compared with the so-called orthodox Vedanta in boldness, depth, and subtlety of speculation. In the third place, /S/a@nkara's bhaashya is, as far as we know, the oldest of the extant commentaries, and relative antiquity is at any rate one of the circumstances which have to be taken into account, although, it must be admitted, too much weight may easily be attached to it. The /S/a@nkara-bhashya further is the authority most generally deferred to in India as to the right understanding of the Vedanta-sutras, and ever since /S/a@nkara's time the majority of the best thinkers of India have been men belonging to his school. If in addition to all this we take into consideration the intrinsic merits of /S/a@nkara's work which, as a piece of philosophical argumentation and theological apologetics, undoubtedly occupies a high rank, the preference here given to it will be easily understood.

But to the European--or, generally, modern--translator of the Vedanta-sutras with /S/a@nkara's commentary another question will of course suggest itself at once, viz. whether or not /S/a@nkara's explanations faithfully render the intended meaning of the author of the Sutras. To the Indian Pandit of /S/a@nkara's school this question has become an indifferent one, or, to state the case more accurately, he objects to it being raised, as he looks on /S/a@nkara's authority as standing above doubt and dispute. When pressed to make good his position he will, moreover, most probably not enter into any detailed comparison of /S/a@nkara's comments with the text of Badaraya/n/a's Sutras, but will rather endeavour to show on speculative grounds that /S/a@nkara's philosophical view is the only true one, whence it of course follows that it accurately represents the meaning of Badaraya/n/a, who himself must necessarily be assured to have taught the true doctrine. But on the modern investigator, who neither can consider himself bound by the authority of a name however great, nor is likely to look to any Indian system of thought for the satisfaction of his speculative wants, it is clearly incumbent not to acquiesce from the outset in the interpretations given of the Vedanta-sutras--and the Upanishads--by /S/a@nkara and his school, but to submit them, as far as that can be done, to a critical investigation.

This is a task which would have to be undertaken even if /S/a@nkara's views as to the true meaning of the Sutras and Upanishads had never been called into doubt on Indian soil, although in that case it could perhaps hardly be entered upon with much hope of success; but it becomes much more urgent, and at the same time more feasible, when we meet in India itself with systems claiming to be Vedantic and based on interpretations of the Sutras and Upanishads more or less differing from those of /S/a@nkara. The claims of those systems to be in the possession of the right understanding of the fundamental authorities of the Vedanta must at any rate be examined, even if we should finally be compelled to reject them.

It appears that already at a very early period the Vedanta-sutras had come to be looked upon as an authoritative work, not to be neglected by any who wished to affiliate their own doctrines to the Veda. At present, at any rate, there are very few Hindu sects not interested in showing that their distinctive tenets are countenanced by Badaraya/n/a's teaching. Owing to this the commentaries on the Sutras have in the course of time become very numerous, and it is at present impossible to give a full and accurate enumeration even of those actually existing, much less of those referred to and quoted. Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall, in his Bibliographical Index, mentions fourteen commentaries, copies of which had been inspected by himself. Some among these (as, for instance, Ramanuja's Vedanta-sara, No. XXXV) are indeed not commentaries in the strict sense of the word, but rather systematic expositions of the doctrine supposed to be propounded in the Sutras; but, on the other hand, there are in existence several true commentaries which had not been accessible to Fitz-Edward Hall. It would hardly be practical--and certainly not feasible in this place--to submit all the existing bhashyas to a critical enquiry at once. All we can do here is to single out one or a few of the more important ones, and to compare their interpretations with those given by /S/a@nkara, and with the text of the

345 Sutras themselves.

346
347 The bhashya, which in this connexion is the first to press itself upon
348 our attention, is the one composed by the famous Vaishnava theologian
349 and philosopher Ramanuja, who is supposed to have lived in the twelfth
350 century. The Ramanuja or, as it is often called, the /S/ri-bhashya
351 appears to be the oldest commentary extant next to /S/a@nkara's. It is
352 further to be noted that the sect of the Ramanujas occupies a
353 pre-eminent position among the Vaishnava, sects which themselves, in
354 their totality, may claim to be considered the most important among all
355 Hindu sects. The intrinsic value of the /S/ri-bhashya moreover is--as
356 every student acquainted with it will be ready to acknowledge--a very
357 high one; it strikes one throughout as a very solid performance due to a
358 writer of extensive learning and great power of argumentation, and in
359 its polemic parts, directed chiefly against the school of /S/a@nkara, it
360 not unfrequently deserves to be called brilliant even. And in addition
361 to all this it shows evident traces of being not the mere outcome of
362 Ramanuja's individual views, but of resting on an old and weighty
363 tradition.

364
365 This latter point is clearly of the greatest importance. If it could be
366 demonstrated or even rendered probable only that the oldest bhashya
367 which we possess, i.e. the /S/a@nkara-bhashya, represents an
368 uninterrupted and uniform tradition bridging over the interval between
369 Badarayana, the reputed author of the Sutras, and /S/a@nkara; and if,
370 on the other hand, it could be shown that the more modern bhashyas are
371 not supported by old tradition, but are nothing more than bold attempts
372 of clever sectarians to force an old work of generally recognised
373 authority into the service of their individual tenets; there would
374 certainly be no reason for us to raise the question whether the later
375 bhashyas can help us in making out the true meaning of the Sutras. All
376 we should have to do in that case would be to accept /S/a@nkara's
377 interpretations as they stand, or at the utmost to attempt to make out,
378 if at all possible, by a careful comparison of /S/a@nkara's bhashya with
379 the text of the Sutras, whether the former in all cases faithfully
380 represents the purport of the latter.

381
382 In the most recent book of note which at all enters into the question as
383 to how far we have to accept /S/a@nkara as a guide to the right
384 understanding of the Sutras (Mr. A. Gough's Philosophy of the
385 Upanishads) the view is maintained (pp. 239 ff.) that /S/a@nkara is the
386 generally recognised expositor of true Vedanta doctrine, that that
387 doctrine was handed down by an unbroken series of teachers intervening
388 between him and the Sutrakara, and that there existed from the beginning
389 only one Vedanta doctrine, agreeing in all essential points with the
390 doctrine known to us from /S/a@nkara's writings. Mr. Gough undertakes to
391 prove this view, firstly, by a comparison of /S/a@nkara's system with
392 the teaching of the Upanishads themselves; and, secondly, by a
393 comparison of the purport of the Sutras--as far as that can be made out
394 independently of the commentaries--with the interpretations given of
395 them by /S/a@nkara. To both these points we shall revert later on.
396 Meanwhile, I only wish to remark concerning the former point that, even
397 if we could show with certainty that all the Upanishads propound one and
398 the same doctrine, there yet remains the undeniable fact of our being
399 confronted by a considerable number of essentially differing theories,
400 all of which claim to be founded on the Upanishads. And with regard to
401 the latter point I have to say for the present that, as long as we have
402 only /S/a@nkara's bhashya before us, we are naturally inclined to find
403 in the Sutras--which, taken by themselves, are for the greater part
404 unintelligible--the meaning which /S/a@nkara ascribes to them; while a
405 reference to other bhashyas may not impossibly change our views at
406 once.--Meanwhile, we will consider the question as to the unbroken
407 uniformity of Vedantic tradition from another point or view, viz. by
408 enquiring whether or not the Sutras themselves, and the
409 /S/a@nkara-bhashya, furnish any indications of there having existed
410 already at an early time essentially different Vedantic systems or lines
411 of Vedantic speculation.

412
413 Beginning with the Sutras, we find that they supply ample evidence to

the effect that already at a very early time, viz. the period antecedent to the final composition of the Vedanta-sutras in their present shape, there had arisen among the chief doctors of the Vedanta differences of opinion, bearing not only upon minor points of doctrine, but affecting the most essential parts of the system. In addition to Badaraya/n/a himself, the reputed author of the Sutras, the latter quote opinions ascribed to the following teachers: Atreya, A/s/marathya, Au/d/ulomi, Karsh/n/agini, Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna, Jaimini, Badari. Among the passages where diverging views of those teachers are recorded and contrasted three are of particular importance. Firstly, a passage in the fourth pada of the fourth adhyaya (Sutras 5-7), where the opinions of various teachers concerning the characteristics of the released soul are given, and where the important discrepancy is noted that, according to Au/d/ulomi, its only characteristic is thought (/k/aitanya), while Jaimini maintains that it possesses a number of exalted qualities, and Badaraya/n/a declares himself in favour of a combination of those two views.--The second passage occurs in the third pada of the fourth adhyaya (Sutras 7-14), where Jaimini maintains that the soul of him who possesses the lower knowledge of Brahman goes after death to the highest Brahman, while Badari--whose opinion is endorsed by /S/a@nkara--teaches that it repairs to the lower Brahman only--Finally, the third and most important passage is met with in the fourth pada of the first adhyaya (Sutras 20-22), where the question is discussed why in a certain passage of the Brhadara/n/yaka Brahman is referred to in terms which are strictly applicable to the individual soul only. In connexion therewith the Sutras quote the views of three ancient teachers about the relation in which the individual soul stands to Brahman. According to A/s/marathya (if we accept the interpretation of his view given by /S/a@nkara and /S/a@nkara's commentators) the soul stands to Brahman in the bhedabheda relation, i.e. it is neither absolutely different nor absolutely non-different from it, as sparks are from fire. Audulomi, on the other hand, teaches that the soul is altogether different from Brahman up to the time when obtaining final release it is merged in it, and Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna finally upholds the doctrine that the soul is absolutely non-different from Brahman; which, in, some way or other presents itself as the individual soul.

That the ancient teachers, the ripest outcome of whose speculations and discussions is embodied in the Vedanta-sutras, disagreed among themselves on points of vital importance is sufficiently proved by the three passages quoted. The one quoted last is specially significant as showing that recognised authorities--deemed worthy of being quoted in the Sutras--denied that doctrine on which the whole system of /S/a@nkara hinges, viz. the doctrine of the absolute identity of the individual soul with Brahman.

Turning next to the /S/a@nkara-bhashya itself, we there also meet with indications that the Vedantins were divided among themselves on important points of dogma. These indications are indeed not numerous: /S/a@nkara, does not on the whole impress one as an author particularly anxious to strengthen his own case by appeals to ancient authorities, a peculiarity of his which later writers of hostile tendencies have not failed to remark and criticise. But yet more than once /S/a@nkara also refers to the opinion of 'another,' viz., commentator of the Sutras, and in several places /S/a@nkara's commentators explain that the 'other' meant is the V/ri/ttikara (about whom more will be said shortly). Those references as a rule concern minor points of exegesis, and hence throw little or no light on important differences of dogma; but there are two remarks of /S/a@nkara's at any rate which are of interest in this connexion. The one is made with reference to Sutras 7-14 of the third pada of the fourth adhyaya; 'some,' he says there, 'declare those Sutras, which I look upon as setting forth the siddhanta view, to state merely the purvapaksha;' a difference of opinion which, as we have seen above, affects the important question as to the ultimate fate of those who have not reached the knowledge of the highest Brahman.--And under I, 3, 19 /S/a@nkara, after having explained at length that the individual soul as such cannot claim any reality, but is real only in so far as it is identical with Brahman, adds the following words, 'apare tu vadina/h/paramarthikam eva jaiva/m/ rupam iti manyante asmadiya/s/ /k/a ke/k/it,'

i.e. other theorists again, and among them some of ours, are of opinion that the individual soul as such is real.' The term 'ours,' here made use of, can denote only the Aupanishadas or Vedantins, and it thus appears that /S/a@nkara himself was willing to class under the same category himself and philosophers who--as in later times the Ramanujas and others--looked upon the individual soul as not due to the fictitious limitations of Maya, but as real in itself; whatever may be the relation in which they considered it to stand to the highest Self.

From what precedes it follows that the Vedantins of the school to which /S/a@nkara himself belonged acknowledged the existence of Vedantic teaching of a type essentially different from their own. We must now proceed to enquire whether the Ramanuja system, which likewise claims to be Vedanta, and to be founded on the Vedanta-sutras, has any title to be considered an ancient system and the heir of a respectable tradition.

It appears that Ramanuja claims--and by Hindu writers is generally admitted--to follow in his bhashya the authority of Bodhayana, who had composed a v/ri/tti on the Sutras. Thus we read in the beginning of the /S/ri-bhashya (Pandit, New Series, VII, p. 163), 'Bhagavad-bodhayanak/ri/ta/m/ vistirna/m/ brahmasutra-v/ri/tti/m/ purva/k/arya/h/ sa/m/kikshipus tanmatanusare/n/a sutrakshara/n/i vyakhyasyante.' Whether the Bodhayana to whom that v/ri/tti is ascribed is to be identified with the author of the Kalpa-sutra, and other works, cannot at present be decided. But that an ancient v/ri/tti on the Sutras connected with Bodhayana's name actually existed, there is not any reason to doubt. Short quotations from it are met with in a few places of the /S/ri-bhashya, and, as we have seen above, /S/a@nkara's commentators state that their author's polemical remarks are directed against the V/ri/ttikara. In addition to Bodhayana, Ramanuja appeals to quite a series of ancient teachers--purva/k/aryas--who carried on the true tradition as to the teaching of the Vedanta and the meaning of the Sutras. In the Vedarthasa@ngraha--a work composed by Ramanuja himself--we meet in one place with the enumeration of the following authorities: Bodhayana, /T/a@nka, Drami/d/a, Guhadeva, Kapardin, Bharu/k/i, and quotations from the writings of some of these are not unfrequent in the Vedarthasa@ngraha, as well as the /S/ri-bhashya. The author most frequently quoted is Drami/d/a, who composed the Drami/d/a-bhashya; he is sometimes referred to as the bhashyakara. Another writer repeatedly quoted as the vakyakara is, I am told, to be identified with the /T/a@nka mentioned above. I refrain from inserting in this place the information concerning the relative age of these writers which may be derived from the oral tradition of the Ramanuja sect. From another source, however, we receive an intimation that Drami/d/a/k/arya or Dravi/d/a/k/arya preceded /S/a@nkara in point of time. In his /t/ika on /S/a@nkara's bhashya to the Chandogya Upanishad III, 10, 4, Anandagiri remarks that the attempt made by his author to reconcile the cosmological views of the Upanishad with the teaching of Sm/ri/ti on the same point is a reproduction of the analogous attempt made by the Dravi/d/a/k/arya.

It thus appears that that special interpretation of the Vedanta-sutras with which the /S/ri-bhashya makes us acquainted is not due to innovating views on the part of Ramanuja, but had authoritative representatives already at a period anterior to that of /S/a@nkara. This latter point, moreover, receives additional confirmation from the relation in which the so-called Ramanuja sect stands to earlier sects. What the exact position of Ramanuja was, and of what nature were the reforms that rendered him so prominent as to give his name to a new sect, is not exactly known at present; at the same time it is generally acknowledged that the Ramanujas are closely connected with the so-called Bhagavatas or Pa/nk/aratras, who are known to have existed already at a very early time. This latter point is proved by evidence of various kinds; for our present purpose it suffices to point to the fact that, according to the interpretation of the most authoritative commentators, the last Sutras of the second pada of the second adhyaya (Vedanta-sutras) refer to a distinctive tenet of the Bhagavatas--which tenet forms part of the Ramanuja system also--viz. that the highest being manifests itself in a fourfold form (vyuha) as Vasudeva,

Sa@nkarsha/n/a, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, those four forms being identical with the highest Self, the individual soul, the internal organ (manas), and the principle of egoity (aha@nkara). Whether those Sutras embody an approval of the tenet referred to, as Ramanuja maintains, or are meant to impugn it, as /S/a@nkara thinks; so much is certain that in the opinion of the best commentators the Bhagavatas, the direct forerunners of the Ramanujas, are mentioned in the Sutras themselves, and hence must not only have existed, but even reached a considerable degree of importance at the time when the Sutras were composed. And considering the general agreement of the systems of the earlier Bhagavatas and the later Ramanujas, we have a full right to suppose that the two sects were at one also in their mode of interpreting the Vedanta-sutras.

The preceding considerations suffice, I am inclined to think, to show that it will by no means be wasted labour to enquire how Ramanuja interprets the Sutras, and wherein he differs from /S/a@nkara. This in fact seems clearly to be the first step we have to take, if we wish to make an attempt at least of advancing beyond the interpretations of scholiasts to the meaning of the Sutras themselves. A full and exhaustive comparison of the views of the two commentators would indeed far exceed the limits of the space which can here be devoted to that task, and will, moreover, be made with greater ease and advantage when the complete Sanskrit text of the /S/ri-bhashya has been printed, and thus made available for general reference. But meanwhile it is possible, and--as said before--even urged upon a translator of the Sutras to compare the interpretations, given by the two bhashyakaras, of those Sutras, which, more than others, touch on the essential points of the Vedanta system. This will best be done in connexion with a succinct but full review of the topics discussed in the adhikara/n/as of the Vedanta-sutras, according to /S/a@nkara; a review which--apart from the side-glances at Ramanuja's comments--will be useful as a guide through the Sutras and the /S/a@nkara-bhashya. Before, however, entering on that task, I think it advisable to insert short sketches of the philosophical systems of /S/a@nkara as well as of Ramanuja, which may be referred to when, later on discrepancies between the two commentators will be noted. In these sketches I shall confine myself to the leading features, and not enter into any details. Of /S/a@nkara's system we possess as it is more than one trustworthy exposition; it may suffice to refer to Deussen's System of the Vedanta, in which the details of the entire system, as far as they can be learned from the Sutra-bhashya, are represented fully and faithfully, and to Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads which, principally in its second chapter, gives a lucid sketch of the /S/a@nkara Vedanta, founded on the Sutra-bhashya, the Upanishad bhashyas, and some later writers belonging to /S/a@nkara's school. With regard to Ramanuja's philosophy our chief source was, hitherto, the Ramanuja chapter in the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha; the short sketch about to be given is founded altogether on the /S/ri-bhashya itself.

What in /S/a@nkara's opinion the Upanishads teach, is shortly as follows.--Whatever is, is in reality one; there truly exists only one universal being called Brahman or Paramatman, the highest Self. This being is of an absolutely homogeneous nature; it is pure 'Being,' or, which comes to the same, pure intelligence or thought (/k/aitanya, j/n/ana). Intelligence or thought is not to be predicated of Brahman as its attribute, but constitutes its substance, Brahman is not a thinking being, but thought itself. It is absolutely destitute of qualities; whatever qualities or attributes are conceivable, can only be denied of it.--But, if nothing exists but one absolutely simple being, whence the appearance of the world by which we see ourselves surrounded, and, in which we ourselves exist as individual beings?--Brahman, the answer runs, is associated with a certain power called Maya or avidya to which the appearance of this entire world is due. This power cannot be called 'being' (sat), for 'being' is only Brahman; nor can it be called 'non-being' (asat) in the strict sense, for it at any rate produces the appearance of this world. It is in fact a principle of illusion; the undefinable cause owing to which there seems to exist a material world comprehending distinct individual existences. Being associated with this principle of illusion, Brahman is enabled to project the appearance of

the world, in the same way as a magician is enabled by his incomprehensible magical power to produce illusory appearances of animate and inanimate beings. Maya thus constitutes the upadana, the material cause of the world; or--if we wish to call attention to the circumstance that Maya belongs to Brahman as a /s/akti--we may say that the material cause of the world is Brahman in so far as it is associated with Maya. In this latter quality Brahman is more properly called I/s/vara, the Lord.

Maya, under the guidance of the Lord, modifies itself by a progressive evolution into all the individual existences (bheda), distinguished by special names and forms, of which the world consists; from it there spring in due succession the different material elements and the whole bodily apparatus belonging to sentient Beings. In all those apparently, individual forms of existence the one indivisible Brahman is present, but, owing to the particular adjuncts into which Maya has specialised itself, it appears to be broken up--it is broken up, as it were--into a multiplicity, of intellectual or sentient principles, the so-called jivas (individual or personal souls). What is real in each jiva is only the universal Brahman itself; the whole aggregate of individualising bodily organs and mental functions, which in our ordinary experience separate and distinguish one jiva from another, is the offspring of Maya and as such unreal.

The phenomenal world or world of ordinary experience (vyavahara) thus consists of a number of individual souls engaged in specific cognitions, volitions, and so on, and of the external material objects with which those cognitions and volitions are concerned. Neither the specific cognitions nor their objects are real in the true sense of the word, for both are altogether due to Maya. But at the same time we have to reject the idealistic doctrine of certain Bauddha schools according to which nothing whatever truly exists, but certain trains of cognitional acts or ideas to which no external objects correspond; for external things, although not real in the strict sense of the word, enjoy at any rate as much reality as the specific cognitional acts whose objects they are.

The non-enlightened soul is unable to look through and beyond Maya, which, like a veil, hides from it its true nature. Instead of recognising itself to be Brahman, it blindly identifies itself with its adjuncts (upadhi), the fictitious offspring of Maya, and thus looks for its true Self in the body, the sense organs, and the internal organ (manas), i.e. the organ of specific cognition. The soul, which in reality is pure intelligence, non-active, infinite, thus becomes limited in extent, as it were, limited in knowledge and power, an agent and enjoyer. Through its actions it burdens itself with merit and demerit, the consequences of which it has to bear or enjoy in series of future embodied existences, the Lord--as a retributor and dispenser--allotting to each soul that form of embodiment to which it is entitled by its previous actions. At the end of each of the great world periods called kalpas the Lord retracts the whole world, i.e. the whole material world is dissolved and merged into non-distinct Maya, while the individual souls, free for the time from actual connexion with upadhis, lie in deep slumber as it were. But as the consequences of their former deeds are not yet exhausted, they have again to enter on embodied existence as soon as the Lord sends forth a new material world, and the old round of birth, action, death begins anew to last to all eternity as it has lasted from all eternity.

The means of escaping from this endless sa/ms/ara, the way out of which can never be found by the non-enlightened soul, are furnished by the Veda. The karmaka/nd/a indeed, whose purport it is to enjoin certain actions, cannot lead to final release; for even the most meritorious works necessarily lead to new forms of embodied existence. And in the j/n/anaka/nd/a of the Veda also two different parts have to be distinguished, viz., firstly, those chapters and passages which treat of Brahman in so far as related to the world, and hence characterised by various attributes, i.e. of I/s/vara or the lower Brahman; and, secondly, those texts which set forth the nature of the highest Brahman transcending all qualities, and the fundamental identity of the

690 individual soul with that highest Brahman. Devout meditation on Brahman
691 as suggested by passages of the former kind does not directly lead to
692 final emancipation; the pious worshipper passes on his death into the
693 world of the lower Brahman only, where he continues to exist as a
694 distinct individual soul--although in the enjoyment of great power and
695 knowledge--until at last he reaches the highest knowledge, and, through
696 it, final release.--That student of the Veda, on the other hand, whose
697 soul has been enlightened by the texts embodying the higher knowledge of
698 Brahman, whom passages such as the great saying, 'That art thou,' have
699 taught that there is no difference between his true Self and the highest
700 Self, obtains at the moment of death immediate final release, i.e. he
701 withdraws altogether from the influence of Maya, and asserts himself in
702 his true nature, which is nothing else but the absolute highest Brahman.

703
704 Thus /S/a@nkara.--According to Ramanuja, on the other hand, the teaching
705 of the Upanishads has to be summarised as follows.--There exists only
706 one all-embracing being called Brahman or the highest Self of the Lord.
707 This being is not destitute of attributes, but rather endowed with all
708 imaginable auspicious qualities. It is not 'intelligence,'--as
709 /S/a@nkara maintains,--but intelligence is its chief attribute. The Lord
710 is all-pervading, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-merciful; his nature is
711 fundamentally antagonistic to all evil. He contains within himself
712 whatever exists. While, according to /S/a@nkara, the only reality is to
713 be found in the non-qualified homogeneous highest Brahman which can only
714 be defined as pure 'Being' or pure thought, all plurality being a mere
715 illusion; Brahman--according to Ramanuja's view--comprises within itself
716 distinct elements of plurality which all of them lay claim to absolute
717 reality of one and the same kind. Whatever is presented to us by
718 ordinary experience, viz. matter in all its various modifications and
719 the individual souls of different classes and degrees, are essential
720 real constituents of Brahman's nature. Matter and souls (a/k/it and
721 /k/it) constitute, according to Ramanuja's terminology, the body of the
722 Lord; they stand to him in the same relation of entire dependence and
723 subserviency in which the matter forming an animal or vegetable body
724 stands to its soul or animating principle. The Lord pervades and rules
725 all things which exist--material or immaterial--as their antaryamin; the
726 fundamental text for this special Ramanuja tenet--which in the writings
727 of the sect is quoted again and again--is the so-called antaryamin
728 brahma/n/a. (B/ri/. Up. III, 7) which says, that within all elements,
729 all sense organs, and, lastly, within all individual souls, there abides
730 an inward ruler whose body those elements, sense-organs, and individual
731 souls constitute.--Matter and souls as forming the body of the Lord are
732 also called modes of him (prakara). They are to be looked upon as his
733 effects, but they have enjoyed the kind of individual existence which is
734 theirs from all eternity, and will never be entirely resolved into
735 Brahman. They, however, exist in two different, periodically
736 alternating, conditions. At some times they exist in a subtle state in
737 which they do not possess those qualities by which they are ordinarily
738 known, and there is then no distinction of individual name and form.
739 Matter in that state is unevolved (avyakta); the individual souls are
740 not joined to material bodies, and their intelligence is in a state of
741 contraction, non-manifestation (sa@nko/k/a). This is the pralaya state
742 which recurs at the end of each kalpa, and Brahman is then said to be in
743 its causal condition (kara/n/avastha). To that state all those
744 scriptural passages refer which speak of Brahman or the Self as being in
745 the beginning one only, without a second. Brahman then is indeed not
746 absolutely one, for it contains within itself matter and souls in a
747 germinal condition; but as in that condition they are so subtle as not
748 to allow of individual distinctions being made, they are not counted as
749 something second in addition to Brahman.--When the pralaya state comes
750 to an end, creation takes place owing to an act of volition on the
751 Lord's part. Primary unevolved matter then passes over into its other
752 condition; it becomes gross and thus acquires all those sensible
753 attributes, visibility, tangibility, and so on, which are known from
754 ordinary experience. At the same time the souls enter into connexion
755 with material bodies corresponding to the degree of merit or demerit
756 acquired by them in previous forms of existence; their intelligence at
757 the same time undergoes a certain expansion (vika/s/a). The Lord,
758 together with matter in its gross state and the 'expanded' souls, is

Brahman in the condition of an effect (karyavastha). Cause and effect are thus at the bottom the same; for the effect is nothing but the cause which has undergone a certain change (pari/n/ama). Hence the cause being known, the effect is known likewise.

Owing to the effects of their former actions the individual souls are implicated in the sa/m/sara, the endless cycle of birth, action, and death, final escape from which is to be obtained only through the study of the j/n/anaka/nd/a of the Veda. Compliance with the injunctions of the karmaka/nd/a does not lead outside the sa/m/sara; but he who, assisted by the grace of the Lord, cognizes--and meditates on--him in the way prescribed by the Upanishads reaches at his death final emancipation, i.e. he passes through the different stages of the path of the gods up to the world of Brahman and there enjoys an everlasting blissful existence from which there is no return into the sphere of transmigration. The characteristics of the released soul are similar to those of Brahman; it participates in all the latter's glorious qualities and powers, excepting only Brahman's power to emit, rule, and retract the entire world.

The chief points in which the two systems sketched above agree on the one hand and diverge on the other may be shortly stated as follows.--Both systems teach advaita, i.e. non-duality or monism. There exist not several fundamentally distinct principles, such as the prak/r/iti and the purushas of the Sa@nkhyas, but there exists only one all-embracing being. While, however, the advaita taught by /S/a@nkara is a rigorous, absolute one, Ramanuja's doctrine has to be characterised as visish/t/a advaita, i.e. qualified non-duality, non-duality with a difference. According to Sankara, whatever is, is Brahman, and Brahman itself is absolutely homogeneous, so that all difference and plurality must be illusory. According to Ramanuja also, whatever is, is Brahman; but Brahman is not of a homogeneous nature, but contains within itself elements of plurality owing to which it truly manifests itself in a diversified world. The world with its variety of material forms of existence and individual souls is not unreal Maya, but a real part of Brahman's nature, the body investing the universal Self. The Brahman of /S/a@nkara is in itself impersonal, a homogeneous mass of objectless thought, transcending all attributes; a personal God it becomes only through its association with the unreal principle of Maya, so that--strictly speaking--/S/a@nkara's personal God, his I/s/vara, is himself something unreal. Ramanuja's Brahman, on the other hand, is essentially a personal God, the all-powerful and all-wise ruler of a real world permeated and animated by his spirit. There is thus no room for the distinction between a param nirgu/n/am and an apara/m/ sagu/n/am brahma, between Brahman and I/s/vara.--/S/a@nkara's individual soul is Brahman in so far as limited by the unreal upadhis due to Maya. The individual soul of Ramanuja, on the other hand, is really individual; it has indeed sprung from Brahman and is never outside Brahman, but nevertheless it enjoys a separate personal existence and will remain a personality for ever--The release from sa/m/sara means, according to /S/a@nkara, the absolute merging of the individual soul in Brahman, due to the dismissal of the erroneous notion that the soul is distinct from Brahman; according to Ramanuja it only means the soul's passing from the troubles of earthly life into a kind of heaven or paradise where it will remain for ever in undisturbed personal bliss.--As Ramanuja does not distinguish a higher and lower Brahman, the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge is likewise not valid for him; the teaching of the Upanishads is not twofold but essentially one, and leads the enlightened devotee to one result only [1].

I now proceed to give a conspectus of the contents of the Vedanta-sutras according to /S/a@nkara in which at the same time all the more important points concerning which Ramanuja disagrees will be noted. We shall here have to enter into details which to many may appear tedious. But it is only on a broad substratum of accurately stated details that we can hope to establish any definite conclusions regarding the comparative value of the different modes of interpretation which have been applied to the Sutras. The line of investigation is an entirely new one, and for the present nothing can be taken for granted or known.--In stating the

different heads of discussion (the so-called adhikara/n/as), each of which comprises one or more Sutras, I shall follow the subdivision into adhikara/n/as adopted in the Vyasadhikara-ra/n/amala, the text of which is printed in the second volume of the Bibliotheca Indica edition of the Sutras.

FIRST ADHYAYA.

PADA I.

The first five adhikara/n/as lay down the fundamental positions with regard to Brahman. Adhik. I (1) [2] treats of what the study of the Vedanta presupposes. Adhik. II (2) defines Brahman as that whence the world originates, and so on. Adhik. III (3) declares that Brahman is the source of the Veda. Adhik. IV (4) proves Brahman to be the uniform topic of all Vedanta-texts. Adhik. V (5-11) is engaged in proving by various arguments that the Brahman, which the Vedanta-texts represent as the cause of the world, is an intelligent principle, and cannot be identified with the non-intelligent pradhana from which the world springs according to the Sa@nkhyas.

With the next adhikara/n/a there begins a series of discussions of essentially similar character, extending up to the end of the first adhyaya. The question is throughout whether certain terms met with in the Upanishads denote Brahman or some other being, in most cases the jiva, the individual soul. /S/a@nkara remarks at the outset that, as the preceding ten Sutras had settled the all-important point that all the Vedanta-texts refer to Brahman, the question now arises why the enquiry should be continued any further, and thereupon proceeds to explain that the acknowledged distinction of a higher Brahman devoid of all qualities and a lower Brahman characterised by qualities necessitates an investigation whether certain Vedic texts of prima facie doubtful import set forth the lower Brahman as the object of devout meditation, or the higher Brahman as the object of true knowledge. But that such an investigation is actually carried on in the remaining portion of the first adhyaya, appears neither from the wording of the Sutras nor even from /S/a@nkara's own treatment of the Vedic texts referred to in the Sutras. In I, 1, 20, for instance, the question is raised whether the golden man within the sphere of the sun, with golden hair and beard and lotus-coloured eyes--of whom the Chandogya Upanishad speaks in 1, 6, 6--is an individual soul abiding within the sun or the highest Lord. /S/a@nkara's answer is that the passage refers to the Lord, who, for the gratification of his worshippers, manifests himself in a bodily shape made of Maya. So that according to /S/a@nkara himself the alternative lies between the sagu/n/a Brahman and some particular individual soul, not between the sagu/n/a Brahman and the nirgu/n/a Brahman.

Adhik. VI (12-19) raises the question whether the anandamaya, mentioned in Taittiriya Upanishad II, 5, is merely a transmigrating individual soul or the highest Self. /S/a@nkara begins by explaining the Sutras on the latter supposition--and the text of the Sutras is certainly in favour of that interpretation--gives, however, finally the preference to a different and exceedingly forced explanation according to which the Sutras teach that the anandamaya is not Brahman, since the Upanishad expressly says that Brahman is the tail or support of the anandamaya[3].--Ramanuja's interpretation of Adhikara/n/a VI, although not agreeing in all particulars with the former explanation of /S/a@nkara, yet is at one with it in the chief point, viz. that the anandamaya is Brahman. It further deserves notice that, while /S/a@nkara looks on Adhik. VI as the first of a series of interpretatory discussions, all of which treat the question whether certain Vedic passages refer to Brahman or not, Ramanuja separates the adhikara/n/a from the subsequent part of the pada and connects it with what had preceded. In Adhik. V it had been shown that Brahman cannot be identified with the pradhana; Adhik. VI shows that it is different from the individual soul, and the proof of the fundamental position of the system is thereby completed[4].--Adhik. VII (20, 21) demonstrates that the golden person seen within the sun and the person seen within the

eye, mentioned in Ch. Up. I, 6, are not some individual soul of high eminence, but the supreme Brahman.--Adhik. VIII (22) teaches that by the ether from which, according to Ch. Up. I, 9, all beings originate, not the elemental ether has to be understood but the highest Brahman.--Adhik. IX (23). The pra/n/a also mentioned in Ch. Up. I, ii, 5 denotes the highest Brahman[5]--Adhik. X (24-27) teaches that the light spoken of in Ch. Up. III, 13, 7 is not the ordinary physical light but the highest Brahman[6].--Adhik. XI (28-31) decides that the pra/n/a mentioned in Kau. Up. III, 2 is Brahman.

PADA II.

Adhik. I (1-8) shows that the being which consists of mind, whose body is breath, &c., mentioned in Ch. Up. III, 14, is not the individual soul, but Brahman. The Sutras of this adhikara/n/a emphatically dwell on the difference of the individual soul and the highest Self, whence /S/a@nkara is obliged to add an explanation--in his comment on Sutra 6--to the effect that that difference is to be understood as not real, but as due to the false limiting adjuncts of the highest Self.--The comment of Ramanuja throughout closely follows the words of the Sutras; on Sutra 6 it simply remarks that the difference of the highest Self from the individual soul rests thereon that the former as free from all evil is not subject to the effects of works in the same way as the soul is [7].--Adhik. II (9, 10) decides that he to whom the Brahmins and Kshattriyas are but food (Ka/th/a. Up. I, 2, 25) is the highest Self.--Adhik. III (11, 12) shows that the two entered into the cave (Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 1) are Brahman and the individual soul[8].--Adhik. IV (13-17) shows that the person within the eye mentioned in Ch. Up. IV, 15, 1 is Brahman.--Adhik. V (18-20) shows that the ruler within (antaraymin) described in B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 3 is Brahman. Sutra 20 clearly enounces the difference of the individual soul and the Lord; hence /S/a@nkara is obliged to remark that that difference is not real.--Adhik. VI (21-23) proves that that which cannot be seen, &c, mentioned in Mu/nd/aka Up. I, 1, 3 is Brahman.--Adhik. VII (24-32) shows that the atman vai/s/vanara of Ch. Up. V, 11, 6 is Brahman.

PADA III.

Adhik. I (1-7) proves that that within which the heaven, the earth, &c. are woven (Mu/nd/. Up. II, 2, 5) is Brahman.--Adhik. II (8, 9) shows that the bhuman referred to in Ch. Up. VII, 23 is Brahman.--Adhik. III (10-12) teaches that the Imperishable in which, according to B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8, the ether is woven is Brahman.--Adhik. IV (13) decides that the highest person who is to be meditated upon with the syllable Om, according to Pra/s/na Up. V, 5, is not the lower but the higher Brahman.--According to Ramanuja the two alternatives are Brahman and Brahma (jivasamash/t/irupoz/nd/adhipatis /k/aturmukha/h/).--Adhik. V and VI (comprising, according to /S/a@nkara, Sutras 14-21) discuss the question whether the small ether within the lotus of the heart mentioned in Ch. Up. VIII, 1 is the elemental ether or the individual soul or Brahman; the last alternative being finally adopted. In favour of the second alternative the purvapakshin pleads the two passages Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 4 and VIII, 12, 3, about the serene being (samprasada); for by the latter the individual soul only can be understood, and in the chapter, of which the latter passage forms part, there are ascribed to it the same qualities (viz. freeness from sin, old age, death, &c.) that were predicated in VIII, 1, of the small ether within the heart.--But the reply to this is, that the second passage refers not to the (ordinary) individual soul but to the soul in that state where its true nature has become manifest, i.e. in which it is Brahman; so that the subject of the passage is in reality not the so-called individual soul but Brahman. And in the former of the two passages the soul is mentioned not on its own account, but merely for the purpose of intimating that the highest Self is the cause through which the individual soul manifests itself in its true nature.--What Ramanuja understands by the

966 avirbhava of the soul will appear from the remarks on IV, 4.
967
968 The two next Sutras (22, 23) constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, a new
969 adhikara/n/a (VII), proving that he 'after whom everything shines, by
970 whose light all this is lighted' (Ka/th/a Up. II, 5, 15) is not some
971 material luminous body, but Brahman itself.--According to Ramanuja the
972 two Sutras do not start a new topic, but merely furnish some further
973 arguments strengthening the conclusion arrived at in the preceding
974 Sutras.[9]
975
976 Adhik. VIII (24, 25) decides that the person of the size of a thumb
977 mentioned in Ka/th/a Up. II, 4, 12 is not the individual soul but
978 Brahman.
979
980 The two next adhikara/n/as are of the nature of a digression. The
981 passage about the a@ngush/th/amatra was explained on the ground that the
982 human heart is of the size of a span; the question may then be asked
983 whether also such individuals as belong to other classes than mankind,
984 more particularly the Gods, are capable of the knowledge of Brahman: a
985 question finally answered in the affirmative.--This discussion leads in
986 its turn to several other digressions, among which the most important
987 one refers to the problem in what relation the different species of
988 beings stand to the words denoting them (Sutra 28). In connexion
989 herewith /S/a@nkara treats of the nature of words (/s/abda), opposing
990 the opinion of the Mima/m/saka Upavarsha, according to whom the word is
991 nothing but the aggregate of its constitutive letters, to the view of
992 the grammarians who teach that over and above the aggregate of the
993 letters there exists a super-sensuous entity called 'spho/t/a,' which is
994 the direct cause of the apprehension of the sense of a word (Adhik. IX;
995 Sutras 26-33).
996
997 Adhik. X (34-38) explains that /S/udras are altogether disqualified for
998 Brahavidya.
999
1000 Sutra 39 constitutes, according to /S/a@nkara, a new adhikara/n/a (XI),
1001 proving that the pra/n/a in which everything trembles, according to
1002 /K/a/th/a Up. II, 6, 2, is Brahman.--According to Ramanuja the Sutra
1003 does not introduce a new topic but merely furnishes an additional reason
1004 for the decision arrived at under Sutras 24, 25, viz. that the
1005 a@ngus/th/amatra is Brahman. On this supposition, Sutras 24-39 form one
1006 adhikara/n/a in which 26-38 constitute a mere digression led up to by
1007 the mention made of the heart in 25.--The a@ngus/th/matra is referred to
1008 twice in the Ka/th/a Upanishad, once in the passage discussed (II, 4,
1009 12), and once in II, 6, 17 ('the Person not larger than a thumb'). To
1010 determine what is meant by the a@ngus/th/matra, Ramanuja says, we are
1011 enabled by the passage II, 6, 2, 3, which is intermediate between the
1012 two passages concerning the a@ngus/th/matra, and which clearly refers to
1013 the highest Brahman, of which alone everything can be said to stand in
1014 awe.
1015
1016 The next Sutra (40) gives rise to a similar difference of opinion.
1017 According to /S/a@nkara it constitutes by itself a new adhikara/n/a
1018 (XII), proving that the 'light' (jyotis) mentioned in Ch. Up. VIII, 12,
1019 3 is the highest Brahman.--According to Ramanuja the Sutra continues the
1020 preceding adhikara/n/a, and strengthens the conclusion arrived at by a
1021 further argument, referring to Ka/th/a Up. II, 5, 15--a passage
1022 intermediate between the two passages about the a@ngush/th/amatra--which
1023 speaks of a primary light that cannot mean anything but Brahman. The
1024 Sutra has in that case to be translated as follows: '(The
1025 a@ngush/th/amatra is Brahman) because (in a passage intervening between
1026 the two) a light is seen to be mentioned (which can be Brahman only).'

1027
1028 The three last Sutras of the pada are, according to /S/a@nkara, to be
1029 divided into two adhikara/n/as (XIII and XIV), Sutra 41 deciding that
1030 the ether which reveals names and forms (Ch. Up. VIII, 14) is not the
1031 elemental ether but Brahman; and 42, 43 teaching that the vij/n/anamaya,
1032 'he who consists of knowledge,' of B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 7 is not the
1033 individual soul but Brahman.--According to Ramanuja the three Sutras
1034 make up one single adhikara/n/a discussing whether the Chandogya

1035 Upanishad passage about the ether refers to Brahman or to the individual
1036 soul in the state of release; the latter of these two alternatives being
1037 suggested by the circumstance that the released soul is the subject of
1038 the passage immediately preceding ('Shaking off all evil as a horse
1039 shakes off his hair,' &c.). Sutra 41 decides that 'the ether (is
1040 Brahman) because the passage designates the nature of something else,'
1041 &c. (i.e. of something other than the individual soul; other because to
1042 the soul the revealing of names and forms cannot be ascribed, &c.)--But,
1043 an objection is raised, does not more than one scriptural passage show
1044 that the released soul and Brahman are identical, and is not therefore
1045 the ether which reveals names and forms the soul as well as
1046 Brahman?--(The two, Sutra 42 replies, are different) 'because in the
1047 states of deep sleep and departing (the highest Self) is designated as
1048 different' (from the soul)--which point is proved by the same scriptural
1049 passages which /S/a@nkara adduces;--and 'because such terms as Lord and
1050 the like' cannot be applied to the individual soul (43). Reference is
1051 made to IV, 4, 14, where all jagadvyapara is said to belong to the Lord
1052 only, not to the soul even when in the state of release.

1053
1054
1055 PADA IV.

1056
1057
1058 The last pada of the first adhyaya is specially directed against the
1059 Sa@nkhyas.

1060
1061 The first adhikara/n/a (1-7) discusses the passage Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 10;
1062 11, where mention is made of the Great and the Undeveloped--both of them
1063 terms used with a special technical sense in the Sa@nkhya-/s/astra,
1064 avyakta being a synonym for pradhana.--/S/a@nkara shows by an exhaustive
1065 review of the topics of the Ka/th/a Upanishad that the term avyakta has
1066 not the special meaning which the Sa@nkhyas attribute to it, but denotes
1067 the body, more strictly the subtle body (sukshma /s/arira), but at the
1068 same time the gross body also, in so far as it is viewed as an effect of
1069 the subtle one.

1070
1071 Adhik. II (8-10) demonstrates, according to /S/a@nkara, that the
1072 tricoloured aja spoken of in /S/ve. Up. IV, 5 is not the pradhana of the
1073 Sankhyas, but either that power of the Lord from which the world
1074 springs, or else the primary causal matter first produced by that
1075 power.--What Ramanuja in contradistinction from /S/a@nkara understands
1076 by the primary causal matter, follows from the short sketch given above
1077 of the two systems.

1078
1079 Adhik. III (11-13) shows that the pa/nk/a pa/nk/ajana/h/ mentioned in
1080 B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 17 are not the twenty-five principles of the
1081 Sa@nkhyas.--Adhik. IV (14, 15) proves that Scripture does not contradict
1082 itself on the all-important point of Brahman, i.e. a being whose essence
1083 is intelligence, being the cause of the world.

1084
1085 Adhik. V (16-18) is, according to /S/a@nkara, meant to prove that 'he
1086 who is the maker of those persons, of whom this is the work,' mentioned
1087 in Kau. Up. IV, 19, is not either the vital air or the individual soul,
1088 but Brahman.--The subject of the adhikara/n/a is essentially the same in
1089 Ramanuja's view; greater stress is, however, laid on the adhikara/n/a
1090 being polemical against the Sa@nkhyas, who wish to turn the passage into
1091 an argument for the pradhana doctrine.

1092
1093 The same partial difference of view is observable with regard to the
1094 next adhikara/n/a (VI; Sutras 19-22) which decides that the 'Self to be
1095 seen, to be heard,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5) is the highest Self, not
1096 the individual soul. This latter passage also is, according to Ramanuja,
1097 made the subject of discussion in order to rebut the Sa@nkhya who is
1098 anxious to prove that what is there inculcated as the object of
1099 knowledge is not a universal Self but merely the Sa@nkhya purusha.

1100
1101 Adhik. VII (23-27) teaches that Brahman is not only the efficient or
1102 operative cause (nimitta) of the world, but its material cause as well.
1103 The world springs from Brahman by way of modification (pari/n/ama; Sutra

1104 26).--Ramanuja views this adhikara/n/a as specially directed against the
1105 Se/s/vara-sa@nkhyas who indeed admit the existence of a highest Lord,
1106 but postulate in addition an independent pradhana on which the Lord acts
1107 as an operative cause merely.

1108
1109 Adhik. VIII (28) remarks that the refutation of the Sa@nkhyas views is
1110 applicable to other theories also, such as the doctrine of the world
1111 having originated from atoms.

1112
1113 After this rapid survey of the contents of the first adhyaya and the
1114 succinct indication of the most important points in which the views of
1115 /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja diverge, we turn to a short consideration of two
1116 questions which here naturally present themselves, viz., firstly, which
1117 is the principle on which the Vedic passages referred to in the Sutras
1118 have been selected and arranged; and, secondly, if, where /S/a@nkara and
1119 Ramanuja disagree as to the subdivision of the Sutras into
1120 Adhikara/n/as, and the determination of the Vedic passages discussed in
1121 the Sutras, there are to be met with any indications enabling us to
1122 determine which of the two commentators is right. (The more general
1123 question as to how far the Sutras favour either /S/a@nkara's or
1124 Ramanuja's general views cannot be considered at present.)

1125
1126 The Hindu commentators here and there attempt to point out the reason
1127 why the discussion of a certain Vedic passage is immediately followed by
1128 the consideration of a certain other one. Their explanations--which have
1129 occasionally been referred to in the notes to the translation--rest on
1130 the assumption that the Sutrakara in arranging the texts to be commented
1131 upon was guided by technicalities of the Mima/m/sa-system, especially by
1132 a regard for the various so-called means of proof which the Mima/m/saka
1133 employs for the purpose of determining the proper meaning and position
1134 of scriptural passages. But that this was the guiding principle, is
1135 rendered altogether improbable by a simple tabular statement of the
1136 Vedic passages referred to in the first adhyaya, such as given by
1137 Deussen on page 130; for from the latter it appears that the order in
1138 which the Sutras exhibit the scriptural passages follows the order in
1139 which those passages themselves occur in the Upanishads, and it would
1140 certainly be a most strange coincidence if that order enabled us at the
1141 same time to exemplify the various prama/n/as of the Mima/m/sa in their
1142 due systematic succession.

1143
1144 As Deussen's statement shows, most of the passages discussed are taken
1145 from the Chandogya Upanishad, so many indeed that the whole first
1146 adhyaya may be said to consist of a discussion of all those Chandogya
1147 passages of which it is doubtful whether they are concerned with Brahman
1148 or not, passages from the other Upanishads being brought in wherever an
1149 opportunity offers. Considering the prominent position assigned to the
1150 Upanishad mentioned, I think it likely that the Sutrakara meant to begin
1151 the series of doubtful texts with the first doubtful passage from the
1152 Chandogya, and that hence the sixth adhikara/n/a which treats of the
1153 anandamaya mentioned in the Taittiriya Upanishad has, in agreement with
1154 Ramanuja's views, to be separated from the subsequent adhikara/n/as, and
1155 to be combined with the preceding ones whose task it is to lay down the
1156 fundamental propositions regarding Brahman's nature.--The remaining
1157 adhikara/n/as of the first pada follow the order of passages in the
1158 Chandogya Upanishad, and therefore call for no remark; with the
1159 exception of the last adhikara/n/a, which refers to a Kaushitaki
1160 passage, for whose being introduced in this place I am not able to
1161 account.--The first adhikara/n/a of the second pada returns to the
1162 Chandogya Upanishad. The second one treats of a passage in the Ka/th/a
1163 Upanishad where a being is referred to which eats everything. The reason
1164 why that passage is introduced in this place seems to be correctly
1165 assigned in the /S/ri-bhashya, which remarks that, as in the preceding
1166 Sutra it had been argued that the highest Self is not an enjoyer, a
1167 doubt arises whether by that being which eats everything the highest
1168 Self can be meant[10]--The third adhikara/n/a again, whose topic is the
1169 'two entered into the cave' (Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 1), appears, as Ramanuja
1170 remarks, to come in at this place owing to the preceding adhikara/n/a;
1171 for if it could not be proved that one of the two is the highest Self, a
1172 doubt would attach to the explanation given above of the 'eater' since

1173 the 'two entered into the cave,' and the 'eater' stand under the same
 1174 prakara/n/a, and must therefore be held to refer to the same
 1175 matter.--The fourth adhikara/n/a is again occupied with a Chandogya
 1176 passage.--The fifth adhikara/n/a, whose topic is the Ruler within
 1177 (antaryamin), manifestly owes its place, as remarked by Ramanuja also,
 1178 to the fact that the Vedic passage treated had been employed in the
 1179 preceding adhikara/n/a (I, 2, 14) for the purpose of strengthening the
 1180 argument [11].--The sixth adhikara/n/a, again, which discusses 'that
 1181 which is not seen' (adre/s/ya; Mu/nd/. Up. I, 1, 6), is clearly
 1182 introduced in this place because in the preceding adhikara/n/a it had
 1183 been said that ad/ri/sh/t/a, &c. denote the highest Self;--The reasons
 1184 to which the last adhikara/n/a of the second pada and the first and
 1185 third adhikara/n/as of the third pada owe their places are not apparent
 1186 (the second adhikara/n/a of the third pada treats of a Chandogya
 1187 passage). The introduction, on the other hand, of the passage from the
 1188 Pra/s/na Upanishad treating of the akshara. O/m/kara is clearly due to
 1189 the circumstance that an akshara, of a different nature, had been
 1190 discussed in the preceding adhikara/n/a.--The fifth and sixth
 1191 adhikara/n/as investigate Chandogya passages.--The two next Sutras (22,
 1192 23) are, as remarked above, considered by /S/a@nkara to constitute a new
 1193 adhikara/n/a treating of the 'being after which everything shines'
 1194 (Mu/nd/. Up. II, 2, 10); while Ramanuja looks on them as continuing the
 1195 sixth adhikara/n/a. There is one circumstance which renders it at any
 1196 rate probable that Ramanuja, and not /S/a@nkara, here hits the intention
 1197 of the author of the Sutras. The general rule in the first three padas
 1198 is that, wherever a new Vedic passage is meant to be introduced, the
 1199 subject of the discussion, i.e. that being which in the end is declared
 1200 to be Brahman is referred to by means of a special word, in most cases a
 1201 nominative form [12]. From this rule there is in the preceding part of
 1202 the adhyaya only one real exception, viz. in I, 2, 1, which possibly may
 1203 be due to the fact that there a new pada begins, and it therefore was
 1204 considered superfluous to indicate the introduction of a new topic by a
 1205 special word. The exception supplied by I, 3, 19 is only an apparent
 1206 one; for, as remarked above, Sutra 19 does not in reality begin a new
 1207 adhikara/n/a. A few exceptions occurring later on will be noticed in
 1208 their places.--Now neither Sutra 22 nor Sutra 23 contains any word
 1209 intimating that a new Vedic passage is being taken into consideration,
 1210 and hence it appears preferable to look upon them, with Ramanuja, as
 1211 continuing the topic of the preceding adhikara/n/a.--This conclusion
 1212 receives an additional confirmation from the position of the next
 1213 adhikara/n/a, which treats of the being 'a span long' mentioned in
 1214 Ka/th/a Up. II, 4, 12; for the reason of this latter passage being
 1215 considered here is almost certainly the reference to the alpa/s/ruti in
 1216 Sutra 21, and, if so, the a@ngush/th/amatra properly constitutes the
 1217 subject of the adhikara/n/a immediately following on Adhik. V, VI;
 1218 which, in its turn, implies that Sutras 22, 23 do not form an
 1219 independent adhikara/n/a.--The two next adhikara/n/as are digressions,
 1220 and do not refer to special Vedic passages.--Sutra 39 forms a new
 1221 adhikara/n/a, according to /S/a@nkara, but not according to Ramanuja,
 1222 whose opinion seems again to be countenanced by the fact that the Sutra
 1223 does not exhibit any word indicative of a new topic. The same difference
 1224 of opinion prevails with regard to Sutra 40, and it appears from the
 1225 translation of the Sutra given above, according to Ramanuja's view, that
 1226 'jyoti/h/' need not be taken as a nominative.--The last two
 1227 adhikara/n/as finally refer, according to Ramanuja, to one Chandogya
 1228 passage only, and here also we have to notice that Sutra 42 does not
 1229 comprise any word intimating that a new passage is about to be
 1230 discussed.

1231
 1232 From all this we seem entitled to draw the following conclusions. The
 1233 Vedic passages discussed in the three first padas of the Vedanta-sutras
 1234 comprise all the doubtful--or at any rate all the more important
 1235 doubtful--passages from the Chandogya Upanishad. These passages are
 1236 arranged in the order in which the text of the Upanishad exhibits them.
 1237 Passages from other Upanishads are discussed as opportunities offer,
 1238 there being always a special reason why a certain Chandogya passage is
 1239 followed by a certain passage from some other Upanishad. Those reasons
 1240 can be assigned with sufficient certainty in a number of cases although
 1241 not in all, and from among those passages whose introduction cannot be

satisfactorily accounted for some are eliminated by our following the subdivision of the Sutras into adhikara/n/as adopted by Ramanuja, a subdivision countenanced by the external form of the Sutras.

The fourth pada of the first adhyaya has to be taken by itself. It is directed specially and avowedly against Sa@nkhyas-interpretations of Scripture, not only in its earlier part which discusses isolated passages, but also--as is brought out much more clearly in the /S/ri-bhashya than by /S/a@nkara--in its latter part which takes a general survey of the entire scriptural evidence for Brahman being the material as well as the operative cause of the world.

Deussen (p. 221) thinks that the selection made by the Sutrakara of Vedic passages setting forth the nature of Brahman is not in all cases an altogether happy one. But this reproach rests on the assumption that the passages referred to in the first adhyaya were chosen for the purpose of throwing light on what Brahman is, and this assumption can hardly be upheld. The Vedanta-sutras as well as the Purva Mima/m/sa-sutras are throughout Mima/m/sa i.e. critical discussions of such scriptural passages as on a prima facie view admit of different interpretations and therefore necessitate a careful enquiry into their meaning. Here and there we meet with Sutras which do not directly involve a discussion of the sense of some particular Vedic passage, but rather make a mere statement on some important point. But those cases are rare, and it would be altogether contrary to the general spirit of the Sutras to assume that a whole adhyaya should be devoted to the task of showing what Brahman is. The latter point is sufficiently determined in the first five (or six) adhikara/n/as; but after we once know what Brahman is we are at once confronted by a number of Upanishad passages concerning which it is doubtful whether they refer to Brahman or not. With their discussion all the remaining adhikara/n/as of the first adhyaya are occupied. That the Vedanta-sutras view it as a particularly important task to controvert the doctrine of the Sa@nkhyas is patent (and has also been fully pointed out by Deussen, p. 23). The fifth adhikara/n/a already declares itself against the doctrine that the world has sprung from a non-intelligent principle, the pradhana, and the fourth pada of the first adhyaya returns to an express polemic against Sa@nkhyas interpretations of certain Vedic statements. It is therefore perhaps not saying too much if we maintain that the entire first adhyaya is due to the wish, on the part of the Sutrakara, to guard his own doctrine against Sa@nkhyas attacks. Whatever the attitude of the other so-called orthodox systems may be towards the Veda, the Sa@nkhyas system is the only one whose adherents were anxious--and actually attempted--to prove that their views are warranted by scriptural passages. The Sa@nkhyas tendency thus would be to show that all those Vedic texts which the Vedantin claims as teaching the existence of Brahman, the intelligent and sole cause of the world, refer either to the pradhana or some product of the pradhana, or else to the purusha in the Sankhya sense, i.e. the individual soul. It consequently became the task of the Vedantin to guard the Upanishads against misinterpretations of the kind, and this he did in the first adhyaya of the Vedanta-sutras, selecting those passages about whose interpretation doubts were, for some reason or other, likely to arise. Some of the passages singled out are certainly obscure, and hence liable to various interpretations; of others it is less apparent why it was thought requisite to discuss them at length. But this is hardly a matter in which we are entitled to find fault with the Sutrakara; for no modern scholar, either European or Hindu, is--or can possibly be--sufficiently at home, on the one hand, in the religious and philosophical views which prevailed at the time when the Sutras may have been composed, and, on the other hand, in the intricacies of the Mima/m/sa, to judge with confidence which Vedic passages may give rise to discussions and which not.

Notes:

[Footnote 1: The only 'sectarian' feature of the Sri-bhashya is, that identifies Brahman with Vish/n/u or Naraya/n/a; but this in no way affects the interpretations put on the Sutras and Upanishads. Naraya/n/a is in fact nothing but another name of Brahman.]

1311
1312 [Footnote 2: The Roman numerals indicate the number of the adhikara/n/a;
1313 the figures in parentheses state the Sutras comprised in each
1314 adhikara/n/a.]
1315
1316 [Footnote 3: Deussen's supposition (pp. 30, 150) that the passage
1317 conveying the second interpretation is an interpolation is liable to two
1318 objections. In the first place, the passage is accepted and explained by
1319 all commentators; in the second place, /S/a@nkara in the passage
1320 immediately preceding Sutra 12 quotes the adhikara/n/a 'anandamayo s
1321 bhyasat' as giving rise to a discussion whether the param or the aparam
1322 brahman is meant. Now this latter point is not touched upon at all in
1323 that part of the bhashya which sets forth the former explanation, but
1324 only in the subsequent passage, which refutes the former and advocates
1325 the latter interpretation.]
1326
1327 [Footnote 4: Eva/m/ jij/n/anasya brahma/nas/
1328 /ko/tanabhogvabhutaga/d/arupsattvara, istamomayapradhanad vyav/ri/ttir
1329 ukta, idani/m/ karmava/s/vat trigu/n/atmakaprik/ri/u
1330 sa/m/sangammittanamavidhan intadukhasagaranimajjaoni/s/addha/h/. /k/i
1331 pratya gaumano nyan nikhilaheyapratauka/m/ miatimyanandam brahmeti
1332 pratipadyate, anandamayo bhyasat.]
1333
1334 [Footnote 5: There is no reason to consider the passage 'atra ke/k/it'
1335 in /S/a@nkara's bhashya on Sutra 23 an interpolation as Deussen does (p.
1336 30). It simply contains a criticism passed by /S/a@nkara on other
1337 commentators.]
1338
1339 [Footnote 6: To the passages on pp. 150 and 153 of the Sanskrit text,
1340 which Deussen thinks to be interpolations, there likewise applies the
1341 remark made in the preceding note.]
1342
1343 [Footnote 7: Givaysa iva parasyapi brahma/n/a/h/ /s/arirantarvaititvam
1344 abhyupagata/m/ /k/et tadvad eva
1345 /s/arirasaibandhaprayuktasukhadukhopabhogapraprtir hi /k/en na,
1346 hetuvai/s/eshyat, na hi /s/arirantarvartitvam eva
1347 sukhadukhopabhogahetu/h/ api tu pu/n/yapaparnpakarmaparavasatva/m/ ta/k/
1348 /K/apahatapapmana/h/ parahatmano na sambhavati.]
1349
1350 [Footnote 8: The second interpretation given on pp. 184-5 of the
1351 Sanskrit text (beginning with apara aha) Deussen considers to be an
1352 interpolation, caused by the reference to the Paingi upanishad in
1353 /S/a@nkara's comment on I, 3, 7 (p. 232). But there is no reason
1354 whatsoever for such an assumption. The passage on p. 232 shows that
1355 /S/a@nkara considered the explanation of the mantra given in the
1356 Paingi-upanishad worth quoting, and is in fact fully intelligible only
1357 in case of its having been quoted before by /S/a@nkara himself.--That
1358 the 'apara' quotes the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka not according to the Ka/n/va
1359 text--to quote from which is /S/a@nkara's habit--but from the
1360 Madhyandina text, is due just to the circumstance of his being an
1361 'apara,' i.e. not /S/a@nkara.]
1362
1363 [Footnote 9: Ita/s/ /k/aitad evam. Anuk/ri/tes tasya /k/a. Tasya
1364 daharakasasya parabrahma/n/o snukarad ayam apahatapapmatvadigu/n/ako
1365 vimuktabandha/h/ pratyagatma na daharaka/s/a/h/ tadanukaras tatsamya/m/
1366 tatha hi pratyagalmanozpi vimuktasya parabrahmanukara/h/ srutyate yada
1367 pa/s/ya/h/ pa/s/yate rukmavar/n/a/m/ kartaram i/s/a/m/ purusha/m/
1368 brahmayoni/m/ tada vidvan pu/n/yapape vidhuya nira/ng/ana/h/ parama/m/
1369 samyam upaitity atos'nukarta prajapativakyanirdish/t/a/h/ anukarya/m/
1370 para/m/ brahma na daharaka/s/a/h/. Api /k/a smaryate. Sa/m/sari/n/oszpi
1371 muktavasthaya/m/ paramasamyapattilaksha/n/a/h/ parabrahmanukara/h/
1372 smaryate ida/m/ j/n/anam upasritya, &c.--Ke/k/id anuk/ri/tes tasya
1373 /k/api smaryate iti /k/a sutradvayam adhikara/n/antara/m/ tam eva
1374 bhantam anubhati sarva/m/ tasya bhasa sarvam ida/m/ vibhatity asya/h/
1375 /s/rute/h/ parabrahmaparatvanir/n/ayaya prav/ri/tta/m/ vadanti. Tat tv
1376 ad/ris/yatvadigu/n/ako dharmokte/h/ dyubhvadyayatana/m/ sva/s/abdad ity
1377 adhi kara/n/advayena tasya prakara/n/asya brahmavishayatvapratipadanat
1378 jyoti/sk/ara/n/abhidhanat ity adishu parasya brahma/n/o
1379 bharupatvavagates /k/a purvapakshanutthanad ayukta/m/

1380 sutraksharavairupya/k/ /k/a.]

1381
1382 [Footnote 10: Yadi paramatma na bhokta eva/m/ taihi bhokt /i/taya
1383 pratiyamano jiva eva syad ity asankyaha atta.]

1384
1385 [Footnote 11: Sthanadivypade/s/a/k/ /k/a ity atra ya/h/ /k/akshushi
1386 tish/th/ann ity adina pratipadyamana/m/ /k/akshushi
1387 sthitiniyamanadika/m/ paramatmana eveti siddha/m/ k/ri/tva
1388 akshipurushasya paramatmatva/m/ sadhitam idani/m/ tad eva samarthayate
1389 antaryau.]

1390
1391 [Footnote 12: Anandamaya/h/ I, 1, 12; anta/h/ I, i, 20; aka/s/a/h/ I, 1,
1392 22; prana/h/ I, 1, 23; jyoti/h/ I, 1, 24; prana/h/ I, 1, 28; atta I, 2,
1393 9; guha/m/ pravish/t/au I, 2, 11; antara I, 2,13; antaryami I, 2, 18;
1394 ad/ris/yatvadigu/n/aka/h/ I, 2, 21; vai/s/vanara/h/ I, 2, 24;
1395 dyubhvadyayatanam I, 3, 1; bhuma I, 3, 8; aksheram I, 3, 10; sa/h/ I, 3,
1396 13; dahara/h/ I, 3, 14; pramita/h/ I, 3, 24; (jyoti/h/ 40;) aka/s/a/h/
1397 I, 3,41.]

1398
1399
1400 SECOND ADHYAYA.

1401
1402
1403 The first adhyaya has proved that all the Vedanta-texts unanimously
1404 teach that there is only one cause of the world, viz. Brahman, whose
1405 nature is intelligence, and that there exists no scriptural passage
1406 which can be used to establish systems opposed to the Vedanta, more
1407 especially the Sa@nkhyas system. The task of the two first padas of the
1408 second adhyaya is to rebut any objections which may be raised against
1409 the Vedanta doctrine on purely speculative grounds, apart from
1410 scriptural authority, and to show, again on purely speculative grounds,
1411 that none of the systems irreconcilable with the Vedanta can be
1412 satisfactorily established.

1413
1414
1415 PADA I.

1416
1417
1418 Adhikara/n/a I refutes the Sa@nkhyas objection that the acceptance of
1419 the Vedanta system involves the rejection of the Sa@nkhyas doctrine which
1420 after all constitutes a part of Sm/ri/ti, and as such has claims on
1421 consideration.--To accept the Sa@nkhyas-sm/ri/ti, the Vedantin replies,
1422 would compel us to reject other Sm/ri/tis, such as the Manu-sm/ri/ti,
1423 which are opposed to the Sa@nkhyas doctrine. The conflicting claims of
1424 Sm/ri/tis can be settled only on the ground of the Veda, and there can
1425 be no doubt that the Veda does not confirm the Sa@nkhyas-sm/ri/ti, but
1426 rather those Sm/ri/tis which teach the origination of the world from an
1427 intelligent primary cause.

1428
1429 Adhik. II (3) extends the same line of argumentation to the
1430 Yoga-sm/ri/ti.

1431
1432 Adhik. III (4-11) shows that Brahman, although of the nature of
1433 intelligence, yet may be the cause of the non-intelligent material
1434 world, and that it is not contaminated by the qualities of the world
1435 when the latter is refunded into Brahman. For ordinary experience
1436 teaches us that like does not always spring from like, and that the
1437 qualities of effected things when the latter are refunded into their
1438 causes--as when golden ornaments, for instance, are melted and thereby
1439 become simple gold again--do not continue to exist in those
1440 causes.--Here also the argumentation is specially directed against the
1441 Sa@nkhyas, who, in order to account for the materiality and the various
1442 imperfections of the world, think it necessary to assume a causal
1443 substance participating in the same characteristics.

1444
1445 Adhik. IV (12) points out that the line of reasoning followed in the
1446 preceding adhikara/n/a is valid also against other theories, such as the
1447 atomistic doctrine.

1448

1449 The one Sutra (13) constituting Adhik. V teaches, according to
1450 /S/a@nkara, that although the enjoying souls as well as the objects of
1451 fruition are in reality nothing but Brahman, and on that account
1452 identical, yet the two sets may practically be held apart, just as in
1453 ordinary life we hold apart, and distinguish as separate individual
1454 things, the waves, ripples, and foam of the sea, although at the bottom
1455 waves, ripples, and foam are all of them identical as being neither more
1456 nor less than sea-water.--The /S/ri-bhashya gives a totally different
1457 interpretation of the Sutra, according to which the latter has nothing
1458 whatever to do with the eventual non-distinction of enjoying souls and
1459 objects to be enjoyed. Translated according to Ramanuja's view, the
1460 Sutra runs as follows: 'If non-distinction (of the Lord and the
1461 individual souls) is said to result from the circumstance of (the Lord
1462 himself) becoming an enjoyer (a soul), we refute this objection by
1463 instances from every-day experience.' That is to say: If it be
1464 maintained that from our doctrine previously expounded, according to
1465 which this world springs from the Lord and constitutes his body, it
1466 follows that the Lord, as an embodied being, is not essentially
1467 different from other souls, and subject to fruition as they are; we
1468 reply that the Lord's having a body does not involve his being subject
1469 to fruition, not any more than in ordinary life a king, although himself
1470 an embodied being, is affected by the experiences of pleasure and pain
1471 which his servants have to undergo.--The construction which Ramanuja
1472 puts on the Sutra is not repugnant either to the words of the Sutra or
1473 to the context in which the latter stands, and that it rests on earlier
1474 authority appears from a quotation made by Ramanuja from the
1475 Drami/d/abhashyakara[13].
1476

1477 Adhik. VI (14-20) treats of the non-difference of the effect from the
1478 cause; a Vedanta doctrine which is defended by its adherents against the
1479 Vai/s/eshikas according to whom the effect is something different from
1480 the cause.--The divergent views of /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja on this
1481 important point have been sufficiently illustrated in the general sketch
1482 of the two systems.
1483

1484 Adhik. VII (21-23) refutes the objection that, from the Vedic passages
1485 insisting on the identity of the Lord and the individual soul, it
1486 follows that the Lord must be like the individual soul the cause of
1487 evil, and that hence the entire doctrine of an all-powerful and all-wise
1488 Lord being the cause of the world has to be rejected. For, the Sutrakira
1489 remarks, the creative principle of the world is additional to, i.e.
1490 other than, the individual soul, the difference of the two being
1491 distinctly declared by Scripture.--The way in which the three Sutras
1492 constituting this adhikara/n/a are treated by /S/a@nkara on the one hand
1493 and Ramanuja on the other is characteristic. Ramanuja throughout simply
1494 follows the words of the Sutras, of which Sutra 21 formulates the
1495 objection based on such texts as 'Thou art that,' while Sutra 22 replies
1496 that Brahman is different from the soul, since that is expressly
1497 declared by Scripture. /S/a@nkara, on the other hand, sees himself
1498 obliged to add that the difference of the two, plainly maintained in
1499 Sutra 22, is not real, but due to the soul's fictitious limiting
1500 adjuncts.
1501

1502 Adhik. VIII (24, 25) shows that Brahman, although destitute of material
1503 and instruments of action, may yet produce the world, just as gods by
1504 their mere power create palaces, animals, and the like, and as milk by
1505 itself turns into curds.
1506

1507 Adhik. IX (26-29) explains that, according to the express doctrine of
1508 Scripture, Brahman does not in its entirety pass over into the world,
1509 and, although emitting the world from itself, yet remains one and
1510 undivided. This is possible, according to /S/a@nkara, because the world
1511 is unreal; according to Ramanuja, because the creation is merely the
1512 visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brahman
1513 in a subtle imperceptible condition.
1514

1515 Adhik. X (30, 31) teaches that Brahman, although destitute of
1516 instruments of action, is enabled to create the world by means of the
1517 manifold powers which it possesses.

1518
1519 Adhik. XI (32, 33) assigns the motive of the creation, or, more properly
1520 expressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating the world, has no motive in
1521 the strict sense of the word, but follows a mere sportive impulse.
1522

1523 Adhik. XII (34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges of partiality and
1524 cruelty which might be brought against it owing to the inequality of
1525 position and fate of the various animate beings, and the universal
1526 suffering of the world. Brahman, as a creator and dispenser, acts with a
1527 view to the merit and demerit of the individual souls, and has so acted
1528 from all eternity.
1529

1530 Adhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation by declaring that
1531 all the qualities of Brahman--omniscience and so on--are such as to
1532 capacitate it for the creation of the world.
1533

1534
1535 PADA II.
1536

1537
1538 The task of the second pada is to refute, by arguments independent of
1539 Vedic passages, the more important philosophical theories concerning the
1540 origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedanta view.--The first
1541 adhikara/n/a (1-10) is directed against the Sa@nkhyas, whose doctrine
1542 had already been touched upon incidentally in several previous places,
1543 and aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause, such as the
1544 pradhana of the Sa@nkhyas, is unable to create and dispose.--The second
1545 adhikara/n/a (11-17) refutes the Vai/s/eshika tenet that the world
1546 originates from atoms set in motion by the ad/ri/sh/t/a.--The third and
1547 fourth adhikara/n/as are directed against various schools of Bauddha
1548 philosophers. Adhik. III (18-27) impugns the view of the so-called
1549 sarvastitvavadins, or bahyarthavadins, who maintain the reality of an
1550 external as well as an internal world; Adhik. IV (28-32) is directed
1551 against the vij/n/anavadins, according to whom ideas are the only
1552 reality.--The last Sutra of this adhikara/n/a is treated by Ramanuja as
1553 a separate adhikara/n/a refuting the view of the Madhyamikas, who teach
1554 that everything is void, i.e. that nothing whatever is real.--Adhik. V
1555 (33-36) is directed against the doctrine of the Jainas; Adhik. VI
1556 (37-41) against those philosophical schools which teach that a highest
1557 Lord is not the material but only the operative cause of the world.
1558

1559 The last adhikara/n/a of the pada (42-45) refers, according to the
1560 unanimous statement of the commentators, to the doctrine of the
1561 Bhagavatas or Pa/nk/aratras. But /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja totally
1562 disagree as to the drift of the Sutrakara's opinion regarding that
1563 system. According to the former it is condemned like the systems
1564 previously referred to; according to the latter it is approved
1565 of.--Sutras 42 and 43, according to both commentators, raise objections
1566 against the system; Sutra 42 being directed against the doctrine that
1567 from the highest being, called Vasudeva, there is originated
1568 Sa@nkarsha/n/a, i.e. the jiva, on the ground that thereby those
1569 scriptural passages would be contradicted which teach the soul's
1570 eternity; and Sutra 43 impugning the doctrine that from Sa@nkarsha/n/a
1571 there springs Pradyumna, i.e. the manas.--The Sutra on which the
1572 difference of interpretation turns is 44. Literally translated it runs,
1573 'Or, on account of there being' (or, 'their being') 'knowledge and so
1574 on, there is non-contradiction of that.'--This means, according to
1575 /S/a@nkara, 'Or, if in consequence of the existence of knowledge and so
1576 on (on the part of Sa@nkarsha/n/a, &c. they be taken not as soul, mind,
1577 &c. but as Lords of pre-eminent knowledge, &c.), yet there is
1578 non-contradiction of that (viz. of the objection raised in Sutra 42
1579 against the Bhagavata doctrine).--According to Ramanuja, on the other
1580 hand, the Sutra has to be explained as follows: 'Or, rather there is
1581 noncontradiction of that (i.e. the Pa/nk/aratra doctrine) on account of
1582 their being knowledge and so on (i.e. on account of their being
1583 Brahman).' Which means: Since Sa@nkarsha/n/a and so on are merely forms
1584 of manifestation of Brahman, the Pa/nk/aratra doctrine, according to
1585 which they spring from Brahman, is not contradicted.--The form of the
1586 Sutra makes it difficult for us to decide which of the two

1587 interpretations is the right one; it, however, appears to me that the
1588 explanations of the 'va' and of the 'tat,' implied in Ramanuja's
1589 comment, are more natural than those resulting from /S/a@nkara's
1590 interpretation. Nor would it be an unnatural proceeding to close the
1591 polemical pada with a defence of that doctrine which--in spite of
1592 objections--has to be viewed as the true one.

1593
1594
1595 PADA III.

1596
1597
1598 The third pada discusses the question whether the different forms of
1599 existence which, in their totality, constitute the world have an origin
1600 or not, i.e. whether they are co-eternal with Brahman, or issue from it
1601 and are refunded into it at stated intervals.

1602
1603 The first seven adhikara/n/as treat of the five elementary
1604 substances.--Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the ether is not co-eternal
1605 with Brahman, but springs from it as its first effect.--Adhik. II (8)
1606 shows that air springs from ether; Adhik. IV, V, VI (10; 11; 12) that
1607 fire springs from air, water from fire, earth from water.--Adhik. III
1608 (9) explains by way of digression that Brahman, which is not some
1609 special entity, but quite generally 'that which is,' cannot have
1610 originated from anything else.

1611
1612 Adhik. VII (13) demonstrates that the origination of one element from
1613 another is due, not to the latter in itself, but to Brahman acting in
1614 it.

1615
1616 Adhik. VIII (14) teaches that the reabsorption of the elements into
1617 Brahman takes place in the inverse order of their emission.

1618
1619 Adhik. IX (15) remarks that the indicated order in which the emission
1620 and the reabsorption of the elementary substances take place is not
1621 interfered with by the creation and reabsorption of the organs of the
1622 soul, i.e. the sense organs and the internal organ (manas); for they
1623 also are of elemental nature, and as such created and retracted together
1624 with the elements of which they consist.

1625
1626 The remainder of the pada is taken up by a discussion of the nature of
1627 the individual soul, the jiva.--Adhik. X (16) teaches that expressions
1628 such as 'Devadatta is born,' 'Devadatta has died,' strictly apply to the
1629 body only, and are transferred to the soul in so far only as it is
1630 connected with a body.

1631
1632 Adhik. XI (17) teaches that the individual soul is, according to
1633 Scripture, permanent, eternal, and therefore not, like the ether and the
1634 other elements, produced from Brahman at the time of creation.--This
1635 Sutra is of course commented on in a very different manner by /S/a@nkara
1636 on the one hand and Ramanuja on the other. According to the former, the
1637 jiva is in reality identical--and as such co-eternal--with Brahman; what
1638 originates is merely the soul's connexion with its limiting adjuncts,
1639 and that connexion is moreover illusory.--According to Ramanuja, the
1640 jiva is indeed an effect of Brahman, but has existed in Brahman from all
1641 eternity as an individual being and as a mode (prakara) of Brahman. So
1642 indeed have also the material elements; yet there is an important
1643 distinction owing to which the elements may be said to originate at the
1644 time of creation, while the same cannot be said of the soul. Previously
1645 to creation the material elements exist in a subtle condition in which
1646 they possess none of the qualities that later on render them the objects
1647 of ordinary experience; hence, when passing over into the gross state at
1648 the time of creation, they may be said to originate. The souls, on the
1649 other hand, possess at all times the same essential qualities, i.e. they
1650 are cognizing agents; only, whenever a new creation takes place, they
1651 associate themselves with bodies, and their intelligence therewith
1652 undergoes a certain expansion or development (vikasa); contrasting with
1653 the unevolved or contracted state (sanko/k/a) which characterised it
1654 during the preceding pralaya. But this change is not a change of
1655 essential nature (svarupanyathabhava) and hence we have to distinguish

1656 the souls as permanent entities from the material elements which at the
1657 time of each creation and reabsorption change their essential
1658 characteristics.

1659
1660 Adhik. XII (18) defines the nature of the individual soul. The Sutra
1661 declares that the soul is 'j/n/a.' This means, according to /S/a@nkara,
1662 that intelligence or knowledge does not, as the Vai/s/eshikas teach,
1663 constitute a mere attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially
1664 non-intelligent, but is the very essence of the soul. The soul is not a
1665 knower, but knowledge; not intelligent, but intelligence.--Ramanuja, on
1666 the other hand, explains 'j/n/a' by 'j/n/at/ri/,' i.e. knower, knowing
1667 agent, and considers the Sutra to be directed not only against the
1668 Vai/s/eshikas, but also against those philosophers who--like the
1669 Sa@nkhyas and the Vedantins of /S/a@nkara's school--maintain that the
1670 soul is not a knowing agent, but pure /k/aitanya.--The wording of the
1671 Sutra certainly seems to favour Ramanuja's interpretation; we can hardly
1672 imagine that an author definitely holding the views of /S/a@nkara
1673 should, when propounding the important dogma of the soul's nature, use
1674 the term j/n/a of which the most obvious interpretation j/n/at/ri/, not
1675 j/n/anam.

1676
1677 Adhik. XIII (19-32) treats the question whether the individual soul is
1678 a/n/u, i.e. of very minute size, or omnipresent, all-pervading
1679 (sarvagata, vyapin). Here, again, we meet with diametrically opposite
1680 views.--In /S/a@nkara's opinion the Sutras 19-38 represent the
1681 purvapaksha view, according to which the jiva is a/n/u, while Sutra 29
1682 formulates the siddhanta, viz. that the jiva, which in reality is
1683 all-pervading, is spoken of as a/n/u in some scriptural passages,
1684 because the qualities of the internal organ--which itself is
1685 a/n/u--constitute the essence of the individual soul as long as the
1686 latter is implicated in the sa/m/sara.--According to Ramanuja, on the
1687 other hand, the first Sutra of the adhikara/n/a gives utterance to the
1688 siddhanta view, according to which the soul is of minute size; the
1689 Sutras 20-25 confirm this view and refute objections raised against it;
1690 while the Sutras 26-29 resume the question already mooted under Sutra
1691 18, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing agent (j/n/at/ri/) stands
1692 to knowledge (j/n/ana).--In order to decide between the conflicting
1693 claims of these two interpretations we must enter into some
1694 details.--/S/a@nkara maintains that Sutras 19-28 state and enforce a
1695 purvapaksha view, which is finally refuted in 29. What here strikes us
1696 at the outset, is the unusual length to which the defence of a mere
1697 prima facie view is carried; in no other place the Sutras take so much
1698 trouble to render plausible what is meant to be rejected in the end, and
1699 an unbiassed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in 19-28
1700 we have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view finally to
1701 be abandoned, but with an elaborate bona fide attempt to establish and
1702 vindicate an essential dogma of the system. Still it is not altogether
1703 impossible that the purvapaksha should here be treated at greater length
1704 than usual, and the decisive point is therefore whether we can, with
1705 /S/a@nkara, look upon Sutra 29 as embodying a refutation of the
1706 purvapaksha and thus implicitly acknowledging the doctrine that the
1707 individual soul is all-pervading. Now I think there can be no doubt that
1708 /S/a@nkara's interpretation of the Sutra is exceedingly forced.
1709 Literally translated (and leaving out the non-essential word
1710 'praj/n/avat') the Sutra runs as follows: 'But on account of that
1711 quality (or "those qualities;" or else "on account of the quality--or
1712 qualities--of that") being the essence, (there is) that designation (or
1713 "the designation of that").' This /S/a@nkara maintains to mean, 'Because
1714 the qualities of the buddhi are the essence of the soul in the sa/m/sara
1715 state, therefore the soul itself is sometimes spoken of as a/n/u.' Now,
1716 in the first place, nothing in the context warrants the explanation of
1717 the first 'tat' by buddhi. And--which is more important--in the second
1718 place, it is more than doubtful whether on /S/a@nkara's own system the
1719 qualities of the buddhi--such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion,
1720 &c.--can with any propriety be said to constitute the essence of the
1721 soul even in the sa/m/sara state. The essence of the soul in whatever
1722 state, according to /S/a@nkara's system, is knowledge or intelligence;
1723 whatever is due to its association with the buddhi is non-essential or,
1724 more strictly, unreal, false.

1725
1726 There are no similar difficulties in the way of Ramanuja's
1727 interpretation of the adhikara/n/a. He agrees with /S/a@nkara in the
1728 explanation of Sutras 19-35, with this difference that he views them as
1729 setting forth, not the purvapaksha, but the siddhanta. Sutras 26-28 also
1730 are interpreted in a manner not very different from /S/a@nkara's,
1731 special stress being laid on the distinction made by Scripture between
1732 knowledge as a mere quality and the soul as a knowing agent, the
1733 substratum of knowledge. This discussion naturally gives rise to the
1734 question how it is that Scripture in some places makes use of the term
1735 vij/n/ana when meaning the individual soul. The answer is given in Sutra
1736 29, 'The soul is designated as knowledge because it has that quality for
1737 its essence,' i.e. because knowledge is the essential characteristic
1738 quality of the soul, therefore the term 'knowledge' is employed here and
1739 there to denote the soul itself. This latter interpretation gives rise
1740 to no doubt whatever. It closely follows the wording of the text and
1741 does not necessitate any forced supplementation. The 'tu' of the Sutra
1742 which, according to /S/a@nkara, is meant to discard the purvapaksha,
1743 serves on Ramanuja's view to set aside a previously-raised objection; an
1744 altogether legitimate assumption.

1745
1746 Of the three remaining Sutras of the adhikara/n/a (30-32), 30 explains,
1747 according to /S/a@nkara, that the soul may be called a/n/u, since, as
1748 long as it exists in the sa/m/sara condition, it is connected with the
1749 buddhi. According to Ramanuja the Sutra teaches that the soul may be
1750 called vij/n/ana because the latter constitutes its essential quality as
1751 long as it exists.--Sutra 31 intimates, according to /S/a@nkara, that in
1752 the states of deep sleep, and so on, the soul is potentially connected
1753 with the buddhi, while in the waking state that connexion becomes
1754 actually manifest. The same Sutra, according to Ramanuja, teaches that
1755 j/n/at/ri/tva is properly said to constitute the soul's essential
1756 nature, although it is actually manifested in some states of the soul
1757 only.--In Sutra 32, finally, /S/a@nkara sees a statement of the doctrine
1758 that, unless the soul had the buddhi for its limiting adjunct, it would
1759 either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing; while,
1760 according to Ramanuja, the Sutra means that the soul would either be
1761 permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing, if it were pure
1762 knowledge and all-pervading (instead of being /jn/at/ri/ and a/n/u, as
1763 it is in reality).--The three Sutras can be made to fit in with either
1764 interpretation, although it must be noted that none of them explicitly
1765 refers to the soul's connexion with the buddhi.

1766
1767 Adhik. XIV and XV (33-39; 40) refer to the kart/ri/tva of the jiva, i.e.
1768 the question whether the soul is an agent. Sutras 33-39 clearly say that
1769 it is such. But as, according to /S/a@nkara's system, this cannot be the
1770 final view,--the soul being essentially non-active, and all action
1771 belonging to the world of upadhis,--he looks upon the next following
1772 Sutra (40) as constituting an adhikara/n/a by itself, and teaching that
1773 the soul is an agent when connected with the instruments of action,
1774 buddhi, &c., while it ceases to be so when dissociated from them, 'just
1775 as the carpenter acts in both ways,' i.e. just as the carpenter works as
1776 long as he wields his instruments, and rests after having laid them
1777 aside.--Ramanuja, perhaps more naturally, does not separate Sutra 40
1778 from the preceding Sutras, but interprets it as follows: Activity is
1779 indeed an essential attribute of the soul; but therefrom it does not
1780 follow that the soul is always actually active, just as the carpenter,
1781 even when furnished with the requisite instruments, may either work or
1782 not work, just as he pleases.

1783
1784 Adhik. XVI (41, 42) teaches that the soul in its activity is dependent
1785 on the Lord who impels it with a view to its former actions.

1786
1787 Adhik. XVII (43-53) treats of the relation of the individual soul to
1788 Brahman. Sutra 43 declares that the individual soul is a part (a/ms/a)
1789 of Brahman, and the following Sutras show how that relation does not
1790 involve either that Brahman is affected by the imperfections,
1791 sufferings, &c. of the souls, or that one soul has to participate in the
1792 experiences of other souls. The two commentators of course take entirely
1793 different views of the doctrine that the soul is a part of Brahman.

1794 According to Ramanuja the souls are in reality parts of Brahman[14];
1795 according to Sa@nkara the 'a/ms/a' of the Sutra must be understood to
1796 mean 'a/ms/a iva,' 'a part as it were;' the one universal indivisible
1797 Brahman having no real parts, but appearing to be divided owing to its
1798 limiting adjuncts.--One Sutra (50) in this adhikara/n/a calls for
1799 special notice. According to Sa@nkara the words 'abhasa eva /k/a' mean
1800 '(the soul is) a mere reflection,' which, as the commentators remark, is
1801 a statement of the so-called pratibimbavada, i.e. the doctrine that the
1802 so-called individual soul is nothing but the reflection of the Self in
1803 the buddhi; while Sutra 43 had propounded the so-called ava/kkh/edavada,
1804 i.e. the doctrine that the soul is the highest Self in so far as limited
1805 by its adjuncts.--According to Ramanuja the abhasa of the Sutra has to
1806 be taken in the sense of hetvabhasa, a fallacious argument, and the
1807 Sutra is explained as being directed against the reasoning of those
1808 Vedantins according to whom the soul is Brahman in so far as limited by
1809 non-real adjuncts[15].
1810

1811
1812 PADA IV.
1813
1814

1815 Adhik. I, II, III (1-4; 5-6; 7) teach that the pra/n/as (by which
1816 generic name are denoted the buddhindriyas, karmen-driyas, and the
1817 manas) spring from Brahman; are eleven in number; and are of minute size
1818 (a/n/u).
1819

1820 Adhik. IV, V, VI (8; 9-12; 13) inform us also that the mukhya pra/n/a,
1821 i.e. the vital air, is produced from Brahman; that it is a principle
1822 distinct from air in general and from the pra/n/as discussed above; and
1823 that it is minute (a/n/u).
1824

1825 Adhik. VII and VIII (14-16; 17-19) teach that the pra/n/as are
1826 superintended and guided in their activity by special divinities, and
1827 that they are independent principles, not mere modifications of the
1828 mukhya pra/n/a.
1829

1830 Adhik. IX (20-22) declares that the evolution of names and forms (the
1831 namarupavyakara/n/a) is the work, not of the individual soul, but of the
1832 Lord.
1833

1834 Notes:
1835

1836 [Footnote 13: Lokavat, Yatha loke raja/s/asananuvartina/m/ /k/a
1837 rajanugrahanigraha/ri/takhadukhayoges'pi na sa/s/ariraivamatre/n/a
1838 sasake rajany api /s/asananuv/ri/ttyauv/ri/ttinimittasukhadukhayor
1839 bhokt/ri/vaprasa@nga/h/. Yathaha Drami/d/abhashyakara/h/ yatha loke raja
1840 pra/k/uradanda/s/uke ghores'narthasa/m/ka/t/es'pi prade/s/e
1841 vartamanoszpi vyajanadyavadhutadeho doshair na sprisyate abhipreta/ms/
1842 /k/a lokan paripipalayishati bhoga/ms/ /k/a gandhadin
1843 avi/s/vajanopabhogyan dharayati tathasau loke/s/varo
1844 bhramatsvasamait/h/ya/k/amato doshair na sp/ris/yate rakshati /k/a lokan
1845 brahmalokadi/ms/ /k/avi/s/vajanopabhogyan dharayatiti.]
1846

1847 [Footnote 14: Givasya kart/ri/tva/m/ paramapurushayattam ity uktam.
1848 Idanim kim aya/m/ giva/h/ parasmad atyantabhinna/h/ uta param eva brahma
1849 bhrantam uta brahmaivopadhyava/kkh/innam atha brahma/ms/a iti
1850 sa/m/sayyate /s/rutivipraticpatte/h/ sa/m/saya/h/. Nanu tadananyam
1851 arambha/n/a/s/abdadibhya/h/ adhika/m/ tu bhedanirdesad ity atraivayam
1852 aitho nir/n/ita/h/ Satya/m/ sa eva nanatvaikatva/s/rutivipratipattya
1853 skshipya jivasya brahma/ms/atvopapadanena vi/s/eshato nir/n/iyate. Yavad
1854 dhi jivasya brahma/m/satva/m/ na nir/n/itam tavaj jivasya
1855 brahmanosnanyatva/m/ brahma/n/as tasmad adhikatva/m/ /k/a na
1856 pratitish/th/ati. Ki/m/ tavat praptam. Atyanta/m/ bhinna iti. Kuta/h/.
1857 J/n/aj/n/nau dvav ityadibhedanirde/s/at. J/n/aj/n/ayor abheda/s/rutayas
1858 tv agnina si/nk/ed itivad viruddharthapratipadanad aupa/k/arikya/h/,
1859 Brahma/n/os/ms/o jiva ity api na sadhiya/h/, ekavastveka/s/ava/k/i hy
1860 a/ms/a/s/sabda/h/, jivasya brahmaikade/s/atve tadgata dosha brahma/n/i
1861 bhavye/h/. Na /k/a brahmakha/nd/o jiva ity a/ms/atvopapatti/h/
1862 kha/nd/anandarhatvad brahma/n/a/h/ praguktadoshaprasa@nga/k/ /k/a, tasmad

1863 atyantabhinnaśya tada/ms/atva/m/ durupapadam. Yadvā bhranta/m/ brahmaiva
 1864 jiva/h/. Kuta/h/. Tat tvam asi ayam atma
 1865 brahmetyadibrahmatmabhavopade/s/at, nanatmatvavadinyas tu
 1866 pratyakshadisiddharthanuvaditvad ananyathasiddhadvaitopade/s/aparabhi/h/
 1867 /s/rutibhi/h/ pratyakshadaya/s/ /k/a avidyāntargata/h/
 1868 khyāpyante.--Athava brahmaivanadyupadhyava/kkh/inna/m/ jiva/h/. Kuta/h/.
 1869 Tata eva brahmatmabhavopade/s/at. Na /k/ayam upadhir bhrantiparikalpita
 1870 ita vaktu/m/ śakya/m/ bandhamokshadivyaṣṭhanupapatter. Ity eva/m/
 1871 pratpeshbhidhiyate. Brahma/ms/a iti. Kuta/h/. Nanavyapade/s/ad anyatha
 1872 /k/aikatvena vyapade/s/ad ubhayatha hi vyapade/s/o d/ris/yate.
 1873 Navavyapade/s/as tavat
 1874 srash/tri/tva/rig/yatva--niyant/ri/tvaniyamyatva--sarvaj/n/atvaj/n/atva--
 1875 svadhinatvaparaḥśinatva--/s/uddhatva/s/uddhatva--
 1876 kalyā/n/agu/n/akarātvaṣṭhanupapaditva--patitva/s/eshatvadibhir d/ris/yate.
 1877 Anyatha /k/abhedena vyapade/s/os pi tat tvam asi ayam atma
 1878 brahmetyadibhir d/ris/yate. Api da/s/akitavāditvam apy adhiyate eke,
 1879 brahma daśa brahma daśa brahmeme kitava ity ātharva/n/ika brahma/n/o
 1880 da/s/akitavāditvam apy adhiyate, tata/s/ /k/a sarvajivavyapitvena abhedo
 1881 vyapadi/s/yata it artha/h/. Evam ubhayavyapade/s/amukhyatvasiddhaye
 1882 jivosya/m/ brahma/n/os/ms/a ity abhyupagantavya/h/.]

1884 [Footnote 15: Nanu bhrantabrahmajivavadeszpy avidyā/ri/topadhibhedā
 1885 bhogavyaṣṭhadaya upādyaṇta ata aha, abhasa eva /k/a.
 1886 Akha/nd/aikarasaḥśaḥśa/s/amātrātvarupasya
 1887 svarupatirodhanapurvakopadhibhedopapadanahetur abhasa eva.
 1888 Prakā/s/aikasaḥśaḥśaḥśa prakā/s/atirodhanam/ prakā/s/ana/s/a eveti prag
 1889 evopapaditam. Abhasa eveti va pa/th/a/h/, tatha sati hetava abhasa/h/.]

1891
 1892 THIRD ADHYAYA.
 1893 PADA I.

1894
 1895
 1896 Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the soul, when passing out of the body at
 1897 the time of death, remains invested with the subtle material elements
 1898 (bhūtasukṣhma) which serve as an abode to the pra/n/as attached to the
 1899 soul.

1900
 1901 Adhik. II (8-11) shows that, when the souls of those who had enjoyed the
 1902 reward of their good works in the moon descend to the earth in order to
 1903 undergo a new embodiment, there cleaves to them a remainder (anu/s/aya)
 1904 of their former deeds which determines the nature of the new embodiment.

1905
 1906 Adhik. III (12-21) discusses the fate after death of those whom their
 1907 good works do not entitle to pass up to the moon.

1908
 1909 Adhik. IV, V, VI (22; 23; 24-27) teach that the subtle bodies of the
 1910 souls descending from the moon through the ether, air, &c., do not
 1911 become identical with ether, air, &c., but only like them; that the
 1912 entire descent occupies a short time only; and that, when the souls
 1913 finally enter into plants and so on, they do not participate in the life
 1914 of the latter, but are merely in external contact with them.

1915
 1916
 1917 PADA II.

1918
 1919
 1920 Adhik. I (1-6) treats of the soul in the dreaming state. According to
 1921 /S/a@nkara the three first Sūtras discuss the question whether the
 1922 creative activity ascribed to the soul in some scriptural passages
 1923 produces things as real as those by which the waking soul is surrounded,
 1924 or not; Sūtra 3 settles the point by declaring that the creations of the
 1925 dreaming soul are mere 'Maya,' since they do not fully manifest the
 1926 character of real objects. Sūtra 4 adds that dreams, although mere Maya,
 1927 yet have a prophetic quality. Sūtras 5 and 6 finally reply to the
 1928 question why the soul, which after all is a part of the Lord and as such
 1929 participates in his excellencies, should not be able to produce in its
 1930 dreams a real creation, by the remark that the soul's knowledge and
 1931 power are obscured by its connexion with the gross body.

1932
1933 The considerably diverging interpretation given of this adhikara/n/a by
1934 Ramanuja has the advantage of more closely connecting the Sutras with
1935 each other. According to him the question is not whether the creations
1936 of a dream are real or not, but whether they are the work of the
1937 individual soul or of the Lord acting within the soul. Sutras 1 and 2
1938 set forth the purvapaksha. The creations of dreams (are the work of the
1939 individual soul); for thus Scripture declares: 'And the followers of
1940 some /s/akas declare (the soul to be) a creator,' &c. The third Sutra
1941 states the siddhanta view: 'But the creations of dreams are Maya, i.e.
1942 are of a wonderful nature (and as such cannot be effected by the
1943 individual soul), since (in this life) the nature (of the soul) is not
1944 fully manifested.' Concerning the word 'maya,' Ramanuja remarks,
1945 'maya/s/abdo hy a/sk/aryava/k/i janaka/s/ya kule jata devamayeva nirmita
1946 ityadishu tatha dar/s/anat.' The three remaining Sutras are exhibited in
1947 the /S/ri-bhashya in a different order, the fourth Sutra, according to
1948 /S/a@nkara, being the sixth according to Ramanuja. Sutras 4 and 5
1949 (according to Ramanuja's numeration) are explained by Ramanuja very much
1950 in the same way as by /S/a@nkara; but owing to the former's statement of
1951 the subject-matter of the whole adhikara/n/a they connect themselves
1952 more intimately with the preceding Sutras than is possible on
1953 /S/a@nkara's interpretation. In Sutra 6 (su/k/aka/s/ /k/a hi) Ramanuja
1954 sees a deduction from the siddhanta of the adhikara/n/a, 'Because the
1955 images of a dream are produced by the highest Lord himself, therefore
1956 they have prophetic significance.'

1957
1958 Adhik. II teaches that in the state of deep dreamless sleep the soul
1959 abides within Brahman in the heart.

1960
1961 Adhik. III (9) expounds the reasons entitling us to assume that the soul
1962 awakening from sleep is the same that went to sleep.--Adhik. IV (9)
1963 explains the nature of a swoon.

1964
1965 Adhik. V (11-21) is, according to /S/a@nkara, taken up with the question
1966 as to the nature of the highest Brahman in which the individual soul is
1967 merged in the state of deep sleep. Sutra 11 declares that twofold
1968 characteristics (viz. absence and presence of distinctive attributes,
1969 nirvi/s/eshatva and savi/s/eshatva) cannot belong to the highest Brahman
1970 even through its stations, i.e. its limiting adjuncts; since all
1971 passages which aim at setting forth Brahman's nature declare it to be
1972 destitute of all distinctive attributes.--The fact, Sutra 12 continues,
1973 that in many passages Brahman is spoken of as possessing distinctive
1974 attributes is of no relevancy, since wherever there are mentioned
1975 limiting adjuncts, on which all distinction depends, it is specially
1976 stated that Brahman in itself is free from all diversity; and--Sutra 13
1977 adds--in some places the assumption of diversity is specially objected
1978 to.--That Brahman is devoid of all form (Sutra 14), is the pre-eminent
1979 meaning of all Vedanta-texts setting forth Brahman's nature.--That
1980 Brahman is represented as having different forms, as it were, is due to
1981 its connexion with its (unreal) limiting adjuncts; just as the light of
1982 the sun appears straight or crooked, as it were, according to the nature
1983 of the things he illuminates (15).--The B/ri/hadara/n/yaka expressly
1984 declares that Brahman is one uniform mass of intelligence (16); and the
1985 same is taught in other scriptural passages and in Sm/ri/ti (17).--At
1986 the unreality of the apparent manifoldness of the Self, caused by the
1987 limiting adjuncts, aim those scriptural passages in which the Self is
1988 compared to the sun, which remains one although his reflections on the
1989 surface of the water are many (18).--Nor must the objection be raised
1990 that that comparison is unsuitable, because the Self is not material
1991 like the sun, and there are no real upadhis separate from it as the
1992 water is from the sun; for the comparison merely means to indicate that,
1993 as the reflected image of the sun participates in the changes, increase,
1994 decrease, &c., which the water undergoes while the sun himself remains
1995 unaffected thereby, so the true Self is not affected by the attributes
1996 of the upadhis, while, in so far as it is limited by the latter, it is
1997 affected by them as it were (19, 20).--That the Self is within the
1998 upadhis, Scripture declares (21).

1999
2000 From the above explanation of this important adhikara/n/a the one given

2001 in the Sri-bhashya differs totally. According to Ramanuja the
2002 adhikara/n/a raises the question whether the imperfections clinging to
2003 the individual soul (the discussion of which has now come to an end)
2004 affect also the highest Lord who, according to Scripture, abides within
2005 the soul as antaryamin. 'Notwithstanding the abode (of the highest Self
2006 within the soul) (it is) not (affected by the soul's imperfections)
2007 because everywhere (the highest Self is represented) as having twofold
2008 characteristics (viz. being, on one hand, free from all evil,
2009 apahatapapman, vijara, vim/ri/tyu, &c., and, on the other hand, endowed
2010 with all auspicious qualities, satyakama, satyasa/m/kalpa, &c.)
2011 (11).--Should it be objected that, just as the soul although essentially
2012 free from evil--according to the Prajapativakya in the Chandogya--yet is
2013 liable to imperfections owing to its connexion with a variety of bodies,
2014 so the antaryamin also is affected by abiding within bodies; we deny
2015 this because in every section of the chapter referring to the antaryamin
2016 (in the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka) he is expressly called the Immortal, the
2017 ruler within; which shows him to be free from the shortcomings of the
2018 jiva (12).--Some, moreover, expressly assert that, although the Lord and
2019 the soul are within one body, the soul only is imperfect, not the Lord
2020 (dva supar/n/a sayuja sakhaya) (13).--Should it be said that, according
2021 to the Chandogya, Brahman entered together with the souls into the
2022 elements previously to the evolution of names and forms, and hence
2023 participates in the latter, thus becoming implicated in the sa/m/sara;
2024 we reply that Brahman, although connected with such and such forms, is
2025 in itself devoid of form, since it is the principal element (agent;
2026 pradhana) in the bringing about of names and forms (according to
2027 'aka/s/o ha vai namarupayor nirvahita') (14).--But does not the passage
2028 'satya/m/ j/n/anam anantam brahma' teach that Brahman is nothing but
2029 light (intelligence) without any difference, and does not the passage
2030 'neti neti' deny of it all qualities?--As in order, we reply, not to
2031 deprive passages as the one quoted from the Taittiriya of their purport,
2032 we admit that Brahman's nature is light, so we must also admit that
2033 Brahman is satyasa/m/kalpa, and so on; for if not, the passages in which
2034 those qualities are asserted would become purportless (15).--Moreover
2035 the Taittiriya passage only asserts so much, viz. the praka/s/arupata of
2036 Brahman, and does not deny other qualities (16).--And the passage 'neti
2037 neti' will be discussed later on.--The ubhayali@ngatva of Brahman in the
2038 sense assigned above is asserted in many places /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti
2039 (17).--Because Brahman although abiding in many places is not touched by
2040 their imperfections, the similes of the reflected sun, of the ether
2041 limited by jars, &c., are applicable to it (18).--Should it be said that
2042 the illustration is not an appropriate one, because the sun is
2043 apprehended in the water erroneously only while the antaryamin really
2044 abides within all things, and therefore must be viewed as sharing their
2045 defects (19); we reply that what the simile means to negative is merely
2046 that Brahman should, owing to its inherence in many places, participate
2047 in the increase, decrease, and so on, of its abodes. On this view both
2048 similes are appropriate (20).--Analogous similes we observe to be
2049 employed in ordinary life, as when we compare a man to a lion (21).

2050
2051 Sutras 22-30 constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, a new adhikara/n/a
2052 (VI), whose object it is to show that the clause 'not so, not so' (neti
2053 neti; B/ri/hadar) negatives, not Brahman itself, but only the two forms
2054 of Brahman described in the preceding part of the chapter. Sutras 23-26
2055 further dwell on Brahman being in reality devoid of all distinctive
2056 attributes which are altogether due to the upadhis. The last four Sutras
2057 return to the question how, Brahman being one only, the souls are in so
2058 many places spoken of as different from it, and, two explanatory
2059 hypotheses having been rejected, the conclusion is arrived at that all
2060 difference is unreal, due to fictitious limiting adjuncts.

2061
2062 According to Ramanuja, Sutras 22 ff. continue the discussion started in
2063 Sutra 11. How, the question is asked, can the ubhayali@ngatva of Brahman
2064 be maintained considering that the 'not so, not so' of the
2065 B/ri/hadara/n/yaka denies of Brahman all the previously mentioned modes
2066 (prakara), so that it can only be called that which is (sanmatra)?--The
2067 reply given in Sutra 22 is that 'not so, not so' does not deny of
2068 Brahman the distinctive qualities or modes declared previously (for it
2069 would be senseless at first to teach them, and finally to deny them

2070 again[16]), but merely denies the prak/ri/taitavattva, the previously
2071 stated limited nature of Brahman, i.e. it denies that Brahman possesses
2072 only the previously mentioned qualifications. With this agrees, that
2073 subsequently to 'neti neti' Scripture itself enunciates further
2074 qualifications of Brahman. That Brahman as stated above is not the
2075 object of any other means of proof but Scripture is confirmed in Sutra
2076 23, 'Scripture declares Brahman to be the non-manifest.'--And the
2077 intuition (sakshatkkara) of Brahman ensues only upon its sa/m/radhana,
2078 i.e. upon its being perfectly pleased by the worshipper's devotion, as
2079 Scripture and Sm/ri/ti declare (24).--That this interpretation of 'neti'
2080 is the right one, is likewise shown by the fact that in the same way as
2081 praka/s/a, luminousness, j/n/ana, intelligence, &c., so also the quality
2082 of being differentiated by the world (prapa/nk/avsish/t/ata) is intuited
2083 as non-different, i.e. as likewise qualifying Brahman; and that
2084 praka/s/a, and so on, characterise Brahman, is known through repeated
2085 practice (on the part of /ri/shis like Vamadeva) in the work of
2086 sa/m/radhana mentioned before (25).--For all these reasons Brahman is
2087 connected with the infinite, i.e. the infinite number of auspicious
2088 qualities; for thus the twofold indications (li@nga) met with in
2089 Scripture are fully justified (26).--In what relation, then, does the
2090 a/k/id vastu, i.e. the non-sentient matter, which, according to the
2091 b/ri/hadara/n/yaka, is one of the forms of Brahman, stand to the
2092 latter?--Non-sentient beings might, in the first place, be viewed as
2093 special arrangements (sa/m/sthanavisesha/h/) of Brahman, as the coils
2094 are of the body of the snake; for Brahman is designated as both, i.e.
2095 sometimes as one with the world (Brahman is all this, &c.), sometimes as
2096 different from it (Let me enter into those elements, &c.) (27).--Or, in
2097 the second place, the relation of the two might be viewed as analogous
2098 to that of light and the luminous object which are two and yet one, both
2099 being fire (28).--Or, in the third place, the relation is like that
2100 stated before, i.e. the material world is, like the individual souls
2101 (whose case was discussed in II, 3, 43), a part--a/ms/a--of Brahman (29,
2102 30).

2103
2104 Adhik. VII (31-37) explains how some metaphorical expressions, seemingly
2105 implying that there is something different from Brahman, have to be
2106 truly understood.

2107
2108 Adhik. VIII (38-41) teaches that the reward of works is not, as Jaimini
2109 opines, the independent result of the works acting through the so-called
2110 apurva, but is allotted by the Lord.

2111
2112
2113 PADA III.

2114
2115
2116 With the third pada of the second adhyaya a new section of the work
2117 begins, whose task it is to describe how the individual soul is enabled
2118 by meditation on Brahman to obtain final release. The first point to be
2119 determined here is what constitutes a meditation on Brahman, and, more
2120 particularly, in what relation those parts of the Upanishads stand to
2121 each other which enjoin identical or partly identical meditations. The
2122 reader of the Upanishads cannot fail to observe that the texts of the
2123 different /s/akhas contain many chapters of similar, often nearly
2124 identical, contents, and that in some cases the text of even one and the
2125 same /s/akha exhibits the same matter in more or less varied forms. The
2126 reason of this clearly is that the common stock of religious and
2127 philosophical ideas which were in circulation at the time of the
2128 composition of the Upanishads found separate expression in the different
2129 priestly communities; hence the same speculations, legends, &c. reappear
2130 in various places of the sacred Scriptures in more or less differing
2131 dress. Originally, when we may suppose the members of each Vedic school
2132 to have confined themselves to the study of their own sacred texts, the
2133 fact that the texts of other schools contained chapters of similar
2134 contents would hardly appear to call for special note or comment; not
2135 any more than the circumstance that the sacrificial performances
2136 enjoined on the followers of some particular /s/akha were found
2137 described with greater or smaller modifications in the books of other
2138 /s/akhas also. But already at a very early period, at any rate long

2139 before the composition of the Vedanta-sutras in their present form, the
2140 Vedic theologians must have apprehended the truth that, in whatever
2141 regards sacrificial acts, one /s/akha may indeed safely follow its own
2142 texts, disregarding the texts of all other /s/akhas; that, however, all
2143 texts which aim at throwing light on the nature of Brahman and the
2144 relation to it of the human soul must somehow or other be combined into
2145 one consistent systematical whole equally valid for the followers of all
2146 Vedic schools. For, as we have had occasion to remark above, while acts
2147 may be performed by different individuals in different ways, cognition
2148 is defined by the nature of the object cognised, and hence can be one
2149 only, unless it ceases to be true cognition. Hence the attempts, on the
2150 one hand, of discarding by skilful interpretation all contradictions met
2151 with in the sacred text, and, on the other hand, of showing what
2152 sections of the different Upanishads have to be viewed as teaching the
2153 same matter, and therefore must be combined in one meditation. The
2154 latter is the special task of the present pada.

2155
2156 Adhik. I and II (1-4; 5) are concerned with the question whether those
2157 vidyas, which are met with in identical or similar form in more than one
2158 sacred text, are to be considered as constituting several vidyas, or one
2159 vidya only. /S/a@nkara remarks that the question affects only those
2160 vidyas whose object is the qualified Brahman; for the knowledge of the
2161 non-qualified Brahman, which is of an absolutely uniform nature, can of
2162 course be one only wherever it is set forth. But things lie differently
2163 in those cases where the object of knowledge is the sagu/n/am brahma or
2164 some outward manifestation of Brahman; for the qualities as well as
2165 manifestations of Brahman are many. Anticipating the subject of a later
2166 adhikara/n/a, we may take for an example the so-called /S/a/nd/ilyavidya
2167 which is met with in Ch. Up. III, 14, again--in an abridged form--in
2168 B/ri/. Up. V, 6, and, moreover, in the tenth book of the
2169 /S/atapathabrahma/n/a (X, 6, 3). The three passages enjoin a meditation
2170 on Brahman as possessing certain attributes, some of which are specified
2171 in all the three texts (as, for instance, manomayatva, bharupatva),
2172 while others are peculiar to each separate passage (pra/n/a/s/ariratva
2173 and satyasa/m/kalpatva, for instance, being mentioned in the Chandogya
2174 Upanishad and /S/atapatha-brahma/n/a, but not in the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka
2175 Upanishad, which, on its part, specifies sarvava/s/itva, not referred to
2176 in the two other texts). Here, then, there is room for a doubt whether
2177 the three passages refer to one object of knowledge or not. To the
2178 devout Vedantin the question is not a purely theoretical one, but of
2179 immediate practical interest. For if the three texts are to be held
2180 apart, there are three different meditations to be gone through; if, on
2181 the other hand, the vidya is one only, all the different qualities of
2182 Brahman mentioned in the three passages have to be combined into one
2183 meditation.--The decision is here, as in all similar cases, in favour of
2184 the latter alternative. A careful examination of the three passages
2185 shows that the object of meditation is one only; hence the meditation
2186 also is one only, comprehending all the attributes mentioned in the
2187 three texts.

2188
2189 Adhik. III (6-8) discusses the case of vidyas being really separate,
2190 although apparently identical. The examples selected are the
2191 udgithavidyas of the Chandogya Upanishad (I, 1-3) and the
2192 B/ri/hadara/n/yaka Upanishad (I, 3), which, although showing certain
2193 similarities--such as bearing the same name and the udgitha being in
2194 both identified with pra/n/a--yet are to be held apart, because the
2195 subject of the Chandogya vidya is not the whole udgitha but only the
2196 sacred syllabic Om, while the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka Upanishad represents
2197 the whole udgitha as the object of meditation.

2198
2199 Sutra 9 constitutes in /S/a@nkara's view a new adhikara/n/a (IV),
2200 proving that in the passage, 'Let a man meditate' (Ch. Up. I, 1, 1), the
2201 O/m/kara and the udgitha stand in the relation of one specifying the
2202 other, the meaning being, 'Let a man meditate on that O/m/kara which,'
2203 &c.--According to Ramanuja's interpretation, which seems to fall in more
2204 satisfactorily with the form and the wording of the Sutra, the latter
2205 merely furnishes an additional argument for the conclusion arrived at in
2206 the preceding adhikara/n/a.--Adhik. V (10) determines the unity of the
2207 so-called pra/n/a-vidyas and the consequent comprehension of the

2208 different qualities of the pra/n/a, which are mentioned in the different
2209 texts, within one meditation.

2210
2211 Adhik. VI comprises, according to /S/a@nkara, the Sutras 11-13. The
2212 point to be settled is whether in all the meditations on Brahman all its
2213 qualities are to be included or only those mentioned in the special
2214 vidya. The decision is that the essential and unalterable attributes of
2215 Brahman, such as bliss and knowledge, are to be taken into account
2216 everywhere, while those which admit of a more or less (as, for instance,
2217 the attribute of having joy for its head, mentioned in the Taitt. Up.)
2218 are confined to special meditations.--Adhik. VII (14, 15), according to
2219 /S/a@nkara, aims at proving that the object of Ka/th/a. Up. III, 10, 11
2220 is one only, viz. to show that the highest Self is higher than
2221 everything, so that the passage constitutes one vidya only.--Adhik. VIII
2222 (16, 17) determines, according to /S/a@nkara, that the Self spoken of in
2223 Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1 is not a lower form of the Self (the so-called
2224 sutratman), but the highest Self; the discussion of that point in this
2225 place being due to the wish to prove that the attributes of the highest
2226 Self have to be comprehended in the Aitaracyaka meditation.

2227
2228 According to Ramanuja the Sutras 11-17 constitute a single adhikara/n/a
2229 whose subject is the same as that of /S/a@nkara's sixth adhikar/n/a.
2230 Sutras 11-13 are, on the whole, explained as by /S/a@nkara; Sutra 12,
2231 however, is said to mean, 'Such attributes as having joy for its head,
2232 &c. are not to be viewed as qualities of Brahman, and therefore not to
2233 be included in every meditation; for if they were admitted as qualities,
2234 difference would be introduced into Brahman's nature, and that would
2235 involve a more or less on Brahman's part.' Sutras 14-17 continue the
2236 discussion of the passage about the priya/s/irastva.--If
2237 priya/s/irastva, &c. are not to be viewed as real qualities of Brahman,
2238 for what purpose does the text mention them?--'Because,' Sutra 14
2239 replies, 'there is no other purpose, Scripture mentions them for the
2240 purpose of pious meditation.'--But how is it known that the Self of
2241 delight is the highest Self? (owing to which you maintain that having
2242 limbs, head, &c. cannot belong to it as attributes.)--'Because,' Sutra
2243 15 replies, 'the term "Self" (atma anandamaya) is applied to it.'--But
2244 in the previous parts of the chapter the term Self (in atma pra/n/amaya,
2245 &c.) is applied to non-Selfs also; how then do you know that in atma
2246 anandamaya it denotes the real Self?--'The term Self,' Sutra 16 replies,
2247 'is employed here to denote the highest Self as in many other passages
2248 (atmaa va idam eka, &c.), as we conclude from the subsequent passage,
2249 viz. he wished, May I be many.'--But, an objection is raised, does not
2250 the context show that the term 'Self,' which in all the preceding
2251 clauses about the pra/n/amaya, &c. denoted something other than the
2252 Self, does the same in anandamaya atman, and is not the context of
2253 greater weight than a subsequent passage?--To this question asked in the
2254 former half of 17 (anvayad iti /k/et) the latter half replies, 'Still it
2255 denotes the Self, owing to the affirmatory statement,' i.e. the fact of
2256 the highest Self having been affirmed in a previous passage also, viz.
2257 II, 1, 'From that Self sprang ether.'

2258
2259 Adhik. IX (18) discusses a minor point connected with the
2260 pra/n/asa/m/vada.--The subject of Adhik. X (19) has been indicated
2261 already above under Adhik. I.--Adhik. XI (20-22) treats of a case of a
2262 contrary nature; in B/ri/. Up. V, 5, Brahman is represented first as
2263 abiding in the sphere of the sun, and then as abiding within the eye; we
2264 therefore, in spite of certain counter-indications, have to do with two
2265 separate vidyas.--Adhik. XII (23) refers to a similar case; certain
2266 attributes of Brahman mentioned in the Ra/n/ayaniya-khila have not to be
2267 introduced into the corresponding Chandogya vidya, because the stated
2268 difference of Brahman's abode involves difference of vidya.--Adhik. XIII
2269 (24) treats of another instance of two vidyas having to be held apart.

2270
2271 Adhik. XIV (25) decides that certain detached mantras and brahma/n/a
2272 passages met with in the beginning of some Upanishads--as, for instance,
2273 a brahma/n/a about the mahavrata ceremony at the beginning of the
2274 Aitareya-ara/n/yaka--do, notwithstanding their position which seems to
2275 connect them with the brahmavidya, not belong to the latter, since they
2276 show unmistakable signs of being connected with sacrificial acts.

2277
2278 Adhik. XV (26) treats of the passages stating that the man dying in the
2279 possession of true knowledge shakes off all his good and evil deeds, and
2280 affirms that a statement, made in some of those passages only, to the
2281 effect that the good and evil deeds pass over to the friends and enemies
2282 of the deceased, is valid for all the passages.
2283
2284 Sutras 27-30 constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, two adhikara/n/as of
2285 which the former (XVI; 27, 28) decides that the shaking off of the good
2286 and evil deeds takes place--not, as the Kaush. Up. states, on the road
2287 to Brahman's world--but at the moment of the soul's departure from the
2288 body; the Kaushitaki statement is therefore not to be taken
2289 literally.--The latter adhikara/n/a (XVII; 29, 30) treats of the cognate
2290 question whether the soul that has freed itself from its deeds proceeds
2291 in all cases on the road of the gods (as said in the Kaush. Up.), or
2292 not. The decision is that he only whose knowledge does not pass beyond
2293 the sagu/n/am brahma proceeds on that road, while the soul of him who
2294 knows the nirgu/n/am brahma becomes one with it without moving to any
2295 other place.
2296
2297 The /S/ri-bhashya treats the four Sutras as one adhikara/n/a whose two
2298 first Sutras are explained as by /S/a@nkara, while Sutra 29 raises an
2299 objection to the conclusion arrived at, 'the going (of the soul on the
2300 path of the gods) has a sense only if the soul's freeing itself from its
2301 works takes place in both ways, i.e. partly at the moment of death,
2302 partly on the road to Brahman; for otherwise there would be a
2303 contradiction' (the contradiction being that, if the soul's works were
2304 all shaken off at the moment of death, the subtle body would likewise
2305 perish at that moment, and then the bodiless soul would be unable to
2306 proceed on the path of the gods). To this Sutra 30 replies, 'The
2307 complete shaking off of the works at the moment of death is possible,
2308 since matters of that kind are observed in Scripture,' i.e. since
2309 scriptural passages show that even he whose works are entirely
2310 annihilated, and who has manifested himself in his true shape, is yet
2311 connected with some kind of body; compare the passage, 'para/m/ jyotir
2312 upasampadya svena rupe/n/abhinishpadyate sa tatra paryeti kri/d/an
2313 ramamana/h/ sa svara/d/ bhavati tasya sarveshu lokeshu kama/k/aro
2314 bhavati.' That subtle body is not due to karman, but to the soul's
2315 vidyamahatmya.--That the explanation of the /S/ri-bhashya agrees with
2316 the text as well as /S/a@nkara's, a comparison of the two will show;
2317 especially forced is /S/a@nkara's explanation of 'arthavattvam
2318 ubhayatha,' which is said to mean that there is arthavattva in one case,
2319 and non-arthavattva in the other case.
2320
2321 The next Sutra (31) constitutes an adhikara/n/a (XVIII) deciding that
2322 the road of the gods is followed not only by those knowing the vidyas
2323 which specially mention the going on that road, but by all who are
2324 acquainted with the sagu/n/a-vidyas of Brahman.--The explanation given
2325 in the /S/ri-bhashya (in which Sutras 31 and 32 have exchanged places)
2326 is similar, with the difference however that all who meditate on
2327 Brahman--without any reference to the distinction of nirgu/n/a and
2328 sagu/n/a--proceed after death on the road of the gods. (The
2329 /S/ri-bhashya reads 'sarvesham,' i.e. all worshippers, not 'sarvasam,'
2330 all sagu/n/a-vidyas.)
2331
2332 Adhik. XIX (32) decides that, although the general effect of true
2333 knowledge is release from all forms of body, yet even such beings as
2334 have reached perfect knowledge may retain a body for the purpose of
2335 discharging certain offices.--In the /S/ri-bhashya, where the Sutra
2336 follows immediately on Sutra 30, the adhikara/n/a determines, in close
2337 connexion with 30, that, although those who know Brahman as a rule
2338 divest themselves of the gross body--there remaining only a subtle body
2339 which enables them to move--and no longer experience pleasure and pain,
2340 yet certain beings, although having reached the cognition of Brahman,
2341 remain invested with a gross body, and hence liable to pleasure and pain
2342 until they have fully performed certain duties.
2343
2344 Adhik. XX (33) teaches that the negative attributes of Brahman mentioned
2345 in some vidyas--such as its being not gross, not subtle, &c.--are to be

2346 included in all meditations on Brahman.--Adhik. XXI (34) determines that
 2347 Ka/th/a Up. III, 1, and Mu. Up. III, 1, constitute one vidya only,
 2348 because both passages refer to the highest Brahman. According to
 2349 Ramanuja the Sutra contains a reply to an objection raised against the
 2350 conclusion arrived at in the preceding Sutra.--Adhik. XXII (35, 36)
 2351 maintains that the two passages, B/ri/. Up. III, 4 and III, 5,
 2352 constitute one vidya only, the object of knowledge being in both cases
 2353 Brahman viewed as the inner Self of all.--Adhik. XXIII (37) on the
 2354 contrary decides that the passage Ait. Ar. II, 2, 4, 6 constitutes not
 2355 one but two meditations.--Adhik. XXIV (38) again determines that the
 2356 vidya of the True contained in B/ri/. Up. V, 4, 5, is one
 2357 only--According to Ramanuja, Sutras 35-38 constitute one adhikara/n/a
 2358 only whose subject is the same as that of XXII according to /S/a@nkara.
 2359
 2360 Adhik. XXV (39) proves that the passages Ch. Up. VIII, 1 and B/ri/. Up.
 2361 IV, 4, 22 cannot constitute one vidya, since the former refers to
 2362 Brahman as possessing qualities, while the latter is concerned with
 2363 Brahman as destitute of qualities.--Adhik. XXVI (40, 41) treats,
 2364 according to /S/a@nkara, of a minor question connected with Ch. Up. V,
 2365 11 ff.--According to the /S/ri-bhashya, Sutras 39-41 form one
 2366 adhikara/n/a whose first Sutra reaches essentially the same conclusion
 2367 as /S/a@nkara under 39. Sutras 40, 41 thereupon discuss a general
 2368 question concerning the meditations on Brahman. The qualities, an
 2369 opponent is supposed to remark, which in the two passages discussed are
 2370 predicated of Brahman--such as va/s/itva, satyakamatva, &c.--cannot be
 2371 considered real (paramarthika), since other passages (sa esha neti neti,
 2372 and the like) declare Brahman to be devoid of all qualities. Hence those
 2373 qualities cannot be admitted into meditations whose purpose is final
 2374 release.--To this objection Sutra 40 replies, '(Those qualities) are not
 2375 to be left off (from the meditations on Brahman), since (in the passage
 2376 under discussion as well as in other passages) they are stated with
 2377 emphasis[17]. '--But, another objection is raised, Scripture says that he
 2378 who meditates on Brahman as satyakama, &c. obtains a mere perishable
 2379 reward, viz. the world of the fathers, and similar results specified in
 2380 Ch. Up. VIII, 2; hence, he who is desirous of final release, must not
 2381 include those qualities of Brahman in his meditation.--To this objection
 2382 Sutra 41 replies, 'Because that (i.e. the free roaming in all the
 2383 worlds, the world of the fathers, &c.) is stated as proceeding therefrom
 2384 (i.e. the approach to Brahman which is final release) in the case of
 2385 (the soul) which has approached Brahman;' (therefore a person desirous
 2386 of release, may include satyakamatva, &c. in his meditations.)
 2387
 2388 Adhik. XXVII (42) decides that those meditations which are connected
 2389 with certain matters forming constituent parts of sacrificial actions,
 2390 are not to be considered as permanently requisite parts of the
 2391 latter.--Adhik. XXVIII (43) teaches that, in a B/ri/. Up. passage and a
 2392 similar Ch. Up. passage, Vayu and Pra/n/a are not to be identified, but
 2393 to be held apart.--Adhik. XXIX (44-52) decides that the firealtars made
 2394 of mind, &c., which are mentioned in the Agnirahasya, do not constitute
 2395 parts of the sacrificial action (so that the mental, &c. construction of
 2396 the altar could optionally be substituted for the actual one), but
 2397 merely subjects of meditations.
 2398
 2399 Adhik. XXX (53, 54) treats, according to /S/a@nkara, in the way of
 2400 digression, of the question whether to the Self an existence independent
 2401 of the body can be assigned, or not (as the Materialists
 2402 maintain).--According to the /S/ri-bhashya the adhikara/n/a does not
 2403 refer to this wide question, but is concerned with a point more
 2404 immediately connected with the meditations on Brahman, viz. the question
 2405 as to the form under which, in those meditations, the Self of the
 2406 meditating devotee has to be viewed. The two Sutras then have to be
 2407 translated as follows: 'Some (maintain that the soul of the devotee has,
 2408 in meditations, to be viewed as possessing those attributes only which
 2409 belong to it in its embodied state, such as j/n/at/ri/tva and the like),
 2410 because the Self is (at the time of meditation) in the body.'--The next
 2411 Sutra rejects this view, 'This is not so, but the separatedness (i.e.
 2412 the pure isolated state in which the Self is at the time of final
 2413 release when it is freed from all evil, &c.) (is to be transferred to
 2414 the meditating Self), because that will be[18] the state (of the Self in

2415 the condition of final release).'

2416

2417 Adhik. XXXI (55, 56) decides that meditations connected with constituent
 2418 elements of the sacrifice, such as the udgitha, are, in spite of
 2419 difference of svara in the udgitha, &c., valid, not only for that
 2420 /s/akha in which the meditation actually is met with, but for all
 2421 /s/akhas.--Adhik. XXXII (57) decides that the Vai/s/vanara Agni of Ch.
 2422 Up. V, 11 ff. is to be meditated upon as a whole, not in his single
 2423 parts.--Adhik. XXXIII (58) teaches that those meditations which refer to
 2424 one subject, but as distinguished by different qualities, have to be
 2425 held apart as different meditations. Thus the daharavidya,
 2426 /S/a/nd/ilyavidya, &c. remain separate.

2427

2428 Adhik. XXXIV (59) teaches that those meditations on Brahman for which
 2429 the texts assign one and the same fruit are optional, there being no
 2430 reason for their being cumulated.--Adhik. XXXV (60) decides that those
 2431 meditations, on the other hand, which refer to special wishes may be
 2432 cumulated or optionally employed according to choice.--Adhik. XXXVI
 2433 (61-66) extends this conclusion to the meditations connected with
 2434 constituent elements of action, such as the udgitha.

2435

2436

2437 PADA IV.

2438

2439

2440 Adhik. I (1-17) proves that the knowledge of Brahman is not kratvartha,
 2441 i.e. subordinate to action, but independent.--Adhik. II (18-20) confirms
 2442 this conclusion by showing that the state of the pravrajins is enjoined
 2443 by the sacred law, and that for them vidya only is prescribed, not
 2444 action.--Adhik. III (21, 22) decides that certain clauses forming part
 2445 of vidyas are not mere stutis (arthavadas), but themselves enjoin the
 2446 meditation.--The legends recorded in the Vedanta-texts are not to be
 2447 used as subordinate members of acts, but have the purpose of
 2448 glorifying--as arthavadas--the injunctions with which they are connected
 2449 (Adhik. IV, 23, 24).--For all these reasons the urdhvaretasa/h/ require
 2450 no actions but only knowledge (Adhik. V, 25).--Nevertheless the actions
 2451 enjoined by Scripture, such as sacrifices, conduct of certain kinds,
 2452 &c., are required as conducive to the rise of vidya in the mind (Adhik.
 2453 VI, 26, 27).--Certain relaxations, allowed by Scripture, of the laws
 2454 regarding food, are meant only for cases of extreme need (Adhik. VII,
 2455 28-31).--The a/s/ramakarma/n/i are obligatory on him also who does not
 2456 strive after mukti (Adhik. VIII, 32-35).--Those also who, owing to
 2457 poverty and so on, are ana/s/rama have claims to vidya (Adhik. IX,
 2458 36-39).--An urdhvaretas cannot revoke his vow (Adhik. X, 40).--Expiation
 2459 of the fall of an urdhvaretas (Adhik. XI, 41, 42).--Exclusion of the
 2460 fallen urdhvaretas in certain cases (Adhik. XII, 43).--Those
 2461 meditations, which are connected with subordinate members of the
 2462 sacrifice, are the business of the priest, not of the yajamana (Adhik.
 2463 XIII, 44-46).--B/ri/. Up. III, 5, 1 enjoins mauna as a third in addition
 2464 to balya and pa/nd/itya (Adhik. XIV, 47-49).--By balya is to be
 2465 understood a childlike innocent state of mind (Adhik. XV, 50).

2466

2467 Sutras 51 and 52 discuss, according to Ramanuja, the question when the
 2468 vidya, which is the result of the means described in III, 4, arises.
 2469 Sutra 51 treats of that vidya whose result is mere exaltation
 2470 (abhyudaya), and states that 'it takes place in the present life, if
 2471 there is not present an obstacle in the form of a prabalakarmantara (in
 2472 which latter case the vidya arises later only), on account of Scripture
 2473 declaring this (in various passages). '--Sutra 52, 'Thus there is also
 2474 absence of a definite rule as to (the time of origination of) that
 2475 knowledge whose fruit is release, it being averred concerning that one
 2476 also that it is in the same condition (i.e. of sometimes having an
 2477 obstacle, sometimes not). '--/S/a@nkara, who treats the two Sutras as two
 2478 adhikara/n/as, agrees as to the explanation of 51, while, putting a
 2479 somewhat forced interpretation on 52, he makes it out to mean that a
 2480 more or less is possible only in the case of the sagu/n/a-vidyas.

2481

2482 Notes:

2483

2484 [Footnote 16: All the mentioned modes of Brahman are known from
2485 Scripture only, not from ordinary experience. If the latter were the
2486 case, then, and then only, Scripture might at first refer to them
2487 'anuvadana,' and finally negative them.]
2488

2489 [Footnote 17: Ramanuja has here some strong remarks on the improbability
2490 of qualities emphatically attributed to Brahman, in more than one
2491 passage, having to be set aside in any meditation: 'Na /k/a
2492 matapit/ri/sahasrebhyo-pi vatsalatara/m/ sastra/m/ pratarakavad
2493 aparamarthikau nirasaniyau gu/n/au prama/n/antarapratipannau
2494 adare/n/opadi/s/ya sa/m/sara/k/akraparivartanena purvam eva
2495 bambhramyamanan mumukshun bhuyo-pi bhramayitum alam.']
2496

2497 [Footnote 18: The /S/ri-bh-ashya as well as several other commentaries
2498 reads tadbhavabhavitvat for /S/an@kara's tadbhavabhavitvat.]
2499
2500

2501 FOURTH ADHYAYA.
2502 PADA I.
2503
2504

2505 Adhikara/n/a I (1, 2).--The meditation on the Atman enjoined by
2506 Scripture is not an act to be accomplished once only, but is to be
2507 repeated again and again.
2508

2509 Adhik. II (3).--The devotee engaged in meditation on Brahman is to view
2510 it as constituting his own Self.
2511

2512 Adhik. III (4).--To the rule laid down in the preceding adhikara/n/a the
2513 so-called pratikopasanas, i.e. those meditations in which Brahman is
2514 viewed under a symbol or outward manifestation (as, for instance, mano
2515 brahmety upasita) constitute an exception, i.e. the devotee is not to
2516 consider the pratika as constituting his own Self.
2517

2518 Adhik. IV (5).--In the pratikopasanas the pratika is to be meditatively
2519 viewed as being one with Brahman, not Brahman as being one with the
2520 pratika.--Ramanuja takes Sutra 5 as simply giving a reason for the
2521 decision arrived at under Sutra 4, and therefore as not constituting a
2522 new adhikara/n/a.
2523

2524 Adhik. V (6).--In meditations connected with constitutives of
2525 sacrificial works (as, for instance, ya evasau tapati tam udgitham
2526 upasita) the idea of the divinity, &c. is to be transferred to the
2527 sacrificial item, not vice versa. In the example quoted, for instance,
2528 the udgitha is to be viewed as Aditya, not Aditya as the udgitha.
2529

2530 Adhik. VI (7-10).--The devotee is to carry on his meditations in a
2531 sitting posture.--/S/a@nkara maintains that this rule does not apply to
2532 those meditations whose result is sa/m/yagdar/s/ana; but the Sutra gives
2533 no hint to that effect.
2534

2535 Adhik. VII (11).--The meditations may be carried on at any time, and in
2536 any place, favourable to concentration of mind.
2537

2538 Adhik. VIII (12).--The meditations are to be continued until
2539 death.--/S/a@nkara again maintains that those meditations which lead to
2540 sa/m/yagdar/s/ana are excepted.
2541

2542 Adhik. IX (13).--When through those meditations the knowledge of Brahman
2543 has been reached, the vidvan is no longer affected by the consequences
2544 of either past or future evil deeds.
2545

2546 Adhik. X (14).--Good deeds likewise lose their efficiency.--The literal
2547 translation of the Sutra is, 'There is likewise non-attachment (to the
2548 vidvan) of the other (i.e. of the deeds other than the evil ones, i.e.
2549 of good deeds), but on the fall (of the body, i.e. when death takes
2550 place).' The last words of the Sutra, 'but on the fall,' are separated
2551 by /S/a@nkara from the preceding part of the Sutra and interpreted to
2552 mean, 'when death takes place (there results mukti of the vidvan, who

2553 through his knowledge has freed himself from the bonds of
2554 works). '--According to Ramanuja the whole Sutra simply means, 'There is
2555 likewise non-attachment of good deeds (not at once when knowledge is
2556 reached), but on the death of the vidvan[19].'
2557

2558 Adhik. XI (15). --The non-operation of works stated in the two preceding
2559 adhikara/n/as holds good only in the case of anarabdhakarya works, i.e.
2560 those works which have not yet begun to produce their effects, while it
2561 does not extend to the arabdhakarya works on which the present existence
2562 of the devotee depends.
2563

2564 Adhik. XII (16, 17). --From the rule enunciated in Adhik. X are excepted
2565 such sacrificial performances as are enjoined permanently (nitya): so,
2566 for instance, the agnihotra, for they promote the origination of
2567 knowledge.
2568

2569 Adhik. XIII (18). --The origination of knowledge is promoted also by such
2570 sacrificial works as are not accompanied with the knowledge of the
2571 upasanas referring to the different members of those works.
2572

2573 Adhik. XIV (19). --The arabdhakarya works have to be worked out fully by
2574 the fruition of their effects; whereupon the vidvan becomes united with
2575 Brahman. --The 'bhoga' of the Sutra is, according to /S/a@nkara,
2576 restricted to the present existence of the devotee, since the complete
2577 knowledge obtained by him destroys the nescience which otherwise would
2578 lead to future embodiments. According to Ramanuja a number of embodied
2579 existences may have to be gone through before the effects of the
2580 arabdhakarya works are exhausted.
2581

2582
2583 PADA II.
2584
2585

2586 This and the two remaining padas of the fourth adhyaya describe the fate
2587 of the vidvan after death. According to /S/a@nkara we have to
2588 distinguish the vidvan who possesses the highest knowledge, viz. that he
2589 is one with the highest Brahman, and the vidvan who knows only the lower
2590 Brahman, and have to refer certain Sutras to the former and others to
2591 the latter. According to Ramanuja the vidvan is one only.
2592

2593 Adhik. I, II, III (1-6). --On the death of the vidvan (i.e. of him who
2594 possesses the lower knowledge, according to /S/a@nkara) his senses are
2595 merged in the manas, the manas in the chief vital air (pra/n/a), the
2596 vital air in the individual soul (jiva), the soul in the subtle
2597 elements. --According to Ramanuja the combination (sampatti) of the
2598 senses with the manas, &c. is a mere conjunction (sa/m/yoga), not a
2599 merging (laya).
2600

2601 Adhik. IV (7). --The vidvan (i.e. according to /S/a@nkara, he who
2602 possesses the lower knowledge) and the avidvan, i.e. he who does not
2603 possess any knowledge of Brahman, pass through the same stages (i.e.
2604 those described hitherto) up to the entrance of the soul, together with
2605 the subtle elements, and so on into the na/d/is. --The vidvan also
2606 remains connected with the subtle elements because he has not yet
2607 completely destroyed avidya, so that the immortality which Scripture
2608 ascribes to him (am/ri/tatva/m/ hi vidvan abhya/s/nute) is only a
2609 relative one. --Ramanuja quotes the following text regarding the
2610 immortality of the vidvan:
2611

2612 'Yada sarve pramu/k/yante kama yessya h/ri/di sthita/h/ atha
2613 martyosm/ri/to bhavaty atra brahma sama/s/nute,'
2614

2615 and explains that the immortality which is here ascribed to the vidvan
2616 as soon as he abandons all desires can only mean the
2617 destruction--mentioned in the preceding pada--of all the effects of good
2618 and evil works, while the 'reaching of Brahman' can only refer to the
2619 intuition of Brahman vouchsafed to the meditating devotee.
2620

2621 Adhik. V (8-11) raises; according to /S/a@nkara, the question whether

2622 the subtle elements of which Scripture says that they are combined with
2623 the highest deity (teja/h/ parasya/m/ devatayam) are completely merged
2624 in the latter or not. The answer is that a complete absorption of the
2625 elements takes place only when final emancipation is reached; that, on
2626 the other hand, as long as the sa/m/sara state lasts, the elements,
2627 although somehow combined with Brahman, remain distinct so as to be able
2628 to form new bodies for the soul.

2629
2630 According to Ramanuja the Sutras 8-11 do not constitute a new
2631 adhikara/n/a, but continue the discussion of the point mooted in 7. The
2632 immortality there spoken of does not imply the separation of the soul
2633 from the body, 'because Scripture declares sa/m/sara, i.e. embodiedness
2634 up to the reaching of Brahman' (tasya tavad eva /k/ira/m/ yavan na
2635 vimokshye atha sampatsye) (8).--That the soul after having departed from
2636 the gross body is not disconnected from the subtle elements, is also
2637 proved hereby, that the subtle body accompanies it, as is observed from
2638 authority[20] (9).--Hence the immortality referred to in the scriptural
2639 passage quoted is not effected by means of the total destruction of the
2640 body (10).

2641
2642 Adhik. VI (12-14) is of special importance.--According to /S/a@nkara the
2643 Sutras now turn from the discussion of the departure of him who
2644 possesses the lower knowledge only to the consideration of what becomes
2645 of him who has reached the higher knowledge. So far it has been taught
2646 that in the case of relative immortality (ensuing on the apara vidya)
2647 the subtle elements, together with the senses and so on, depart from the
2648 body of the dying devotee; this implies at the same time that they do
2649 not depart from the body of the dying sage who knows himself to be one
2650 with Brahman.--Against this latter implied doctrine Sutra 12 is supposed
2651 to formulate an objection. 'If it be said that the departure of the
2652 pra/n/as from the body of the dying sage is denied (viz. in B/ri/. Up.
2653 IV, 4, 5, na tasya pra/n/a utkramanti, of him the pra/n/as do not pass
2654 out); we reply that in that passage the genitive "tasya" has the sense
2655 of the ablative "tasmat," so that the sense of the passage is, "from
2656 him, i.e. from the jiva of the dying sage, the pra/n/as do not depart,
2657 but remain with it."--This objection /S/a@nkara supposes to be disposed
2658 of in Sutra 13. 'By some there is given a clear denial of the departure
2659 of the pra/n/as in the case of the dying sage,' viz. in the passage
2660 B/ri/. Up. III, 2, 11, where Yaj/n/avalkya instructs Artabhaga that,
2661 when this man dies, the pra/n/as do not depart from it (asmat; the
2662 context showing that asmat means 'from it,' viz. from the body, and not
2663 'from him,' viz. the jiva).--The same view is, moreover, confirmed by
2664 Sm/ri/ti passages.

2665
2666 According to Ramanuja the three Sutras forming /S/a@nkara's sixth
2667 adhikara/n/a do not constitute a new adhikara/n/a at all, and, moreover,
2668 have to be combined into two Sutras. The topic continuing to be
2669 discussed is the utkranti of the vidvan. If, Sutra 12 says, the utkranti
2670 of the pra/n/as is not admitted, on the ground of the denial supposed to
2671 be contained in B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5; the reply is that the sense of the
2672 tasya there is '/s/arirat' (so that the passage means, 'from him, i.e.
2673 the jiva, the pra/n/as do not depart'); for this is clearly shown by the
2674 reading of some, viz. the Madhyandinas, who, in their text of the
2675 passage, do not read 'tasya' but 'tasmat.'--With reference to the
2676 instruction given by Yaj/n/avalkya to Artabhaga, it is to be remarked
2677 that nothing there shows the 'ayam purusha' to be the sage who knows
2678 Brahman.--And, finally, there are Sm/ri/ti passages declaring that the
2679 sage also when dying departs from the body.

2680
2681 Adhik. VII and VIII (15, 16) teach, according to /S/a@nkara, that, on
2682 the death of him who possesses the higher knowledge, his pra/n/as,
2683 elements, &c. are merged in Brahman, so as to be no longer distinct from
2684 it in any way.

2685
2686 According to Ramanuja the two Sutras continue the teaching about the
2687 pra/n/as, bhutas, &c. of the vidvan in general, and declare that they
2688 are finally merged in Brahman, not merely in the way of conjunction
2689 (sa/m/yoga), but completely.[21]
2690

2691 Adhik. IX (17).--/S/a@nkara here returns to the owner of the apara
2692 vidya, while Ramanuja continues the description of the utkranti of his
2693 vidvan.--The jiva of the dying man passes into the heart, and thence
2694 departs out of the body by means of the na/d/is; the vidvan by means of
2695 the na/d/i called sushum/n/a, the avidvan by means of some other na/d/i.
2696
2697 Adhik. X (18, 19).--The departing soul passes up to the sun by means of
2698 a ray of light which exists at night as well as during day.
2699
2700 Adhik. XI (20, 21).--Also that vidvan who dies during the dakshi/n/ayana
2701 reaches Brahman.
2702
2703
2704 PADA III.
2705
2706
2707 Adhik. I, II, III (1-3) reconcile the different accounts given in the
2708 Upanishads as to the stations of the way which leads the vidvan up to
2709 Brahman.
2710
2711 Adhik. IV (4-6)--By the 'stations' we have, however, to understand not
2712 only the subdivisions of the way but also the divine beings which lead
2713 the soul on.
2714
2715 The remaining part of the pada is by /S/a@nkara divided into two
2716 adhikara/n/as. Of these the former one (7-14) teaches that the Brahman
2717 to which the departed soul is led by the guardians of the path of the
2718 gods is not the highest Brahman, but the effected (karya) or qualified
2719 (/s/agu/n/a) Brahman. This is the opinion propounded in Sutras 7-11 by
2720 Badari, and, finally, accepted by /S/a@nkara in his commentary on Sutra
2721 14. In Sutras 12-14 Jaimini defends the opposite view, according to
2722 which the soul of the vidvan goes to the highest Brahman, not to the
2723 karyam brahma. But Jaimini's view, although set forth in the latter part
2724 of the adhikara/n/a, is, according to /S/a@nkara, a mere purvapaksha,
2725 while Badari's opinion represents the siddhanta.--The latter of the two
2726 adhikara/n/as (VI of the whole pada; 15, 16) records the opinion of
2727 Badaraya/n/a on a collateral question, viz. whether, or not, all those
2728 who worship the effected Brahman are led to it. The decision is that
2729 those only are guided to Brahman who have not worshipped it under a
2730 pratika form.
2731
2732 According to Ramanuja, Sutras 7-16 form one adhikara/n/a only, in which
2733 the views of Badari and of Jaimini represent two purvapakshas, while
2734 Badaraya/n/a's opinion is adopted as the siddhanta. The question is
2735 whether the guardians of the path lead to Brahman only those who worship
2736 the effected Brahman, i.e. Hira/n/yagarbha, or those who worship the
2737 highest Brahman, or those who worship the individual soul as free from
2738 Prak/ri/ti, and having Brahman for its Self (ye pratyagatmana/m/
2739 prak/ri/tiviyukta/m/ brahmatmakam upasate).--The first view is
2740 maintained by Badari in Sutra 7, 'The guardians lead to Brahman those
2741 who worship the effected Brahman, because going is possible towards the
2742 latter only;' for no movement can take place towards the highest and as
2743 such omnipresent Brahman.--The explanation of Sutra 9 is similar to that
2744 of /S/a@nkara; but more clearly replies to the objection (that, if
2745 Hira/n/yagarbha were meant in the passage, 'purusho /s/a manava/h/ sa
2746 etan brahma gamayati,' the text would read 'sa etan brahma/n/am
2747 gamayati') that Hira/n/yagarbha is called Brahman on account of his
2748 nearness to Brahman, i.e. on account of his prathamajatva.--The
2749 explanation of 10, 11 is essentially the same as in /S/a@nkara; so also
2750 of 12-14.--The siddhanta view is established in Sutra 13, 'It is the
2751 opinion of Badaraya/n/a that it, i.e. the ga/n/a of the guardians, leads
2752 to Brahman those who do not take their stand on what is pratika, i.e.
2753 those who worship the highest Brahman, and those who meditate on the
2754 individual Self as dissociated from prak/ri/ti, and having Brahman for
2755 its Self, but not those who worship Brahman under pratikas. For both
2756 views--that of Jaimini as well as that of Badari--are faulty.' The karya
2757 view contradicts such passages as 'asma/k/ charirat samutthaya para/m/
2758 jyotir upasampadya,' &c.; the para view, such passages as that in the
2759 pa/nk/agni-vidya, which declares that ya ittha/m/ vidu/h/, i.e. those

2760 who know the pa/nk/agni-vidya, are also led up to Brahman.

2761

2762

2763 PADA IV.

2764

2765

2766 Adhik. I (1-3) returns, according to /S/a@nkara, to the owner of the
2767 para vidya, and teaches that, when on his death his soul obtains final
2768 release, it does not acquire any new characteristics, but merely
2769 manifests itself in its true nature.--The explanation given by Ramanuja
2770 is essentially the same, but of course refers to that vidvan whose going
2771 to Brahman had been described in the preceding pada.

2772

2773 Adhik. II (4) determines that the relation in which the released soul
2774 stands to Brahman is that of avibhaga, non-separation. This, on
2775 /S/a@nkara's view, means absolute non-separation, identity.--According
2776 to Ramanuja the question to be considered is whether the released soul
2777 views itself as separate (p/ri/thagbhuta) from Brahman, or as
2778 non-separate because being a mode of Brahman. The former view is
2779 favoured by those /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti passages which speak of the soul
2780 as being with, or equal to, Brahman; the latter by, such passages as tat
2781 tvam asi and the like.[22]

2782

2783 Adhik. III (5-7) discusses the characteristics of the released soul
2784 (i.e. of the truly released soul, according to /S/a@nkara). According to
2785 Jaimini the released soul, when manifesting itself in its true nature,
2786 possesses all those qualities which in Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1 and other
2787 places are ascribed to Brahman, such as apahatapapmatva,
2788 satyasa/m/kalpatva, &c., ai/s/varya.--According to Au/d/ulomi the only
2789 characteristic of the released soul is /k/aitanya.--According to
2790 Badarayana the two views can be combined (/S/a@nkara remarking that
2791 satyasa/m/kalpatva, &c. are ascribed to the released soul
2792 vyavaharapekshaya).

2793

2794 Adhik. IV (8-9) returns, according to /S/a@nkara, to the apara vidya,
2795 and discusses the question whether the soul of the pious effects its
2796 desires by its mere determination, or uses some other means. The former
2797 alternative is accepted--According to Ramanuja the adhikara/n/a simply
2798 continues the consideration of the state of the released, begun in the
2799 preceding adhikara/n/a. Of the released soul it is said in Ch. Up. VIII,
2800 12, 3 that after it has manifested itself in its true nature it moves
2801 about playing and rejoicing with women, carriages, and so on. The
2802 question then arises whether it effects all this by its mere sa/m/kalpa
2803 (it having been shown in the preceding adhikara/n/a that the released
2804 soul is, like the Lord, satyasa/m/kalpa), or not. The answer is in
2805 favour of the former alternative, on account of the explicit declaration
2806 made in Ch. Up. VIII, 2, 'By his mere will the fathers come to receive
2807 him.'

2808

2809 Adhik. V (10-14) decides that the released are embodied or disembodied
2810 according to their wish and will.

2811

2812 Adhik. VI (11, 12) explains how the soul of the released can animate
2813 several bodies at the same time.--Sutra 12 gives, according to
2814 /S/a@nkara, the additional explanation that those passages which declare
2815 the absence of all specific cognition on the part of the released soul
2816 do not refer to the partly released soul of the devotee, but either to
2817 the soul in the state of deep sleep (svapyaya = sushupti), or to the
2818 fully released soul of the sage (sampatti = kaivalya).--Ramanuja
2819 explains that the passages speaking of absence of consciousness refer
2820 either to the state of deep sleep, or to the time of dying (sampatti =
2821 mata/n/am according to 'van manasi sampadyate,' &c.).

2822

2823 Adhik. VII (17-21).--The released jivas participate in all the
2824 perfections and powers of the Lord, with the exception of the power of
2825 creating and sustaining the world. They do not return to new forms of
2826 embodied existence.

2827

2828 After having, in this way, rendered ourselves acquainted with the

2829 contents of the Brahma-sutras according to the views of /S/a@nkara as
2830 well as Ramanuja, we have now to consider the question which of the two
2831 modes of interpretation represents--or at any rate more closely
2832 approximates to the true meaning of the Sutras. That few of the Sutras
2833 are intelligible if taken by themselves, we have already remarked above;
2834 but this does not exclude the possibility of our deciding with a fair
2835 degree of certainty which of the two interpretations proposed agrees
2836 better with the text, at least in a certain number of cases.

2837
2838 We have to note in the first place that, in spite of very numerous
2839 discrepancies,--of which only the more important ones have been singled
2840 out in the conspectus of contents,--the two commentators are at one as
2841 to the general drift of the Sutras and the arrangement of topics. As a
2842 rule, the adhikara/n/as discuss one or several Vedic passages bearing
2843 upon a certain point of the system, and in the vast majority of cases
2844 the two commentators agree as to which are the special texts referred
2845 to. And, moreover, in a very large number of cases the agreement extends
2846 to the interpretation to be put on those passages and on the Sutras.
2847 This far-reaching agreement certainly tends to inspire us with a certain
2848 confidence as to the existence of an old tradition concerning the
2849 meaning of the Sutras on which the bulk of the interpretations of
2850 /S/a@nkara as well as of Ramanuja are based.

2851
2852 But at the same time we have seen that, in a not inconsiderable number
2853 of cases, the interpretations of /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja diverge more or
2854 less widely, and that the Sutras affected thereby are, most of them,
2855 especially important because bearing on fundamental points of the
2856 Vedanta system. The question then remains which of the two
2857 interpretations is entitled to preference.

2858
2859 Regarding a small number of Sutras I have already (in the conspectus of
2860 contents) given it as my opinion that Ramanuja's explanation appears to
2861 be more worthy of consideration. We meet, in the first place, with a
2862 number of cases in which the two commentators agree as to the literal
2863 meaning of a Sutra, but where /S/a@nkara sees himself reduced to the
2864 necessity of supplementing his interpretation by certain additions and
2865 reservations of his own for which the text gives no occasion, while
2866 Ramanuja is able to take the Sutra as it stands. To exemplify this
2867 remark, I again direct attention to all those Sutras which in clear
2868 terms represent the individual soul as something different from the
2869 highest soul, and concerning which /S/a@nkara is each time obliged to
2870 have recourse to the plea of the Sutra referring, not to what is true in
2871 the strict sense of the word, but only to what is conventionally looked
2872 upon as true. It is, I admit, not altogether impossible that
2873 /S/a@nkara's interpretation should represent the real meaning of the
2874 Sutras; that the latter, indeed, to use the terms employed by Dr.
2875 Deussen, should for the nonce set forth an exoteric doctrine adapted to
2876 the common notions of mankind, which, however, can be rightly understood
2877 by him only to whose mind the esoteric doctrine is all the while
2878 present. This is not impossible, I say; but it is a point which requires
2879 convincing proofs before it can be allowed.--We have had, in the second
2880 place, to note a certain number of adhikara/n/as and Sutras concerning
2881 whose interpretation /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja disagree altogether; and we
2882 have seen that not unfrequently the explanations given by the latter
2883 commentator appear to be preferable because falling in more easily with
2884 the words of the text. The most striking instance of this is afforded by
2885 the 13th adhikara/n/a of II, 3, which treats of the size of the jiva,
2886 and where Ramanuja's explanation seems to be decidedly superior to
2887 /S/a@nkara's, both if we look to the arrangement of the whole
2888 adhikara/n/a and to the wording of the single Sutras. The adhikara/n/a
2889 is, moreover, a specially important one, because the nature of the view
2890 held as to the size of the individual soul goes far to settle the
2891 question what kind of Vedanta is embodied in Badaraya/n/a's work.

2892
2893 But it will be requisite not only to dwell on the interpretations of a
2894 few detached Sutras, but to make the attempt at least of forming some
2895 opinion as to the relation of the Vedanta-sutras as a whole to the chief
2896 distinguishing doctrines of /S/a@nkara as well as Ramanuja. Such an
2897 attempt may possibly lead to very slender positive results; but in the

2898 present state of the enquiry even a merely negative result, viz. the
 2899 conclusion that the Sutras do not teach particular doctrines found in
 2900 them by certain commentators, will not be without its value.
 2901
 2902 The first question we wish to consider in some detail is whether the
 2903 Sutras in any way favour /S/a@nkara's doctrine that we have to
 2904 distinguish a twofold knowledge of Brahman, a higher knowledge which
 2905 leads to the immediate absorption, on death, of the individual soul in
 2906 Brahman, and a lower knowledge which raises its owner merely to an
 2907 exalted form of individual existence. The adhyaya first to be considered
 2908 in this connexion is the fourth one. According to /S/a@nkara the three
 2909 latter padas of that adhyaya are chiefly engaged in describing the fate
 2910 of him who dies in the possession of the lower knowledge, while two
 2911 sections (IV, 2, 12-14; IV, 4, 1-7) tell us what happens to him who,
 2912 before his death, had risen to the knowledge of the highest Brahman.
 2913 According to Ramanuja, on the other hand, the three padas, referring
 2914 throughout to one subject only, give an uninterrupted account of the
 2915 successive steps by which the soul of him who knows the Lord through the
 2916 Upanishads passes, at the time of death, out of the gross body which it
 2917 had tenanted, ascends to the world of Brahman, and lives there for ever
 2918 without returning into the sa/m/sara.
 2919
 2920 On an a priori view of the matter it certainly appears somewhat strange
 2921 that the concluding section of the Sutras should be almost entirely
 2922 taken up with describing the fate of him who has after all acquired an
 2923 altogether inferior knowledge only, and has remained shut out from the
 2924 true sanctuary of Vedantic knowledge, while the fate of the fully
 2925 initiated is disposed of in a few occasional Sutras. It is, I think, not
 2926 too much to say that no unbiassed student of the Sutras would--before
 2927 having allowed himself to be influenced by /S/a@nkara's
 2928 interpretations--imagine for a moment that the solemn words, 'From
 2929 thence is no return, from thence is no return,' with which the Sutras
 2930 conclude, are meant to describe, not the lasting condition of him who
 2931 has reached final release, the highest aim of man, but merely a stage on
 2932 the way of that soul which is engaged in the slow progress of gradual
 2933 release, a stage which is indeed greatly superior to any earthly form of
 2934 existence, but yet itself belongs to the essentially fictitious
 2935 sa/m/sara, and as such remains infinitely below the bliss of true mukti.
 2936 And this a priori impression--which, although no doubt significant,
 2937 could hardly be appealed to as decisive--is confirmed by a detailed
 2938 consideration of the two sets of Sutras which /S/a@nkara connects with
 2939 the knowledge of the higher Brahman. How these Sutras are interpreted by
 2940 /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja has been stated above in the conspectus of
 2941 contents; the points which render the interpretation given by Ramanuja
 2942 more probable are as follows. With regard to IV, 2, 12-14, we have to
 2943 note, in the first place, the circumstance--relevant although not
 2944 decisive in itself--that Sutra 12 does not contain any indication of a
 2945 new topic being introduced. In the second place, it can hardly be
 2946 doubted that the text of Sutra 13, 'spash/t/o hy ekesham,' is more
 2947 appropriately understood, with Ramanuja, as furnishing a reason for the
 2948 opinion advanced in the preceding Sutra, than--with /S/a@nkara--as
 2949 embodying the refutation of a previous statement (in which latter case
 2950 we should expect not 'hi' but 'tu'). And, in the third place, the 'eke,'
 2951 i.e. 'some,' referred to in Sutra 13 would, on /S/a@nkara's
 2952 interpretation, denote the very same persons to whom the preceding Sutra
 2953 had referred, viz. the followers of the Ka/n/va-/s/akha (the two Vedic
 2954 passages referred to in 12 and 13 being B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5, and III, 2,
 2955 11, according to the Ka/n/va recension); while it is the standing
 2956 practice of the Sutras to introduce, by means of the designation 'eke,'
 2957 members of Vedic /s/akhas, teachers, &c. other than those alluded to in
 2958 the preceding Sutras. With this practice Ramanuja's interpretation, on
 2959 the other hand, fully agrees; for, according to him, the 'eke' are the
 2960 Madhyandinas, whose reading in B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5, viz. 'tasmad,'
 2961 clearly indicates that the 'tasya' in the corresponding passage of the
 2962 Ka/n/vas denotes the /s/arira, i.e. the jiva. I think it is not saying
 2963 too much that /S/a@nkara's explanation, according to which the 'eke'
 2964 would denote the very same Ka/n/vas to whom the preceding Sutra had
 2965 referred--so that the Ka/n/vas would be distinguished from themselves as
 2966 it were--is altogether impossible.

2967
2968 The result of this closer consideration of the first set of Sutras,
2969 alleged by /S/a@nkara to concern the owner of the higher knowledge of
2970 Brahman, entitles us to view with some distrust /S/a@nkara's assertion
2971 that another set also--IV, 4, 1-7--has to be detached from the general
2972 topic of the fourth adhyaya, and to be understood as depicting the
2973 condition of those who have obtained final absolute release. And the
2974 Sutras themselves do not tend to weaken this preliminary want of
2975 confidence. In the first place their wording also gives no indication
2976 whatever of their having to be separated from what precedes as well as
2977 what follows. And, in the second place, the last Sutra of the set (7)
2978 obliges /S/a@nkara to ascribe to his truly released souls qualities
2979 which clearly cannot belong to them; so that he finally is obliged to
2980 make the extraordinary statement that those qualities belong to them
2981 'vyavaharapekshaya,' while yet the purport of the whole adhikara/n/a is
2982 said to be the description of the truly released soul for which no
2983 vyavahara exists! Very truly /S/a@nkara's commentator here remarks,
2984 'atra ke/k/in muhyanti akha/n/da/k/inmatrajanan muktasyajnanabhavat kuta
2985 aj/n/anika-dharmayoga/h/,' and the way in which thereupon he himself
2986 attempts to get over the difficulty certainly does not improve matters.
2987

2988 In connexion with the two passages discussed, we meet in the fourth
2989 adhyaya with another passage, which indeed has no direct bearing on the
2990 distinction of apara and para vidya, but may yet be shortly referred to
2991 in this place as another and altogether undoubted instance of
2992 /S/a@nkara's interpretations not always agreeing with the text of the
2993 Sutras. The Sutras 7-16 of the third pada state the opinions of three
2994 different teachers on the question to which Brahman the soul of the
2995 vidvan repairs on death, or--according to Ramanuja--the worshippers of
2996 which Brahman repair to (the highest) Brahman. Ramanuja treats the views
2997 of Badari and Jaimini as two purvapakshas, and the opinion of
2998 Badaraya/n/a--which is stated last--as the siddhanta. /S/a@nkara, on the
2999 other hand, detaching the Sutras in which Badaraya/n/a's view is set
3000 forth from the preceding part of the adhikara/n/a (a proceeding which,
3001 although not plausible, yet cannot be said to be altogether
3002 illegitimate), maintains that Badari's view, which is expounded first,
3003 represents the siddhanta, while Jaimini's view, set forth subsequently,
3004 is to be considered a mere purvapaksha. This, of course, is altogether
3005 inadmissible, it being the invariable practice of the Vedanta-sutras as
3006 well as the Purva Mima/m/sa-sutras to conclude the discussion of
3007 contested points with the statement of that view which is to be accepted
3008 as the authoritative one. This is so patent that /S/a@nkara feels
3009 himself called upon to defend his deviation from the general rule
3010 (Commentary on IV, 4, 13), without, however, bringing forward any
3011 arguments but such as are valid only if /S/a@nkara's system itself is
3012 already accepted.
3013

3014 The previous considerations leave us, I am inclined to think, no choice
3015 but to side with Ramanuja as to the general subject-matter of the fourth
3016 adhyaya of the Sutras. We need not accept him as our guide in all
3017 particular interpretations, but we must acknowledge with him that the
3018 Sutras of the fourth adhyaya describe the ultimate fate of one and the
3019 same vidvan, and do not afford any basis for the distinction of a higher
3020 and lower knowledge of Brahman in /S/a@nkara's sense.
3021

3022 If we have not to discriminate between a lower and a higher knowledge of
3023 Brahman, it follows that the distinction of a lower and a higher Brahman
3024 is likewise not valid. But this is not a point to be decided at once on
3025 the negative evidence of the fourth adhyaya, but regarding which the
3026 entire body of the Vedanta-sutras has to be consulted. And intimately
3027 connected with this investigation--in fact, one with it from a certain
3028 point of view--is the question whether the Sutras afford any evidence of
3029 their author having held the doctrine of Maya, the principle of
3030 illusion, by the association with which the highest Brahman, in itself
3031 transcending all qualities, appears as the lower Brahman or I/s/vara.
3032 That Ramanuja denies the distinction of the two Brahman and the
3033 doctrine of Maya we have seen above; we shall, however, in the
3034 subsequent investigation, pay less attention to his views and
3035 interpretations than to the indications furnished by the Sutras

3036 themselves.

3037

3038 Placing myself at the point of view of a /S/a@nkara, I am startled at
3039 the outset by the second Sutra of the first adhyaya, which undertakes to
3040 give a definition of Brahman. 'Brahman is that whence the origination
3041 and so on (i.e. the sustentation and reabsorption) of this world
3042 proceed.' What, we must ask, is this Sutra meant to define?--That
3043 Brahman, we are inclined to answer, whose cognition the first Sutra
3044 declares to constitute the task of the entire Vedanta; that Brahman
3045 whose cognition is the only road to final release; that Brahman in fact
3046 which /S/a@nkara calls the highest.--But, here we must object to
3047 ourselves, the highest Brahman is not properly defined as that from
3048 which the world originates. In later Vedantic writings, whose authors
3049 were clearly conscious of the distinction of the higher absolute Brahman
3050 and the lower Brahman related to Maya or the world, we meet with
3051 definitions of Brahman of an altogether different type. I need only
3052 remind the reader of the current definition of Brahman as
3053 sa/k/-/k/id-ananda, or, to mention one individual instance, refer to the
3054 introductory /s/lokas of the Pa/nk/ada/s/i dilating on the sa/m/vid
3055 svayam-prabha, the self-luminous principle of thought which in all time,
3056 past or future, neither starts into being nor perishes (P.D. I, 7).
3057 'That from which the world proceeds' can by a /S/a@nkara be accepted
3058 only as a definition of I/s/vara, of Brahman which by its association
3059 with Maya is enabled to project the false appearance of this world, and
3060 it certainly is as improbable that the Sutras should open with a
3061 definition of that inferior principle, from whose cognition there can
3062 accrue no permanent benefit, as, according to a remark made above, it is
3063 unlikely that they should conclude with a description of the state of
3064 those who know the lower Brahman only, and thus are debarred from
3065 obtaining true release. As soon, on the other hand, as we discard the
3066 idea of a twofold Brahman and conceive Brahman as one only, as the
3067 all-enfolding being which sometimes emits the world from its own
3068 substance and sometimes again retracts it into itself, ever remaining
3069 one in all its various manifestations--a conception which need not by
3070 any means be modelled in all its details on the views of the
3071 Ramanujas--the definition of Brahman given in the second Sutra becomes
3072 altogether unobjectionable.

3073

3074 We next enquire whether the impression left on the mind by the manner in
3075 which Badarayana defines Brahman, viz. that he does not distinguish
3076 between an absolute Brahman and a Brahman associated with Maya, is
3077 confirmed or weakened by any other parts of his work. The Sutras being
3078 throughout far from direct in their enunciations, we shall have to look
3079 less to particular terms and turns of expression than to general lines
3080 of reasoning. What in this connexion seems specially worthy of being
3081 taken into account, is the style of argumentation employed by the
3082 Sutrakara against the Sa@nkhyas doctrine, which maintains that the world
3083 has originated, not from an intelligent being, but from the
3084 non-intelligent pradhana. The most important Sutras relative to this
3085 point are to be met with in the first pada of the second adhyaya. Those
3086 Sutras are indeed almost unintelligible if taken by themselves, but the
3087 unanimity of the commentators as to their meaning enables us to use them
3088 as steps in our investigation. The sixth Sutra of the pada mentioned
3089 replies to the Sa@nkhyas objection that the non-intelligent world cannot
3090 spring from an intelligent principle, by the remark that 'it is thus
3091 seen,' i.e. it is a matter of common observation that non-intelligent
3092 things are produced from beings endowed with intelligence; hair and
3093 nails, for instance, springing from animals, and certain insects from
3094 dung.--Now, an argumentation of this kind is altogether out of place
3095 from the point of view of the true /S/a@nkara. According to the latter
3096 the non-intelligent world does not spring from Brahman in so far as the
3097 latter is intelligence, but in so far as it is associated with Maya.
3098 Maya is the upadana of the material world, and Maya itself is of a
3099 non-intelligent nature, owing to which it is by so many Vedantic writers
3100 identified with the prak/ri/ti of the Sa@nkhyas. Similarly the
3101 illustrative instances, adduced under Sutra 9 for the purpose of showing
3102 that effects when being reabsorbed into their causal substances do not
3103 impart to the latter their own qualities, and that hence the material
3104 world also, when being refunded into Brahman, does not impart to it its

own imperfections, are singularly inappropriate if viewed in connexion with the doctrine of Maya, according to which the material world is no more in Brahman at the time of a pralaya than during the period of its subsistence. According to /S/a@nkara the world is not merged in Brahman, but the special forms into which the upadana of the world, i.e. Maya, had modified itself are merged in non-distinct Maya, whose relation to Brahman is not changed thereby.--The illustration, again, given in Sutra 24 of the mode in which Brahman, by means of its inherent power, transforms itself into the world without employing any extraneous instruments of action, 'kshiravad dhi,' 'as milk (of its own accord turns into curds),' would be strangely chosen indeed if meant to bring nearer to our understanding the mode in which Brahman projects the illusive appearance of the world; and also the analogous instance given in the Sutra next following, 'as Gods and the like (create palaces, chariots, &c. by the mere power of their will)'--which refers to the real creation of real things--would hardly be in its place if meant to illustrate a theory which considers unreality to be the true character of the world. The mere cumulation of the two essentially heterogeneous illustrative instances (kshiravad dhi; devadivat), moreover, seems to show that the writer who had recourse to them held no very definite theory as to the particular mode in which the world springs from Brahman, but was merely concerned to render plausible in some way or other that an intelligent being can give rise to what is non-intelligent without having recourse to any extraneous means.[23]

That the Maya doctrine was not present to the mind of the Sutrakara, further appears from the latter part of the fourth pada of the first adhyaya, where it is shown that Brahman is not only the operative but also the material cause of the world. If anywhere, there would have been the place to indicate, had such been the author's view, that Brahman is the material cause of the world through Maya only, and that the world is unreal; but the Sutras do not contain a single word to that effect. Sutra 26, on the other hand, exhibits the significant term 'pari/n/amat;' Brahman produces the world by means of a modification of itself. It is well known that later on, when the terminology of the Vedanta became definitely settled, the term 'pari/n/avada' was used to denote that very theory to which the followers of /S/a@nkara are most violently opposed, viz. the doctrine according to which the world is not a mere vivarta, i.e. an illusory manifestation of Brahman, but the effect of Brahman undergoing a real change, may that change be conceived to take place in the way taught by Ramanuja or in some other manner.--With regard to the last-quoted Sutra, as well as to those touched upon above, the commentators indeed maintain that whatever terms and modes of expression are apparently opposed to the vivartavada are in reality reconcilable with it; to Sutra 26, for instance, Govindananda remarks that the term 'pari/n/ama' only denotes an effect in general (karyamatra), without implying that the effect is real. But in cases of this nature we are fully entitled to use our own judgment, even if we were not compelled to do so by the fact that other commentators, such as Ramanuja, are satisfied to take 'pari/n/ama' and similar terms in their generally received sense.

A further section treating of the nature of Brahman is met with in III, 2, 11 ff. It is, according to /S/a@nkara's view, of special importance, as it is alleged to set forth that Brahman is in itself destitute of all qualities, and is affected with qualities only through its limiting adjuncts (upadhis), the offspring of Maya. I have above (in the conspectus of contents) given a somewhat detailed abstract of the whole section as interpreted by /S/a@nkara on the one hand, and Ramanuja on the other hand, from which it appears that the latter's opinion as to the purport of the group of Sutras widely diverges from that of /S/a@nkara. The wording of the Sutras is so eminently concise and vague that I find it impossible to decide which of the two commentators--if indeed either--is to be accepted as a trustworthy guide; regarding the sense of some Sutras /S/a@nkara's explanation seems to deserve preference, in the case of others Ramanuja seems to keep closer to the text. I decidedly prefer, for instance, Ramanuja's interpretation of Sutra 22, as far as the sense of the entire Sutra is concerned, and more especially with regard to the term 'prak/ri/taitavattvam,' whose proper

3174 force is brought out by Ramanuja's explanation only. So much is certain
3175 that none of the Sutras decidedly favours the interpretation proposed by
3176 /S/a@nkara. Whichever commentator we follow, we greatly miss coherence
3177 and strictness of reasoning, and it is thus by no means improbable that
3178 the section is one of those--perhaps not few in number--in which both
3179 interpreters had less regard to the literal sense of the words and to
3180 tradition than to their desire of forcing Badaraya/n/a's Sutras to bear
3181 testimony to the truth of their own philosophic theories.

3182
3183 With special reference to the Maya doctrine one important Sutra has yet
3184 to be considered, the only one in which the term 'maya' itself occurs,
3185 viz. III, 2, 3. According to /S/a@nkara the Sutra signifies that the
3186 environments of the dreaming soul are not real but mere Maya, i.e.
3187 unsubstantial illusion, because they do not fully manifest the character
3188 of real objects. Ramanuja (as we have seen in the conspectus) gives a
3189 different explanation of the term 'maya,' but in judging of /S/a@nkara's
3190 views we may for the time accept /S/a@nkara's own interpretation. Now,
3191 from the latter it clearly follows that if the objects seen in dreams
3192 are to be called Maya, i.e. illusion, because not evincing the
3193 characteristics of reality, the objective world surrounding the waking
3194 soul must not be called Maya. But that the world perceived by waking men
3195 is Maya, even in a higher sense than the world presented to the dreaming
3196 consciousness, is an undoubted tenet of the /S/a@nkara Vedanta; and the
3197 Sutra therefore proves either that Badaraya/n/a did not hold the
3198 doctrine of the illusory character of the world, or else that, if after
3199 all he did hold that doctrine, he used the term 'maya' in a sense
3200 altogether different from that in which /S/a@nkara employs it.--If, on
3201 the other hand, we, with Ramanuja, understand the word 'maya' to denote
3202 a wonderful thing, the Sutra of course has no bearing whatever on the
3203 doctrine of Maya in its later technical sense.

3204
3205 We now turn to the question as to the relation of the individual soul to
3206 Brahman. Do the Sutras indicate anywhere that their author held
3207 /S/a@nkara's doctrine, according to which the jiva is in reality
3208 identical with Brahman, and separated from it, as it were, only by a
3209 false surmise due to avidya, or do they rather favour the view that the
3210 souls, although they have sprung from Brahman, and constitute elements
3211 of its nature, yet enjoy a kind of individual existence apart from it?
3212 This question is in fact only another aspect of the Maya question, but
3213 yet requires a short separate treatment.

3214
3215 In the conspectus I have given it as my opinion that the Sutras in which
3216 the size of the individual soul is discussed can hardly be understood in
3217 /S/a@nkara's sense, and rather seem to favour the opinion, held among
3218 others by Ramanuja, that the soul is of minute size. We have further
3219 seen that Sutra 18 of the third pada of the second adhyaya, which
3220 describes the soul as 'j/n/a,' is more appropriately understood in the
3221 sense assigned to it by Ramanuja; and, again, that the Sutras which
3222 treat of the soul being an agent, can be reconciled with /S/a@nkara's
3223 views only if supplemented in a way which their text does not appear to
3224 authorise.--We next have the important Sutra II, 3, 43 in which the soul
3225 is distinctly said to be a part (a/ms/a) of Brahman, and which, as we
3226 have already noticed, can be made to fall in with /S/a@nkara's views
3227 only if a/ms/a is explained, altogether arbitrarily, by 'a/ms/a iva,'
3228 while Ramanuja is able to take the Sutra as it stands.--We also have
3229 already referred to Sutra 50, 'abhasa eva /k/a,' which /S/a@nkara
3230 interprets as setting forth the so-called pratibimbavada according to
3231 which the individual Self is merely a reflection of the highest Self.
3232 But almost every Sutra--and Sutra 50 forms no exception--being so
3233 obscurely expressed, that viewed by itself it admits of various, often
3234 totally opposed, interpretations, the only safe method is to keep in
3235 view, in the case of each ambiguous aphorism, the general drift and
3236 spirit of the whole work, and that, as we have seen hitherto, is by no
3237 means favourable to the pratibimba doctrine. How indeed could Sutra 50,
3238 if setting forth that latter doctrine, be reconciled with Sutra 43,
3239 which says distinctly that the soul is a part of Brahman? For that 43
3240 contains, as /S/a@nkara and his commentators aver, a statement of the
3241 ava/kkh/edavada, can itself be accepted only if we interpret a/ms/a by
3242 a/ms/a iva, and to do so there is really no valid reason whatever. I

3243 confess that Ramanuja's interpretation of the Sutra (which however is
3244 accepted by several other commentators also) does not appear to me
3245 particularly convincing; and the Sutras unfortunately offer us no other
3246 passages on the ground of which we might settle the meaning to be
3247 ascribed to the term abhasa, which may mean 'reflection,' but may mean
3248 hetvabhasa, i.e. fallacious argument, as well. But as things stand, this
3249 one Sutra cannot, at any rate, be appealed to as proving that the
3250 pratibimbavada which, in its turn, presupposes the mayavada, is the
3251 teaching of the Sutras.

3252
3253 To the conclusion that the Sutrakara did not hold the doctrine of the
3254 absolute identity of the highest and the individual soul in the sense of
3255 /S/a@nkara, we are further led by some other indications to be met with
3256 here and there in the Sutras. In the conspectus of contents we have had
3257 occasion to direct attention to the important Sutra II, 1, 22, which
3258 distinctly enunciates that the Lord is adhika, i.e. additional to, or
3259 different from, the individual soul, since Scripture declares the two to
3260 be different. Analogously I, 2, 20 lays stress on the fact that the
3261 /s/arira is not the antaryamin, because the Madhyandinas, as well as the
3262 Ka/n/vas, speak of him in their texts as different (bhedena enam
3263 adhiyate), and in 22 the /s/arira and the pradhana are referred to as
3264 the two 'others' (itarau) of whom the text predicates distinctive
3265 attributes separating them from the highest Lord. The word 'itara' (the
3266 other one) appears in several other passages (I, 1, 16; I, 3, 16; II, 1,
3267 21) as a kind of technical term denoting the individual soul in
3268 contradistinction from the Lord. The /S/a@nkaras indeed maintain that
3269 all those passages refer to an unreal distinction due to avidya. But
3270 this is just what we should like to see proved, and the proof offered in
3271 no case amounts to more than a reference to the system which demands
3272 that the Sutras should be thus understood. If we accept the
3273 interpretations of the school of /S/a@nkara, it remains altogether
3274 unintelligible why the Sutrakara should never hint even at what
3275 /S/a@nkara is anxious again and again to point out at length, viz. that
3276 the greater part of the work contains a kind of exoteric doctrine only,
3277 ever tending to mislead the student who does not keep in view what its
3278 nature is. If other reasons should make it probable that the Sutrakara
3279 was anxious to hide the true doctrine of the Upanishads as a sort of
3280 esoteric teaching, we might be more ready to accept /S/a@nkara's mode of
3281 interpretation. But no such reasons are forthcoming; nowhere among the
3282 avowed followers of the /S/a@nkara system is there any tendency to treat
3283 the kernel of their philosophy as something to be jealously guarded and
3284 hidden. On the contrary, they all, from Gau/d/apada down to the most
3285 modern writer, consider it their most important, nay, only task to
3286 inculcate again and again in the clearest and most unambiguous language
3287 that all appearance of multiplicity is a vain illusion, that the Lord
3288 and the individual souls are in reality one, and that all knowledge but
3289 this one knowledge is without true value.

3290
3291 There remains one more important passage concerning the relation of the
3292 individual soul to the highest Self, a passage which attracted our
3293 attention above, when we were reviewing the evidence for early
3294 divergence of opinion among the teachers of the Vedanta. I mean I, 4,
3295 20-22, which three Sutras state the views of A/s/marathya, Au/d/ulomi,
3296 and Ka/s/akr/ri/tsna as to the reason why, in a certain passage of the
3297 B/ri/hadara/n/yaka, characteristics of the individual soul are ascribed
3298 to the highest Self. The siddhanta view is enounced in Sutra 22,
3299 'avasthiter iti Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna/h/' i.e. Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna (accounts for
3300 the circumstance mentioned) on the ground of the 'permanent abiding or
3301 abode.' By this 'permanent abiding' /S/a@nkara understands the Lord's
3302 abiding as, i.e. existing as--or in the condition of--the individual
3303 soul, and thus sees in the Sutra an enunciation of his own view that the
3304 individual soul is nothing but the highest Self, 'avik/ri/ta/h/
3305 parame/s/varo jivo nanya/h/.' Ramanuja on the other hand, likewise
3306 accepting Ka/saak/ri/tsna's opinion as the siddhanta view, explains
3307 'avasthiti' as the Lord's permanent abiding within the individual soul,
3308 as described in the antaryamin-brahma/n/a.--We can hardly maintain that
3309 the term 'avasthiti' cannot have the meaning ascribed to it by
3310 Sa@/n/kara, viz. special state or condition, but so much must be urged
3311 in favour of Ramanuja's interpretation that in the five other places

3312 where avasthiti (or anavasthiti) is met with in the Sutras (I, 2, 17;
3313 II, 2, 4; II, 2, 13; II, 3, 24; III, 3, 32) it regularly means permanent
3314 abiding or permanent abode within something.

3315
3316 If, now, I am shortly to sum up the results of the preceding enquiry as
3317 to the teaching of the Sutras, I must give it as my opinion that they do
3318 not set forth the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of
3319 Brahman; that they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and
3320 I/s/vara in /S/a@nkara's sense; that they do not hold the doctrine of
3321 the unreality of the world; and that they do not, with /S/a@nkara,
3322 proclaim the absolute identity of the individual and the highest Self. I
3323 do not wish to advance for the present beyond these negative results.
3324 Upon Ramanuja's mode of interpretation--although I accept it without
3325 reserve in some important details--I look on the whole as more useful in
3326 providing us with a powerful means of criticising /S/a@nkara's
3327 explanations than in guiding us throughout to the right understanding of
3328 the text. The author of the Sutras may have held views about the nature
3329 of Brahman, the world, and the soul differing from those of /S/a@nkara,
3330 and yet not agreeing in all points with those of Ramanuja. If, however,
3331 the negative conclusions stated above should be well founded, it would
3332 follow even from them that the system of Badaraya/n/a had greater
3333 affinities with that of the Bhagavatas and Ramanuja than with the one of
3334 which the /S/a@nkara-bhashya is the classical exponent.

3335
3336 It appears from the above review of the teaching of the Sutras that only
3337 a comparatively very small proportion of them contribute matter enabling
3338 us to form a judgment as to the nature of the philosophical doctrine
3339 advocated by Badaraya/n/a. The reason of this is that the greater part
3340 of the work is taken up with matters which, according to /S/a@nkara's
3341 terminology, form part of the so-called lower knowledge, and throw no
3342 light upon philosophical questions in the stricter sense of the word.
3343 This circumstance is not without significance. In later works belonging
3344 to /S/a@nkara's school in which the distinction of a higher and lower
3345 vidya is clearly recognised, the topics constituting the latter are
3346 treated with great shortness; and rightly so, for they are unable to
3347 accomplish the highest aim of man, i.e. final release. When we
3348 therefore, on the other hand, find that the subjects of the so-called
3349 lower vidya are treated very fully in the Vedanta-sutras, when we
3350 observe, for instance, the almost tedious length to which the
3351 investigation of the unity of vidyas (most of which are so-called
3352 sagu/n/a, i.e. lower vidyas) is carried in the third adhyaya, or the
3353 fact of almost the whole fourth adhyaya being devoted to the ultimate
3354 fate of the possessor of the lower vidya; we certainly feel ourselves
3355 confirmed in our conclusion that what /S/a@nkara looked upon as
3356 comparatively unimportant formed in Badaraya/n/a's opinion part of that
3357 knowledge higher than which there is none, and which therefore is
3358 entitled to the fullest and most detailed exposition.

3359
3360 The question as to what kind of system is represented by the
3361 Vedanta-sutras may be approached in another way also. While hitherto we
3362 have attempted to penetrate to the meaning of the Sutras by means of the
3363 different commentaries, we might try the opposite road, and, in the
3364 first place, attempt to ascertain independently of the Sutras what
3365 doctrine is set forth in the Upanishads, whose teaching the Sutras
3366 doubtless aim at systematising. If, it might be urged, the Upanishads
3367 can be convincingly shown to embody a certain settled doctrine, we must
3368 consider it at the least highly probable that that very same
3369 doctrine--of whatever special nature it may be--is hidden in the
3370 enigmatical aphorisms of Badaraya/n/a.[24]

3371
3372 I do not, however, consider this line of argumentation a safe one. Even
3373 if it could be shown that the teaching of all the chief Upanishads
3374 agrees in all essential points (a subject to which some attention will
3375 be paid later on), we should not on that account be entitled
3376 unhesitatingly to assume that the Sutras set forth the same doctrine.
3377 Whatever the true philosophy of the Upanishads may be, there remains the
3378 undeniable fact that there exist and have existed since very ancient
3379 times not one but several essentially differing systems, all of which
3380 lay claim to the distinction of being the true representatives of the

3381 teaching of the Upanishads as well as of the Sutras. Let us suppose, for
3382 argument's sake, that, for instance, the doctrine of Maya is distinctly
3383 enunciated in the Upanishads; nevertheless Ramanuja and, for all we know
3384 to the contrary, the whole series of more ancient commentators on whom
3385 he looked as authorities in the interpretation of the Sutras, denied
3386 that the Upanishads teach Maya, and it is hence by no means impossible
3387 that Badaraya/n/a should have done the same. The a priori style of
3388 reasoning as to the teaching of the Sutras is therefore without much
3389 force.

3390

3391 But apart from any intention of arriving thereby at the meaning of the
3392 Sutras there, of course, remains for us the all-important question as to
3393 the true teaching of the Upanishads, a question which a translator of
3394 the Sutras and /S/a@nkara cannot afford to pass over in silence,
3395 especially after reason has been shown for the conclusion that the
3396 Sutras and the /S/a@nkara-bhashya do not agree concerning most important
3397 points of Vedantic doctrine. The Sutras as well as the later
3398 commentaries claim, in the first place, to be nothing more than
3399 systematisations of the Upanishads, and for us a considerable part at
3400 least of their value and interest lies in this their nature. Hence the
3401 further question presents itself by whom the teaching of the Upanishads
3402 has been most adequately systematised, whether by Badaraya/n/a, or
3403 /S/a@nkara, or Ramanuja, or some other commentator. This question
3404 requires to be kept altogether separate from the enquiry as to which
3405 commentator most faithfully renders the contents of the Sutras, and it
3406 is by no means impossible that /S/a@nkara, for instance, should in the
3407 end have to be declared a more trustworthy guide with regard to the
3408 teaching of the Upanishads than concerning the meaning of the Sutras.

3409

3410 We must remark here at once that, whatever commentator may be found to
3411 deserve preference on the whole, it appears fairly certain already at
3412 the outset that none of the systems which Indian ingenuity has succeeded
3413 in erecting on the basis of the Upanishads can be accepted in its
3414 entirety. The reason for this lies in the nature of the Upanishads
3415 themselves. To the Hindu commentator and philosopher the Upanishads came
3416 down as a body of revealed truth whose teaching had, somehow or other,
3417 to be shown to be thoroughly consistent and free from contradictions; a
3418 system had to be devised in which a suitable place could be allotted to
3419 every one of the multitudinous statements which they make on the various
3420 points of Vedantic doctrine. But to the European scholar, or in fact to
3421 any one whose mind is not bound by the doctrine of /S/ruti, it will
3422 certainly appear that all such attempts stand self-condemned. If
3423 anything is evident even on a cursory review of the Upanishads--and the
3424 impression so created is only strengthened by a more careful
3425 investigation--it is that they do not constitute a systematic whole.
3426 They themselves, especially the older ones, give the most unmistakable
3427 indications on that point. Not only are the doctrines expounded in the
3428 different Upanishads ascribed to different teachers, but even the
3429 separate sections of one and the same Upanishad are assigned to
3430 different authorities. It would be superfluous to quote examples of what
3431 a mere look at the Chandogya Upanishad, for instance, suffices to prove.
3432 It is of course not impossible that even a multitude of teachers should
3433 agree in imparting precisely the same doctrine; but in the case of the
3434 Upanishads that is certainly not antecedently probable. For, in the
3435 first place, the teachers who are credited with the doctrines of the
3436 Upanishads manifestly belonged to different sections of Brahminical
3437 society, to different Vedic /s/akhas; nay, some of them the tradition
3438 makes out to have been kshattriyas. And, in the second place, the
3439 period, whose mental activity is represented in the Upanishads, was a
3440 creative one, and as such cannot be judged according to the analogy of
3441 later periods of Indian philosophic development. The later philosophic
3442 schools as, for instance, the one of which /S/a@nkara is the great
3443 representative, were no longer free in their speculations, but strictly
3444 bound by a traditional body of texts considered sacred, which could not
3445 be changed or added to, but merely systematised and commented upon.
3446 Hence the rigorous uniformity of doctrine characteristic of those
3447 schools. But there had been a time when, what later writers received as
3448 a sacred legacy, determining and confining the whole course of their
3449 speculations, first sprang from the minds of creative thinkers not

3450 fettered by the tradition of any school, but freely following the
3451 promptings of their own heads and hearts. By the absence of school
3452 traditions, I do not indeed mean that the great teachers who appear in
3453 the Upanishads were free to make an entirely new start, and to assign to
3454 their speculations any direction they chose; for nothing can be more
3455 certain than that, at the period as the outcome of whose philosophical
3456 activity the Upanishads have to be considered, there were in circulation
3457 certain broad speculative ideas overshadowing the mind of every member
3458 of Brahminical society. But those ideas were neither very definite nor
3459 worked out in detail, and hence allowed themselves to be handled and
3460 fashioned in different ways by different individuals. With whom the few
3461 leading conceptions traceable in the teaching of all Upanishads first
3462 originated, is a point on which those writings themselves do not
3463 enlighten us, and which we have no other means for settling; most
3464 probably they are to be viewed not as the creation of any individual
3465 mind, but as the gradual outcome of speculations carried on by
3466 generations of Vedic theologians. In the Upanishads themselves, at any
3467 rate, they appear as floating mental possessions which may be seized and
3468 moulded into new forms by any one who feels within himself the required
3469 inspiration. A certain vague knowledge of Brahman, the great hidden
3470 being in which all this manifold world is one, seems to be spread
3471 everywhere, and often issues from the most unexpected sources.
3472 /S/vetaketu receives instruction from his father Uddalaka; the proud
3473 Gargya has to become the pupil of Ajata/s/atru, the king of Ka/s/i;
3474 Bhujyu Sahyayani receives answers to his questions from a Gandharva
3475 possessing a maiden; Satyakama learns what Brahman is from the bull of
3476 the herd he is tending, from Agni and from a flamingo; and Upako/s/ala
3477 is taught by the sacred fires in his teacher's house. All this is of
3478 course legend, not history; but the fact that the philosophic and
3479 theological doctrines of the Upanishads are clothed in this legendary
3480 garb certainly does not strengthen the expectation of finding in them a
3481 rigidly systematic doctrine.

3482
3483 And a closer investigation of the contents of the Upanishads amply
3484 confirms this preliminary impression. If we avail ourselves, for
3485 instance, of M. Paul Regnaud's *Materiaux pour servir a l'Histoire de la*
3486 *Philosophie de l'Inde*, in which the philosophical lucubrations of the
3487 different Upanishads are arranged systematically according to topics, we
3488 can see with ease how, together with a certain uniformity of general
3489 leading conceptions, there runs throughout divergence in details, and
3490 very often not unimportant details. A look, for instance, at the
3491 collection of passages relative to the origination of the world from the
3492 primitive being, suffices to show that the task of demonstrating that
3493 whatever the Upanishads teach on that point can be made to fit into a
3494 homogeneous system is an altogether hopeless one. The accounts there
3495 given of the creation belong, beyond all doubt to different stages of
3496 philosophic and theological development or else to different sections of
3497 priestly society. None but an Indian commentator would, I suppose, be
3498 inclined and sufficiently courageous to attempt the proof that, for
3499 instance, the legend of the atman purushavidha, the Self in the shape of
3500 a person which is as large as man and woman together, and then splits
3501 itself into two halves from which cows, horses, asses, goats, &c. are
3502 produced in succession (B/ri/. Up. I, 1, 4), can be reconciled with the
3503 account given of the creation in the Chandogya Upanishad, where it is
3504 said that in the beginning there existed nothing but the sat, 'that
3505 which is,' and that feeling a desire of being many it emitted out of
3506 itself ether, and then all the other elements in due succession. The
3507 former is a primitive cosmogonic myth, which in its details shows
3508 striking analogies with the cosmogonic myths of other nations; the
3509 latter account is fairly developed Vedanta (although not Vedanta
3510 implying the Maya doctrine). We may admit that both accounts show a
3511 certain fundamental similarity in so far as they derive the manifold
3512 world from one original being; but to go beyond this and to maintain, as
3513 /S/a@nkara does, that the atman purushavidha of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka
3514 is the so-called Virag of the latter Vedanta--implying thereby that that
3515 section consciously aims at describing only the activity of one special
3516 form of I/s/vara, and not simply the whole process of creation--is the
3517 ingenious shift of an orthodox commentator in difficulties, but nothing
3518 more.

3519
3520 How all those more or less conflicting texts came to be preserved and
3521 handed down to posterity, is not difficult to understand. As mentioned
3522 above, each of the great sections of Brahminical priesthood had its own
3523 sacred texts, and again in each of those sections there existed more
3524 ancient texts which it was impossible to discard when deeper and more
3525 advanced speculations began in their turn to be embodied in literary
3526 compositions, which in the course of time likewise came to be looked
3527 upon as sacred. When the creative period had reached its termination,
3528 and the task of collecting and arranging was taken in hand, older and
3529 newer pieces were combined into wholes, and thus there arose collections
3530 of such heterogeneous character as the Chandogya and B/ri/hadara/n/yaka
3531 Upanishads. On later generations, to which the whole body of texts came
3532 down as revealed truth, there consequently devolved the inevitable task
3533 of establishing systems on which no exception could be taken to any of
3534 the texts; but that the task was, strictly speaking, an impossible one,
3535 i.e. one which it was impossible to accomplish fairly and honestly,
3536 there really is no reason to deny.

3537
3538 For a comprehensive criticism of the methods which the different
3539 commentators employ in systematizing the contents of the Upanishads
3540 there is no room in this place. In order, however, to illustrate what is
3541 meant by the 'impossibility,' above alluded to, of combining the various
3542 doctrines of the Upanishads into a whole without doing violence to a
3543 certain number of texts, it will be as well to analyse in detail some
3544 few at least of /S/a@nkara's interpretations, and to render clear the
3545 considerations by which he is guided.

3546
3547 We begin with a case which has already engaged our attention when
3548 discussing the meaning of the Sutras, viz. the question concerning the
3549 ultimate fate of those who have attained the knowledge of Brahman. As we
3550 have seen, /S/a@nkara teaches that the soul of him who has risen to an
3551 insight into the nature of the higher Brahman does not, at the moment of
3552 death, pass out of the body, but is directly merged in Brahman by a
3553 process from which all departing and moving, in fact all considerations
3554 of space, are altogether excluded. The soul of him, on the other hand,
3555 who has not risen above the knowledge of the lower qualified Brahman
3556 departs from the body by means of the artery called sushum/n/a, and
3557 following the so-called devayana, the path of the gods, mounts up to the
3558 world of Brahman. A review of the chief Upanishad texts on which
3559 /S/a@nkara founds this distinction will show how far it is justified.

3560
3561 In a considerable number of passages the Upanishads contrast the fate of
3562 two classes of men, viz. of those who perform sacrifices and meritorious
3563 works only, and of those who in addition possess a certain kind of
3564 knowledge. Men of the former kind ascend after death to the moon, where
3565 they live for a certain time, and then return to the earth into new
3566 forms of embodiment; persons of the latter kind proceed on the path of
3567 the gods--on which the sun forms one stage--up to the world of Brahman,
3568 from which there is no return. The chief passages to that effect are Ch.
3569 Up. V, 10; Kaush. Up. I, 2 ff.; Mu/nd/. Up. I, 2, 9 ff.; B/ri/. Up. VI,
3570 2, 15 ff.; Pra/s/na Up. I, 9 ff.--In other passages only the latter of
3571 the two paths is referred to, cp. Ch. Up. IV, 15; VIII 6, 5; Taitt. Up.
3572 I, 6; B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 8, 9; V, 10; Maitr. Up. VI, 30, to mention only
3573 the more important ones.

3574
3575 Now an impartial consideration of those passages shows I think, beyond
3576 any doubt, that what is meant there by the knowledge which leads through
3577 the sun to the world of Brahman is the highest knowledge of which the
3578 devotee is capable, and that the world of Brahman to which his knowledge
3579 enables him to proceed denotes the highest state which he can ever
3580 reach, the state of final release, if we choose to call it by that
3581 name.--Ch. Up. V, 10 says, 'Those who know this (viz. the doctrine of
3582 the five fires), and those who in the forest follow faith and
3583 austerities go to light,' &c.--Ch. Up. IV, 15 is manifestly intended to
3584 convey the true knowledge of Brahman; Upako/s/ala's teacher himself
3585 represents the instruction given by him as superior to the teaching of
3586 the sacred fires.--Ch. Up. VIII, 6, 5 quotes the old /s/loka which says
3587 that the man moving upwards by the artery penetrating the crown of the

3588 head reaches the Immortal.--Kaush. Up. I, 2--which gives the most
3589 detailed account of the ascent of the soul--contains no intimation
3590 whatever of the knowledge of Brahman, which leads up to the Brahman
3591 world, being of an inferior nature.--Mu/nd/. Up. I, 2, 9 agrees with the
3592 Chandogya in saying that 'Those who practise penance and faith in the
3593 forest, tranquil, wise, and living on alms, depart free from passion,
3594 through the sun, to where that immortal Person dwells whose nature is
3595 imperishable,' and nothing whatever in the context countenances the
3596 assumption that not the highest knowledge and the highest Person are
3597 there referred to.--B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 8 quotes old /s/lokas clearly
3598 referring to the road of the gods ('the small old path'), on which
3599 'sages who know Brahman move on to the svargaloka and thence higher on
3600 as entirely free.--That path was found by Brahman, and on it goes
3601 whoever knows Brahman.'--B/ri/. Up. VI, 2, 15 is another version of the
3602 Pa/nk/agnividya, with the variation, 'Those who know this, and those who
3603 in the forest worship faith and the True, go to light,' &c.--Pra/s/na
3604 Up. 1, 10 says, 'Those who have sought the Self by penance, abstinence,
3605 faith, and knowledge gain by the northern path Aditya, the sun. There is
3606 the home of the spirits, the immortal free from danger, the highest.
3607 From thence they do not return, for it is the end.'--Maitr. Up. VI, 30
3608 quotes /s/lokas, 'One of them (the arteries) leads upwards, piercing the
3609 solar orb: by it, having stepped beyond the world of Brahman, they go to
3610 the highest path.'

3611
3612 All these passages are as clear as can be desired. The soul of the sage
3613 who knows Brahman passes out by the sushum/n/a, and ascends by the path
3614 of the gods to the world of Brahman, there to remain for ever in some
3615 blissful state. But, according to /S/a@nkara, all these texts are meant
3616 to set forth the result of a certain inferior knowledge only, of the
3617 knowledge of the conditioned Brahman. Even in a passage apparently so
3618 entirely incapable of more than one interpretation as B/ri/. Up. VI, 2,
3619 15, the 'True,' which the holy hermits in the forest are said to
3620 worship, is not to be the highest Brahman, but only
3621 Hira/n/yagarbha!--And why?--Only because the system so demands it, the
3622 system which teaches that those who know the highest Brahman become on
3623 their death one with it, without having to resort to any other place.
3624 The passage on which this latter tenet is chiefly based is B/ri/. Up.
3625 IV, 4, 6, 7, where, with the fate of him who at his death has desires,
3626 and whose soul therefore enters a new body after having departed from
3627 the old one, accompanied by all the pra/n/as, there is contrasted the
3628 fate of the sage free from all desires. 'But as to the man who does not
3629 desire, who not desiring, freed from desires is satisfied in his
3630 desires, or desires the Self only, the vital spirits of him (tasya) do
3631 not depart--being Brahman he goes to Brahman.'

3632
3633 We have seen above (p. lxxx) that this passage is referred to in the
3634 important Sutras on whose right interpretation it, in the first place,
3635 depends whether or not we must admit the Sutrakara to have acknowledged
3636 the distinction of a para and an apara vidya. Here the passage interests
3637 us as throwing light on the way in which /S/a@nkara systematises. He
3638 looks on the preceding part of the chapter as describing what happens to
3639 the souls of all those who do not know the highest Brahman, inclusive of
3640 those who know the lower Brahman only. They pass out of the old bodies
3641 followed by all pra/n/as and enter new bodies. He, on the other hand,
3642 section 6 continues, who knows the true Brahman, does not pass out of
3643 the body, but becomes one with Brahman then and there. This
3644 interpretation of the purport of the entire chapter is not impossibly
3645 right, although I am rather inclined to think that the chapter aims at
3646 setting forth in its earlier part the future of him who does not know
3647 Brahman at all, while the latter part of section 6 passes on to him who
3648 does know Brahman (i.e. Brahman pure and simple, the text knowing of no
3649 distinction of the so-called lower and higher Brahman). In explaining
3650 section 6 /S/a@nkara lays stress upon the clause 'na tasya pra/n/a
3651 utkramanti,' 'his vital spirits do not pass out,' taking this to signify
3652 that the soul with the vital spirits does not move at all, and thus does
3653 not ascend to the world of Brahman; while the purport of the clause may
3654 simply be that the soul and vital spirits do not go anywhere else, i.e.
3655 do not enter a new body, but are united, somehow or other, with Brahman.
3656 On /S/a@nkara's interpretation there immediately arises a new

3657 difficulty. In the /s/lokas, quoted under sections 8 and 9, the
3658 description of the small old path which leads to the svargaloka and
3659 higher on clearly refers--as noticed already above--to the path through
3660 the veins, primarily the sushum/n/a, on which, according to so many
3661 other passages, the soul of the wise mounts upwards. But that path is,
3662 according to /S/a@nkara, followed by him only who has not risen above
3663 the lower knowledge, and yet the /s/lokas have manifestly to be
3664 connected with what is said in the latter half of 6 about the owner of
3665 the para vidya. Hence /S/a@nkara sees himself driven to explain the
3666 /s/lokas in 8 and 9 (of which a faithful translation is given in
3667 Professor Max Mueller's version) as follows:

3668
3669 8. 'The subtle old path (i.e. the path of knowledge on which final
3670 release is reached; which path is subtle, i.e. difficult to know, and
3671 old, i.e. to be known from the eternal Veda) has been obtained and fully
3672 reached by me. On it the sages who know Brahman reach final release
3673 (svargaloka/s/abda/h/ samnihitaprakara/n/at mokshabhidyaka/h/).

3674
3675 9. 'On that path they say that there is white or blue or yellow or green
3676 or red (i.e. others maintain that the path to final release is, in
3677 accordance with the colour of the arteries, either white or blue, &c.;
3678 but that is false, for the paths through the arteries lead at the best
3679 to the world of Brahman, which itself forms part of the sa/m/sara); that
3680 path (i.e. the only path to release, viz. the path of true knowledge) is
3681 found by Brahman, i.e. by such Brahma/n/as as through true knowledge
3682 have become like Brahman,' &c.

3683
3684 A significant instance in truth of the straits to which thorough-going
3685 systematisers of the Upanishads see themselves reduced occasionally!

3686
3687 But we return to the point which just now chiefly interests us. Whether
3688 /S/a@nkara's interpretation of the chapter, and especially of section 6,
3689 be right or wrong, so much is certain that we are not entitled to view
3690 all those texts which speak of the soul going to the world of Brahman as
3691 belonging to the so-called lower knowledge, because a few other passages
3692 declare that the sage does not go to Brahman. The text which declares
3693 the sage free from desires to become one with Brahman could not, without
3694 due discrimination, be used to define and limit the meaning of other
3695 passages met with in the same Upanishad even--for as we have remarked
3696 above the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka contains pieces manifestly belonging to
3697 different stages of development;--much less does it entitle us to put
3698 arbitrary constructions on passages forming part of other Upanishads.
3699 Historically the disagreement of the various accounts is easy to
3700 understand. The older notion was that the soul of the wise man proceeds
3701 along the path of the gods to Brahman's abode. A later--and, if we like,
3702 more philosophic--conception is that, as Brahman already is a man's
3703 Self, there is no need of any motion on man's part to reach Brahman. We
3704 may even apply to those two views the terms apara and para--lower and
3705 higher--knowledge. But we must not allow any commentator to induce us to
3706 believe that what he from his advanced standpoint looks upon as an
3707 inferior kind of cognition, was viewed in the same light by the authors
3708 of the Upanishads.

3709
3710 We turn to another Upanishad text likewise touching upon the point
3711 considered in what precedes, viz. the second Brahma/n/a of the third
3712 adhyaya of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka. The discussion there first turns upon
3713 the grahas and atigrahas, i.e. the senses and organs and their objects,
3714 and Yajnavalkya thereupon explains that death, by which everything is
3715 overcome, is itself overcome by water; for death is fire. The colloquy
3716 then turns to what we must consider an altogether new topic, Artabhaga
3717 asking, 'When this man (ayam purusha) dies, do the vital spirits depart
3718 from him or not?' and Yajnavalkya answering, 'No, they are gathered up
3719 in him; he swells, he is inflated; inflated the dead (body) is
3720 lying.'--Now this is for /S/a@nkara an important passage, as we have
3721 already seen above (p. lxxxi); for he employs it, in his comment on
3722 Ved.-sutra IV, 2, 13, for the purpose of proving that the passage B/ri/.
3723 Up. IV, 4, 6 really means that the vital spirits do not, at the moment
3724 of death, depart from the true sage. Hence the present passage also must
3725 refer to him who possesses the highest knowledge; hence the 'ayam

3726 purusha' must be 'that man,' i.e. the man who possesses the highest
3727 knowledge, and the highest knowledge then must be found in the preceding
3728 clause which says that death itself may be conquered by water. But, as
3729 Ramanuja also remarks, neither does the context favour the assumption
3730 that the highest knowledge is referred to, nor do the words of section
3731 11 contain any indication that what is meant is the merging of the Self
3732 of the true Sage in Brahman. With the interpretation given by Ramanuja
3733 himself, viz. that the pra/n/as do not depart from the jiva of the dying
3734 man, but accompany it into a new body, I can agree as little (although
3735 he no doubt rightly explains the 'ayam purusha' by 'man' in general),
3736 and am unable to see in the passage anything more than a crude attempt
3737 to account for the fact that a dead body appears swollen and
3738 inflated.--A little further on (section 13) Artabhaga asks what becomes
3739 of this man (ayam purusha) when his speech has entered into the fire,
3740 his breath into the air, his eye into the sun, &c. So much here is clear
3741 that we have no right to understand by the 'ayam purusha' of section 13
3742 anybody different from the 'ayam purusha' of the two preceding sections;
3743 in spite of this /S/a@nkara--according to whose system the organs of the
3744 true sage do not enter into the elements, but are directly merged in
3745 Brahman--explains the 'ayam purusha' of section 13 to be the
3746 'asa/m/yagdar/s/in,' i.e. the person who has not risen to the cognition
3747 of the highest Brahman. And still a further limiting interpretation is
3748 required by the system. The asa/m/yagdar/s/in also--who as such has to
3749 remain in the sa/m/sara--cannot do without the organs, since his jiva
3750 when passing out of the old body into a new one is invested with the
3751 subtle body; hence section 13 cannot be taken as saying what it clearly
3752 does say, viz. that at death the different organs pass into the
3753 different elements, but as merely indicating that the organs are
3754 abandoned by the divinities which, during lifetime, presided over them!

3755
3756 The whole third adhyaya indeed of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka affords ample
3757 proof of the artificial character of /S/a@nkara's attempts to show that
3758 the teaching of the Upanishads follows a definite system. The eighth
3759 brahma/n/a, for instance, is said to convey the doctrine of the highest
3760 non-related Brahman, while the preceding brahma/n/as had treated only of
3761 I/s/vara in his various aspects. But, as a matter of fact, brahma/n/a 8,
3762 after having, in section 8, represented Brahman as destitute of all
3763 qualities, proceeds, in the next section, to describe that very same
3764 Brahman as the ruler of the world, 'By the command of that Imperishable
3765 sun and moon stand apart,' &c.; a clear indication that the author of
3766 the Upanishad does not distinguish a higher and lower Brahman
3767 in--/S/a@nkara's sense.--The preceding brahma/n/a (7) treats of the
3768 antaryamin, i.e. Brahman viewed as the internal ruler of everything.
3769 This, according to /S/a@nkara, is the lower form of Brahman called
3770 I/s/vara; but we observe that the antaryamin as well as the so-called
3771 highest Brahman described in section 8 is, at the termination of the two
3772 sections, characterised by means of the very same terms (7, 23: Unseen
3773 but seeing, unheard but hearing, &c. There is no other seer but he,
3774 there is no other hearer but he, &c.; and 8, 11: That Brahman is unseen
3775 but seeing, unheard but hearing, &c. There is nothing that sees but it,
3776 nothing that hears but it, &c.).--Nothing can be clearer than that all
3777 these sections aim at describing one and the same being, and know
3778 nothing of the distinctions made by the developed Vedanta, however valid
3779 the latter may be from a purely philosophic point of view.

3780
3781 We may refer to one more similar instance from the Chandogya Upanishad.
3782 We there meet in III, 14 with one of the most famous vidyas describing
3783 the nature of Brahman, called after its reputed author the
3784 Sa/nd/ilya-vidya. This small vidya is decidedly one of the finest and
3785 most characteristic texts; it would be difficult to point out another
3786 passage setting forth with greater force and eloquence and in an equally
3787 short compass the central doctrine of the Upanishads. Yet this text,
3788 which, beyond doubt, gives utterance to the highest conception of
3789 Brahman's nature that Sa/nd/ilya's thought was able to reach, is by
3790 /S/a@nkara and his school again declared to form part of the lower vidya
3791 only, because it represents Brahman as possessing qualities. It is,
3792 according to their terminology, not j/n/ana, i.e. knowledge, but the
3793 injunction of a mere upasana, a devout meditation on Brahman in so far
3794 as possessing certain definite attributes such as having light for its

3795 form, having true thoughts, and so on. The Ramanujas, on the other hand,
3796 quote this text with preference as clearly describing the nature of
3797 their highest, i.e. their one Brahman. We again allow that /S/a@nkara is
3798 free to deny that any text which ascribes qualities to Brahman embodies
3799 absolute truth; but we also again remark that there is no reason
3800 whatever for supposing that Sa/nd/ilya, or whoever may have been the
3801 author of that vidya, looked upon it as anything else but a statement of
3802 the highest truth accessible to man.

3803
3804 We return to the question as to the true philosophy of the Upanishads,
3805 apart from the systems of the commentators.--From what precedes it will
3806 appear with sufficient distinctness that, if we understand by philosophy
3807 a philosophical system coherent in all its parts, free from all
3808 contradictions and allowing room for all the different statements made
3809 in all the chief Upanishads, a philosophy of the Upanishads cannot even
3810 be spoken of. The various lucubrations on Brahman, the world, and the
3811 human soul of which the Upanishads consist do not allow themselves to be
3812 systematised simply because they were never meant to form a system.
3813 /S/a/nd/ilya's views as to the nature of Brahman did not in all details
3814 agree with those of Yaj/n/avalkya, and Uddalaka differed from both. In
3815 this there is nothing to wonder at, and the burden of proof rests
3816 altogether with those who maintain that a large number of detached
3817 philosophic and theological dissertations, ascribed to different
3818 authors, doubtless belonging to different periods, and not seldom
3819 manifestly contradicting each other, admit of being combined into a
3820 perfectly consistent whole.

3821
3822 The question, however, assumes a different aspect, if we take the terms
3823 'philosophy' and 'philosophical system,' not in the strict sense in
3824 which /S/a@nkara and other commentators are not afraid of taking them,
3825 but as implying merely an agreement in certain fundamental features. In
3826 this latter sense we may indeed undertake to indicate the outlines of a
3827 philosophy of the Upanishads, only keeping in view that precision in
3828 details is not to be aimed at. And here we finally see ourselves driven
3829 back altogether on the texts themselves, and have to acknowledge that
3830 the help we receive from commentators, to whatever school they may
3831 belong, is very inconsiderable. Fortunately it cannot be asserted that
3832 the texts on the whole oppose very serious difficulties to a right
3833 understanding, however obscure the details often are. Concerning the
3834 latter we occasionally depend entirely on the explanations vouchsafed by
3835 the scholiasts, but as far as the general drift and spirit of the texts
3836 are concerned, we are quite able to judge by ourselves, and are even
3837 specially qualified to do so by having no particular system to advocate.

3838
3839 The point we will first touch upon is the same from which we started
3840 when examining the doctrine of the Sutras, viz. the question whether the
3841 Upanishads acknowledge a higher and lower knowledge in /S/a@nkara's
3842 sense, i.e. a knowledge of a higher and a lower Brahman. Now this we
3843 find not to be the case. Knowledge is in the Upanishads frequently
3844 opposed to avidya, by which latter term we have to understand ignorance
3845 as to Brahman, absence of philosophic knowledge; and, again, in several
3846 places we find the knowledge of the sacrificial part of the Veda with
3847 its supplementary disciplines contrasted as inferior with the knowledge
3848 of the Self; to which latter distinction the Mu/nd/aka Up. (I, 4)
3849 applies the terms apara and para vidya. But a formal recognition of the
3850 essential difference of Brahman being viewed, on the one hand, as
3851 possessing distinctive attributes, and, on the other hand, as devoid of
3852 all such attributes is not to be met with anywhere. Brahman is indeed
3853 sometimes described as sagu/n/a and sometimes as nirgu/n/a (to use later
3854 terms); but it is nowhere said that thereon rests a distinction of two
3855 different kinds of knowledge leading to altogether different results.
3856 The knowledge of Brahman is one, under whatever aspects it is viewed;
3857 hence the circumstance (already exemplified above) that in the same
3858 vidyas it is spoken of as sagu/n/a as well as nirgu/n/a. When the mind
3859 of the writer dwells on the fact that Brahman is that from which all
3860 this world originates, and in which it rests, he naturally applies to it
3861 distinctive attributes pointing at its relation to the world; Brahman,
3862 then, is called the Self and life of all, the inward ruler, the
3863 omniscient Lord, and so on. When, on the other hand, the author follows

3864 out the idea that Brahman may be viewed in itself as the mysterious
3865 reality of which the whole expanse of the world is only an outward
3866 manifestation, then it strikes him that no idea or term derived from
3867 sensible experience can rightly be applied to it, that nothing more may
3868 be predicated of it but that it is neither this nor that. But these are
3869 only two aspects of the cognition of one and the same entity.

3870
3871 Closely connected with the question as to the double nature of the
3872 Brahman of the Upanishads is the question as to their teaching
3873 Maya.--From Colebrooke downwards the majority of European writers have
3874 inclined towards the opinion that the doctrine of Maya, i.e. of the
3875 unreal illusory character of the sensible world, does not constitute a
3876 feature of the primitive philosophy of the Upanishads, but was
3877 introduced into the system at some later period, whether by Badarayana or
3878 or /S/a@nkara or somebody else. The opposite view, viz. that the
3879 doctrine of Maya forms an integral element of the teaching of the
3880 Upanishads, is implied in them everywhere, and enunciated more or less
3881 distinctly in more than one place, has in recent times been advocated
3882 with much force by Mr. Gough in the ninth chapter of his Philosophy of
3883 the Upanishads.

3884
3885 In his Materiaux, &c. M. Paul Regnaud remarks that 'the doctrine of
3886 Maya, although implied in the teaching of the Upanishads, could hardly
3887 become clear and explicit before the system had reached a stage of
3888 development necessitating a choice between admitting two co-existent
3889 eternal principles (which became the basis of the Sa@nkhyas philosophy),
3890 and accepting the predominance of the intellectual principle, which in
3891 the end necessarily led to the negation of the opposite principle.'--To
3892 the two alternatives here referred to as possible we, however, have to
3893 add a third one, viz. that form of the Vedanta of which the theory of
3894 the Bhagavatas or Ramanujas is the most eminent type, and according to
3895 which Brahman carries within its own nature an element from which the
3896 material universe originates; an element which indeed is not an
3897 independent entity like the pradhana of the Sa@nkhyas, but which at the
3898 same time is not an unreal Maya but quite as real as any other part of
3899 Brahman's nature. That a doctrine of this character actually developed
3900 itself on the basis of the Upanishads, is a circumstance which we
3901 clearly must not lose sight of, when attempting to determine what the
3902 Upanishads themselves are teaching concerning the character of the
3903 world.

3904
3905 In enquiring whether the Upanishads maintain the Maya doctrine or not,
3906 we must proceed with the same caution as regards other parts of the
3907 system, i.e. we must refrain from using unhesitatingly, and without
3908 careful consideration of the merits of each individual case, the
3909 teaching--direct or inferred--of any one passage to the end of
3910 determining the drift of the teaching of other passages. We may admit
3911 that some passages, notably of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka, contain at any
3912 rate the germ of the later developed Maya doctrine[25], and thus render
3913 it quite intelligible that a system like /S/a@nkara's should evolve
3914 itself, among others, out of the Upanishads; but that affords no valid
3915 reason for interpreting Maya into other texts which give a very
3916 satisfactory sense without that doctrine, or are even clearly repugnant
3917 to it. This remark applies in the very first place to all the accounts
3918 of the creation of the physical universe. There, if anywhere, the
3919 illusional character of the world should have been hinted at, at least,
3920 had that theory been held by the authors of those accounts; but not a
3921 word to that effect is met with anywhere. The most important of those
3922 accounts--the one given in the sixth chapter of the Chandogya
3923 Upanishad--forms no exception. There is absolutely no reason to assume
3924 that the 'sending forth' of the elements from the primitive Sat, which
3925 is there described at length, was by the writer of that passage meant to
3926 represent a vivarta rather than a pari/n/ama that the process of the
3927 origination of the physical universe has to be conceived as anything
3928 else but a real manifestation of real powers hidden in the primeval
3929 Self. The introductory words, addressed to /S/vetaketu by Uddalaka,
3930 which are generally appealed to as intimating the unreal character of
3931 the evolution about to be described, do not, if viewed impartially,
3932 intimate any such thing[26]. For what is capable of being proved, and

3933 manifestly meant to be proved, by the illustrative instances of the lump
3934 of clay and the nugget of gold, through which there are known all things
3935 made of clay and gold? Merely that this whole world has Brahman for its
3936 causal substance, just as clay is the causal matter of every earthen
3937 pot, and gold of every golden ornament, but not that the process through
3938 which any causal substance becomes an effect is an unreal one.
3939 We--including Uddalaka--may surely say that all earthen pots are in
3940 reality nothing but earth--the earthen pot being merely a special
3941 modification (vikara) of clay which has a name of its own--without
3942 thereby committing ourselves to the doctrine that the change of form,
3943 which a lump of clay undergoes when being fashioned into a pot, is not
3944 real but a mere baseless illusion.

3945
3946 In the same light we have to view numerous other passages which set
3947 forth the successive emanations proceeding from the first principle.
3948 When, for instance, we meet in the Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 10, in the serial
3949 enumeration of the forms of existence intervening between the gross
3950 material world and the highest Self (the Person), with the
3951 'avyak/ri/ta,' the Undeveloped, immediately below the purusha; and when
3952 again the Mu/nd/aka Up. II, 1, 2, speaks of the 'high Imperishable'
3953 higher than which is the heavenly Person; there is no reason whatever to
3954 see in that 'Undeveloped' and that 'high Imperishable' anything but that
3955 real element in Brahman from which, as in the Ramanuja system, the
3956 material universe springs by a process of real development. We must of
3957 course render it quite clear to ourselves in what sense the terms 'real'
3958 and 'unreal' have to be understood. The Upanishads no doubt teach
3959 emphatically that the material world does not owe its existence to any
3960 principle independent from the Lord like the pradhana of the Sa@nkhyas;
3961 the world is nothing but a manifestation of the Lord's wonderful power,
3962 and hence is unsubstantial, if we take the term 'substance' in its
3963 strict sense. And, again, everything material is immeasurably inferior
3964 in nature to the highest spiritual principle from which it has emanated,
3965 and which it now hides from the individual soul. But neither
3966 unsubstantiality nor inferiority of the kind mentioned constitutes
3967 unreality in the sense in which the Maya of /S/a@nkara is unreal.
3968 According to the latter the whole world is nothing but an erroneous
3969 appearance, as unreal as the snake, for which a piece of rope is
3970 mistaken by the belated traveller, and disappearing just as the imagined
3971 snake does as soon as the light of true knowledge has risen. But this is
3972 certainly not the impression left on the mind by a comprehensive review
3973 of the Upanishads which dwells on their general scope, and does not
3974 confine itself to the undue urging of what may be implied in some
3975 detached passages. The Upanishads do not call upon us to look upon the
3976 whole world as a baseless illusion to be destroyed by knowledge; the
3977 great error which they admonish us to relinquish is rather that things
3978 have a separate individual existence, and are not tied together by the
3979 bond of being all of them effects of Brahman, or Brahman itself. They do
3980 not say that true knowledge sublates this false world, as /S/a@nkara
3981 says, but that it enables the sage to extricate himself from the
3982 world--the inferior murta rupa of Brahman, to use an expression of the
3983 B/ri/hadara/n/yaka--and to become one with Brahman in its highest form.
3984 'We are to see everything in Brahman, and Brahman in everything;' the
3985 natural meaning of this is, 'we are to look upon this whole world as a
3986 true manifestation of Brahman, as sprung from it and animated by it.'
3987 The mayavadin has indeed appropriated the above saying also, and
3988 interpreted it so as to fall in with his theory; but he is able to do so
3989 only by perverting its manifest sense. For him it would be appropriate
3990 to say, not that everything we see is in Brahman, but rather that
3991 everything we see is out of Brahman, viz. as a false appearance spread
3992 over it and hiding it from us.

3993
3994 Stress has been laid[27] upon certain passages of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka
3995 which seem to hint at the unreality of this world by qualifying terms,
3996 indicative of duality or plurality of existence, by means of an added
3997 'iva,' i.e. 'as it were' (yatranyad iva syat; yatra dvaitam iva bhavati;
3998 atma dhyayativa lelayativa). Those passages no doubt readily lend
3999 themselves to Maya interpretations, and it is by no means impossible
4000 that in their author's mind there was something like an undeveloped Maya
4001 doctrine. I must, however, remark that they, on the other hand, also

admit of easy interpretations not in any way presupposing the theory of the unreality of the world. If Yaj/n/avalkya refers to the latter as that 'where there is something else as it were, where there is duality as it were,' he may simply mean to indicate that the ordinary opinion, according to which the individual forms of existence of the world are opposed to each other as altogether separate, is a mistaken one, all things being one in so far as they spring from--and are parts of--Brahman. This would in no way involve duality or plurality being unreal in /S/a@nkara's sense, not any more than, for instance, the modes of Spinoza are unreal because, according to that philosopher, there is only one universal substance. And with regard to the clause 'the Self thinks as it were' it has to be noted that according to the commentators the 'as it were' is meant to indicate that truly not the Self is thinking, but the upadhis, i.e. especially the manas with which the Self is connected. But whether these upadhis are the mere offspring of Maya, as /S/a@nkara thinks, or real forms of existence, as Ramanuja teaches, is an altogether different question.

I do not wish, however, to urge these last observations, and am ready to admit that not impossibly those iva's indicate that the thought of the writer who employed them was darkly labouring with a conception akin to--although much less explicit than--the Maya of /S/a@nkara. But what I object to is, that conclusions drawn from a few passages of, after all, doubtful import should be employed for introducing the Maya doctrine into other passages which do not even hint at it, and are fully intelligible without it.[28]

The last important point in the teaching of the Upanishads we have to touch upon is the relation of the jivas, the individual souls to the highest Self. The special views regarding that point held by /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja, as have been stated before. Confronting their theories with the texts of the Upanishads we must, I think, admit without hesitation, that /S/a@nkara's doctrine faithfully represents the prevailing teaching of the Upanishads in one important point at least, viz. therein that the soul or Self of the sage--whatever its original relation to Brahman may be--is in the end completely merged and indistinguishably lost in the universal Self. A distinction, repeatedly alluded to before, has indeed to be kept in view here also. Certain texts of the Upanishads describe the soul's going upwards, on the path of the gods, to the world of Brahman, where it dwells for unnumbered years, i.e. for ever. Those texts, as a type of which we may take, the passage Kaushit. Up. I--the fundamental text of the Ramanujas concerning the soul's fate after death--belong to an earlier stage of philosophic development; they manifestly ascribe to the soul a continued individual existence. But mixed with texts of this class there are others in which the final absolute identification of the individual Self with the universal Self is indicated in terms of unmistakable plainness. 'He who knows Brahman and becomes Brahman;' 'he who knows Brahman becomes all this;' 'as the flowing rivers disappear in the sea losing their name and form, thus a wise man goes to the divine person.' And if we look to the whole, to the prevailing spirit of the Upanishads, we may call the doctrine embodied in passages of the latter nature the doctrine of the Upanishads. It is, moreover, supported by the frequently and clearly stated theory of the individual souls being merged in Brahman in the state of deep dreamless sleep.

It is much more difficult to indicate the precise teaching of the Upanishads concerning the original relation of the individual soul to the highest Self, although there can be no doubt that it has to be viewed as proceeding from the latter, and somehow forming a part of it. Negatively we are entitled to say that the doctrine, according to which the soul is merely brahma bhrantam or brahma mayopadhikam, is in no way countenanced by the majority of the passages bearing on the question. If the emission of the elements, described in the Chandogya and referred to above, is a real process--of which we saw no reason to doubt--the jiva atman with which the highest Self enters into the emitted elements is equally real, a true part or emanation of Brahman itself.

After having in this way shortly reviewed the chief elements of Vedantic

4071 doctrine according to the Upanishads, we may briefly consider
4072 /S/a@nkara's system and mode of interpretation--with whose details we
4073 had frequent opportunities of finding fault--as a whole. It has been
4074 said before that the task of reducing the teaching of the whole of the
4075 Upanishads to a system consistent and free from contradictions is an
4076 intrinsically impossible one. But the task once being given, we are
4077 quite ready to admit that /S/a@nkara's system is most probably the best
4078 which can be devised. While unable to allow that the Upanishads
4079 recognise a lower and higher knowledge of Brahman, in fact the
4080 distinction of a lower and higher Brahman, we yet acknowledge that the
4081 adoption of that distinction furnishes the interpreter with an
4082 instrument of extraordinary power for reducing to an orderly whole the
4083 heterogeneous material presented by the old theosophic treatises. This
4084 becomes very manifest as soon as we compare /S/a@nkara's system with
4085 that of Ramanuja. The latter recognises only one Brahman which is, as we
4086 should say, a personal God, and he therefore lays stress on all those
4087 passages of the Upanishads which ascribe to Brahman the attributes of a
4088 personal God, such as omniscience and omnipotence. Those passages, on
4089 the other hand, whose decided tendency it is to represent Brahman as
4090 transcending all qualities, as one undifferentenced mass of impersonal
4091 intelligence, Ramanuja is unable to accept frankly and fairly, and has
4092 to misinterpret them more or less to make them fall in with his system.
4093 The same remark holds good with regard to those texts which represent
4094 the individual soul as finally identifying itself with Brahman; Ramanuja
4095 cannot allow a complete identification but merely an assimilation
4096 carried as far as possible. /S/a@nkara, on the other hand, by skilfully
4097 ringing the changes on a higher and a lower doctrine, somehow manages to
4098 find room for whatever the Upanishads have to say. Where the text speaks
4099 of Brahman as transcending all attributes, the highest doctrine is set
4100 forth. Where Brahman is called the All-knowing ruler of the world, the
4101 author means to propound the lower knowledge of the Lord only. And where
4102 the legends about the primary being and its way of creating the world
4103 become somewhat crude and gross, Hira/n/yagarbha and Viraj are summoned
4104 forth and charged with the responsibility. Of Viraj Mr. Gough remarks
4105 (p. 55) that in him a place is provided by the poets of the Upanishads
4106 for the purusha of the ancient /ri/shis, the divine being out of whom
4107 the visible and tangible world proceeded. This is quite true if only we
4108 substitute for the 'poets of the Upanishads' the framers of the orthodox
4109 Vedanta system--for the Upanishads give no indication whatever that by
4110 their purusha they understand not the simple old purusha but the Viraj
4111 occupying a definite position in a highly elaborate system;--but the
4112 mere phrase, 'providing a place' intimates with sufficient clearness the
4113 nature of the work in which systematisers of the Vedantic doctrine are
4114 engaged.

4115
4116 /S/a@nkara's method thus enables him in a certain way to do justice to
4117 different stages of historical development, to recognise clearly
4118 existing differences which other systematisers are intent on
4119 obliterating. And there has yet to be made a further and even more
4120 important admission in favour of his system. It is not only more
4121 pliable, more capable of amalgamating heterogeneous material than other
4122 systems, but its fundamental doctrines are manifestly in greater harmony
4123 with the essential teaching of the Upanishads than those of other
4124 Vedantic systems. Above we were unable to allow that the distinction
4125 made by /S/a@nkara between Brahman and I/s/vara is known to the
4126 Upanishads; but we must now admit that if, for the purpose of
4127 determining the nature of the highest being, a choice has to be made
4128 between those texts which represent Brahman as nirgu/n/a, and those
4129 which ascribe to it personal attributes, /S/a@nkara is right in giving
4130 preference to texts of the former kind. The Brahman of the old
4131 Upanishads, from which the souls spring to enjoy individual
4132 consciousness in their waking state, and into which they sink back
4133 temporarily in the state of deep dreamless sleep and permanently in
4134 death, is certainly not represented adequately by the strictly personal
4135 I/s/vara of Ramanuja, who rules the world in wisdom and mercy. The older
4136 Upanishads, at any rate, lay very little stress upon personal attributes
4137 of their highest being, and hence /S/a@nkara is right in so far as he
4138 assigns to his hypostatized personal I/s/vara[29] a lower place than to
4139 his absolute Brahman. That he also faithfully represents the prevailing

spirit of the Upanishads in his theory of the ultimate fate of the soul, we have already remarked above. And although the Maya doctrine cannot, in my opinion, be said to form part of the teaching of the Upanishads, it cannot yet be asserted to contradict it openly, because the very point which it is meant to elucidate, viz. the mode in which the physical universe and the multiplicity of individual souls originate, is left by the Upanishads very much in the dark. The later growth of the Maya doctrine on the basis of the Upanishads is therefore quite intelligible, and I fully agree with Mr. Gough when he says regarding it that there has been no addition to the system from without but only a development from within, no graft but only growth. The lines of thought which finally led to the elaboration of the full-blown Maya theory may be traced with considerable certainty. In the first place, deepening speculation on Brahman tended to the notion of advaita being taken in a more and more strict sense, as implying not only the exclusion of any second principle external to Brahman, but also the absence of any elements of duality or plurality in the nature of the one universal being itself; a tendency agreeing with the spirit of a certain set of texts from the Upanishads. And as the fact of the appearance of a manifold world cannot be denied, the only way open to thoroughly consistent speculation was to deny at any rate its reality, and to call it a mere illusion due to an unreal principle, with which Brahman is indeed associated, but which is unable to break the unity of Brahman's nature just on account of its own unreality. And, in the second place, a more thorough following out of the conception that the union with Brahman is to be reached through true knowledge only, not unnaturally led to the conclusion that what separates us in our unenlightened state from Brahman is such as to allow itself to be completely sublated by an act of knowledge; is, in other words, nothing else but an erroneous notion, an illusion.--A further circumstance which may not impossibly have co-operated to further the development of the theory of the world's unreality will be referred to later on.[30]

We have above been obliged to leave it an open question what kind of Vedanta is represented by the Vedanta-sutras, although reason was shown for the supposition that in some important points their teaching is more closely related to the system of Ramanuja than to that of /S/a@nkara. If so, the philosophy of /S/a@nkara would on the whole stand nearer to the teaching of the Upanishads than the Sutras of Badaraya/n/a. This would indeed be a somewhat unexpected conclusion--for, judging a priori, we should be more inclined to assume a direct propagation of the true doctrine of the Upanishads through Badaraya/n/a to /S/a@nkara--but a priori considerations have of course no weight against positive evidence to the contrary. There are, moreover, other facts in the history of Indian philosophy and theology which help us better to appreciate the possibility of Badaraya/n/a's Sutras already setting forth a doctrine that lays greater stress on the personal character of the highest being than is in agreement with the prevailing tendency of the Upanishads. That the pure doctrine of those ancient Brahminical treatises underwent at a rather early period amalgamations with beliefs which most probably had sprung up in altogether different--priestly or non-priestly--communities is a well-known circumstance; it suffices for our purposes to refer to the most eminent of the early literary monuments in which an amalgamation of the kind mentioned is observable, viz. the Bhagavadgita. The doctrine of the Bhagavadgita represents a fusion of the Brahman theory of the Upanishads with the belief in a personal highest being--K/ri/sh/n/a or Vish/n/u--which in many respects approximates very closely to the system of the Bhagavatas; the attempts of a certain set of Indian commentators to explain it as setting forth pure Vedanta, i.e. the pure doctrine of the Upanishads, may simply be set aside. But this same Bhagavadgita is quoted in Badaraya/n/a's Sutras (at least according to the unanimous explanations of the most eminent scholiasts of different schools) as inferior to /S/ruti only in authority. The Sutras, moreover, refer in different places to certain Vedantic portions of the Mahabharata, especially the twelfth book, several of which represent forms of Vedanta distinctly differing from /S/a@nkara's teaching, and closely related to the system of the Bhagavatas.

Facts of this nature--from entering into the details of which we are prevented by want of space--tend to mitigate the prima facie strangeness of the assumption that the Vedanta-sutras, which occupy an intermediate position between the Upanishads and /S/a@nkara, should yet diverge in their teaching from both. The Vedanta of Gau/d/apada and /S/a@nkara would in that case mark a strictly orthodox reaction against all combinations of non-Vedic elements of belief and doctrine with the teaching of the Upanishads. But although this form of doctrine has ever since /S/a@nkara's time been the one most generally accepted by Brahminic students of philosophy, it has never had any wide-reaching influence on the masses of India. It is too little in sympathy with the wants of the human heart, which, after all, are not so very different in India from what they are elsewhere. Comparatively few, even in India, are those who rejoice in the idea of a universal non-personal essence in which their own individuality is to be merged and lost for ever, who think it sweet 'to be wrecked on the ocean of the Infinite.' [31] The only forms of Vedantic philosophy which are--and can at any time have been--really popular, are those in which the Brahman of the Upanishads has somehow transformed itself into a being, between which and the devotee there can exist a personal relation, love and faith on the part of man, justice tempered by mercy on the part of the divinity. The only religious books of widespread influence are such as the Ramayan of Tulsidas, which lay no stress on the distinction between an absolute Brahman inaccessible to all human wants and sympathies, and a shadowy Lord whose very conception depends on the illusory principle of Maya, but love to dwell on the delights of devotion to one all-wise and merciful ruler, who is able and willing to lend a gracious ear to the supplication of the worshipper.

* * * * *

The present translation of the Vedanta-sutras does not aim at rendering that sense which their author may have aimed at conveying, but strictly follows /S/a@nkara's interpretation. The question as to how far the latter agrees with the views held by Badaraya/n/a has been discussed above, with the result that for the present it must, on the whole, be left an open one. In any case it would not be feasible to combine a translation of /S/a@nkara's commentary with an independent version of the Sutras which it explains. Similar considerations have determined the method followed in rendering the passages of the Upanishads referred to in the Sutras and discussed at length by /S/a@nkara. There also the views of the commentator have to be followed closely; otherwise much of the comment would appear devoid of meaning. Hence, while of course following on the whole the critical translation published by Professor Max Mueller in the earlier volumes of this Series, I had, in a not inconsiderable number of cases, to modify it so as to render intelligible /S/a@nkara's explanations and reasonings. I hope to find space in the introduction to the second volume of this translation for making some general remarks on the method to be followed in translating the Upanishads.

I regret that want of space has prevented me from extracting fuller notes from later scholiasts. The notes given are based, most of them, on the /t/ikas composed by Anandagiri and Govindananda (the former of which is unpublished as yet, so far as I know), and on the Bhamati.

My best thanks are due to Pa/nd/its Rama Mi/s/ra /S/astrin and Ga/ngadhara /S/astrin of the Benares Sanskrit College, whom I have consulted on several difficult passages. Greater still are my obligations to Pa/nd/it Ke/s/ava /S/astrin, of the same institution, who most kindly undertook to read a proof of the whole of the present volume, and whose advice has enabled me to render my version of more than one passage more definite or correct.

Notes:

[Footnote 19: Nanu vidusho z pi setikartavyatakopasananirv/ri/ttaye v/ri/shyannadiphalanish/t/any eva katha/m/ tesha/m/ virodhad vina/s/a u/k/yate. Tatraha pate tv iti. /S/arirapate tu tesha/m/ vina/s/a/h/

4278 /s/arirapatad urdhv/m/ tu vidyanugu/n/ad/ri/sh/t/aphalani suk/ri/tani
4279 na/s/yantity artha/h/.]

4280
4281 [Footnote 20: Upalabhyate hi devayanena pantha ga/kkh/ato vidushas tam
4282 pratibruuyat satyam bruyad iti /k/andramasa sa/m/vadava/k/anena
4283 /s/arirasadbhava/h/, ata/h/ sukshma/s/ariram anuvartate.]

4284
4285 [Footnote 21: When the jiva has passed out of the body and ascends to
4286 the world of Brahman, it remains enveloped by the subtle body until it
4287 reaches the river Vijara. There it divests itself of the subtle body,
4288 and the latter is merged in Brahman.].

4289
4290 [Footnote 22: Kim aya/m/ para/m/, yotir upasampanna/h/
4291 saivabandhavinirmukta/h/ pratyagatma svatmana/m/ paramatmana/h/
4292 p/rit/hagbhutam anubhavati uta tatpraharataya tadavibhaktam iti visnye
4293 so, /s/nate sarvan kaman saha brahma/n/a vipas/k/ita pasya/h/ pasyate
4294 rukmavar/n/a/m/ kartaram isa/m/ purusha/m/ brahmayoni/m/ tada vidvin
4295 pu/n/yapape vidhuya nirangana/h/ parama/m/ samyam upaiti ida/m/ jnanam
4296 upasritya mama sadharinyam agata/h/ sarve, punopajayante pralayena
4297 vyathanti /k/etyadysruysm/nt/ibhyo muktasta pare/n/a
4298 sahityasamyasadharmyavagamat p/ri/thagbhutam anubhavatiu prapte
4299 u/k/yate. Avibhageneti. Parasmad brahmana/h/ svatmanam
4300 avibhagenanubhavati mukta/h/. Kuta/h/. D/ri/shtatvat. Para/m/
4301 brahmopasampadya niv/ri/ttavidyanrodhanasya yathatathyena svatamano
4302 d/ri/sh/ta/tvat. Svatmana/h/ ssvarupa/m/ hi tat tvam asy ayam atma
4303 brahma aitadatmyam ida/m/ sarva/m/ sarva/m/ khalv ida/m/
4304 brahnetyadisamanadhikara/n/yanirdesai/h/ ya atmani tishtan atmano ntaro
4305 yam atma na veda yastatma sarira/m/ ya atmanam antaro yamayati
4306 atmantaryamy am/ri/tah anta/h/ pravishtha/h/ sasta ananam ityadibhis /k/a
4307 paramatmatmaka/m/ ta/kk/haritataya tatprakatabhutam iti pratipaditam
4308 avashitei iti kasak/ri/stnety atrato vibhagenaha/m/ brahmasmity
4309 cvanubhavati.]

4310
4311 [Footnote 23: /S/a@nkara's favourite illustrative instance of the
4312 magician producing illusive sights is--significantly enough--not known
4313 to the Sutras.]

4314
4315 [Footnote 24: Cp. Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 240 ff.]

4316
4317 [Footnote 25: It is well known that, with the exception of the
4318 /S/vitasvatara and Maitrayaniya, none of the chief Upanishads exhibits
4319 the word 'maya.' The term indeed occurs in one place in the
4320 B/ri/hadara/n/yaka; but that passage is a quotation from the /Ri/k
4321 Sa/m/bitā in which maya means 'creative power.' Cp. P. Regnaud, La Maya,
4322 in the Revue de l'Histoire des Religions, tome xii, No. 3, 1885.]

4323
4324 [Footnote 26: As is demonstrated very satisfactorily by Ramanuja.]

4325
4326 [Footnote 27: Gough, Philosophy of the Upanishads pp. 213 ff.]

4327
4328 [Footnote 28: I cannot discuss in this place the Maya passages of the
4329 Svetasvatara and the Maitrayaniya Upanishads. Reasons which want of
4330 space prevents me from setting forth in detail induce me to believe that
4331 neither of those two treatises deserves to be considered by us when
4332 wishing to ascertain the true immixed doctrine of the Upanishads.]

4333
4334 [Footnote 29: The I/s/vara who allots to the individual souls their new
4335 forms of embodiment in strict accordance with their merit or demerit
4336 cannot be called anything else but a personal God. That this personal
4337 conscious being is at the same time identified with the totality of the
4338 individual souls in the unconscious state of deep dreamless sleep, is
4339 one of those extraordinary contradictions which thorough-going
4340 systematisers of Vedantic doctrine are apparently unable to avoid
4341 altogether.]

4342
4343 [Footnote 30: That section of the introduction in which the point
4344 referred to in the text is touched upon will I hope form part of the
4345 second volume of the translation. The same remark applies to a point
4346 concerning which further information had been promised above on page v.]

4347
4348 [Footnote 31:
4349
4350 Cosi tra questa
4351 Immensita s'annega il pensier mio,
4352 E il naufrago m' e dolce in qnesto mare.
4353 LEOPARDI.
4354]
4355
4356
4357
4358
4359 VEDANTA-SUTRAS
4360
4361 WITH
4362
4363 /S/A@NKARA BHASHYA.
4364
4365 /S/A@NKARA'S INTRODUCTION
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4368 FIRST ADHYAYA.
4369
4370 FIRST PADA.
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4372
4373 REVERENCE TO THE AUGUST VASUDEVA!
4374
4375 It is a matter not requiring any proof that the object and the
4376 subject[32] whose respective spheres are the notion of the 'Thou' (the
4377 Non-Ego[33]) and the 'Ego,' and which are opposed to each other as much
4378 as darkness and light are, cannot be identified. All the less can their
4379 respective attributes be identified. Hence it follows that it is wrong
4380 to superimpose[34] upon the subject--whose Self is intelligence, and
4381 which has for its sphere the notion of the Ego--the object whose sphere
4382 is the notion of the Non-Ego, and the attributes of the object, and
4383 _vice versa_ to superimpose the subject and the attributes of the
4384 subject on the object. In spite of this it is on the part of man a
4385 natural[35] procedure--which which has its cause in wrong knowledge--not
4386 to distinguish the two entities (object and subject) and their
4387 respective attributes, although they are absolutely distinct, but to
4388 superimpose upon each the characteristic nature and the attributes of
4389 the other, and thus, coupling the Real and the Unreal[36], to make use
4390 of expressions such as 'That am I,' 'That is mine.[37] '--But what have
4391 we to understand by the term 'superimposition?'--The apparent
4392 presentation, in the form of remembrance, to consciousness of something
4393 previously observed, in some other thing.[38]
4394
4395 Some indeed define the term 'superimposition' as the superimposition of
4396 the attributes of one thing on another thing.[39] Others, again, define
4397 superimposition as the error founded on the non-apprehension of the
4398 difference of that which is superimposed from that on which it is
4399 superimposed.[40] Others[41], again, define it as the fictitious
4400 assumption of attributes contrary to the nature of that thing on which
4401 something else is superimposed. But all these definitions agree in so
4402 far as they represent superimposition as the apparent presentation of
4403 the attributes of one thing in another thing. And therewith agrees also
4404 the popular view which is exemplified by expressions such as the
4405 following: 'Mother-of-pearl appears like silver,' 'The moon although one
4406 only appears as if she were double.' But how is it possible that on the
4407 interior Self which itself is not an object there should be superimposed
4408 objects and their attributes? For every one superimposes an object only
4409 on such other objects as are placed before him (i.e. in contact with his
4410 sense-organs), and you have said before that the interior Self which is
4411 entirely disconnected from the idea of the Thou (the Non-Ego) is never
4412 an object. It is not, we reply, non-object in the absolute sense. For it
4413 is the object of the notion of the Ego[42], and the interior Self is
4414 well known to exist on account of its immediate (intuitive)
4415 presentation.[43] Nor is it an exceptionless rule that objects can be

4416 superimposed only on such other objects as are before us, i.e. in
4417 contact with our sense-organs; for non-discerning men superimpose on the
4418 ether, which is not the object of sensuous perception, dark-blue colour.
4419

4420 Hence it follows that the assumption of the Non-Self being superimposed
4421 on the interior Self is not unreasonable.
4422

4423 This superimposition thus defined, learned men consider to be Nescience
4424 (avidya), and the ascertainment of the true nature of that which is (the
4425 Self) by means of the discrimination of that (which is superimposed on
4426 the Self), they call knowledge (vidya). There being such knowledge
4427 (neither the Self nor the Non-Self) are affected in the least by any
4428 blemish or (good) quality produced by their mutual superimposition[44].
4429 The mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self, which is termed
4430 Nescience, is the presupposition on which there base all the practical
4431 distinctions--those made in ordinary life as well as those laid down by
4432 the Veda--between means of knowledge, objects of knowledge (and knowing
4433 persons), and all scriptural texts, whether they are concerned with
4434 injunctions and prohibitions (of meritorious and non-meritorious
4435 actions), or with final release[45].--But how can the means of right
4436 knowledge such as perception, inference, &c., and scriptural texts have
4437 for their object that which is dependent on Nescience[46]?--Because, we
4438 reply, the means of right knowledge cannot operate unless there be a
4439 knowing personality, and because the existence of the latter depends on
4440 the erroneous notion that the body, the senses, and so on, are identical
4441 with, or belong to, the Self of the knowing person. For without the
4442 employment of the senses, perception and the other means of right
4443 knowledge cannot operate. And without a basis (i.e. the body[47]) the
4444 senses cannot act. Nor does anybody act by means of a body on which the
4445 nature of the Self is not superimposed[48]. Nor can, in the absence of
4446 all that[49], the Self which, in its own nature is free from all
4447 contact, become a knowing agent. And if there is no knowing agent, the
4448 means of right knowledge cannot operate (as said above). Hence
4449 perception and the other means of right knowledge, and the Vedic texts
4450 have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience. (That human
4451 cognitional activity has for its presupposition the superimposition
4452 described above), follows also from the non-difference in that respect
4453 of men from animals. Animals, when sounds or other sensible qualities
4454 affect their sense of hearing or other senses, recede or advance
4455 according as the idea derived from the sensation is a comforting or
4456 disquieting one. A cow, for instance, when she sees a man approaching
4457 with a raised stick in his hand, thinks that he wants to beat her, and
4458 therefore moves away; while she walks up to a man who advances with some
4459 fresh grass in his hand. Thus men also--who possess a higher
4460 intelligence--run away when they see strong fierce-looking fellows
4461 drawing near with shouts and brandishing swords; while they confidently
4462 approach persons of contrary appearance and behaviour. We thus see that
4463 men and animals follow the same course of procedure with reference to
4464 the means and objects of knowledge. Now it is well known that the
4465 procedure of animals bases on the non-distinction (of Self and
4466 Non-Self); we therefore conclude that, as they present the same
4467 appearances, men also--although distinguished by superior
4468 intelligence--proceed with regard to perception and so on, in the same
4469 way as animals do; as long, that is to say, as the mutual
4470 superimposition of Self and Non-Self lasts. With reference again to that
4471 kind of activity which is founded on the Veda (sacrifices and the like),
4472 it is true indeed that the reflecting man who is qualified to enter on
4473 it, does so not without knowing that the Self has a relation to another
4474 world; yet that qualification does not depend on the knowledge,
4475 derivable from the Vedanta-texts, of the true nature of the Self as free
4476 from all wants, raised above the distinctions of the Brahma/n/a and
4477 Kshattriya-classes and so on, transcending transmigratory existence. For
4478 such knowledge is useless and even contradictory to the claim (on the
4479 part of sacrificers, &c. to perform certain actions and enjoy their
4480 fruits). And before such knowledge of the Self has arisen, the Vedic
4481 texts continue in their operation, to have for their object that which
4482 is dependent on Nescience. For such texts as the following, 'A
4483 Brahma/n/a is to sacrifice,' are operative only on the supposition that
4484 on the Self are superimposed particular conditions such as caste, stage

of life, age, outward circumstances, and so on. That by superimposition we have to understand the notion of something in some other thing we have already explained. (The superimposition of the Non-Self will be understood more definitely from the following examples.) Extra-personal attributes are superimposed on the Self, if a man considers himself sound and entire, or the contrary, as long as his wife, children, and so on are sound and entire or not. Attributes of the body are superimposed on the Self, if a man thinks of himself (his Self) as stout, lean, fair, as standing, walking, or jumping. Attributes of the sense-organs, if he thinks 'I am mute, or deaf, or one-eyed, or blind.' Attributes of the internal organ when he considers himself subject to desire, intention, doubt, determination, and so on. Thus the producer of the notion of the Ego (i.e. the internal organ) is superimposed on the interior Self, which, in reality, is the witness of all the modifications of the internal organ, and vice versa the interior Self, which is the witness of everything, is superimposed on the internal organ, the senses, and so on. In this way there goes on this natural beginning--and endless superimposition, which appears in the form of wrong conception, is the cause of individual souls appearing as agents and enjoyers (of the results of their actions), and is observed by every one.

With a view to freeing one's self from that wrong notion which is the cause of all evil and attaining thereby the knowledge of the absolute unity of the Self the study of the Vedanta-texts is begun. That all the Vedanta-texts have the mentioned purport we shall show in this so-called /S/ariraka-mima/m/sa.[50]

Of this Vedanta-mima/m/sa about to be explained by us the first Sutra is as follows.

1. Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.

The word 'then' is here to be taken as denoting immediate consecution; not as indicating the introduction of a new subject to be entered upon; for the enquiry into Brahman (more literally, the desire of knowing Brahman) is not of that nature[51]. Nor has the word 'then' the sense of auspiciousness (or blessing); for a word of that meaning could not be properly construed as a part of the sentence. The word 'then' rather acts as an auspicious term by being pronounced and heard merely, while it denotes at the same time something else, viz. immediate consecution as said above. That the latter is its meaning follows moreover from the circumstance that the relation in which the result stands to the previous topic (viewed as the cause of the result) is non-separate from the relation of immediate consecution.[52]

If, then, the word 'then' intimates immediate consecution it must be explained on what antecedent the enquiry into Brahman specially depends; just as the enquiry into active religious duty (which forms the subject of the Purva Mima/m/sa) specially depends on the antecedent reading of the Veda. The reading of the Veda indeed is the common antecedent (for those who wish to enter on an enquiry into religious duty as well as for those desirous of knowing Brahman). The special question with regard to the enquiry into Brahman is whether it presupposes as its antecedent the understanding of the acts of religious duty (which is acquired by means of the Purva Mima/m/sa). To this question we reply in the negative, because for a man who has read the Vedanta-parts of the Veda it is possible to enter on the enquiry into Brahman even before engaging in the enquiry into religious duty. Nor is it the purport of the word 'then' to indicate order of succession; a purport which it serves in other passages, as, for instance, in the one enjoining the cutting off of pieces from the heart and other parts of the sacrificial animal.[53] (For the intimation of order of succession could be intended only if the agent in both cases were the same; but this is not the case), because there is no proof for assuming the enquiry into religious duty and the enquiry into Brahman to stand in the relation of principal and subordinate matter or the relation of qualification (for a certain act) on the part of the person qualified[54]; and because the result as well as the object of the enquiry differs in the two cases. The knowledge of active religious duty has for its fruit transitory felicity, and that

again depends on the performance of religious acts. The enquiry into Brahman, on the other hand, has for its fruit eternal bliss, and does not depend on the performance of any acts. Acts of religious duty do not yet exist at the time when they are enquired into, but are something to be accomplished (in the future); for they depend on the activity of man. In the Brahma-mima/m/sa, on the other hand, the object of enquiry, i.e. Brahman, is something already accomplished (existent),--for it is eternal,--and does not depend on human energy. The two enquiries differ moreover in so far as the operation of their respective fundamental texts is concerned. For the fundamental texts on which active religious duty depends convey information to man in so far only as they enjoin on him their own particular subjects (sacrifices, &c.); while the fundamental texts about Brahman merely instruct man, without laying on him the injunction of being instructed, instruction being their immediate result. The case is analogous to that of the information regarding objects of sense which ensues as soon as the objects are approximated to the senses. It therefore is requisite that something should be stated subsequent to which the enquiry into Brahman is proposed.--Well, then, we maintain that the antecedent conditions are the discrimination of what is eternal and what is non-eternal; the renunciation of all desire to enjoy the fruit (of one's actions) both here and hereafter; the acquirement of tranquillity, self-restraint, and the other means[55], and the desire of final release. If these conditions exist, a man may, either before entering on an enquiry into active religious duty or after that, engage in the enquiry into Brahman and come to know it; but not otherwise. The word 'then' therefore intimates that the enquiry into Brahman is subsequent to the acquisition of the above-mentioned (spiritual) means.

The word 'therefore' intimates a reason. Because the Veda, while declaring that the fruit of the agnihotra and similar performances which are means of happiness is non-eternal (as, for instance. Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 6, 'As here on earth whatever has been acquired by action perishes so perishes in the next world whatever is acquired by acts of religious duty'), teaches at the same time that the highest aim of man is realised by the knowledge of Brahman (as, for instance, Taitt. Up. II, 1, 'He who knows Brahman attains the highest'); therefore the enquiry into Brahman is to be undertaken subsequently to the acquirement of the mentioned means.

By Brahman is to be understood that the definition of which will be given in the next Sutra (I, 1, 2); it is therefore not to be supposed that the word Brahman may here denote something else, as, for instance, the brahminical caste. In the Sutra the genitive case ('of Brahman;' the literal translation of the Sutra being 'then therefore the desire of knowledge of Brahman') denotes the object, not something generally supplementary (/s/esha[56]); for the desire of knowledge demands an object of desire and no other such object is stated.--But why should not the genitive case be taken as expressing the general complementary relation (to express which is its proper office)? Even in that case it might constitute the object of the desire of knowledge, since the general relation may base itself on the more particular one.--This assumption, we reply, would mean that we refuse to take Brahman as the direct object, and then again indirectly introduce it as the object; an altogether needless procedure.--Not needless; for if we explain the words of the Sutra to mean 'the desire of knowledge connected with Brahman' we thereby virtually promise that also all the heads of discussion which bear on Brahman will be treated.--This reason also, we reply, is not strong enough to uphold your interpretation. For the statement of some principal matter already implies all the secondary matters connected therewith. Hence if Brahman, the most eminent of all objects of knowledge, is mentioned, this implies already all those objects of enquiry which the enquiry into Brahman presupposes, and those objects need therefore not be mentioned, especially in the Sutra. Analogously the sentence 'there the king is going' implicitly means that the king together with his retinue is going there. Our interpretation (according to which the Sutra represents Brahman as the direct object of knowledge) moreover agrees with Scripture, which directly represents Brahman as the object of the desire of knowledge; compare, for instance,

4623 the passage, 'That from whence these beings are born, &c., desire to
4624 know that. That is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 1). With passages of this
4625 kind the Sutra only agrees if the genitive case is taken to denote the
4626 object. Hence we do take it in that sense. The object of the desire is
4627 the knowledge of Brahman up to its complete comprehension, desires
4628 having reference to results[57]. Knowledge thus constitutes the means by
4629 which the complete comprehension of Brahman is desired to be obtained.
4630 For the complete comprehension of Brahman is the highest end of man,
4631 since it destroys the root of all evil such as Nescience, the seed of
4632 the entire Sa/m/sara. Hence the desire of knowing Brahman is to be
4633 entertained.

4634
4635 But, it may be asked, is Brahman known or not known (previously to the
4636 enquiry into its nature)? If it is known we need not enter on an enquiry
4637 concerning it; if it is not known we can not enter on such an enquiry.

4638
4639 We reply that Brahman is known. Brahman, which is all-knowing and
4640 endowed with all powers, whose essential nature is eternal purity,
4641 intelligence, and freedom, exists. For if we consider the derivation of
4642 the word 'Brahman,' from the root b/ri/h, 'to be great,' we at once
4643 understand that eternal purity, and so on, belong to Brahman[58].
4644 Moreover the existence of Brahman is known on the ground of its being
4645 the Self of every one. For every one is conscious of the existence of
4646 (his) Self, and never thinks 'I am not.' If the existence of the Self
4647 were not known, every one would think 'I am not.' And this Self (of
4648 whose existence all are conscious) is Brahman. But if Brahman is
4649 generally known as the Self, there is no room for an enquiry into it!
4650 Not so, we reply; for there is a conflict of opinions as to its special
4651 nature. Unlearned people and the Lokayatikas are of opinion that the
4652 mere body endowed with the quality of intelligence is the Self; others
4653 that the organs endowed with intelligence are the Self; others maintain
4654 that the internal organ is the Self; others, again, that the Self is a
4655 mere momentary idea; others, again, that it is the Void. Others, again
4656 (to proceed to the opinion of such as acknowledge the authority of the
4657 Veda), maintain that there is a transmigrating being different from the
4658 body, and so on, which is both agent and enjoyer (of the fruits of
4659 action); others teach that that being is enjoying only, not acting;
4660 others believe that in addition to the individual souls, there is an
4661 all-knowing, all-powerful Lord[59]. Others, finally, (i.e. the
4662 Vedantins) maintain that the Lord is the Self of the enjoyer (i.e. of
4663 the individual soul whose individual existence is apparent only, the
4664 product of Nescience).

4665
4666 Thus there are many various opinions, basing part of them on sound
4667 arguments and scriptural texts, part of them on fallacious arguments and
4668 scriptural texts misunderstood[60]. If therefore a man would embrace
4669 some one of these opinions without previous consideration, he would bar
4670 himself from the highest beatitude and incur grievous loss. For this
4671 reason the first Sutra proposes, under the designation of an enquiry
4672 into Brahman, a disquisition of the Vedanta-texts, to be carried on with
4673 the help of conformable arguments, and having for its aim the highest
4674 beatitude.

4675
4676 So far it has been said that Brahman is to be enquired into. The
4677 question now arises what the characteristics of that Brahman are, and
4678 the reverend author of the Sutras therefore propounds the following
4679 aphorism.

4680
4681 2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c. (i.e. the origin,
4682 subsistence, and dissolution) of this (world proceed).

4683
4684 The term, &c. implies subsistence and re-absorption. That the origin is
4685 mentioned first (of the three) depends on the declaration of Scripture
4686 as well as on the natural development of a substance. Scripture declares
4687 the order of succession of origin, subsistence, and dissolution in the
4688 passage, Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'From whence these beings are born,' &c. And
4689 with regard to the second reason stated, it is known that a substrate of
4690 qualities can subsist and be dissolved only after it has entered,
4691 through origination, on the state of existence. The words 'of this'

4692 denote that substrate of qualities which is presented to us by
4693 perception and the other means of right knowledge; the genitive case
4694 indicates it to be connected with origin, &c. The words 'from which'
4695 denote the cause. The full sense of the Sutra therefore is: That
4696 omniscient omnipotent cause from which proceed the origin, subsistence,
4697 and dissolution of this world--which world is differentiated by names
4698 and forms, contains many agents and enjoyers, is the abode of the fruits
4699 of actions, these fruits having their definite places, times, and
4700 causes[61], and the nature of whose arrangement cannot even be conceived
4701 by the mind,--that cause, we say, is Brahman. Since the other forms of
4702 existence (such as increase, decline, &c.) are included in origination,
4703 subsistence, and dissolution, only the three latter are referred to in
4704 the Sutra. As the six stages of existence enumerated by Yaska[62] are
4705 possible only during the period of the world's subsistence, it
4706 might--were they referred to in the Sutra--be suspected that what is
4707 meant are not the origin, subsistence, and dissolution (of the world) as
4708 dependent on the first cause. To preclude this suspicion the Sutra is to
4709 be taken as referring, in addition to the world's origination from
4710 Brahman, only to its subsistence in Brahman, and final dissolution into
4711 Brahman.

4712
4713 The origin, &c. of a world possessing the attributes stated above cannot
4714 possibly proceed from anything else but a Lord possessing the stated
4715 qualities; not either from a non-intelligent pradhana[63], or from
4716 atoms, or from non-being, or from a being subject to transmigration[64];
4717 nor, again, can it proceed from its own nature (i.e. spontaneously,
4718 without a cause), since we observe that (for the production of effects)
4719 special places, times, and causes have invariably to be employed.

4720
4721 (Some of) those who maintain a Lord to be the cause of the world[65],
4722 think that the existence of a Lord different from mere transmigrating
4723 beings can be inferred by means of the argument stated just now (without
4724 recourse being had to Scripture at all).--But, it might be said, you
4725 yourself in the Sutra under discussion have merely brought forward the
4726 same argument!--By no means, we reply. The Sutras (i.e. literally 'the
4727 strings') have merely the purpose of stringing together the flowers of
4728 the Vedanta-passages. In reality the Vedanta-passages referred to by the
4729 Sutras are discussed here. For the comprehension of Brahman is effected
4730 by the ascertainment, consequent on discussion, of the sense of the
4731 Vedanta-texts, not either by inference or by the other means of right
4732 knowledge. While, however, the Vedanta-passages primarily declare the
4733 cause of the origin, &c., of the world, inference also, being an
4734 instrument of right knowledge in so far as it does not contradict the
4735 Vedanta-texts, is not to be excluded as a means of confirming the
4736 meaning ascertained. Scripture itself, moreover, allows argumentation;
4737 for the passages, B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5 ('the Self is to be heard, to be
4738 considered'), and Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2 ('as the man, &c., having been
4739 informed, and being able to judge for himself, would arrive at Gandhara,
4740 in the same way a man who meets with a teacher obtains knowledge'),
4741 declare that human understanding assists Scripture[66].

4742
4743 Scriptural text, &c.[67], are not, in the enquiry into Brahman, the only
4744 means of knowledge, as they are in the enquiry into active duty (i.e. in
4745 the Purva Mima/m/sa), but scriptural texts on the one hand, and
4746 intuition[68], &c., on the other hand, are to be had recourse to
4747 according to the occasion: firstly, because intuition is the final
4748 result of the enquiry into Brahman; secondly, because the object of the
4749 enquiry is an existing (accomplished) substance. If the object of the
4750 knowledge of Brahman were something to be accomplished, there would be
4751 no reference to intuition, and text, &c., would be the only means of
4752 knowledge. The origination of something to be accomplished depends,
4753 moreover, on man since any action either of ordinary life, or dependent
4754 on the Veda may either be done or not be done, or be done in a different
4755 way. A man, for instance, may move on either by means of a horse, or by
4756 means of his feet, or by some other means, or not at all. And again (to
4757 quote examples of actions dependent on the Veda), we meet in Scripture
4758 with sentences such as the following: 'At the atiratra he takes the
4759 sho/d/asin cup,' and 'at the atiratra he does not take the sho/d/asin
4760 cup;' or, 'he makes the oblation after the sun has risen,' and, 'he

makes the oblation when the sun has not yet risen.' Just as in the quoted instances, injunctions and prohibitions, allowances of optional procedure, general rules and exceptions have their place, so they would have their place with regard to Brahman also (if the latter were a thing to be accomplished). But the fact is that no option is possible as to whether a substance is to be thus or thus, is to be or not to be. All option depends on the notions of man; but the knowledge of the real nature of a thing does not depend on the notions of man, but only on the thing itself. For to think with regard to a post, 'this is a post or a man, or something else,' is not knowledge of truth; the two ideas, 'it is a man or something else,' being false, and only the third idea, 'it is a post,' which depends on the thing itself, falling under the head of true knowledge. Thus true knowledge of all existing things depends on the things themselves, and hence the knowledge of Brahman also depends altogether on the thing, i.e. Brahman itself.--But, it might be said, as Brahman is an existing substance, it will be the object of the other means of right knowledge also, and from this it follows that a discussion of the Vedanta-texts is purposeless.--This we deny; for as Brahman is not an object of the senses, it has no connection with those other means of knowledge. For the senses have, according to their nature, only external things for their objects, not Brahman. If Brahman were an object of the senses, we might perceive that the world is connected with Brahman as its effect; but as the effect only (i.e. the world) is perceived, it is impossible to decide (through perception) whether it is connected with Brahman or something else. Therefore the Sutra under discussion is not meant to propound inference (as the means of knowing Brahman), but rather to set forth a Vedanta-text.--Which, then, is the Vedanta-text which the Sutra points at as having to be considered with reference to the characteristics of Brahman?--It is the passage Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'Bh/ri/gu Varu/n/i went to his father Varu/n/a, saying, Sir, teach me Brahman,' &c., up to 'That from whence these beings are born, that by which, when born, they live, that into which they enter at their death, try to know that. That is Brahman.' The sentence finally determining the sense of this passage is found III, 6: 'From bliss these beings are born; by bliss, when born, they live; into bliss they enter at their death.' Other passages also are to be adduced which declare the cause to be the almighty Being, whose essential nature is eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom.

That Brahman is omniscient we have been made to infer from it being shown that it is the cause of the world. To confirm this conclusion, the Sutakara continues as follows:

3. (The omniscience of Brahman follows) from its being the source of Scripture.

Brahman is the source, i.e. the cause of the great body of Scripture, consisting of the /Ri/g-veda and other branches, which is supported by various disciplines (such as grammar, nyaya, pura/n/a, &c.); which lamp-like illuminates all things; which is itself all-knowing as it were. For the origin of a body of Scripture possessing the quality of omniscience cannot be sought elsewhere but in omniscience itself. It is generally understood that the man from whom some special body of doctrine referring to one province of knowledge only originates, as, for instance, grammar from Pa/n/ini possesses a more extensive knowledge than his work, comprehensive though it be; what idea, then, shall we have to form of the supreme omniscience and omnipotence of that great Being, which in sport as it were, easily as a man sends forth his breath, has produced the vast mass of holy texts known as the /Ri/g-veda, &c., the mine of all knowledge, consisting of manifold branches, the cause of the distinction of all the different classes and conditions of gods, animals, and men! See what Scripture says about him, 'The /Ri/g-veda, &c., have been breathed forth from that great Being' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 10).

Or else we may interpret the Sutra to mean that Scripture consisting of the /Ri/g-veda, &c., as described above, is the source or cause, i.e. the means of right knowledge through which we understand the nature of Brahman. So that the sense would be: through Scripture only as a means

of knowledge Brahman is known to be the cause of the origin, &c., of the world. The special scriptural passage meant has been quoted under the preceding Sutra 'from which these beings are born,' &c.--But as the preceding Sutra already has pointed out a text showing that Scripture is the source of Brahman, of what use then is the present Sutra?--The words of the preceding Sutra, we reply, did not clearly indicate the scriptural passage, and room was thus left for the suspicion that the origin, &c., of the world were adduced merely as determining an inference (independent of Scripture). To obviate this suspicion the Sutra under discussion has been propounded.

But, again, how can it be said that Scripture is the means of knowing Brahman? Since it has been declared that Scripture aims at action (according to the Purva Mimamsa Sutra I, 2, 1, 'As the purport of Scripture is action, those scriptural passages whose purport is not action are purportless'), the Vedanta-passages whose purport is not action are purportless. Or else if they are to have some sense, they must either, by manifesting the agent, the divinity or the fruit of the action, form supplements to the passages enjoining actions, or serve the purpose of themselves enjoining a new class of actions, such as devout meditation and the like. For the Veda cannot possibly aim at conveying information regarding the nature of accomplished substances, since the latter are the objects of perception and the other means of proof (which give sufficient information about them; while it is the recognised object of the Veda to give information about what is not known from other sources). And if it did give such information, it would not be connected with things to be desired or shunned, and thus be of no use to man. For this very reason Vedic passages, such as 'he howled, &c.,' which at first sight appear purposeless, are shown to have a purpose in so far as they glorify certain actions (cp. Pu. Mi. Su. I, 2, 7, 'Because they stand in syntactical connection with the injunctions, therefore their purport is to glorify the injunctions'). In the same way mantras are shown to stand in a certain relation to actions, in so far as they notify the actions themselves and the means by which they are accomplished. So, for instance, the mantra, 'For strength thee (I cut;' which accompanies the cutting of a branch employed in the darśana/apurṇa/amasa-sacrifice). In short, no Vedic passage is seen or can be proved to have a meaning but in so far as it is related to an action. And injunctions which are defined as having actions for their objects cannot refer to accomplished existent things. Hence we maintain that the Vedanta-texts are mere supplements to those passages which enjoin actions; notifying the agents, divinities, and results connected with those actions. Or else, if this be not admitted, on the ground of its involving the introduction of a subject-matter foreign to the Vedanta-texts (viz. the subject-matter of the Karmakāṇḍa of the Veda), we must admit (the second of the two alternatives proposed above viz.) that the Vedanta-texts refer to devout meditation (upasana) and similar actions which are mentioned in those very (Vedanta) texts. The result of all of which is that Scripture is not the source of Brahman.

To this argumentation the Sutrakara replies as follows:

4. But that (Brahman is to be known from Scripture), because it is connected (with the Vedanta-texts) as their purport.

The word 'but' is meant to rebut the purva-paksha (the prima facie view as urged above). That all-knowing, all-powerful Brahman, which is the cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world, is known from the Vedanta-part of Scripture. How? Because in all the Vedanta-texts the sentences construe in so far as they have for their purport, as they intimate that matter (viz. Brahman). Compare, for instance, 'Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'In the beginning all this was Self, one only' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1); 'This is the Brahman without cause and without effect, without anything inside or outside; this Self is Brahman perceiving everything' (Bṛi. Up. II, 5, 19); 'That immortal Brahman is before' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); and similar passages. If the words contained in these passages have once been determined to refer to Brahman, and their purport is understood thereby, it would be improper to assume them to

4899 have a different sense; for that would involve the fault of abandoning
4900 the direct statements of the text in favour of mere assumptions. Nor can
4901 we conclude the purport of these passages to be the intimation of the
4902 nature of agents, divinities, &c. (connected with acts of religious
4903 duty); for there are certain scriptural passages which preclude all
4904 actions, actors, and fruits, as, for instance, B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 13,
4905 'Then by what should he see whom?' (which passage intimates that there
4906 is neither an agent, nor an object of action, nor an instrument.) Nor
4907 again can Brahman, though it is of the nature of an accomplished thing,
4908 be the object of perception and the other means of knowledge; for the
4909 fact of everything having its Self in Brahman cannot be grasped without
4910 the aid of the scriptural passage 'That art thou' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7).
4911 Nor can it rightly be objected that instruction is purportless if not
4912 connected with something either to be striven after or shunned; for from
4913 the mere comprehension of Brahman's Self, which is not something either
4914 to be avoided or endeavoured after, there results cessation of all pain,
4915 and thereby the attainment of man's highest aim. That passages notifying
4916 certain divinities, and so on, stand in subordinate relation to acts of
4917 devout meditation mentioned in the same chapters may readily be
4918 admitted. But it is impossible that Brahman should stand in an analogous
4919 relation to injunctions of devout meditation, for if the knowledge of
4920 absolute unity has once arisen there exists no longer anything to be
4921 desired or avoided, and thereby the conception of duality, according to
4922 which we distinguish actions, agents, and the like, is destroyed. If the
4923 conception of duality is once uprooted by the conception of absolute
4924 unity, it cannot arise again, and so no longer be the cause of Brahman
4925 being looked upon as the complementary object of injunctions of
4926 devotion. Other parts of the Veda may have no authority except in so far
4927 as they are connected with injunctions; still it is impossible to impugn
4928 on that ground the authoritativeness of passages conveying the knowledge
4929 of the Self; for such passages have their own result. Nor, finally, can
4930 the authoritativeness of the Veda be proved by inferential reasoning so
4931 that it would be dependent on instances observed elsewhere. From all
4932 which it follows that the Veda possesses authority as a means of right
4933 knowledge of Brahman.

4934
4935 Here others raise the following objection:--Although the Veda is the
4936 means of gaining a right knowledge of Brahman, yet it intimates Brahman
4937 only as the object of certain injunctions, just as the information which
4938 the Veda gives about the sacrificial post, the ahavaniya-fire and other
4939 objects not known from the practice of common life is merely
4940 supplementary to certain injunctions[69]. Why so? Because the Veda has
4941 the purport of either instigating to action or restraining from it. For
4942 men fully acquainted with the object of the Veda have made the following
4943 declaration, 'The purpose of the Veda is seen to be the injunction of
4944 actions' (Bhashya on Jaimini Sutra I, 1, 1); 'Injunction means passages
4945 impelling to action' (Bh. on Jaim. Su. I, 1, 2); 'Of this (viz. active
4946 religious duty) the knowledge comes from injunction' (part of Jaim. Su.
4947 I, 1, 5); 'The (words) denoting those (things) are to be connected with
4948 (the injunctive verb of the vidhi-passage) whose purport is action'
4949 (Jaim. Su. I, 1, 25); 'As action is the purport of the Veda, whatever
4950 does not refer to action is purportless' (Jaim. Su. I, 2, 1). Therefore
4951 the Veda has a purport in so far only as it rouses the activity of man
4952 with regard to some actions and restrains it with regard to others;
4953 other passages (i.e. all those passages which are not directly
4954 injunctive) have a purport only in so far as they supplement injunctions
4955 and prohibitions. Hence the Vedanta-texts also as likewise belonging to
4956 the Veda can have a meaning in the same way only. And if their aim is
4957 injunction, then just as the agnihotra-oblation and other rites are
4958 enjoined as means for him who is desirous of the heavenly world, so the
4959 knowledge of Brahman is enjoined as a means for him who is desirous of
4960 immortality.--But--somebody might object--it has been declared that
4961 there is a difference in the character of the objects enquired into, the
4962 object of enquiry in the karma-ka/nd/a (that part of the Veda which
4963 treats of active religious duty) being something to be accomplished,
4964 viz. duty, while here the object is the already existent absolutely
4965 accomplished Brahman. From this it follows that the fruit of the
4966 knowledge of Brahman must be of a different nature from the fruit of the
4967 knowledge of duty which depends on the performance of actions[70].--We

4968 reply that it must not be such because the Vedanta-texts give
4969 information about Brahman only in so far as it is connected with
4970 injunctions of actions. We meet with injunctions of the following kind,
4971 'Verily the Self is to be seen' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5); 'The Self which
4972 is free from sin that it is which we must search out, that it is which
4973 we must try to understand' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a man worship him
4974 as Self' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7); 'Let a man worship the Self only as his
4975 true state' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 15); 'He who knows Brahman becomes
4976 Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). These injunctions rouse in us the desire
4977 to know what that Brahman is. It, therefore, is the task of the
4978 Vedanta-texts to set forth Brahman's nature, and they perform that task
4979 by teaching us that Brahman is eternal, all-knowing, absolutely
4980 self-sufficient, ever pure, intelligent and free, pure knowledge,
4981 absolute bliss. From the devout meditation on this Brahman there results
4982 as its fruit, final release, which, although not to be discerned in the
4983 ordinary way, is discerned by means of the /s/astra. If, on the other
4984 hand, the Vedanta-texts were considered to have no reference to
4985 injunctions of actions, but to contain statements about mere
4986 (accomplished) things, just as if one were saying 'the earth comprises
4987 seven dvipas,' 'that king is marching on,' they would be purportless,
4988 because then they could not possibly be connected with something to be
4989 shunned or endeavoured after.--Perhaps it will here be objected that
4990 sometimes a mere statement about existent things has a purpose, as, for
4991 instance, the affirmation, 'This is a rope, not a snake,' serves the
4992 purpose of removing the fear engendered by an erroneous opinion, and
4993 that so likewise the Vedanta-passages making statements about the
4994 non-transmigrating Self, have a purport of their own (without reference
4995 to any action), viz. in so far as they remove the erroneous opinion of
4996 the Self being liable to transmigration.--We reply that this might be so
4997 if just as the mere hearing of the true nature of the rope dispels the
4998 fear caused by the imagined snake, so the mere hearing of the true
4999 nature of Brahman would dispel the erroneous notion of one's being
5000 subject to transmigration. But this is not the case; for we observe that
5001 even men to whom the true nature of Brahman has been stated continue to
5002 be affected by pleasure, pain, and the other qualities attaching to the
5003 transmigratory condition. Moreover, we see from the passage, /Bri/. Up.
5004 II, 4, 5, 'The Self is to be heard, to be considered, to be reflected
5005 upon,' that consideration and reflection have to follow the mere
5006 hearing. From all this it results that the sastra can be admitted as a
5007 means of knowing Brahman in so far only as the latter is connected with
5008 injunctions.

5009
5010 To all this, we, the Vedantins, make the following reply:--The preceding
5011 reasoning is not valid, on account of the different nature of the fruits
5012 of actions on the one side, and of the knowledge of Brahman on the other
5013 side. The enquiry into those actions, whether of body, speech, or mind,
5014 which are known from /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti, and are comprised under the
5015 name 'religious duty' (dharma), is carried on in the Jaimini Sutra,
5016 which begins with the words 'then therefore the enquiry into duty;' the
5017 opposite of duty also (adharma), such as doing harm, &c., which is
5018 defined in the prohibitory injunctions, forms an object of enquiry to
5019 the end that it may be avoided. The fruits of duty, which is good, and
5020 its opposite, which is evil, both of which are defined by original Vedic
5021 statements, are generally known to be sensible pleasure and pain, which
5022 make themselves felt to body, speech, and mind only, are produced by the
5023 contact of the organs of sense with the objects, and affect all animate
5024 beings from Brahman down to a tuft of grass. Scripture, agreeing with
5025 observation, states that there are differences in the degree of pleasure
5026 of all embodied creatures from men upward to Brahman. From those
5027 differences it is inferred that there are differences in the degrees of
5028 the merit acquired by actions in accordance with religious duty;
5029 therefrom again are inferred differences in degree between those
5030 qualified to perform acts of religious duty. Those latter differences
5031 are moreover known to be affected by the desire of certain results
5032 (which entitles the man so desirous to perform certain religious acts),
5033 worldly possessions, and the like. It is further known from Scripture
5034 that those only who perform sacrifices proceed, in consequence of the
5035 pre-eminence of their knowledge and meditation, on the northern path (of
5036 the sun; Ch. Up. V, 10, 1), while mere minor offerings, works of public

5037 utility and alms, only lead through smoke and the other stages to the
5038 southern path. And that there also (viz. in the moon which is finally
5039 reached by those who have passed along the southern path) there are
5040 degrees of pleasure and the means of pleasure is understood from the
5041 passage 'Having dwelt there till their works are consumed.' Analogously
5042 it is understood that the different degrees of pleasure which are
5043 enjoyed by the embodied creatures, from man downward to the inmates of
5044 hell and to immovable things, are the mere effects of religious merit as
5045 defined in Vedic injunctions. On the other hand, from the different
5046 degrees of pain endured by higher and lower embodied creatures, there is
5047 inferred difference of degree in its cause, viz. religious demerit as
5048 defined in the prohibitory injunctions, and in its agents. This
5049 difference in the degree of pain and pleasure, which has for its
5050 antecedent embodied existence, and for its cause the difference of
5051 degree of merit and demerit of animated beings, liable to faults such as
5052 ignorance and the like, is well known--from /S/ruti, Sm/ri/ti, and
5053 reasoning--to be non-eternal, of a fleeting, changing nature
5054 (sa/m/sara). The following text, for instance, 'As long as he is in the
5055 body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1),
5056 refers to the sa/m/sara-state as described above. From the following
5057 passage, on the other hand, 'When he is free from the body then neither
5058 pleasure nor pain touches him,' which denies the touch of pain or
5059 pleasure, we learn that the unembodied state called 'final release'
5060 (moksha) is declared not to be the effect of religious merit as defined
5061 by Vedic injunctions. For if it were the effect of merit it would not be
5062 denied that it is subject to pain and pleasure. Should it be said that
5063 the very circumstance of its being an unembodied state is the effect of
5064 merit, we reply that that cannot be, since Scripture declares that state
5065 to be naturally and originally an unembodied one. 'The wise who knows
5066 the Self as bodiless within the bodies, as unchanging among changing
5067 things, as great and omnipresent does never grieve' (Ka. Up. II, 22);
5068 'He is without breath, without mind, pure' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); 'That
5069 person is not attached to anything' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 15)[71]. All
5070 which passages establish the fact that so-called release differs from
5071 all the fruits of action, and is an eternally and essentially
5072 disembodied state. Among eternal things, some indeed may be 'eternal,
5073 although changing' (pari/n/aminitya), viz. those, the idea of whose
5074 identity is not destroyed, although they may undergo changes; such, for
5075 instance, are earth and the other elements in the opinion of those who
5076 maintain the eternity of the world, or the three gu/n/as in the opinion
5077 of the Sa@nkhyas. But this (moksha) is eternal in the true sense, i.e.
5078 eternal without undergoing any changes (ku/ta/sthanitya), omnipresent as
5079 ether, free from all modifications, absolutely self-sufficient, not
5080 composed of parts, of self-luminous nature. That bodiless entity in
5081 fact, to which merit and demerit with their consequences and threefold
5082 time do not apply, is called release; a definition agreeing with
5083 scriptural passages, such as the following: 'Different from merit and
5084 demerit, different from effect and cause, different from past and
5085 future' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 14). It[72] (i.e. moksha) is, therefore, the same
5086 as Brahman in the enquiry into which we are at present engaged. If
5087 Brahman were represented as supplementary to certain actions, and
5088 release were assumed to be the effect of those actions, it would be
5089 non-eternal, and would have to be considered merely as something holding
5090 a pre-eminent position among the described non-eternal fruits of actions
5091 with their various degrees. But that release is something eternal is
5092 acknowledged by whoever admits it at all, and the teaching concerning
5093 Brahman can therefore not be merely supplementary to actions.

5094
5095 There are, moreover, a number of scriptural passages which declare
5096 release to follow immediately on the cognition of Brahman, and which
5097 thus preclude the possibility of an effect intervening between the two;
5098 for instance, 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2,
5099 9); 'All his works perish when He has been beheld, who is the higher and
5100 the lower' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8); 'He who knows the bliss of Brahman fears
5101 nothing' (Taitt. Up. II, 9); 'O Janaka, you have indeed reached
5102 fearlessness' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4); 'That Brahman knew its Self only,
5103 saying, I am Brahman. From it all this sprang' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10);
5104 'What sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who beholds that unity?'
5105 (Is. Up. 7.) We must likewise quote the passage,--B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10,

5106 ('Seeing this the /Ri/shi Vamadeva understood: I was Manu, I was the
5107 sun,') in order to exclude the idea of any action taking place between
5108 one's seeing Brahman and becoming one with the universal Self; for that
5109 passage is analogous to the following one, 'standing he sings,' from
5110 which we understand that no action due to the same agent intervenes
5111 between the standing and the singing. Other scriptural passages show
5112 that the removal of the obstacles which lie in the way of release is the
5113 only fruit of the knowledge of Brahman; so, for instance, 'You indeed
5114 are our father, you who carry us from our ignorance to the other shore'
5115 (Pr. Up. VI, 8); 'I have heard from men like you that he who knows the
5116 Self overcomes grief. I am in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of
5117 mine' (Ch. Up. VII, 1, 3); 'To him after his faults had been rubbed out,
5118 the venerable Sanatkumara showed the other side of darkness' (Ch. Up.
5119 VII, 26, 2). The same is the purport of the Sutra, supported by
5120 arguments, of (Gautama) Akarya, 'Final release results from the
5121 successive removal of wrong knowledge, faults, activity, birth, pain,
5122 the removal of each later member of the series depending on the removal
5123 of the preceding member' (Nyay. Su. I, i, 2); and wrong knowledge itself
5124 is removed by the knowledge of one's Self being one with the Self of
5125 Brahman.

5126
5127 Nor is this knowledge of the Self being one with Brahman a mere
5128 (fanciful) combination[73], as is made use of, for instance, in the
5129 following passage, 'For the mind is endless, and the Vi/s/vedevas are
5130 endless, and he thereby gains the endless world' (B/ri/. Up. III, 1,
5131 9)[74]; nor is it an (in reality unfounded) ascription
5132 (superimposition)[75], as in the passages, 'Let him meditate on mind as
5133 Brahman,' and 'Aditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine' (Ch. Up. III,
5134 18, 1; 19, 1), where the contemplation as Brahman is superimposed on the
5135 mind, Aditya and so on; nor, again, is it (a figurative conception of
5136 identity) founded on the connection (of the things viewed as identical)
5137 with some special activity, as in the passage, 'Air is indeed the
5138 absorber; breath is indeed the absorber[76]' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 1; 3); nor
5139 is it a mere (ceremonial) purification of (the Self constituting a
5140 subordinate member) of an action (viz. the action of seeing, &c.,
5141 Brahman), in the same way as, for instance, the act of looking at the
5142 sacrificial butter[77]. For if the knowledge of the identity of the Self
5143 and Brahman were understood in the way of combination and the like,
5144 violence would be done thereby to the connection of the words whose
5145 object, in certain passages, it clearly is to intimate the fact of
5146 Brahman and the Self being really identical; so, for instance, in the
5147 following passages, 'That art thou' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7); 'I am Brahman'
5148 (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10); 'This Self is Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. II, 5, 19).
5149 And other texts which declare that the fruit of the cognition of Brahman
5150 is the cessation of Ignorance would be contradicted thereby; so, for
5151 instance, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved'
5152 (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). Nor, finally, would it be possible, in that case,
5153 satisfactorily to explain the passages which speak of the individual
5154 Self becoming Brahman: such as 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman'
5155 (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). Hence the knowledge of the unity of Brahman and the
5156 Self cannot be of the nature of figurative combination and the like. The
5157 knowledge of Brahman does, therefore, not depend on the active energy of
5158 man, but is analogous to the knowledge of those things which are the
5159 objects of perception, inference, and so on, and thus depends on the
5160 object of knowledge only. Of such a Brahman or its knowledge it is
5161 impossible to establish, by reasoning, any connection with actions.

5162
5163 Nor, again, can we connect Brahman with acts by representing it as the
5164 object of the action of knowing. For that it is not such is expressly
5165 declared in two passages, viz. 'It is different from the known and again
5166 above (i.e. different from) the unknown' (Ken. Up. I, 3); and 'How
5167 should he know him by whom he knows all this?' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 13.)
5168 In the same way Brahman is expressly declared not to be the object of
5169 the act of devout meditation, viz. in the second half of the verse, Ken.
5170 Up. I, 5, whose first half declares it not to be an object (of speech,
5171 mind, and so on), 'That which is not proclaimed by speech, by which
5172 speech is proclaimed, that only know to be Brahman, not that on which
5173 people devoutly meditate as this.' If it should be objected that if
5174 Brahman is not an object (of speech, mind, &c.) the sastra can

5175 impossibly be its source, we refute this objection by the remark that
5176 the aim of the sastra is to discard all distinctions fictitiously
5177 created by Nescience. The sastra's purport is not to represent Brahman
5178 definitely as this or that object, its purpose is rather to show that
5179 Brahman as the eternal subject (pratyagatman, the inward Self) is never
5180 an object, and thereby to remove the distinction of objects known,
5181 knowers, acts of knowledge, &c., which is fictitiously created by
5182 Nescience. Accordingly the sastra says, 'By whom it is not thought by
5183 him it is thought, by whom it is thought he does not know it; unknown by
5184 those who know it, it is known by those who do not know it' (Ken. Up.
5185 II, 3); and 'Thou couldst not see the seer of sight, thou couldst not
5186 hear the hearer of hearing, nor perceive the perceiver of perception,
5187 nor know the knower of knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. III, 4, 2). As thereby
5188 (i.e. by the knowledge derived from the sastra) the imagination of the
5189 transitoriness of Release which is due to Nescience is discarded, and
5190 Release is shown to be of the nature of the eternally free Self, it
5191 cannot be charged with the imperfection of non-eternality. Those, on the
5192 other hand, who consider Release to be something to be effected properly
5193 maintain that it depends on the action of mind, speech, or body. So,
5194 likewise, those who consider it to be a mere modification.
5195 Non-eternality of Release is the certain consequence of these two
5196 opinions; for we observe in common life that things which are
5197 modifications, such as sour milk and the like, and things which are
5198 effects, such as jars, &c., are non-eternal. Nor, again, can it be said
5199 that there is a dependance on action in consequence of (Brahman or
5200 Release) being something which is to be obtained[78]; for as Brahman
5201 constitutes a person's Self it is not something to be attained by that
5202 person. And even if Brahman were altogether different from a person's
5203 Self still it would not be something to be obtained; for as it is
5204 omnipresent it is part of its nature that it is ever present to every
5205 one, just as the (all-pervading) ether is. Nor, again, can it be
5206 maintained that Release is something to be ceremonially purified, and as
5207 such depends on an activity. For ceremonial purification (sa/m/skara)
5208 results either from the accretion of some excellence or from the removal
5209 of some blemish. The former alternative does not apply to Release as it
5210 is of the nature of Brahman, to which no excellence can be added; nor,
5211 again, does the latter alternative apply, since Release is of the nature
5212 of Brahman, which is eternally pure.--But, it might be said, Release
5213 might be a quality of the Self which is merely hidden and becomes
5214 manifest on the Self being purified by some action; just as the quality
5215 of clearness becomes manifest in a mirror when the mirror is cleaned by
5216 means of the action of rubbing.--This objection is invalid, we reply,
5217 because the Self cannot be the abode of any action. For an action cannot
5218 exist without modifying that in which it abides. But if the Self were
5219 modified by an action its non-eternality would result therefrom, and
5220 texts such as the following, 'unchangeable he is called,' would thus be
5221 stultified; an altogether unacceptable result. Hence it is impossible to
5222 assume that any action should abide in the Self. On the other hand, the
5223 Self cannot be purified by actions abiding in something else as it
5224 stands in no relation to that extraneous something. Nor will it avail to
5225 point out (as a quasi-analogous case) that the embodied Self (dehin, the
5226 individual soul) is purified by certain ritual actions which abide in
5227 the body, such as bathing, rinsing one's mouth, wearing the sacrificial
5228 thread, and the like. For what is purified by those actions is that Self
5229 merely which is joined to the body, i.e. the Self in so far as it is
5230 under the power of Nescience. For it is a matter of perception that
5231 bathing and similar actions stand in the relation of inherence to the
5232 body, and it is therefore only proper to conclude that by such actions
5233 only that something is purified which is joined to the body. If a person
5234 thinks 'I am free from disease,' he predicates health of that entity
5235 only which is connected with and mistakenly identifies itself with the
5236 harmonious condition of matter (i.e. the body) resulting from
5237 appropriate medical treatment applied to the body (i.e. the 'I'
5238 constituting the subject of predication is only the individual embodied
5239 Self). Analogously that I which predicates of itself, that it is
5240 purified by bathing and the like, is only the individual soul joined to
5241 the body. For it is only this latter principle of egoity
5242 (aha/m/kart/ri/), the object of the notion of the ego and the agent in
5243 all cognition, which accomplishes all actions and enjoys their results.

5244 Thus the mantras also declare, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit, the
5245 other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1); and 'When he is in
5246 union with the body, the senses, and the mind, then wise people call him
5247 the Enjoyer' (Ka. Up. III, 1, 4). Of Brahman, on the other hand, the two
5248 following passages declare that it is incapable of receiving any
5249 accretion and eternally pure, 'He is the one God, hidden in all beings,
5250 all-pervading, the Self within all beings, watching over all works,
5251 dwelling in all beings, the witness, the perceiver, the only one; free
5252 from qualities' (/S/v. Up. VI, 11); and 'He pervaded all, bright,
5253 incorporeal, scatheless, without muscles, pure, untouched by evil'
5254 (I/s/. Up. 8). But Release is nothing but being Brahman. Therefore
5255 Release is not something to be purified. And as nobody is able to show
5256 any other way in which Release could be connected with action, it is
5257 impossible that it should stand in any, even the slightest, relation to
5258 any action, excepting knowledge.

5259
5260 But, it will be said here, knowledge itself is an activity of the mind.
5261 By no means, we reply; since the two are of different nature. An action
5262 is that which is enjoined as being independent of the nature of existing
5263 things and dependent on the energy of some person's mind; compare, for
5264 instance, the following passages, 'To whichever divinity the offering is
5265 made on that one let him meditate when about to say vasha/t/' (Ait.
5266 Brahm. III, 8, 1); and 'Let him meditate in his mind on the sandhya.'
5267 Meditation and reflection are indeed mental, but as they depend on the
5268 (meditating, &c.) person they may either be performed or not be
5269 performed or modified. Knowledge, on the other hand, is the result of
5270 the different means of (right) knowledge, and those have for their
5271 objects existing things; knowledge can therefore not be either made or
5272 not made or modified, but depends entirely on existing things, and not
5273 either on Vedic statements or on the mind of man. Although mental it
5274 thus widely differs from meditation and the like.

5275
5276 The meditation, for instance, on man and woman as fire, which is founded
5277 on Ch. Up. V, 7, 1; 8, 1, 'The fire is man, O Gautama; the fire is
5278 woman, O Gautama,' is on account of its being the result of a Vedic
5279 statement, merely an action and dependent on man; that conception of
5280 fire, on the other hand, which refers to the well-known (real) fire, is
5281 neither dependent on Vedic statements nor on man, but only on a real
5282 thing which is an object of perception; it is therefore knowledge and
5283 not an action. The same remark applies to all things which are the
5284 objects of the different means of right knowledge. This being thus that
5285 knowledge also which has the existent Brahman for its object is not
5286 dependent on Vedic injunction. Hence, although imperative and similar
5287 forms referring to the knowledge of Brahman are found in the Vedic
5288 texts, yet they are ineffective because they refer to something which
5289 cannot be enjoined, just as the edge of a razor becomes blunt when it is
5290 applied to a stone. For they have for their object something which can
5291 neither be endeavoured after nor avoided.--But what then, it will be
5292 asked, is the purport of those sentences which, at any rate, have the
5293 appearance of injunctions; such as, 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard
5294 about?'--They have the purport, we reply, of diverting (men) from the
5295 objects of natural activity. For when a man acts intent on external
5296 things, and only anxious to attain the objects of his desire and to
5297 eschew the objects of his aversion, and does not thereby reach the
5298 highest aim of man although desirous of attaining it; such texts as the
5299 one quoted divert him from the objects of natural activity and turn the
5300 stream of his thoughts on the inward (the highest) Self. That for him
5301 who is engaged in the enquiry into the Self, the true nature of the Self
5302 is nothing either to be endeavoured after or to be avoided, we learn
5303 from texts such as the following: 'This everything, all is that Self'
5304 (B/ri/, Up. II, 4, 6); 'But when the Self only is all this, how should
5305 he see another, how should he know another, how should he know the
5306 knower?' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'This Self is Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. II,
5307 5, 19). That the knowledge of Brahman refers to something which is not a
5308 thing to be done, and therefore is not concerned either with the pursuit
5309 or the avoidance of any object, is the very thing we admit; for just
5310 that constitutes our glory, that as soon as we comprehend Brahman, all
5311 our duties come to an end and all our work is over. Thus /S/ruti says,
5312 'If a man understands the Self, saying, "I am he," what could he wish or

5313 desire that he should pine after the body?' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 12.) And
5314 similarly Sm/ri/ti declares, 'Having understood this the understanding
5315 man has done with all work, O Bharata' (Bha. Gita XV, 20). Therefore
5316 Brahman is not represented as the object of injunctions.

5317
5318 We now proceed to consider the doctrine of those who maintain that there
5319 is no part of the Veda which has the purport of making statements about
5320 mere existent things, and is not either an injunction or a prohibition,
5321 or supplementary to either. This opinion is erroneous, because the soul
5322 (purusha), which is the subject of the Upanishads, does not constitute a
5323 complement to anything else. Of that soul which is to be comprehended
5324 from the Upanishads only, which is non-transmigratory, Brahman,
5325 different in nature from the four classes of substances[79], which forms
5326 a topic of its own and is not a complement to anything else; of that
5327 soul it is impossible to say that it is not or is not apprehended; for
5328 the passage, 'That Self is to be described by No, no!' (B/ri/. Up. III,
5329 9, 26) designates it as the Self, and that the Self is cannot be denied.
5330 The possible objection that there is no reason to maintain that the soul
5331 is known from the Upanishads only, since it is the object of
5332 self-consciousness, is refuted by the fact that the soul of which the
5333 Upanishads treat is merely the witness of that (i.e. of the object of
5334 self-consciousness, viz. the jivatman). For neither from that part of
5335 the Veda which enjoins works nor from reasoning, anybody apprehends that
5336 soul which, different from the agent that is the object of
5337 self-consciousness, merely witnesses it; which is permanent in all
5338 (transitory) beings; uniform; one; eternally unchanging; the Self of
5339 everything. Hence it can neither be denied nor be represented as the
5340 mere complement of injunctions; for of that very person who might deny
5341 it it is the Self. And as it is the Self of all, it can neither be
5342 striven after nor avoided. All perishable things indeed perish, because
5343 they are mere modifications, up to (i.e. exclusive of) the soul. But the
5344 soul is imperishable[80], as there is no cause why it should perish; and
5345 eternally unchanging, as there is no cause for its undergoing any
5346 modification; hence it is in its essence eternally pure and free. And
5347 from passages, such as 'Beyond the soul there is nothing; this is the
5348 goal, the highest road' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 11), and 'That soul, taught in
5349 the Upanishads, I ask thee' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 26), it appears that the
5350 attribute of resting on the Upanishads is properly given to the soul, as
5351 it constitutes their chief topic. To say, therefore, that there is no
5352 portion of the Veda referring to existing things, is a mere bold
5353 assertion.

5354
5355 With regard to the quotations made of the views of men acquainted with
5356 the purport of the /S/astra (who alone were stated to have declared that
5357 the Veda treats of actions) it is to be understood that they, having to
5358 do with the enquiry into duty, refer to that part of the /S/astra which
5359 consists of injunctions and prohibitions. With regard to the other
5360 passage quoted ('as action is the purport of the Veda, whatever does not
5361 refer to action is purportless') we remark that if that passage were
5362 taken in an absolutely strict sense (when it would mean that only those
5363 words which denote action have a meaning), it would follow that all
5364 information about existent things is meaningless[81]. If, on the other
5365 hand, the Veda--in addition to the injunctions of activity and cessation
5366 of activity--does give information about existent things as being
5367 subservient to some action to be accomplished, why then should it not
5368 give information also about the existent eternally unchangeable Self?
5369 For an existent thing, about which information is given, does not become
5370 an act (through being stated to be subservient to an act).--But, it will
5371 be said, although existent things are not acts, yet, as they are
5372 instrumental to action, the information given about such things is
5373 merely subservient to action.--This, we reply, does not matter; for
5374 although the information may be subservient to action, the things
5375 themselves about which information is given are already intimated
5376 thereby as things which have the power of bringing about certain
5377 actions. Their final end (prayojana) indeed may be subserviency to some
5378 action, but thereby they do not cease to be, in the information given
5379 about them, intimated in themselves.--Well, and if they are thus
5380 intimated, what is gained thereby for your purpose[82]? We reply that
5381 the information about the Self, which is an existing thing not

5382 comprehended from other sources, is of the same nature (as the
5383 information about other existent things); for by the comprehension of
5384 the Self a stop is put to all false knowledge, which is the cause of
5385 transmigration, and thus a purpose is established which renders the
5386 passages relative to Brahman equal to those passages which give
5387 information about things instrumental to actions. Moreover, there are
5388 found (even in that part of the Veda which treats of actions) such
5389 passages as 'a Brahman is not to be killed,' which teach abstinence
5390 from certain actions. Now abstinence from action is neither action nor
5391 instrumental to action. If, therefore, the tenet that all those passages
5392 which do not express action are devoid of purport were insisted on, it
5393 would follow that all such passages as the one quoted, which teach
5394 abstinence from action, are devoid of purport--a consequence which is of
5395 course unacceptable. Nor, again, can the connexion in which the word
5396 'not' stands with the action expressed by the verb 'is to be
5397 killed'--which action is naturally established[83]--be used as a reason
5398 for assuming that 'not' denotes an action non-established elsewhere[84],
5399 different from the state of mere passivity implied in the abstinence
5400 from the act of killing. For the peculiar function of the particle 'not'
5401 is to intimate the idea of the non-existence of that with which it is
5402 connected, and the conception of the non-existence (of something to be
5403 done) is the cause of the state of passivity. (Nor can it be objected
5404 that, as soon as that momentary idea has passed away, the state of
5405 passivity will again make room for activity; for) that idea itself
5406 passes away (only after having completely destroyed the natural impulse
5407 prompting to the murder of a Brahman, &c., just as a fire is
5408 extinguished only after having completely consumed its fuel). Hence we
5409 are of opinion that the aim of prohibitory passages, such as 'a
5410 Brahman is not to be killed,' is a merely passive state, consisting
5411 in the abstinence from some possible action; excepting some special
5412 cases, such as the so-called Prajapati-vow, &c.[85] Hence the charge of
5413 want of purpose is to be considered as referring (not to the
5414 Vedanta-passages, but only) to such statements about existent things as
5415 are of the nature of legends and the like, and do not serve any purpose
5416 of man.

5417
5418 The allegation that a mere statement about an actually existent thing
5419 not connected with an injunction of something to be done, is purposeless
5420 (as, for instance, the statement that the earth contains seven dvipas)
5421 has already been refuted on the ground that a purpose is seen to exist
5422 in some such statements, as, for instance, 'this is not a snake, but a
5423 rope.'--But how about the objection raised above that the information
5424 about Brahman cannot be held to have a purpose in the same way as the
5425 statement about a rope has one, because a man even after having heard
5426 about Brahman continues to belong to this transmigratory world?--We
5427 reply as follows: It is impossible to show that a man who has once
5428 understood Brahman to be the Self, belongs to the transmigratory world
5429 in the same sense as he did before, because that would be contrary to
5430 the fact of his being Brahman. For we indeed observe that a person who
5431 imagines the body, and so on, to constitute the Self, is subject to fear
5432 and pain, but we have no right to assume that the same person after
5433 having, by means of the Veda, comprehended Brahman to be the Self, and
5434 thus having got over his former imaginings, will still in the same
5435 manner be subject to pain and fear whose cause is wrong knowledge. In
5436 the same way we see that a rich householder, puffed up by the conceit of
5437 his wealth, is grieved when his possessions are taken from him; but we
5438 do not see that the loss of his wealth equally grieves him after he has
5439 once retired from the world and put off the conceit of his riches. And,
5440 again, we see that a person possessing a pair of beautiful earrings
5441 derives pleasure from the proud conceit of ownership; but after he has
5442 lost the earrings and the conceit established thereon, the pleasure
5443 derived from them vanishes. Thus /S/ruti also declares, 'When he is free
5444 from the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (Ch. Up.
5445 VIII, 12, 1). If it should be objected that the condition of being free
5446 from the body follows on death only, we demur, since the cause of man
5447 being joined to the body is wrong knowledge. For it is not possible to
5448 establish the state of embodiedness upon anything else but wrong
5449 knowledge. And that the state of disembodiedness is eternal on account
5450 of its not having actions for its cause, we have already explained. The

5451 objection again, that embodiedness is caused by the merit and demerit
5452 effected by the Self (and therefore real), we refute by remarking that
5453 as the (reality of the) conjunction of the Self with the body is itself
5454 not established, the circumstance of merit and demerit being due to the
5455 action of the Self is likewise not established; for (if we should try to
5456 get over this difficulty by representing the Self's embodiedness as
5457 caused by merit and demerit) we should commit the logical fault of
5458 making embodiedness dependent on merit and demerit, and again merit and
5459 demerit on embodiedness. And the assumption of an endless retrogressive
5460 chain (of embodied states and merit and demerit) would be no better than
5461 a chain of blind men (who are unable to lead one another). Moreover, the
5462 Self can impossibly become an agent, as it cannot enter into intimate
5463 relation to actions. If it should be said that the Self may be
5464 considered as an agent in the same way as kings and other great people
5465 are (who without acting themselves make others act) by their mere
5466 presence, we deny the appositeness of this instance; for kings may
5467 become agents through their relation to servants whom they procure by
5468 giving them wages, &c., while it is impossible to imagine anything,
5469 analogous to money, which could be the cause of a connexion between the
5470 Self as lord and the body, and so on (as servants). Wrong imagination,
5471 on the other hand, (of the individual Self, considering itself to be
5472 joined to the body,) is a manifest reason of the connexion of the two
5473 (which is not based on any assumption). This explains also in how far
5474 the Self can be considered as the agent in sacrifices and similar
5475 acts[86]. Here it is objected that the Self's imagination as to the
5476 body, and so on, belonging to itself is not false, but is to be
5477 understood in a derived (figurative) sense. This objection we invalidate
5478 by the remark that the distinction of derived and primary senses of
5479 words is known to be applicable only where an actual difference of
5480 things is known to exist. We are, for instance, acquainted with a
5481 certain species of animals having a mane, and so on, which is the
5482 exclusive primary object of the idea and word 'lion,' and we are
5483 likewise acquainted with persons possessing in an eminent degree certain
5484 leonine qualities, such as fierceness, courage, &c.; here, a well
5485 settled difference of objects existing, the idea and the name 'lion' are
5486 applied to those persons in a derived or figurative sense. In those
5487 cases, however, where the difference of the objects is not well
5488 established, the transfer of the conception and name of the one to the
5489 other is not figurative, but simply founded on error. Such is, for
5490 instance, the case of a man who at the time of twilight does not discern
5491 that the object before him is a post, and applies to it the conception
5492 and designation of a man; such is likewise the case of the conception
5493 and designation of silver being applied to a shell of mother-of-pearl
5494 somehow mistaken for silver. How then can it be maintained that the
5495 application of the word and the conception of the Ego to the body, &c.,
5496 which application is due to the non-discrimination of the Self and the
5497 Not-Self, is figurative (rather than simply false)? considering that
5498 even learned men who know the difference of the Self and the Not-Self
5499 confound the words and ideas just as common shepherds and goatherds do.

5500
5501 As therefore the application of the conception of the Ego to the body on
5502 the part of those who affirm the existence of a Self different from the
5503 body is simply false, not figurative, it follows that the embodiedness
5504 of the Self is (not real but) caused by wrong conception, and hence that
5505 the person who has reached true knowledge is free from his body even
5506 while still alive. The same is declared in the /S/ruti passages
5507 concerning him who knows Brahman: 'And as the slough of a snake lies on
5508 an ant-hill, dead and cast away, thus lies this body; but that
5509 disembodied immortal spirit is Brahman only, is only light' (B/ri/. Up.
5510 IV, 4, 7); and 'With eyes he is without eyes as it were, with ears
5511 without ears as it were, with speech without speech as it were, with a
5512 mind without mind as it were, with vital airs without vital airs as it
5513 were.' Sm/ri/ti also, in the passage where the characteristic marks are
5514 enumerated of one whose mind is steady (Bha. Gita II, 54), declares that
5515 he who knows is no longer connected with action of any kind. Therefore
5516 the man who has once comprehended Brahman to be the Self, does not
5517 belong to this transmigratory world as he did before. He, on the other
5518 hand, who still belongs to this transmigratory world as before, has not
5519 comprehended Brahman to be the Self. Thus there remain no unsolved

5520 contradictions.

5521

5522 With reference again to the assertion that Brahman is not fully
5523 determined in its own nature, but stands in a complementary relation to
5524 injunctions, because the hearing about Brahman is to be followed by
5525 consideration and reflection, we remark that consideration and
5526 reflection are themselves merely subservient to the comprehension of
5527 Brahman. If Brahman, after having been comprehended, stood in a
5528 subordinate relation to some injunctions, it might be said to be merely
5529 supplementary. But this is not the case, since consideration and
5530 reflection no less than hearing are subservient to comprehension. It
5531 follows that the /S/astra cannot be the means of knowing Brahman only in
5532 so far as it is connected with injunctions, and the doctrine that on
5533 account of the uniform meaning of the Vedanta-texts, an independent
5534 Brahman is to be admitted, is thereby fully established. Hence there is
5535 room for beginning the new /S/astra indicated in the first Sutra, 'Then
5536 therefore the enquiry into Brahman.' If, on the other hand, the
5537 Vedanta-texts were connected with injunctions, a new /S/astra would
5538 either not be begun at all, since the /S/astra concerned with
5539 injunctions has already been introduced by means of the first Sutra of
5540 the Purva Mima/m/sa, 'Then therefore the enquiry into duty;' or if it
5541 were begun it would be introduced as follows: 'Then therefore the
5542 enquiry into the remaining duties;' just as a new portion of the Purva
5543 Mima/m/sa Sutras is introduced with the words, 'Then therefore the
5544 enquiry into what subserves the purpose of the sacrifice, and what
5545 subserves the purpose of man' (Pu. Mi. Su. IV, 1, 1). But as the
5546 comprehension of the unity of Brahman and the Self has not been
5547 propounded (in the previous /S/astra), it is quite appropriate that a
5548 new /S/astra, whose subject is Brahman, should be entered upon. Hence
5549 all injunctions and all other means of knowledge end with the cognition
5550 expressed in the words, 'I am Brahman;' for as soon as there supervenes
5551 the comprehension of the non-dual Self, which is not either something to
5552 be eschewed or something to be appropriated, all objects and knowing
5553 agents vanish, and hence there can no longer be means of proof. In
5554 accordance with this, they (i.e. men knowing Brahman) have made the
5555 following declaration:--'When there has arisen (in a man's mind) the
5556 knowledge, "I am that which is, Brahman is my Self," and when, owing to
5557 the sublation of the conceptions of body, relatives, and the like, the
5558 (imagination of) the figurative and the false Self has come to an
5559 end[87]; how should then the effect[88] (of that wrong imagination)
5560 exist any longer? As long as the knowledge of the Self, which Scripture
5561 tells us to search after, has not arisen, so long the Self is knowing
5562 subject; but that same subject is that which is searched after, viz.
5563 (the highest Self) free from all evil and blemish. Just as the idea of
5564 the Self being the body is assumed as valid (in ordinary life), so all
5565 the ordinary sources of knowledge (perception and the like) are valid
5566 only until the one Self is ascertained.'

5567

5568 (Herewith the section comprising the four Sutras is finished[89].)

5569

5570 So far it has been declared that the Vedanta-passages, whose purport is
5571 the comprehension of Brahman being the Self, and which have their object
5572 therein, refer exclusively to Brahman without any reference to actions.
5573 And it has further been shown that Brahman is the omniscient omnipotent
5574 cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. But now
5575 the Sa@nkhyas and others being of opinion that an existent substance is
5576 to be known through other means of proof (not through the Veda) infer
5577 different causes, such as the pradhana and the like, and thereupon
5578 interpret the Vedanta-passages as referring to the latter. All the
5579 Vedanta-passages, they maintain, which treat of the creation of the
5580 world distinctly point out that the cause (of the world) has to be
5581 concluded from the effect by inference; and the cause which is to be
5582 inferred is the connexion of the pradhana with the souls (purusha). The
5583 followers of Ka/n/ada again infer from the very same passages that the
5584 Lord is the efficient cause of the world while the atoms are its
5585 material cause. And thus other argumentators also taking their stand on
5586 passages apparently favouring their views and on fallacious arguments
5587 raise various objections. For this reason the teacher
5588 (Vyasa)--thoroughly acquainted as he is with words, passages, and means

5589 of proof--proceeds to state as prima facie views, and afterwards to
5590 refute, all those opinions founded on deceptive passages and fallacious
5591 arguments. Thereby he at the same time proves indirectly that what the
5592 Vedanta-texts aim at is the comprehension of Brahman.

5593
5594 The Sa@nkhyas who opine that the non-intelligent pradhana consisting of
5595 three constituent elements (gu/n/a) is the cause of the world argue as
5596 follows. The Vedanta-passages which you have declared to intimate that
5597 the all-knowing all-powerful Brahman is the cause of the world can be
5598 consistently interpreted also on the doctrine of the pradhana being the
5599 general cause. Omnipotence (more literally: the possession of all
5600 powers) can be ascribed to the pradhana in so far as it has all its
5601 effects for its objects. All-knowingness also can be ascribed to it,
5602 viz. in the following manner. What you think to be knowledge is in
5603 reality an attribute of the gu/n/a of Goodness[90], according to the
5604 Sm/ri/ti passage 'from Goodness springs knowledge' (Bha. Gita XIV, 17).
5605 By means of this attribute of Goodness, viz. knowledge, certain men
5606 endowed with organs which are effects (of the pradhana) are known as
5607 all-knowing Yogins; for omniscience is acknowledged to be connected with
5608 the very highest degree of 'Goodness.' Now to the soul (purusha) which
5609 is isolated, destitute of effected organs, consisting of pure
5610 (undifferented) intelligence it is quite impossible to ascribe either
5611 all-knowingness or limited knowledge; the pradhana, on the other hand,
5612 because consisting of the three gu/n/as, comprises also in its pradhana
5613 state the element of Goodness which is the cause of all-knowingness. The
5614 Vedanta-passages therefore in a derived (figurative) sense ascribe
5615 all-knowingness to the pradhana, although it is in itself
5616 non-intelligent. Moreover you (the Vedantin) also who assume an
5617 all-knowing Brahman can ascribe to it all-knowingness in so far only as
5618 that term means capacity for all knowledge. For Brahman cannot always be
5619 actually engaged in the cognition of everything; for from this there
5620 would follow the absolute permanency of his cognition, and this would
5621 involve a want of independence on Brahman's part with regard to the
5622 activity of knowing. And if you should propose to consider Brahman's
5623 cognition as non-permanent it would follow that with the cessation of
5624 the cognition Brahman itself would cease. Therefore all-knowingness is
5625 possible only in the sense of capacity for all knowledge. Moreover you
5626 assume that previously to the origination of the world Brahman is
5627 without any instruments of action. But without the body, the senses, &c.
5628 which are the instruments of knowledge, cognition cannot take place in
5629 any being. And further it must be noted that the pradhana, as consisting
5630 of various elements, is capable of undergoing modifications, and may
5631 therefore act as a (material) cause like clay and other substances;
5632 while the uncompounded homogeneous Brahman is unable to do so.

5633
5634 To these conclusions he (Vyasa) replies in the following Sutra.

5635
5636 5. On account of seeing (i.e. thinking being attributed in the
5637 Upanishads to the cause of the world; the pradhana) is not (to be
5638 identified with the cause indicated by the Upanishads; for) it is not
5639 founded on Scripture.

5640
5641 It is impossible to find room in the Vedanta-texts for the
5642 non-intelligent pradhana, the fiction of the Sa@nkhyas; because it is
5643 not founded on Scripture. How so? Because the quality of seeing, i.e.
5644 thinking, is in Scripture ascribed to the cause. For the passage, Ch.
5645 Up. VI, 2, (which begins: 'Being only, my dear, this was in the
5646 beginning, one only, without a second,' and goes on, 'It thought (saw),
5647 may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire,') declares that
5648 this world differentiated by name and form, which is there denoted by
5649 the word 'this,' was before its origination identical with the Self of
5650 that which is and that the principle denoted by the term 'the being' (or
5651 'that which is') sent forth fire and the other elements after having
5652 thought. The following passage also ('Verily in the beginning all this
5653 was Self, one only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He
5654 thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds,' Ait.
5655 Ar. II, 4, 1, 2) declares the creation to have had thought for its
5656 antecedent. In another passage also (Pr. Up. VI, 3) it is said of the
5657 person of sixteen parts, 'He thought, &c. He sent forth Pra/n/a.' By

5658 'seeing' (i.e. the verb 'seeing' exhibited in the Sutra) is not meant
5659 that particular verb only, but any verbs which have a cognate sense;
5660 just as the verb 'to sacrifice' is used to denote any kind of offering.
5661 Therefore other passages also whose purport it is to intimate that an
5662 all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world are to be quoted here, as,
5663 for instance, Mu. Up. I, 1, 9, 'From him who perceives all and who knows
5664 all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born that
5665 Brahman, name and form and food.'

5666
5667 The argumentation of the Sa@nkhyas that the pradhana may be called
5668 all-knowing on account of knowledge constituting an attribute of the
5669 gu/n/a Goodness is inadmissible. For as in the pradhana-condition the
5670 three gu/n/as are in a state of equipoise, knowledge which is a quality
5671 of Goodness only is not possible[91]. Nor can we admit the explanation
5672 that the pradhana is all-knowing because endowed with the capacity for
5673 all knowledge. For if, in the condition of equipoise of the gu/n/as, we
5674 term the pradhana all-knowing with reference to the power of knowledge
5675 residing in Goodness, we must likewise term it little-knowing, with
5676 reference to the power impeding knowledge which resides in Passion and
5677 Darkness.

5678
5679 Moreover a modification of Goodness which is not connected with a
5680 witnessing (observing) principle (sakshin) is not called knowledge, and
5681 the non-intelligent pradhana is destitute of such a principle. It is
5682 therefore impossible to ascribe to the pradhana all-knowingness. The
5683 case of the Yogins finally does not apply to the point under
5684 consideration; for as they possess intelligence, they may, owing to an
5685 excess of Goodness in their nature, rise to omniscience[92].--Well then
5686 (say those Sa@nkhyas who believe in the existence of a Lord) let us
5687 assume that the pradhana possesses the quality of knowledge owing to the
5688 witnessing principle (the Lord), just as the quality of burning is
5689 imparted to an iron ball by fire.--No, we reply; for if this were so, it
5690 would be more reasonable to assume that that which is the cause of the
5691 pradhana having the quality of thought i.e. the all-knowing primary
5692 Brahman itself is the cause of the world.

5693
5694 The objection that to Brahman also all-knowingness in its primary sense
5695 cannot be ascribed because, if the activity of cognition were permanent,
5696 Brahman could not be considered as independent with regard to it, we
5697 refute as follows. In what way, we ask the Sa@nkhyas, is Brahman's
5698 all-knowingness interfered with by a permanent cognitional activity? To
5699 maintain that he, who possesses eternal knowledge capable to throw light
5700 on all objects, is not all-knowing, is contradictory. If his knowledge
5701 were considered non-permanent, he would know sometimes, and sometimes he
5702 would not know; from which it would follow indeed that he is not
5703 all-knowing. This fault is however avoided if we admit Brahman's
5704 knowledge to be permanent.--But, it may be objected, on this latter
5705 alternative the knower cannot be designated as independent with
5706 reference to the act of knowing.--Why not? we reply; the sun also,
5707 although his heat and light are permanent, is nevertheless designated as
5708 independent when we say, 'he burns, he gives light[93]. '--But, it will
5709 again be objected, we say that the sun burns or gives light when he
5710 stands in relation to some object to be heated or illuminated; Brahman,
5711 on the other hand, stands, before the creation of the world, in no
5712 relation to any object of knowledge. The cases are therefore not
5713 parallel.--This objection too, we reply, is not valid; for as a matter
5714 of fact we speak of the Sun as an agent, saying 'the sun shines' even
5715 without reference to any object illuminated by him, and hence Brahman
5716 also may be spoken of as an agent, in such passages as 'it thought,'
5717 &c., even without reference to any object of knowledge. If, however, an
5718 object is supposed to be required ('knowing' being a transitive verb
5719 while 'shining' is intransitive), the texts ascribing thought to Brahman
5720 will fit all the better.--What then is that object to which the
5721 knowledge of the Lord can refer previously to the origin of the
5722 world?--Name and form, we reply, which can be defined neither as being
5723 identical with Brahman nor as different from it, unevolved but about to
5724 be evolved. For if, as the adherents of the Yoga-/s/astra assume, the
5725 Yogins have a perceptive knowledge of the past and the future through
5726 the favour of the Lord; in what terms shall we have to speak of the

5727 eternal cognition of the ever pure Lord himself, whose objects are the
5728 creation, subsistence, and dissolution of the world! The objection that
5729 Brahman, previously to the origin of the world, is not able to think
5730 because it is not connected with a body, &c. does not apply; for
5731 Brahman, whose nature is eternal cognition--as the sun's nature is
5732 eternal luminousness--can impossibly stand in need of any instruments of
5733 knowledge. The transmigrating soul (sa/m/sarin) indeed, which is under
5734 the sway of Nescience, &c., may require a body in order that knowledge
5735 may arise in it; but not so the Lord, who is free from all impediments
5736 of knowledge. The two following Mantras also declare that the Lord does
5737 not require a body, and that his knowledge is without any obstructions.
5738 'There is no effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like
5739 unto him or better; his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent,
5740 acting as knowledge and force.' 'Grasping without hands, hasting without
5741 feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears. He knows what can be
5742 known, but no one knows him; they call him the first, the great person'
5743 (/S/v. Up. VI, 8; III, 19).

5744
5745 But, to raise a new objection, there exists no transmigrating soul
5746 different from the Lord and obstructed by impediments of knowledge; for
5747 /S/ruti expressly declares that 'there is no other seer but he; there is
5748 no other knower but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23). How then can it be said
5749 that the origination of knowledge in the transmigrating soul depends on
5750 a body, while it does not do so in the case of the Lord?--True, we
5751 reply. There is in reality no transmigrating soul different from the
5752 Lord. Still the connexion (of the Lord) with limiting adjuncts,
5753 consisting of bodies and so on, is assumed, just as we assume the ether
5754 to enter into connexion with divers limiting adjuncts such as jars,
5755 pots, caves, and the like. And just as in consequence of connexion of
5756 the latter kind such conceptions and terms as 'the hollow (space) of a
5757 jar,' &c. are generally current, although the space inside a jar is not
5758 really different from universal space, and just as in consequence
5759 thereof there generally prevails the false notion that there are
5760 different spaces such as the space of a jar and so on; so there prevails
5761 likewise the false notion that the Lord and the transmigrating soul are
5762 different; a notion due to the non-discrimination of the (unreal)
5763 connexion of the soul with the limiting conditions, consisting of the
5764 body and so on. That the Self, although in reality the only existence,
5765 imparts the quality of Selfhood to bodies and the like which are
5766 Not-Self is a matter of observation, and is due to mere wrong
5767 conception, which depends in its turn on antecedent wrong conception.
5768 And the consequence of the soul thus involving itself in the
5769 transmigratory state is that its thought depends on a body and the like.

5770
5771 The averment that the pradhana, because consisting of several elements,
5772 can, like clay and similar substances, occupy the place of a cause while
5773 the uncompounded Brahman cannot do so, is refuted by the fact of the
5774 pradhana not basing on Scripture. That, moreover, it is possible to
5775 establish by argumentation the causality of Brahman, but not of the
5776 pradhana and similar principles, the Sutrakara will set forth in the
5777 second Adhyaya (II, 1, 4, &c.).

5778
5779 Here the Sa@nkhyas comes forward with a new objection. The difficulty
5780 stated by you, he says, viz. that the non-intelligent pradhana cannot be
5781 the cause of the world, because thought is ascribed to the latter in the
5782 sacred texts, can be got over in another way also, viz. on the ground
5783 that non-intelligent things are sometimes figuratively spoken of as
5784 intelligent beings. We observe, for instance, that people say of a
5785 river-bank about to fall, 'the bank is inclined to fall (pipatishati),'
5786 and thus speak of a non-intelligent bank as if it possessed
5787 intelligence. So the pradhana also, although non-intelligent, may, when
5788 about to create, be figuratively spoken of as thinking. Just as in
5789 ordinary life some intelligent person after having bathed, and dined,
5790 and formed the purpose of driving in the afternoon to his village,
5791 necessarily acts according to his purpose, so the pradhana also acts by
5792 the necessity of its own nature, when transforming itself into the
5793 so-called great principle and the subsequent forms of evolution; it may
5794 therefore figuratively be spoken of as intelligent.--But what reason
5795 have you for setting aside the primary meaning of the word 'thought' and

5796 for taking it in a figurative sense?--The observation, the Sa@nkhyā
5797 replies, that fire and water also are figuratively spoken of as
5798 intelligent beings in the two following scriptural passages, 'That fire
5799 thought; that water thought' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3; 4). We therefrom
5800 conclude that thought is to be taken in a figurative sense there also
5801 where Being (Sat) is the agent, because it is mentioned in a chapter
5802 where (thought) is generally taken in a figurative sense[94].
5803

5804 To this argumentation of the Sadkhya the next Sutra replies:
5805

5806 6. If it is said that (the word 'seeing') has a figurative meaning, we
5807 deny that, on account of the word Self (being applied to the cause of
5808 the world).
5809

5810 Your assertion that the term 'Being' denotes the non-intelligent
5811 pradhana, and that thought is ascribed to it in a figurative sense only,
5812 as it is to fire and water, is untenable. Why so? On account of the term
5813 'Self.' For the passage Ch. Up. VI, 2, which begins 'Being only, my
5814 dear, this was in the beginning,' after having related the creation of
5815 fire, water, and earth ('it thought,' &c.; 'it sent forth fire,' &c.),
5816 goes on--denoting the thinking principle of which the whole chapter
5817 treats, and likewise fire, water, and earth, by the
5818 term--'divinities'--as follows, 'That divinity thought: Let me now enter
5819 those three divinities with this living Self (jiva. atman) and evolve
5820 names and forms.' If we assumed that in this passage the non-intelligent
5821 pradhana is figuratively spoken of as thinking, we should also have to
5822 assume that the same pradhana--as once constituting the subject-matter
5823 of the chapter--is referred to by the term 'that divinity.' But in that
5824 case the divinity would not speak of the jiva as 'Self.' For by the term
5825 'Jiva' we must understand, according to the received meaning and the
5826 etymology of the word, the intelligent (principle) which rules over the
5827 body and sustains the vital airs. How could such a principle be the Self
5828 of the non-intelligent pradhana? By 'Self' we understand (a being's) own
5829 nature, and it is clear that the intelligent Jiva cannot constitute the
5830 nature of the non-intelligent pradhana. If, on the other hand, we refer
5831 the whole chapter to the intelligent Brahman, to which thought in its
5832 primary sense belongs, the use of the word 'Self' with reference to the
5833 Jiva is quite adequate. Then again there is the other passage, 'That
5834 which is that subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is
5835 the true. It is the Self. That art thou, O /S/vetaketu' (Ch. Up. VI, 8,
5836 7, &c.). Here the clause 'It is the Self' designates the Being of which
5837 the entire chapter treats, viz. the subtle Self, by the word 'Self,' and
5838 the concluding clause, 'that art thou, O /S/vetaketu,' declares the
5839 intelligent /S/vetaketu to be of the nature of the Self. Fire and water,
5840 on the other hand, are non-intelligent, since they are objects (of the
5841 mind), and since they are declared to be implicated in the evolution of
5842 names and forms. And as at the same time there is no reason for
5843 ascribing to them thought in its primary sense--while the employment of
5844 the word 'Self' furnishes such a reason with reference to the Sat--the
5845 thought attributed to them must be explained in a figurative sense, like
5846 the inclination of the river-bank. Moreover, the thinking on the part of
5847 fire and water is to be understood as dependent on their being ruled
5848 over by the Sat. On the other hand, the thought of the Sat is, on
5849 account of the word 'Self,' not to be understood in a figurative
5850 sense.[95]
5851

5852 Here the Sa@nkhyā comes forward with a new objection. The word 'Self,'
5853 he says, may be applied to the pradhana, although unintelligent, because
5854 it is sometimes figuratively used in the sense of 'that which effects
5855 all purposes of another;' as, for instance, a king applies the word
5856 'Self' to some servant who carries out all the king's intentions,
5857 'Bhadrāsena is my (other) Self.' For the pradhana, which effects the
5858 enjoyment and the emancipation of the soul, serves the latter in the
5859 same way as a minister serves his king in the affairs of peace and war.
5860 Or else, it may be said, the one word 'Self' may refer to
5861 non-intelligent things as well as to intelligent beings, as we see that
5862 such expressions as 'the Self of the elements,' 'the Self of the
5863 senses,' are made use of, and as the one word 'light' (jyotis) denotes a
5864 certain sacrifice (the jyotish/t/oma) as well as a flame. How then does

5865 it follow from the word 'Self' that the thinking (ascribed to the cause
5866 of the world) is not to be taken in a figurative sense?
5867

5868 To this last argumentation the Sutrakara replies:
5869

5870 7. (The pradhana cannot be designated by the term 'Self') because
5871 release is taught of him who takes his stand on that (the Sat).
5872

5873 The non-intelligent pradhana cannot be the object of the term 'Self'
5874 because in the passage Ch. Up. VI, 2 ff., where the subtle Sat which is
5875 under discussion is at first referred to in the sentence, 'That is the
5876 Self,' and where the subsequent clause, 'That art thou, O /S/vetaketu,'
5877 declares the intelligent /S/vetaketu to have his abode in the Self, a
5878 passage subsequent to the two quoted (viz. 'a man who has a teacher
5879 obtains true knowledge; for him there is only delay as long as he is not
5880 delivered, then he will be perfect') declares final release. For if the
5881 non-intelligent pradhana were denoted by the term 'Sat' and did
5882 comprehend--by means of the phrase 'That art thou'--persons desirous of
5883 final release who as such are intelligent, the meaning could only be
5884 'Thou art non-intelligent;' so that Scripture would virtually make
5885 contradictory statements to the disadvantage of man, and would thus
5886 cease to be a means of right knowledge. But to assume that the faultless
5887 /s/astra is not a means of right knowledge, would be contrary to reason.
5888 And if the /s/astra, considered as a means of right knowledge, should
5889 point out to a man desirous of release, but ignorant of the way to it, a
5890 non-intelligent Self as the real Self, he would--comparable to the blind
5891 man who had caught hold of the ox's tail[96]--cling to the view of that
5892 being the Self, and thus never be able to reach the real Self different
5893 from the false Self pointed out to him; hence he would be debarred from
5894 what constitutes man's good, and would incur evil. We must therefore
5895 conclude that, just as the /s/astra teaches the agnihotra and similar
5896 performances in their true nature as means for those who are desirous of
5897 the heavenly world, so the passage 'that is the Self, that art thou, O
5898 /S/vetaketu,' teaches the Self in its true nature also. Only on that
5899 condition release for him whose thoughts are true can be taught by means
5900 of the simile in which the person to be released is compared to the man
5901 grasping the heated axe (Ch. Up. VI, 16). For in the other case, if the
5902 doctrine of the Sat constituting the Self had a secondary meaning only,
5903 the cognition founded on the passage 'that art thou' would be of the
5904 nature of a fanciful combination only[97], like the knowledge derived
5905 from the passage, 'I am the hymn' (Ait. Ar. II, 1, 2, 6), and would lead
5906 to a mere transitory reward; so that the simile quoted could not convey
5907 the doctrine of release. Therefore the word 'Self' is applied to the
5908 subtle Sat not in a merely figurative sense. In the case of the faithful
5909 servant, on the other hand, the word 'Self' can--in such phrases as
5910 'Bhadrasena is my Self'--be taken in a figurative sense, because the
5911 difference between master and servant is well established by perception.
5912 Moreover, to assume that, because words are sometimes seen to be used in
5913 figurative senses, a figurative sense may be resorted to in the case of
5914 those things also for which words (i.e. Vedic words) are the only means
5915 of knowledge, is altogether indefensible; for an assumption of that
5916 nature would lead to a general want of confidence. The assertion that
5917 the word 'Self' may (primarily) signify what is non-intelligent as well
5918 as what is intelligent, just as the word 'jyotis' signifies a certain
5919 sacrifice as well as light, is inadmissible, because we have no right to
5920 attribute to words a plurality of meanings. Hence (we rather assume
5921 that) the word 'Self' in its primary meaning refers to what is
5922 intelligent only and is then, by a figurative attribution of
5923 intelligence, applied to the elements and the like also; whence such
5924 phrases as 'the Self of the elements,' 'the Self of the senses.' And
5925 even if we assume that the word 'Self' primarily signifies both classes
5926 of beings, we are unable to settle in any special case which of the two
5927 meanings the word has, unless we are aided either by the general heading
5928 under which it stands, or some determinative attributive word. But in
5929 the passage under discussion there is nothing to determine that the word
5930 refers to something non-intelligent, while, on the other hand, the Sat
5931 distinguished by thought forms the general heading, and /S/vetaketu,
5932 i.e. a being endowed with intelligence, is mentioned in close proximity.
5933 That a non-intelligent Self does not agree with /S/vetaketu, who

5934 possesses intelligence, we have already shown. All these circumstances
5935 determine the object of the word 'Self' here to be something
5936 intelligent. The word 'jyotis' does moreover not furnish an appropriate
5937 example; for according to common use it has the settled meaning of
5938 'light' only, and is used in the sense of sacrifice only on account of
5939 the arthavada assuming a similarity (of the sacrifice) to light.

5940
5941 A different explanation of the Sutra is also possible. The preceding
5942 Sutra may be taken completely to refute all doubts as to the word 'Self'
5943 having a figurative or double sense, and then the present Sutra is to be
5944 explained as containing an independent reason, proving that the doctrine
5945 of the pradhana being the general cause is untenable.

5946
5947 Hence the non-intelligent pradhana is not denoted by the word 'Self.'
5948 This the teacher now proceeds to prove by an additional reason.

5949
5950 8. And (the pradhana cannot be denoted by the word 'Self') because there
5951 is no statement of its having to be set aside.

5952
5953 If the pradhana which is the Not-Self were denoted by the term 'Being'
5954 (Sat), and if the passage 'That is the Self, that art thou, O
5955 /S/vetaketu,' referred to the pradhana; the teacher whose wish it is to
5956 impart instruction about the true Brahman would subsequently declare
5957 that the pradhana is to be set aside (and the true Brahman to be
5958 considered); for otherwise his pupil, having received the instruction
5959 about the pradhana, might take his stand on the latter, looking upon it
5960 as the Non-Self. In ordinary life a man who wishes to point out to a
5961 friend the (small) star Arundhati at first directs his attention to a
5962 big neighbouring star, saying 'that is Arundhati,' although it is really
5963 not so; and thereupon he withdraws his first statement and points out
5964 the real Arundhati. Analogously the teacher (if he intended to make his
5965 pupil understand the Self through the Non-Self) would in the end
5966 definitely state that the Self is not of the nature of the pradhana. But
5967 no such statement is made; for the sixth Prapa/th/aka arrives at a
5968 conclusion based on the view that the Self is nothing but that which is
5969 (the Sat).

5970
5971 The word 'and' (in the Sutra) is meant to notify that the contradiction
5972 of a previous statement (which would be implied in the rejected
5973 interpretation) is an additional reason for the rejection. Such a
5974 contradiction would result even if it were stated that the pradhana is
5975 to be set aside. For in the beginning of the Prapa/th/aka it is
5976 intimated that through the knowledge of the cause everything becomes
5977 known. Compare the following consecutive sentences, 'Have you ever asked
5978 for that instruction by which we hear what cannot be heard, by which we
5979 perceive what cannot be perceived, by which we know what cannot be
5980 known? What is that instruction? As, my dear, by one clod of clay all
5981 that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e. the effect) being
5982 a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it
5983 is clay merely,' &c. Now if the term 'Sat' denoted the pradhana, which
5984 is merely the cause of the aggregate of the objects of enjoyment, its
5985 knowledge, whether to be set aside or not to be set aside, could never
5986 lead to the knowledge of the aggregate of enjoyers (souls), because the
5987 latter is not an effect of the pradhana. Therefore the pradhana is not
5988 denoted by the term 'Sat.'--For this the Sutakara gives a further
5989 reason.

5990
5991 9. On account of (the individual Soul) going to the Self (the Self
5992 cannot be the pradhana).

5993
5994 With reference to the cause denoted by the word 'Sat,' Scripture says,
5995 'When a man sleeps here, then, my dear, he becomes united with the Sat,
5996 he is gone to his own (Self). Therefore they say of him, "he sleeps"
5997 (svapiti), because he is gone to his own (svam apita).' (Ch. Up. VI, 8,
5998 1.) This passage explains the well-known verb 'to sleep,' with reference
5999 to the soul. The word, 'his own,' denotes the Self which had before been
6000 denoted by the word Sat; to the Self he (the individual soul) goes, i.e.
6001 into it it is resolved, according to the acknowledged sense of api-i,
6002 which means 'to be resolved into.' The individual soul (jiva) is called

6003 awake as long as being connected with the various external objects by
6004 means of the modifications of the mind--which thus constitute limiting
6005 adjuncts of the soul--it apprehends those external objects, and
6006 identifies itself with the gross body, which is one of those external
6007 objects[98]. When, modified by the impressions which the external
6008 objects have left, it sees dreams, it is denoted by the term 'mind[99].'
6009 When, on the cessation of the two limiting adjuncts (i.e. the subtle and
6010 the gross bodies), and the consequent absence of the modifications due
6011 to the adjuncts, it is, in the state of deep sleep, merged in the Self
6012 as it were, then it is said to be asleep (resolved into the Self). A
6013 similar etymology of the word 'h/ri/daya' is given by /s/ruti, 'That
6014 Self abides in the heart. And this is the etymological explanation: he
6015 is in the heart (h/ri/di ayam).' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 3.) The words
6016 a/s/anaya and udanya are similarly etymologised: 'water is carrying away
6017 what has been eaten by him;' 'fire carries away what has been drunk by
6018 him' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 3; 5). Thus the passage quoted above explains the
6019 resolution (of the soul) into the Self, denoted by the term 'Sat,' by
6020 means of the etymology of the word 'sleep.' But the intelligent Self can
6021 clearly not resolve itself into the non-intelligent pradhana. If, again,
6022 it were said that the pradhana is denoted by the word 'own,' because
6023 belonging to the Self (as being the Self's own), there would remain the
6024 same absurd statement as to an intelligent entity being resolved into a
6025 non-intelligent one. Moreover another scriptural passage (viz. 'embraced
6026 by the intelligent--praj/n/a--Self he knows nothing that is without,
6027 nothing that is within,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 21) declares that the soul in
6028 the condition of dreamless sleep is resolved into an intelligent entity.
6029 Hence that into which all intelligent souls are resolved is an
6030 intelligent cause of the world, denoted by the word 'Sat,' and not the
6031 pradhana.--A further reason for the pradhana not being the cause is
6032 subjoined.

6033
6034 10. On account of the uniformity of view (of the Vedanta-texts, Brahman
6035 is to be considered the cause).

6036
6037 If, as in the argumentations of the logicians, so in the Vedanta-texts
6038 also, there were set forth different views concerning the nature of the
6039 cause, some of them favouring the theory of an intelligent Brahman being
6040 the cause of the world, others inclining towards the pradhana doctrine,
6041 and others again tending in a different direction; then it might perhaps
6042 be possible to interpret such passages as those, which speak of the
6043 cause of the world as thinking, in such a manner as to make them fall in
6044 with the pradhana theory. But the stated condition is absent since all
6045 the Vedanta-texts uniformly teach that the cause of the world is the
6046 intelligent Brahman. Compare, for instance, 'As from a burning fire
6047 sparks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the pra/n/as
6048 proceed each towards its place; from the pra/n/as the gods, from the
6049 gods the worlds' (Kau. Up. III, 3). And 'from that Self sprang ether'
6050 (Taitt. Up. II, 1). And 'all this springs from the Self' (Ch. Up. VII,
6051 26, 1). And 'this pra/n/a is born from the Self' (Pr. Up. III, 3); all
6052 which passages declare the Self to be the cause. That the word 'Self'
6053 denotes an intelligent being, we have already shown.

6054
6055 And that all the Vedanta-texts advocate the same view as to an
6056 intelligent cause of the world, greatly strengthens their claim to be
6057 considered a means of right knowledge, just as the corresponding claims
6058 of the senses are strengthened by their giving us information of a
6059 uniform character regarding colour and the like. The all-knowing Brahman
6060 is therefore to be considered the cause of the world, 'on account of the
6061 uniformity of view (of the Vedanta-texts).--A further reason for this
6062 conclusion is advanced.

6063
6064 11. And because it is directly stated in Scripture (therefore the
6065 all-knowing Brahman is the cause of the world).

6066
6067 That the all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world, is also declared in
6068 a text directly referring to him (viz. the all-knowing one), viz. in the
6069 following passage of the mantropanishad of the /S/veta/s/vataras (VI, 9)
6070 where the word 'he' refers to the previously mentioned all-knowing Lord,
6071 'He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of

6072 him neither parent nor lord.' It is therefore finally settled that the
6073 all-knowing Brahman is the general cause, not the non-intelligent
6074 pradhana or anything else.

6075
6076 In what precedes we have shown, availing ourselves of appropriate
6077 arguments, that the Vedanta-texts exhibited under Sutras I, 1-11, are
6078 capable of proving that the all-knowing, all-powerful Lord is the cause
6079 of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. And we have
6080 explained, by pointing to the prevailing uniformity of view (I, 10),
6081 that all Vedanta-texts whatever maintain an intelligent cause. The
6082 question might therefore be asked, 'What reason is there for the
6083 subsequent part of the Vedanta-sutras?' (as the chief point is settled
6084 already.)

6085
6086 To this question we reply as follows: Brahman is apprehended under two
6087 forms; in the first place as qualified by limiting conditions owing to
6088 the multiformity of the evolutions of name and form (i.e. the
6089 multiformity of the created world); in the second place as being the
6090 opposite of this, i.e. free from all limiting conditions whatever.
6091 Compare the following passages: B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15, 'For where there
6092 is duality as it were, then one sees the other; but when the Self only
6093 is all this, how should he see another?' Ch. Up. VII, 24, 1, 'Where one
6094 sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is
6095 the greatest. Where one sees something else, hears something else,
6096 understands something else, that is the little. The greatest is
6097 immortal; the little is mortal;' Taitt. Up. III, 12, 7, 'The wise one,
6098 who having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling (the
6099 things by their names[100]);' /S/v. Up. VI, 19, 'Who is without parts,
6100 without actions, tranquil, without faults, without taint, the highest
6101 bridge of immortality, like a fire that has consumed its fuel;' B/ri/.
6102 Up. II, 3, 6, 'Not so, not so;' B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8, 'It is neither
6103 coarse nor fine, neither short nor long;' and 'defective is one place,
6104 perfect the other.' All these passages, with many others, declare
6105 Brahman to possess a double nature, according as it is the object either
6106 of Knowledge or of Nescience. As long as it is the object of Nescience,
6107 there are applied to it the categories of devotee, object of devotion,
6108 and the like[101]. The different modes of devotion lead to different
6109 results, some to exaltation, some to gradual emancipation, some to
6110 success in works; those modes are distinct on account of the distinction
6111 of the different qualities and limiting conditions[102]. And although
6112 the one highest Self only, i.e. the Lord distinguished by those
6113 different qualities constitutes the object of devotion, still the fruits
6114 (of devotion) are distinct, according as the devotion refers to
6115 different qualities. Thus Scripture says, 'According as man worships
6116 him, that he becomes;' and, 'According to what his thought is in this
6117 world, so will he be when he has departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14,
6118 1). Sm/ri/ti also makes an analogous statement, 'Remembering whatever
6119 form of being he leaves this body in the end, into that form he enters,
6120 being impressed with it through his constant meditation' (Bha. Gita
6121 VIII, 6).

6122
6123 Although one and the same Self is hidden in all beings movable as well
6124 as immovable, yet owing to the gradual rise of excellence of the minds
6125 which form the limiting conditions (of the Self), Scripture declares
6126 that the Self, although eternally unchanging and uniform, reveals
6127 itself[103] in a graduated series of beings, and so appears in forms of
6128 various dignity and power; compare, for instance (Ait. Ar. II, 3, 2, 1),
6129 'He who knows the higher manifestation of the Self in him[104],' &c.
6130 Similarly Sm/ri/ti remarks, 'Whatever being there is of power, splendour
6131 or might, know it to have sprung from portions of my glory' (Bha. Gita,
6132 X, 41); a passage declaring that wherever there is an excess of power
6133 and so on, there the Lord is to be worshipped. Accordingly here (i.e. in
6134 the Sutras) also the teacher will show that the golden person in the
6135 disc of the Sun is the highest Self, on account of an indicating sign,
6136 viz. the circumstance of his being unconnected with any evil (Ved. Su.
6137 I, 1, 20); the same is to be observed with regard to I, 1, 22 and other
6138 Sutras. And, again, an enquiry will have to be undertaken into the
6139 meaning of the texts, in order that a settled conclusion may be reached
6140 concerning that knowledge of the Self which leads to instantaneous

6141 release; for although that knowledge is conveyed by means of various
6142 limiting conditions, yet no special connexion with limiting conditions
6143 is intended to be intimated, in consequence of which there arises a
6144 doubt whether it (the knowledge) has the higher or the lower Brahman for
6145 its object; so, for instance, in the case of Sutra I, 1, 12[105]. From
6146 all this it appears that the following part of the /S/astra has a
6147 special object of its own, viz. to show that the Vedanta-texts teach, on
6148 the one hand, Brahman as connected with limiting conditions and forming
6149 an object of devotion, and on the other hand, as being free from the
6150 connexion with such conditions and constituting an object of knowledge.
6151 The refutation, moreover, of non-intelligent causes different from
6152 Brahman, which in I, 1, 10 was based on the uniformity of the meaning of
6153 the Vedanta-texts, will be further detailed by the Sutrakara, who, while
6154 explaining additional passages relating to Brahman, will preclude all
6155 causes of a nature opposite to that of Brahman.

6156
6157 12. (The Self) consisting of bliss (is the highest Self) on account of
6158 the repetition (of the word 'bliss,' as denoting the highest Self).
6159

6160 The Taittiriya-upanishad (II, 1-5), after having enumerated the Self
6161 consisting of food, the Self consisting of the vital airs, the Self
6162 consisting of mind, and the Self consisting of understanding, says,
6163 'Different from this which consists of understanding is the other inner
6164 Self which consists of bliss.' Here the doubt arises whether the phrase,
6165 'that which consists of bliss,' denotes the highest Brahman of which it
6166 had been said previously, that 'It is true Being, Knowledge, without
6167 end,' or something different from Brahman, just as the Self consisting
6168 of food, &c., is different from it.--The purvapakshin maintains that the
6169 Self consisting of bliss is a secondary (not the principal) Self, and
6170 something different from Brahman; as it forms a link in a series of
6171 Selves, beginning with the Self consisting of food, which all are not the
6172 principal Self. To the objection that even thus the Self consisting of
6173 bliss may be considered as the primary Self, since it is stated to be
6174 the innermost of all, he replies that this cannot be admitted, because
6175 the Self of bliss is declared to have joy and so on for its limbs, and
6176 because it is said to be embodied. If it were identical with the primary
6177 Self, joy and the like would not touch it; but the text expressly says
6178 'Joy is its head;' and about its being embodied we read, 'Of that former
6179 one this one is the embodied Self' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), i.e. of that
6180 former Self of Understanding this Self of bliss is the embodied Self.
6181 And of what is embodied, the contact with joy and pain cannot be
6182 prevented. Therefore the Self which consists of bliss is nothing but the
6183 transmigrating Soul.

6184
6185 To this reasoning we make the following reply:--By the Self consisting
6186 of bliss we have to understand the highest Self, 'on account of
6187 repetition.' For the word 'bliss' is repeatedly applied to the highest
6188 Self. So Taitt. Up. II, 7, where, after the clause 'That is
6189 flavour'--which refers back to the Self consisting of bliss, and
6190 declares it to be of the nature of flavour--we read, 'For only after
6191 having perceived flavour can any one perceive delight. Who could
6192 breathe, who could breathe forth if that Bliss existed not in the ether
6193 (of the heart)? For he alone causes blessedness;' and again, II, 8, 'Now
6194 this is an examination of Bliss;' 'He reaches that Self consisting of
6195 Bliss;' and again, II, 9, 'He who knows the Bliss of Brahman fears
6196 nothing;' and in addition, 'He understood that Bliss is Brahman' (III,
6197 6). And in another scriptural passage also (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 28),
6198 'Knowledge and bliss is Brahman,' we see the word 'bliss' applied just
6199 to Brahman. As, therefore, the word 'bliss' is repeatedly used with
6200 reference to Brahman, we conclude that the Self consisting of bliss is
6201 Brahman also. The objection that the Self consisting of bliss can only
6202 denote the secondary Self (the Sa/m/sarin), because it forms a link in a
6203 series of secondary Selves, beginning with the one consisting of food, is
6204 of no force, for the reason that the Self consisting of bliss is the
6205 innermost of all. The /S/astra, wishing to convey information about the
6206 primary Self, adapts itself to common notions, in so far as it at first
6207 refers to the body consisting of food, which, although not the Self, is
6208 by very obtuse people identified with it; it then proceeds from the body
6209 to another Self, which has the same shape with the preceding one, just

6210 as the statue possesses the form of the mould into which the molten
6211 brass had been poured; then, again, to another one, always at first
6212 representing the Non-Self as the Self, for the purpose of easier
6213 comprehension; and it finally teaches that the innermost Self[106],
6214 which consists of bliss, is the real Self. Just as when a man, desirous
6215 of pointing out the star Arundhati to another man, at first points to
6216 several stars which are not Arundhati as being Arundhati, while only the
6217 star pointed out in the end is the real Arundhati; so here also the Self
6218 consisting of bliss is the real Self on account of its being the
6219 innermost (i.e. the last). Nor can any weight be allowed to the
6220 objection that the attribution of joy and so on, as head, &c., cannot
6221 possibly refer to the real Self; for this attribution is due to the
6222 immediately preceding limiting condition (viz. the Self consisting of
6223 understanding, the so-called vij/n/anakosa), and does not really belong
6224 to the real Self. The possession of a bodily nature also is ascribed to
6225 the Self of bliss, only because it is represented as a link in the chain
6226 of bodies which begins with the Self consisting of food, and is not
6227 ascribed to it in the same direct sense in which it is predicated of the
6228 transmigrating Self. Hence the Self consisting of bliss is the highest
6229 Brahman.

6230
6231 13. If (it be objected that the term anandamaya, consisting of bliss,
6232 can) not (denote the highest Self) on account of its being a word
6233 denoting a modification (or product); (we declare the objection to be)
6234 not (valid) on account of abundance, (the idea of which may be expressed
6235 by the affix maya.)

6236
6237 Here the purvapakshin raises the objection that the word anandamaya
6238 (consisting of bliss) cannot denote the highest Self.--Why?--Because the
6239 word anandamaya is understood to denote something different from the
6240 original word (i.e. the word ananda without the derivative affix maya),
6241 viz. a modification; according to the received sense of the affix maya.
6242 'Anandamaya' therefore denotes a modification, just as annamaya
6243 (consisting of food) and similar words do.

6244
6245 This objection is, however, not valid, because 'maya' is also used in
6246 the sense of abundance, i.e. denotes that where there is abundance of
6247 what the original word expresses. So, for instance, the phrase 'the
6248 sacrifice is annamaya' means 'the sacrifice is abounding in food' (not
6249 'is some modification or product of food'). Thus here Brahman also, as
6250 abounding in bliss, is called anandamaya. That Brahman does abound in
6251 bliss follows from the passage (Taitt. Up. II, 8), where, after the
6252 bliss of each of the different classes of beings, beginning with man,
6253 has been declared to be a hundred times greater than the bliss of the
6254 immediately preceding class, the bliss of Brahman is finally proclaimed
6255 to be absolutely supreme. Maya therefore denotes abundance.

6256
6257 14. And because he is declared to be the cause of it, (i.e. of bliss;
6258 therefore maya is to be taken as denoting abundance.)

6259
6260 Maya must be understood to denote abundance, for that reason also that
6261 Scripture declares Brahman to be the cause of bliss, 'For he alone
6262 causes bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). For he who causes bliss must himself
6263 abound in bliss; just as we infer in ordinary life, that a man who
6264 enriches others must himself possess abundant wealth. As, therefore,
6265 maya may be taken to mean 'abundant,' the Self consisting of bliss is
6266 the highest Self.

6267
6268 15. Moreover (the anandamaya is Brahman because) the same (Brahman)
6269 which had been referred to in the mantra is sung, (i.e. proclaimed in
6270 the Brahma/n/a passage as the anandamaya.)

6271
6272 The Self, consisting of joy, is the highest Brahman for the following
6273 reason also[107]. On the introductory words 'he who knows Brahman
6274 attains the highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1), there follows a mantra
6275 proclaiming that Brahman, which forms the general topic of the chapter,
6276 possesses the qualities of true existence, intelligence, infinity; after
6277 that it is said that from Brahman there sprang at first the ether and
6278 then all other moving and non-moving things, and that, entering into the

6279 beings which it had emitted, Brahman stays in the recess, inmost of all;
6280 thereupon, for its better comprehension, the series of the different
6281 Selfs ('different from this is the inner Self,' &c.) are enumerated, and
6282 then finally the same Brahman which the mantra had proclaimed, is again
6283 proclaimed in the passage under discussion, 'different from this is the
6284 other inner Self, which consists of bliss.' To assume that a mantra and
6285 the Brahma/n/a passage belonging to it have the same sense is only
6286 proper, on account of the absence of contradiction (which results
6287 therefrom); for otherwise we should be driven to the unwelcome inference
6288 that the text drops the topic once started, and turns to an altogether
6289 new subject.

6290
6291 Nor is there mentioned a further inner Self different from the Self
6292 consisting of bliss, as in the case of the Self consisting of food,
6293 &c.[108] On the same (i.e. the Self consisting of bliss) is founded,
6294 'This same knowledge of Bh/ri/gu and Varu/n/a; he understood that bliss
6295 is Brahman' (Taïtt. Up. III, 6). Therefore the Self consisting of bliss
6296 is the highest Self.

6297
6298 16. (The Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self,) not the other
6299 (i.e. the individual Soul), on account of the impossibility (of the
6300 latter assumption).

6301
6302 And for the following reason also the Self consisting of bliss is the
6303 highest Self only, not the other, i.e. the one which is other than the
6304 Lord, i.e. the transmigrating individual soul. The personal soul cannot
6305 be denoted by the term 'the one consisting of bliss.' Why? On account of
6306 the impossibility. For Scripture says, with reference to the Self
6307 consisting of bliss, 'He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth. He
6308 brooded over himself. After he had thus brooded, he sent forth whatever
6309 there is.' Here, the desire arising before the origination of a body,
6310 &c., the non-separation of the effects created from the creator, and the
6311 creation of all effects whatever, cannot possibly belong to any Self
6312 different from the highest Self.

6313
6314 17. And on account of the declaration of the difference (of the two, the
6315 anandamaya cannot be the transmigrating soul).

6316
6317 The Self consisting of bliss cannot be identical with the transmigrating
6318 soul, for that reason also that in the section treating of the Self of
6319 bliss, the individual soul and the Self of bliss are distinctly
6320 represented as different; Taïtt. Up. II, 7, 'It (i.e. the Self
6321 consisting of bliss) is a flavour; for only after perceiving a flavour
6322 can this (soul) perceive bliss.' For he who perceives cannot be that
6323 which is perceived.--But, it may be asked, if he who perceives or
6324 attains cannot be that which is perceived or attained, how about the
6325 following /S/ruti- and Smr/ri/ti-passages, 'The Self is to be sought;'
6326 'Nothing higher is known than the attainment of the Self[109]?'--This
6327 objection, we reply, is legitimate (from the point of view of absolute
6328 truth). Yet we see that in ordinary life, the Self, which in reality is
6329 never anything but the Self, is, owing to non-comprehension of the
6330 truth, identified with the Non-Self, i.e. the body and so on; whereby it
6331 becomes possible to speak of the Self in so far as it is identified with
6332 the body, and so on, as something not searched for but to be searched
6333 for, not heard but to be heard, not seized but to be seized, not
6334 perceived but to be perceived, not known but to be known, and the like.
6335 Scripture, on the other hand, denies, in such passages as 'there is no
6336 other seer but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23), that there is in reality any
6337 seer or hearer different from the all-knowing highest Lord. (Nor can it
6338 be said that the Lord is unreal because he is identical with the unreal
6339 individual soul; for)[110] the Lord differs from the soul
6340 (vij/n/anatman) which is embodied, acts and enjoys, and is the product
6341 of Nescience, in the same way as the real juggler who stands on the
6342 ground differs from the illusive juggler, who, holding in his hand a
6343 shield and a sword, climbs up to the sky by means of a rope; or as the
6344 free unlimited ether differs from the ether of a jar, which is
6345 determined by its limiting adjunct, (viz. the jar.) With reference to
6346 this fictitious difference of the highest Self and the individual Self,
6347 the two last Sutras have been propounded.

6348
6349 18. And on account of desire (being mentioned as belonging to the
6350 anandamaya) no regard is to be had to what is inferred, (i.e. to the
6351 pradhana inferred by the Sa@nkhyas.)
6352

6353 Since in the passage 'he desired, may I be many, may I grow forth,'
6354 which occurs in the chapter treating of the anandamaya (Taitt. Up. II,
6355 6), the quality of feeling desire is mentioned, that which is inferred,
6356 i.e. the non-intelligent pradhana assumed by the Sa@nkhyas, cannot be
6357 regarded as being the Self consisting of bliss and the cause of the
6358 world. Although the opinion that the pradhana is the cause of the world,
6359 has already been refuted in the Sutra I, 1, 5, it is here, where a
6360 favourable opportunity presents itself, refuted for a second time on the
6361 basis of the scriptural passage about the cause of the world feeling
6362 desire, for the purpose of showing the uniformity of view (of all
6363 scriptural passages).
6364

6365 19. And, moreover, it (i.e. Scripture) teaches the joining of this (i.e.
6366 the individual soul) with that, (i.e. the Self consisting of bliss), on
6367 that (being fully known).
6368

6369 And for the following reason also the term, 'the Self consisting of
6370 bliss,' cannot denote either the pradhana or the individual soul.
6371 Scripture teaches that the individual soul when it has reached knowledge
6372 is joined, i.e. identified, with the Self of bliss under discussion,
6373 i.e. obtains final release. Compare the following passage (Taitt. Up.
6374 II, 7), 'When he finds freedom from fear, and rest in that which is
6375 invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he has obtained the
6376 fearless. For if he makes but the smallest distinction in it there is
6377 fear for him.' That means, if he sees in that Self consisting of bliss
6378 even a small difference in the form of non-identity, then he finds no
6379 release from the fear of transmigratory existence. But when he, by means
6380 of the cognition of absolute identity, finds absolute rest in the Self
6381 consisting of bliss, then he is freed from the fear of transmigratory
6382 existence. But this (finding absolute rest) is possible only when we
6383 understand by the Self consisting of bliss, the highest Self, and not
6384 either the pradhana or the individual soul. Hence it is proved that the
6385 Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self.
6386

6387 But, in reality, the following remarks have to be made concerning the
6388 true meaning of the word 'anandamaya[111].' On what grounds, we ask, can
6389 it be maintained that the affix 'maya' after having, in the series of
6390 compounds beginning with annamaya and ending with vij/n/anamaya, denoted
6391 mere modifications, should all at once, in the word anandamaya, which
6392 belongs to the same series, denote abundance, so that anandamaya would
6393 refer to Brahman? If it should be said that the assumption is made on
6394 account of the governing influence of the Brahman proclaimed in the
6395 mantra (which forms the beginning of the chapter, Taitt. Up. II), we
6396 reply that therefrom it would follow that also the Selfs consisting of
6397 food, breath, &c., denote Brahman (because the governing influence of
6398 the mantra extends to them also).--The advocate of the former
6399 interpretation will here, perhaps, restate an argument already made use
6400 of above, viz. as follows: To assume that the Selfs consisting of food,
6401 and so on, are not Brahman is quite proper, because after each of them
6402 an inner Self is mentioned. After the Self of bliss, on the other hand,
6403 no further inner Self is mentioned, and hence it must be considered to
6404 be Brahman itself; otherwise we should commit the mistake of dropping
6405 the subject-matter in hand (as which Brahman is pointed out by the
6406 mantra), and taking up a new topic.--But to this we reply that, although
6407 unlike the case of the Selfs consisting of food, &c., no inner Self is
6408 mentioned after the Self consisting of bliss, still the latter cannot be
6409 considered as Brahman, because with reference to the Self consisting of
6410 bliss Scripture declares, 'Joy is its head. Satisfaction is its right
6411 arm. Great satisfaction is its left arm. Bliss is its trunk. Brahman is
6412 its tail, its support.' Now, here the very same Brahman which, in the
6413 mantra, had been introduced as the subject of the discussion, is called
6414 the tail, the support; while the five involucra, extending from the
6415 involucrum of food up to the involucrum of bliss, are merely introduced
6416 for the purpose of setting forth the knowledge of Brahman. How, then,

6417 can it be maintained that our interpretation implies the needless
6418 dropping of the general subject-matter and the introduction of a new
6419 topic?--But, it may again be objected, Brahman is called the tail, i.e.
6420 a member of the Self consisting of bliss; analogously to those passages
6421 in which a tail and other members are ascribed to the Selfs consisting
6422 of food and so on. On what grounds, then, can we claim to know that
6423 Brahman (which is spoken of as a mere member, i.e. a subordinate matter)
6424 is in reality the chief matter referred to?--From the fact, we reply, of
6425 Brahman being the general subject-matter of the chapter.--But, it will
6426 again be said, that interpretation also according to which Brahman is
6427 cognised as a mere member of the anandamaya does not involve a dropping
6428 of the subject-matter, since the anandamaya himself is Brahman.--But, we
6429 reply, in that case one and the same Brahman would at first appear as
6430 the whole, viz. as the Self consisting of bliss, and thereupon as a mere
6431 part, viz. as the tail; which is absurd. And as one of the two
6432 alternatives must be preferred, it is certainly appropriate to refer to
6433 Brahman the clause 'Brahman is the tail' which contains the word
6434 'Brahman,' and not the sentence about the Self of Bliss in which Brahman
6435 is not mentioned. Moreover, Scripture, in continuation of the phrase,
6436 'Brahman is the tail, the support,' goes on, 'On this there is also the
6437 following /s/loka: He who knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes
6438 himself non-existing. He who knows Brahman as existing him we know
6439 himself as existing.' As this /s/loka, without any reference to the Self
6440 of bliss, states the advantage and disadvantage connected with the
6441 knowledge of the being and non-being of Brahman only, we conclude that
6442 the clause, 'Brahman is the tail, the support,' represents Brahman as
6443 the chief matter (not as a merely subordinate matter). About the being
6444 or non-being of the Self of bliss, on the other hand, a doubt is not
6445 well possible, since the Self of bliss distinguished by joy,
6446 satisfaction, &c., is well known to every one.--But if Brahman is the
6447 principal matter, how can it be designated as the mere tail of the Self
6448 of bliss ('Brahman is the tail, the support')?--Its being called so, we
6449 reply, forms no objection; for the word tail here denotes that which is
6450 of the nature of a tail, so that we have to understand that the bliss of
6451 Brahman is not a member (in its literal sense), but the support or
6452 abode, the one nest (resting-place) of all worldly bliss. Analogously
6453 another scriptural passage declares, 'All other creatures live on a
6454 small portion of that bliss' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 32). Further, if by the
6455 Self consisting of bliss we were to understand Brahman we should have to
6456 assume that the Brahman meant is the Brahman distinguished by qualities
6457 (savi/s/esha), because it is said to have joy and the like for its
6458 members. But this assumption is contradicted by a complementary passage
6459 (II, 9) which declares that Brahman is the object neither of mind nor
6460 speech, and so shows that the Brahman meant is the (absolute) Brahman
6461 (devoid of qualities), 'From whence all speech, with the mind, turns
6462 away unable to reach it, he who knows the bliss of that Brahman fears
6463 nothing.' Moreover, if we speak of something as 'abounding in
6464 bliss[112],' we thereby imply the co-existence of pain; for the word
6465 'abundance' in its ordinary sense implies the existence of a small
6466 measure of what is opposed to the thing whereof there is abundance. But
6467 the passage so understood would be in conflict with another passage (Ch.
6468 Up. VII, 24), 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else,
6469 understands nothing else, that is the Infinite;' which declares that in
6470 the Infinite, i.e. Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from it.
6471 Moreover, as joy, &c. differ in each individual body, the Self
6472 consisting of bliss also is a different one in each body. Brahman, on
6473 the other hand, does not differ according to bodies; for the mantra at
6474 the beginning of the chapter declares it to be true Being, knowledge,
6475 infinite, and another passage says, 'He is the one God, hidden in all
6476 beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings' (/S/v. Up. VI, 11).
6477 Nor, again, does Scripture exhibit a frequent repetition of the word
6478 'anandamaya;' for merely the radical part of the compound (i.e. the word
6479 ananda without the affix maya) is repeated in all the following
6480 passages; 'It is a flavour, for only after seizing flavour can any one
6481 seize bliss. Who could breathe, who could breathe forth, if that bliss
6482 existed not in the ether? For he alone causes blessedness;' 'Now this is
6483 an examination of bliss;' 'He who knows the bliss of that Brahman fears
6484 nothing;' 'He understood that bliss is Brahman.' If it were a settled
6485 matter that Brahman is denoted by the term, 'the Self consisting of

6486 bliss,' then we could assume that in the subsequent passages, where
6487 merely the word 'bliss' is employed, the term 'consisting of bliss' is
6488 meant to be repeated; but that the Self consisting of bliss is not
6489 Brahman, we have already proved by means of the reason of joy being its
6490 head, and so on. Hence, as in another scriptural passage, viz. 'Brahman
6491 is knowledge and bliss' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 28), the mere word 'bliss'
6492 denotes Brahman, we must conclude that also in such passages as, 'If
6493 that bliss existed not in the ether,' the word bliss is used with
6494 reference to Brahman, and is not meant to repeat the term 'consisting of
6495 bliss.' The repetition of the full compound, 'consisting of bliss,'
6496 which occurs in the passage, 'He reaches that Self consisting of bliss'
6497 (Taitt. Up. II, 8), does not refer to Brahman, as it is contained in the
6498 enumeration of Non-Selfs, comprising the Self of food, &c., all of which
6499 are mere effects, and all of which are represented as things to be
6500 reached.--But, it may be said, if the Self consisting of bliss, which is
6501 said to have to be reached, were not Brahman--just as the Self
6502 consisting of food, &c. are not Brahman--then it would not be declared
6503 (in the passage immediately following) that he who knows obtains for his
6504 reward Brahman.--This objection we invalidate by the remark that the
6505 text makes its declaration as to Brahman--which is the tail, the
6506 support--being reached by him who knows, by the very means of the
6507 declaration as to the attainment of the Self of bliss; as appears from
6508 the passage, 'On this there is also this /s/loka, from which all speech
6509 returns,' &c. With reference, again, to the passage, 'He desired: may I
6510 be many, may I grow forth,' which is found in proximity to the mention
6511 of the Self consisting of bliss, we remark that it is in reality
6512 connected (not with the Self of bliss but with) Brahman, which is
6513 mentioned in the still nearer passage, 'Brahman is the tail, the
6514 support,' and does therefore not intimate that the Self of bliss is
6515 Brahman. And, on account of its referring to the passage last quoted
6516 ('it desired,' &c.), the later passage also, 'That is flavour,' &c., has
6517 not the Self of bliss for its subject.--But, it may be objected, the
6518 (neuter word) Brahman cannot possibly be designated by a masculine word
6519 as you maintain is done in the passage, 'He desired,' &c.--In reply to
6520 this objection we point to the passage (Taitt. Up. II, 1), 'From that
6521 Self sprang ether,' where, likewise, the masculine word 'Self' can refer
6522 to Brahman only, since the latter is the general topic of the chapter.
6523 In the knowledge of Bh/ri/gu and Varu/n/a finally ('he knew that bliss
6524 is Brahman'), the word 'bliss' is rightly understood to denote Brahman,
6525 since we there meet neither with the affix 'maya,' nor with any
6526 statement as to joy being its head, and the like. To ascribe to Brahman
6527 in itself joy, and so on, as its members, is impossible, unless we have
6528 recourse to certain, however minute, distinctions qualifying Brahman;
6529 and that the whole chapter is not meant to convey a knowledge of the
6530 qualified (savi/s/esha) Brahman is proved by the passage (quoted above),
6531 which declares that Brahman transcends speech and mind. We therefore
6532 must conclude that the affix maya, in the word anandamaya, does not
6533 denote abundance, but expresses a mere effect, just as it does in the
6534 words annamaya and the subsequent similar compounds.

6535
6536 The Sutras are therefore to be explained as follows. There arises the
6537 question whether the passage, 'Brahman is the tail, the support,' is to
6538 be understood as intimating that Brahman is a mere member of the Self
6539 consisting of bliss, or that it is the principal matter. If it is said
6540 that it must be considered as a mere member, the reply is, 'The Self
6541 consisting of bliss on account of the repetition.' That means: Brahman,
6542 which in the passage 'the Self consisting of bliss,' &c., is spoken of
6543 as the tail, the support, is designated as the principal matter (not as
6544 something subordinate). On account of the repetition; for in the
6545 memorial /s/loka, 'he becomes himself non-existing,' Brahman alone is
6546 reiterated. 'If not, on account of the word denoting a modification; not
6547 so, on account of abundance.' In this Sutra the word 'modification' is
6548 meant to convey the sense of member. The objection that on account of
6549 the word 'tail,' which denotes a mere member, Brahman cannot be taken as
6550 the principal matter must be refuted. This we do by remarking that there
6551 is no difficulty, since a word denoting a member may be introduced into
6552 the passage on account of pra/k/urya[113]. Pra/k/urya here means a
6553 phraseology abounding in terms denoting members. After the different
6554 members, beginning with the head and ending with the tail, of the Selfs,

6555 consisting of food, &c. have been enumerated, there are also mentioned
6556 the head and the other limbs of the Self of bliss, and then it is added,
6557 'Brahman is the tail, the support;' the intention being merely to
6558 introduce some more terms denoting members, not to convey the meaning of
6559 'member,' (an explanation which is impossible) because the preceding
6560 Sutra already has proved Brahman (not to be a member, but) to be the
6561 principal matter. 'And because he is declared to be the cause of it.'
6562 That means: Brahman is declared to be the cause of the entire aggregate
6563 of effects, inclusive of the Self, consisting of bliss, in the following
6564 passage, 'He created all whatever there is' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). And as
6565 Brahman is the cause, it cannot at the same time be called the member,
6566 in the literal sense of the word, of the Self of bliss, which is nothing
6567 but one of Brahman's effects. The other Sutras also (which refer to the
6568 Self of bliss[114]) are to be considered, as well as they may, as
6569 conveying a knowledge of Brahman, which (Brahman) is referred to in the
6570 passage about the tail.

6571
6572 20. The one within (the sun and the eye) (is the highest Lord), on
6573 account of his qualities being declared[115].

6574
6575 The following passage is found in Scripture (Ch. Up. I, 6, 6 ff.), 'Now
6576 that person bright as gold who is seen within the sun, with beard bright
6577 as gold and hair bright as gold, bright as gold altogether to the very
6578 tips of his nails, whose eyes are like blue lotus; his name is Ut, for
6579 he has risen (udita) above all evil. He also who knows this rises above
6580 all evil. So much with reference to the devas.' And further on, with
6581 reference to the body, 'Now the person who is seen in the eye,' &c. Here
6582 the following doubt presents itself. Do these passages point out, as the
6583 object of devotion directed on the sphere of the sun and the eye, merely
6584 some special individual soul, which, by means of a large measure of
6585 knowledge and pious works, has raised itself to a position of eminence;
6586 or do they refer to the eternally perfect highest Lord?

6587
6588 The purvapakshin takes the former view. An individual soul, he says, is
6589 referred to, since Scripture speaks of a definite shape. To the person
6590 in the sun special features are ascribed, such as the possession of a
6591 beard as bright as gold and so on, and the same features manifestly
6592 belong to the person in the eye also, since they are expressly
6593 transferred to it in the passage, 'The shape of this person is the same
6594 as the shape of that person.' That, on the other hand, no shape can be
6595 ascribed to the highest Lord, follows from the passage (Kau. Up. I, 3,
6596 15), 'That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without
6597 decay.' That an individual soul is meant follows moreover from the fact
6598 that a definite abode is mentioned, 'He who is in the sun; he who is in
6599 the eye.' About the highest Lord, who has no special abode, but abides
6600 in his own glory, no similar statement can be made; compare, for
6601 instance, the two following passages, 'Where does he rest? In his own
6602 glory?' (Ch. Up. VII, 24, 1); and 'like the ether he is omnipresent,
6603 eternal.' A further argument for our view is supplied by the fact that
6604 the might (of the being in question) is said to be limited; for the
6605 passage, 'He is lord of the worlds beyond that, and of the wishes of the
6606 devas,' indicates the limitation of the might of the person in the sun;
6607 and the passage, 'He is lord of the worlds beneath that and of the
6608 wishes of men,' indicates the limitation of the might of the person in
6609 the eye. No limit, on the other hand, can be admitted of the might of
6610 the highest Lord, as appears from the passage (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 22),
6611 'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all
6612 things. He is a bank and a boundary so that these worlds may not be
6613 confounded;' which passage intimates that the Lord is free from all
6614 limiting distinctions. For all these reasons the person in the eye and
6615 the sun cannot be the highest Lord.

6616
6617 To this reasoning the Sutra replies, 'The one within, on account of his
6618 qualities being declared.' The person referred to in the passages
6619 concerning the person within the sun and the person within the eye is
6620 not a transmigrating being, but the highest Lord. Why? Because his
6621 qualities are declared. For the qualities of the highest Lord are
6622 indicated in the text as follows. At first the name of the person within
6623 the sun is mentioned--'his name is Ut'--and then this name is explained

6624 on the ground of that person being free from all evil, 'He has risen
6625 above all evil.' The same name thus explained is then transferred to the
6626 person in the eye, in the clause, 'the name of the one is the name of
6627 the other.' Now, entire freedom from sin is attributed in Scripture to
6628 the highest Self only; so, for instance (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1), 'The Self
6629 which is free from sin,' &c. Then, again, there is the passage, 'He is
6630 /Ri/k, he is Saman, Uktha, Yajus, Brahman,' which declares the person in
6631 the eye to be the Self of the /Ri/k, Saman, and so on; which is possible
6632 only if that person is the Lord who, as being the cause of all, is to be
6633 considered as the Self of all. Moreover, the text, after having stated
6634 in succession /Ri/k and Saman to have earth and fire for their Self with
6635 reference to the Devas, and, again, speech and breath with reference to
6636 the body, continues, '/Ri/k and Saman are his joints,' with reference to
6637 the Devas, and 'the joints of the one are the joints of the other,' with
6638 reference to the body. Now this statement also can be made only with
6639 regard to that which is the Self of all. Further, the passage,
6640 'Therefore all who sing to the Vina sing him, and from him also they
6641 obtain wealth,' shows that the being spoken of is the sole topic of all
6642 worldly songs; which again holds true of the highest Lord only. That
6643 absolute command over the objects of worldly desires (as displayed, for
6644 instance, in the bestowal of wealth) entitles us to infer that the Lord
6645 is meant, appears also from the following passage of the Bhagavad-gita
6646 (X, 41), 'Whatever being there is possessing power, glory, or strength,
6647 know it to be produced from a portion of my energy[116].' To the
6648 objection that the statements about bodily shape contained in the
6649 clauses, 'With a beard bright as gold,' &c., cannot refer to the highest
6650 Lord, we reply that the highest Lord also may, when he pleases, assume a
6651 bodily shape formed of Maya, in order to gratify thereby his devout
6652 worshippers. Thus Sm/ri/ti also says, 'That thou seest me, O Narada, is
6653 the Maya emitted by me; do not then look on me as endowed with the
6654 qualities of all beings.' We have further to note that expressions such
6655 as, 'That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without
6656 decay,' are made use of where instruction is given about the nature of
6657 the highest Lord in so far as he is devoid of all qualities; while
6658 passages such as the following one, 'He to whom belong all works, all
6659 desires, all sweet odours and tastes' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2), which
6660 represent the highest Lord as the object of devotion, speak of him, who
6661 is the cause of everything, as possessing some of the qualities of his
6662 effects. Analogously he may be spoken of, in the passage under
6663 discussion, as having a beard bright as gold and so on. With reference
6664 to the objection that the highest Lord cannot be meant because an abode
6665 is spoken of, we remark that, for the purposes of devout meditation, a
6666 special abode may be assigned to Brahman, although it abides in its own
6667 glory only; for as Brahman is, like ether, all-pervading, it may be
6668 viewed as being within the Self of all beings. The statement, finally,
6669 about the limitation of Brahman's might, which depends on the
6670 distinction of what belongs to the gods and what to the body, has
6671 likewise reference to devout meditation only. From all this it follows
6672 that the being which Scripture states to be within the eye and the sun
6673 is the highest Lord.

6674
6675 21. And there is another one (i.e. the Lord who is different from the
6676 individual souls animating the sun, &c.), on account of the declaration
6677 of distinction.

6678
6679 There is, moreover, one distinct from the individual souls which animate
6680 the sun and other bodies, viz. the Lord who rules within; whose
6681 distinction (from all individual souls) is proclaimed in the following
6682 scriptural passage, 'He who dwells in the sun and within the sun, whom
6683 the sun does not know, whose body the sun is, and who rules the sun
6684 within; he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal' (B/ri/. Up. III,
6685 7, 9). Here the expression, 'He within the sun whom the sun does not
6686 know,' clearly indicates that the Ruler within is distinct from that
6687 cognising individual soul whose body is the sun. With that Ruler within
6688 we have to identify the person within the sun, according to the tenet of
6689 the sameness of purport of all Vedanta-texts. It thus remains a settled
6690 conclusion that the passage under discussion conveys instruction about
6691 the highest Lord.

6692

6693 22. The aka/s/a, i.e. ether (is Brahman) on account of characteristic
6694 marks (of the latter being mentioned).
6695

6696 In the Chandogya (I, 9) the following passage is met with, 'What is the
6697 origin of this world?' 'Ether,' he replied. 'For all these beings take
6698 their rise from the ether only, and return into the ether. Ether is
6699 greater than these, ether is their rest.'--Here the following doubt
6700 arises. Does the word 'ether' denote the highest Brahman or the
6701 elemental ether?--Whence the doubt?--Because the word is seen to be used
6702 in both senses. Its use in the sense of 'elemental ether' is well
6703 established in ordinary as well as in Vedic speech; and, on the other
6704 hand, we see that it is sometimes used to denote Brahman, viz. in cases
6705 where we ascertain, either from some complementary sentence or from the
6706 fact of special qualities being mentioned, that Brahman is meant. So,
6707 for instance, Taitt. Up. II, 7, 'If that bliss existed not in the
6708 ether;' and Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 'That which is called ether is the
6709 revealer of all forms and names; that within which forms and names
6710 are[117] that is Brahman.' Hence the doubt.--Which sense is then to be
6711 adopted in our case?--The sense of elemental ether, the purvapakshin
6712 replies; because this sense belongs to the word more commonly, and
6713 therefore presents itself to the mind more readily. The word 'ether'
6714 cannot be taken in both senses equally, because that would involve a
6715 (faulty) attribution of several meanings to one and the same word. Hence
6716 the term 'ether' applies to Brahman in a secondary (metaphorical) sense
6717 only; on account of Brahman being in many of its attributes, such as all
6718 pervadingness and the like, similar to ether. The rule is, that when the
6719 primary sense of a word is possible, the word must not be taken in a
6720 secondary sense. And in the passage under discussion only the primary
6721 sense of the word 'ether' is admissible. Should it be objected that, if
6722 we refer the passage under discussion to the elemental ether, a
6723 complementary passage ('for all these beings take their rise from the
6724 ether only, &c.') cannot be satisfactorily accounted for; we reply that
6725 the elemental ether also may be represented as a cause, viz. of air,
6726 fire, &c. in due succession. For we read in Scripture (Taitt. Up. II,
6727 1), 'From that Self sprang ether, from ether air, from air fire, and so
6728 on.' The qualities also of being greater and of being a place of rest
6729 may be ascribed to the elemental ether, if we consider its relations to
6730 all other beings. Therefore we conclude that the word 'ether' here
6731 denotes the elemental ether.
6732

6733 To this we reply as follows:--The word ether must here be taken to
6734 denote Brahman, on account of characteristic marks of the latter being
6735 mentioned. For the sentence, 'All these beings take their rise from the
6736 ether only,' clearly indicates the highest Brahman, since all
6737 Vedanta-texts agree in definitely declaring that all beings spring from
6738 the highest Brahman.--But, the opponent may say, we have shown that the
6739 elemental ether also may be represented as the cause, viz. of air, fire,
6740 and the other elements in due succession.--We admit this. But still
6741 there remains the difficulty, that, unless we understand the word to
6742 apply to the fundamental cause of all, viz. Brahman, the affirmation
6743 contained in the word 'only' and the qualification expressed by the word
6744 'all' (in 'all beings') would be out of place. Moreover, the clause,
6745 'They return into the ether,' again points to Brahman, and so likewise
6746 the phrase, 'Ether is greater than these, ether is their rest;' for
6747 absolute superiority in point of greatness Scripture attributes to the
6748 highest Self only; cp. Ch. Up. III, 14, 3, 'Greater than the earth,
6749 greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than all these
6750 worlds.' The quality of being a place of rest likewise agrees best with
6751 the highest Brahman, on account of its being the highest cause. This is
6752 confirmed by the following scriptural passage: 'Knowledge and bliss is
6753 Brahman, it is the rest of him who gives gifts' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 28).
6754 Moreover, Jaivali finding fault with the doctrine of /S/alavatya, on
6755 account of (his saman) having an end (Ch. Up. I, 8, 8), and wishing to
6756 proclaim something that has no end chooses the ether, and then, having
6757 identified the ether with the Udgitha, concludes, 'He is the Udgitha
6758 greater than great; he is without end.' Now this endlessness is a
6759 characteristic mark of Brahman. To the remark that the sense of
6760 'elemental ether' presents itself to the mind more readily, because it
6761 is the better established sense of the word aka/s/a, we reply, that,

6762 although it may present itself to the mind first, yet it is not to be
6763 accepted, because we see that qualities of Brahman are mentioned in the
6764 complementary sentences. That the word aka/s/a is also used to denote
6765 Brahman has been shown already; cp. such passages as, 'Ether is the
6766 revealer of all names and forms.' We see, moreover, that various
6767 synonyma of aka/s/a are employed to denote Brahman. So, for instance,
6768 /Ri/k Sa/m/h. I, 164, 39, 'In which the Vedas are[118], in the
6769 Imperishable one (i.e. Brahman), the highest, the ether (vyoman), on
6770 which all gods have their seat.' And Taitt. Up. III, 6, 'This is the
6771 knowledge of Bh/ri/gu and Varu/n/a, founded on the highest ether
6772 (vyoman).' And again, 'Om, ka is Brahman, ether (kha) is Brahman' (Ch.
6773 Up. IV, 10, 5), and 'the old ether' (B/ri/. Up. V, 1)[119]. And other
6774 similar passages. On account of the force of the complementary passage
6775 we are justified in deciding that the word 'ether,' although occurring
6776 in the beginning of the passage, refers to Brahman. The case is
6777 analogous to that of the sentence, 'Agni (lit. the fire) studies a
6778 chapter,' where the word agni, although occurring in the beginning, is
6779 at once seen to denote a boy[120]. It is therefore settled that the word
6780 'ether' denotes Brahman.

6781
6782 23. For the same reason breath (is Brahman).
6783

6784 Concerning the udgitha it is said (Ch. Up. I, 10, 9), 'Prastot/ri/, that
6785 deity which belongs to the prastava, &c.,' and, further on (I, 11, 4;
6786 5), 'Which then is that deity? He said: Breath. For all these beings
6787 merge into breath alone, and from breath they arise. This is the deity
6788 belonging to the prastava.' With reference to this passage doubt and
6789 decision are to be considered as analogous to those stated under the
6790 preceding Sutra. For while in some passages--as, for instance, 'For
6791 indeed, my son, mind is fastened to pra/n/a,' Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2; and,
6792 'the pra/n/a of pra/n/a,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 18--the word 'breath' is
6793 seen to denote Brahman, its use in the sense of a certain modification
6794 of air is better established in common as well as in Vedic language.
6795 Hence there arises a doubt whether in the passage under discussion the
6796 word pra/n/a denotes Brahman or (ordinary) breath. In favour of which
6797 meaning have we then to decide?
6798

6799 Here the purvapakshin maintains that the word must be held to denote the
6800 fivefold vital breath, which is a peculiar modification of wind (or
6801 air); because, as has been remarked already, that sense of the word
6802 pra/n/a is the better established one.--But no, an objector will say,
6803 just as in the case of the preceding Sutra, so here also Brahman is
6804 meant, on account of characteristic marks being mentioned; for here also
6805 a complementary passage gives us to understand that all beings spring
6806 from and merge into pra/n/a; a process which can take place in connexion
6807 with the highest Lord only.--This objection, the purvapakshin replies,
6808 is futile, since we see that the beings enter into and proceed from the
6809 principal vital air also. For Scripture makes the following statement
6810 (Sat. Br. X, 3, 3, 6), 'When man sleeps, then into breath indeed speech
6811 merges, into breath the eye, into breath the ear, into breath the mind;
6812 when he awakes then they spring again from breath alone.' What the Veda
6813 here states is, moreover, a matter of observation, for during sleep,
6814 while the process of breathing goes on uninterruptedly, the activity of
6815 the sense organs is interrupted and again becomes manifest at the time
6816 of awaking only. And as the sense organs are the essence of all material
6817 beings, the complementary passage which speaks of the merging and
6818 emerging of the beings can be reconciled with the principal vital air
6819 also. Moreover, subsequently to pra/n/a being mentioned as the divinity
6820 of the prastava the sun and food are designated as the divinities of the
6821 udgitha and the pratibara. Now as they are not Brahman, the pra/n/a
6822 also, by parity of reasoning, cannot be Brahman.
6823

6824 To this argumentation the author of the Sutras replies: For the same
6825 reason pra/n/a--that means: on account of the presence of characteristic
6826 marks--which constituted the reason stated in the preceding Sutra--the
6827 word pra/n/a also must be held to denote Brahman. For Scripture says of
6828 pra/n/a also, that it is connected with marks characteristic of Brahman.
6829 The sentence, 'All these beings merge into breath alone, and from breath
6830 they arise,' which declares that the origination and retractation of all

6831 beings depend on pra/n/a, clearly shows pra/n/a to be Brahman. In reply
6832 to the assertion that the origination and retractation of all beings can
6833 be reconciled equally well with the assumption of pra/n/a denoting the
6834 chief vital air, because origination and retractation take place in the
6835 state of waking and of sleep also, we remark that in those two states
6836 only the senses are merged into, and emerge from, the chief vital air,
6837 while, according to the scriptural passage, 'For all these beings, &c.,'
6838 all beings whatever into which a living Self has entered, together with
6839 their senses and bodies, merge and emerge by turns. And even if the word
6840 'beings' were taken (not in the sense of animated beings, but) in the
6841 sense of material elements in general, there would be nothing in the way
6842 of interpreting the passage as referring to Brahman.--But, it may be
6843 said, that the senses together with their objects do, during sleep,
6844 enter into pra/n/a, and again issue from it at the time of waking, we
6845 distinctly learn from another scriptural passage, viz. Kau. Up. III, 3,
6846 'When a man being thus asleep sees no dream whatever, he becomes one
6847 with that pra/n/a alone. Then speech goes to him with all names,'
6848 &c.--True, we reply, but there also the word pra/n/a denotes (not the
6849 vital air) but Brahman, as we conclude from characteristic marks of
6850 Brahman being mentioned. The objection, again, that the word pra/n/a
6851 cannot denote Brahman because it occurs in proximity to the words 'food'
6852 and 'sun' (which do not refer to Brahman), is altogether baseless; for
6853 proximity is of no avail against the force of the complementary passage
6854 which intimates that pra/n/a is Brahman. That argument, finally, which
6855 rests on the fact that the word pra/n/a commonly denotes the vital air
6856 with its five modifications, is to be refuted in the same way as the
6857 parallel argument which the purvapakshin brought forward with reference
6858 to the word 'ether.' From all this it follows that the pra/n/a, which is
6859 the deity of the prastava, is Brahman.

6860
6861 Some (commentators)[121] quote under the present Sutra the following
6862 passages, 'the pra/n/a of pra/n/a' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 18), and 'for to
6863 pra/n/a mind is fastened' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2). But that is wrong since
6864 these two passages offer no opportunity for any discussion, the former
6865 on account of the separation of the words, the latter on account of the
6866 general topic. When we meet with a phrase such as 'the father of the
6867 father' we understand at once that the genitive denotes a father
6868 different from the father denoted by the nominative. Analogously we
6869 infer from the separation of words contained in the phrase, 'the breath
6870 of breath,' that the 'breath of breath' is different from the ordinary
6871 breath (denoted by the genitive 'of breath'). For one and the same thing
6872 cannot, by means of a genitive, be predicated of--and thus distinguished
6873 from--itself. Concerning the second passage we remark that, if the
6874 matter constituting the general topic of some chapter is referred to in
6875 that chapter under a different name, we yet conclude, from the general
6876 topic, that that special matter is meant. For instance, when we meet in
6877 the section which treats of the jyotish/t/oma sacrifice with the
6878 passage, 'in every spring he is to offer the jyotis sacrifice,' we at
6879 once understand that the word denotes the jyotish/t/oma. If we therefore
6880 meet with the clause 'to pra/n/a mind is fastened' in a section of which
6881 the highest Brahman is the topic, we do not for a moment suppose that
6882 the word pra/n/a should there denote the ordinary breath which is a mere
6883 modification of air. The two passages thus do not offer any matter for
6884 discussion, and hence do not furnish appropriate instances for the
6885 Sutra. We have shown, on the other hand, that the passage about the
6886 pra/n/a, which is the deity of the prastava, allows room for doubt,
6887 purvapaksha and final decision.

6888
6889 24. The 'light' (is Brahman), on account of the mention of feet (in a
6890 passage which is connected with the passage about the light).

6891
6892 Scripture says (Ch. Up. III, 13, 7), 'Now that light which shines above
6893 this heaven, higher than all, higher than everything, in the highest
6894 worlds beyond which there are no other worlds that is the same light
6895 which is within man.' Here the doubt presents itself whether the word
6896 'light' denotes the light of the sun and the like, or the highest Self.
6897 Under the preceding Sutras we had shown that some words which ordinarily
6898 have different meanings yet in certain passages denote Brahman, since
6899 characteristic marks of the latter are mentioned. Here the question has

6900 to be discussed whether, in connexion with the passage quoted,
6901 characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned or not.
6902

6903 The purvapakshin maintains that the word 'light' denotes nothing else
6904 but the light of the sun and the like, since that is the ordinary
6905 well-established meaning of the term. The common use of language, he
6906 says, teaches us that the two words 'light' and 'darkness' denote
6907 mutually opposite things, darkness being the term for whatever
6908 interferes with the function of the sense of sight, as, for instance,
6909 the gloom of the night, while sunshine and whatever else favours the
6910 action of the eye is called light. The word 'shines' also, which the
6911 text exhibits, is known ordinarily to refer to the sun and similar
6912 sources of light; while of Brahman, which is devoid of colour, it cannot
6913 be said, in the primary sense of the word, that it 'shines.' Further,
6914 the word jyotis must here denote light because it is said to be bounded
6915 by the sky ('that light which shines above this heaven'). For while it
6916 is impossible to consider the sky as being the boundary of Brahman,
6917 which is the Self of all and the source of all things movable or
6918 immovable, the sky may be looked upon as forming the boundary of light,
6919 which is a mere product and as such limited; accordingly the text says,
6920 'the light beyond heaven.'--But light, although a mere product, is
6921 perceived everywhere; it would therefore be wrong to declare that it is
6922 bounded by the sky!--Well, then, the purvapakshin replies, let us assume
6923 that the light meant is the first-born (original) light which has not
6924 yet become tripartite[122]. This explanation again cannot be admitted,
6925 because the non-tripartite light does not serve any purpose.--But, the
6926 purvapakshin resumes, Why should its purpose not be found therein that
6927 it is the object of devout meditation?--That cannot be, we reply; for we
6928 see that only such things are represented as objects of devotion as have
6929 some other independent use of their own; so, for instance, the sun
6930 (which dispels darkness and so on). Moreover the scriptural passage,
6931 'Let me make each of these three (fire, water, and earth) tripartite,'
6932 does not indicate any difference[123]. And even of the non-tripartite
6933 light it is not known that the sky constitutes its boundary.--Well, then
6934 (the purvapakshin resumes, dropping the idea of the non-tripartite
6935 light), let us assume that the light of which the text speaks is the
6936 tripartite (ordinary) light. The objection that light is seen to exist
6937 also beneath the sky, viz. in the form of fire and the like, we
6938 invalidate by the remark that there is nothing contrary to reason in
6939 assigning a special locality to fire, although the latter is observed
6940 everywhere; while to assume a special place for Brahman, to which the
6941 idea of place does not apply at all, would be most unsuitable. Moreover,
6942 the clause 'higher than everything, in the highest worlds beyond which
6943 there are no other worlds,' which indicates a multiplicity of abodes,
6944 agrees much better with light, which is a mere product (than with
6945 Brahman). There is moreover that other clause, also, 'That is the same
6946 light which is within man,' in which the highest light is identified
6947 with the gastric fire (the fire within man). Now such identifications
6948 can be made only where there is a certain similarity of nature; as is
6949 seen, for instance, in the passage, 'Of that person Bhu/h/ is the head,
6950 for the head is one and that syllable is one' (B/ri/. Up. V, 5, 3). But
6951 that the fire within the human body is not Brahman clearly appears from
6952 the passage, 'Of this we have visible and audible proof' (Ch. Up. III,
6953 13, 7; 8), which declares that the fire is characterised by the noise it
6954 makes, and by heat; and likewise from the following passage, 'Let a man
6955 meditate on this as that which is seen and heard.' The same conclusion
6956 may be drawn from the passage, 'He who knows this becomes conspicuous
6957 and celebrated,' which proclaims an inconsiderable reward only, while to
6958 the devout meditation on Brahman a high reward would have to be
6959 allotted. Nor is there mentioned in the entire passage about the light
6960 any other characteristic mark of Brahman, while such marks are set forth
6961 in the passages (discussed above) which refer to pra/n/a and the ether.
6962 Nor, again, is Brahman indicated in the preceding section, 'the Gayatri
6963 is everything whatsoever exists,' &c. (III, 12); for that passage makes
6964 a statement about the Gayatri metre only. And even if that section did
6965 refer to Brahman, still Brahman would not be recognised in the passage
6966 at present under discussion; for there (in the section referred to) it
6967 is declared in the clause, 'Three feet of it are the Immortal in
6968 heaven'--that heaven constitutes the abode; while in our passage the

6969 words 'the light above heaven' declare heaven to be a boundary. For all
6970 these reasons the word jyotis is here to be taken in its ordinary
6971 meaning, viz. light.
6972
6973 To this we make the following reply. The word jyotis must be held to
6974 denote Brahman. Why? On account of the feet (quarters) being mentioned.
6975 In a preceding passage Brahman had been spoken of as having four feet
6976 (quarters). 'Such is the greatness of it; greater than it is the Person
6977 (purusha). One foot of it are all the beings, three feet of it are the
6978 Immortal in heaven.' That which in this passage is said to constitute
6979 the three-quarter part, immortal and connected with heaven, of Brahman,
6980 which altogether comprises four quarters; this very same entity we
6981 recognise as again referred to in the passage under discussion, because
6982 there also it is said to be connected with heaven. If therefore we
6983 should set it aside in our interpretation of the passage and assume the
6984 latter to refer to the ordinary light, we should commit the mistake of
6985 dropping, without need, the topic started and introducing a new subject.
6986 Brahman, in fact, continues to form the subject-matter, not only of the
6987 passage about the light, but likewise of the subsequent section, the
6988 so-called Sa/nd/ilya-vidya (Ch. Up. III, 14). Hence we conclude that in
6989 our passage the word 'light' must be held to denote Brahman. The
6990 objection (raised above) that from common use the words 'light' and 'to
6991 shine' are known to denote effected (physical) light is without force;
6992 for as it is known from the general topic of the chapter that Brahman is
6993 meant, those two words do not necessarily denote physical light only to
6994 the exclusion of Brahman[124], but may also denote Brahman itself, in so
6995 far as it is characterised by the physical shining light which is its
6996 effect. Analogously another mantra declares, 'that by which the sun
6997 shines kindled with heat' (Taitt. Br. III, 12, 9, 7). Or else we may
6998 suppose that the word jyotis here does not denote at all that light on
6999 which the function of the eye depends. For we see that in other passages
7000 it has altogether different meanings; so, for instance, B/ri/. Up. IV,
7001 3, 5, 'With speech only as light man sits,' and Taitt. Sa. I, 6, 3, 3,
7002 'May the mind, the light, accept,' &c. It thus appears that whatever
7003 illuminates (in the different senses of the word) something else may be
7004 spoken of as 'light.' Hence to Brahman also, whose nature is
7005 intelligence, the term 'light' may be applied; for it gives light to the
7006 entire world. Similarly, other scriptural passages say, 'Him the shining
7007 one, everything shines after; by his light all this is lighted' (Kau.
7008 Up. II, 5, 15); and 'Him the gods worship as the light of lights, as the
7009 immortal' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 16). Against the further objection that the
7010 omnipresent Brahman cannot be viewed as bounded by heaven we remark that
7011 the assignment, to Brahman, of a special locality is not contrary to
7012 reason because it subserves the purpose of devout meditation. Nor does
7013 it avail anything to say that it is impossible to assign any place to
7014 Brahman because Brahman is out of connexion with all place. For it is
7015 possible to make such an assumption, because Brahman is connected with
7016 certain limiting adjuncts. Accordingly Scripture speaks of different
7017 kinds of devout meditation on Brahman as specially connected with
7018 certain localities, such as the sun, the eye, the heart. For the same
7019 reason it is also possible to attribute to Brahman a multiplicity of
7020 abodes, as is done in the clause (quoted above) 'higher than all.' The
7021 further objection that the light beyond heaven is the mere physical
7022 light because it is identified with the gastric fire, which itself is a
7023 mere effect and is inferred from perceptible marks such as the heat of
7024 the body and a certain sound, is equally devoid of force; for the
7025 gastric fire may be viewed as the outward appearance (or symbol) of
7026 Brahman, just as Brahman's name is a mere outward symbol. Similarly in
7027 the passage, 'Let a man meditate on it (the gastric light) as seen and
7028 heard,' the visibility and audibility (here implicitly ascribed to
7029 Brahman) must be considered as rendered possible through the gastric
7030 fire being the outward appearance of Brahman. Nor is there any force in
7031 the objection that Brahman cannot be meant because the text mentions an
7032 inconsiderable reward only; for there is no reason compelling us to have
7033 recourse to Brahman for the purpose of such and such a reward only, and
7034 not for the purpose of such and such another reward. Wherever the text
7035 represents the highest Brahman--which is free from all connexion with
7036 distinguishing attributes--as the universal Self, it is understood that
7037 the result of that instruction is one only, viz. final release.

7038 Wherever, on the other hand, Brahman is taught to be connected with
7039 distinguishing attributes or outward symbols, there, we see, all the
7040 various rewards which this world can offer are spoken of; cp. for
7041 instance, B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 24, 'This is he who eats all food, the giver
7042 of wealth. He who knows this obtains wealth.' Although in the passage
7043 itself which treats of the light no characteristic mark of Brahman is
7044 mentioned, yet, as the Sutra intimates, the mark stated in a preceding
7045 passage (viz. the mantra, 'Such is the greatness of it,' &c.) has to be
7046 taken in connexion with the passage about the light as well. The
7047 question how the mere circumstance of Brahman being mentioned in a not
7048 distant passage can have the power of divorcing from its natural object
7049 and transferring to another object the direct statement about light
7050 implied in the word 'light,' may be answered without difficulty. The
7051 passage under discussion runs[125], 'which above this heaven, the
7052 light.' The relative pronoun with which this clause begins intimates,
7053 according to its grammatical force[126], the same Brahman which was
7054 mentioned in the previous passage, and which is here recognised (as
7055 being the same which was mentioned before) through its connexion with
7056 heaven; hence the word jyotis also--which stands in grammatical
7057 co-ordination to 'which'--must have Brahman for its object. From all
7058 this it follows that the word 'light' here denotes Brahman.

7059
7060 25. If it be objected that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the
7061 metre being denoted; (we reply) not so, because thus (i.e. by means of
7062 the metre) the direction of the mind (on Brahman) is declared; for thus
7063 it is seen (in other passages also).

7064
7065 We now address ourselves to the refutation of the assertion (made in the
7066 purvapaksha of the preceding Sutra) that in the previous passage also
7067 Brahman is not referred to, because in the sentence, 'Gayatri is
7068 everything whatsoever here exists,' the metre called Gayatri is spoken
7069 of.--How (we ask the purvapakshin) can it be maintained that, on account
7070 of the metre being spoken of, Brahman is not denoted, while yet the
7071 mantra 'such is the greatness of it,' &c., clearly sets forth Brahman
7072 with its four quarters?--You are mistaken (the purvapakshin replies).
7073 The sentence, 'Gayatri is everything,' starts the discussion of Gayatri.
7074 The same Gayatri is thereupon described under the various forms of all
7075 beings, earth, body, heart, speech, breath; to which there refers also
7076 the verse, 'that Gayatri has four feet and is sixfold.' After that we
7077 meet with the mantra, 'Such is the greatness of it.' &c. How then, we
7078 ask, should this mantra, which evidently is quoted with reference to the
7079 Gayatri (metre) as described in the preceding clauses, all at once
7080 denote Brahman with its four quarters? Since therefore the metre Gayatri
7081 is the subject-matter of the entire chapter, the term 'Brahman' which
7082 occurs in a subsequent passage ('the Brahman which has thus been
7083 described') must also denote the metre. This is analogous to a previous
7084 passage (Ch. Up. III, 11, 3, 'He who thus knows this Brahma-upanishad'),
7085 where the word Brahma-upanishad is explained to mean Veda-upanishad. As
7086 therefore the preceding passage refers (not to Brahman, but) to the
7087 Gayatri metre, Brahman does not constitute the topic of the entire
7088 section.

7089
7090 This argumentation, we reply, proves nothing against our position.
7091 'Because thus direction of the mind is declared,' i.e. because the
7092 Brahma/n/a passage, 'Gayatri indeed is all this,' intimates that by
7093 means of the metre Gayatri the mind is to be directed on Brahman which
7094 is connected with that metre. Of the metre Gayatri, which is nothing but
7095 a certain special combination of syllables, it could not possibly be
7096 said that it is the Self of everything. We therefore have to understand
7097 the passage as declaring that Brahman, which, as the cause of the world,
7098 is connected with that product also whose name is Gayatri, is 'all
7099 this;' in accordance with that other passage which directly says, 'All
7100 this indeed is Brahman' (Kh. Up. III, 14, 1). That the effect is in
7101 reality not different from the cause, we shall prove later on, under
7102 Sutra II, 1, 14. Devout meditation on Brahman under the form of certain
7103 effects (of Brahman) is seen to be mentioned in other passages also, so,
7104 for instance, Ait. Ar. III, 2, 3, 12, 'For the Bahv/rik/as consider him
7105 in the great hymn, the Adhvaryus in the sacrificial fire, the Chandogas
7106 in the Mahavrata ceremony.' Although, therefore, the previous passage

7107 speaks of the metre, Brahman is what is meant, and the same Brahman is
7108 again referred to in the passage about the light, whose purport it is to
7109 enjoin another form of devout meditation.

7110
7111 Another commentator[127] is of opinion that the term Gayatri (does not
7112 denote Brahman in so far as viewed under the form of Gayatri, but)
7113 directly denotes Brahman, on account of the equality of number; for just
7114 as the Gayatri metre has four feet consisting of six syllables each, so
7115 Brahman also has four feet, (i.e. quarters.) Similarly we see that in
7116 other passages also the names of metres are used to denote other things
7117 which resemble those metres in certain numerical relations; cp. for
7118 instance, Ch. Up. IV, 3, 8, where it is said at first, 'Now these five
7119 and the other five make ten and that is the K/ri/ta,' and after that
7120 'these are again the Viraj which eats the food.' If we adopt this
7121 interpretation, Brahman only is spoken of, and the metre is not referred
7122 to at all. In any case Brahman is the subject with which the previous
7123 passage is concerned.

7124
7125 26. And thus also (we must conclude, viz. that Brahman is the subject of
7126 the previous passage), because (thus only) the declaration as to the
7127 beings, &c. being the feet is possible.

7128
7129 That the previous passage has Brahman for its topic, we must assume for
7130 that reason also that the text designates the beings and so on as the
7131 feet of Gayatri. For the text at first speaks of the beings, the earth,
7132 the body, and the heart[128], and then goes on 'that Gayatri has four
7133 feet and is sixfold.' For of the mere metre, without any reference to
7134 Brahman, it would be impossible to say that the beings and so on are its
7135 feet. Moreover, if Brahman were not meant, there would be no room for
7136 the verse, 'Such is the greatness,' &c. For that verse clearly describes
7137 Brahman in its own nature; otherwise it would be impossible to represent
7138 the Gayatri as the Self of everything as is done in the words, 'One foot
7139 of it are all the beings; three feet of it are what is immortal in
7140 heaven.' The purusha-sukta also (/Ri/k Sa/m/h. X, 90) exhibits the verse
7141 with sole reference to Brahman. Sm/ri/ti likewise ascribes to Brahman a
7142 like nature, 'I stand supporting all this world by a single portion of
7143 myself' (Bha. Gita X, 42). Our interpretation moreover enables us to
7144 take the passage, 'that Brahman indeed which,' &c. (III, 12, 7), in its
7145 primary sense, (i.e. to understand the word Brahman to denote nothing
7146 but Brahman.) And, moreover, the passage, 'these are the five men of
7147 Brahman' (III, 13, 6), is appropriate only if the former passage about
7148 the Gayatri is taken as referring to Brahman (for otherwise the
7149 'Brahman' in 'men of Brahman' would not be connected with the previous
7150 topic). Hence Brahman is to be considered as the subject-matter of the
7151 previous passage also. And the decision that the same Brahman is
7152 referred to in the passage about the light where it is recognised (to be
7153 the same) from its connexion with heaven, remains unshaken.

7154
7155 27. The objection that (the Brahman of the former passage cannot be
7156 recognised in the latter) on account of the difference of designation,
7157 is not valid because in either (designation) there is nothing contrary
7158 (to the recognition).

7159
7160 The objection that in the former passage ('three feet of it are what is
7161 immortal in heaven'), heaven is designated as the abode, while in the
7162 latter passage ('that light which shines above this heaven'), heaven is
7163 designated as the boundary, and that, on account of this difference of
7164 designation, the subject-matter of the former passage cannot be
7165 recognised in the latter, must likewise be refuted. This we do by
7166 remarking that in either designation nothing is contrary to the
7167 recognition. Just as in ordinary language a falcon, although in contact
7168 with the top of a tree, is not only said to be on the tree but also
7169 above the tree, so Brahman also, although being in heaven, is here
7170 referred to as being beyond heaven as well.

7171
7172 Another (commentator) explains: just as in ordinary language a falcon,
7173 although not in contact with the top of a tree, is not only said to be
7174 above the top of the tree but also on the top of the tree, so Brahman
7175 also, which is in reality beyond heaven, is (in the former of the two

7176 passages) said to be in heaven. Therefore the Brahman spoken of in the
7177 former passage can be recognised in the latter also, and it remains
7178 therefore a settled conclusion that the word 'light' denotes Brahman.
7179

7180 28. Pra/n/a (breath) is Brahman, that being understood from a connected
7181 consideration (of the passages referring to pra/n/a).
7182

7183 In the Kaushitaki-brahma/n/a-upanishad there is recorded a legend of
7184 Indra and Pratardana which begins with the words, 'Pratardana, forsooth,
7185 the son of Divodasa came by means of fighting and strength to the
7186 beloved abode of Indra' (Kau. Up. III, 1). In this legend we read: 'He
7187 said: I am pra/n/a, the intelligent Self (praj/n/atman), meditate on me
7188 as Life, as Immortality' (III, 2). And later on (III, 3), 'Pra/n/a
7189 alone, the intelligent Self, having laid hold of this body, makes it
7190 rise up.' Then, again (III, 8), 'Let no man try to find out what speech
7191 is, let him know the speaker.' And in the end (III, 8), 'That breath
7192 indeed is the intelligent Self, bliss, imperishable, immortal.'--Here
7193 the doubt presents itself whether the word pra/n/a denotes merely
7194 breath, the modification of air, or the Self of some divinity, or the
7195 individual soul, or the highest Brahman.--But, it will be said at the
7196 outset, the Sutra I, 1, 21 already has shown that the word pra/n/a
7197 refers to Brahman, and as here also we meet with characteristic marks of
7198 Brahman, viz. the words 'bliss, imperishable, immortal,' what reason is
7199 there for again raising the same doubt?--We reply: Because there are
7200 observed here characteristic marks of different kinds. For in the legend
7201 we meet not only with marks indicating Brahman, but also with marks
7202 pointing to other beings Thus Indra's words, 'Know me only' (III, 1)
7203 point to the Self of a divinity; the words, 'Having laid hold of this
7204 body it makes it rise up,' point to the breath; the words, 'Let no man
7205 try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,' point to the
7206 individual soul. There is thus room for doubt.
7207

7208 If, now, the purvapakshin maintains that the term pra/n/a here denotes
7209 the well-known modification of air, i.e. breath, we, on our side, assert
7210 that the word pra/n/a must be understood to denote Brahman.--For what
7211 reason?--On account of such being the consecutive meaning of the
7212 passages. For if we examine the connexion of the entire section which
7213 treats of the pra/n/a, we observe that all the single passages can be
7214 construed into a whole only if they are viewed as referring to Brahman.
7215 At the beginning of the legend Pratardana, having been allowed by Indra
7216 to choose a boon, mentions the highest good of man, which he selects for
7217 his boon, in the following words, 'Do you yourself choose that boon for
7218 me which you deem most beneficial for a man.' Now, as later on pra/n/a
7219 is declared to be what is most beneficial for man, what should pra/n/a
7220 denote but the highest Self? For apart from the cognition of that Self a
7221 man cannot possibly attain what is most beneficial for him, as many
7222 scriptural passages declare. Compare, for instance, /S/ve. Up. III, 8,
7223 'A man who knows him passes over death; there is no other path to go.'
7224 Again, the further passage, 'He who knows me thus by no deed of his is
7225 his life harmed, not by theft, not by bhru/n/ahatya' (III, 1), has a
7226 meaning only if Brahman is supposed to be the object of knowledge. For,
7227 that subsequently to the cognition of Brahman all works and their
7228 effects entirely cease, is well known from scriptural passages, such as
7229 the following, 'All works perish when he has been beheld who is the
7230 higher and the lower' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). Moreover, pra/n/a can be
7231 identified with the intelligent Self only if it is Brahman. For the air
7232 which is non-intelligent can clearly not be the intelligent Self. Those
7233 characteristic marks, again, which are mentioned in the concluding
7234 passage (viz. those intimated by the words 'bliss,' 'imperishable,'
7235 'immortal') can, if taken in their full sense, not be reconciled with
7236 any being except Brahman. There are, moreover, the following passages,
7237 'He does not increase by a good action, nor decrease by a bad action.
7238 For he makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good
7239 deed; and the same makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these
7240 worlds do a bad deed;' and, 'He is the guardian of the world, he is the
7241 king of the world, he is the Lord of the world' (Kau. Up. III, 8). All
7242 this can be properly understood only if the highest Brahman is
7243 acknowledged to be the subject-matter of the whole chapter, not if the
7244 vital air is substituted in its place. Hence the word pra/n/a denotes

7245 Brahman.

7246
7247 29. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the
7248 speaker denoting himself; (we reply that this objection is not valid)
7249 because there is in that (chapter) a multitude of references to the
7250 interior Self.

7251
7252 An objection is raised against the assertion that pra/n/a denotes
7253 Brahman. The word pra/n/a, it is said, does not denote the highest
7254 Brahman, because the speaker designates himself. The speaker, who is a
7255 certain powerful god called Indra, at first says, in order to reveal
7256 himself to Pratardana, 'Know me only,' and later on, 'I am pra/n/a, the
7257 intelligent Self.' How, it is asked, can the pra/n/a, which this latter
7258 passage, expressive of personality as it is, represents as the Self of
7259 the speaker, be Brahman to which, as we know from Scripture, the
7260 attribute of being a speaker cannot be ascribed; compare, for instance,
7261 B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8, 'It is without speech, without mind.' Further on,
7262 also, the speaker, i.e. Indra, glorifies himself by enumerating a number
7263 of attributes, all of which depend on personal existence and can in no
7264 way belong to Brahman, 'I slew the three-headed son of Tvash/tri/; I
7265 delivered the Arunmukhas, the devotees, to the wolves,' and so on. Indra
7266 may be called pra/n/a on account of his strength. Scripture says,
7267 'Strength indeed is pra/n/a,' and Indra is known as the god of strength;
7268 and of any deed of strength people say, 'It is Indra's work.' The
7269 personal Self of a deity may, moreover, be called an intelligent Self;
7270 for the gods, people say, possess unobstructed knowledge. It thus being
7271 a settled matter that some passages convey information about the
7272 personal Self of some deity, the other passages also--as, for instance,
7273 the one about what is most beneficial for man--must be interpreted as
7274 well as they may with reference to the same deity. Hence pra/n/a does
7275 not denote Brahman.

7276
7277 This objection we refute by the remark that in that chapter there are
7278 found a multitude of references to the interior Self. For the passage,
7279 'As long as pra/n/a dwells in this body so long surely there is life,'
7280 declares that that pra/n/a only which is the intelligent interior
7281 Self--and not some particular outward deity--has power to bestow and to
7282 take back life. And where the text speaks of the eminence of the
7283 pra/n/as as founded on the existence of the pra/n/a, it shows that that
7284 pra/n/a is meant which has reference to the Self and is the abode of the
7285 sense-organs.[129]

7286
7287 Of the same tendency is the passage, 'Pra/n/a, the intelligent Self,
7288 alone having laid hold of this body makes it rise up;' and the passage
7289 (which occurs in the passus, 'Let no man try to find out what speech
7290 is,' &c.), 'For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the
7291 spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the
7292 subjects (the senses) and the subjects on the pra/n/a. And that pra/n/a
7293 indeed is the Self of pra/n/a, blessed, imperishable, immortal.' So also
7294 the following passage which, referring to this interior Self, forming as
7295 it were the centre of the peripheral interaction of the objects and
7296 senses, sums up as follows, 'He is my Self, thus let it be known;' a
7297 summing up which is appropriate only if pra/n/a is meant to denote not
7298 some outward existence, but the interior Self. And another scriptural
7299 passage declares 'this Self is Brahman, omniscient'[130] (B/ri/. Up. II,
7300 5, 19). We therefore arrive at the conclusion that, on account of the
7301 multitude of references to the interior Self, the chapter contains
7302 information regarding Brahman, not regarding the Self of some
7303 deity.--How then can the circumstance of the speaker (Indra) referring
7304 to himself be explained?

7305
7306 30. The declaration (made by Indra about himself, viz. that he is one
7307 with Brahman) (is possible) through intuition vouched for by Scripture,
7308 as in the case of Vamadeva.

7309
7310 The individual divine Self called Indra perceiving by means of
7311 /ri/shi-like intuition[131]--the existence of which is vouched for by
7312 Scripture--its own Self to be identical with the supreme Self, instructs
7313 Pratardana (about the highest Self) by means of the words 'Know me

7314 only.'

7315

7316 By intuition of the same kind the /ri/shi Vamadeva reached the knowledge
7317 expressed in the words, 'I was Manu and Surya;' in accordance with the
7318 passage, 'Whatever deva was awakened (so as to know Brahman) he indeed
7319 became that' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10). The assertion made above (in the
7320 purvapaksha of the preceding Sutra) that Indra after saying, 'Know me
7321 only,' glorifies himself by enumerating the slaying of Tvash/tri/'s son
7322 and other deeds of strength, we refute as follows. The death of
7323 Tvash/tri/'s son and similar deeds are referred to, not to the end of
7324 glorifying Indra as the object of knowledge--in which case the sense of
7325 the passage would be, 'Because I accomplished such and such deeds,
7326 therefore know me'--but to the end of glorifying the cognition of the
7327 highest Self. For this reason the text, after having referred to the
7328 slaying of Tvash/tri/'s son and the like, goes on in the clause next
7329 following to exalt knowledge, 'And not one hair of me is harmed there.
7330 He who knows me thus by no deed of his is his life harmed.'--(But how
7331 does this passage convey praise of knowledge?)--Because, we reply, its
7332 meaning is as follows: 'Although I do such cruel deeds, yet not even a
7333 hair of mine is harmed because I am one with Brahman; therefore the life
7334 of any other person also who knows me thus is not harmed by any deed of
7335 his.' And the object of the knowledge (praised by Indra) is nothing else
7336 but Brahman which is set forth in a subsequent passage, 'I am pra/n/a,
7337 the intelligent Self.' Therefore the entire chapter refers to Brahman.

7338

7339 31. If it be said (that Brahman is) not (meant), on account of
7340 characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air
7341 (being mentioned); we say no, on account of the threefoldness of devout
7342 meditation (which would result from your interpretation); on account of
7343 (the meaning advocated by us) being accepted (elsewhere); and on account
7344 of (characteristic marks of Brahman) being connected (with the passage
7345 under discussion).

7346

7347 Although we admit, the purvapakshin resumes, that the chapter about the
7348 pra/n/a does not furnish any instruction regarding some outward deity,
7349 since it contains a multitude of references to the interior Self; still
7350 we deny that it is concerned with Brahman.--For what reason?--Because it
7351 mentions characteristic marks of the individual soul on the one hand,
7352 and of the chief vital air on the other hand. The passage, 'Let no man
7353 try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,' mentions a
7354 characteristic mark of the individual soul, and must therefore be held
7355 to point out as the object of knowledge the individual soul which rules
7356 and employs the different organs of action such as speech and so on. On
7357 the other hand, we have the passage, 'But pra/n/a alone, the intelligent
7358 Self, having laid hold of this body makes it rise up,' which points to
7359 the chief vital air; for the chief attribute of the vital air is that it
7360 sustains the body. Similarly, we read in the colloquy of the vital airs
7361 (Pra. Up. II, 3), concerning speech and the other vital airs, 'Then
7362 pra/n/a (the chief vital air) as the best said to them: Be not deceived;
7363 I alone dividing myself fivefold support this body and keep it.' Those,
7364 again, who in the passage quoted above read 'this one (masc.), the
7365 body[132]' must give the following explanation, Pra/n/a having laid hold
7366 of this one, viz. either the individual soul or the aggregate of the
7367 sense organs, makes the body rise up. The individual soul as well as the
7368 chief vital air may justly be designated as the intelligent Self; for
7369 the former is of the nature of intelligence, and the latter (although
7370 non-intelligent in itself) is the abode of other pra/n/as, viz. the
7371 sense organs, which are the instruments of intelligence. Moreover, if
7372 the word pra/n/a be taken to denote the individual soul as well as the
7373 chief vital air, the pra/n/a and the intelligent Self may be spoken of
7374 in two ways, either as being non-different on account of their mutual
7375 concomitance, or as being different on account of their (essentially
7376 different) individual character; and in these two different ways they
7377 are actually spoken of in the two following passages, 'What is pra/n/a
7378 that is praj/n/a, what is praj/n/a that is pra/n/a;' and, 'For together
7379 do these two live in the body and together do they depart.' If, on the
7380 other hand, pra/n/a denoted Brahman, what then could be different from
7381 what? For these reasons pra/n/a does not denote Brahman, but either the
7382 individual soul or the chief vital air or both.

7383

7384 All this argumentation, we reply, is wrong, 'on account of the
7385 threefoldness of devout meditation.' Your interpretation would involve
7386 the assumption of devout meditation of three different kinds, viz. on
7387 the individual soul, on the chief vital air, and on Brahman. But it is
7388 inappropriate to assume that a single sentence should enjoin three kinds
7389 of devout meditation; and that all the passages about the pra/n/a really
7390 constitute one single sentence (one syntactical whole) appears from the
7391 beginning and the concluding part. In the beginning we have the clause
7392 'Know me only,' followed by 'I am pra/n/a, the intelligent Self,
7393 meditate on me as Life, as Immortality;' and in the end we read, 'And
7394 that pra/n/a indeed is the intelligent Self, blessed, imperishable,
7395 immortal.' The beginning and the concluding part are thus seen to be
7396 similar, and we therefore must conclude that they refer to one and the
7397 same matter. Nor can the characteristic mark of Brahman be so turned as
7398 to be applied to something else; for the ten objects and the ten
7399 subjects (subjective powers)[133] cannot rest on anything but Brahman.
7400 Moreover, pra/n/a must denote Brahman 'on account of (that meaning)
7401 being accepted,' i.e. because in the case of other passages where
7402 characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned the word pra/n/a is taken
7403 in the sense of 'Brahman.' And another reason for assuming the passage
7404 to refer to Brahman is that here also, i.e. in the passage itself there
7405 is 'connexion' with characteristic marks of Brahman, as, for instance,
7406 the reference to what is most beneficial for man. The assertion that the
7407 passage, 'Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up,' contains a
7408 characteristic mark of the chief vital air, is untrue; for as the
7409 function of the vital air also ultimately rests on Brahman it can
7410 figuratively be ascribed to the latter. So Scripture also declares, 'No
7411 mortal lives by the breath that goes up and by the breath that goes
7412 down. We live by another in whom these two repose' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 5).
7413 Nor does the indication of the individual soul which you allege to occur
7414 in the passage, 'Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know
7415 the speaker,' preclude the view of pra/n/a denoting Brahman. For, as the
7416 passages, 'I am Brahman,' 'That art thou,' and others, prove, there is
7417 in reality no such thing as an individual soul absolutely different from
7418 Brahman, but Brahman, in so far as it differentiates itself through the
7419 mind (buddhi) and other limiting conditions, is called individual soul,
7420 agent, enjoyer. Such passages therefore as the one alluded to, (viz.
7421 'let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,')
7422 which, by setting aside all the differences due to limiting conditions,
7423 aim at directing the mind on the internal Self and thus showing that the
7424 individual soul is one with Brahman, are by no means out of place. That
7425 the Self which is active in speaking and the like is Brahman appears
7426 from another scriptural passage also, viz. Ke. Up. I, 5, 'That which is
7427 not expressed by speech and by which speech is expressed that alone know
7428 as Brahman, not that which people here adore.' The remark that the
7429 statement about the difference of pra/n/a and praj/n/a (contained in the
7430 passage, 'Together they dwell in this body, together they depart') does
7431 not agree with that interpretation according to which pra/n/a is
7432 Brahman, is without force; for the mind and the vital air which are the
7433 respective abodes of the two powers of cognition and action, and
7434 constitute the limiting conditions of the internal Self may be spoken of
7435 as different. The internal Self, on the other hand, which is limited by
7436 those two adjuncts, is in itself non-differentiated, so that the two may
7437 be identified, as is done in the passage 'pra/n/a is praj/n/a.'

7438

7439 The second part of the Sutra is explained in a different manner
7440 also[134], as follows: Characteristic marks of the individual soul as
7441 well as of the chief vital air are not out of place even in a chapter
7442 whose topic is Brahman. How so? 'On account of the threefoldness of
7443 devout meditation.' The chapter aims at enjoining three kinds of devout
7444 meditation on Brahman, according as Brahman is viewed under the aspect
7445 of pra/n/a, under the aspect of praj/n/a, and in itself. The passages,
7446 'Meditate (on me) as life, as immortality. Life is pra/n/a,' and 'Having
7447 laid hold of this body it makes it rise up. Therefore let man worship it
7448 alone as uktha,' refer to the pra/n/a aspect. The introductory passage,
7449 'Now we shall explain how all things become one in that praj/n/a,' and
7450 the subsequent passages, 'Speech verily milked one portion thereof; the
7451 word is its object placed outside;' and, 'Having by praj/n/a taken

7452 possession of speech he obtains by speech all words &c., ' refer to the
7453 praj/n/a aspect. The Brahman aspect finally is referred to in the
7454 following passage, 'These ten objects have reference to praj/n/a, the
7455 ten subjects have reference to objects. If there were no objects there
7456 would be no subjects; and if there were no subjects there would be no
7457 objects. For on either side alone nothing could be achieved. But that is
7458 not many. For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the
7459 spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the
7460 subjects and the subjects on the pra/n/a.' Thus we see that the one
7461 meditation on Brahman is here represented as threefold, according as
7462 Brahman is viewed either with reference to two limiting conditions or in
7463 itself. In other passages also we find that devout meditation on Brahman
7464 is made dependent on Brahman being qualified by limiting adjuncts; so,
7465 for instance (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2), 'He who consists of mind, whose body
7466 is pra/n/a.' The hypothesis of Brahman being meditated upon under three
7467 aspects perfectly agrees with the pra/n/a chapter[135]; as, on the one
7468 hand, from a comparison of the introductory and the concluding clauses
7469 we infer that the subject-matter of the whole chapter is one only, and
7470 as, on the other hand, we meet with characteristic marks of pra/n/a,
7471 praj/n/a, and Brahman in turns. It therefore remains a settled
7472 conclusion that Brahman is the topic of the whole chapter.

7473
7474 Notes:

7475
7476 [Footnote 32: The subject is the universal Self whose nature is
7477 intelligence (/k/u); the object comprises whatever is of a
7478 non-intelligent nature, viz. bodies with their sense organs, internal
7479 organs, and the objects of the senses, i.e. the external material
7480 world.]

7481
7482 [Footnote 33: The object is said to have for its sphere the notion of
7483 the 'thou' (yushmat), not the notion of the 'this' or 'that' (idam), in
7484 order better to mark its absolute opposition to the subject or Ego.
7485 Language allows of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and
7486 the third person ('It is I,' 'I am he who,' &c.; ete vayam, ame vayam
7487 asmahe), but not of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and
7488 second person.]

7489
7490 [Footnote 34: Adhyasa, literally 'superimposition' in the sense of
7491 (mistaken) ascription or imputation, to something, of an essential
7492 nature or attributes not belonging to it. See later on.]

7493
7494 [Footnote 35: Natural, i.e. original, beginningless; for the modes of
7495 speech and action which characterise transmigratory existence have
7496 existed, with the latter, from all eternity.]

7497
7498 [Footnote 36: I.e. the intelligent Self which is the only reality and
7499 the non-real objects, viz. body and so on, which are the product of
7500 wrong knowledge.]

7501
7502 [Footnote 37: 'The body, &c. is my Self;' 'sickness, death, children,
7503 wealth, &c., belong to my Self.']

7504
7505 [Footnote 38: Literally 'in some other place.' The clause 'in the form
7506 of remembrance' is added, the Bhamati remarks, in order to exclude those
7507 cases where something previously observed is recognised in some other
7508 thing or place; as when, for instance, the generic character of a cow
7509 which was previously observed in a black cow again presents itself to
7510 consciousness in a grey cow, or when Devadatta whom we first saw in
7511 Pa/t/aliputra again appears before us in Mahishmati. These are cases of
7512 recognition where the object previously observed again presents itself
7513 to our senses; while in mere remembrance the object previously perceived
7514 is not in renewed contact with the senses. Mere remembrance operates in
7515 the case of adhyasa, as when we mistake mother-of-pearl for silver which
7516 is at the time not present but remembered only.]

7517
7518 [Footnote 39: The so-called anyathakhyativadins maintain that in the act
7519 of adhyasa the attributes of one thing, silver for instance, are
7520 superimposed on a different thing existing in a different place,

7521 mother-of-pearl for instance (if we take for our example of adhyasa the
7522 case of some man mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl before him for a
7523 piece of silver). The atmakhyativadins maintain that in adhyasa the
7524 modification, in the form of silver, of the internal organ and action
7525 which characterise transmigratory existence have existed, with the
7526 latter, from all eternity.]

7527
7528 [Footnote 40: This is the definition of the akhyativadins.]

7529
7530 [Footnote 41: Some anyathakhyativadins and the Madhyamikas according to
7531 Ananda Giri.]

7532
7533 [Footnote 42: The pratyagatman is in reality non-object, for it is
7534 svayampraka/s/a, self-luminous, i.e. the subjective factor in all
7535 cognition. But it becomes the object of the idea of the Ego in so far as
7536 it is limited, conditioned by its adjuncts which are the product of
7537 Nescience, viz. the internal organ, the senses and the subtle and gross
7538 bodies, i.e. in so far as it is jiva, individual or personal soul. Cp.
7539 Bhamati, pp. 22, 23: '/k/idaatmaiva svayampraka/s/oszpi
7540 buddhyadivishayavi/kkh/ura/n/at katha/mk/id asm
7541 upratyayavishayoszha/m/karaspada/m/ jiva iti /k/a jantur iti /k/a
7542 ksheuajna iti /k/akhyayate.']

7543
7544 [Footnote 43: Translated according to the Bhamati. We deny, the objector
7545 says, the possibility of adhyasa in the case of the Self, not on the
7546 ground that it is not an object because self-luminous (for that it may
7547 be an object although it is self-luminous you have shown), but on the
7548 ground that it is not an object because it is not manifested either by
7549 itself or by anything else.--It is known or manifest, the Vedantin
7550 replies, on account of its immediate presentation (aparokshatvat), i.e.
7551 on account of the intuitional knowledge we have of it. Ananda Giri
7552 construes the above clause in a different way:
7553 asmatpratyayavishayatveszpy aparokshatvad ekantenavishayatvabbavat
7554 tasminn aha@nkaradyadhyasa ity artha/h/. Aparokshatvam api kai/sk/id
7555 atmano nesh/t/am ity asa@nkyaha pratyagatmeti.]

7556
7557 [Footnote 44: Tatraiva/m/ sati evambhutavastutattvavadhara/n/e sati.
7558 Bha. Tasminn adhyase uktarityazvidyavmake sati. Go. Yatratmani
7559 buddhyadau va yasya buddhyader atmano vadhyasa/h/ tena
7560 buddhyadi-nasztmana va k/ri/tenasz/s/anayadidoshe/n/a /k/aitanyagu/n/ena
7561 /k/atmanatma va vastuto na svalpenapi yujyate. Ananda Giri.]

7562
7563 [Footnote 45: Whether they belong to the karmaka/nd/a, i.e. that part of
7564 the Veda which enjoins active religious duty or the j/n/anaka/nd/a, i.e.
7565 that part of the Veda which treats of Brahman.]

7566
7567 [Footnote 46: It being of course the function of the means of right
7568 knowledge to determine Truth and Reality.]

7569
7570 [Footnote 47: The Bhamati takes adhish/th/anam in the sense of
7571 superintendence, guidance. The senses cannot act unless guided by a
7572 superintending principle, i.e. the individual soul.]

7573
7574 [Footnote 48: If activity could proceed from the body itself,
7575 non-identified with the Self, it would take place in deep sleep also.]

7576
7577 [Footnote 49: I.e. in the absence of the mutual superimposition of the
7578 Self and the Non-Self and their attributes.]

7579
7580 [Footnote 50: The Mima/m/sa, i.e. the enquiry whose aim it is to show
7581 that the embodied Self, i.e. the individual or personal soul is one with
7582 Brahman. This Mima/m/sa being an enquiry into the meaning of the
7583 Vedanta-portions of the Veda, it is also called Vedanta mima/m/sa.]

7584
7585 [Footnote 51: Nadhikarartha iti. Tatra hetur brahmeti. Asyārtha/h/, kam
7586 ayam atha/s/abdo brahmaj/n/ane/kkh/ya/h/ kim vantar/n/itavi/k/arasya
7587 athave/kkh/avi/s/esha/n/aj/n/anasyarambhartha/h/. Nadya/h/ tasya
7588 mima/m/sapravartikayas tadapravartyatvad anarabhyatvat tasya/s/
7589 /k/ottaratra pratyadhikara/n/am apratipadanat. Na

7590 dvitiiyoztha/s/abdenanantaryoktidvara vi/s/ish/t/adhikaryasamarpa/n/e
7591 sadhana/k/atush/t/ayasampannana/m/ brahmadhitadvi/k/arayor anarthitvad
7592 vi/k/aranarambhan na /k/a vi/k/aravidhiva/s/ad adhikari kalpya/h/
7593 prarambhasyapi tulyatvad adhikari/n/a/s/ /k/a vidhyapekshitopadhitvan na
7594 t/ri/tiya/h/ brahmaj/n/anasyanandasakshatkaratvenadhikaryatve z
7595 pyapradhanyad atha/s/abdasambandhat tasman narambharthateti. Ananda
7596 Giri.]

7597
7598 [Footnote 52: Any relation in which the result, i.e. here the enquiry
7599 into Brahman may stand to some antecedent of which it is the effect may
7600 be comprised under the relation of anantarya.]

7601
7602 [Footnote 53: He cuts off from the heart, then from the tongue, then
7603 from the breast.]

7604
7605 [Footnote 54: Where one action is subordinate to another as, for
7606 instance, the offering of the prayajas is to the
7607 dar/s/apur/n/amasa-sacrifice, or where one action qualifies a person for
7608 another as, for instance, the offering of the dar/s/apur/n/amasa
7609 qualifies a man for the performance of the Soma-sacrifice, there is
7610 unity of the agent, and consequently an intimation of the order of
7611 succession of the actions is in its right place.]

7612
7613 [Footnote 55: The 'means' in addition to /s/ama and dama are
7614 discontinuance of religious ceremonies (uparati), patience in suffering
7615 (titiksha), attention and concentration of the mind (samadhana), and
7616 faith (/s/raddha).]

7617
7618 [Footnote 56: According to Pa/n/ini II, 3, 50 the sixth (genitive) case
7619 expresses the relation of one thing being generally supplementary to, or
7620 connected with, some other thing.]

7621
7622 [Footnote 57: In the case of other transitive verbs, object and result
7623 may be separate; so, for instance, when it is said 'grama/m/
7624 ga/kkh/ati,' the village is the object of the action of going, and the
7625 arrival at the village its result. But in the case of verbs of desiring
7626 object and result coincide.]

7627
7628 [Footnote 58: That Brahman exists we know, even before entering on the
7629 Brahma-mima/m/sa, from the occurrence of the word in the Veda, &c., and
7630 from the etymology of the word we at once infer Brahman's chief
7631 attributes.]

7632
7633 [Footnote 59: The three last opinions are those of the followers of the
7634 Nyaya, the Sa@nkhyas, and the Yoga-philosophy respectively. The three
7635 opinions mentioned first belong to various materialistic schools; the
7636 two subsequent ones to two sects of Bauddha philosophers.]

7637
7638 [Footnote 60: As, for instance, the passages 'this person consists of
7639 the essence of food;' 'the eye, &c. spoke;' 'non-existing this was in
7640 the beginning,' &c.]

7641
7642 [Footnote 61: So the compound is to be divided according to An. Gi. and
7643 Go.; the Bha. proposes another less plausible division.]

7644
7645 [Footnote 62: According to Nirukta I, 2 the six bhavavikara/h/ are:
7646 origination, existence, modification, increase, decrease, destruction.]

7647
7648 [Footnote 63: The pradhana, called also prak/ri/ti, is the primal causal
7649 matter of the world in the /S/a@nkhyasystem. It will be fully discussed
7650 in later parts of this work. To avoid ambiguities, the term pradhana has
7651 been left untranslated. Cp. Sa@nkhyas Karika 3.]

7652
7653 [Footnote 64: Ke/k/it tu hira/n/yagaroha/m/ sa/m/sari/n/am evagama
7654 jagaddhetum a/k/akshate. Ananda Giri.]

7655
7656 [Footnote 65: Viz. the Vai/s/eshikas.]

7657
7658 [Footnote 66: Atmana/h/ /s/ruter ity artha/h/. Ananda Giri.]

7659
7660 [Footnote 67: Text (or direct statement), suggestive power (linga),
7661 syntactical connection (vakya), &c., being the means of proof made use
7662 of in the Purva Mima/m/sa.]
7663
7664 [Footnote 68: The so-called sakshatkara of Brahman. The &c. comprises
7665 inference and so on.]
7666
7667 [Footnote 69: So, for instance, the passage 'he carves the sacrificial
7668 post and makes it eight-cornered,' has a purpose only as being
7669 supplementary to the injunction 'he ties the victim to the sacrificial
7670 post.']
7671
7672 [Footnote 70: If the fruits of the two /s/astras were not of a different
7673 nature, there would be no reason for the distinction of two /s/astras;
7674 if they are of a different nature, it cannot be said that the knowledge
7675 of Brahman is enjoined for the purpose of final release, in the same way
7676 as sacrifices are enjoined for the purpose of obtaining the heavenly
7677 world and the like.]
7678
7679 [Footnote 71: The first passage shows that the Self is not joined to the
7680 gross body; the second that it is not joined to the subtle body; the
7681 third that is independent of either.]
7682
7683 [Footnote 72: Ananda Giri omits 'ata/h/.' His comment is:
7684 p/ri/thagjij/n/asavishayatva/k/ /k/a dharmadyasp/ri/sh/t/atva/m/
7685 brahma/n/o yuktam ityaha; tad iti; ata/h/ /s/abdapa/th/e dharmadyasp/ri/sh/t/atva/m/
7686 karmaphalavilaksha/n/ya/m/ hetuk/ri/tam.--The above translation follows
7687 Govindananda's first explanation. Tat kaivalyam brahmaiva
7688 karmaphalavilaksha/n/atvad ity artha/h/.]
7689
7690 [Footnote 73: Sampat. Sampan namalpe vastuny alambane samanyena
7691 kena/k/in mahato vastuna/h/ sampadanam. Ananda Giri.]
7692
7693 [Footnote 74: In which passage the mind, which may be called endless on
7694 account of the infinite number of modifications it undergoes, is
7695 identified with the Vi/s/vedevas, which thereby constitute the chief
7696 object of the meditation; the fruit of the meditation being immortality.
7697 The identity of the Self with Brahman, on the other hand, is real, not
7698 only meditatively imagined, on account of the attribute of intelligence
7699 being common to both.]
7700
7701 [Footnote 75: Adhyasa/h/ /s/astratoitasmi/m/s taddhi/h/. Sampadi
7702 sampadyamanasya pradhanyenanudhyanam, adhyase tu alambanasyeti
7703 vi/s/esha/h/. Ananda Giri.]
7704
7705 [Footnote 76: Air and breath each absorb certain things, and are,
7706 therefore, designated by the same term 'absorber.' Seya/m/
7707 sa/m/vargad/ri/sh/t/ir vayau pra/n/e /k/a da/s/a/s/agata/m/ jagad
7708 dar/s/ayati yatha jivatmani b/rim/ha/n/akriyaya
7709 brahmad/ri/sh/t/iram/ri/tatvayaphalayakalpata iti. Bhamati.]
7710
7711 [Footnote 77: The butter used in the upa/ms/uyaja is ceremonially
7712 purified by the wife of the sacrificer looking at it; so, it might be
7713 said, the Self of him who meditates on Brahman (and who as
7714 kart/ri/--agent--stands in a subordinate anga-relation to the karman of
7715 meditation) is merely purified by the cognition of its being one with
7716 Brahman.]
7717
7718 [Footnote 78: An hypothesis which might be proposed for the purpose of
7719 obviating the imputation to moksha of non-eternality which results from
7720 the two preceding hypotheses.]
7721
7722 [Footnote 79: Viz. things to be originated (for instance, gha/t/a/m/
7723 karoti), things to be obtained (grama/m/ ga/kkh/ati), things to be
7724 modified (suvar/n/a/m/ ku/nd/ala/m/ karoti), and things to be
7725 ceremonially purified (vrihin prokshati).]
7726
7727 [Footnote 80: Whence it follows that it is not something to be avoided

7728 like transitory things.]

7729

7730 [Footnote 81: That, for instance, in the passage 'he is to sacrifice
7731 with Soma,' the word 'soma,' which does not denote an action, is devoid
7732 of sense.]

7733

7734 [Footnote 82: I.e. for the purpose of showing that the passages
7735 conveying information about Brahman as such are justified. You have (the
7736 objector maintains) proved hitherto only that passages containing
7737 information about existent things are admissible, if those things have a
7738 purpose; but how does all this apply to the information about Brahman of
7739 which no purpose has been established?]

7740

7741 [Footnote 83: It is 'naturally established' because it has natural
7742 motives--not dependent on the injunctions of the Veda, viz. passion and
7743 the like.]

7744

7745 [Footnote 84: Elsewhere, i.e. outside the Veda.]

7746

7747 [Footnote 85: The above discussion of the prohibitory passages of the
7748 Veda is of a very scholastic nature, and various clauses in it are
7749 differently interpreted by the different commentators. /S/a@nkara
7750 endeavours to fortify his doctrine, that not all parts of the Veda refer
7751 to action by an appeal to prohibitory passages which do not enjoin
7752 action but abstinence from action. The legitimacy of this appeal might
7753 be contested on the ground that a prohibitory passage also, (as, for
7754 instance, 'a Brahma/n/a is not to be killed,') can be explained as
7755 enjoining a positive action, viz. some action opposed in nature to the
7756 one forbidden, so that the quoted passage might be interpreted to mean
7757 'a determination, &c. of not killing a Brahma/n/a is to be formed;' just
7758 as we understand something positive by the expression 'a
7759 non-Brahma/n/a,' viz. some man who is a kshattriya or something else. To
7760 this the answer is that, wherever we can, we must attribute to the word
7761 'not' its primary sense which is the absolute negation of the word to
7762 which it is joined; so that passages where it is joined to words
7763 denoting action must be considered to have for their purport the entire
7764 absence of action. Special cases only are excepted, as the one alluded
7765 to in the text where certain prohibited actions are enumerated under the
7766 heading of vows; for as a vow is considered as something positive, the
7767 non-doing of some particular action must there be understood as
7768 intimating the performance of some action of an opposite nature. The
7769 question as to the various meanings of the particle 'not' is discussed
7770 in all treatises on the Purva Mimamsa; see, for instance,
7771 Arthasamgraha, translation, p. 39 ff.]

7772

7773 [Footnote 86: The Self is the agent in a sacrifice, &c. only in so far
7774 as it imagines itself to be joined to a body; which imagination is
7775 finally removed by the cognition of Brahman.]

7776

7777 [Footnote 87: The figurative Self, i.e. the imagination that wife,
7778 children, possessions, and the like are a man's Self; the false Self,
7779 i.e. the imagination that the Self acts, suffers, enjoys, &c.]

7780

7781 [Footnote 88: I.e. the apparent world with all its distinctions.]

7782

7783 [Footnote 89: The words in parentheses are not found in the best
7784 manuscripts.]

7785

7786 [Footnote 90: The most exalted of the three constituent elements whose
7787 state of equipoise constitutes the pradhana.]

7788

7789 [Footnote 91: Knowledge can arise only where Goodness is predominant,
7790 not where the three qualities mutually counterbalance one another.]

7791

7792 [Footnote 92: The excess of Sattva in the Yogin would not enable him to
7793 rise to omniscience if he did not possess an intelligent principle
7794 independent of Sattva.]

7795

7796 [Footnote 93: Ananda Giri comments as follows: paroktanupapatlim

7797 nirasitum p/rikkh/ati idam iti. Prak/ri/tyarthabhavad pratyayarthabhavad
7798 va brahma/n/o sarvaj/n/ateti pra/s/nam eva praka/t/ayati katham iti.
7799 Prathama/m/ pratyaha yasyeti. Ukta/m/ vyatirckadvara viyz/rin/oti
7800 anityatve hiti. Dvitiya/m/ /s/a@nkate j/n/aneti. Svato nityasyapi
7801 j/n/anasya tattadarthava/kkh/innasya karyatvat tatra svatantryam
7802 pratyayartho brahma/n/a/h/ sidhyatity aha.--The knowledge of Brahman is
7803 eternal, and in so far Brahman is not independent with regard to it, but
7804 it is independent with regard to each particular act of knowledge; the
7805 verbal affix in 'janati' indicating the particularity of the act.]
7806

7807 [Footnote 94: In the second Kha/nd/a of the sixth Prapa/th/aka of the
7808 Ch. Up. 'aikshata' is twice used in a figurative sense (with regard to
7809 fire and water); it is therefore to be understood figuratively in the
7810 third passage also where it occurs.]
7811

7812 [Footnote 95: So that, on this latter explanation, it is unnecessary to
7813 assume a figurative sense of the word 'thinking' in any of the three
7814 passages.]
7815

7816 [Footnote 96: A wicked man meets in a forest a blind person who has lost
7817 his way, and implores him to lead him to his village; instead of doing
7818 so the wicked man persuades the blind one to catch hold of the tail of
7819 an ox, which he promises would lead him to his place. The consequence is
7820 that the blind man is, owing to his trustfulness, led even farther
7821 astray, and injured by the bushes, &c., through which the ox drags him.]
7822

7823 [Footnote 97: Cp. above, p. 30.]
7824

7825 [Footnote 98: So according to the commentators, not to accept whose
7826 guidance in the translation of scholastic definitions is rather
7827 hazardous. A simpler translation of the clause might however be given.]
7828

7829 [Footnote 99: With reference to Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2.]
7830

7831 [Footnote 100: The wise one, i.e. the highest Self; which as jivatman is
7832 conversant with the names and forms of individual things.]
7833

7834 [Footnote 101: I.e. it is looked upon as the object of the devotion of
7835 the individual souls; while in reality all those souls and Brahman are
7836 one.]
7837

7838 [Footnote 102: Qualities, i.e. the attributes under which the Self is
7839 meditated on; limiting conditions, i.e. the localities--such as the
7840 heart and the like--which in pious meditation are ascribed to the Self.]
7841

7842 [Footnote 103: Ananda Giri reads avish/t/asya for avishk/ri/tasya.]
7843

7844 [Footnote 104: Cp. the entire passage. All things are manifestations of
7845 the highest Self under certain limiting conditions, but occupying
7846 different places in an ascending scale. In unsentient things, stones,
7847 &c. only the satta, the quality of being manifests itself; in plants,
7848 animals, and men the Self manifests itself through the vital sap; in
7849 animals and men there is understanding; higher thought in man alone.]
7850

7851 [Footnote 105: Ananda Giri on the preceding passage beginning from 'thus
7852 here also:' na kevala/m/ dvaividhyam brahma/n/a/h/ /s/rutism/ri/tyor eva
7853 siddha/m/ ki/m/ tu sutrak/ri/to api matam ity aha, evam iti,
7854 /s/rutism/ri/tyor iva prak/ri/te pi /s/astre dvairupyam brahma/n/o
7855 bhavati; tatra sopadhikabrahmavishayam antastaddharmadhikara/n/am
7856 udaharati adityeti; uktanyaya/m/ tulyade/s/eshu prasarayati evam iti;
7857 sopadhikopade/s/avan nirupadhikopade/s/a/m/ dar/s/ayati evam ityadina,
7858 atmaj/n/@ana/m/ nir/n/etavyam iti sambandha/h/; ayaprasa@ngam aha
7859 pareti; annamayadyupadhidvarokasya katham paravidyavishayatva/m/ tatraha
7860 upadhiti; nir/n/ayakramam aha vakyeti, uktartham adhikara/n/a/m/
7861 kvastity asa@nkyokta/m/ yatheti.]
7862

7863 [Footnote 106: After which no other Self is mentioned.]
7864

7865 [Footnote 107: The previous proofs were founded on li@nga; the argument

7866 which is now propounded is founded on prakara/n/a.]
7867
7868 [Footnote 108: While, in the case of the Selfs consisting of food and so
7869 on, a further inner Self is duly mentioned each time. It cannot,
7870 therefore, be concluded that the Selfs consisting of food, &c., are
7871 likewise identical with the highest Self referred to in the mantra.]
7872
7873 [Footnote 109: Yadi labdha na labdhavya/h/ katha/m/ tarhi paramatmano
7874 vastutobhinnena jivatmana paramatma labhyata ity artha/h/. Bhamati.]
7875
7876 [Footnote 110: Yatha paramesvarad bhinno jivatma drash/t/a na bhavaty
7877 evam givatmanozpi drash/t/ur na bhinna/h/ parame/s/vara iti,
7878 jivasyanirva/k/yarve parame/s/varozpy anirva/k/ya/h/ syad ity ata aha
7879 parame/s/varas tv avidyakalpita ity. Ananda Giri.]
7880
7881 [Footnote 111: The explanation of the anandamaya given hitherto is here
7882 recalled, and a different one given. The previous explanation is
7883 attributed by Go. An. to the v/ri/ttikara.]
7884
7885 [Footnote 112: In which sense, as shown above, the word anandamaya must
7886 be taken if understood to denote Brahman.]
7887
7888 [Footnote 113: I.e. the word translated hitherto by abundance.]
7889
7890 [Footnote 114: See I, 1, 15-19.]
7891
7892 [Footnote 115: The preceding adhikara/n/a had shown that the five Selfs
7893 (consisting of food, mind, and so on), which the Taitt. Up. enumerates,
7894 are introduced merely for the purpose of facilitating the cognition of
7895 Brahman considered as devoid of all qualities; while that Brahman itself
7896 is the real object of knowledge. The present adhikara/n/a undertakes to
7897 show that the passage about the golden person represents the savi/s/esha
7898 Brahman as the object of devout meditation.]
7899
7900 [Footnote 116: So that the real giver of the gifts bestowed by princes
7901 on poets and singers is Brahman.]
7902
7903 [Footnote 117: Or else 'that which is within forms and names.']
7904
7905 [Footnote 118: Viz. as intimating it. Thus An. Gi. and Go. An. against
7906 the accent of /rik/a/h/. Saya/n/a explains /rik/a/h/ as genitive.]
7907
7908 [Footnote 119: O/m/karasya pratikatvena va/k/akatvena lakshakatvena va
7909 brahmatvam uktam, om iti, ka/m/ sukha/m/ tasyarthendriyayogajatva/m/
7910 varayitu/m/ kham iti, tasya bhutaka/s/atva/m/ vyaseddhum pura/n/am ity
7911 uktam. An. Gi.]
7912
7913 [Footnote 120: The doubt about the meaning of a word is preferably to be
7914 decided by means of a reference to preceding passages; where that is not
7915 possible (the doubtful word occurring at the beginning of some new
7916 chapter) complementary, i.e. subsequent passages have to be taken into
7917 consideration.]
7918
7919 [Footnote 121: The v/ri/ttikara, the commentators say.]
7920
7921 [Footnote 122: I.e. which has not been mixed with water and earth,
7922 according to Ch. Up. VI, 3, 3. Before that mixture took place light was
7923 entirely separated from the other elements, and therefore bounded by the
7924 latter.]
7925
7926 [Footnote 123: So as to justify the assumption that such a thing as
7927 non-tripartite light exists at all.]
7928
7929 [Footnote 124: Brahma/n/o vyava/kkh/idya teja/h/samarpakatva/m/
7930 vi/s/eshakatvam, tadabhavozvi/s/eshakatvam. An. Gi.]
7931
7932 [Footnote 125: If we strictly follow the order of words in the
7933 original.]
7934

7935 [Footnote 126: Svasamarthyena sarvanamna/h/
7936 sannihitaparamar/s/itvava/s/ena.]
7937
7938 [Footnote 127: The v/ri/ttikara according to Go. An. in his /t/ika on
7939 the bhashya to the next Sutra.]
7940
7941 [Footnote 128: Concerning the difficulty involved in this
7942 interpretation, cp. Deussen, p. 183, note.]
7943
7944 [Footnote 129: The text runs, 'astitve /k/a pra/n/ana/m/ ni/hs/reyasam,'
7945 and Go. An. explains 'astitve pra/n/asthitau pra/n/ana/m/ indriya/n/am
7946 sthitir ity arthata/h/ /s/rutim aha.' He as well as An. Gi. quotes as
7947 the text of the scriptural passage referred to 'athato ni/hs/reyasadanam
7948 ity adi.' But if instead of 'astitve /k/a' we read 'asti tv eva,' we get
7949 the concluding clause of Kau. Up. III, 2, as given in Cowell's
7950 edition.].
7951
7952 [Footnote 130: Whence we know that the interior Self referred to in the
7953 Kau. Up. is Brahman.]
7954
7955 [Footnote 131: I.e. spontaneous intuition of supersensible truth,
7956 rendered possible through the knowledge acquired in former existences.]
7957
7958 [Footnote 132: Ima/m/ /s/ariram instead of ida/m/ /s/ariram.]
7959
7960 [Footnote 133: Pa/nk/a /s/abdadaya/h/ pa/nk/a p/ri/thivyadaya/s/ /k/a
7961 da/s/a bhutamatra/h/ pa/nk/a buddhindriya/n/i pa/nk/a buddhaya iti
7962 da/s/a praj/n/amatra/h/. Yadva j/n/anendriyarthah/ pa/nk/a
7963 karzmendriyarthas/ /ka/ pa/nk/eti da/s/a bhutamatra/h/
7964 dvividhanindriya/n/i praj/n/amatra da/s/eti bhava/h/. An. Gi.]
7965
7966 [Footnote 134: Viz. by the v/ri/ttikara.]
7967
7968 [Footnote 135: Ihapi tad yujyate explaining the 'iha tadyogat' of the
7969 Sutra.]
7970
7971
7972
7973
7974 SECOND PADA.
7975
7976 REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!
7977
7978
7979 In the first pada Brahman has been shown to be the cause of the origin,
7980 subsistence, and reabsorption of the entire world, comprising the ether
7981 and the other elements. Moreover, of this Brahman, which is the cause of
7982 the entire world, certain qualities have (implicitly) been declared,
7983 such as all-pervadingness, eternity, omniscience, its being the Self of
7984 all, and so on. Further, by producing reasons showing that some words
7985 which are generally used in a different sense denote Brahman also, we
7986 have been able to determine that some passages about whose sense doubts
7987 are entertained refer to Brahman. Now certain other passages present
7988 themselves which because containing only obscure indications of Brahman
7989 give rise to the doubt whether they refer to the highest Self or to
7990 something else. We therefore begin the second and third padas in order
7991 to settle those doubtful points.
7992
7993 1. (That which consists of mind is Brahman) because there is taught what
7994 is known from everywhere.
7995
7996 Scripture says, 'All this indeed is Brahman, beginning, ending, and
7997 breathing in it; thus knowing let a man meditate with calm mind. Now man
7998 is made of determination (kratu); according to what his determination is
7999 in this world so will he be when he has departed this life. Let him
8000 therefore form this determination: he who consists of mind, whose body
8001 is breath (the subtle body),' &c. (Ch. Up. III, 14). Concerning this
8002 passage the doubt presents itself whether what is pointed out as the
8003 object of meditation, by means of attributes such as consisting of mind,

8004 &c., is the embodied (individual) soul or the highest Brahman.

8005

8006 The embodied Self, the purvapakshin says.--Why?--Because the embodied
8007 Self as the ruler of the organs of action is well known to be connected
8008 with the mind and so on, while the highest Brahman is not, as is
8009 declared in several scriptural passages, so, for instance (Mu. Up. II,
8010 1, 2), 'He is without breath, without mind, pure.'--But, it may be
8011 objected, the passage, 'All this indeed is Brahman,' mentions Brahman
8012 directly; how then can you suppose that the embodied Self forms the
8013 object of meditation?--This objection does not apply, the purvapakshin
8014 rejoins, because the passage does not aim at enjoining meditation on
8015 Brahman, but rather at enjoining calmness of mind, the sense being:
8016 because Brahman is all this, tajjalan, let a man meditate with a calm
8017 mind. That is to say: because all this aggregate of effects is Brahman
8018 only, springing from it, ending in it, and breathing in it; and because,
8019 as everything constitutes one Self only, there is no room for passion;
8020 therefore a man is to meditate with a calm mind. And since the sentence
8021 aims at enjoining calmness of mind, it cannot at the same time enjoin
8022 meditation on Brahman[136]; but meditation is separately enjoined in the
8023 clause, 'Let him form the determination, i.e. reflection.' And thereupon
8024 the subsequent passage, 'He who consists of mind, whose body is breath,'
8025 &c. states the object of the meditation in words indicative of the
8026 individual soul. For this reason we maintain that the meditation spoken
8027 of has the individual soul for its object. The other attributes also
8028 subsequently stated in the text, 'He to whom all works, all desires
8029 belong,' &c. may rightly be held to refer to the individual soul. The
8030 attributes, finally, of being what abides in the heart and of being
8031 extremely minute which are mentioned in the passage, 'He is my Self
8032 within the heart, smaller than a corn of rice, smaller than a corn of
8033 barley,' may be ascribed to the individual soul which has the size of
8034 the point of a goad, but not to the unlimited Brahman. If it be objected
8035 that the immediately following passage, 'greater than the earth,' &c.,
8036 cannot refer to something limited, we reply that smallness and greatness
8037 which are mutually opposite cannot indeed be ascribed to one and the
8038 same thing; and that, if one attribute only is to be ascribed to the
8039 subject of the passage, smallness is preferable because it is mentioned
8040 first; while the greatness mentioned later on may be attributed to the
8041 soul in so far as it is one with Brahman. If it is once settled that the
8042 whole passage refers to the individual soul, it follows that the
8043 declaration of Brahman also, contained in the passage, 'That is Brahman'
8044 (III, 14, 4), refers to the individual soul[137], as it is clearly
8045 connected with the general topic. Therefore the individual soul is the
8046 object of meditation indicated by the qualities of consisting of mind
8047 and so on.

8048

8049 To all this we reply: The highest Brahman only is what is to be
8050 meditated upon as distinguished by the attributes of consisting of mind
8051 and so on.--Why?--'On account of there being taught here what is known
8052 from everywhere.' What is known from all Vedanta-passages to be the
8053 sense of the word Brahman, viz. the cause of the world, and what is
8054 mentioned here in the beginning words of the passage, ('all this indeed
8055 is Brahman,') the same we must assume to be taught here as distinguished
8056 by certain qualities, viz. consisting of mind and so on. Thus we avoid
8057 the fault of dropping the subject-matter under discussion and needlessly
8058 introducing a new topic.--But, it may be said, it has been shown that
8059 Brahman is, in the beginning of the passage, introduced merely for the
8060 purpose of intimating the injunction of calmness of mind, not for the
8061 purpose of intimating Brahman itself.--True, we reply; but the fact
8062 nevertheless remains that, where the qualities of consisting of mind,
8063 &c. are spoken of, Brahman only is proximate (i.e. mentioned not far off
8064 so that it may be concluded to be the thing referred to), while the
8065 individual soul is neither proximate nor intimated by any word directly
8066 pointing to it. The cases of Brahman and the individual soul are
8067 therefore not equal.

8068

8069 2. And because the qualities desired to be expressed are possible (in
8070 Brahman; therefore the passage refers to Brahman).

8071

8072 Although in the Veda which is not the work of man no wish in the strict

sense can be expressed[138], there being no speaker, still such phrases as 'desired to be expressed,' may be figuratively used on account of the result, viz. (mental) comprehension. For just as in ordinary language we speak of something which is intimated by a word and is to be received (by the hearer as the meaning of the word), as 'desired to be expressed;' so in the Veda also whatever is denoted as that which is to be received is 'desired to be expressed,' everything else 'not desired to be expressed.' What is to be received as the meaning of a Vedic sentence, and what not, is inferred from the general purport of the passage. Those qualities which are here desired to be expressed, i.e. intimated as qualities to be dwelt on in meditation, viz. the qualities of having true purposes, &c. are possible in the highest Brahman; for the quality of having true purposes may be ascribed to the highest Self which possesses unimpeded power over the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of this world. Similarly the qualities of having true desires and true purposes are attributed to the highest Self in another passage, viz. the one beginning, 'The Self which is free from sin' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1). The clause, 'He whose Self is the ether,' means 'he whose Self is like the ether;' for Brahman may be said to be like the ether on account of its omnipresence and other qualities. This is also expressed by the clause, 'Greater than the earth.' And the other explanation also, according to which the passage means 'he whose Self is the ether' is possible, since Brahman which as the cause of the whole world is the Self of everything is also the Self of the ether. For the same reasons he is called 'he to whom all works belong, and so on.' Thus the qualities here intimated as topics of meditation agree with the nature of Brahman. We further maintain that the terms 'consisting of mind,' and 'having breath for its body,' which the purvapakshin asserts cannot refer to Brahman, may refer to it. For as Brahman is the Self of everything, qualities such as consisting of mind and the like, which belong to the individual soul, belong to Brahman also. Accordingly /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti say of Brahman, 'Thou art woman, thou art man; thou art youth, thou art maiden; thou as an old man totterest along on thy staff; thou art born with thy face turned everywhere' (/S/ve. Up. IV, 3), and 'its hands and feet are everywhere, its eyes and head are everywhere, its ears are everywhere, it stands encompassing all in the world' (Bha. Gita III, 13).

The passage (quoted above against our view), 'Without breath, without mind, pure,' refers to the pure (unrelated) Brahman. The terms 'consisting of mind; having breath for its body,' on the other hand, refer to Brahman as distinguished by qualities. Hence, as the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman, we conclude that the highest Brahman only is represented as the object of meditation.

3. On the other hand, as (those qualities) are not possible (in it), the embodied (soul is) not (denoted by manomaya, &c.).

The preceding Sutra has declared that the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman; the present Sutra states that they are not possible in the embodied Self. Brahman only possesses, in the manner explained, the qualities of consisting of mind, and so on; not the embodied individual soul. For qualities such as expressed in the words, 'He whose purposes are true, whose Self is the ether, who has no speech, who is not disturbed, who is greater than the earth,' cannot easily be attributed to the embodied Self. By the term 'embodied' (/s/arira) we have to understand 'residing' in a body. If it be objected that the Lord also resides in the body[139], we reply, True, he does reside in the body, but not in the body only; for /s/ruti declares him to be all-pervading; compare, 'He is greater than the earth; greater than the atmosphere, omnipresent like the ether, eternal.' The individual soul, on the other hand, is in the body only, apart from which as the abode of fruition it does not exist.

4. And because there is a (separate) denotation of the object of activity and of the agent.

The attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot belong to the embodied Self for that reason also, that there is a (separate)

8142 denotation of the object of activity and of the agent. In the passage,
8143 'When I shall have departed from hence I shall obtain him' (Ch. Up. III,
8144 14, 4), the word 'him' refers to that which is the topic of discussion,
8145 viz. the Self which is to be meditated upon as possessing the attributes
8146 of consisting of mind, &c., as the object of an activity, viz. as
8147 something to be obtained; while the words, 'I shall obtain,' represent
8148 the meditating individual Self as the agent, i.e. the obtainer. Now,
8149 wherever it can be helped, we must not assume that one and the same
8150 being is spoken of as the agent and the object of the activity at the
8151 same time. The relation existing between a person meditating and the
8152 thing meditated upon requires, moreover, different abodes.--And thus for
8153 the above reason, also, that which is characterised by the attributes of
8154 consisting of mind, and so on, cannot be the individual soul.

8155
8156 5. On account of the difference of words.

8157
8158 That which possesses the attributes of consisting of mind, and so on,
8159 cannot be the individual soul, for that reason also that there is a
8160 difference of words.

8161
8162 That is to say, we meet with another scriptural passage of kindred
8163 subject-matter (/S/at. Bra. X, 6, 3, 2), 'Like a rice grain, or a barley
8164 grain, or a canary seed or the kernel of a canary seed, thus that golden
8165 person is in the Self.' There one word, i.e. the locative 'in the Self,'
8166 denotes the embodied Self, and a different word, viz. the nominative
8167 'person,' denotes the Self distinguished by the qualities of consisting
8168 of mind, &c. We therefrom conclude that the two are different.

8169
8170 6. And on account of Sm/ri/ti.

8171
8172 Sm/ri/ti also declares the difference of the embodied Self and the
8173 highest Self, viz. Bha. Gita XVIII, 61, 'The Lord, O Arjuna, is seated
8174 in the heart of all beings, driving round by his magical power all
8175 beings (as if they were) mounted on a machine.'

8176
8177 But what, it may be asked, is that so-called embodied Self different
8178 from the highest Self which is to be set aside according to the
8179 preceding Sutras? /S/ruti passages, as well as Sm/ri/ti, expressly deny
8180 that there is any Self apart from the highest Self; compare, for
8181 instance, B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23, 'There is no other seer but he; there
8182 is no other hearer but he;' and Bha. Gita XIII, 2, 'And know me also, O
8183 Bharata, to be the kshetiaj/n/a in all kshetras.'

8184
8185 True, we reply, (there is in reality one universal Self only.) But the
8186 highest Self in so far as it is limited by its adjuncts, viz. the body,
8187 the senses, and the mind (mano-buddhi), is, by the ignorant, spoken of
8188 as if it were embodied. Similarly the ether, although in reality
8189 unlimited, appears limited owing to certain adjuncts, such as jars and
8190 other vessels. With regard to this (unreal limitation of the one Self)
8191 the distinction of objects of activity and of agents may be practically
8192 assumed, as long as we have not learned--from the passage, 'That art
8193 thou'--that the Self is one only. As soon, however, as we grasp the
8194 truth that there is only one universal Self, there is an end to the
8195 whole practical view of the world with its distinction of bondage, final
8196 release, and the like.

8197
8198 7. If it be said that (the passage does) not (refer to Brahman) on
8199 account of the smallness of the abode (mentioned), and on account of the
8200 denotations of that (i.e. of minuteness); we say, no; because (Brahman)
8201 has thus to be contemplated, and because the case is analogous to that
8202 of ether.

8203
8204 On account of the limitation of its abode, which is mentioned in the
8205 clause, 'He is my Self within the heart,' and on account of the
8206 declaration as to its minuteness contained in the direct statement, 'He
8207 is smaller than a grain of rice,' &c.; the embodied soul only, which is
8208 of the size of an awl's point, is spoken of in the passage under
8209 discussion, and not the highest Self. This assertion made above (in the
8210 purvapaksha of Sutra I, and restated in the purvapaksha of the present

8211 Sutra) has to be refuted. We therefore maintain that the objection
8212 raised does not invalidate our view of the passage. It is true that a
8213 thing occupying a limited space only cannot in any way be spoken of as
8214 omnipresent; but, on the other hand, that which is omnipresent, and
8215 therefore in all places may, from a certain point of view, be said to
8216 occupy a limited space. Similarly, a prince may be called the ruler of
8217 Ayodhya although he is at the same time the ruler of the whole
8218 earth.--But from what point of view can the omnipresent Lord be said to
8219 occupy a limited space and to be minute?--He may, we reply, be spoken of
8220 thus, 'because he is to be contemplated thus.' The passage under
8221 discussion teaches us to contemplate the Lord as abiding within the
8222 lotus of the heart, characterised by minuteness and similar
8223 qualities--which apprehension of the Lord is rendered possible through a
8224 modification of the mind--just as Hari is contemplated in the sacred
8225 stone called /S/alagram. Although present everywhere, the Lord is
8226 pleased when meditated upon as dwelling in the heart. The case is,
8227 moreover, to be viewed as analogous to that of the ether. The ether,
8228 although all-pervading, is spoken of as limited and minute, if
8229 considered in its connexion with the eye of a needle; so Brahman also.
8230 But it is an understood matter that the attributes of limitation of
8231 abode and of minuteness depend, in Brahman's case, entirely on special
8232 forms of contemplation, and are not real. The latter consideration
8233 disposes also of the objection, that if Brahman has its abode in the
8234 heart, which heart-abode is a different one in each body, it would
8235 follow that it is affected by all the imperfections which attach to
8236 beings having different abodes, such as parrots shut up in different
8237 cages, viz. want of unity, being made up of parts, non-permanency, and
8238 so on.

8239
8240 8. If it is said that (from the circumstance of Brahman and the
8241 individual soul being one) there follows fruition (on the part of
8242 Brahman); we say, no; on account of the difference of nature (of the
8243 two).

8244
8245 But, it may be said, as Brahman is omnipresent like ether, and therefore
8246 connected with the hearts of all living beings, and as it is of the
8247 nature of intelligence and therefore not different from the individual
8248 soul, it follows that Brahman also has the same fruition of pleasure,
8249 pain, and so on (as the individual soul). The same result follows from
8250 its unity. For in reality there exists no transmigratory Self different
8251 from the highest Self; as appears from the text, 'There is no other
8252 knower but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23), and similar passages. Hence the
8253 highest Self is subject to the fruition connected with transmigratory
8254 existence.

8255
8256 This is not so, we reply; because there is a difference of nature. From
8257 the circumstance that Brahman is connected with the hearts of all living
8258 beings it does not follow that it is, like the embodied Self, subject to
8259 fruition. For, between the embodied Self and the highest Self, there is
8260 the difference that the former acts and enjoys, acquires merit and
8261 demerit, and is affected by pleasure, pain, and so on; while the latter
8262 is of the opposite nature, i.e. characterised by being free from all
8263 evil and the like. On account of this difference of the two, the
8264 fruition of the one does not extend to the other. To assume merely on
8265 the ground of the mutual proximity of the two, without considering their
8266 essentially different powers, that a connexion with effects exists (in
8267 Brahman's case also), would be no better than to suppose that space is
8268 on fire (when something in space is on fire). The same objection and
8269 refutation apply to the case of those also who teach the existence of
8270 more than one omnipresent Self. In reply to the assertion, that because
8271 Brahman is one and there are no other Selves outside it, Brahman must be
8272 subject to fruition since the individual soul is so, we ask the
8273 question: How have you, our wise opponent, ascertained that there is no
8274 other Self? You will reply, we suppose, from scriptural texts such as,
8275 'That art thou,' 'I am Brahman,' 'There is no other knower but he,' and
8276 so on. Very well, then, it appears that the truth about scriptural
8277 matters is to be ascertained from Scripture, and that Scripture is not
8278 sometimes to be appealed to, and on other occasions to be disregarded.

8279

8280 Scriptural texts, such as 'that art thou,' teach that Brahman which is
8281 free from all evil is the Self of the embodied soul, and thus dispel
8282 even the opinion that the embodied soul is subject to fruition; how then
8283 should fruition on the part of the embodied soul involve fruition on the
8284 part of Brahman?--Let, then, the unity of the individual soul and
8285 Brahman not be apprehended on the ground of Scripture.--In that case, we
8286 reply, the fruition on the part of the individual soul has wrong
8287 knowledge for its cause, and Brahman as it truly exists is not touched
8288 thereby, not any more than the ether becomes really dark-blue in
8289 consequence of ignorant people presuming it to be so. For this reason
8290 the Sutrakara says[140] 'no, on account of the difference.' In spite of
8291 their unity, fruition on the part of the soul does not involve fruition
8292 on the part of Brahman; because there is a difference. For there is a
8293 difference between false knowledge and perfect knowledge, fruition being
8294 the figment of false knowledge while the unity (of the Self) is revealed
8295 by perfect knowledge. Now, as the substance revealed by perfect
8296 knowledge cannot be affected by fruition which is nothing but the
8297 figment of false knowledge, it is impossible to assume even a shadow of
8298 fruition on Brahman's part.
8299

8300 9. The eater (is the highest Self) since what is movable and what is
8301 immovable is mentioned (as his food).
8302

8303 We read in the Ka/th/avalli (I, 2, 25), 'Who then knows where He is, He
8304 to whom the Brahmins and Kshattriyas are but food, and death itself a
8305 condiment?' This passage intimates, by means of the words 'food' and
8306 'condiment,' that there is some eater. A doubt then arises whether the
8307 eater be Agni or the individual soul or the highest Self; for no
8308 distinguishing characteristic is stated, and Agni as well as the
8309 individual soul and the highest Self is observed to form, in that
8310 Upanishad, the subjects of questions[141].
8311

8312 The purvapakshin maintains that the eater is Agni, fire being known from
8313 Scripture as well (cp. B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 6) as from ordinary life to be
8314 the eater of food. Or else the individual soul may be the eater,
8315 according to the passage, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit' (Mu. Up.
8316 III, 1, 1). On the other hand, the eater cannot be Brahman on account of
8317 the passage (which forms the continuation of the one quoted from the Mu.
8318 Up.), 'The other looks on without eating.'
8319

8320 The eater, we reply, must be the highest Self 'because there is
8321 mentioned what is movable and what is immovable.' For all things movable
8322 and immovable are here to be taken as constituting the food, while death
8323 is the condiment. But nothing beside the highest Self can be the
8324 consumer of all these things in their totality; the highest Self,
8325 however, when reabsorbing the entire aggregate of effects may be said to
8326 eat everything. If it is objected that here no express mention is made
8327 of things movable and things immovable, and that hence we have no right
8328 to use the (alleged) mention made of them as a reason, we reply that
8329 this objection is unfounded; firstly, because the aggregate of all
8330 living beings is seen to be meant from the circumstance of death being
8331 the condiment; and, secondly, because the Brahmins and Kshattriyas may
8332 here, on account of their pre-eminent position, be viewed as instances
8333 only (of all beings). Concerning the objection that the highest Self
8334 cannot be an eater on account of the passage quoted ('the other looks on
8335 without eating'), we remark that that passage aims at denying the
8336 fruition (on the part of the highest Self) of the results of works, such
8337 fruition being mentioned in immediate proximity, but is not meant to
8338 negative the reabsorption of the world of effects (into Brahman); for it
8339 is well established by all the Vedanta-texts that Brahman is the cause
8340 of the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world. Therefore
8341 the eater can here be Brahman only.
8342

8343 10. And on account of the topic under discussion. That the highest Self
8344 only can be the eater referred to is moreover evident from the passage
8345 (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18), ('The knowing Self is not born, it dies not'), which
8346 shows that the highest Self is the general topic. And to adhere to the
8347 general topic is the proper proceeding. Further, the clause, 'Who then
8348 knows where he is,' shows that the cognition is connected with

8349 difficulties; which circumstance again points to the highest Self.

8350

8351 11. The 'two entered into the cave' (are the individual soul and the
8352 highest Self), for the two are (intelligent) Selves (and therefore of the
8353 same nature), as it is seen (that numerals denote beings of the same
8354 nature).

8355

8356 In the same Ka/th/avalli we read (I, 3, 1), 'There are the two drinking
8357 the reward of their works in the world, (i.e. the body,) entered into
8358 the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those who know Brahman call
8359 them shade and light; likewise those householders who perform the
8360 Tri/n/a/k/iketa sacrifice.'

8361

8362 Here the doubt arises whether the mind (buddhi) and the individual soul
8363 are referred to, or the individual soul and the highest Self. If the
8364 mind and the individual soul, then the individual soul is here spoken of
8365 as different from the aggregate of the organs of action, (i.e. the
8366 body,) among which the mind occupies the first place. And a statement on
8367 this point is to be expected, as a question concerning it is asked in a
8368 preceding passage, viz. I, 1, 20, 'There is that doubt when a man is
8369 dead--some saying he is; others, he is not. This I should like to know
8370 taught by thee; this is the third of my boons.' If, on the other hand,
8371 the passage refers to the individual soul and the highest Self, then it
8372 intimates that the highest Self is different from the individual soul;
8373 and this also requires to be declared here, on account of the question
8374 contained in the passage (I, 2, 14), 'That which thou seest as different
8375 from religious duty and its contrary, from effect and cause, from the
8376 past and the future, tell me that.'

8377

8378 The doubt to which the passage gives rise having thus been stated, a
8379 caviller starts the following objection: neither of the stated views can
8380 be maintained.--Why?--On account of the characteristic mark implied in
8381 the circumstance that the two are said to drink, i.e. to enjoy, the
8382 fruit of their works in the world. For this can apply to the intelligent
8383 individual soul only, not to the non-intelligent buddhi. And as the dual
8384 form 'drinking' (pibantau) shows that both are drinking, the view of the
8385 two being the buddhi and the individual soul is not tenable. For the
8386 same reason the other opinion also, viz. of the two being the individual
8387 soul and the highest Self, cannot be maintained; for drinking (i.e. the
8388 fruition of reward) cannot be predicated of the highest Self, on account
8389 of the mantra (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1), 'The other looks on without eating.'

8390

8391 These objections, we reply, are without any force. Just as we see that
8392 in phrases such as 'the men with the umbrella (lit. the umbrella-men)
8393 are walking,' the attribute of being furnished with an umbrella which
8394 properly speaking belongs to one man only is secondarily ascribed to
8395 many, so here two agents are spoken of as drinking because one of them
8396 is really drinking. Or else we may explain the passage by saying that,
8397 while the individual soul only drinks, the Lord also is said to drink
8398 because he makes the soul drink. On the other hand, we may also assume
8399 that the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, the instrument
8400 being figuratively spoken of as the agent--a figure of speech
8401 exemplified by phrases such as 'the fuel cooks (the food).' And in a
8402 chapter whose topic is the soul no two other beings can well be
8403 represented as enjoying rewards. Hence there is room for the doubt
8404 whether the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, or the
8405 individual soul and the highest Self.

8406

8407 Here the purvapakshin maintains that the former of the two stated views
8408 is the right one, because the two beings are qualified as 'entered into
8409 the cave.' Whether we understand by the cave the body or the heart, in
8410 either case the buddhi and the individual soul may be spoken of as
8411 'entered into the cave.' Nor would it be appropriate, as long as another
8412 interpretation is possible, to assume that a special place is here
8413 ascribed to the omnipresent Brahman. Moreover, the words 'in the world
8414 of their good deeds' show that the two do not pass beyond the sphere of
8415 the results of their good works. But the highest Self is not in the
8416 sphere of the results of either good or bad works; according to the
8417 scriptural passage, 'It does not grow larger by works nor does it grow

8418 smaller.' Further, the words 'shade and light' properly designate what
8419 is intelligent and what is non-intelligent, because the two are opposed
8420 to each other like light and shade. Hence we conclude that the buddhi
8421 and the individual soul are spoken of.

8422
8423 To this we make the following reply:--In the passage under discussion
8424 the individual soul (vij/n/anatman) and the highest Self are spoken of,
8425 because these two, being both intelligent Selves, are of the same nature.
8426 For we see that in ordinary life also, whenever a number is mentioned,
8427 beings of the same class are understood to be meant; when, for instance,
8428 the order is given, 'Look out for a second (i.e. a fellow) for this
8429 bull,' people look out for a second bull, not for a horse or a man. So
8430 here also, where the mention of the fruition of rewards enables us to
8431 determine that the individual soul is meant, we understand at once, when
8432 a second is required, that the highest Self has to be understood; for
8433 the highest Self is intelligent, and therefore of the same nature as the
8434 soul.--But has it not been said above that the highest Self cannot be
8435 meant here, on account of the text stating that it is placed in the
8436 cave?--Well, we reply, /s/ruti as well as sm/ri/ti speaks of the highest
8437 Self as placed in the cave. Compare, for instance (Ka. Up. I, 2, 12),
8438 'The Ancient who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss;' Taitt.
8439 Up. II, 1, 'He who knows him hidden in the cave, in the highest ether;'
8440 and, 'Search for the Self entered into the cave.' That it is not
8441 contrary to reason to assign to the omnipresent Brahman a special
8442 locality, for the purpose of clearer perception, we have already
8443 demonstrated. The attribute of existing in the world of its good works,
8444 which properly belongs to one of the two only, viz. to the individual
8445 soul, may be assigned to both, analogously to the case of the men, one
8446 of whom carries an umbrella. Their being compared to light and shade
8447 also is unobjectionable, because the qualities of belonging and not
8448 belonging to this transmigratory world are opposed to each other, like
8449 light and shade; the quality of belonging to it being due to Nescience,
8450 and the quality of not belonging to it being real. We therefore
8451 understand by the two 'entered into the cave,' the individual soul and
8452 the highest Self.--Another reason for this interpretation follows.

8453
8454 12. And on account of the distinctive qualities (mentioned).
8455

8456 Moreover, the distinctive qualities mentioned in the text agree only
8457 with the individual Self and the highest Self. For in a subsequent
8458 passage (I, 3, 3), 'Know the Self to be the charioteer, the body to be
8459 the chariot,' which contains the simile of the chariot, the individual
8460 soul is represented as a charioteer driving on through transmigratory
8461 existence and final release, while the passage (9), 'He reaches the end
8462 of his journey, and that is the highest place of Vish/n/u,' represents
8463 the highest Self as the goal of the driver's course. And in a preceding
8464 passage also, (I, 2, 12, 'The wise, who by means of meditation on his
8465 Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has
8466 entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the
8467 abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind,') the same
8468 two beings are distinguished as thinker and as object of thought. The
8469 highest Self is, moreover, the general topic. And further, the clause,
8470 'Those who know Brahman call them,' &c., which brings forward a special
8471 class of speakers, is in its place only if the highest Self is accepted
8472 (as one of the two beings spoken of). It is therefore evident that the
8473 passage under discussion refers to the individual soul and the highest
8474 Self.

8475
8476 The same reasoning applies to the passage (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1), 'Two
8477 birds, inseparable friends,' &c. There also the Self is the general
8478 topic, and hence no two ordinary birds can be meant; we therefore
8479 conclude from the characteristic mark of eating, mentioned in the
8480 passage, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit,' that the individual soul is
8481 meant, and from the characteristic marks of abstinence from eating and
8482 of intelligence, implied in the words, 'The other looks on without
8483 eating,' that the highest Self is meant. In a subsequent mantra again
8484 the two are distinguished as the seer and the object of sight. 'Merged
8485 into the same tree (as it were into water) man grieves at his own
8486 impotence (ani/s/a), bewildered; but when he sees the other Lord

(i/s/a.) contented and knows his glory, then his grief passes away.'

Another (commentator) gives a different interpretation of the mantra, 'Two birds inseparable,' &c. To that mantra, he says, the final decision of the present head of discussion does not apply, because it is differently interpreted in the Pai@ngi-rahasya Brahma/n/a. According to the latter the being which eats the sweet fruit is the sattva; the other being which looks on without eating, the individual soul (j/n/a); so that the two are the sattva and the individual soul (kshetraj/n/a). The objection that the word sattva might denote the individual soul, and the word kshetraj/n/a, the highest Self, is to be met by the remark that, in the first place, the words sattva and kshetraj/n/a have the settled meaning of internal organ and individual soul, and are in the second place, expressly so interpreted there, (viz. in the Pai@ngi-rahasya,) 'The sattva is that by means of which man sees dreams; the embodied one, the seer, is the kshetraj/n/a; the two are therefore the internal organ and the individual soul.' Nor does the mantra under discussion fall under the purvapaksha propounded above. For it does not aim at setting forth the embodied individual soul, in so far as it is characterised by the attributes connected with the transmigratory state, such as acting and enjoying; but in so far rather as it transcends all attributes connected with the sa/m/sara and is of the nature of Brahman, i.e. is pure intelligence; as is evident from the clause, 'The other looks on without eating.' That agrees, moreover, with /s/ruti and sm/ri/ti passages, such as, 'That art thou,' and 'Know me also to be the individual soul' (Bha. Gita XIII, 2). Only on such an explanation of the passage as the preceding one there is room for the declaration made in the concluding passage of the section, 'These two are the sattva and the kshetraj/n/a; to him indeed who knows this no impurity attaches[142].'

--But how can, on the above interpretation, the non-intelligent sattva (i.e. the internal organ) be spoken of as an enjoyer, as is actually done in the clause, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit?'--The whole passage, we reply, does not aim at setting forth the fact that the sattva is an enjoyer, but rather the fact that the intelligent individual soul is not an enjoyer, but is of the nature of Brahman. To that end[143] the passage under discussion metaphorically ascribes the attribute of being an enjoyer to the internal organ, in so far as it is modified by pleasure, pain, and the like. For all acting and enjoying is at the bottom based on the non-discrimination (by the soul) of the respective nature of internal organ and soul: while in reality neither the internal organ nor the soul either act or enjoy; not the former, because it is non-intelligent; not the latter, because it is not capable of any modification. And the internal organ can be considered as acting and enjoying, all the less as it is a mere presentment of Nescience. In agreement with what we have here maintained, Scripture ('For where there is as it were duality there one sees the other,' &c.; B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15) declares that the practical assumption of agents, and so on--comparable to the assumption of the existence of elephants, and the like, seen in a dream--holds good in the sphere of Nescience only; while the passage, 'But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' declares that all that practically postulated existence vanishes for him who has arrived at discriminative knowledge.

13. The person within (the eye) (is Brahman) on account of the agreement (of the attributes of that person with the nature of Brahman).

Scripture says, 'He spoke: The person that is seen in the eye that is the Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman. Even though they drop melted butter or water on it (the eye) it runs away on both sides,' &c. (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 1).

The doubt here arises whether this passage refers to the reflected Self which resides in the eye, or to the individual Self, or to the Self of some deity which presides over the sense of sight, or to the Lord.

With reference to this doubt the purvapakshin argues as follows: What is meant (by the person in the eye) is the reflected Self, i.e. the image of a person (reflected in the eye of another): for of that it is well

8556 known that it is seen, and the clause, 'The person that is seen in the
8557 eye,' refers to it as something well known. Or else we may appropriately
8558 take the passage as referring to the individual Self. For the individual
8559 Self (cognitional Self, vij/n/anatman) which perceives the colours by
8560 means of the eye is, on that account, in proximity to the eye; and,
8561 moreover, the word 'Self' (which occurs in the passage) favours this
8562 interpretation. Or else the passage is to be understood as referring to
8563 the soul animating the sun which assists the sense of sight; compare the
8564 passage (B/ri/. Up. V, 5, 2), 'He (the person in the sun) rests with his
8565 rays in him (the person in the right eye).' Moreover, qualities such as
8566 immortality and the like (which are ascribed to the subject of the
8567 scriptural passage) may somehow belong to individual deities. The Lord,
8568 on the other hand[144], cannot be meant, because a particular locality
8569 is spoken of.

8570
8571 Against this we remark that the highest Lord only can be meant here by
8572 the person within the eye.--Why?--'On account of the agreement.' For the
8573 qualities mentioned in the passage accord with the nature of the highest
8574 Lord. The quality of being the Self, in the first place, belongs to the
8575 highest Lord in its primary (non-figurative or non-derived) sense, as we
8576 know from such texts as 'That is the Self,' 'That art thou.' Immortality
8577 and fearlessness again are often ascribed to him in Scripture. The
8578 location in the eye also is in consonance with the nature of the highest
8579 Lord. For just as the highest Lord whom Scripture declares to be free
8580 from all evil is not stained by any imperfections, so the station of the
8581 eye also is declared to be free from all stain, as we see from the
8582 passage, 'Even though they drop melted butter or water on it it runs
8583 away on both sides.' The statement, moreover, that he possesses the
8584 qualities of sa/m/yadvama, &c. can be reconciled with the highest Lord
8585 only (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 2, 'They call him Sa/m/yadvama, for all blessings
8586 (vama) go towards him (sa/m/yanti). He is also vamani, for he leads
8587 (nayati) all blessings (vama). He is also Bhamani, for he shines (bhati)
8588 in all worlds'). Therefore, on account of agreement, the person within
8589 the eye is the highest Lord.

8590
8591 14. And on account of the statement of place, and so on.

8592
8593 But how does the confined locality of the eye agree with Brahman which
8594 is omnipresent like the ether?--To this question we reply that there
8595 would indeed be a want of agreement if that one locality only were
8596 assigned to the Lord. For other localities also, viz. the earth and so
8597 on, are attributed to him in the passage, 'He who dwells in the earth,'
8598 &c. (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 3). And among those the eye also is mentioned,
8599 viz. in the clause, 'He who dwells in the eye,' &c. The phrase 'and so
8600 on,' which forms part of the Sutra, intimates that not only locality is
8601 assigned to Brahman, although not (really) appropriate to it, but that
8602 also such things as name and form, although not appropriate to Brahman
8603 which is devoid of name and form, are yet seen to be attributed to it.
8604 That, in such passages as 'His name is ut, he with the golden beard'
8605 (Ch. Up. I, 6, 7, 6), Brahman although devoid of qualities is spoken of,
8606 for the purposes of devotion, as possessing qualities depending on name
8607 and form, we have already shown. And we have, moreover, shown that to
8608 attribute to Brahman a definite locality, in spite of his omnipresence,
8609 subserves the purposes of contemplation, and is therefore not contrary
8610 to reason[145]; no more than to contemplate Vish/n/u in the sacred
8611 /s/alagram.

8612
8613 15. And on account of the passage referring to that which is
8614 distinguished by pleasure (i.e. Brahman).

8615
8616 There is, moreover, really no room for dispute whether Brahman be meant
8617 in the passage under discussion or not, because the fact of Brahman
8618 being meant is established 'by the reference to that which is
8619 distinguished by pleasure.' For the same Brahman which is spoken of as
8620 characterised by pleasure in the beginning of the chapter[146], viz. in
8621 the clauses, 'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' that
8622 same Brahman we must suppose to be referred to in the present passage
8623 also, it being proper to adhere to the subject-matter under discussion;
8624 the clause, 'The teacher will tell you the way[147],' merely announcing

8625 that the way will be proclaimed [by the teacher; not that a new subject
8626 will be started].--How then, it may be asked, is it known that Brahman,
8627 as distinguished by pleasure, is spoken of in the beginning of the
8628 passage?--We reply: On hearing the speech of the fires, viz. 'Breath is
8629 Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' Upako/s/ala says, 'I understand
8630 that breath is Brahman, but I do not understand that Ka or Kha is
8631 Brahman.' Thereupon the fires reply, 'What is Ka is Kha, what is Kha is
8632 Ka.' Now the word Kha denotes in ordinary language the elemental ether.
8633 If therefore the word Ka which means pleasure were not applied to
8634 qualify the sense of 'Kha,' we should conclude that the name Brahman is
8635 here symbolically[148] given to the mere elemental ether as it is (in
8636 other places) given to mere names and the like. Thus also with regard to
8637 the word Ka, which, in ordinary language, denotes the imperfect pleasure
8638 springing from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. If
8639 the word Kha were not applied to qualify the sense of Ka we should
8640 conclude that ordinary pleasure is here called Brahman. But as the two
8641 words Ka and Kha (occur together and therefore) qualify each other, they
8642 intimate Brahman whose Self is pleasure. If[149] in the passage referred
8643 to (viz. 'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman') the second
8644 Brahman (i.e. the word Brahman in the clause 'Ka is Brahman') were not
8645 added, and if the sentence would run 'Ka, Kha is Brahman,' the word Ka
8646 would be employed as a mere qualifying word, and thus pleasure as being
8647 a mere quality would not be represented as a subject of meditation. To
8648 prevent this, both words--Ka as well as Kha--are joined with the word
8649 Brahman ('Ka (is) Brahman, Kha (is) Brahman'). For the passage wishes to
8650 intimate that pleasure also, although a quality, should be meditated
8651 upon as something in which qualities inhere. It thus appears that at the
8652 beginning of the chapter Brahman, as characterised by pleasure, is
8653 spoken of. After that the Garhapatya and the other sacred fires proclaim
8654 in turns their own glory, and finally conclude with the words, 'This is
8655 our knowledge, O friend, and the knowledge of the Self;' wherein they
8656 point back to the Brahman spoken of before. The words, 'The teacher will
8657 tell you the way' (which form the last clause of the concluding
8658 passage), merely promise an explanation of the way, and thus preclude
8659 the idea of another topic being started. The teacher thereupon saying,
8660 'As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to one
8661 who knows it' (which words intervene between the concluding speech of
8662 the fires and the information given by the teacher about the person
8663 within the eye) declares that no evil attacks him who knows the person
8664 within the eye, and thereby shows the latter to be Brahman. It thus
8665 appears that the teacher's intention is to speak about that Brahman
8666 which had formed the topic of the instruction of the fires; to represent
8667 it at first as located in the eye and possessing the qualities of
8668 Sa/m/yadvama and the like, and to point out afterwards that he who thus
8669 knows passes on to light and so on. He therefore begins by saying, 'That
8670 person that is seen in the eye that is the Self.'

8671
8672 16. And on account of the statement of the way of him who has heard the
8673 Upanishads.

8674
8675 The person placed in the eye is the highest lord for the following
8676 reason also. From /s/ruti as well as sm/ri/ti we are acquainted with the
8677 way of him who has heard the Upanishads or the secret knowledge, i.e.
8678 who knows Brahman. That way, called the path of the gods, is described
8679 (Pra. Up. I, 10), 'Those who have sought the Self by penance,
8680 abstinence, faith, and knowledge gain by the northern path the sun. This
8681 is the home of the spirits, the immortal, free from fear, the highest.
8682 From thence they do not return;' and also (Bha. Gita VIII, 24), 'Fire,
8683 light, the bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of
8684 the sun, on that way those who know Brahman go, when they have died, to
8685 Brahman.' Now that very same way is seen to be stated, in our text, for
8686 him who knows the person within the eye. For we read (Ch. Up. IV, 15,
8687 5), 'Now whether people perform obsequies for him or no he goes to
8688 light;' and later on, 'From the sun (he goes) to the moon, from the moon
8689 to lightning. There is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman.
8690 This is the path of the gods, the path that leads to Brahman. Those who
8691 proceed on that path do not return to the life of man.' From this
8692 description of the way which is known to be the way of him who knows
8693 Brahman we ascertain that the person within the eye is Brahman.

8694
8695 17. (The person within the eye is the highest), not any other Self; on
8696 account of the non-permanency (of the other Selves) and on account of the
8697 impossibility (of the qualities of the person in the eye being ascribed
8698 to the other Selves).

8699
8700 To the assertion made in the purvapaksha that the person in the eye is
8701 either the reflected Self or the cognitional Self (the individual soul)
8702 or the Self of some deity the following answer is given.--No other Self
8703 such as, for instance, the reflected Self can be assumed here, on
8704 account of non-permanency.--The reflected Self, in the first place, does
8705 not permanently abide in the eye. For when some person approaches the
8706 eye the reflection of that person is seen in the eye, but when the
8707 person moves away the reflection is seen no longer. The passage 'That
8708 person within the eye' must, moreover, be held, on the ground of
8709 proximity, to intimate that the person seen in a man's own eye is the
8710 object of (that man's) devout meditation (and not the reflected image of
8711 his own person which he may see in the eye of another man). [Let, then,
8712 another man approach the devout man, and let the latter meditate on the
8713 image reflected in his own eye, but seen by the other man only. No, we
8714 reply, for] we have no right to make the (complicated) assumption that
8715 the devout man is, at the time of devotion, to bring close to his eye
8716 another man in order to produce a reflected image in his own eye.
8717 Scripture, moreover, (viz. Ch. Up. VIII, 9, 1, 'It (the reflected Self)
8718 perishes as soon as the body perishes,') declares the non-permanency of
8719 the reflected Self.--And, further, 'on account of impossibility' (the
8720 person in the eye cannot be the reflected Self). For immortality and the
8721 other qualities ascribed to the person in the eye are not to be
8722 perceived in the reflected Self.--Of the cognitional Self, in the second
8723 place, which is in general connexion with the whole body and all the
8724 senses, it can likewise not be said that it has its permanent station in
8725 the eye only. That, on the other hand, Brahman although all-pervading
8726 may, for the purpose of contemplation, be spoken of as connected with
8727 particular places such as the heart and the like, we have seen already.
8728 The cognitional Self shares (with the reflected Self) the impossibility
8729 of having the qualities of immortality and so on attributed to it.
8730 Although the cognitional Self is in reality not different from the
8731 highest Self, still there are fictitiously ascribed to it (adhyaropita)
8732 the effects of nescience, desire and works, viz, mortality and fear; so
8733 that neither immortality nor fearlessness belongs to it. The qualities
8734 of being the sa/m/yadvama, &c. also cannot properly be ascribed to the
8735 cognitional Self, which is not distinguished by lordly power
8736 (ai/s/varya).--In the third place, although the Self of a deity (viz.
8737 the sun) has its station in the eye--according to the scriptural
8738 passage, 'He rests with his rays in him'--still Selfhood cannot be
8739 ascribed to the sun, on account of his externality (paragrupatva).
8740 Immortality, &c. also cannot be predicated of him, as Scripture speaks
8741 of his origin and his dissolution. For the (so-called) deathlessness of
8742 the gods only means their (comparatively) long existence. And their
8743 lordly power also is based on the highest Lord and does not naturally
8744 belong to them; as the mantra declares, 'From terror of it (Brahman) the
8745 wind blows, from terror the sun rises; from terror of it Agni and Indra,
8746 yea, Death runs as the fifth.'--Hence the person in the eye must be
8747 viewed as the highest Lord only. In the case of this explanation being
8748 adopted the mention (of the person in the eye) as something well known
8749 and established, which is contained in the words 'is seen' (in the
8750 phrase 'the person that is seen in the eye'), has to be taken as
8751 referring to (the mental perception founded on) the /s/astra which
8752 belongs to those who know; and the glorification (of devout meditation)
8753 has to be understood as its purpose.

8754
8755 18. The internal ruler over the devas and so on (is Brahman), because
8756 the attributes of that (Brahman) are designated.

8757
8758 In B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 1 ff. we read, 'He who within rules this world and
8759 the other world and all beings,' and later on, 'He who dwells in the
8760 earth and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the
8761 earth is, who rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within,
8762 the immortal,' &c. The entire chapter (to sum up its contents) speaks of

8763 a being, called the antaryamin (the internal ruler), who, dwelling
8764 within, rules with reference to the gods, the world, the Veda, the
8765 sacrifice, the beings, the Self.--Here now, owing to the unusualness of
8766 the term (antaryamin), there arises a doubt whether it denotes the Self
8767 of some deity which presides over the gods and so on, or some Yogin who
8768 has acquired extraordinary powers, such as, for instance, the capability
8769 of making his body subtle, or the highest Self, or some other being.
8770 What alternative then does recommend itself?

8771
8772 As the term is an unknown one, the purvapakshin says, we must assume
8773 that the being denoted by it is also an unknown one, different from all
8774 those mentioned above.--Or else it may be said that, on the one hand, we
8775 have no right to assume something of an altogether indefinite character,
8776 and that, on the other hand, the term antaryamin--which is derived from
8777 antaryamana (ruling within)--cannot be called altogether unknown, that
8778 therefore antaryamin may be assumed to denote some god presiding over
8779 the earth, and so on. Similarly, we read (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 16), 'He
8780 whose dwelling is the earth, whose sight is fire, whose mind is light,'
8781 &c. A god of that kind is capable of ruling the earth, and so on,
8782 dwelling within them, because he is endowed with the organs of action;
8783 rulership is therefore rightly ascribed to him.--Or else the rulership
8784 spoken of may belong to some Yogin whom his extraordinary powers enable
8785 to enter within all things.--The highest Self, on the other hand, cannot
8786 be meant, as it does not possess the organs of action (which are
8787 required for ruling).

8788
8789 To this we make the following reply.--The internal ruler, of whom
8790 Scripture speaks with reference to the gods, must be the highest Self,
8791 cannot be anything else.--Why so?--Because its qualities are designated
8792 in the passage under discussion. The universal rulership implied in the
8793 statement that, dwelling within, it rules the entire aggregate of
8794 created beings, inclusive of the gods, and so on, is an appropriate
8795 attribute of the highest Self, since omnipotence depends on (the
8796 omnipotent ruler) being the cause of all created things.--The qualities
8797 of Selfhood and immortality also, which are mentioned in the passage,
8798 'He is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal,' belong in their
8799 primary sense to the highest Self.--Further, the passage, 'He whom the
8800 earth does not know,' which declares that the internal ruler is not
8801 known by the earth-deity, shows him to be different from that deity; for
8802 the deity of the earth knows itself to be the earth.--The attributes
8803 'unseen,' 'unheard,' also point to the highest Self, which is devoid of
8804 shape and other sensible qualities.--The objection that the highest Self
8805 is destitute of the organs of action, and hence cannot be a ruler, is
8806 without force, because organs of action may be ascribed to him owing to
8807 the organs of action of those whom he rules.--If it should be objected
8808 that [if we once admit an internal ruler in addition to the individual
8809 soul] we are driven to assume again another and another ruler ad
8810 infinitum; we reply that this is not the case, as actually there is no
8811 other ruler (but the highest Self[150]). The objection would be valid
8812 only in the case of a difference of rulers actually existing.--For all
8813 these reasons, the internal ruler is no other but the highest Self.

8814
8815 19. And (the internal ruler is) not that which the Sm/ri/ti assumes,
8816 (viz. the pradhana,) on account of the statement of qualities not
8817 belonging to it.

8818
8819 Good so far, a Sa@nkhyas opponent resumes. The attributes, however, of
8820 not being seen, &c., belong also to the pradhana assumed by the
8821 Sa@nkhyas-sm/ri/ti, which is acknowledged to be devoid of form and other
8822 sensible qualities. For their Sm/ri/ti says, 'Undiscoverable,
8823 unknowable, as if wholly in sleep' (Manu I, 5). To this pradhana also
8824 the attribute of rulership belongs, as it is the cause of all effects.
8825 Therefore the internal ruler may be understood to denote the pradhana.
8826 The pradhana has, indeed, been set aside already by the Sutra I, 1, 5,
8827 but we bring it forward again, because we find that attributes belonging
8828 to it, such as not being seen and the like, are mentioned in Scripture.

8829
8830 To this argumentation the Sutrakara replies that the word 'internal
8831 ruler' cannot denote the pradhana, because qualities not belonging to

8832 the latter are stated. For, although the pradhana may be spoken of as
8833 not being seen, &c, it cannot be spoken of as seeing, since the
8834 Sa@nkhyas admit it to be non-intelligent. But the scriptural passage
8835 which forms the complement to the passage about the internal ruler
8836 (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23) says expressly, 'Unseen but seeing, unheard but
8837 hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.'--And Selfhood
8838 also cannot belong to the pradhana.

8839
8840 Well, then, if the term 'internal ruler' cannot be admitted to denote
8841 the pradhana, because the latter is neither a Self nor seeing; let us
8842 suppose it to denote the embodied (individual) soul, which is
8843 intelligent, and therefore hears, sees, perceives, knows; which is
8844 internal (pratya/nk/), and therefore of the nature of Self; and which is
8845 immortal, because it is able to enjoy the fruits of its good and evil
8846 actions. It is, moreover, a settled matter that the attributes of not
8847 being seen, &c., belong to the embodied soul, because the agent of an
8848 action, such as seeing, cannot at the same time be the object of the
8849 action. This is declared in scriptural passages also, as, for instance
8850 (B/ri/. Up. III, 4, 2), 'Thou couldst not see the seer of sight.' The
8851 individual soul is, moreover, capable of inwardly ruling the complex of
8852 the organs of action, as it is the enjoyer. Therefore the internal ruler
8853 is the embodied soul.--To this reasoning the following Sutra replies.

8854
8855 20. And the embodied soul (also cannot be understood by the internal
8856 ruler), for both also (i.e. both recensions of the B/ri/had Ara/n/yaka)
8857 speak of it as different (from the internal ruler).

8858
8859 The word 'not' (in the Sutra) has to be supplied from the preceding
8860 Sutra. Although the attributes of seeing, &c., belong to the individual
8861 soul, still as the soul is limited by its adjuncts, as the ether is by a
8862 jar, it is not capable of dwelling completely within the earth and the
8863 other beings mentioned, and to rule them. Moreover, the followers of
8864 both /s/akhas, i.e. the Ka/n/vas as well as the Madhyandinas, speak in
8865 their texts of the individual soul as different from the internal ruler,
8866 viz. as constituting, like the earth, and so on, his abode and the
8867 object of his rule. The Ka/n/vas read (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 22), 'He who
8868 dwells in knowledge;' the Madhyandinas, 'He who dwells in the Self.' If
8869 the latter reading is adopted, the word 'Self' denotes the individual
8870 soul; if the former, the individual soul is denoted by the word
8871 'knowledge;' for the individual soul consists of knowledge. It is
8872 therefore a settled matter that some being different from the individual
8873 soul, viz. the lord, is denoted by the term 'internal ruler.'--But how,
8874 it may be asked, is it possible that there should be within one body two
8875 seers, viz. the lord who rules internally and the individual soul
8876 different from him?--Why--we ask in return--should that be
8877 impossible?--Because, the opponent replies, it is contrary to scriptural
8878 passages, such as, 'There is no other seer but he,' &c., which deny that
8879 there is any seeing, hearing, perceiving, knowing Self, but the internal
8880 ruler under discussion.--May, we rejoin, that passage not have the
8881 purpose of denying the existence of another ruler?--No, the opponent
8882 replies, for there is no occasion for another ruler (and therefore no
8883 occasion for denying his existence), and the text does not contain any
8884 specification, (but merely denies the existence of any other seer in
8885 general.)

8886
8887 We therefore advance the following final refutation of the opponent's
8888 objection.--The declaration of the difference of the embodied Self and
8889 the internal ruler has its reason in the limiting adjunct, consisting of
8890 the organs of action, presented by Nescience, and is not absolutely
8891 true. For the Self within is one only; two internal Selves are not
8892 possible. But owing to its limiting adjunct the one Self is practically
8893 treated as if it were two; just as we make a distinction between the
8894 ether of the jar and the universal ether. Hence there is room for those
8895 scriptural passages which set forth the distinction of knower and object
8896 of knowledge, for perception and the other means of proof, for the
8897 intuitive knowledge of the apparent world, and for that part of
8898 Scripture which contains injunctions and prohibitions. In accordance
8899 with this, the scriptural passage, 'Where there is duality, as it were,
8900 there one sees another,' declares that the whole practical world exists

8901 only in the sphere of Nescience; while the subsequent passage, 'But when
8902 the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' declares that the
8903 practical world vanishes in the sphere of true knowledge.

8904
8905 21. That which possesses the attributes of invisibility and so on (is
8906 Brahman), on account of the declaration of attributes.

8907
8908 Scripture says, 'The higher knowledge is this by which the
8909 Indestructible is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor seized,
8910 which is without origin and qualities, without eyes and ears, without
8911 hands and feet, the eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent, infinitesimal,
8912 that which is imperishable, that it is which the wise regard as the
8913 source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5; 6).--Here the doubt arises
8914 whether the source of all beings which is spoken of as characterised by
8915 invisibility, &c. be the pradhana or the embodied soul, or the highest
8916 Lord.

8917
8918 We must, the purvapakshin says, understand by the source of all beings
8919 the non-intelligent pradhana because (in the passage immediately
8920 subsequent to the one quoted) only non-intelligent beings are mentioned
8921 as parallel instances. 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its
8922 thread, as plants grow on the earth, as from the living man hairs spring
8923 forth on the head and the body, thus everything arises here from the
8924 Indestructible.'--But, it may be objected, men and spiders which are
8925 here quoted as parallel instances are of intelligent nature.--No, the
8926 purvapakshin replies; for the intelligent being as such is not the
8927 source of the threads and the hair, but everybody knows that the
8928 non-intelligent body of the spider ruled by intelligence is the source
8929 of the threads; and so in the case of man also.--While, moreover, in the
8930 case of the preceding Sutra, the pradhana hypothesis could not be
8931 accepted, because, although some qualities mentioned, such as
8932 invisibility and so on, agreed with it, others such as being the seer
8933 and the like did not; we have here to do only with attributes such as
8934 invisibility which agree with the pradhana, no attribute of a contrary
8935 nature being mentioned.--But the qualities mentioned in the
8936 complementary passage (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9), 'He who knows all and perceives
8937 all,' do not agree with the non-intelligent pradhana; how, then, can the
8938 source of all beings be interpreted to mean the pradhana?--To this the
8939 purvapakshin replies: The passage, 'The higher knowledge is that by
8940 which the Indestructible is apprehended, that which cannot be seen,'
8941 &c., points, by means of the term 'the Indestructible,' to the source of
8942 all beings characterised by invisibility and similar attributes. This
8943 same 'Indestructible' is again mentioned later on in the passage, 'It is
8944 higher than the high Imperishable.' Now that which in this latter
8945 passage is spoken of as higher than the Imperishable may possess the
8946 qualities of knowing and perceiving everything, while the pradhana
8947 denoted by the term 'the Imperishable' is the source of all beings.--If,
8948 however, the word 'source' (yoni) be taken in the sense of operative
8949 cause, we may by 'the source of the beings' understand the embodied Self
8950 also, which, by means of merit and demerit, is the cause of the origin
8951 of the complex of things.

8952
8953 To this we make the following reply.--That which here is spoken of as
8954 the source of all beings, distinguished by such qualities as
8955 invisibility and so on, can be the highest Lord only, nothing
8956 else.--Whereupon is this conclusion founded?--On the statement of
8957 attributes. For the clause, 'He who is all-knowing, all-perceiving,'
8958 clearly states an attribute belonging to the highest Lord only, since
8959 the attributes of knowing all and perceiving all cannot be predicated
8960 either of the non-intelligent pradhana or the embodied soul whose power
8961 of sight is narrowed by its limiting conditions. To the objection that
8962 the qualities of knowing and perceiving all are, in the passage under
8963 discussion, attributed to that which is higher than the source of all
8964 beings--which latter is denoted by the term 'the Imperishable'--not to
8965 the source itself, we reply that this explanation is inadmissible
8966 because the source of all beings, which--in the clause, 'From the
8967 Indestructible everything here arises'--is designated as the material
8968 cause of all created beings, is later on spoken of as all-knowing, and
8969 again as the cause of all created beings, viz. in the passage (I, 1, 9),

8970 'From him who knows all and perceives all, whose brooding consists of
8971 knowledge, from him is born that Brahman, name, form, and food.' As
8972 therefore the Indestructible which forms the general topic of discussion
8973 is, owing to the identity of designation, recognised (as being referred
8974 to in the later passage also), we understand that it is the same
8975 Indestructible to which the attributes of knowing and perceiving all are
8976 ascribed.--We further maintain that also the passage, 'Higher than the
8977 high Imperishable,' does not refer to any being different from the
8978 imperishable source of all beings which is the general topic of
8979 discussion. We conclude this from the circumstance that the passage, 'He
8980 truly told that knowledge of Brahman through which he knows the
8981 imperishable true person,' (I, 2, 13; which passage leads on to the
8982 passage about that which is higher than the Imperishable,) merely
8983 declares that the imperishable source of all beings, distinguished by
8984 invisibility and the like--which formed the subject of the preceding
8985 chapter--will be discussed. The reason why that imperishable source is
8986 called higher than the high Imperishable, we shall explain under the
8987 next Sutra.--Moreover, two kinds of knowledge are enjoined there (in the
8988 Upanishad), a lower and a higher one. Of the lower one it is said that
8989 it comprises the /Ri/g-veda and so on, and then the text continues, 'The
8990 higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended.'
8991 Here the Indestructible is declared to be the subject of the higher
8992 knowledge. If we now were to assume that the Indestructible
8993 distinguished by invisibility and like qualities is something different
8994 from the highest Lord, the knowledge referring to it would not be the
8995 higher one. For the distinction of lower and higher knowledge is made on
8996 account of the diversity of their results, the former leading to mere
8997 worldly exaltation, the latter to absolute bliss; and nobody would
8998 assume absolute bliss to result from the knowledge of the
8999 pradhana.--Moreover, as on the view we are controverting the highest
9000 Self would be assumed to be something higher than the imperishable
9001 source of all beings, three kinds of knowledge would have to be
9002 acknowledged, while the text expressly speaks of two kinds
9003 only.--Further, the reference to the knowledge of everything being
9004 implied in the knowledge of one thing--which is contained in the passage
9005 (I, 1, 3), 'Sir, what is that through which if it is known everything
9006 else becomes known?'--is possible only if the allusion is to Brahman the
9007 Self of all, and not either to the pradhana which comprises only what is
9008 non-intelligent or to the enjoyer viewed apart from the objects of
9009 enjoyment.--The text, moreover, by introducing the knowledge of Brahman
9010 as the chief subject--which it does in the passage (I, 1, 1), 'He told
9011 the knowledge of Brahman, the foundation of all knowledge, to his eldest
9012 son Atharvan'--and by afterwards declaring that out of the two kinds of
9013 knowledge, viz. the lower one and the higher one, the higher one leads
9014 to the comprehension of the Imperishable, shows that the knowledge of
9015 the Imperishable is the knowledge of Brahman. On the other hand, the
9016 term 'knowledge of Brahman' would become meaningless if that
9017 Imperishable which is to be comprehended by means of it were not
9018 Brahman. The lower knowledge of works which comprises the /Ri/g-veda,
9019 and so on, is mentioned preliminarily to the knowledge of Brahman for
9020 the mere purpose of glorifying the latter; as appears from the passages
9021 in which it (the lower knowledge) is spoken of slightly, such as (I,
9022 2, 7), 'But frail indeed are those boats, the sacrifices, the eighteen
9023 in which this lower ceremonial has been told. Fools who praise this as
9024 the highest good are subject again and again to old age and death.'
9025 After these slighting remarks the text declares that he who turns away
9026 from the lower knowledge is prepared for the highest one (I, 2, 12),
9027 'Let a Brahmana after he has examined all these worlds which are
9028 gained by works acquire freedom from all desires. Nothing that is
9029 eternal (not made) can be gained by what is not eternal (made). Let him
9030 in order to understand this take fuel in his hand and approach a guru
9031 who is learned and dwells entirely in Brahman.'--The remark that,
9032 because the earth and other non-intelligent things are adduced as
9033 parallel instances, that also which is compared to them, viz. the source
9034 of all beings must be non-intelligent, is without foundation, since it
9035 is not necessary that two things of which one is compared to the other
9036 should be of absolutely the same nature. The things, moreover, to which
9037 the source of all beings is compared, viz. the earth and the like, are
9038 material, while nobody would assume the source of all beings to be

9039 material.--For all these reasons the source of all beings, which
9040 possesses the attributes of invisibility and so on, is the highest Lord.

9041
9042 22. The two others (i.e. the individual soul and the pradhana) are not
9043 (the source of all beings) because there are stated distinctive
9044 attributes and difference.

9045
9046 The source of all beings is the highest Lord, not either of the two
9047 others, viz. the pradhana and the individual soul, on account of the
9048 following reason also. In the first place, the text distinguishes the
9049 source of all beings from the embodied soul, as something of a different
9050 nature; compare the passage (II, 1, 2), 'That heavenly person is without
9051 body, he is both without and within, not produced, without breath and
9052 without mind, pure.' The distinctive attributes mentioned here, such as
9053 being of a heavenly nature, and so on, can in no way belong to the
9054 individual soul, which erroneously considers itself to be limited by
9055 name and form as presented by Nescience, and erroneously imputes their
9056 attributes to itself. Therefore the passage manifestly refers to the
9057 Person which is the subject of all the Upanishads.--In the second place,
9058 the source of all beings which forms the general topic is represented in
9059 the text as something different from the pradhana, viz. in the passage,
9060 'Higher than the high Imperishable.' Here the term 'Imperishable' means
9061 that undeveloped entity which represents the seminal potentiality of
9062 names and forms, contains the fine parts of the material elements,
9063 abides in the Lord, forms his limiting adjunct, and being itself no
9064 effect is high in comparison to all effects; the whole phrase, 'Higher
9065 than the high Imperishable,' which expresses a difference then clearly
9066 shows that the highest Self is meant here.--We do not on that account
9067 assume an independent entity called pradhana and say that the source of
9068 all beings is stated separately therefrom; but if a pradhana is to be
9069 assumed at all (in agreement with the common opinion) and if being
9070 assumed it is assumed of such a nature as not to be opposed to the
9071 statements of Scripture, viz. as the subtle cause of all beings denoted
9072 by the terms 'the Undeveloped' and so on, we have no objection to such
9073 an assumption, and declare that, on account of the separate statement
9074 therefrom, i.e. from that pradhana, 'the source of all beings' must mean
9075 the highest Lord.--A further argument in favour of the same conclusion
9076 is supplied by the next Sutra.

9077
9078 23. And on account of its form being mentioned.

9079
9080 Subsequently to the passage, 'Higher than the high Imperishable,' we
9081 meet (in the passage, 'From him is born breath,' &c.) with a description
9082 of the creation of all things, from breath down to earth, and then with
9083 a statement of the form of this same source of beings as consisting of
9084 all created beings, 'Fire is his head, his eyes the sun and the moon,
9085 the quarters his ears, his speech the Vedas disclosed, the wind his
9086 breath, his heart the universe; from his feet came the earth; he is
9087 indeed the inner Self of all things.' This statement of form can refer
9088 only to the highest Lord, and not either to the embodied soul, which, on
9089 account of its small power, cannot be the cause of all effects, or to
9090 the pradhana, which cannot be the inner Self of all beings. We therefore
9091 conclude that the source of all beings is the highest Lord, not either
9092 of the other two.--But wherefrom do you conclude that the quoted
9093 declaration of form refers to the source of all beings?--From the
9094 general topic, we reply. The word 'he' (in the clause, 'He is indeed the
9095 inner Self of all things') connects the passage with the general topic.
9096 As the source of all beings constitutes the general topic, the whole
9097 passage, from 'From him is born breath,' up to, 'He is the inner Self of
9098 all beings,' refers to that same source. Similarly, when in ordinary
9099 conversation a certain teacher forms the general topic of the talk, the
9100 phrase, 'Study under him; he knows the Veda and the Veda@ngas
9101 thoroughly,' as a matter of course, refers to that same teacher.--But
9102 how can a bodily form be ascribed to the source of all beings which is
9103 characterised by invisibility and similar attributes?--The statement as
9104 to its nature, we reply, is made for the purpose of showing that the
9105 source of all beings is the Self of all beings, not of showing that it
9106 is of a bodily nature. The case is analogous to such passages as, 'I am
9107 food, I am food, I am the eater of food' (Taitt. Up. III, 10,

9108 6).--Others, however, are of opinion[151] that the statement quoted does
9109 not refer to the source of all beings, because that to which it refers
9110 is spoken of as something produced. For, on the one hand, the
9111 immediately preceding passage ('From him is born health, mind, and all
9112 organs of sense, ether, air, light, water, and the earth, the support of
9113 all') speaks of the aggregate of beings from air down to earth as
9114 something produced, and, on the other hand, a passage met with later on
9115 ('From him comes Agni, the sun being his fuel,' up to 'All herbs and
9116 juices') expresses itself to the same purpose. How then should all at
9117 once, in the midst of these two passages (which refer to the creation),
9118 a statement be made about the nature of the source of all beings?--The
9119 attribute of being the Self of all beings, (which above was said to be
9120 mentioned in the passage about the creation, 'Fire is his head,' &c., is
9121 not mentioned there but) is stated only later on in a passage subsequent
9122 to that which refers to the creation, viz. 'The Person is all this,
9123 sacrifice,' &c. (II, 1, 10).--Now, we see that /s/ruti as well as
9124 sm/ri/ti speaks of the birth of Prajapati, whose body is this threefold
9125 world; compare /Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. X, 121, 1, 'Hira/n/ya-garbha arose in
9126 the beginning; he was the one born Lord of things existing. He
9127 established the earth and this sky; to what God shall we offer our
9128 oblation?' where the expression 'arose' means 'he was born.' And in
9129 sm/ri/ti we read, 'He is the first embodied one, he is called the
9130 Person; as the primal creator of the beings Brahman was evolved in the
9131 beginning.' This Person which is (not the original Brahman but) an
9132 effect (like other created beings) may be called the internal Self of
9133 all beings (as it is called in II, 1, 4), because in the form of the
9134 Self of breath it abides in the Self of all beings.--On this latter
9135 explanation (according to which the passage, 'Fire is his head,' &c.,
9136 does not describe the nature of the highest Lord, and can therefore not
9137 be referred to in the Sutra) the declaration as to the Lord being the
9138 'nature' of all which is contained in the passage, 'The Person is all
9139 this, sacrifice,' &c., must be taken as the reason for establishing the
9140 highest Lord, (i.e. as the passage which, according to the Sutra, proves
9141 that the source of all beings is the highest Lord[152].)

9142
9143 24. Vai/s/vanara (is the highest Lord) on account of the distinction
9144 qualifying the common terms (Vai/s/vanara and Self).

9145
9146 (In Ch. Up. V, 11 ff.) a discussion begins with the words, 'What is our
9147 Self, what is Brahman?' and is carried on in the passage, 'You know at
9148 present that Vai/s/vanara Self, tell us that;' after that it is declared
9149 with reference to Heaven, sun, air, ether, water, and earth, that they
9150 are connected with the qualities of having good light, &c., and, in
9151 order to disparage devout meditation on them singly, that they stand to
9152 the Vai/s/vanara in the relation of being his head, &c., merely; and
9153 then finally (V, 18) it is said, 'But he who meditates on the
9154 Vai/s/vanara Self as measured by a span, as abhivimana[153], he eats
9155 food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Self. Of that Vai/s/vanara
9156 Self the head is Sutejas (having good light), the eye Vi/s/varupa
9157 (multiform), the breath P/ri/thagvartman (moving in various courses),
9158 the trunk Bahula (full), the bladder Rayi (wealth), the feet the earth,
9159 the chest the altar, the hairs the grass on the altar, the heart the
9160 Garhapatya fire, the mind the Anvaharya fire, the mouth the Ahavaniya
9161 fire.'--Here the doubt arises whether by the term 'Vai/s/vanara' we have
9162 to understand the gastric fire, or the elemental fire, or the divinity
9163 presiding over the latter, or the embodied soul, or the highest
9164 Lord.--But what, it may be asked, gives rise to this doubt?--The
9165 circumstance, we reply, of 'Vai/s/vanara' being employed as a common
9166 term for the gastric fire, the elemental fire, and the divinity of the
9167 latter, while 'Self' is a term applying to the embodied soul as well as
9168 to the highest Lord. Hence the doubt arises which meaning of the term is
9169 to be accepted and which to be set aside.

9170
9171 Which, then, is the alternative to be embraced?--Vai/s/vanara, the
9172 purvapakshin maintains, is the gastric fire, because we meet, in some
9173 passages, with the term used in that special sense; so, for instance
9174 (B/ri/. Up. V, 9), 'Agni Vai/s/vanara is the fire within man by which
9175 the food that is eaten is cooked.'--Or else the term may denote fire in
9176 general, as we see it used in that sense also; so, for instance

9177 (/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. X, 88, 12), 'For the whole world the gods have made
9178 the Agni Vai/s/vanara a sign of the days.' Or, in the third place, the
9179 word may denote that divinity whose body is fire. For passages in which
9180 the term has that sense are likewise met with; compare, for instance,
9181 /Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. I, 98, 1, 'May we be in the favour of Vai/s/vanara;
9182 for he is the king of the beings, giving pleasure, of ready grace;' this
9183 and similar passages properly applying to a divinity endowed with power
9184 and similar qualities. Perhaps it will be urged against the preceding
9185 explanations, that, as the word Vai/s/vanara is used in co-ordination
9186 with the term 'Self,' and as the term 'Self' alone is used in the
9187 introductory passage ('What is our Self, what is Brahman?'),
9188 Vai/s/vanara has to be understood in a modified sense, so as to be in
9189 harmony with the term Self. Well, then, the purvapakshin rejoins, let us
9190 suppose that Vai/s/vanara is the embodied Self which, as being an
9191 enjoyer, is in close vicinity to the Vai/s/vanara fire,[154] (i.e. the
9192 fire within the body,) and with which the qualification expressed by the
9193 term, 'Measured by a span,' well agrees, since it is restricted by its
9194 limiting condition (viz. the body and so on).--In any case it is evident
9195 that the term Vai/s/vanara does not denote the highest Lord.

9196
9197 To this we make the following reply.--The word Vai/s/vanara denotes the
9198 highest Self, on account of the distinction qualifying the two general
9199 terms.--Although the term 'Self,' as well as the term 'Vai/s/vanara,'
9200 has various meanings--the latter term denoting three beings while the
9201 former denotes two--yet we observe a distinction from which we conclude
9202 that both terms can here denote the highest Lord only; viz. in the
9203 passage, 'Of that Vai/s/vanara Self the head is Sutejas,' &c. For it is
9204 clear that that passage refers to the highest Lord in so far as he is
9205 distinguished by having heaven, and so on, for his head and limbs, and
9206 in so far as he has entered into a different state (viz. into the state
9207 of being the Self of the threefold world); represents him, in fact, for
9208 the purpose of meditation, as the internal Self of everything. As such
9209 the absolute Self may be represented, because it is the cause of
9210 everything; for as the cause virtually contains all the states belonging
9211 to its effects, the heavenly world, and so on, may be spoken of as the
9212 members of the highest Self.--Moreover, the result which Scripture
9213 declares to abide in all worlds--viz. in the passage, 'He eats food in
9214 all worlds, in all beings, in all Selves'--is possible only if we take
9215 the term Vai/s/vanara to denote the highest Self.--The same remark
9216 applies to the declaration that all the sins are burned of him who has
9217 that knowledge, 'Thus all his sins are burned,' &c. (Ch. Up. V, 24,
9218 3).--Moreover, we meet at the beginning of the chapter with the words
9219 'Self' and 'Brahman;' viz. in the passage, 'What is our Self, what is
9220 Brahman?' Now these are marks of Brahman, and indicate the highest Lord
9221 only. Hence he only can be meant by the term Vai/s/vanara.

9222
9223 25. (And) because that which is stated by Sm/ri/ti (i.e. the shape of
9224 the highest Lord as described by Sm/ri/ti) is an inference (i.e. an
9225 indicatory mark from which we infer the meaning of /S/ruti).

9226
9227 The highest Lord only is Vai/s/vanara, for that reason also that
9228 Sm/ri/ti ascribes to the highest Lord only a shape consisting of the
9229 threefold world, the fire constituting his mouth, the heavenly world his
9230 head, &c. So, for instance, in the following passage, 'He whose mouth is
9231 fire, whose head the heavenly world, whose navel the ether, whose feet
9232 the earth, whose eye the sun, whose ears the regions, reverence to him
9233 the Self of the world.' The shape described here in Sm/ri/ti allows us
9234 to infer a /S/ruti passage on which the Sm/ri/ti rests, and thus
9235 constitutes an inference, i.e. a sign indicatory of the word
9236 'Vai/s/vanara' denoting the highest Lord. For, although the quoted
9237 Sm/ri/ti passage contains a glorification[155], still even a
9238 glorification in the form in which it there appears is not possible,
9239 unless it has a Vedic passage to rest on.--Other Sm/ri/ti passages also
9240 may be quoted in connexion with this Sutra, so, for instance, the
9241 following one, 'He whose head the wise declare to be the heavenly world,
9242 whose navel the ether, whose eyes sun and moon, whose ears the regions,
9243 and whose feet the earth, he is the inscrutable leader of all beings.'

9244
9245 26. If it be maintained that (Vai/s/vanara is) not (the highest Lord) on

9246 account of the term (viz. Vai/s/vanara, having a settled different
9247 meaning), &c., and on account of his abiding within (which is a
9248 characteristic of the gastric fire); (we say) no, on account of the
9249 perception (of the highest Lord), being taught thus (viz. in the gastric
9250 fire), and on account of the impossibility (of the heavenly world, &c.
9251 being the head, &c. of the gastric fire), and because they (the
9252 Vajasaneyins) read of him (viz. the Vai/s/vanara) as man (which term
9253 cannot apply to the gastric fire).

9254
9255 Here the following objection is raised.--Vai/s/vanara cannot be the
9256 highest Lord, on account of the term, &c., and on account of the abiding
9257 within. The term, viz. the term Vai/s/vanara, cannot be applied to the
9258 highest Lord, because the settled use of language assigns to it a
9259 different sense. Thus, also, with regard to the term Agni (fire) in the
9260 passage (/S/at. Bra. X, 6, 1, 11), 'He is the Agni Vai/s/vanara.' The
9261 word '&c.' (in the Sutra) hints at the fiction concerning the three
9262 sacred fires, the garhapatya being represented as the heart, and so on,
9263 of the Vai/s/vanara Self (Ch. Up. V, 18, 2[156]).--Moreover, the
9264 passage, 'Therefore the first food which a man may take is in the place
9265 of homa' (Ch. Up. V, 19, 1), contains a glorification of (Vai/s/vanara)
9266 being the abode of the oblation to Pra/n/a[157]. For these reasons we
9267 have to understand by Vai/s/vanara the gastric fire.--Moreover,
9268 Scripture speaks of the Vai/s/vanara as abiding within. 'He knows him
9269 abiding within man;' which again applies to the gastric fire only.--With
9270 reference to the averment that on account of the specifications
9271 contained in the passage, 'His head is Sutejas,' &c., Vai/s/vanara is to
9272 be explained as the highest Self, we (the purvapakshin) ask: How do you
9273 reach the decision that those specifications, although agreeing with
9274 both interpretations, must be assumed to refer to the highest Lord only,
9275 and not to the gastric fire?--Or else we may assume that the passage
9276 speaks of the elemental fire which abides within and without; for that
9277 that fire is also connected with the heavenly world, and so on, we
9278 understand from the mantra, 'He who with his light has extended himself
9279 over earth and heaven, the two halves of the world, and the atmosphere'
9280 (/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. X, 88, 3).--Or else the attribute of having the
9281 heavenly world, and so on, for its members may, on account of its power,
9282 be attributed to that divinity which has the elemental fire for its
9283 body.--Therefore Vai/s/vanara is not the highest Lord.

9284
9285 To all this we reply as follows.--Your assertions are unfounded,
9286 'because there is taught the perception in this manner.' The reasons
9287 (adduced in the former part of the Sutra), viz. the term, and so on, are
9288 not sufficient to make us abandon the interpretation according to which
9289 Vai/s/vanara is the highest Lord.--Why?--On account of perception being
9290 taught in this manner, i.e. without the gastric fire being set aside.
9291 For the passages quoted teach the perception of the highest Lord in the
9292 gastric fire, analogously to such passages as 'Let a man meditate on the
9293 mind as Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 1).--Or else they teach that the
9294 object of perception is the highest Lord, in so far as he has the
9295 gastric fire called Vai/s/vanara for his limiting condition; analogously
9296 to such passages as 'He who consists of mind, whose body is breath,
9297 whose form is light' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2[158]). If it were the aim of
9298 the passages about the Vai/s/vanara to make statements not concerning
9299 the highest Lord, but merely concerning the gastric fire, there would be
9300 no possibility of specifications such as contained in the passage 'His
9301 head is Sutejas,' &c. That also on the assumption of Vai/s/vanara being
9302 either the divinity of fire or the elemental fire no room is to be found
9303 for the said specifications, we shall show under the following
9304 Sutra.--Moreover, if the mere gastric fire were meant, there would be
9305 room only for a declaration that it abides within man, not that it is
9306 man. But, as a matter of fact, the Vajasaneyins speak of him--in their
9307 sacred text--as man, 'This Agni Vai/s/vanara is man; he who knows this
9308 Agni Vai/s/vanara as man-like, as abiding within man,' &c. (/S/at. Bra.
9309 X, 6, 1, 11). The highest Lord, on the other hand, who is the Self of
9310 everything, may be spoken of as well as man, as abiding within
9311 man.--Those who, in the latter part of the Sutra, read 'man-like'
9312 (puru-shavidham) instead of 'man' (purusham), wish to express the
9313 following meaning: If Vai/s/vanara were assumed to be the gastric fire
9314 only, he might be spoken of as abiding within man indeed, but not as

9315 man-like. But the Vajasaneyins do speak of him as man-like, 'He who
9316 knows him as man-like, as abiding within man.'--The meaning of the term
9317 man-like is to be concluded from the context, whence it will be seen
9318 that, with reference to nature, it means that the highest Lord has the
9319 heaven for his head, &c., and is based on the earth; and with reference
9320 to man, that he forms the head, &c., and is based on the chin (of the
9321 devout worshipper[159]).
9322

9323 27. For the same reasons (the Vai/s/vanara) cannot be the divinity (of
9324 fire), or the element (of fire).
9325

9326 The averment that the fanciful attribution of members contained in the
9327 passage 'His head is Sutejas,' &c. may apply to the elemental fire also
9328 which from the mantras is seen to be connected with the heavenly world,
9329 &c., or else to the divinity whose body is fire, on account of its
9330 power, is refuted by the following remark: For the reasons already
9331 stated Vai/s/vanara is neither the divinity nor the element. For to the
9332 elemental fire which is mere heat and light the heavenly world and so on
9333 cannot properly be ascribed as head and so on, because an effect cannot
9334 be the Self of another effect.--Again, the heavenly world cannot be
9335 ascribed as head, &c. to the divinity of fire, in spite of the power of
9336 the latter; for, on the one hand, it is not a cause (but a mere effect),
9337 and on the other hand its power depends on the highest Lord. Against all
9338 these interpretations there lies moreover the objection founded on the
9339 inapplicability of the term 'Self.'
9340

9341 28. Jaimini (declares that there is) no contradiction even on the
9342 assumption of a direct (worship of the highest Lord as Vai/s/vanara).
9343

9344 Above (Sutra 26) it has been said that Vai/s/vanara is the highest Lord,
9345 to be meditated upon as having the gastric fire either for his outward
9346 manifestation or for his limiting condition; which interpretation was
9347 accepted in deference to the circumstance that he is spoken of as
9348 abiding within--and so on.--The teacher Jaimini however is of opinion
9349 that it is not necessary to have recourse to the assumption of an
9350 outward manifestation or limiting condition, and that there is no
9351 objection to refer the passage about Vai/s/vanara to the direct worship
9352 of the highest Lord.--But, if you reject the interpretation based on the
9353 gastric fire, you place yourself in opposition to the statement that
9354 Vai/s/vanara abides within, and to the reasons founded on the term, &c.
9355 (Su. 26).--To this we reply that we in no way place ourselves in
9356 opposition to the statement that Vai/s/vanara abides within. For the
9357 passage, 'He knows him as man-like, as abiding within man,' does not by
9358 any means refer to the gastric fire, the latter being neither the
9359 general topic of discussion nor having been mentioned by name
9360 before.--What then does it refer to?--It refers to that which forms the
9361 subject of discussion, viz. that similarity to man (of the highest Self)
9362 which is fancifully found in the members of man from the upper part of
9363 the head down to the chin; the text therefore says, 'He knows him as
9364 man-like, as abiding within man,' just as we say of a branch that it
9365 abides within the tree[160].--Or else we may adopt another
9366 interpretation and say that after the highest Self has been represented
9367 as having the likeness to man as a limiting condition, with regard to
9368 nature as well as to man, the passage last quoted ('He knows him as
9369 abiding within man') speaks of the same highest Self as the mere witness
9370 (sakshin; i.e. as the pure Self, non-related to the limiting
9371 conditions).--The consideration of the context having thus shown that
9372 the highest Self has to be resorted to for the interpretation of the
9373 passage, the term 'Vai/s/vanara' must denote the highest Self in some
9374 way or other. The word 'Vi/s/vanara' is to be explained either as 'he
9375 who is all and man (i.e. the individual soul),' or 'he to whom souls
9376 belong' (in so far as he is their maker or ruler), and thus denotes the
9377 highest Self which is the Self of all. And the form 'Vai/s/vanara' has
9378 the same meaning as 'Vi/s/vanara,' the taddhita-suffix, by which the
9379 former word is derived from the latter, not changing the meaning; just
9380 as in the case of rakshasa (derived from rakshas), and vayasa (derived
9381 from vayas).--The word 'Agni' also may denote the highest Self if we
9382 adopt the etymology agni=agra/n/i, i.e. he who leads in front.--As the
9383 Garhapatya-fire finally, and as the abode of the oblation to breath the

9384 highest Self may be represented because it is the Self of all.

9385

9386 But, if it is assumed that Vai/s/vanara denotes the highest Self, how
9387 can Scripture declare that he is measured by a span?--On the explanation
9388 of this difficulty we now enter.

9389

9390 29. On account of the manifestation, so A/s/marathya opines.

9391

9392 The circumstance of the highest Lord who transcends all measure being
9393 spoken of as measured by a span has for its reason 'manifestation.' The
9394 highest Lord manifests himself as measured by a span, i.e. he specially
9395 manifests himself for the benefit of his worshippers in some special
9396 places, such as the heart and the like, where he may be perceived.
9397 Hence, according to the opinion of the teacher A/s/marathya, the
9398 scriptural passage which speaks of him who is measured by a span may
9399 refer to the highest Lord.

9400

9401 30. On account of remembrance; so Badari opines.

9402

9403 Or else the highest Lord may be called 'measured by a span' because he
9404 is remembered by means of the mind which is seated in the heart which is
9405 measured by a span. Similarly, barley-corns which are measured by means
9406 of prasthas are themselves called prasthas. It must be admitted that
9407 barley-grains themselves have a certain size which is merely rendered
9408 manifest through their being connected with a prastha measure; while the
9409 highest Lord himself does not possess a size to be rendered manifest by
9410 his connexion with the heart. Still the remembrance (of the Lord by
9411 means of the mind) may be accepted as offering a certain foundation for
9412 the /S/ruti passage concerning him who is measured by a span.--Or
9413 else[161] the Sutra may be interpreted to mean that the Lord, although
9414 not really measured by a span, is to be remembered (meditated upon) as
9415 being of the measure of a span; whereby the passage is furnished with an
9416 appropriate sense.--Thus the passage about him who is measured by a span
9417 may, according to the opinion of the teacher Badari, be referred to the
9418 highest Lord, on account of remembrance.

9419

9420 31. On the ground of imaginative identification (the highest Lord may be
9421 called prade/s/amatra), Jaimini thinks; for thus (Scripture) declares.

9422

9423 Or else the passage about him who is measured by a span may be
9424 considered to rest on imaginative combination.--Why?--Because the
9425 passage of the Vajasaneyibrahma/n/a which treats of the same topic
9426 identifies heaven, earth, and so on--which are the members of
9427 Vai/s/vanara viewed as the Self of the threefold world--with certain
9428 parts of the human frame, viz. the parts comprised between the upper
9429 part of the head and the chin, and thus declares the imaginative
9430 identity of Vai/s/vanara with something whose measure is a span. There
9431 we read, 'The Gods indeed reached him, knowing him as measured by a span
9432 as it were. Now I will declare them (his members) to you so as to
9433 identify him (the Vai/s/vanara) with that whose measure is a span; thus
9434 he said. Pointing to the upper part of the head he said: This is what
9435 stands above (i.e. the heavenly world) as Vai/s/vanara (i.e. the head of
9436 Vai/s/vanara[162]). Pointing to the eyes he said: This is he with good
9437 light (i.e. the sun) as Vai/s/vanara (i.e. the eye of V.). Pointing to
9438 the nose he said: This is he who moves on manifold paths (i.e. the air)
9439 as Vai/s/vanara (i.e. the breath of V.). Pointing to the space (ether)
9440 within his mouth he said: This is the full one (i.e. the ether) as
9441 Vai/s/vanara. Pointing to the saliva within his mouth he said: This is
9442 wealth as Vai/s/vanara (i.e. the water in the bladder of V.). Pointing
9443 to the chin he said: This is the base as Vai/s/vanara (i.e. the feet of
9444 V.).'--Although in the Vajasaneyi-brahma/n/a the heaven is denoted as
9445 that which has the attribute of standing above and the sun as that which
9446 has the attribute of good light, while in the Chandogya the heaven is
9447 spoken of as having good light and the sun as being multiform; still
9448 this difference does not interfere (with the unity of the vidya)[163],
9449 because both texts equally use the term 'measured by a span,' and
9450 because all /s/akhas intimate the same.--The above explanation of the
9451 term 'measured by a span,' which rests on imaginative identification,
9452 the teacher Jaimini considers the most appropriate one.

9453

9454 32. Moreover they (the Jabalas) speak of him (the highest Lord) in that
9455 (i.e. the interstice between the top of the head and the chin which is
9456 measured by a span).

9457

9458 Moreover the Jabalas speak in their text of the highest Lord as being in
9459 the interstice between the top of the head and the chin. 'The unevolved
9460 infinite Self abides in the avimukta (i.e. the non-released soul). Where
9461 does that avimukta abide? It abides in the Vara/n/a and the Nasi, in the
9462 middle. What is that Vara/n/a, what is that Nasi?' The text thereupon
9463 etymologises the term Vara/n/a as that which wards off (varayati) all
9464 evil done by the senses, and the term Nasi as that which destroys
9465 (na/s/ayati) all evil done by the senses; and then continues, 'And what
9466 is its place?--The place where the eyebrows and the nose join. That is
9467 the joining place of the heavenly world (represented by the upper part
9468 of the head) and of the other (i.e. the earthly world represented by the
9469 chin).' (Jabala Up. I.)--Thus it appears that the scriptural statement
9470 which ascribes to the highest Lord the measure of a span is appropriate.
9471 That the highest Lord is called abhivimana refers to his being the
9472 inward Self of all. As such he is directly measured, i.e. known by all
9473 animate beings. Or else the word may be explained as 'he who is near
9474 everywhere--as the inward Self--and who at the same time is measureless'
9475 (as being infinite). Or else it may denote the highest Lord as him who,
9476 as the cause of the world, measures it out, i.e. creates it. By all this
9477 it is proved that Vai/s/vanara is the highest Lord.

9478

9479 Notes:

9480

9481 [Footnote 136: The clause 'he is to meditate with a calm mind' if taken
9482 as a gu/n/avidhi, i.e. as enjoining some secondary matter, viz. calmness
9483 of mind of the meditating person, cannot at the same time enjoin
9484 meditation; for that would involve a so-called split of the sentence
9485 (vakyabheda).]

9486

9487 [Footnote 137: Jivezpi dehadib/rim/hanaj jyastvanyayad va brahmatety
9488 artha/h/. An. Gi.]

9489

9490 [Footnote 138: The discussion is brought on by the term 'vivakshita' in
9491 the Sutra whose meaning is 'expressed, aimed at,' but more literally
9492 'desired to be expressed.']

9493

9494 [Footnote 139: Because he is vyapin.]

9495

9496 [Footnote 140: Another interpretation of the later part of Sutra.]

9497

9498 [Footnote 141: Cp. Ka/th/a Up, I, 1, 13; 20; I, 2, 14.]

9499

9500 [Footnote 142: Freedom from impurity can result only from the knowledge
9501 that the individual soul is in reality Brahman. The commentators explain
9502 rajas by avidya.]

9503

9504 [Footnote 143: Tadartham iti, jivasya brahmasiddhyartham iti yavat,
9505 /k/aitanya/kh/ayapanna dhi/h/sukhadina pari/n/amata iti, tatra
9506 purushozpi bhakt/ri/tvam ivanubhavati na tattvata iti vaktum
9507 adhyaropayati. Ananda Giri.]

9508

9509 [Footnote 144: Who, somebody might say, is to be understood here,
9510 because immortality and similar qualities belong to him not somehow
9511 only, but in their true sense.]

9512

9513 [Footnote 145: The /t/ikas say that the contents of this last sentence
9514 are hinted at by the word 'and' in the Sutra.]

9515

9516 [Footnote 146: I.e. at the beginning of the instruction which the sacred
9517 fires give to Upako/s/ala, Ch. Up. IV, 10 ff.]

9518

9519 [Footnote 147: Which words conclude the instruction given by the fires,
9520 and introduce the instruction given by the teacher, of which the passage
9521 'the person that is seen in the eye,' &c. forms a part.]

9522
9523 [Footnote 148: A/s/rayantarapratyayasya/s/rayantare kshepa/h/
9524 pratika/h/, yatha brahma/s/abda/h/ paramatmavishayo namadishu kshipyate.
9525 Bha.]
9526
9527 [Footnote 149: The following sentences give the reason why, although
9528 there is only one Brahman, the word Brahman is repeated.]
9529
9530 [Footnote 150: According to Scripture, Nira@nku/s/a/m/
9531 sarvaniyantritva/m/ /s/rauta/m/ na /k/a tadri/s/e sarvaniyantari bhedo
9532 na /k/anumana/m/ /s/rutibhaditam uttish/th/ati. Ananda Giri. Or else, as
9533 Go. An. remarks, we may explain: as the highest Self is not really
9534 different from the individual soul. So also Bhamati: Na /h/anavastha, na
9535 hi niyantrantara/m/ tena niyamyate ki/m/ tu yo jivo niyanta
9536 lokasiddha/h/ sa paramatmevopadhyava/kkh/edakalpitabheda/h/.]
9537
9538 [Footnote 151: V/ri/ttik/ri/dvyakhyam dushayati, Go. An.; ekade/s/ina/m/
9539 dushayati, Ananda Giri; tad etat paramatenakshepasamadhanabhya/m/
9540 vyakhyaya svamatena vya/k/ash/t/e, puna/h/ /s/abdozpi purvasmad
9541 vi/s/esha/m/ dyotayann asyesh/t/ata/m/ su/k/ayati, Bhamati.--The
9542 statement of the two former commentators must be understood to mean--in
9543 agreement with the Bhamati--that /S/a@nkara is now going to refute the
9544 preceding explanation by the statement of his own view. Thus Go. An.
9545 later on explains 'asmin pakshe' by 'svapakshe.']
9546
9547 [Footnote 152: The question is to what passage the 'rupopanyasat' of the
9548 Sutra refers.--According to the opinion set forth first it refers to Mu.
9549 Up. II, 1, 4 ff.--But, according to the second view, II, 1, 4 to II, 1,
9550 9, cannot refer to the source of all beings, i.e. the highest Self,
9551 because that entire passage describes the creation, the inner Self of
9552 which is not the highest Self but Prajapati, i.e. the Hira/n/yagarbha or
9553 Sutratman of the later Vedanta, who is himself an 'effect,' and who is
9554 called the inner Self, because he is the breath of life (pra/n/a) in
9555 everything.--Hence the Sutra must be connected with another passage, and
9556 that passage is found in II, 1, 10, where it is said that the Person
9557 (i.e. the highest Self) is all this, &c.]
9558
9559 [Footnote 153: About which term see later on.]
9560
9561 [Footnote 154: Sarire laksha/n/aya vai/s/vanara/s/abdopapattim aha
9562 tasyeti. An. Gi.]
9563
9564 [Footnote 155: And as such might be said not to require a basis for its
9565 statements.]
9566
9567 [Footnote 156: Na /k/a garhapatyadih/ri/dayadita brahma/n/a/h/
9568 sambhavini. Bhamati.]
9569
9570 [Footnote 157: Na /k/a pra/n/ahutyadhikara/n/ata z nyatra ja/th/aragner
9571 yujyate. Bhamati.]
9572
9573 [Footnote 158: According to the former explanation the gastric fire is
9574 to be looked on as the outward manifestation (pratika) of the highest
9575 Lord; according to the latter as his limiting condition.]
9576
9577 [Footnote 159: I.e. that he may be fancifully identified with the head
9578 and so on of the devout worshipper.]
9579
9580 [Footnote 160: Whereby we mean not that it is inside the tree, but that
9581 it forms a part of the tree.--The Vai/s/vanara Self is identified with
9582 the different members of the body, and these members abide within, i.e.
9583 form parts of the body.]
9584
9585 [Footnote 161: Parima/n/asya h/ri/da/y/advararopitasya smaryama/n/e
9586 katham aropo vishayavishayitvena bhedad ity a/s/a@nkya vyakhyantaram aha
9587 prade/s/eti. Ananda Giri.]
9588
9589 [Footnote 162: Atra sarvatra vai/s/vanara/s/abdastada@ngapara/h/. Go.
9590 An.]

9591
9592 [Footnote 163: Which unity entitles us to use the passage from the
9593 /S/at. Bra. for the explanation of the passage from the Ch. Up.]
9594
9595
9596
9597

9598 THIRD PADA.
9599

9600 REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!
9601
9602

9603 1. The abode of heaven, earth, and so on (is Brahman), on account of the
9604 term 'own,' i.e. Self.
9605

9606 We read (Mu. Up. II, 2, 5), 'He in whom the heaven, the earth, and the
9607 sky are woven, the mind also with all the vital airs, know him alone as
9608 the Self, and leave off other words! He is the bridge of the
9609 Immortal.'--Here the doubt arises whether the abode which is intimated
9610 by the statement of the heaven and so on being woven in it is the
9611 highest Brahman or something else.
9612

9613 The purvapakshin maintains that the abode is something else, on account
9614 of the expression, 'It is the bridge of the Immortal.' For, he says, it
9615 is known from every-day experience that a bridge presupposes some
9616 further bank to which it leads, while it is impossible to assume
9617 something further beyond the highest Brahman, which in Scripture is
9618 called 'endless, without a further shore' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 12). Now if
9619 the abode is supposed to be something different from Brahman, it must be
9620 supposed to be either the pradhana known from Sm/ri/ti, which, as being
9621 the (general) cause, may be called the (general) abode; or the air known
9622 from /S/ruti, of which it is said (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 2, 'Air is that
9623 thread, O Gautama. By air as by a thread, O Gautama, this world and the
9624 other world and all beings are strung together'), that it supports all
9625 things; or else the embodied soul which, as being the enjoyer, may be
9626 considered as an abode with reference to the objects of its fruition.
9627

9628 Against this view we argue with the sutrakara as follows:--'Of the world
9629 consisting of heaven, earth, and so on, which in the quoted passage is
9630 spoken of as woven (upon something), the highest Brahman must be the
9631 abode.'--Why?--On account of the word 'own,' i.e. on account of the word
9632 'Self.' For we meet with the word 'Self' in the passage, 'Know him alone
9633 as the Self.' This term 'Self' is thoroughly appropriate only if we
9634 understand the highest Self and not anything else.--(To propound another
9635 interpretation of the phrase 'sva/s/abdat' employed in the Sutra.)
9636 Sometimes also Brahman is spoken of in /S/ruti as the general abode by
9637 its own terms (i.e. by terms properly designating Brahman), as, for
9638 instance (Ch. Up. VI. 8, 4), 'All these creatures, my dear, have their
9639 root in the being, their abode in the being, their rest in the
9640 being[164]. '--(Or else we have to explain 'sva/s/abdena' as follows), In
9641 the passages preceding and following the passage under discussion
9642 Brahman is glorified with its own names[165]; cp. Mu. Up. II, 1, 10,
9643 'The Person is all this, sacrifice, penance, Brahman, the highest
9644 Immortal,' and II, 2, 11, 'That immortal Brahman is before, is behind,
9645 Brahman is to the right and left.' Here, on account of mention being
9646 made of an abode and that which abides, and on account of the
9647 co-ordination expressed in the passage, 'Brahman is all' (Mu. Up. II, 2,
9648 11), a suspicion might arise that Brahman is of a manifold variegated
9649 nature, just as in the case of a tree consisting of different parts we
9650 distinguish branches, stem, and root. In order to remove this suspicion
9651 the text declares (in the passage under discussion), 'Know him alone as
9652 the Self.' The sense of which is: The Self is not to be known as
9653 manifold, qualified by the universe of effects; you are rather to
9654 dissolve by true knowledge the universe of effects, which is the mere
9655 product of Nescience, and to know that one Self, which is the general
9656 abode, as uniform. Just as when somebody says, 'Bring that on which
9657 Devadatta sits,' the person addressed brings the chair only (the abode
9658 of Devadatta), not Devadatta himself; so the passage, 'Know him alone as
9659 the Self,' teaches that the object to be known is the one uniform Self

9660 which constitutes the general abode. Similarly another scriptural
9661 passage reproves him who believes in the unreal world of effects, 'From
9662 death to death goes he who sees any difference here' (Ka. Up. II, 4,
9663 11). The statement of co-ordination made in the clause 'All is Brahman'
9664 aims at dissolving (the wrong conception of the reality of) the world,
9665 and not in any way at intimating that Brahman is multifarious in
9666 nature[166]; for the uniformity (of Brahman's nature) is expressly
9667 stated in other passages such as the following one, 'As a mass of salt
9668 has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus
9669 indeed has that Self neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a
9670 mass of knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 13).--For all these reasons the
9671 abode of heaven, earth, &c. is the highest Brahman.--Against the
9672 objection that on account of the text speaking of a 'bridge,' and a
9673 bridge requiring a further bank, we have to understand by the abode of
9674 heaven and earth something different from Brahman, we remark that the
9675 word 'bridge' is meant to intimate only that that which is called a
9676 bridge supports, not that it has a further bank. We need not assume by
9677 any means that the bridge meant is like an ordinary bridge made of clay
9678 and wood. For as the word setu (bridge) is derived from the root si,
9679 which means 'to bind,' the idea of holding together, supporting is
9680 rather implied in it than the idea of being connected with something
9681 beyond (a further bank).

9682
9683 According to the opinion of another (commentator) the word 'bridge' does
9684 not glorify the abode of heaven, earth, &c., but rather the knowledge of
9685 the Self which is glorified in the preceding clause, 'Know him alone as
9686 the Self,' and the abandonment of speech advised in the clause, 'leave
9687 off other words;' to them, as being the means of obtaining immortality,
9688 the expression 'the bridge of the immortal' applies[167]. On that
9689 account we have to set aside the assertion that, on account of the word
9690 'bridge,' something different from Brahman is to be understood by the
9691 abode of heaven, earth, and so on.

9692
9693 2. And on account of its being designated as that to which the Released
9694 have to resort.

9695
9696 By the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, we have to understand the
9697 highest Brahman for that reason also that we find it denoted as that to
9698 which the Released have to resort.--The conception that the body and
9699 other things contained in the sphere of the Not-self are our Self,
9700 constitutes Nescience; from it there spring desires with regard to
9701 whatever promotes the well-being of the body and so on, and aversions
9702 with regard to whatever tends to injure it; there further arise fear and
9703 confusion when we observe anything threatening to destroy it. All this
9704 constitutes an endless series of the most manifold evils with which we
9705 all are acquainted. Regarding those on the other hand who have freed
9706 themselves from the stains of Nescience desire aversion and so on, it is
9707 said that they have to resort to that, viz. the abode of heaven, earth,
9708 &c. which forms the topic of discussion. For the text, after having
9709 said, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, all his
9710 works perish when He has been beheld who is the higher and the lower'
9711 (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8), later on remarks, 'The wise man freed from name and
9712 form goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great' (Mu. Up.
9713 III, 2, 8). That Brahman is that which is to be resorted to by the
9714 released, is known from other scriptural passages, such as 'When all
9715 desires which once entered his heart are undone then does the mortal
9716 become immortal, then he obtains Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 7). Of the
9717 pradhana and similar entities, on the other hand, it is not known from
9718 any source that they are to be resorted to by the released. Moreover,
9719 the text (in the passage, 'Know him alone as the Self and leave off
9720 other words') declares that the knowledge of the abode of heaven and
9721 earth, &c. is connected with the leaving off of all speech; a condition
9722 which, according to another scriptural passage, attaches to (the
9723 knowledge of) Brahman; cp. B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 21, 'Let a wise Brahman/n/a,
9724 after he has discovered him, practise wisdom. Let him not seek after
9725 many words, for that is mere weariness of the tongue.'--For that reason
9726 also the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, is the highest Brahman.

9727
9728 3. Not (i.e. the abode of heaven, earth, &c. cannot be) that which is

9729 inferred, (i.e. the pradhana), on account of the terms not denoting it.

9730

9731 While there has been shown a special reason in favour of Brahman (being
9732 the abode), there is no such special reason in favour of anything else.
9733 Hence he (the sutrakara) says that that which is inferred, i.e. the
9734 pradhana assumed by the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, is not to be accepted as the
9735 abode of heaven, earth, &c.--Why?--On account of the terms not denoting
9736 it. For the sacred text does not contain any term intimating the
9737 non-intelligent pradhana, on the ground of which we might understand the
9738 latter to be the general cause or abode; while such terms as 'he who
9739 perceives all and knows all' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9) intimate an intelligent
9740 being opposed to the pradhana in nature.--For the same reason the air
9741 also cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.

9742

9743 4. (Nor) also the individual soul (pra/n/abh/ri/t).

9744

9745 Although to the cognitional (individual) Self the qualities of Selfhood
9746 and intelligence do belong, still omniscience and similar qualities do
9747 not belong to it as its knowledge is limited by its adjuncts; thus the
9748 individual soul also cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth,
9749 &c., for the same reason, i.e. on account of the terms not denoting
9750 it.--Moreover, the attribute of forming the abode of heaven, earth, and
9751 so on, cannot properly be given to the individual soul because the
9752 latter is limited by certain adjuncts and therefore non-pervading (not
9753 omnipresent)[168].--The special enunciation (of the individual soul) is
9754 caused by what follows[169].--The individual soul is not to be accepted
9755 as the abode of heaven, earth, &c. for the following reason also.

9756

9757 5. On account of the declaration of difference.

9758

9759 The passage 'Know him alone as the Self' moreover implies a declaration
9760 of difference, viz. of the difference of the object of knowledge and the
9761 knower. Here the individual soul as being that which is desirous of
9762 release is the knower, and consequently Brahman, which is denoted by the
9763 word 'self' and represented as the object of knowledge, is understood to
9764 be the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.--For the following reason also
9765 the individual soul cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth,
9766 &c.

9767

9768 6. On account of the subject-matter.

9769

9770 The highest Self constitutes the subject-matter (of the entire chapter),
9771 as we see from the passage, 'Sir, what is that through which, when it is
9772 known, everything else becomes known?' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 3) in which the
9773 knowledge of everything is declared to be dependent on the knowledge of
9774 one thing. For all this (i.e. the entire world) becomes known if Brahman
9775 the Self of all is known, not if only the individual soul is
9776 known.--Another reason against the individual soul follows.

9777

9778 7. And on account of the two conditions of standing and eating (of which
9779 the former is characteristic of the highest Lord, the latter of the
9780 individual soul).

9781

9782 With reference to that which is the abode of heaven, earth, and so on,
9783 the text says, 'Two birds, inseparable friends,' &c. (Mu. Up. III, 1,
9784 1). This passage describes the two states of mere standing, i.e. mere
9785 presence, and of eating, the clause, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit,'
9786 referring to the eating, i.e. the fruition of the results of works, and
9787 the clause, 'The other one looks on without eating,' describing the
9788 condition of mere inactive presence. The two states described, viz. of
9789 mere presence on the one hand and of enjoyment on the other hand, show
9790 that the Lord and the individual soul are referred to. Now there is room
9791 for this statement which represents the Lord as separate from the
9792 individual soul, only if the passage about the abode of heaven and earth
9793 likewise refers to the Lord; for in that case only there exists a
9794 continuity of topic. On any other supposition the second passage would
9795 contain a statement about something not connected with the general
9796 topic, and would therefore be entirely uncalled for.--But, it may be
9797 objected, on your interpretation also the second passage makes an

9798 uncalled-for statement, viz. in so far as it represents the individual
9799 soul as separate from the Lord.--Not so, we reply. It is nowhere the
9800 purpose of Scripture to make statements regarding the individual soul.
9801 From ordinary experience the individual soul, which in the different
9802 individual bodies is joined to the internal organs and other limiting
9803 adjuncts, is known to every one as agent and enjoyer, and we therefore
9804 must not assume that it is that which Scripture aims at setting forth.
9805 The Lord, on the other hand, about whom ordinary experience tells us
9806 nothing, is to be considered as the special topic of all scriptural
9807 passages, and we therefore cannot assume that any passage should refer
9808 to him merely casually[170].--That the mantra 'two birds,' &c. speaks of
9809 the Lord--and the individual soul we have already shown under I, 2,
9810 11.--And if, according to the interpretation given in the
9811 Pai@ngi-upanishad (and quoted under I, 2, 11), the verse is understood
9812 to refer to the internal organ (sattva) and the individual soul (not to
9813 the individual soul and the Lord), even then there is no contradiction
9814 (between that interpretation and our present averment that the
9815 individual soul is not the abode of heaven and earth).--How so?--Here
9816 (i.e. in the present Sutra and the Sutras immediately preceding) it is
9817 denied that the individual soul which, owing to its imagined connexion
9818 with the internal organ and other limiting adjuncts, has a separate
9819 existence in separate bodies--its division being analogous to the
9820 division of universal space into limited spaces such as the spaces
9821 within jars and the like--is that which is called the abode of heaven
9822 and earth. That same soul, on the other hand, which exists in all
9823 bodies, if considered apart from the limiting adjuncts, is nothing else
9824 but the highest Self. Just as the spaces within jars, if considered
9825 apart from their limiting conditions, are merged in universal space, so
9826 the individual soul also is incontestably that which is denoted as the
9827 abode of heaven and earth, since it (the soul) cannot really be separate
9828 from the highest Self. That it is not the abode of heaven and earth, is
9829 therefore said of the individual soul in so far only as it imagines
9830 itself to be connected with the internal organ and so on. Hence it
9831 follows that the highest Self is the abode of heaven, earth, and so
9832 on.--The same conclusion has already been arrived at under I, 2, 21; for
9833 in the passage concerning the source of all beings (which passage is
9834 discussed under the Sutra quoted) we meet with the clause, 'In which
9835 heaven and earth and the sky are woven.' In the present adhikara/n/a the
9836 subject is resumed for the sake of further elucidation.

9837
9838 8. The bhuman (is Brahman), as the instruction about it is additional to
9839 that about the state of deep sleep (i.e. the vital air which remains
9840 awake even in the state of deep sleep).

9841
9842 We read (Ch. Up. VII, 23; 24), 'That which is much (bhuman) we must
9843 desire to understand.--Sir, I desire to understand it.--Where one sees
9844 nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is what
9845 is much (bhuman). Where one sees something else, hears something else,
9846 understands something else, that is the Little.'--Here the doubt arises
9847 whether that which is much is the vital air (pra/n/a) or the highest
9848 Self.--Whence the doubt?--The word 'bhuman,' taken by itself, means the
9849 state of being much, according to its derivation as taught by Pa/n/ani,
9850 VI, 4, 158. Hence there is felt the want of a specification showing what
9851 constitutes the Self of that muchness. Here there presents itself at
9852 first the approximate passage, 'The vital air is more than hope' (Ch.
9853 Up. VII, 15, 1), from which we may conclude that the vital air is
9854 bhuman.--On the other hand, we meet at the beginning of the chapter,
9855 where the general topic is stated, with the following passage, 'I have
9856 heard from men like you that he who knows the Self overcomes grief. I am
9857 in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine;' from which passage
9858 it would appear that the bhuman is the highest Self.--Hence there arises
9859 a doubt as to which of the two alternatives is to be embraced, and which
9860 is to be set aside.

9861
9862 The purvapakshin maintains that the bhuman is the vital air, since there
9863 is found no further series of questions and answers as to what is more.
9864 For while we meet with a series of questions and answers (such as, 'Sir,
9865 is there something which is more than a name?'--'Speech is more than
9866 name.'--'Is there something which is more than speech?'--'Mind is more

9867 than speech'), which extends from name up to vital air, we do not meet
 9868 with a similar question and answer as to what might be more than vital
 9869 air (such as, 'Is there something which is more than vital air?'--'Such
 9870 and such a thing is more than vital air'). The text rather at first
 9871 declares at length (in the passage, 'The vital air is more than hope,'
 9872 &c.) that the vital air is more than all the members of the series from
 9873 name up to hope; it then acknowledges him who knows the vital air to be
 9874 an ativadin, i.e. one who makes a statement surpassing the preceding
 9875 statements (in the passage, 'Thou art an ativadin. He may say I am an
 9876 ativadin; he need not deny it'); and it thereupon (in the passage, 'But
 9877 he in reality is an ativadin who declares something beyond by means of
 9878 the True'[171]),--not leaving off, but rather continuing to refer to the
 9879 quality of an ativadin which is founded on the vital air,--proceeds, by
 9880 means of the series beginning with the True, to lead over to the bhuman;
 9881 so that we conclude the meaning to be that the vital air is the
 9882 bhuman.--But, if the bhuman is interpreted to mean the vital air, how
 9883 have we to explain the passage in which the bhuman is characterised.
 9884 'Where one sees nothing else?' &c.--As, the purvapakshin replies, in the
 9885 state of deep sleep we observe a cessation of all activity, such as
 9886 seeing, &c., on the part of the organs merged in the vital air, the
 9887 vital air itself may be characterised by a passage such as, 'Where one
 9888 sees nothing else.' Similarly, another scriptural passage (Pra. Up. IV,
 9889 2; 3) describes at first (in the words, 'He does not hear, he does not
 9890 see,' &c.) the state of deep sleep as characterised by the cessation of
 9891 the activity of all bodily organs, and then by declaring that in that
 9892 state the vital air, with its five modifications, remains awake ('The
 9893 fires of the pra/n/as are awake in that town'), shows the vital air to
 9894 occupy the principal position in the state of deep sleep.--That passage
 9895 also, which speaks of the bliss of the bhuman ('The bhuman is bliss,'
 9896 Ch. Up. VII, 23), can be reconciled with our explanation, because Pra.
 9897 Up. IV, 6 declares bliss to attach to the state of deep sleep ('Then
 9898 that god sees no dreams and at that time that happiness arises in his
 9899 body').--Again, the statement, 'The bhuman is immortality' (Ch. Up. VII,
 9900 24, 1), may likewise refer to the vital air; for another scriptural
 9901 passage says, 'Pra/n/a is immortality' (Kau. Up. III, 2).--But how can
 9902 the view according to which the bhuman is the vital air be reconciled
 9903 with the fact that in the beginning of the chapter the knowledge of the
 9904 Self is represented as the general topic ('He who knows the Self
 9905 overcomes grief,' &c.)?--By the Self there referred to, the purvapakshin
 9906 replies, nothing else is meant but the vital air. For the passage, 'The
 9907 vital air is father, the vital air is mother, the vital air is brother,
 9908 the vital air is sister, the vital air is teacher, the vital air is
 9909 Brahma/n/a' (Ch. Up. VII, 15, 1), represents the vital air as the Self
 9910 of everything. As, moreover, the passage, 'As the spokes of a wheel rest
 9911 in the nave, so all this rests in pra/n/a,' declares the pra/n/a to be
 9912 the Self of all--by means of a comparison with the spokes and the nave
 9913 of a wheel--the pra/n/a may be conceived under the form of bhuman, i.e.
 9914 plenitude.--Bhuman, therefore, means the vital air.

9916 To this we make the following reply.--Bhuman can mean the highest Self
 9917 only, not the vital air.--Why?--'On account of information being given
 9918 about it, subsequent to bliss.' The word 'bliss' (samprasada) means the
 9919 state of deep sleep, as may be concluded, firstly, from the etymology of
 9920 the word ('In it he, i.e. man, is altogether
 9921 pleased--samprasidati')--and, secondly, from the fact of samprasada
 9922 being mentioned in the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka together with the state of
 9923 dream and the waking state. And as in the state of deep sleep the vital
 9924 air remains awake, the word 'samprasada' is employed in the Sutra to
 9925 denote the vital air; so that the Sutra means, 'on account of
 9926 information being given about the bhuman, subsequently to (the
 9927 information given about) the vital air.' If the bhuman were the vital
 9928 air itself, it would be a strange proceeding to make statements about
 9929 the bhuman in addition to the statements about the vital air. For in the
 9930 preceding passages also we do not meet, for instance, with a statement
 9931 about name subsequent to the previous statement about name (i.e. the
 9932 text does not say 'name is more than name'), but after something has
 9933 been said about name, a new statement is made about speech, which is
 9934 something different from name (i.e. the text says, 'Speech is more than
 9935 name'), and so on up to the statement about vital air, each subsequent

9936 statement referring to something other than the topic of the preceding
9937 one. We therefore conclude that the bhuman also, the statement about
9938 which follows on the statement about the vital air, is something other
9939 than the vital air. But--it may be objected--we meet here neither with a
9940 question, such as, 'Is there something more than vital air?' nor with an
9941 answer, such as, 'That and that is more than vital air.' How, then, can
9942 it be said that the information about the bhuman is given subsequently
9943 to the information about the vital air?--Moreover, we see that the
9944 circumstance of being an ativadin, which is exclusively connected with
9945 the vital air, is referred to in the subsequent passage (viz. 'But in
9946 reality he is an ativadin who makes a statement surpassing (the
9947 preceding statements) by means of the True'). There is thus no
9948 information additional to the information about the vital air.--To this
9949 objection we reply that it is impossible to maintain that the passage
9950 last quoted merely continues the discussion of the quality of being an
9951 ativadin, as connected with the knowledge of the vital air; since the
9952 clause, 'He who makes a statement surpassing, &c. by means of the True,'
9953 states a specification.--But, the objector resumes, this very statement
9954 of a specification may be explained as referring to the vital air. If
9955 you ask how, we refer you to an analogous case. If somebody says, 'This
9956 Agnihotrin speaks the truth,' the meaning is not that the quality of
9957 being an Agnihotrin depends on speaking the truth; that quality rather
9958 depends on the (regular performance of the) agnihotra only, and speaking
9959 the truth is mentioned merely as a special attribute of that special
9960 Agnihotrin. So our passage also ('But in reality he is an ativadin who
9961 makes a statement, &c. by means of the True') does not intimate that the
9962 quality of being an ativadin depends on speaking the truth, but merely
9963 expresses that speaking the truth is a special attribute of him who
9964 knows the vital air; while the quality of being an ativadin must be
9965 considered to depend on the knowledge of the vital air.--This objection
9966 we rebut by the remark that it involves an abandonment of the direct
9967 meaning of the sacred text. For from the text, as it stands, we
9968 understand that the quality of being an ativadin depends on speaking the
9969 truth; the sense being: An ativadin is he who is an ativadin by means of
9970 the True. The passage does not in anyway contain a eulogisation of the
9971 knowledge of the vital air. It could be connected with the latter only
9972 on the ground of general subject-matter (prakara/n/a)[172]; which would
9973 involve an abandonment of the direct meaning of the text in favour of
9974 prakara/n/a[173].--Moreover, the particle but ('But in reality he is,'
9975 &c.), whose purport is to separate (what follows) from the
9976 subject-matter of what precedes, would not agree (with the pra/n/a
9977 explanation). The following passage also, 'But we must desire to know
9978 the True' (VII, 16), which presupposes a new effort, shows that a new
9979 topic is going to be entered upon.--For these reasons we have to
9980 consider the statement about the ativadin in the same light as we should
9981 consider the remark--made in a conversation which previously had turned
9982 on the praise of those who study one Veda--that he who studies the four
9983 Vedas is a great Brahma/n/a; a remark which we should understand to be
9984 laudatory of persons different from those who study one Veda, i.e. of
9985 those who study all the four Vedas. Nor is there any reason to assume
9986 that a new topic can be introduced in the form of question and answer
9987 only; for that the matter propounded forms a new topic is sufficiently
9988 clear from the circumstance that no connexion can be established between
9989 it and the preceding topic. The succession of topics in the chapter
9990 under discussion is as follows: Narada at first listens to the
9991 instruction which Sanatkumara gives him about various matters, the last
9992 of which is Pra/n/a, and then becomes silent. Thereupon Sanatkumara
9993 explains to him spontaneously (without being asked) that the quality of
9994 being an ativadin, if merely based on the knowledge of the vital
9995 air--which knowledge has for its object an unreal product,--is devoid of
9996 substance, and that he only is an ativadin who is such by means of the
9997 True. By the term 'the True' there is meant the highest Brahman; for
9998 Brahman is the Real, and it is called the 'True' in another scriptural
9999 passage also, viz. Taitt. Up. II, 1, 'The True, knowledge, infinite is
10000 Brahman.' Narada, thus enlightened, starts a new line of enquiry ('Might
10001 I, Sir, become an ativadin by the True?') and Sanatkumara then leads
10002 him, by a series of instrumental steps, beginning with understanding, up
10003 to the knowledge of bhuman. We therefrom conclude that the bhuman is
10004 that very True whose explanation had been promised in addition to the

(knowledge of the) vital air. We thus see that the instruction about the bhuman is additional to the instruction about the vital air, and bhuman must therefore mean the highest Self, which is different from the vital air. With this interpretation the initial statement, according to which the enquiry into the Self forms the general subject-matter, agrees perfectly well. The assumption, on the other hand (made by the purvapakshin), that by the Self we have here to understand the vital air is indefensible. For, in the first place, Self-hood does not belong to the vital air in any non-figurative sense. In the second place, cessation of grief cannot take place apart from the knowledge of the highest Self; for, as another scriptural passage declares, 'There is no other path to go' (/S/vet. Up. VI, 15). Moreover, after we have read at the outset, 'Do, Sir, lead me over to the other side of grief' (Ch. Up. VII, 1, 3), we meet with the following concluding words (VII, 26, 2), 'To him, after his faults had been rubbed out, the venerable Sanatkumara showed the other side of darkness.' The term 'darkness' here denotes Nescience, the cause of grief, and so on.--Moreover, if the instruction terminated with the vital air, it would not be said of the latter that it rests on something else. But the brahma/n/a (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 1) does say, 'The vital air springs from the Self.' Nor can it be objected against this last argument that the concluding part of the chapter may refer to the highest Self, while, all the same, the bhuman (mentioned in an earlier part of the chapter) may be the vital air. For, from the passage (VII, 24, 1), ('Sir, in what does the bhuman rest? In its own greatness,' &c.), it appears that the bhuman forms the continuous topic up to the end of the chapter.--The quality of being the bhuman--which quality is plenitude--agrees, moreover, best with the highest Self, which is the cause of everything.

9. And on account of the agreement of the attributes (mentioned in the text).

The attributes, moreover, which the sacred text ascribes to the bhuman agree well with the highest Self. The passage, 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the bhuman,' gives us to understand that in the bhuman the ordinary activities of seeing and so on are absent; and that this is characteristic of the highest Self, we know from another scriptural passage, viz. 'But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' &c. (B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15). What is said about the absence of the activities of seeing and so on in the state of deep sleep (Pra. Up. IV, 2) is said with the intention of declaring the non-attachedness of the Self, not of describing the nature of the pra/n/a; for the highest Self (not the vital air) is the topic of that passage. The bliss also of which Scripture speaks as connected with that state is mentioned only in order to show that bliss constitutes the nature of the Self. For Scripture says (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 32), 'This is his highest bliss. All other creatures live on a small portion of that bliss.'--The passage under discussion also ('The bhuman is bliss. There is no bliss in that which is little (limited). The bhuman only is bliss') by denying the reality of bliss on the part of whatever is perishable shows that Brahman only is bliss as bhuman, i.e. in its plenitude.--Again, the passage, 'The bhuman is immortality,' shows that the highest cause is meant; for the immortality of all effected things is a merely relative one, and another scriptural passage says that 'whatever is different from that (Brahman) is perishable' (B/ri/. Up. III, 4, 2).--Similarly, the qualities of being the True, and of resting in its own greatness, and of being omnipresent, and of being the Self of everything which the text mentions (as belonging to the bhuman) can belong to the highest Self only, not to anything else.--By all this it is proved that the bhuman is the highest Self.

10. The Imperishable (is Brahman) on account of (its) supporting (all things) up to ether.

We read (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 7; 8). 'In what then is the ether woven, like warp and woof?--He said: O Gargi, the Brahma/n/as call this the akshara (the Imperishable). It is neither coarse nor fine,' and so on.--Here the doubt arises whether the word 'akshara' means 'syllable'

10074 or 'the highest Lord.'

10075
10076 The purvapakshin maintains that the word 'akshara' means 'syllable'
10077 merely, because it has, in such terms as akshara-samamnaya, the meaning
10078 of 'syllable;' because we have no right to disregard the settled meaning
10079 of a word; and because another scriptural passage also ('The syllable Om
10080 is all this,' Ch. Up. II, 23, 4) declares a syllable, represented as the
10081 object of devotion, to be the Self of all.

10082
10083 To this we reply that the highest Self only is denoted by the word
10084 'akshara.'--Why?--Because it (the akshara) is said to support the entire
10085 aggregate of effects, from earth up to ether. For the sacred text
10086 declares at first that the entire aggregate of effects beginning with
10087 earth and differentiated by threefold time is based on ether, in which
10088 it is 'woven like warp and woof;' leads then (by means of the question,
10089 'In what then is the ether woven, like warp and woof?') over to the
10090 akshara, and, finally, concludes with the words, 'In that akshara then,
10091 O Gargi, the ether is woven, like warp and woof.'--Now the attribute of
10092 supporting everything up to ether cannot be ascribed to any being but
10093 Brahman. The text (quoted from the Ch. Up.) says indeed that the
10094 syllable Om is all this, but that statement is to be understood as a
10095 mere glorification of the syllable Om considered as a means to obtain
10096 Brahman.--Therefore we take akshara to mean either 'the Imperishable' or
10097 'that which pervades;' on the ground of either of which explanations it
10098 must be identified with the highest Brahman.

10099
10100 But--our opponent resumes--while we must admit that the above reasoning
10101 holds good so far that the circumstance of the akshara supporting all
10102 things up to ether is to be accepted as a proof of all effects depending
10103 on a cause, we point out that it may be employed by those also who
10104 declare the pradhana to be the general cause. How then does the previous
10105 argumentation specially establish Brahman (to the exclusion of the
10106 pradhana)?--The reply to this is given in the next Sutra.

10107
10108 11. This (supporting can), on account of the command (attributed to the
10109 Imperishable, be the work of the highest Lord only).

10110
10111 The supporting of all things up to ether is the work of the highest Lord
10112 only.--Why?--On account of the command.--For the sacred text speaks of a
10113 command ('By the command of that akshara, O Gargi, sun and moon stand
10114 apart!' III, 8, 9), and command can be the work of the highest Lord
10115 only, not of the non-intelligent pradhana. For non-intelligent causes
10116 such as clay and the like are not capable of command, with reference to
10117 their effects, such as jars and the like.

10118
10119 12. And on account of (Scripture) separating (the akshara) from that
10120 whose nature is different (from Brahman).

10121
10122 Also on account of the reason stated in this Sutra Brahman only is to be
10123 considered as the Imperishable, and the supporting of all things up to
10124 ether is to be looked upon as the work of Brahman only, not of anything
10125 else. The meaning of the Sutra is as follows. Whatever things other than
10126 Brahman might possibly be thought to be denoted by the term 'akshara,'
10127 from the nature of all those things Scripture separates the akshara
10128 spoken of as the support of all things up to ether. The scriptural
10129 passage alluded to is III, 8, 11, 'That akshara, O Gargi, is unseen but
10130 seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but
10131 knowing.' Here the designation of being unseen, &c. agrees indeed with
10132 the pradhana also, but not so the designation of seeing, &c., as the
10133 pradhana is non-intelligent.--Nor can the word akshara denote the
10134 embodied soul with its limiting conditions, for the passage following on
10135 the one quoted declares that there is nothing different from the Self
10136 ('there is nothing that sees but it, nothing that hears but it, nothing
10137 that perceives but it, nothing that knows but it'); and, moreover,
10138 limiting conditions are expressly denied (of the akshara) in the
10139 passage, 'It is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without
10140 mind,' &c. (III, 8, 8). An embodied soul without limiting conditions
10141 does not exist[174].--It is therefore certain beyond doubt that the
10142 Imperishable is nothing else but the highest Brahman.

13. On account of his being designated as the object of sight (the highest Self is meant, and) the same (is meant in the passage speaking of the meditation on the highest person by means of the syllable Om).

(In Pra. Up. V, 2) the general topic of discussion is set forth in the words, 'O Satyakama, the syllable Om is the highest and also the other Brahman; therefore he who knows it arrives by the same means at one of the two.' The text then goes on, 'Again, he who meditates with this syllable Om of three matras on the highest Person,' &c.--Here the doubt presents itself, whether the object of meditation referred to in the latter passage is the highest Brahman or the other Brahman; a doubt based on the former passage, according to which both are under discussion.

The purvapakshin maintains that the other, i.e. the lower Brahman, is referred to, because the text promises only a reward limited by a certain locality for him who knows it. For, as the highest Brahman is omnipresent, it would be inappropriate to assume that he who knows it obtains a fruit limited by a certain locality. The objection that, if the lower Brahman were understood, there would be no room for the qualification, 'the highest person,' is not valid, because the vital principal (pra/n/a) may be called 'higher' with reference to the body[175].

To this we make the following reply: What is here taught as the object of meditation is the highest Brahman only.--Why?--On account of its being spoken of as the object of sight. For the person to be meditated upon is, in a complementary passage, spoken of as the object of the act of seeing, 'He sees the person dwelling in the castle (of the body; purusham puri/s/ayam), higher than that one who is of the shape of the individual soul, and who is himself higher (than the senses and their objects).' Now, of an act of meditation an unreal thing also can be the object, as, for instance, the merely imaginary object of a wish. But of the act of seeing, real things only are the objects, as we know from experience; we therefore conclude, that in the passage last quoted, the highest (only real) Self which corresponds to the mental act of complete intuition[176] is spoken of as the object of sight. This same highest Self we recognise in the passage under discussion as the object of meditation, in consequence of the term, 'the highest person.'--But--an objection will be raised--as the object of meditation we have the highest person, and as the object of sight the person higher than that one who is himself higher, &c.; how, then, are we to know that those two are identical?--The two passages, we reply, have in common the terms 'highest' (or 'higher,' para) and 'person.' And it must not by any means be supposed that the term jivaghana[177] refers to that highest person which, considered as the object of meditation, had previously been introduced as the general topic. For the consequence of that supposition would be that that highest person which is the object of sight would be different from that highest person which is represented as the object of meditation. We rather have to explain the word jivaghana as 'He whose shape[178] is characterised by the jivas;' so that what is really meant by that term is that limited condition of the highest Self which is owing to its adjuncts, and manifests itself in the form of jivas, i.e. individual souls; a condition analogous to the limitation of salt (in general) by means of the mass of a particular lump of salt. That limited condition of the Self may itself be called 'higher,' if viewed with regard to the senses and their objects.

Another (commentator) says that we have to understand by the word 'jivaghana' the world of Brahman spoken of in the preceding sentence ('by the Saman verses he is led up to the world of Brahman'), and again in the following sentence (v. 7), which may be called 'higher,' because it is higher than the other worlds. That world of Brahman may be called jivaghana because all individual souls (jiva) with their organs of action may be viewed as comprised (sa@nghata = ghana) within Hira/n/yagarbha, who is the Self of all organs, and dwells in the Brahma-world. We thus understand that he who is higher than that jivaghana, i.e. the highest Self, which constitutes the object of sight,

also constitutes the object of meditation. The qualification, moreover, expressed in the term 'the highest person' is in its place only if we understand the highest Self to be meant. For the name, 'the highest person,' can be given only to the highest Self, higher than which there is nothing. So another scriptural passage also says, 'Higher than the person there is nothing--this is the goal, the highest road.' Hence the sacred text, which at first distinguishes between the higher and the lower Brahman ('the syllable Om is the higher and the lower Brahman'), and afterwards speaks of the highest Person to be meditated upon by means of the syllable Om, gives us to understand that the highest Person is nothing else but the highest Brahman. That the highest Self constitutes the object of meditation, is moreover intimated by the passage declaring that release from evil is the fruit (of meditation), 'As a snake is freed from its skin, so is he freed from evil.'--With reference to the objection that a fruit confined to a certain place is not an appropriate reward for him who meditates on the highest Self, we finally remark that the objection is removed, if we understand the passage to refer to emancipation by degrees. He who meditates on the highest Self by means of the syllable Om, as consisting of three matras, obtains for his (first) reward the world of Brahman, and after that, gradually, complete intuition.

14. The small (ether) (is Brahman) on account of the subsequent (arguments).

We read (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 1), 'There is this city of Brahman, and in it the palace, the small lotus, and in it that small ether. Now what exists within that small ether that is to be sought for, that is to be understood,' &c.--Here the doubt arises whether the small ether within the small lotus of the heart of which Scripture speaks, is the elemental ether, or the individual soul (vij/n/anatman), or the highest Self. This doubt is caused by the words 'ether' and 'city of Brahman.' For the word 'ether,' in the first place, is known to be used in the sense of elemental ether as well as of highest Brahman. Hence the doubt whether the small ether of the text be the elemental ether or the highest ether, i.e. Brahman. In explanation of the expression 'city of Brahman,' in the second place, it might be said either that the individual soul is here called Brahman and the body Brahman's city, or else that the city of Brahman means the city of the highest Brahman. Here (i.e. in consequence of this latter doubt) a further doubt arises as to the nature of the small ether, according as the individual soul or the highest Self is understood by the Lord of the city.

The purvapakshin maintains that by the small ether we have to understand the elemental ether, since the latter meaning is the conventional one of the word aka/s/a. The elemental ether is here called small with reference to its small abode (the heart).--In the passage, 'As large as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart,' it is represented as constituting at the same time the two terms of a comparison, because it is possible to make a distinction between the outer and the inner ether[179]; and it is said that 'heaven and earth are contained within it,' because the whole ether, in so far as it is space, is one[180].--Or else, the purvapakshin continues, the 'small one' may be taken to mean the individual soul, on account of the term, 'the city of Brahman.' The body is here called the city of Brahman because it is the abode of the individual soul; for it is acquired by means of the actions of the soul. On this interpretation we must assume that the individual soul is here called Brahman metaphorically. The highest Brahman cannot be meant, because it is not connected with the body as its lord. The lord of the city, i.e. the soul, is represented as dwelling in one spot of the city (viz. the heart), just as a real king resides in one spot of his residence. Moreover, the mind (manas) constitutes the limiting adjunct of the individual soul, and the mind chiefly abides in the heart; hence the individual soul only can be spoken of as dwelling in the heart. Further, the individual soul only can be spoken of as small, since it is (elsewhere; /S/vet. Up. V, 8) compared in size to the point of a goad. That it is compared (in the passage under discussion) to the ether must be understood to intimate its non difference from Brahman.--Nor does the scriptural passage say

10281 that the 'small' one is to be sought for and to be understood, since in
10282 the clause, 'That which is within that,' &c., it is represented as a
10283 mere distinguishing attribute of something else[181].
10284

10285 To all this we make the following reply:--The small ether can mean the
10286 highest Lord only, not either the elemental ether or the individual
10287 soul.--Why?--On account of the subsequent reasons, i.e. on account of
10288 the reasons implied in the complementary passage. For there, the text
10289 declares at first, with reference to the small ether, which is enjoined
10290 as the object of sight, 'If they should say to him,' &c.; thereupon
10291 follows an objection, 'What is there that deserves to be sought for or
10292 that is to be understood?' and thereon a final decisive statement, 'Then
10293 he should say: As large as this ether is, so large is that ether within
10294 the heart. Both heaven and earth are contained within it.' Here the
10295 teacher, availing himself of the comparison of the ether within the
10296 heart with the known (universal) ether, precludes the conception that
10297 the ether within the heart is small--which conception is based on the
10298 statement as to the smallness of the lotus, i.e. the heart--and thereby
10299 precludes the possibility of our understanding by the term 'the small
10300 ether,' the elemental ether. For, although the ordinary use of language
10301 gives to the word 'ether' the sense of elemental ether, here the
10302 elemental ether cannot be thought of, because it cannot possibly be
10303 compared with itself.--But, has it not been stated above, that the
10304 ether, although one only, may be compared with itself, in consequence of
10305 an assumed difference between the outer and the inner ether?--That
10306 explanation, we reply, is impossible; for we cannot admit that a
10307 comparison of a thing with itself may be based upon a merely imaginary
10308 difference. And even if we admitted the possibility of such a
10309 comparison, the extent of the outer ether could never be ascribed to the
10310 limited inner ether. Should it be said that to the highest Lord also the
10311 extent of the (outer) ether cannot be ascribed, since another scriptural
10312 passage declares that he is greater than ether (/S/a. Bra, X, 6, 3, 2),
10313 we invalidate this objection by the remark, that the passage (comparing
10314 the inner ether with the outer ether) has the purport of discarding the
10315 idea of smallness (of the inner ether), which is prima facie established
10316 by the smallness of the lotus of the heart in which it is contained, and
10317 has not the purport of establishing a certain extent (of the inner
10318 ether). If the passage aimed at both, a split of the sentence[182] would
10319 result.--Nor, if we allowed the assumptive difference of the inner and
10320 the outer ether, would it be possible to represent that limited portion
10321 of the ether which is enclosed in the lotus of the heart, as containing
10322 within itself heaven, earth, and so on. Nor can we reconcile with the
10323 nature of the elemental ether the qualities of Self-hood, freeness from
10324 sin, and so on, (which are ascribed to the 'small' ether) in the
10325 following passage, 'It is the Self free from sin, free from old age,
10326 from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, of true desires, of true
10327 purposes.'--Although the term 'Self' (occurring in the passage quoted)
10328 may apply to the individual soul, yet other reasons exclude all idea of
10329 the individual soul being meant (by the small ether). For it would be
10330 impossible to dissociate from the individual soul, which is restricted
10331 by limiting conditions and elsewhere compared to the point of a goad,
10332 the attribute of smallness attaching to it, on account of its being
10333 enclosed in the lotus of the heart.--Let it then be assumed--our
10334 opponent remarks--that the qualities of all-pervadingness, &c. are
10335 ascribed to the individual soul with the intention of intimating its
10336 non-difference from Brahman.--Well, we reply, if you suppose that the
10337 small ether is called all-pervading because it is one with Brahman, our
10338 own supposition, viz. that the all-pervadingness spoken of is directly
10339 predicated of Brahman itself, is the much more simple one.--Concerning
10340 the assertion that the term 'city of Brahman' can only be understood, on
10341 the assumption that the individual soul dwells, like a king, in one
10342 particular spot of the city of which it is the Lord, we remark that the
10343 term is more properly interpreted to mean 'the body in so far as it is
10344 the city of the highest Brahman;' which interpretation enables us to
10345 take the term 'Brahman' in its primary sense[183]. The highest Brahman
10346 also is connected with the body, for the latter constitutes an abode for
10347 the perception of Brahman[184]. Other scriptural passages also express
10348 the same meaning, so, for instance, Pra. Up. V, 5, 'He sees the highest
10349 person dwelling in the city' (purusha = puri/s/aya), &c., and B/ri/. Up.

10350 II, 5, 18, 'This person (purusha) is in all cities (bodies) the dweller
10351 within the city (puri/s/aya). '--Or else (taking brahmapura to mean
10352 jivapura) we may understand the passage to teach that Brahman is, in the
10353 city of the individual soul, near (to the devout worshipper), just as
10354 Vish/n/u is near to us in the Salagrama-stone.--Moreover, the text
10355 (VIII, 1, 6) at first declares the result of works to be perishable ('as
10356 here on earth whatever has been acquired by works perishes, so perishes
10357 whatever is acquired for the next world by good actions,' &c.), and
10358 afterwards declares the imperishableness of the results flowing from a
10359 knowledge of the small ether, which forms the general subject of
10360 discussion ('those who depart from hence after having discovered the
10361 Self and those true desires, for them there is freedom in all worlds').
10362 From this again it is manifest that the small ether is the highest
10363 Self.--We now turn to the statement made by the purvapakshin, 'that the
10364 sacred text does not represent the small ether as that which is to be
10365 sought for and to be understood, because it is mentioned as a
10366 distinguishing attribute of something else,' and reply as follows: If
10367 the (small) ether were not that which is to be sought for and to be
10368 understood, the description of the nature of that ether, which is given
10369 in the passage ('as large as this ether is, so large is that ether
10370 within the heart'), would be devoid of purport.--But--the opponent might
10371 say--that descriptive statement also has the purport of setting forth
10372 the nature of the thing abiding within (the ether); for the text after
10373 having raised an objection (in the passage, 'And if they should say to
10374 him: Now with regard to that city of Brahman and the palace in it, i.e.
10375 the small lotus of the heart, and the small ether within the heart, what
10376 is there within it that deserves to be sought for or that is to be
10377 understood?') declares, when replying to that objection, that heaven,
10378 earth, and so on, are contained within it (the ether), a declaration to
10379 which the comparison with the ether forms a mere introduction.--Your
10380 reasoning, we reply, is faulty. If it were admitted, it would follow
10381 that heaven, earth, &c., which are contained within the small ether,
10382 constitute the objects of search and enquiry. But in that case the
10383 complementary passage would be out of place. For the text carrying on,
10384 as the subject of discussion, the ether that is the abode of heaven,
10385 earth, &c.--by means of the clauses, 'In it all desires are contained,'
10386 'It is the Self free from sin,' &c., and the passage, 'But those who
10387 depart from hence having discovered the Self, and the true desires' (in
10388 which passage the conjunction 'and' has the purpose of joining the
10389 desires to the Self)--declares that the Self as well, which is the abode
10390 of the desires, as the desires which abide in the Self, are the objects
10391 of knowledge. From this we conclude that in the beginning of the passage
10392 also, the small ether abiding within the lotus of the heart, together
10393 with whatever is contained within it as earth, true desires, and so on,
10394 is represented as the object of knowledge. And, for the reasons
10395 explained, that ether is the highest Lord.

10396
10397 15. (The small ether is Brahman) on account of the action of going (into
10398 Brahman) and of the word (brahmaloka); for thus it is seen (i.e. that
10399 the individual souls go into Brahman is seen elsewhere in Scripture);
10400 and (this going of the souls into Brahman constitutes) an inferential
10401 sign (by means of which we may properly interpret the word
10402 'brahmaloka').

10403
10404 It has been declared (in the preceding Sutra) that the small (ether) is
10405 the highest Lord, on account of the reasons contained in the subsequent
10406 passages. These subsequent reasons are now set forth.--For this reason
10407 also the small (ether) can be the highest Lord only, because the passage
10408 complementary to the passage concerning the small (ether) contains a
10409 mention of going and a word, both of which intimate the highest Lord. In
10410 the first place, we read (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2), 'All these creatures, day
10411 after day going into that Brahma-world, do not discover it.' This
10412 passage which refers back, by means of the word 'Brahma-world,' to the
10413 small ether which forms the general subject-matter, speaks of the going
10414 to it of the creatures, i.e. the individual souls, wherefrom we conclude
10415 that the small (ether) is Brahman. For this going of the individual
10416 souls into Brahman, which takes place day after day in the state of deep
10417 sleep, is seen, i.e. is met with in another scriptural passage, viz. Ch.
10418 Up. VI, 8, 1, 'He becomes united with the True,' &c. In ordinary life

also we say of a man who lies in deep sleep, 'he has become Brahman,' 'he is gone into the state of Brahman.'--In the second place, the word 'Brahma-world,' which is here applied to the small (ether) under discussion, excludes all thought of the individual soul or the elemental ether, and thus gives us to understand that the small (ether) is Brahman.--But could not the word 'Brahma-world' convey as well the idea of the world of him whose throne is the lotus[185]?--It might do so indeed, if we explained the compound 'Brahma-world' as 'the world of Brahman.' But if we explain it on the ground of the coordination of both members of the compound--so that 'Brahma-world' denotes that world which is Brahman--then it conveys the idea of the highest Brahman only.--And that daily going (of the souls) into Brahman (mentioned above) is, moreover, an inferential sign for explaining the compound 'Brahma-world,' on the ground of the co-ordination of its two constituent members. For it would be impossible to assume that all those creatures daily go into the world of the effected (lower) Brahman; which world is commonly called the Satyaloka, i.e. the world of the True.

16. And on account of the supporting also (attributed to it), (the small ether must be the Lord) because that greatness is observed in him (according to other scriptural passages).

And also on account of the 'supporting' the small ether can be the highest Lord only.--How?--The text at first introduces the general subject of discussion in the passage, 'In it is that small ether;' declares thereupon that the small one is to be compared with the universal ether, and that everything is contained in it; subsequently applies to it the term 'Self,' and states it to possess the qualities of being free from sin, &c.; and, finally, declares with reference to the same general subject of discussion, 'That Self is a bank, a limitary support (vidh/ri/ti), that these worlds may not be confounded.' As 'support' is here predicated of the Self, we have to understand by it a supporting agent. Just as a dam stems the spreading water so that the boundaries of the fields are not confounded, so that Self acts like a limitary dam in order that these outer and inner worlds, and all the different castes and a/s/ramas may not be confounded. In accordance with this our text declares that greatness, which is shown in the act of holding asunder, to belong to the small (ether) which forms the subject of discussion; and that such greatness is found in the highest Lord only, is seen from other scriptural passages, such as 'By the command of that Imperishable, O Gargi, sun and moon; are held apart' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 9). Similarly, we read in another passage also, about whose referring to the highest Lord there is no doubt, 'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things. He is a bank and a limitary support, so that these worlds may not be confounded' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 22)--Hence, on account of the 'supporting,' also the small (ether) is nothing else but the highest Lord.

17. And on account of the settled meaning.

The small ether within cannot denote anything but the highest Lord for this reason also, that the word 'ether' has (among other meanings) the settled meaning of 'highest Lord.' Compare, for instance, the sense in which the word 'ether' is used in Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 'He who is called ether is the revealer of all forms and names;' and Ch. Up. I, 9, 1, 'All these beings take their rise from the ether,' &c. On the other hand, we do not meet with any passage in which the word 'ether' is used in the sense of 'individual soul.'--We have already shown that the word cannot, in our passage, denote the elemental ether; for, although the word certainly has that settled meaning, it cannot have it here, because the elemental ether cannot possibly be compared to itself, &c. &c.

18. If it be said that the other one (i.e. the individual soul) (is meant) on account of a reference to it (made in a complementary passage), (we say) no, on account of the impossibility.

If the small (ether) is to be explained as the highest Lord on account of a complementary passage, then, the purvapakshin resumes, we point out that another complementary passage contains a reference to the other

one, i.e. to the individual soul: 'Now that serene being (literally: serenity, complete satisfaction), which after having risen out from this earthly body and having reached the highest light, appears in its true form, that is, the Self; thus he spoke' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 4). For there the word 'serenity,' which is known to denote, in another scriptural passage, the state of deep sleep, can convey the idea of the individual soul only when it is in that state, not of anything else. The 'rising from the body' also can be predicated of the individual soul only whose abode the body is; just as air, &c., whose abode is the ether, are said to arise from the ether. And just as the word 'ether,' although in ordinary language not denoting the highest Lord, yet is admitted to denote him in such passages as, 'The ether is the revealer of forms and names,' because it there occurs in conjunction with qualities of the highest Lord, so it may likewise denote the individual soul. Hence the term 'the small ether' denotes in the passage under discussion the individual soul, 'on account of the reference to the other.'

Not so, we reply, 'on account of the impossibility.' In the first place, the individual soul, which imagines itself to be limited by the internal organ and its other adjuncts, cannot be compared with the ether. And, in the second place, attributes such as freedom from evil, and the like, cannot be ascribed to a being which erroneously transfers to itself the attributes of its limiting adjuncts. This has already been set forth in the first Sutra of the present adhikara/n/a, and is again mentioned here in order to remove all doubt as to the soul being different from the highest Self. That the reference pointed out by the purvapakshin is not to the individual soul will, moreover, be shown in one of the next Sutras (I, 3, 21).

19. If it be said that from the subsequent (chapter it appears that the individual soul is meant), (we point out that what is there referred to is) rather (the individual soul in so far) as its true nature has become manifest (i.e. as it is non-different from Brahman).

The doubt whether, 'on account of the reference to the other,' the individual soul might not possibly be meant, has been discarded on the ground of 'impossibility.' But, like a dead man on whom am/ri/ta has been sprinkled, that doubt rises again, drawing new strength from the subsequent chapter which treats of Prajapati. For there he (Prajapati) at the outset declares that the Self, which is free from sin and the like, is that which is to be searched out, that which we must try to understand (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); after that he points out that the seer within the eye, i.e. the individual soul, is the Self ('that person that is seen in the eye is the Self,' VIII, 7, 3); refers again and again to the same entity (in the clauses 'I shall explain him further to you,' VIII, 9, 3; VIII, 10, 4); and (in the explanations fulfilling the given promises) again explains the (nature of the) same individual soul in its different states ('He who moves about happy in dreams is the Self,' VIII, 10, 1; 'When a man being asleep, reposing, and at perfect rest sees no dreams, that is the Self,' VIII, 11, 1). The clause attached to both these explanations (viz. 'That is the immortal, the fearless; that is Brahman') shows, at the same time, the individual soul to be free from sin, and the like. After that Prajapati, having discovered a shortcoming in the condition of deep sleep (in consequence of the expostulation of Indra, 'In that way he does not know himself that he is I, nor does he know these beings,' VIII, 11, 2), enters on a further explanation ('I shall explain him further to you, and nothing more than this'), begins by blaming the (soul's) connexion with the body, and finally declares the individual soul, when it has risen from the body, to be the highest person. ('Thus does that serene being, arising from this body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light. That is the highest person.')--From this it appears that there is a possibility of the qualities of the highest Lord belonging to the individual soul also, and on that account we maintain that the term, 'the small ether within it,' refers to the individual soul.

This position we counter-argue as follows. 'But in so far as its nature has become manifest.' The particle 'but' (in the Sutra) is meant to set aside the view of the purvapakshin, so that the sense of the Sutra is,

10557 'Not even on account of the subsequent chapter a doubt as to the small
10558 ether being the individual soul is possible, because there also that
10559 which is meant to be intimated is the individual soul, in so far only as
10560 its (true) nature has become manifest.' The Sutra uses the expression
10561 'he whose nature has become manifest,' which qualifies jiva., the
10562 individual soul, with reference to its previous condition[186].--The
10563 meaning is as follows. Prajapati speaks at first of the seer
10564 characterised by the eye ('That person which is within the eye,' &c.);
10565 shows thereupon, in the passage treating of (the reflection in) the
10566 waterpan, that he (viz. the seer) has not his true Self in the body;
10567 refers to him repeatedly as the subject to be explained (in the clauses
10568 'I shall explain him further to you'); and having then spoken of him as
10569 subject to the states of dreaming and deep sleep, finally explains the
10570 individual soul in its real nature, i.e. in so far as it is the highest
10571 Brahman, not in so far as it is individual soul ('As soon as it has
10572 approached the highest light it appears in its own form'). The highest
10573 light mentioned, in the passage last quoted, as what is to be
10574 approached, is nothing else but the highest Brahman, which is
10575 distinguished by such attributes as freeness from sin, and the like.
10576 That same highest Brahman constitutes--as we know from passages such as
10577 'that art thou'--the real nature of the individual soul, while its
10578 second nature, i.e. that aspect of it which depends on fictitious
10579 limiting conditions, is not its real nature. For as long as the
10580 individual soul does not free itself from Nescience in the form of
10581 duality--which Nescience may be compared to the mistake of him who in
10582 the twilight mistakes a post for a man--and does not rise to the
10583 knowledge of the Self, whose nature is unchangeable, eternal
10584 Cognition--which expresses itself in the form 'I am Brahman'--so long it
10585 remains the individual soul. But when, discarding the aggregate of body,
10586 sense-organs and mind, it arrives, by means of Scripture, at the
10587 knowledge that it is not itself that aggregate, that it does not form
10588 part of transmigratory existence, but is the True, the Real, the Self,
10589 whose nature is pure intelligence; then knowing itself to be of the
10590 nature of unchangeable, eternal Cognition, it lifts itself above the
10591 vain conceit of being one with this body, and itself becomes the Self,
10592 whose nature is unchanging, eternal Cognition. As is declared in such
10593 scriptural passages as 'He who knows the highest Brahman becomes even
10594 Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). And this is the real nature of the
10595 individual soul by means of which it arises from the body and appears in
10596 its own form.

10597
10598 Here an objection may be raised. How, it is asked, can we speak of the
10599 true nature (svarupa) of that which is unchanging and eternal, and then
10600 say that 'it appears in its own form (true nature)?' Of gold and similar
10601 substances, whose true nature becomes hidden, and whose specific
10602 qualities are rendered non-apparent by their contact with some other
10603 substance, it may be said that their true nature is rendered manifest
10604 when they are cleaned by the application of some acid substance; so it
10605 may be said, likewise, that the stars, whose light is during daytime
10606 overpowered (by the superior brilliancy of the sun), become manifest in
10607 their true nature at night when the overpowering (sun) has departed. But
10608 it is impossible to speak of an analogous overpowering of the eternal
10609 light of intelligence by whatever agency, since, like ether, it is free
10610 from all contact, and since, moreover, such an assumption would be
10611 contradicted by what we actually observe. For the (energies of) seeing,
10612 hearing, noticing, cognising constitute the character of the individual
10613 soul, and that character is observed to exist in full perfection, even
10614 in the case of that individual soul which has not yet risen beyond the
10615 body. Every individual soul carries on the course of its practical
10616 existence by means of the activities of seeing, hearing, cognising;
10617 otherwise no practical existence at all would be possible. If, on the
10618 other hand, that character would realise itself in the case of that soul
10619 only which has risen above the body, the entire aggregate of practical
10620 existence, as it actually presents itself prior to the soul's rising,
10621 would thereby be contradicted. We therefore ask: Wherein consists that
10622 (alleged) rising from the body? Wherein consists that appearing (of the
10623 soul) in its own form?

10624
10625 To this we make the following reply.--Before the rise of discriminative

10626 knowledge the nature of the individual soul, which is (in reality) pure
10627 light, is non-discriminated as it were from its limiting adjuncts
10628 consisting of body, senses, mind, sense-objects and feelings, and
10629 appears as consisting of the energies of seeing and so on. Similarly--to
10630 quote an analogous case from ordinary experience--the true nature of a
10631 pure crystal, i.e. its transparency and whiteness, is, before the rise
10632 of discriminative knowledge (on the part of the observer),
10633 non-discriminated as it were from any limiting adjuncts of red or blue
10634 colour; while, as soon as through some means of true cognition
10635 discriminative knowledge has arisen, it is said to have now accomplished
10636 its true nature, i.e. transparency and whiteness, although in reality it
10637 had already done so before. Thus the discriminative knowledge, effected
10638 by /S/ruti, on the part of the individual soul which previously is
10639 non-discriminated as it were from its limiting adjuncts, is (according
10640 to the scriptural passage under discussion) the soul's rising from the
10641 body, and the fruit of that discriminative knowledge is its
10642 accomplishment in its true nature, i.e. the comprehension that its
10643 nature is the pure Self. Thus the embodiedness and the non-embodiedness
10644 of the Self are due merely to discrimination and non-discrimination, in
10645 agreement with the mantra, 'Bodiless within the bodies,' &c. (Ka. Up. I,
10646 2, 22), and the statement of Sm/ri/ti as to the non-difference between
10647 embodiedness and non-embodiedness 'Though dwelling in the body, O
10648 Kaunteya, it does not act and is not tainted' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 31). The
10649 individual soul is therefore called 'That whose true nature is
10650 non-manifest' merely on account of the absence of discriminative
10651 knowledge, and it is called 'That whose nature has become manifest' on
10652 account of the presence of such knowledge. Manifestation and
10653 non-manifestation of its nature of a different kind are not possible,
10654 since its nature is nothing but its nature (i.e. in reality is always
10655 the same). Thus the difference between the individual soul and the
10656 highest Lord is owing to wrong knowledge only, not to any reality,
10657 since, like ether, the highest Self is not in real contact with
10658 anything.

10659
10660 And wherefrom is all this to be known?--From the instruction given by
10661 Prajapati who, after having referred to the jiva ('the person that is
10662 seen in the eye,' &c.), continues 'This is the immortal, the fearless,
10663 this is Brahman.' If the well-known seer within the eye were different
10664 from Brahman which is characterised as the immortal and fearless, it
10665 would not be co-ordinated (as it actually is) with the immortal, the
10666 fearless, and Brahman. The reflected Self, on the other hand, is not
10667 spoken of as he who is characterised by the eye (the seer within the
10668 eye), for that would render Prajapati obnoxious to the reproach of
10669 saying deceitful things.--So also, in the second section, the passage,
10670 'He who moves about happy in dreams,' &c. does not refer to a being
10671 different from the seeing person within the eye spoken of in the first
10672 chapter, (but treats of the same topic) as appears from the introductory
10673 clause, 'I shall explain him further to you.' Moreover[187], a person
10674 who is conscious of having seen an elephant in a dream and of no longer
10675 seeing it when awake discards in the waking state the object which he
10676 had seen (in his sleep), but recognises himself when awake to be the
10677 same person who saw something in the dream.--Thus in the third section
10678 also Prajapati does indeed declare the absence of all particular
10679 cognition in the state of deep sleep, but does not contest the identity
10680 of the cognising Self ('In that way he does not know himself that he is
10681 I, nor all these beings'). The following clause also, 'He is gone to
10682 utter annihilation,' is meant to intimate only the annihilation of all
10683 specific cognition, not the annihilation of the cogniser. For there is
10684 no destruction of the knowing of the knower as--according to another
10685 scriptural passage (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 30)--that is imperishable.--Thus,
10686 again, in the fourth section the introductory phrase of Prajapati is, 'I
10687 shall explain him further to you and nothing different from this;' he
10688 thereupon refutes the connexion (of the Self) with the body and other
10689 limiting conditions ('Maghavat, this body is mortal,' &c.), shows the
10690 individual soul--which is there called 'the serene being'--in the state
10691 when it has reached the nature of Brahman ('It appears in its own
10692 form'), and thus proves the soul to be non-different from the highest
10693 Brahman whose characteristics are immortality and fearlessness.

10694

10695 Some (teachers) however are of opinion that if the highest Self is meant
10696 (in the fourth section) it would be inappropriate to understand the
10697 words 'This (him) I will explain further,' &c., as referring to the
10698 individual soul, and therefore suppose that the reference is (not to the
10699 individual soul forming the topic of the three preceding sections, but)
10700 to the Self possessing the qualities of freeness from sin, &c., which
10701 Self is pointed out at the beginning of the entire chapter (VII,
10702 1).--Against this interpretation we remark that, in the first place, it
10703 disregards the direct enunciation of the pronoun (i.e. the 'this' in
10704 'this I will explain') which rests on something approximate (i.e. refers
10705 to something mentioned not far off), and, in the second place, is
10706 opposed to the word 'further' (or 'again') met with in the text, since
10707 from that interpretation it would follow that what had been discussed in
10708 the preceding sections is not again discussed in the subsequent section.
10709 Moreover, if Prajapati, after having made a promise in the clause, 'This
10710 I shall explain' (where that clause occurs for the first time), did
10711 previously to the fourth section explain a different topic in each
10712 section, we should have to conclude that he acted deceitfully.--Hence
10713 (our opinion about the purport of the whole chapter remains valid, viz.
10714 that it sets forth how) the unreal aspect of the individual soul as
10715 such--which is a mere presentation of Nescience, is stained by all the
10716 desires and aversions attached to agents and enjoyers, and is connected
10717 with evils of various kinds--is dissolved by true knowledge, and how the
10718 soul is thus led over into the opposite state, i.e. into its true state
10719 in which it is one with the highest Lord and distinguished by freedom
10720 from sin and similar attributes. The whole process is similar to that by
10721 which an imagined snake passes over into a rope as soon as the mind of
10722 the beholder has freed itself from its erroneous imagination.

10723
10724 Others again, and among them some of ours (asmadiya/s/ /k/a. ke/k/it),
10725 are of opinion that the individual soul as such is real. To the end of
10726 refuting all these speculators who obstruct the way to the complete
10727 intuition of the unity of the Self this /s/ariraka-/s/astra has been set
10728 forth, whose aim it is to show that there is only one highest Lord ever
10729 unchanging, whose substance is cognition[188], and who, by means of
10730 Nescience, manifests himself in various ways, just as a thaumaturg
10731 appears in different shapes by means of his magical power. Besides that
10732 Lord there is no other substance of cognition.--If, now, the Sutrakara
10733 raises and refutes the doubt whether a certain passage which (in
10734 reality) refers to the Lord does refer to the individual soul, as he
10735 does in this and the preceding Sutras[189], he does so for the following
10736 purpose. To the highest Self which is eternally pure, intelligent and
10737 free, which is never changing, one only, not in contact with anything,
10738 devoid of form, the opposite characteristics of the individual soul are
10739 erroneously ascribed; just as ignorant men ascribe blue colour to the
10740 colourless ether. In order to remove this erroneous opinion by means of
10741 Vedic passages tending either to prove the unity of the Self or to
10742 disprove the doctrine of duality--which passages he strengthens by
10743 arguments--he insists on the difference of the highest Self from the
10744 individual soul, does however not mean to prove thereby that the soul is
10745 different from the highest Self, but, whenever speaking of the soul,
10746 refers to its distinction (from the Self) as forming an item of ordinary
10747 thought, due to the power of Nescience. For thus, he thinks, the Vedic
10748 injunctions of works which are given with a view to the states of acting
10749 and enjoying, natural (to the non-enlightened soul), are not
10750 stultified.--That, however, the absolute unity of the Self is the real
10751 purport of the /s/astra's teaching, the Sutrakara declares, for
10752 instance, in I, 1, 30[190]. The refutation of the reproach of futility
10753 raised against the injunctions of works has already been set forth by
10754 us, on the ground of the distinction between such persons as possess
10755 full knowledge, and such as do not.

10756
10757 20. And the reference (to the individual soul) has a different meaning.

10758
10759 The alleged reference to the individual soul which has been pointed out
10760 (by the purvapakshin) in the passage complementary to the passage about
10761 the small ether ('Now that serene being,' &c., VIII, 3, 4) teaches, if
10762 the small ether is interpreted to mean the highest Lord, neither the
10763 worship of the individual soul nor any qualification of the subject

10764 under discussion (viz. the small ether), and is therefore devoid of
10765 meaning.--On that account the Sutra declares that the reference has
10766 another meaning, i.e. that the reference to the individual soul is not
10767 meant to determine the nature of the individual soul, but rather the
10768 nature of the highest Lord. In the following manner. The individual soul
10769 which, in the passage referred to, is called the serene being, acts in
10770 the waking state as the ruler of the aggregate comprising the body and
10771 the sense-organs; permeates in sleep the na/d/is of the body, and enjoys
10772 the dream visions resulting from the impressions of the waking state;
10773 and, finally, desirous of reaching an inner refuge, rises in the state
10774 of deep sleep beyond its imagined connexion with the gross and the
10775 subtle body, reaches the highest light, i.e. the highest Brahman
10776 previously called ether, and thus divesting itself of the state of
10777 specific cognition appears in its own (true) nature. The highest light
10778 which the soul is to reach and through which it is manifested in its
10779 true nature is the Self, free from sin and so on, which is there
10780 represented as the object of worship.--In this sense the reference to
10781 the individual soul can be admitted by those also who maintain that in
10782 reality the highest Lord is meant.

10783
10784 21. If it be said that on account of the scriptural declaration of the
10785 smallness (of the ether) (the Lord cannot be meant; we reply that) that
10786 has been explained (before).

10787
10788 The purvapakshin has remarked that the smallness of the ether stated by
10789 Scripture ('In it is that small ether') does not agree with the highest
10790 Lord, that it may however be predicated of the individual soul which (in
10791 another passage) is compared to the point of a goad. As that remark
10792 calls for a refutation we point out that it has been refuted already, it
10793 having been shown--under I, 2, 7--that a relative smallness may be
10794 attributed to the Lord. The same refutation is--as the Sutra points
10795 out--to be applied here also.--That smallness is, moreover, contradicted
10796 by that scriptural passage which compares (the ether within the heart)
10797 with the known (universal) ether. ('As large as is this ether so large
10798 is the ether within the heart.')

10799
10800 22. On account of the acting after (i.e. the shining after), (that after
10801 which sun, moon, &c. are said to shine is the highest Self), and
10802 (because by the light) of him (all this is said to be lighted).

10803
10804 We read (Mu. Up. II, 2, 10, and Ka. Up. V, 15), 'The sun does not shine
10805 there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, much less this
10806 fire. After him when he shines everything shines; by the light of him
10807 all this is lighted.' The question here arises whether he 'after whom
10808 when he shines everything shines, and by whose light all this is
10809 lighted,' is some luminous substance, or the highest Self (praj/n/a
10810 atman).

10811
10812 A luminous substance, the purvapakshin maintains.--Why?--Because the
10813 passage denies the shining only of such luminous bodies as the sun and
10814 the like. It is known (from every-day experience) that luminous bodies
10815 such as the moon and the stars do not shine at daytime when the sun,
10816 which is itself a luminous body, is shining. Hence we infer that that
10817 thing on account of which all this, including the moon, the stars, and
10818 the sun himself, does not shine is likewise a thing of light. The
10819 'shining after' also is possible only if there is a luminous body
10820 already, for we know from experience that 'acting after' (imitation) of
10821 any kind takes place only when there are more than one agent of similar
10822 nature; one man, for instance, walks after another man who walks
10823 himself. Therefore we consider it settled that the passage refers to
10824 some luminous body.

10825
10826 To this we reply that the highest Self only can be meant.--Why?--On
10827 account of the acting after. The shining after mentioned in the passage,
10828 'After him when he shines everything shines,' is possible only if the
10829 praj/n/a Self, i.e. the highest Self, is understood. Of that praj/n/a
10830 Self another scriptural passage says, 'His form is light, his thoughts
10831 are true' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2). On the other hand, it is not by any
10832 means known that the sun, &c. shines after some other luminous body.

Moreover, on account of the equality of nature of all luminous bodies such as the sun and the like, there is no need for them of any other luminous body after which they should shine; for we see that a lamp, for instance, does not 'shine after' another lamp. Nor is there any such absolute rule (as the purvapakshin asserted) that acting after is observed only among things of similar nature. It is rather observed among things of dissimilar nature also; for a red-hot iron ball acts after, i.e. burns after the burning fire, and the dust of the ground blows (is blown) after the blowing wind.--The clause 'on account of the acting after' (which forms part of the Sutra) points to the shining after (mentioned in the scriptural /s/loka under discussion); the clause 'and of him' points to the fourth pada of the same /s/loka. The meaning of this latter clause is that the cause assigned for the light of the sun, &c. (in the passage 'by the light of him everything is lighted') intimates the praj/n/a Self. For of that Self Scripture says, 'Him the gods worship as the light of lights, as immortal time' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 16). That, on the other hand, the light of the sun, the moon, &c, should shine by some other (physical) light is, in the first place, not known; and, in the second place, absurd as one (physical) light is counteracted by another.--Or else the cause assigned for the shining does not apply only to the sun and the other bodies mentioned in the /s/loka; but the meaning (of the last pada) rather is--as we may conclude from the comprehensive statement 'all this'--that the manifestation of this entire world consisting of names and forms, acts, agents and fruits (of action) has for its cause the existence of the light of Brahman; just as the existence of the light of the sun is the cause of the manifestation of all form and colour.--Moreover, the text shows by means of the word 'there' ('the sun does not shine there,' &c.) that the passage is to be connected with the general topic, and that topic is Brahman as appears from Mu. Up. II, 2, 5, 'In whom the heaven, the earth, and the sky are woven,' &c. The same appears from a passage subsequent (on the one just quoted and immediately preceding the passage under discussion). 'In the highest golden sheath there is the Brahman without passion and without parts; that is pure, that is the light of lights, that is it which they know who know the Self.' This passage giving rise to the question, 'How is it the light of lights?' there is occasion for the reply given in 'The sun does not shine there,' &c.--In refutation of the assertion that the shining of luminous bodies such as the sun and the moon can be denied only in case of there being another luminous body--as, for instance, the light of the moon and the stars is denied only when the sun is shining--we point out that it has been shown that he (the Self) only can be the luminous being referred to, nothing else. And it is quite possible to deny the shining of sun, moon, and so on with regard to Brahman; for whatever is perceived is perceived by the light of Brahman only so that sun, moon, &c. can be said to shine in it; while Brahman as self-luminous is not perceived by means of any other light. Brahman manifests everything else, but is not manifested by anything else; according to such scriptural passages as, 'By the Self alone as his light man sits,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 6), and 'He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4).

23. Moreover Sm/ri/ti also speaks of him (i.e. of the praj/n/a Self as being the universal light).

Moreover that aspect of the praj/n/a Self is spoken of in Sm/ri/ti also, viz. in the Bhagavad Gita (XV, 6, 12), 'Neither the sun, nor the moon, nor the fire illumines that; having gone into which men do not return, that is my highest seat.' And 'The light which abiding in the sun illumines the whole world, and that which is in the moon and that which is in the fire, all that light know to be mine.'

24. On account of the term, (viz. the term 'lord' applied to it) the (person) measured (by a thumb) (is the highest Lord).

We read (Ka. Up. II, 4, 12), 'The person of the size of a thumb stands in the middle of the Self,' &c., and (II, 4, 13), 'That person, of the size of a thumb, is like a light without smoke, lord of the past and of the future, he is the same to-day and to-morrow. This is that.'--The question here arises whether the person of the size of a thumb mentioned

10902 in the text is the cognitional (individual) Self or the highest Self.

10903
10904 The purvapakshin maintains that on account of the declaration of the
10905 person's size the cognitional Self is meant. For to the highest Self
10906 which is of infinite length and breadth Scripture would not ascribe the
10907 measure of a span; of the cognitional Self, on the other hand, which is
10908 connected with limiting adjuncts, extension of the size of a span may,
10909 by means of some fictitious assumption, be predicated. Sm/ri/ti also
10910 confirms this, 'Then Yama drew forth, by force, from the body of
10911 Satyavat the person of the size of a thumb tied to Yama's noose and
10912 helpless' (Mahabh. III, 16763). For as Yama could not pull out by force
10913 the highest Self, the passage is clearly seen to refer to the
10914 transmigrating (individual soul) of the size of a thumb, and we thence
10915 infer that the same Self is meant in the Vedic passage under discussion.

10916
10917 To this we reply that the person a thumb long can only be the highest
10918 Lord.--Why?--On account of the term 'lord of the past and of the
10919 future.' For none but the highest Lord is the absolute ruler of the past
10920 and the future.--Moreover, the clause 'this is that' connects the
10921 passage with that which had been enquired about, and therefore forms the
10922 topic of discussion. And what had been enquired about is Brahman, 'That
10923 which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause,
10924 as neither past nor future, tell me that' (I, 2, 14).--'On account of
10925 the term,' i.e. on account of the direct statement, in the text, of a
10926 designation, viz. the term 'Lord,' we understand that the highest Lord
10927 is meant[191].--But still the question remains how a certain extension
10928 can be attributed to the omnipresent highest Self.--The reply to this is
10929 given, in the next Sutra.

10930
10931 25. But with reference to the heart (the highest Self is said to be of
10932 the size of a span), as men are entitled (to the study of the Veda).

10933
10934 The measure of a span is ascribed to the highest Lord, although
10935 omnipresent with reference to his abiding within the heart; just as to
10936 ether (space) the measure of a cubit is ascribed with reference to the
10937 joint of a bamboo. For, on the one hand, the measure of a span cannot be
10938 ascribed directly to the highest Self which exceeds all measure, and, on
10939 the other hand, it has been shown that none but the highest Lord can be
10940 meant here, on account of the term 'Lord,' and so on.--But--an objection
10941 may be raised--as the size of the heart varies in the different classes
10942 of living beings it cannot be maintained that the declaration of the
10943 highest Self being of the size of a thumb can be explained with
10944 reference to the heart.--To this objection the second half of the Sutra
10945 replies: On account of men (only) being entitled. For the /s/astra,
10946 although propounded without distinction (i.e. although not itself
10947 specifying what class of beings is to proceed according to its
10948 precepts), does in reality entitle men[192] only (to act according to
10949 its precepts); for men only (of the three higher castes) are, firstly,
10950 capable (of complying with the precepts of the /s/astra); are, secondly,
10951 desirous (of the results of actions enjoined by the /s/astra); are,
10952 thirdly, not excluded by prohibitions; and are, fourthly, subject to the
10953 precepts about the upanayana ceremony and so on[193]. This point has
10954 been explained in the section treating of the definition of adhikara
10955 (Purva Mim. S. VI, 1).--Now the human body has ordinarily a fixed size,
10956 and hence the heart also has a fixed size, viz. the size of a thumb.
10957 Hence, as men (only) are entitled to study and practise the /s/astra,
10958 the highest Self may, with reference to its dwelling in the human heart,
10959 be spoken of as being of the size of a thumb.--In reply to the
10960 purvapakshin's reasoning that on account of the statement of size and on
10961 account of Sm/ri/ti we can understand by him who is of the size of a
10962 thumb the transmigrating soul only, we remark that--analogously to such
10963 passages as 'That is the Self,' 'That art thou'--our passage teaches
10964 that the transmigrating soul which is of the size of a thumb is (in
10965 reality) Brahman. For the Vedanta-passages have a twofold purport; some
10966 of them aim at setting forth the nature of the highest Self, some at
10967 teaching the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self. Our
10968 passage teaches the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self,
10969 not the size of anything. This point is made clear further on in the
10970 Upanishad, 'The person of the size of a thumb, the inner Self, is always

10971 settled in the heart of men. Let a man draw that Self forth from his
10972 body with steadiness, as one draws the pith from a reed. Let him know
10973 that Self as the Bright, as the Immortal' (II, 6, 17).

10974
10975 26. Also (beings) above them, (viz. men) (are qualified for the study
10976 and practice of the Veda), on account of the possibility (of it),
10977 according to Badaraya/n/a.

10978
10979 It has been said above that the passage about him who is of the size of
10980 a thumb has reference to the human heart, because men are entitled to
10981 study and act according to the /s/astra. This gives us an occasion for
10982 the following discussion.--It is true that the /s/astra entitles men,
10983 but, at the same time, there is no exclusive rule entitling men only to
10984 the knowledge of Brahman; the teacher, Badaraya/n/a, rather thinks that
10985 the /s/astra entitles those (classes of beings) also which are above
10986 men, viz. gods, and so on.--On what account?--On the account of
10987 possibility.--For in their cases also the different causes on which the
10988 qualification depends, such as having certain desires, and so on, may
10989 exist. In the first place, the gods also may have the desire of final
10990 release, caused by the reflection that all effects, objects, and powers
10991 are non-permanent. In the second place, they may be capable of it as
10992 their corporeality appears from mantras, arthavadas, itihasas,
10993 pura/n/as, and ordinary experience. In the third place, there is no
10994 prohibition (excluding them like /S/udras). Nor does, in the fourth
10995 place, the scriptural rule about the upanayana-ceremony annul their
10996 title; for that ceremony merely subserves the study of the Veda, and to
10997 the gods the Veda is manifest of itself (without study). That the gods,
10998 moreover, for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, undergo discipleship,
10999 and the like, appears from such scriptural passages as 'One hundred and
11000 one years Indra lived as a disciple with Prajapati' (Ch. Up. VIII, 11,
11001 3), and 'Bh/ri/gu Varu/n/i went to his father Varu/n/a, saying, "Sir,
11002 teach me Brahman"' (Taitt. Up. III, 1).--And the reasons which have been
11003 given above against gods and /ri/shis being entitled to perform
11004 religious works (such as sacrifices), viz. the circumstance of there
11005 being no other gods (to whom the gods could offer sacrifices), and of
11006 there being no other /ri/shis (who could be invoked during the
11007 sacrifice), do not apply to the case of branches of knowledge. For Indra
11008 and the other gods, when applying themselves to knowledge, have no acts
11009 to perform with a view to Indra, and so on; nor have Bh/ri/gu and other
11010 /ri/shis, in the same case, to do anything with the circumstance of
11011 their belonging to the same gotra as Bh/ri/gu, &c. What, then, should
11012 stand in the way of the gods' and /ri/shis' right to acquire
11013 knowledge?--Moreover, the passage about that which is of the size of a
11014 thumb remains equally valid, if the right of the gods, &c. is admitted;
11015 it has then only to be explained in each particular case by a reference
11016 to the particular size of the thumb (of the class of beings spoken of).

11017
11018 27. If it be said that (the corporeal individuality of the gods
11019 involves) a contradiction to (sacrificial) works; we deny that, on
11020 account of the observation of the assumption (on the part of the gods)
11021 of several (forms).

11022
11023 If the right of the gods, and other beings superior to men, to the
11024 acquisition of knowledge is founded on the assumption of their
11025 corporeality, &c., we shall have to admit, in consequence of that
11026 corporeality, that Indra and the other gods stand in the relation of
11027 subordinate members (a@nga) to sacrificial acts, by means of their being
11028 present in person just as the priests are. But this admission will lead
11029 to 'a contradiction in the sacrificial acts,' because the circumstance
11030 of the gods forming the members of sacrificial acts by means of their
11031 personal presence, is neither actually observed nor possible. For it is
11032 not possible that one and the same Indra should, at the same time, be
11033 present in person at many sacrifices.

11034
11035 To this we reply, that there is no such contradiction.--Why?--On account
11036 of the assumption of several (forms). For it is possible for one and the
11037 same divine Self to assume several forms at the same time.--How is that
11038 known?--From observation.--For a scriptural passage at first replies to
11039 the question how many gods there are, by the declaration that there are

11040 'Three and three hundred, three and three thousand,' and subsequently,
11041 on the question who they are, declares 'They (the 303 and 3003) are only
11042 the various powers of them, in reality there are only thirty-three gods'
11043 (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 1, 2); showing thereby that one and the same divine
11044 Self may at the same time appear in many forms. After that it proceeds
11045 to show that these thirty-three gods themselves are in reality contained
11046 in six, five, &c., and, finally, by replying to the question, 'Who is
11047 the one god?' that Breath is the one god, shows that the gods are all
11048 forms of Breath, and that Breath, therefore, can at the same time appear
11049 in many forms.--Sm/ri/ti also has a similar statement, 'A Yogin, O hero
11050 of the Bharatas, may, by his power, multiply his Self in many thousand
11051 shapes, and in them walk about on the earth. In some he may enjoy the
11052 objects, in others he may undergo dire penance, and, finally, he may
11053 again retract them all, just as the sun retracts the multitude of his
11054 rays.' If such Sm/ri/ti passages as the above declare that even Yogins,
11055 who have merely acquired various extraordinary powers, such as subtlety
11056 of body, and the like, may animate several bodies at the same time, how
11057 much more capable of such feats must the gods be, who naturally possess
11058 all supernatural powers. The gods thus being able to assume several
11059 shapes, a god may divide himself into many forms and enter into relation
11060 with many sacrifices at the same time, remaining all the while unseen by
11061 others, in consequence of his power to render himself invisible.

11062
11063 The latter part of the Sutra may be explained in a different manner
11064 also, viz. as meaning that even beings enjoying corporeal individuality
11065 are seen to enter into mere subordinate relation to more than one
11066 action. Sometimes, indeed, one individual does not at the same time
11067 enter into subordinate relation to different actions; one Brahma/n/a,
11068 for instance, is not at the same time entertained by many entertainers.
11069 But in other cases one individual stands in subordinate relation to many
11070 actions at the same time; one Brahma/n/a, for instance, may constitute
11071 the object of the reverence done to him by many persons at the same
11072 time. Similarly, it is possible that, as the sacrifice consists in the
11073 parting (on the part of the sacrificer with some offering) with a view
11074 (to some divinity), many persons may at the same time part with their
11075 respective offerings, all of them having in view one and the same
11076 individual divinity. The individuality of the gods does not, therefore,
11077 involve any contradiction in sacrificial works.

11078
11079 28. If it be said (that a contradiction will result) in respect of the
11080 word; we refute this objection on the ground that (the world) originates
11081 from the word, as is shown by perception and inference.

11082
11083 Let it then be granted that, from the admission of the corporeal
11084 individuality of the gods, no contradiction will result in the case of
11085 sacrificial works. Still a contradiction will result in respect of the
11086 'word' (/s/abda).--How?--The authoritativeness of the Veda has been
11087 proved 'from its independence,' basing on the original (eternal)
11088 connection of the word with its sense ('the thing signified')[194]. But
11089 now, although a divinity possessing corporeal individuality, such as
11090 admitted above, may, by means of its supernatural powers, be able to
11091 enjoy at the same time the oblations which form part of several
11092 sacrifices yet it will, on account of its very individuality, be subject
11093 to birth and death just as we men are, and hence, the eternal connexion
11094 of the eternal word with a non-eternal thing being destroyed, a
11095 contradiction will arise with regard to the authoritativeness proved to
11096 belong to the word of the Veda.

11097
11098 To this we reply that no such contradiction exists.--Why?--'On account
11099 of their origin from it.' For from that very same word of the Veda the
11100 world, with the gods and other beings, originates.--But--an objection
11101 will be raised--in Sutra I, 1, 2 ('That whence there is the origin, &c.
11102 of this world') it has been proved that the world originates from
11103 Brahman; how then can it be said here that it originates from the word?
11104 And, moreover, even if the origin of the world from the word of the Veda
11105 be admitted, how is the contradiction in regard to the word removed
11106 thereby, inasmuch as the Vasus, the Rudras, the Adityas, the
11107 Vi/s/vedevas, and the Maruts[195] are non-eternal beings, because
11108 produced; and if they are non-eternal, what is there to preclude the

11109 non-eternality of the Vedic words Vasu, &c. designating them? For it is
11110 known from every-day life that only when the son of Devadatta is born,
11111 the name Yaj/n/adatta is given to him (lit. made for him)[196]. Hence we
11112 adhere to our opinion that a contradiction does arise with regard to the
11113 'word.'

11114
11115 This objection we negative, on the ground that we observe the eternity
11116 of the connexion between such words as cow, and so on, and the things
11117 denoted by them. For, although the individuals of the (species denoted
11118 by the word) cow have an origin, their species[197] does not have an
11119 origin, since of (the three categories) substances, qualities, and
11120 actions the individuals only originate, not the species. Now it is with
11121 the species that the words are connected, not with the individuals,
11122 which, as being infinite in number, are not capable of entering into
11123 that connexion. Hence, although the individuals do not originate, no
11124 contradiction arises in the case of words such as cow, and the like,
11125 since the species are eternal. Similarly, although individual gods are
11126 admitted to originate, there arises no contradiction in the case of such
11127 words as Vasu, and the like, since the species denoted by them are
11128 eternal. And that the gods, and so on, belong to different species, is
11129 to be concluded from the descriptions of their various personal
11130 appearance, such as given in the mantras, arthavadas, &c. Terms such as
11131 'Indra' rest on the connexion (of some particular being) with some
11132 particular place, analogously to terms such as 'army-leader;' hence,
11133 whoever occupies that particular place is called by that particular
11134 name.--The origination of the world from the 'word' is not to be
11135 understood in that sense, that the word constitutes the material cause
11136 of the world, as Brahman does; but while there exist the everlasting
11137 words, whose essence is the power of denotation in connexion with their
11138 eternal sense (i.e. the ak/r/itis denoted), the accomplishment of such
11139 individual things as are capable of having those words applied to them
11140 is called an origination from those words.

11141
11142 How then is it known that the world originates from the word?--'From
11143 perception and inference.' Perception here denotes Scripture which, in
11144 order to be authoritative, is independent (of anything else).
11145 'Inference' denotes Sm/r/iti which, in order to be authoritative,
11146 depends on something else (viz. Scripture). These two declare that
11147 creation is preceded by the word. Thus a scriptural passage says, 'At
11148 the word these Prajapati created the gods; at the words were poured out
11149 he created men; at the word drops he created the fathers; at the words
11150 through the filter he created the Soma cups; at the words the swift ones
11151 he created the stotra; at the words to all he created the /s/astra; at
11152 the word blessings he created the other beings.' And another passage
11153 says, 'He with his mind united himself with speech (i.e. the word of the
11154 Veda.--B/ri/. Up. I, 2, 4). Thus Scripture declares in different places
11155 that the word precedes the creation.--Sm/r/ti also delivers itself as
11156 follows, 'In the beginning a divine voice, eternal, without beginning or
11157 end, formed of the Vedas was uttered by Svayambhu, from which all
11158 activities proceeded.' By the 'uttering' of the voice we have here to
11159 understand the starting of the oral tradition (of the Veda), because of
11160 a voice without beginning or end 'uttering' in any other sense cannot be
11161 predicated.--Again, we read, 'In the beginning Mahe/s/vara shaped from
11162 the words of the Veda the names and forms of all beings and the
11163 procedure of all actions.' And again, 'The several names, actions, and
11164 conditions of all things he shaped in the beginning from the words of
11165 the Veda' (Manu I, 21). Moreover, we all know from observation that any
11166 one when setting about some thing which he wishes to accomplish first
11167 remembers the word denoting the thing, and after that sets to work. We
11168 therefore conclude that before the creation the Vedic words became
11169 manifest in the mind of Prajapati the creator, and that after that he
11170 created the things corresponding to those words. Scripture also, where it
11171 says (Taitt. Bra. II, 2, 4, 2) 'uttering bhur he created the earth,'
11172 &c., shows that the worlds such as the earth, &c. became manifest, i.e.
11173 were created from the words bhur, &c. which had become manifest in the
11174 mind (of Prajapati).

11175
11176 Of what nature then is the 'word' with a view to which it is said that
11177 the world originates from the 'word?'--It is the spho/t/a, the

11178 purvapakshin says.[198] For on the assumption that the letters are the
11179 word, the doctrine that the individual gods, and so on, originates from
11180 the eternal words of the Veda could not in any way be proved, since the
11181 letters perish as soon as they are produced (i.e. pronounced). These
11182 perishable letters are moreover apprehended as differing according to
11183 the pronunciation of the individual speaker. For this reason we are able
11184 to determine, merely from the sound of the voice of some unseen person
11185 whom we hear reading, who is reading, whether Devadatta or Yaj/n/adatta
11186 or some other man. And it cannot be maintained that this apprehension of
11187 difference regarding the letters is an erroneous one; for we do not
11188 apprehend anything else whereby it is refuted. Nor is it reasonable to
11189 maintain that the apprehension of the sense of a word results from the
11190 letters. For it can neither be maintained that each letter by itself
11191 intimates the sense, since that would be too wide an assumption;[199]
11192 nor that there takes place a simultaneous apprehension of the whole
11193 aggregate of letters; since the letters succeed one another in time. Nor
11194 can we admit the explanation that the last letter of the word together
11195 with the impressions produced by the perception of the preceding letters
11196 is that which makes us apprehend the sense. For the word makes us
11197 apprehend the sense only if it is itself apprehended in so far as having
11198 reference to the mental grasp of the constant connexion (of the word and
11199 the sense), just as smoke makes us infer the existence of fire only when
11200 it is itself apprehended; but an apprehension of the last letter
11201 combined with the impressions produced by the preceding letters does not
11202 actually take place, because those impressions are not objects of
11203 perception.[200] Nor, again, can it be maintained that (although those
11204 impressions are not objects of perception, yet they may be inferred from
11205 their effects, and that thus) the actual perception of the last letter
11206 combined with the impressions left by the preceding letters--which
11207 impressions are apprehended from their effects--is that which intimates
11208 the sense of the word; for that effect of the impressions, viz. the
11209 remembrance of the entire word, is itself something consisting of parts
11210 which succeed each other in time.--From all this it follows that the
11211 spho/t/a is the word. After the apprehending agent, i.e. the buddhi,
11212 has, through the apprehension of the several letters of the word,
11213 received rudimentary impressions, and after those impressions have been
11214 matured through the apprehension of the last letter, the spho/t/a
11215 presents itself in the buddhi all at once as the object of one mental
11216 act of apprehension.--And it must not be maintained that that one act of
11217 apprehension is merely an act of remembrance having for its object the
11218 letters of the word; for the letters which are more than one cannot form
11219 the object of one act of apprehension.--As that spho/t/a is recognised
11220 as the same as often as the word is pronounced, it is eternal; while the
11221 apprehension of difference referred to above has for its object the
11222 letters merely. From this eternal word, which is of the nature of the
11223 spho/t/a and possesses denotative power, there is produced the object
11224 denoted, i.e. this world which consists of actions, agents, and results
11225 of action.

11226
11227 Against this doctrine the reverend Upavarsha maintains that the letters
11228 only are the word.--But--an objection is raised--it has been said above
11229 that the letters no sooner produced pass away!--That assertion is not
11230 true, we reply; for they are recognised as the same letters (each time
11231 they are produced anew).--Nor can it be maintained that the recognition
11232 is due to similarity only, as in the case of hairs, for instance; for
11233 the fact of the recognition being a recognition in the strict sense of
11234 the word is not contradicted by any other means of proof.--Nor, again,
11235 can it be said that the recognition has its cause in the species (so
11236 that not the same individual letter would be recognised, but only a
11237 letter belonging to the same species as other letters heard before);
11238 for, as a matter of fact, the same individual letters are recognised.
11239 That the recognition of the letters rests on the species could be
11240 maintained only if whenever the letters are pronounced different
11241 individual letters were apprehended, just as several cows are
11242 apprehended as different individuals belonging to the same species. But
11243 this is actually not the case; for the (same) individual letters are
11244 recognised as often as they are pronounced. If, for instance, the word
11245 cow is pronounced twice, we think not that two different words have been
11246 pronounced, but that the same individual word has been repeated.--But,

11247 our opponent reminds us, it has been shown above, that the letters are
11248 apprehended as different owing to differences of pronunciation, as
11249 appears from the fact that we apprehend a difference when merely hearing
11250 the sound of Devadatta or Yaj/n/adatta reading.--Although, we reply, it
11251 is a settled matter that the letters are recognised as the same, yet we
11252 admit that there are differences in the apprehension of the letters; but
11253 as the letters are articulated by means of the conjunction and
11254 disjunction (of the breath with the palate, the teeth, &c.), those
11255 differences are rightly ascribed to the various character of the
11256 articulating agents and not to the intrinsic nature of the letters
11257 themselves. Those, moreover, who maintain that the individual letters
11258 are different have, in order to account for the fact of recognition, to
11259 assume species of letters, and further to admit that the apprehension of
11260 difference is conditioned by external factors. Is it then not much
11261 simpler to assume, as we do, that the apprehension of difference is
11262 conditioned by external factors while the recognition is due to the
11263 intrinsic nature of the letters? And this very fact of recognition is
11264 that mental process which prevents us from looking on the apprehension
11265 of difference as having the letters for its object (so that the opponent
11266 was wrong in denying the existence of such a process). For how should,
11267 for instance, the one syllable ga, when it is pronounced in the same
11268 moment by several persons, be at the same time of different nature, viz.
11269 accented with the udatta, the anudatta, and the Svarita and nasal as
11270 well as non-nasal[201]? Or else[202]--and this is the preferable
11271 explanation--we assume that the difference of apprehension is caused not
11272 by the letters but by the tone (dhvani). By this tone we have to
11273 understand that which enters the ear of a person who is listening from a
11274 distance and not able to distinguish the separate letters, and which,
11275 for a person standing near, affects the letters with its own
11276 distinctions, such as high or low pitch and so on. It is on this tone
11277 that all the distinctions of udatta, anudatta, and so on depend, and not
11278 on the intrinsic nature of the letters; for they are recognised as the
11279 same whenever they are pronounced. On this theory only we gain a basis
11280 for the distinctive apprehension of the udatta, the anudatta, and the
11281 like. For on the theory first propounded (but now rejected), we should
11282 have to assume that the distinctions of udatta and so on are due to the
11283 processes of conjunction and disjunction described above, since the
11284 letters themselves, which are ever recognised as the same, are not
11285 different. But as those processes of conjunction and disjunction are not
11286 matter of perception, we cannot definitely ascertain in the letters any
11287 differences based on those processes, and hence the apprehension of the
11288 udatta and so on remains without a basis.--Nor should it be urged that
11289 from the difference of the udatta and so on there results also a
11290 difference of the letters recognised. For a difference in one matter
11291 does not involve a difference in some other matter which in itself is
11292 free from difference. Nobody, for instance, thinks that because the
11293 individuals are different from each other the species also contains a
11294 difference in itself.

11295
11296 The assumption of the spho/t/a is further gratuitous, because the sense
11297 of the word may be apprehended from the letters.--But--our opponent here
11298 objects--I do not assume the existence of the spho/t/a. I, on the
11299 contrary, actually perceive it; for after the buddhi has been impressed
11300 by the successive apprehension of the letters of the word, the spho/t/a
11301 all at once presents itself as the object of cognition.--You are
11302 mistaken, we reply. The object of the cognitional act of which you speak
11303 is simply the letters of the word. That one comprehensive cognition
11304 which follows upon the apprehension of the successive letters of the
11305 word has for its object the entire aggregate of the letters constituting
11306 the word, and not anything else. We conclude this from the circumstance
11307 that in that final comprehensive cognition there are included those
11308 letters only of which a definite given word consists, and not any other
11309 letters. If that cognitional act had for its object the spho/t/a--i.e.
11310 something different from the letters of the given word--then those
11311 letters would be excluded from it just as much as the letters of any
11312 other word. But as this is not the case, it follows that that final
11313 comprehensive act of cognition is nothing but an act of remembrance
11314 which has the letters of the word for its object.--Our opponent has
11315 asserted above that the letters of a word being several cannot form the

11316 object of one mental act. But there he is wrong again. The ideas which
11317 we have of a row, for instance, or a wood or an army, or of the numbers
11318 ten, hundred, thousand, and so on, show that also such things as
11319 comprise several unities can become the objects of one and the same
11320 cognitional act. The idea which has for its object the word as one whole
11321 is a derived one, in so far as it depends on the determination of one
11322 sense in many letters[203]; in the same way as the idea of a wood, an
11323 army, and so on. But--our opponent may here object--if the word were
11324 nothing else but the letters which in their aggregate become the object
11325 of one mental act, such couples of words as jara and raja or pika and
11326 kapi would not be cognised as different words; for here the same letters
11327 are presented to consciousness in each of the words constituting one
11328 couple.--There is indeed, we reply, in both cases a comprehensive
11329 consciousness of the same totality of letters; but just as ants
11330 constitute the idea of a row only if they march one after the other, so
11331 the letters also constitute the idea of a certain word only if they
11332 follow each other in a certain order. Hence it is not contrary to reason
11333 that the same letters are cognised as different words, in consequence of
11334 the different order in which they are arranged.

11335
11336 The hypothesis of him who maintains that the letters are the word may
11337 therefore be finally formulated as follows. The letters of which a word
11338 consists--assisted by a certain order and number--have, through
11339 traditional use, entered into a connexion with a definite sense. At the
11340 time when they are employed they present themselves as such (i.e. in
11341 their definite order and number) to the buddhi, which, after having
11342 apprehended the several letters in succession, finally comprehends the
11343 entire aggregate, and they thus unerringly intimate to the buddhi their
11344 definite sense. This hypothesis is certainly simpler than the
11345 complicated hypothesis of the grammarians who teach that the spho/t/a is
11346 the word. For they have to disregard what is given by perception, and to
11347 assume something which is never perceived; the letters apprehended in a
11348 definite order are said to manifest the spho/t/a, and the spho/t/a in
11349 its turn is said to manifest the sense.

11350
11351 Or let it even be admitted that the letters are different ones each time
11352 they are pronounced; yet, as in that case we necessarily must assume
11353 species of letters as the basis of the recognition of the individual
11354 letters, the function of conveying the sense which we have demonstrated
11355 in the case of the (individual) letters has then to be attributed to the
11356 species.

11357
11358 From all this it follows that the theory according to which the
11359 individual gods and so on originate from the eternal words is
11360 unobjectionable.

11361
11362 29. And from this very reason there follows the eternity of the Veda.

11363
11364 As the eternity of the Veda is founded on the absence of the remembrance
11365 of an agent only, a doubt with regard to it had been raised owing to the
11366 doctrine that the gods and other individuals have sprung from it. That
11367 doubt has been refuted in the preceding Sutra.--The present Sutra now
11368 confirms the, already established, eternity of the Veda. The eternity of
11369 the word of the Veda has to be assumed for this very reason, that the
11370 world with its definite (eternal) species, such as gods and so on,
11371 originates from it.--A mantra also ('By means of the sacrifice they
11372 followed the trace of speech; they found it dwelling in the /ri/shis,'
11373 /Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. X, 71, 3) shows that the speech found (by the
11374 /ri/shis) was permanent.--On this point Vedavyasa also speaks as
11375 follows: 'Formerly the great /ri/shis, being allowed to do so by
11376 Svayambhu, obtained, through their penance, the Vedas together with the
11377 itihisas, which had been hidden at the end of the yuga.'

11378
11379 30. And on account of the equality of names and forms there is no
11380 contradiction (to the eternity of the word of the Veda) in the
11381 renovation (of the world); as is seen from /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti.

11382
11383 If--the purvapakshin resumes--the individual gods and so on did, like
11384 the individual animals, originate and pass away in an unbroken

11385 succession so that there would be no break of the course of practical
11386 existence including denominations, things denominated and agents
11387 denominating; the connexion (between word and thing) would be eternal,
11388 and the objection as to a contradiction with reference to the word
11389 (raised in Sutra 27) would thereby be refuted. But if, as /S/ruti and
11390 Sm/ri/ti declare, the whole threefold world periodically divests itself
11391 of name and form, and is entirely dissolved (at the end of a kalpa), and
11392 is after that produced anew; how can the contradiction be considered to
11393 have been removed?

11394
11395 To this we reply: 'On account of the sameness of name and form.'--Even
11396 then the beginninglessness of the world will have to be admitted (a
11397 point which the teacher will prove later on: II, 1, 36). And in the
11398 beginningless sa/m/sara we have to look on the (relative) beginning, and
11399 the dissolution connected with a new kalpa in the same light in which we
11400 look on the sleeping and waking states, which, although in them
11401 according to Scripture (a kind of) dissolution and origination take
11402 place, do not give rise to any contradiction, since in the later waking
11403 state (subsequent to the state of sleep) the practical existence is
11404 carried on just as in the former one. That in the sleeping and the
11405 waking states dissolution and origination take place is stated Kaush.
11406 Up. III, 3, 'When a man being asleep sees no dream whatever he becomes
11407 one with that pra/n/a alone. Then speech goes to him with all names, the
11408 eye with all forms, the ear with all sounds, the mind with all thoughts.
11409 And when he awakes then, as from a burning fire, sparks proceed in all
11410 directions, thus from that Self the pra/n/as proceed, each towards its
11411 place; from the pra/n/as the gods, from the gods the worlds.'

11412
11413 Well, the purvapakshin resumes, it may be that no contradiction arises
11414 in the case of sleep, as during the sleep of one person the practical
11415 existence of other persons suffers no interruption, and as the sleeping
11416 person himself when waking from sleep may resume the very same form of
11417 practical existence which was his previously to his sleep. The case of a
11418 mahapralaya (i.e. a general annihilation of the world) is however a
11419 different one, as then the entire current of practical existence is
11420 interrupted, and the form of existence of a previous kalpa can be
11421 resumed in a subsequent kalpa no more than an individual can resume that
11422 form of existence which it enjoyed in a former birth.

11423
11424 This objection, we reply, is not valid. For although a mahapralaya does
11425 cut short the entire current of practical existence, yet, by the favour
11426 of the highest Lord, the Lords (i/s/vara), such as Hira/n/yagarbha and
11427 so on, may continue the same form of existence which belonged to them in
11428 the preceding kalpa. Although ordinary animated beings do not, as we
11429 see, resume that form of existence which belonged to them in a former
11430 birth; still we cannot judge of the Lords as we do of ordinary beings.
11431 For as in the series of beings which descends from man to blades of
11432 grass a successive diminution of knowledge, power, and so on, is
11433 observed--although they all have the common attribute of being
11434 animated--so in the ascending series extending from man up to
11435 Hira/n/yagarbha, a gradually increasing manifestation of knowledge,
11436 power, &c. takes place; a circumstance which /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti
11437 mention in many places, and which it is impossible to deny. On that
11438 account it may very well be the case that the Lords, such as
11439 Hira/n/yagarbha and so on, who in a past kalpa were distinguished by
11440 superior knowledge and power of action, and who again appear in the
11441 present kalpa, do, if favoured by the highest Lord, continue (in the
11442 present kalpa) the same kind of existence which they enjoyed in the
11443 preceding kalpa; just as a man who rises from sleep continues the same
11444 form of existence which he enjoyed previously to his sleep. Thus
11445 Scripture also declares, 'He who first creates Brahman (Hira/n/yagarbha)
11446 and delivers the Vedas to him, to that God who is the light of his own
11447 thoughts, I, seeking for release, go for refuge' (/S/vet. Up. VI, 18).
11448 /S/aunaka and others moreover declare (in the Anukrama/n/is of the Veda)
11449 that the ten books (of the /Ri/g-veda) were seen by Madhu/kkh/andas and
11450 other /ri/shis.[204] And, similarly, Sm/ri/ti tells us, for every Veda,
11451 of men of exalted mental vision (/ri/shis) who 'saw' the subdivisions of
11452 their respective Vedas, such as ka/nd/as and so on. Scripture also
11453 declares that the performance of the sacrificial action by means of the

mantra is to be preceded by the knowledge of the /ri/shi and so on, 'He who makes another person sacrifice or read by means of a mantra of which he does not know the /ri/shi, the metre, the divinity, and the Brahma/n/a, runs against a post, falls into a pit[205], &c. &c., therefore one must know all those matters for each mantra' (Arsheya Brahma/n/a, first section).--Moreover, religious duty is enjoined and its opposite is forbidden, in order that the animate beings may obtain pleasure and escape pain. Desire and aversion have for their objects pleasure and pain, known either from experience or from Scripture, and do not aim at anything of a different nature. As therefore each new creation is (nothing but) the result of the religious merit and demerit (of the animated beings of the preceding creation), it is produced with a nature resembling that of the preceding creation. Thus Sm/ri/ti also declares, 'To whatever actions certain of these (animated beings) had turned in a former creation, to the same they turn when created again and again. Whether those actions were harmful or harmless, gentle or cruel, right or wrong, true or untrue, influenced by them they proceed; hence a certain person delights in actions of a certain kind.'--Moreover, this world when being dissolved (in a mahapralaya) is dissolved to that extent only that the potentiality (/s/akti) of the world remains, and (when it is produced again) it is produced from the root of that potentiality; otherwise we should have to admit an effect without a cause. Nor have we the right to assume potentialities of different kind (for the different periods of the world). Hence, although the series of worlds from the earth upwards, and the series of different classes of animate beings such as gods, animals, and men, and the different conditions based on caste, a/s/rama, religious duty and fruit (of works), although all these we say are again and again interrupted and thereupon produced anew; we yet have to understand that they are, in the beginningless sa/m/sara, subject to a certain determinateness analogous to the determinateness governing the connexion between the senses and their objects. For it is impossible to imagine that the relation of senses and sense-objects should be a different one in different creations, so that, for instance, in some new creation a sixth sense and a corresponding sixth sense-object should manifest themselves. As, therefore, the phenomenal world is the same in all kalpas and as the Lords are able to continue their previous forms of existence, there manifest themselves, in each new creation, individuals bearing the same names and forms as the individuals of the preceding creations, and, owing to this equality of names and forms, the admitted periodical renovations of the world in the form of general pralayas and general creations do not conflict with the authoritativeness of the word of the Veda. The permanent identity of names and forms is declared in /S/ruti as well as Sm/ri/ti; compare, for instance, /Ri/k. Sa/m/h. X, 190, 3, 'As formerly the creator ordered sun and moon, and the sky, and the air, and the heavenly world;' which passage means that the highest Lord arranged at the beginning of the present kalpa the entire world with sun and moon, and so on, just as it had been arranged in the preceding kalpa. Compare also Taitt. Brahm. III, 1, 4, 1, 'Agni desired: May I become the consumer of the food of the gods; for that end he offered a cake on eight potsherd to Agni and the K/ri/ttikas.' This passage, which forms part of the injunction of the ish/t/i to the Nakshatras, declares equality of name and form connecting the Agni who offered and the Agni to whom he offered.[206]

Sm/ri/ti also contains similar statements to be quoted here; so, for instance, 'Whatever were the names of the /ri/shis and their powers to see the Vedas, the same the Unborn one again gives to them when they are produced afresh at the end of the night (the mahapralaya). As the various signs of the seasons return in succession in their due time, thus the same beings again appear in the different yugas. And of whatever individuality the gods of the past ages were, equal to them are the present gods in name and form.'

31. On account of the impossibility of (the gods being qualified) for the madhu-vidya, &c., Jaimini (maintains) the non-qualification (of the gods for the Brahma-vidya).

A new objection is raised against the averment that the gods, &c. also

11523 are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. The teacher, Jaimini,
11524 considers the gods and similar beings not to have any claim.--Why?--On
11525 account of the impossibility, in the case of the so-called Madhu-vidya,
11526 &c. If their claim to the knowledge of Brahman were admitted, we should
11527 have to admit their claim to the madhu-vidya ('the knowledge of the
11528 honey') also, because that also is a kind of knowledge not different
11529 (from the knowledge of Brahman). But to admit this latter claim is not
11530 possible; for, according to the passage, 'The Sun is indeed the honey of
11531 the devas' (Ch. Up. III, 1, 1), men are to meditate on the sun (the god
11532 Aditya) under the form of honey, and how, if the gods themselves are
11533 admitted as meditating worshippers, can Aditya meditate upon another
11534 Aditya?--Again, the text, after having enumerated five kinds of nectar,
11535 the red one, &c. residing in the sun, and after having stated that the
11536 five classes of gods, viz. the Vasus, Rudras, Adityas, Maruts, and
11537 Sadhyas, live on one of these nectars each, declares that 'he who thus
11538 knows this nectar becomes one of the Vasus, with Agni at their head, he
11539 sees the nectar and rejoices, &c., and indicates thereby that those who
11540 know the nectars enjoyed by the Vasus, &c., attain the greatness of the
11541 Vasus, &c.' But how should the Vasus themselves know other Vasus
11542 enjoying the nectar, and what other Vasu-greatness should they desire to
11543 attain?--We have also to compare the passages 'Agni is one foot, Aditya
11544 is one foot, the quarters are one foot' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 2); 'Air is
11545 indeed the absorber' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 1); 'Aditya is Brahman, this is the
11546 doctrine.' All these passages treat of the meditation on the Self of
11547 certain divinities, for which meditation these divinities themselves are
11548 not qualified.--So it is likewise impossible that the /ri/shis
11549 themselves should be qualified for meditations connected with /ri/shis,
11550 such as expressed in passages like B/ri/. Up. II, 2, 4, 'These two are
11551 the /ri/shis Gautama and Bharadvaja; the right Gautama, the left
11552 Bharadvaja.'--Another reason for the non-qualification of the gods is
11553 stated in the following Sutra.

11554
11555 32. And (the devas, &c. are not qualified) on account of (the words
11556 denoting the devas, &c.) being (used) in the sense of (sphere of) light.
11557

11558 To that sphere of light, the purvapakshin resumes, which is stationed in
11559 the sky, and during its diurnal revolutions illumines the world, terms
11560 such as Aditya, i.e. the names of devas, are applied, as we know from
11561 the use of ordinary language, and from Vedic complementary
11562 passages[207]. But of a mere sphere of light we cannot understand how it
11563 should be endowed with either a bodily form, consisting of the heart and
11564 the like, or intelligence, or the capability of forming wishes[208]. For
11565 mere light we know to be, like earth, entirely devoid of intelligence.
11566 The same observation applies to Agni (fire), and so on. It will perhaps
11567 be said that our objection is not valid, because the personality of the
11568 devas is known from the mantras, arthavadas, itihisas, pura/n/as, and
11569 from the conceptions of ordinary life[209]; but we contest the relevancy
11570 of this remark. For the conceptions of ordinary life do not constitute
11571 an independent means of knowledge; we rather say that a thing is known
11572 from ordinary life if it is known by the (acknowledged) means of
11573 knowledge, perception, &c. But none of the recognised means of
11574 knowledge, such as perception and the like, apply to the matter under
11575 discussion. Itihisas and pura/n/as again being of human origin, stand
11576 themselves in need of other means of knowledge on which to base. The
11577 arthavada passages also, which, as forming syntactical wholes with the
11578 injunctory passages, have merely the purpose of glorifying (what is
11579 enjoined in the latter), cannot be considered to constitute by
11580 themselves reasons for the existence of the personality, &c. of the
11581 devas. The mantras again, which, on the ground of direct enunciation,
11582 &c., are to be employed (at the different stages of the sacrificial
11583 action), have merely the purpose of denoting things connected with the
11584 sacrificial performance, and do not constitute an independent means of
11585 authoritative knowledge for anything[210].--For these reasons the devas,
11586 and similar beings, are not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.

11587
11588 33. Badaraya/n/a, on the other hand, (maintains) the existence (of
11589 qualification for Brahma-vidya on the part of the gods); for there are
11590 (passages indicative of that).
11591

11592 The expression 'on the other hand' is meant to rebut the purvapaksha.
11593 The teacher, Badaraya/n/a, maintains the existence of the qualification
11594 on the part of the gods, &c. For, although the qualification of the gods
11595 cannot be admitted with reference to the madhu-vidya, and similar topics
11596 of knowledge, in which the gods themselves are implicated, still they
11597 may be qualified for the pure knowledge of Brahman, qualification in
11598 general depending on the presence of desire, capability, &c.[211] Nor
11599 does the impossibility of qualification in certain cases interfere with
11600 the presence of qualification in those other cases where it is not
11601 impossible. To the case of the gods the same reasoning applies as to the
11602 case of men; for among men also, all are not qualified for everything,
11603 Brahma/n/as, for instance, not for the rajasuya-sacrifice[212].

11604
11605 And, with reference to the knowledge of Brahman, Scripture, moreover,
11606 contains express hints notifying that the devas are qualified; compare,
11607 for instance, /Br/i. Up. I, 4, 10, 'Whatever Deva was awakened (so as to
11608 know Brahman) he indeed became that; and the same with /ri/shis;' Ch.
11609 Up. VIII, 7, 2, 'They said: Well, let us search for that Self by which,
11610 if one has searched it out, all worlds and all desires are obtained.
11611 Thus saying, Indra went forth from the Devas, Viro/k/ana from the
11612 Asuras.' Similar statements are met with in Sm/ri/ti, so, for instance,
11613 in the colloquy of the Gandharva and Yaj/n/avalkya[213].--Against the
11614 objection raised in the preceding Sutra (32) we argue as follows. Words
11615 like aditya, and so on, which denote devas, although having reference to
11616 light and the like, yet convey the idea of certain divine Selfs
11617 (persons) endowed with intelligence and pre-eminent power; for they are
11618 used in that sense in mantras and arthavada passages. For the devas
11619 possess, in consequence of their pre-eminent power, the capability of
11620 residing within the light, and so on, and to assume any form they like.
11621 Thus we read in Scripture, in the arthavada passage explaining the words
11622 'ram of Medhatithi,' which form part of the Subrahma/n/ya-formula, that
11623 'Indra, having assumed the shape of a ram, carried off Medhatithi, the
11624 descendant of Ka/n/va' (Sha/d/v. Br. I, 1). And thus Sm/ri/ti says that
11625 'Aditya, having assumed the shape of a man, came to Kunti.' Moreover,
11626 even in such substances as earth, intelligent ruling beings must be
11627 admitted to reside, for that appears from such scriptural passages as
11628 'the earth spoke,' 'the waters spoke,' &c. The non-intelligence of light
11629 and the like, in so far as they are mere material elements, is admitted
11630 in the case of the sun (aditya), &c. also; but--as already
11631 remarked--from the use of the words in mantras and arthavadas it appears
11632 that there are intelligent beings of divine nature (which animate those
11633 material elements).

11634
11635 We now turn to the objection (raised above by the purvapakshin) that
11636 mantras and arthavadas, as merely subserving other purposes, have no
11637 power of setting forth the personality of the devas, and remark that not
11638 the circumstance of subordination or non-subordination to some other
11639 purpose, but rather the presence or absence of a certain idea furnishes
11640 a reason for (our assuming) the existence of something. This is
11641 exemplified by the case of a person who, having set out for some other
11642 purpose, (nevertheless) forms the conviction of the existence of leaves,
11643 grass, and the like, which he sees lying on the road.--But, the
11644 purvapakshin may here object, the instance quoted by you is not strictly
11645 analogous. In the case of the wanderer, perception, whose objects the
11646 grass and leaves are, is active, and through it he forms the conception
11647 of their existence. In the case of an arthavada, on the other hand,
11648 which, as forming a syntactical unity with the corresponding injunctory
11649 passage, merely subserves the purpose of glorifying (the latter), it is
11650 impossible to determine any energy having a special object of its own.
11651 For in general any minor syntactical unity, which is included in a more
11652 comprehensive syntactical unity conveying a certain meaning, does not
11653 possess the power of expressing a separate meaning of its own. Thus, for
11654 instance, we derive, from the combination of the three words
11655 constituting the negative sentence, '(Do) not drink wine,' one meaning
11656 only, i.e. a prohibition of drinking wine, and do not derive an
11657 additional meaning, viz. an order to drink wine, from the combination of
11658 the last two words, 'drink wine.'--To this objection we reply, that the
11659 instance last quoted is not analogous (to the matter under discussion).
11660 The words of the sentence prohibiting the drinking of wine form only one

11661 whole, and on that account the separate sense which any minor
11662 syntactical unity included in the bigger sentence may possess cannot be
11663 accepted. In the case of injunction and arthavada, on the other hand,
11664 the words constituting the arthavada form a separate group of their own
11665 which refers to some accomplished thing[214], and only subsequently to
11666 that, when it comes to be considered what purpose they subserve, they
11667 enter on the function of glorifying the injunction. Let us examine, as
11668 an illustrative example, the injunctive passage, 'He who is desirous of
11669 prosperity is to offer to Vayu a white animal.' All the words contained
11670 in this passage are directly connected with the injunction. This is,
11671 however, not the case with the words constituting the corresponding
11672 arthavada passage, 'For Vayu is the swiftest deity; Vayu he approaches
11673 with his own share; he leads him to prosperity.' The single words of
11674 this arthavada are not grammatically connected with the single words of
11675 the injunction, but form a subordinate unity of their own, which
11676 contains the praise of Vayu, and glorify the injunction, only in so far
11677 as they give us to understand that the action enjoined is connected with
11678 a distinguished divinity. If the matter conveyed by the subordinate
11679 (arthavada) passage can be known by some other means of knowledge, the
11680 arthavada acts as a mere anuvada, i.e. a statement referring to
11681 something (already known)[215]. When its contents are contradicted by
11682 other means of knowledge it acts as a so-called gu/n/avada, i.e. a
11683 statement of a quality[216]. Where, again, neither of the two mentioned
11684 conditions is found, a doubt may arise whether the arthavada is to be
11685 taken as a gu/n/avada on account of the absence of other means of
11686 knowledge, or as an arthavada referring to something known (i.e. an
11687 anuvada) on account of the absence of contradiction by other means of
11688 proof. The latter alternative is, however, to be embraced by reflecting
11689 people.--The same reasoning applies to mantras also.

11690
11691 There is a further reason for assuming the personality of the gods. The
11692 Vedic injunctions, as enjoining sacrificial offerings to Indra and the
11693 other gods, presuppose certain characteristic shapes of the individual
11694 divinities, because without such the sacrificer could not represent
11695 Indra and the other gods to his mind. And if the divinity were not
11696 represented to the mind it would not be possible to make an offering to
11697 it. So Scripture also says, 'Of that divinity for which the offering is
11698 taken he is to think when about to say vausha/t/' (Ai. Br. III, 8, 1).
11699 Nor is it possible to consider the essential form (or character) of a
11700 thing to consist in the word only[217]; for word (denoting) and thing
11701 (denoted) are different. He therefore who admits the authoritativeness
11702 of the scriptural word has no right to deny that the shape of Indra, and
11703 the other gods, is such as we understand it to be from the mantras and
11704 arthavadas.--Moreover, itihisas and pura/n/as also--because based on
11705 mantra and arthavada which possess authoritative power in the manner
11706 described--are capable of setting forth the personality, &c. of the
11707 devas. Itihasa and pura/n/a can, besides, be considered as based on
11708 perception also. For what is not accessible to our perception may have
11709 been within the sphere of perception of people in ancient times.
11710 Sm/ri/ti also declares that Vyasa and others conversed with the gods
11711 face to face. A person maintaining that the people of ancient times were
11712 no more able to converse with the gods than people are at present, would
11713 thereby deny the (incontestable) variety of the world. He might as well
11714 maintain that because there is at present no prince ruling over the
11715 whole earth, there were no such princes in former times; a position by
11716 which the scriptural injunction of the rajasuya-sacrifice[218] would be
11717 stultified. Or he might maintain that in former times the spheres of
11718 duty of the different castes and a/s/ramas were as generally unsettled
11719 as they are now, and, on that account, declare those parts of Scripture
11720 which define those different duties to be purposeless. It is therefore
11721 altogether unobjectionable to assume that the men of ancient times, in
11722 consequence of their eminent religious merit, conversed with the gods
11723 face to face. Sm/ri/ti also declares that 'from the reading of the Veda
11724 there results intercourse with the favourite divinity' (Yoga Sutra II,
11725 44). And that Yoga does, as Sm/ri/ti declares, lead to the acquirement
11726 of extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body, and so on, is a fact
11727 which cannot be set aside by a mere arbitrary denial. Scripture also
11728 proclaims the greatness of Yoga, 'When, as earth, water, light, heat,
11729 and ether arise, the fivefold quality of Yoga takes place, then there is

11730 no longer illness, old age, or pain for him who has obtained a body
11731 produced by the fire of Yoga' (/S/vet. Up. II, 12). Nor have we the
11732 right to measure by our capabilities the capability of the /ri/shis who
11733 see the mantras and brahma/n/a passages (i.e. the Veda).--From all this
11734 it appears that the itihisas and pura/n/as have an adequate basis.--And
11735 the conceptions of ordinary life also must not be declared to be
11736 unfounded, if it is at all possible to accept them.
11737

11738 The general result is that we have the right to conceive the gods as
11739 possessing personal existence, on the ground of mantras, arthavadas,
11740 itihisas, pura/n/as, and ordinarily prevailing ideas. And as the gods
11741 may thus be in the condition of having desires and so on, they must be
11742 considered as qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. Moreover, the
11743 declarations which Scripture makes concerning gradual emancipation[219]
11744 agree with this latter supposition only.
11745

11746 34. Grief of him (i.e. of Jana/s/ruti) (arose) on account of his hearing
11747 a disrespectful speech about himself; on account of the rushing on of
11748 that (grief) (Raikva called him /S/udra); for it (the grief) is pointed
11749 at (by Raikva).
11750

11751 (In the preceding adhikara/n/a) the exclusiveness of the claim of men to
11752 knowledge has been refuted, and it has been declared that the gods, &c.
11753 also possess such a claim. The present adhikara/n/a is entered on for
11754 the purpose of removing the doubt whether, as the exclusiveness of the
11755 claim of twice-born men is capable of refutation, the /S/udras also
11756 possess such a claim.
11757

11758 The purvapakshin maintains that the /S/udras also have such a claim,
11759 because they may be in the position of desiring that knowledge, and
11760 because they are capable of it; and because there is no scriptural
11761 prohibition (excluding them from knowledge) analogous to the text,
11762 'Therefore[220] the /S/udra is unfit for sacrificing' (Taitt. Sa/m/h.
11763 VII, 1, 1, 6). The reason, moreover, which disqualifies the /S/udras for
11764 sacrificial works, viz. their being without the sacred fires, does not
11765 invalidate their qualification for knowledge, as knowledge can be
11766 apprehended by those also who are without the fires. There is besides an
11767 inferential mark supporting the claim of the /S/udras; for in the
11768 so-called sa/m/varga-knowledge he (Raikva) refers to Jana/s/ruti
11769 Pautraya/n/a, who wishes to learn from him, by the name of /S/udra 'Fie,
11770 necklace and carnage be thine, O /S/udra, together with the cows' (Ch.
11771 Up. IV, 2, 3). Sm/ri/ti moreover speaks of Vidura and others who were
11772 born from /S/udra mothers as possessing eminent knowledge.--Hence the
11773 /S/udra has a claim to the knowledge of Brahman.
11774

11775 To this we reply that the /S/udras have no such claim, on account of
11776 their not studying the Veda. A person who has studied the Veda and
11777 understood its sense is indeed qualified for Vedic matters; but a
11778 /S/udra does not study the Veda, for such study demands as its
11779 antecedent the upanayana-ceremony, and that ceremony belongs to the
11780 three (higher) castes only. The mere circumstance of being in a
11781 condition of desire does not furnish a reason for qualification, if
11782 capability is absent. Mere temporal capability again does not constitute
11783 a reason for qualification, spiritual capability being required in
11784 spiritual matters. And spiritual capability is (in the case of the
11785 /S/udras) excluded by their being excluded from the study of the
11786 Veda.--The Vedic statement, moreover, that the /S/udra is unfit for
11787 sacrifices intimates, because founded on reasoning, that he is unfit for
11788 knowledge also; for the argumentation is the same in both
11789 cases[221].--With reference to the purvapakshin's opinion that the fact
11790 of the word '/S/udra' being enounced in the sa/m/varga-knowledge
11791 constitutes an inferential mark (of the /S/udra's qualification for
11792 knowledge), we remark that that inferential mark has no force, on
11793 account of the absence of arguments. For the statement of an inferential
11794 mark possesses the power of intimation only in consequence of arguments
11795 being adduced; but no such arguments are brought forward in the passage
11796 quoted.[222] Besides, the word '/S/udra' which occurs in the
11797 sa/m/varga-vidya would establish a claim on the part of the /S/udras to
11798 that one vidya only, not to all vidyas. In reality, however, it is

11799 powerless, because occurring in an arthavada, to establish the /S/udras'
11800 claim to anything.--The word '/S/udra' can moreover be made to agree
11801 with the context in which it occurs in the following manner. When
11802 Jana/s/ruti Pautraya/n/a heard himself spoken of with disrespect by the
11803 flamingo ('How can you speak of him, being what he is, as if he were
11804 like Raikva with the car?' IV, 1, 3), grief (su/k/) arose in his mind,
11805 and to that grief the /ri/shi Raikva alludes with the word /S/udra, in
11806 order to show thereby his knowledge of what is remote. This explanation
11807 must be accepted because a (real) born /S/udra is not qualified (for the
11808 sa/m/varga-vidya). If it be asked how the grief (su/k/) which had arisen
11809 in Janasruti's mind can be referred to by means of the word /S/udra, we
11810 reply: On account of the rushing on (adrava/n/a) of the grief. For we
11811 may etymologise the word /S/udra by dividing it into its parts, either
11812 as 'he rushed into grief (/S/u/k/am abhidudrava) or as 'grief rushed on
11813 him,' or as 'he in his grief rushed to Raikva;' while on the other hand
11814 it is impossible to accept the word in its ordinary conventional sense.
11815 The circumstance (of the king actually being grieved) is moreover
11816 expressly touched upon in the legend[223].
11817

11818 35. And because the kshattriyahood (of Jana/s/ruti) is understood from
11819 the inferential mark (supplied by his being mentioned) later on with
11820 /K/aitraratha (who was a kshattriya himself).
11821

11822 Jana/s/ruti cannot have been a /S/udra by birth for that reason also
11823 that his being a kshattriya is understood from an inferential sign, viz.
11824 his being mentioned together (in one chapter) with the kshattriya
11825 /K/aitraratha Abhipratarin. For, later on, i.e. in the passage
11826 complementary to the sa/m/varga-vidya, a kshattriya /K/aitrarathi
11827 Abhipratarin is glorified, 'Once while /S/aunaka Kapeya and Abhipratarin
11828 Kakshaseni were being waited on at their meal a religious student begged
11829 of them' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 5). That this Abhipratarin was a /K/aitrarathi
11830 (i.e. a descendant of /K/itraratha) we have to infer from his connexion
11831 with a Kapeya. For we know (from /S/ruti) about the connexion of
11832 /K/itraratha himself with the Kapeyas ('the Kapeyas made /K/itraratha
11833 perform that sacrifice;' Ta/nd/ya. Br. XX, 12, 5), and as a rule
11834 sacrificers of one and the same family employ officiating priests of one
11835 and the same family. Moreover, as we understand from Scripture ('from
11836 him a /K/aitrarathi descended who was a prince[224]') that he
11837 (/K/aitraratha) was a prince, we must understand him to have been a
11838 kshattriya. The fact now of Jana/s/ruti being praised in the same vidya
11839 with the kshattriya Abhipratarin intimates that the former also was a
11840 kshattriya. For as a rule equals are mentioned together with equals.
11841 That Jana/s/ruti was a kshattriya we moreover conclude from his sending
11842 his door-keeper and from other similar signs of power (mentioned in the
11843 text).--Hence the /S/udras are not qualified (for the knowledge of
11844 Brahman).
11845

11846 36. On account of the reference to ceremonial purifications (in the case
11847 of the higher castes) and on account of their absence being declared (in
11848 the case of the /S/udras).
11849

11850 That the /S/udras are not qualified, follows from that circumstance also
11851 that in different places of the vidyas such ceremonies as the upanayana
11852 and the like are referred to. Compare, for instance, /S/at. Br. XI, 5,
11853 3, 13, 'He initiated him as a pupil;' Ch. Up. VII, 1, 1, 'Teach me, Sir!
11854 thus he approached him;' Pra. Up. I, 1, 'Devoted to Brahman, firm in
11855 Brahman, seeking for the highest Brahman they, carrying fuel in their
11856 hands, approached the venerable Pippalada, thinking that he would teach
11857 them all that.'--Thus the following passage also, 'He without having
11858 made them undergo the upanayana (said) to them' (Ch. Up. V, 11, 7),
11859 shows that the upanayana is a well-established ceremony[225].--With
11860 reference to the /S/udras, on the other hand, the absence of ceremonies
11861 is frequently mentioned; so, for instance, Manu X, 4, where they are
11862 spoken of as 'once born' only ('the /S/udra is the fourth caste,
11863 once-born'), and Manu X, 126, 'In the /S/udra there is not any sin, and
11864 he is not fit for any ceremony.'
11865

11866 37. And on account of (Gautama) proceeding (to initiate Jabala) on the
11867 ascertainment of (his) not being that (i.e. a /S/udra).

11868
11869 The /S/udras are not qualified for that reason also that Gautama, having
11870 ascertained Jabala not to be a /S/udra from his speaking the truth,
11871 proceeded to initiate and instruct him. 'None who is not a Brahma/n/a
11872 would thus speak out. Go and fetch fuel, friend, I shall initiate you.
11873 You have not swerved from the truth' (Ch. Up. IV, 4, 5); which
11874 scriptural passage furnishes an inferential sign (of the /S/udras not
11875 being capable of initiation).

11876
11877 38. And on account of the prohibition, in Sm/ri/ti, of (the /S/udras')
11878 hearing and studying (the Veda) and (knowing and performing) (Vedic)
11879 matters.

11880
11881 The /S/udras are not qualified for that reason also that Sm/ri/ti
11882 prohibits their hearing the Veda, their studying the Veda, and their
11883 understanding and performing Vedic matters. The prohibition of hearing
11884 the Veda is conveyed by the following passages: 'The ears of him who
11885 hears the Veda are to be filled with (molten) lead and lac,' and 'For a
11886 /S/udra is (like) a cemetery, therefore (the Veda) is not to be read in
11887 the vicinity of a /S/udra.' From this latter passage the prohibition of
11888 studying the Veda results at once; for how should he study Scripture in
11889 whose vicinity it is not even to be read? There is, moreover, an express
11890 prohibition (of the /S/udras studying the Veda). 'His tongue is to be
11891 slit if he pronounces it; his body is to be cut through if he preserves
11892 it.' The prohibitions of hearing and studying the Veda already imply the
11893 prohibition of the knowledge and performance of Vedic matters; there
11894 are, however, express prohibitions also, such as 'he is not to impart
11895 knowledge to the /S/udra,' and 'to the twice-born belong study,
11896 sacrifice, and the bestowal of gifts.'--From those /S/udras, however,
11897 who, like Vidura and 'the religious hunter,' acquire knowledge in
11898 consequence of the after effects of former deeds, the fruit of their
11899 knowledge cannot be withheld, since knowledge in all cases brings about
11900 its fruit. Sm/ri/ti, moreover, declares that all the four castes are
11901 qualified for acquiring the knowledge of the itihasas and pura/n/as;
11902 compare the passage, 'He is to teach the four castes' (Mahabh.).--It
11903 remains, however, a settled point that they do not possess any such
11904 qualification with regard to the Veda.

11905
11906 39. (The pra/n/a is Brahman), on account of the trembling (predicated of
11907 the whole world).

11908
11909 The discussion of qualification for Brahma-knowledge--on which we
11910 entered as an opportunity offered--being finished we return to our chief
11911 topic, i.e. the enquiry into the purport of the Vedanta-texts.--We read
11912 (Ka. Up. II, 6, 2), 'Whatever there is, the whole world when gone forth
11913 trembles in the pra/n/a. It (the pra/n/a) is a great terror, a raised
11914 thunderbolt. Those who know it become immortal[226]. '--This passage
11915 declares that this whole world trembles, abiding in pra/n/a, and that
11916 there is raised something very terrible, called a thunderbolt, and that
11917 through its knowledge immortality is obtained. But as it is not
11918 immediately clear what the pra/n/a is, and what that terrible
11919 thunderbolt, a discussion arises.

11920
11921 The purvapakshin maintains that, in accordance with the ordinary meaning
11922 of the term, pra/n/a denotes the air with its five modifications, that
11923 the word 'thunderbolt' also is to be taken in its ordinary sense, and
11924 that thus the whole passage contains a glorification of air. For, he
11925 says, this whole world trembles, abiding within air with its five
11926 forms--which is here called pra/n/a--and the terrible thunderbolts also
11927 spring from air (or wind) as their cause. For in the air, people say,
11928 when it manifests itself in the form of Parjanya, lightning, thunder,
11929 rain, and thunderbolts manifest themselves.--Through the knowledge of
11930 that air immortality also can be obtained; for another scriptural
11931 passage says, 'Air is everything by itself, and air is all things
11932 together. He who knows this conquers death.'--We therefore conclude that
11933 the same air is to be understood in the passage under discussion.

11934
11935 To this we make the following reply.--Brahman only can be meant, on
11936 account of what precedes as well as what follows. In the preceding as

11937 well as the subsequent part of the chapter Brahman only is spoken of;
11938 how then can it be supposed that in the intermediate part all at once
11939 the air should be referred to? The immediately preceding passage runs as
11940 follows, 'That only is called the Bright, that is called Brahman, that
11941 alone is called the Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one
11942 goes beyond it.' That the Brahman there spoken of forms the topic of our
11943 passage also, we conclude, firstly, from proximity; and, secondly, from
11944 the circumstance that in the clause, 'The whole world trembles in
11945 pra/n/a' we recognise a quality of Brahman, viz. its constituting the
11946 abode of the whole world. That the word pra/n/a can denote the highest
11947 Self also, appears from such passages as 'the pra/n/a of pra/n/a'
11948 (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 18). Being the cause of trembling, moreover, is a
11949 quality which properly appertains to the highest Self only, not to mere
11950 air. Thus Scripture says, 'No mortal lives by the pra/n/a and the breath
11951 that goes down. We live by another in whom these two repose' (Ka. Up.
11952 II, 5 5). And also in the passage subsequent to the one under
11953 discussion, ('From terror of it fire burns, from terror the sun burns,
11954 from terror Indra and Vayu, and Death as the fifth run away,') Brahman,
11955 and not the air, must be supposed to be spoken of, since the subject of
11956 that passage is represented as the cause of fear on the part of the
11957 whole world inclusive of the air itself. Thence we again conclude that
11958 the passage under discussion also refers to Brahman, firstly, on the
11959 ground of proximity; and, secondly, because we recognise a quality of
11960 Brahman, viz. its being the cause of fear, in the words, 'A great
11961 terror, a raised thunderbolt.' The word 'thunderbolt' is here used to
11962 denote a cause of fear in general. Thus in ordinary life also a man
11963 strictly carries out a king's command because he fearfully considers in
11964 his mind, 'A thunderbolt (i.e. the king's wrath, or threatened
11965 punishment) is hanging over my head; it might fall if I did not carry
11966 out his command.' In the same manner this whole world inclusive of fire,
11967 air, sun, and so on, regularly carries on its manifold functions from
11968 fear of Brahman; hence Brahman as inspiring fear is compared to a
11969 thunderbolt. Similarly, another scriptural passage, whose topic is
11970 Brahman, declares, 'From terror of it the wind blows, from terror the
11971 sun rises; from terror of it Agni and Indra, yea, Death runs as the
11972 fifth.'--That Brahman is what is referred to in our passage, further
11973 follows from the declaration that the fruit of its cognition is
11974 immortality. For that immortality is the fruit of the knowledge of
11975 Brahman is known, for instance, from the mantra, 'A man who knows him
11976 only passes over death, there is no other path to go' (/S/vet. Up. VI,
11977 15).--That immortality which the purvapakshin asserts to be sometimes
11978 represented as the fruit of the knowledge of the air is a merely
11979 relative one; for there (i.e. in the chapter from which the passage is
11980 quoted) at first the highest Self is spoken of, by means of a new topic
11981 being started (B/ri/. Up. III, 4), and thereupon the inferior nature of
11982 the air and so on is referred to. ('Everything else is evil.')--That in
11983 the passage under discussion the highest Self is meant appears finally
11984 from the general subject-matter; for the question (asked by Na/k/iketas
11985 in I, 2, 14, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither
11986 effect nor cause, as neither past nor future tell me that') refers to
11987 the highest Self.

11988
11989 40. The light (is Brahman), on account of that (Brahman) being seen (in
11990 the scriptural passage).

11991
11992 We read in Scripture, 'Thus does that serene being, arising from this
11993 body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest
11994 light' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3). Here the doubt arises whether the word
11995 'light' denotes the (physical) light, which is the object of sight and
11996 dispels darkness, or the highest Brahman.

11997
11998 The purvapakshin maintains that the word 'light' denotes the well-known
11999 (physical) light, because that is the conventional sense of the word.
12000 For while it is to be admitted that in another passage, discussed under
12001 I, 1, 24, the word 'light' does, owing to the general topic of the
12002 chapter, divest itself of its ordinary meaning and denote Brahman, there
12003 is in our passage no similar reason for setting the ordinary meaning
12004 aside. Moreover, it is stated in the chapter treating of the na/d/is of
12005 the body, that a man going to final release reaches the sun ('When he

12006 departs from this body then he departs upwards by those very rays;' Ch.
12007 Up. VIII, 6, 5). Hence we conclude that the word 'light' denotes, in our
12008 passage, the ordinary light.

12009
12010 To this we make the following reply.--The word 'light' can denote the
12011 highest Brahman only, on account of that being seen. We see that in the
12012 whole chapter Brahman is carried on as the topic of discussion. For the
12013 Self, which is free from sin, &c. is introduced as the general
12014 subject-matter in VIII, 7, 1 ('the Self which is free from sin'); it is
12015 thereupon set forth as that which is to be searched out and to be
12016 understood (VIII, 7, 1); it is carried on by means of the clauses, 'I
12017 shall explain that further to you' (VIII, 9, 3 ff.); after that freedom
12018 from body is said to belong to it, because it is one with light ('when
12019 he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him,'
12020 VIII, 12, 1)--and freedom from body is not possible outside Brahman--and
12021 it is finally qualified as 'the highest light, the highest person'
12022 (VIII, 12, 3).--Against the statement, made by the purvapakshin, that
12023 Scripture speaks of a man going to release as reaching the sun, we
12024 remark, that the release there referred to is not the ultimate one,
12025 since it is said to be connected with going and departing upwards. That
12026 the ultimate release has nothing to do with going and departing upwards
12027 we shall show later on.

12028
12029 41. The ether is (Brahman), as it is designated as something different,
12030 &c. (from name and form).

12031
12032 Scripture says, 'He who is called ether, (aka/s/a) is the revealer of
12033 all forms and names. That within which these forms and names are
12034 contained is the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self (Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 1).

12035
12036 There arising a doubt whether that which here is called ether is the
12037 highest Brahman or the ordinary elemental ether, the purvapakshin
12038 declares that the latter alternative is to be embraced, firstly, because
12039 it is founded on the conventional meaning of the word 'ether;' and,
12040 secondly, because the circumstance of revealing names and forms can very
12041 well be reconciled with the elemental ether, as that which affords room
12042 (for all things). Moreover, the passage contains no clear indicatory
12043 mark of Brahman, such as creative power, and the like.

12044
12045 To this we reply, that the word 'ether' can here denote the highest
12046 Brahman only, because it is designated as a different thing, &c. For the
12047 clause, 'That within which these two are contained is Brahman,'
12048 designates the ether as something different from names and forms. But,
12049 excepting Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from name and
12050 form, since the entire world of effects is evolved exclusively by names
12051 and forms. Moreover, the complete revealing of names and forms cannot be
12052 accomplished by anything else but Brahman, according to the text which
12053 declares Brahman's creative agency, 'Let me enter (into those beings)
12054 with this living Self (jiva atman), and evolve names and forms' (Ch. Up.
12055 VI, 3, 2). But--it may be said--from this very passage it is apparent
12056 that the living Self also (i.e. the individual soul) possesses revealing
12057 power with regard to names and forms.--True, we reply, but what the
12058 passage really wishes to intimate, is the non-difference (of the
12059 individual soul from the highest Self). And the very statement
12060 concerning the revealing of names and forms implies the statement of
12061 signs indicatory of Brahman, viz. creative power and the
12062 like.--Moreover, the terms 'the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self' (VIII,
12063 14) indicate that Brahman is spoken of.

12064
12065 42. And (on account of the designation) (of the highest Self) as
12066 different (from the individual soul) in the states of deep sleep and
12067 departing.

12068
12069 In the sixth prapa/th/aka of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka there is given, in
12070 reply to the question, 'Who is that Self?' a lengthy exposition of the
12071 nature of the Self, 'He who is within the heart, among the pra/n/as, the
12072 person of light, consisting of knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 7). Here
12073 the doubt arises, whether the passage merely aims at making an
12074 additional statement about the nature of the transmigrating soul (known

12075 already from other sources), or at establishing the nature of the
12076 non-transmigrating Self.

12077
12078 The purvapakshin maintains that the passage is concerned with the nature
12079 of the transmigrating soul, on account of the introductory and
12080 concluding statements. For the introductory statement, 'He among the
12081 pra/n/as who consists of knowledge,' contains marks indicatory of the
12082 embodied soul, and so likewise the concluding passage, 'And that great
12083 unborn Self is he who consists of cognition,' &c. (IV, 4, 22). We must
12084 therefore adhere to the same subject-matter in the intermediate passages
12085 also, and look on them as setting forth the same embodied Self,
12086 represented in its different states, viz. the waking state, and so on.

12087
12088 In reply to this, we maintain that the passage aims only at giving
12089 information about the highest Lord, not at making additional statements
12090 about the embodied soul.--Why?--On account of the highest Lord being
12091 designated as different from the embodied soul, in the states of deep
12092 sleep and of departing from the body. His difference from the embodied
12093 soul in the state of deep sleep is declared in the following passage,
12094 'This person embraced by the intelligent (praj/n/a) Self knows nothing
12095 that is without, nothing that is within.' Here the term, 'the person,'
12096 must mean the embodied soul; for of him it is possible to deny that he
12097 knows, because he, as being the knower, may know what is within and
12098 without. The 'intelligent Self,' on the other hand, is the highest Lord,
12099 because he is never dissociated from intelligence, i.e.--in his
12100 case--all-embracing knowledge.--Similarly, the passage treating of
12101 departure, i.e. death ('this bodily Self mounted by the intelligent Self
12102 moves along groaning'), refers to the highest Lord as different from the
12103 individual Self. There also we have to understand by the 'embodied one'
12104 the individual soul which is the Lord of the body, while the
12105 'intelligent one' is again the Lord. We thus understand that 'on account
12106 of his being designated as something different, in the states of deep
12107 sleep and departure,' the highest Lord forms the subject of the
12108 passage.--With reference to the purvapakshin's assertion that the entire
12109 chapter refers to the embodied Self, because indicatory marks of the
12110 latter are found in its beginning, middle, and end, we remark that in
12111 the first place the introductory passage ('He among the pra/n/as who
12112 consists of cognition') does not aim at setting forth the character of
12113 the transmigrating Self, but rather, while merely referring to the
12114 nature of the transmigrating Self as something already known, aims at
12115 declaring its identity with the highest Brahman; for it is manifest that
12116 the immediately subsequent passage, 'as if thinking, as if moving'[227],
12117 aims at discarding the attributes of the transmigrating Self. The
12118 concluding passage again is analogous to the initial one; for the words,
12119 'And that great unborn Self is he who,' &c., mean: We have shown that
12120 that same cognitional Self, which is observed among the pra/n/as, is the
12121 great unborn Self, i.e. the highest Lord--He, again, who imagines that
12122 the passages intervening (between the two quoted) aim at setting forth
12123 the nature of the transmigrating Self by representing it in the waking
12124 state, and so on, is like a man who setting out towards the east, wants
12125 to set out at the same time towards the west. For in representing the
12126 states of waking, and so on, the passage does not aim at describing the
12127 soul as subject to different states or transmigration, but rather as
12128 free from all particular conditions and transmigration. This is evident
12129 from the circumstance that on Janaka's question, which is repeated in
12130 every section, 'Speak on for the sake of emancipation,' Yaj/n/avalkya
12131 replies each time, 'By all that he is not affected, for that person is
12132 not attached to anything' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 14-16). And later on he
12133 says (IV, 3, 22), 'He is not followed by good, not followed by evil, for
12134 he has then overcome all the sorrows of the heart.' We have, therefore,
12135 to conclude that the chapter exclusively aims at setting forth the
12136 nature of the non-transmigrating Self.

12137
12138 43. And on account of such words as Lord, &c.

12139
12140 That the chapter aims at setting forth the nature of the
12141 non-transmigrating Self, we have to conclude from that circumstance also
12142 that there occur in it terms such as Lord and so on, intimating the
12143 nature of the non-transmigrating Self, and others excluding the nature

12144 of the transmigrating Self. To the first class belongs, for instance,
12145 'He is the lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all
12146 things.' To the latter class belongs the passage, 'He does not become
12147 greater by good works, nor smaller by evil works.'--From all which we
12148 conclude that the chapter refers to the non-transmigrating highest Lord.

12149
12150 Notes:

12151
12152 [Footnote 164: From passages of which nature we may infer that in the
12153 passage under discussion also the 'abode' is Brahman.]

12154
12155 [Footnote 165: From which circumstance we may conclude that the passage
12156 under discussion also refers to Brahman.]

12157
12158 [Footnote 166: Yat sarvam avidyaroṇa/ tat sarva/ paramārthato
12159 brahma na tu yad brahma tat sarvam ity artha/h/. Bhamati.]

12160
12161 [Footnote 167: So that the passage would have to be translated, 'That,
12162 viz. knowledge, &c. is the bridge of the Immortal.']

12163
12164 [Footnote 168: Bhogyaśya bhokt/ri/śhatvat tasyāyatanatvam uktam
12165 a/s/a@nkyaha na /k/eti, jivasyad/ri/sh/t/advara dyubhvaḍinimittatveṣpi
12166 na sakṣat tadāyatanatvam aupadhikātvenavibhūtvad ity artha/h/. Ananda
12167 Giri.]

12168
12169 [Footnote 169: It would not have been requisite to introduce a special
12170 Sūtra for the individual soul--which, like the air, is already excluded
12171 by the preceding Sūtra--if it were not for the new argument brought
12172 forward in the following Sūtra which applies to the individual soul
12173 only.]

12174
12175 [Footnote 170: If the individual soul were meant by the abode of heaven,
12176 earth, &c., the statement regarding I/s/vara made in the passage about
12177 the two birds would be altogether abrupt, and on that ground
12178 objectionable. The same difficulty does not present itself with regard
12179 to the abrupt mention of the individual soul which is well known to
12180 everybody, and to which therefore casual allusions may be made.--I
12181 subjoin Ananda Giri's commentary on the entire passage:
12182 Jivasyopādhyāyāṇavivakṣitatvat tadj/n/aneṣpi sarvaj/n/anasiddhes
12183 tasyāyatanatvadyabhāve hetvantara/m/ va/k/yam ity a/s/a@nkyā sūtre/n/a
12184 pariḥarati kuta/sk/etyadina. Tad vya/k/āśh/t/e dyubhvaḍiti. Nirde/s/am
12185 eva dar/s/ayati tayor iti. Vibhaktiyartham aha tabhya/m/ /k/eti.
12186 Sthitye/s/varasyadanaḥ jivasa/m/graheṣpi katham i/s/varasyaiva
12187 vi/s/vayatanatva/m/ tadāha yaditi. I/s/varasyāyanatvenaprak/ri/tatve
12188 jivap/ri/thakkathananupapattir ity uktam eva vyatirekadvarāha anyatheti.
12189 Jivasyāyatanatvenaprak/ri/tatve tulyanupapattir iti /s/a@nkate nanviti.
12190 Tasyaikyārtha/m/ lokasiddhasyanuvadatvan naivam ity aha neti.
12191 Jivasyāpūrvatvabhāvenāpratipadyatvam eva prakā/t/ayati kṣhetraj/n/o
12192 hiti. I/s/varasyapi lokavādisiddhatvad āpratipadyatety a/s/a@nkyāha
12193 i/s/varas tv iti.]

12194
12195 [Footnote 171: As might be the prima facie conclusion from the particle
12196 'but' introducing the sentence 'but he in reality,' &c.]

12197
12198 [Footnote 172: It being maintained that the passage referred to is to be
12199 viewed in connexion with the general subject-matter of the preceding
12200 past of the chapter.]

12201
12202 [Footnote 173: And would thus involve a violation of a fundamental
12203 principle of the Mīmāṃsa.]

12204
12205 [Footnote 174: A remark directed against the possible attempt to explain
12206 the passage last quoted as referring to the embodied soul.]

12207
12208 [Footnote 175: Pi/nd/a/h/ sthūlo deha/h/, pra/n/a/h/ sūtratma. Ananda
12209 Giri.--The lower Brahman (hira/n/yagarbha on sūtratman) is the vital
12210 principle (pra/n/a) in all creatures.]

12211
12212 [Footnote 176: Sa/m/yagdar/s/ana, i.e. complete seeing or intuition; the

12213 same term which in other places--where it is not requisite to insist on
12214 the idea of 'seeing' in contradistinction from 'reflecting' or
12215 'meditating'--is rendered by perfect knowledge.]

12216
12217 [Footnote 177: Translated above by 'of the shape of the individual
12218 soul.']

12219
12220 [Footnote 178: Pa/n/ini III, 3, 77, 'murtta/m/ ghana/h/.']

12221
12222 [Footnote 179: So that the interpretation of the purvapakshin cannot be
12223 objected to on the ground of its involving the comparison of a thing to
12224 itself.]

12225
12226 [Footnote 180: So that no objection can be raised on the ground that
12227 heaven and earth cannot be contained in the small ether of the heart.]

12228
12229 [Footnote 181: Viz. of that which is within it. Ananda Giri proposes two
12230 explanations: na /k/eti, paravi/s/esha/n/atvenety atra paro daharaka/s/a
12231 upadanat tasminn iti saptamyanta-ta/kkh/abdasyeti /s/esha/h/. Yadva
12232 para/s/abdo s nta/h/sthavastuvishayas tadvi/s/esha/n/alvena tasminn iti
12233 daharaka/s/asyokter ity artha/h/. Ta/kkh/abdasya
12234 samnik/ri/sh/t/anvayayoge viprak/ri/sh/t/anvayasya jaghanyatvad
12235 aka/s/antargata/m/ dhyeyam iti bhava/h/.]

12236
12237 [Footnote 182: A vakyabheda--split of the sentence--takes place
12238 according to the Mimam/s/a when one and the same sentence contains two
12239 new statements which are different.]

12240
12241 [Footnote 183: While the explanation of Brahman by jiva would compel us
12242 to assume that the word Brahman secondarily denotes the individual
12243 soul.]

12244
12245 [Footnote 184: Upalabdher adhish/th/anam brahma/n/a deha ishyate.
12246 Tenasadhara/n/atvena deho brahmapuram bhavet. Bhamati.]

12247
12248 [Footnote 185: I.e. Brahma, the lower Brahman.]

12249
12250 [Footnote 186: The masculine 'avirbhutasvarupa/h/' qualifies the
12251 substantive jiva/h/ which has to be supplied. Properly speaking the jiva
12252 whose true nature has become manifest, i.e. which has become Brahman, is
12253 no longer jiva; hence the explanatory statement that the term jiva is
12254 used with reference to what the jiva was before it became Brahman.]

12255
12256 [Footnote 187: To state another reason showing that the first and second
12257 chapters of Prajapati's instruction refer to the same subject.]

12258
12259 [Footnote 188: I.e. of whom cognition is not a mere attribute.]

12260
12261 [Footnote 189: Although in reality there is no such thing as an
12262 individual soul.]

12263
12264 [Footnote 190: Nanu jivabrahma/n/or aikyam na kvapi sutrakaro mukhato
12265 vadati kim tu sarvatra bhedam eva, ato naikyam ish/t/am tatraha
12266 pratipadyam tv iti.]

12267
12268 [Footnote 191: This last sentence is directed against the possible
12269 objection that '/s/abda,' which the Sutra brings forward as an argument
12270 in favour of the highest Lord being meant, has the sense of 'sentence'
12271 (vakya), and is therefore of less force than li@nga, i.e. indicative or
12272 inferential mark which is represented in our passage by the
12273 a@ngush/th/amatrata of the purusha, and favours the jiva interpretation.
12274 /S/abda, the text remarks, here means /s/ruti, i.e. direct enunciation,
12275 and /s/ruti ranks, as a means of proof, higher than li@nga.]

12276
12277 [Footnote 192: I.e. men belonging to the three upper castes.]

12278
12279 [Footnote 193: The first reason excludes animals, gods, and /ri/shis.
12280 Gods cannot themselves perform sacrifices, the essential feature of
12281 which is the parting, on the part of the sacrificer, with an offering

12282 meant for the gods. /Ri/shis cannot perform sacrifices in the course of
12283 whose performance the ancestral /ri/shis of the sacrificer are
12284 invoked.--The second reason excludes those men whose only desire is
12285 emancipation and who therefore do not care for the perishable fruits of
12286 sacrifices.--The third and fourth reasons exclude the /S/udras who are
12287 indirectly disqualified for /s/astric works because the Veda in
12288 different places gives rules for the three higher castes only, and for
12289 whom the ceremony of the upanayana--indispensable for all who wish to
12290 study the Veda--is not prescribed.--Cp. Purva Mima/m/sa Sutras VI, 1.]

12291
12292 [Footnote 194: The reference is to Purva Mima/m/sa Sutras I, 1, 5 (not
12293 to I, 2, 21, as stated in Muir's Sanskrit Texts, III, p. 69).]

12294
12295 [Footnote 195: In which classes of beings all the gods are comprised.]

12296
12297 [Footnote 196: Which shows that together with the non-eternality of the
12298 thing denoted there goes the non-eternality of the denoting word.]

12299
12300 [Footnote 197: Ak/ri/ti, best translated by [Greek: eidos].]

12301
12302 [Footnote 198: The purvapakshin, i.e. here the grammarian maintains, for
12303 the reasons specified further on, that there exists in the case of words
12304 a supersensuous entity called spho/t/a which is manifested by the
12305 letters of the word, and, if apprehended by the mind, itself manifests
12306 the sense of the word. The term spho/t/a may, according as it is viewed
12307 in either of these lights, be explained as the manifestor or that which
12308 is manifested.--The spho/t/a is a grammatical fiction, the word in so
12309 far as it is apprehended by us as a whole. That we cannot identify it
12310 with the 'notion' (as Deussen seems inclined to do, p. 80) follows from
12311 its being distinctly called va/k/aka or abhidhayaka, and its being
12312 represented as that which causes the conception of the sense of a word
12313 (arthadhihetu).]

12314
12315 [Footnote 199: For that each letter by itself expresses the sense is not
12316 observed; and if it did so, the other letters of the word would have to
12317 be declared useless.]

12318
12319 [Footnote 200: In order to enable us to apprehend the sense from the
12320 word, there is required the actual consciousness of the last letter plus
12321 the impressions of the preceding letters; just as smoke enables us to
12322 infer the existence of fire only if we are actually conscious of the
12323 smoke. But that actual consciousness does not take place because the
12324 impressions are not objects of perceptive consciousness.]

12325
12326 [Footnote 201: 'How should it be so?' i.e. it cannot be so; and on that
12327 account the differences apprehended do not belong to the letters
12328 themselves, but to the external conditions mentioned above.]

12329
12330 [Footnote 202: With 'or else' begins the exposition of the finally
12331 accepted theory as to the cause why the same letters are apprehended as
12332 different. Hitherto the cause had been found in the variety of the
12333 upadhis of the letters. Now a new distinction is made between
12334 articulated letters and non-articulated tone.]

12335
12336 [Footnote 203: I.e. it is not directly one idea, for it has for its
12337 object more than one letter; but it may be called one in a secondary
12338 sense because it is based on the determinative knowledge that the
12339 letters, although more than one, express one sense only.]

12340
12341 [Footnote 204: Which circumstance proves that exalted knowledge
12342 appertains not only to Hira/n/yagarbha, but to many beings.]

12343
12344 [Footnote 205: Viz. naraka, the commentaries say.]

12345
12346 [Footnote 206: Asmin kalpe sarvesham pra/n/inam dahapakapraka/s/akari
12347 yozyam agnir d/ris/yate sozyam agni/h/ purvasmin kalpe manushya/h/ san
12348 devatvapadaprapaka/m/ karmanush/th/ayasmin kalpa etaj janma labdhavan
12349 ata/h/ purvasmin kalpe sa manushyo bhavini/m/ sa/m/j/n/am a/sri/tyagnir
12350 iti vyapadi/s/yate.--Saya/n/a on the quoted passage.]

12351
12352 [Footnote 207: As, for instance, 'So long as Aditya rises in the east
12353 and sets in the west' (Ch. Up. III, 6, 4).]
12354
12355 [Footnote 208: Whence it follows that the devas are not personal beings,
12356 and therefore not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.]
12357
12358 [Footnote 209: Yama, for instance, being ordinarily represented as a
12359 person with a staff in his hand, Varu/n/a with a noose, Indra with a
12360 thunderbolt, &c. &c.]
12361
12362 [Footnote 210: On the proper function of arthavada and mantra according
12363 to the Mima/m/sa, cp. Arthasa/m/graha, Introduction.]
12364
12365 [Footnote 211: See above, p. 197.]
12366
12367 [Footnote 212: Which can be offered by kshattriyas only.]
12368
12369 [Footnote 213: /S/rautali@ngenanumanabadha/m/ dar/s/ayitva smartenapi
12370 tadbaddha/m/ dar/s/ayati smartam iti. Ki/m/ atra brahma am/ri/tam ki/m/
12371 svid vedyam anuttamam, /k/intayet tatra vai gatva gandharvo mam
12372 ap/rikkh/ata, Vi/s/vavasus tato rajan vedantaj/n/anakovidā iti
12373 mokshadharme janakayaj/n/avalkyasa/m/vadat prahladajagarasa/m/vada/k/
12374 /k/oktanumanasiddhir ity artha/h/.]
12375
12376 [Footnote 214: As opposed to an action to be accomplished.]
12377
12378 [Footnote 215: Of this nature is, for instance, the arthavada, 'Fire is
12379 a remedy for cold.']
12380
12381 [Footnote 216: Of this nature is, for instance, the passage 'the
12382 sacrificial post is the sun' (i.e. possesses the qualities of the sun,
12383 luminousness, &c.; a statement contradicted by perception).]
12384
12385 [Footnote 217: And therefore to suppose that a divinity is nothing but a
12386 certain word forming part of a mantra.]
12387
12388 [Footnote 218: The rajasuya-sacrifice is to be offered by a prince who
12389 wishes to become the ruler of the whole earth.]
12390
12391 [Footnote 219: In one of whose stages the being desirous of final
12392 emancipation becomes a deva.]
12393
12394 [Footnote 220: The commentaries explain 'therefore' by 'on account of
12395 his being devoid of the three sacred fires.' This explanation does not,
12396 however, agree with the context of the Taitt. Sa/m/h.]
12397
12398 [Footnote 221: The /S/udra not having acquired a knowledge of Vedic
12399 matters in the legitimate way, i.e. through the study of the Veda under
12400 the guidance of a guru, is unfit for sacrifices as well as for vidya.]
12401
12402 [Footnote 222: The li@nga contained in the word '/S/udra' has no proving
12403 power as it occurs in an arthavada-passage which has no authority if not
12404 connected with a corresponding injunctive passage. In our case the
12405 li@nga in the arthavada-passage is even directly contradicted by those
12406 injunctions which militate against the /S/udras' qualification for Vedic
12407 matters.]
12408
12409 [Footnote 223: Ha/m/savakyad atmanoznadara/m/ /s/rutva jana/s/rute/h/
12410 /s/ug utpannety etad eva katha/m/ gamyate yenasau /s/udra/s/abdena
12411 sa/k/yate tatraha sp/ris/yate /k/eti. Ananda Giri.]
12412
12413 [Footnote 224: I translate this passage as I find it in all MSS. of
12414 /S/a@nkara consulted by me (noting, however, that some MSS. read
12415 /k/aitrarathinamaika/h/). Ananda Giri expressly explains tasmad by
12416 /k/aitrarathad ity artha/h/.--The text of the Ta/nd/ya Br. runs:
12417 tasma/k/ /k/aitrarathinam eka/h/ kshatrapatir gayate, and the commentary
12418 explains: tasmad kara/n/ad adyapi /k/itrava/ms/otpannana/m/ madhye eka
12419 eva raja kshatrapatir baladhipatir bhavati.--Grammar does not authorise

12420 the form /k/ahraratha used in the Sutra.]

12421

12422 [Footnote 225: The king A/s/vapati receives some Brahma/n/as as his

12423 pupils without insisting on the upanayana. This express statement of the

12424 upanayana having been omitted in a certain case shows it to be the

12425 general rule.]

12426

12427 [Footnote 226: As the words stand in the original they might be

12428 translated as follows (and are so translated by the purvapakshin),

12429 'Whatever there is, the whole world trembles in the pra/n/a, there goes

12430 forth (from it) a great terror, viz. the raised thunderbolt.']

12431

12432 [Footnote 227: The stress lies here on the 'as if.' which intimate that

12433 the Self does not really think or move.]

12434

12435

12436

12437

12438 FOURTH PADA.

12439

12440 REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

12441

12442

12443 1. If it be said that some (mention) that which is based on inference

12444 (i.e. the pradhana); we deny this, because (the term alluded to) refers

12445 to what is contained in the simile of the body (i.e. the body itself);

12446 and (that the text) shows.

12447

12448 In the preceding part of this work--as whose topic there has been set

12449 forth an enquiry into Brahman--we have at first defined Brahman (I, 1,

12450 2); we have thereupon refuted the objection that that definition applies

12451 to the pradhana also, by showing that there is no scriptural authority

12452 for the latter (I, 1, 5), and we have shown in detail that the common

12453 purport of all Vedanta-texts is to set forth the doctrine that Brahman,

12454 and not the pradhana, is the cause of the world. Here, however, the

12455 Sa@nkhyas again raises an objection which he considers not to have been

12456 finally disposed of.

12457

12458 It has not, he says, been satisfactorily proved that there is no

12459 scriptural authority for the pradhana; for some /s/akhas contain

12460 expressions which seem to convey the idea of the pradhana. From this it

12461 follows that Kapila and other supreme /ri/shis maintain the doctrine of

12462 the pradhana being the general cause only because it is based on the

12463 Veda.--As long therefore as it has not been proved that those passages

12464 to which the Sa@nkhyas refer have a different meaning (i.e. do not

12465 allude to the pradhana), all our previous argumentation as to the

12466 omniscient Brahman being the cause of the world must be considered as

12467 unsettled. We therefore now begin a new chapter which aims at proving

12468 that those passages actually have a different meaning.

12469

12470 The Sa@nkhyas maintain that that also which is based on inference, i.e.

12471 the pradhana, is perceived in the text of some /s/akhas. We read, for

12472 instance, they say, in the Ka/th/aka (I, 3, 11), 'Beyond the Great there

12473 is the Undeveloped, beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person.' There

12474 we recognise, named by the same names and enumerated in the same order,

12475 the three entities with which we are acquainted from the

12476 Sa@nkhyas-sm/ri/ti, viz. the great principle, the Undeveloped (the

12477 pradhana), and the soul[228]. That by the Undeveloped is meant the

12478 pradhana is to be concluded from the common use of Sm/ri/ti and from the

12479 etymological interpretation of which the word admits, the pradhana being

12480 called undeveloped because it is devoid of sound and other qualities. It

12481 cannot therefore be asserted that there is no scriptural authority for

12482 the pradhana. And this pradhana vouched for by Scripture we declare to

12483 be the cause of the world, on the ground of Scripture, Sm/ri/ti, and

12484 ratiocination.

12485

12486 Your reasoning, we reply, is not valid. The passage from the Ka/th/aka

12487 quoted by you intimates by no means the existence of that great

12488 principle and that Undeveloped which are known from the

12489 Sa@nkhyas, i.e. an independent general cause consisting of three
12490 constituting elements; we merely recognise the word 'Undeveloped,' which
12491 does not denote any particular determined thing, but may--owing to its
12492 etymological meaning, 'that which is not developed, not
12493 manifest'--denote anything subtle and difficult to distinguish. The
12494 Sa@nkhyas indeed give to the word a settled meaning, as they apply it to
12495 the pradhana; but then that meaning is valid for their system only, and
12496 has no force in the determination of the sense of the Veda. Nor does
12497 mere equality of position prove equality of being, unless the latter be
12498 recognised independently. None but a fool would think a cow to be a
12499 horse because he sees it tied in the usual place of a horse. We,
12500 moreover, conclude, on the strength of the general subject-matter, that
12501 the passage does not refer to the pradhana the fiction of the Sa@nkhyas,
12502 'on account of there being referred to that which is contained in the
12503 simile of the body.' This means that the body which is mentioned in the
12504 simile of the chariot is here referred to as the Undeveloped. We infer
12505 this from the general subject-matter of the passage and from the
12506 circumstance of nothing else remaining.--The immediately preceding part
12507 of the chapter exhibits the simile in which the Self, the body, and so
12508 on, are compared to the lord of a chariot, a chariot, &c., 'Know the
12509 Self to be the lord of the chariot, the body to be the chariot, the
12510 intellect the charioteer, and the mind the reins. The senses they call
12511 the horses, the objects of the senses their roads. When he (the Self) is
12512 in union with the body, the senses and the mind, then wise people call
12513 him the enjoyer.' The text then goes on to say that he whose senses, &c.
12514 are not well controlled enters into sa/m/sara, while he who has them
12515 under control reaches the end of the journey, the highest place of
12516 Vish/n/u. The question then arises: What is the end of the journey, the
12517 highest place of Vish/n/u? Whereupon the text explains that the highest
12518 Self which is higher than the senses, &c., spoken of is the end of the
12519 journey, the highest place of Vish/n/u. 'Beyond the senses there are the
12520 objects, beyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the mind there is
12521 the intellect, the great Self is beyond the intellect. Beyond the great
12522 there is the Undeveloped, beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person.
12523 Beyond the Person there is nothing--this is the goal, the highest Road.'
12524 In this passage we recognise the senses, &c. which in the preceding
12525 simile had been compared to horses and so on, and we thus avoid the
12526 mistake of abandoning the matter in hand and taking up a new subject.
12527 The senses, the intellect, and the mind are referred to in both passages
12528 under the same names. The objects (in the second passage) are the
12529 objects which are (in the former passage) designated as the roads of the
12530 senses; that the objects are beyond (higher than) the senses is known
12531 from the scriptural passage representing the senses as grahas, i.e.
12532 graspers, and the objects as atigrahas, i.e. superior to the grahas
12533 (B/ri/ Up. III, 2). The mind (manas) again is superior to the objects,
12534 because the relation of the senses and their objects is based on the
12535 mind. The intellect (buddhi) is higher than the mind, since the objects
12536 of enjoyment are conveyed to the soul by means of the intellect. Higher
12537 than the intellect is the great Self which was represented as the lord
12538 of the chariot in the passage, 'Know the Self to be the lord of the
12539 chariot.' That the same Self is referred to in both passages is manifest
12540 from the repeated use of the word 'Self;' that the Self is superior to
12541 intelligence is owing to the circumstance that the enjoyer is naturally
12542 superior to the instrument of enjoyment. The Self is appropriately
12543 called great as it is the master.--Or else the phrase 'the great Self'
12544 may here denote the intellect of the first-born Hira/n/yagarbha which is
12545 the basis of all intellects; in accordance with the following
12546 Sm/ri/ti-passage it is called mind, the great one; reflection, Brahman;
12547 the stronghold, intellect; enunciation, the Lord; highest knowledge,
12548 consciousness; thought, remembrance[229], and likewise with the
12549 following scriptural passage, 'He (Hira/n/ya-garbha) who first creates
12550 Brahman and delivers the Vedas to him' (/S/vet. Up. VI, 18). The
12551 intellect, which in the former passage had been referred to under its
12552 common name buddhi, is here mentioned separately, since it may be
12553 represented as superior to our human intellects. On this latter
12554 explanation of the term 'the great Self,' we must assume that the
12555 personal Self which in the simile had been compared to the charioteer
12556 is, in the latter passage, included in the highest person (mentioned

12558 last); to which there is no objection, since in reality the personal
12559 Self and the highest Self are identical.--Thus there remains now the
12560 body only which had before been compared to a chariot. We therefore
12561 conclude that the text after having enumerated the senses and all the
12562 other things mentioned before, in order to point out the highest place,
12563 points out by means of the one remaining word, viz. avyakta, the only
12564 thing remaining out of those which had been mentioned before, viz. the
12565 body. The entire passage aims at conveying the knowledge of the unity of
12566 the inward Self and Brahman, by describing the soul's passing through
12567 sa/m/sara and release under the form of a simile in which the body, &c.
12568 of the soul--which is affected by Nescience and therefore joined to a
12569 body, senses, mind, intellect, objects, sensations, &c.--are compared to
12570 a chariot, and so on.--In accordance with this the subsequent verse
12571 states the difficulty of knowing the highest place of Vish/n/u ('the
12572 Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, but it is seen by
12573 subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect'), and after that
12574 the next verse declares Yoga to be the means of attaining that
12575 cognition. 'A wise man should keep down speech in the mind, he should
12576 keep down the mind in intelligence, intelligence he should keep down
12577 within the great Self, and he should keep that within the quiet
12578 Self.'--That means: The wise man should restrain the activity of the
12579 outer organs such as speech, &c., and abide within the mind only; he
12580 should further restrain the mind which is intent on doubtful external
12581 objects within intelligence, whose characteristic mark is decision,
12582 recognising that indecision is evil; he should further restrain
12583 intelligence within the great Self, i.e. the individual soul or else the
12584 fundamental intellect; he should finally fix the great Self on the calm
12585 Self, i.e. the highest Self, the highest goal, of which the whole
12586 chapter treats.--If we in this manner review the general context, we
12587 perceive that there is no room for the pradhana imagined by the
12588 Sankhyas.

12589
12590 2. But the subtle (body is meant by the term avyakta) on account of its
12591 capability (of being so designated).

12592
12593 It has been asserted, under the preceding Sutra, that the term 'the
12594 Undeveloped' signifies, on account of the general subject-matter and
12595 because the body only remains, the body and not the pradhana of the
12596 Sa@nkhyas.--But here the following doubt arises: How can the word
12597 'undeveloped' appropriately denote the body which, as a gross and
12598 clearly appearing thing, should rather be called vyakta, i.e. that which
12599 is developed or manifested?

12600
12601 To this doubt the Sutra replies that what the term avyakta denotes is
12602 the subtle causal body. Anything subtle may be spoken of as Undeveloped.
12603 The gross body indeed cannot directly be termed 'undeveloped,' but the
12604 subtle parts of the elements from which the gross body originates may be
12605 called so, and that the term denoting the causal substance is applied to
12606 the effect also is a matter of common occurrence; compare, for instance,
12607 the phrase 'mix the Soma with cows, i.e. milk' (/Ri/g-veda. S. IX, 46,
12608 4). Another scriptural passage also--'now all this was then undeveloped'
12609 (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7)--shows that this, i.e. this developed world with
12610 its distinction of names and forms, is capable of being termed
12611 undeveloped in so far as in a former condition it was in a merely
12612 seminal or potential state, devoid of the later evolved distinctions of
12613 name and form.

12614
12615 3. (Such a previous seminal condition of the world may be admitted) on
12616 account of its dependency on him (the Lord); (for such an admission is)
12617 according to reason.

12618
12619 Here a new objection is raised.--If, the opponent says, in order to
12620 prove the possibility of the body being called undeveloped you admit
12621 that this world in its antecedent seminal condition before either names
12622 or forms are evolved can be called undeveloped, you virtually concede
12623 the doctrine that the pradhana is the cause of the world. For we
12624 Sa@nkhyas understand by the term pradhana nothing but that antecedent
12625 condition of the world.

12626

12627 Things lie differently, we rejoin. If we admitted some antecedent state
12628 of the world as the independent cause of the actual world, we should
12629 indeed implicitly, admit the pradhana doctrine. What we admit is,
12630 however, only a previous state dependent on the highest Lord, not an
12631 independent state. A previous stage of the world such as the one assumed
12632 by us must necessarily be admitted, since it is according to sense and
12633 reason. For without it the highest Lord could not be conceived as
12634 creator, as he could not become active if he were destitute of the
12635 potentiality of action. The existence of such a causal potentiality
12636 renders it moreover possible that the released souls should not enter on
12637 new courses of existence, as it is destroyed by perfect knowledge. For
12638 that causal potentiality is of the nature of Nescience; it is rightly
12639 denoted by the term 'undeveloped;' it has the highest Lord for its
12640 substratum; it is of the nature of an illusion; it is a universal sleep
12641 in which are lying the transmigrating souls destitute for the time of
12642 the consciousness of their individual character.[230] This undeveloped
12643 principle is sometimes denoted by the term aka/s/a, ether; so, for
12644 instance, in the passage, 'In that Imperishable then, O Gargi, the ether
12645 is woven like warp and woof' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 11). Sometimes, again,
12646 it is denoted by the term akshara, the Imperishable; so, for instance
12647 (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2), 'Higher, than the high Imperishable.' Sometimes it
12648 is spoken of as Maya, illusion; so, for instance (/S/ve. Up. IV, 10),
12649 'Know then Prak/ri/ti is Maya, and the great Lord he who is affected
12650 with Maya.' For Maya is properly called undeveloped or non-manifested
12651 since it cannot be defined either as that which is or that which is
12652 not.--The statement of the Ka/th/aka that 'the Undeveloped is beyond the
12653 Great one' is based on the fact of the Great one originating from the
12654 Undeveloped, if the Great one be the intellect of Hira/n/yagarbha. If,
12655 on the other hand, we understand by the Great one the individual soul,
12656 the statement is founded on the fact of the existence of the individual
12657 soul depending on the Undeveloped, i.e. Nescience. For the continued
12658 existence of the individual soul as such is altogether owing to the
12659 relation in which it stands to Nescience. The quality of being beyond
12660 the Great one which in the first place belongs to the Undeveloped, i.e.
12661 Nescience, is attributed to the body which is the product of Nescience,
12662 the cause and the effect being considered as identical. Although the
12663 senses, &c. are no less products of Nescience, the term 'the
12664 Undeveloped' here refers to the body only, the senses, &c. having
12665 already been specially mentioned by their individual names, and the body
12666 alone being left.--Other interpreters of the two last Sutras give a
12667 somewhat different explanation[231].--There are, they say, two kinds of
12668 body, the gross one and the subtle one. The gross body is the one which
12669 is perceived; the nature of the subtle one will be explained later on.
12670 (Ved. Su. III, 1, 1.) Both these bodies together were in the simile
12671 compared to the chariot; but here (in the passage under discussion) only
12672 the subtle body is referred to as the Undeveloped, since the subtle body
12673 only is capable of being denoted by that term. And as the soul's passing
12674 through bondage and release depends on the subtle body, the latter is
12675 said to be beyond the soul, like the things (arthavat), i.e. just as the
12676 objects are said to be beyond the senses because the activity of the
12677 latter depends on the objects.--But how--we ask interpreters--is it
12678 possible that the word 'Undeveloped' should refer to the subtle body
12679 only, while, according to your opinion, both bodies had in the simile
12680 been represented as a chariot, and so equally constitute part of the
12681 topic of the chapter, and equally remain (to be mentioned in the passage
12682 under discussion)?--If you should rejoin that you are authorised to
12683 settle the meaning of what the text actually mentions, but not to find
12684 fault with what is not mentioned, and that the word avyakta which occurs
12685 in the text can denote only the subtle body, but not the gross body
12686 which is vyakta, i.e. developed or manifest; we invalidate this
12687 rejoinder by remarking that the determination of the sense depends on
12688 the circumstance of the passages interpreted constituting a syntactical
12689 whole. For if the earlier and the later passage do not form a whole they
12690 convey no sense, since that involves the abandonment of the subject
12691 started and the taking up of a new subject. But syntactical unity cannot
12692 be established unless it be on the ground of there being a want of a
12693 complementary part of speech or sentence. If you therefore construe the
12694 connexion of the passages without having regard to the fact that the
12695 latter passage demands as its complement that both bodies (which had

12696 been spoken of in the former passage) should be understood as referred
12697 to, you destroy all syntactical unity and so incapacitate yourselves
12698 from arriving at the true meaning of the text. Nor must you think that
12699 the second passage occupies itself with the subtle body only, for that
12700 reason that the latter is not easily distinguished from the Self, while
12701 the gross body is easily so distinguished on account of its readily
12702 perceived loathsomeness. For the passage does not by any means refer to
12703 such a distinction--as we conclude from the circumstance of there being
12704 no verb enjoining it--but has for its only subject the highest place of
12705 Vish/n/u, which had been mentioned immediately before. For after having
12706 enumerated a series of things in which the subsequent one is always
12707 superior to the one preceding it, it concludes by saying that nothing is
12708 beyond the Person.--We might, however, accept the interpretation just
12709 discussed without damaging our general argumentation; for whichever
12710 explanation we receive, so much remains clear that the Ka/th/aka passage
12711 does not refer to the pradhana.

12712
12713 4. And (the pradhana cannot be meant) because there is no statement as
12714 to (the avyakta) being something to be cognised.

12715
12716 The Sa@nkhyas, moreover, represent the pradhana as something to be
12717 cognised in so far as they say that from the knowledge of the difference
12718 of the constitutive elements of the pradhana and of the soul there
12719 results the desired isolation of the soul. For without a knowledge of
12720 the nature of those constitutive elements it is impossible to cognise
12721 the difference of the soul from them. And somewhere they teach that the
12722 pradhana is to be cognised by him who wishes to attain special
12723 powers.--Now in the passage under discussion the avyakta is not
12724 mentioned as an object of knowledge; we there meet with the mere word
12725 avyakta, and there is no sentence intimating that the avyakta is to be
12726 known or meditated upon. And it is impossible to maintain that a
12727 knowledge of things which (knowledge) is not taught in the text is of
12728 any advantage to man.--For this reason also we maintain that the word
12729 avyakta cannot denote the pradhana.--Our interpretation, on the other
12730 hand, is unobjectionable, since according to it the passage mentions the
12731 body (not as an object of knowledge, but merely) for the purpose of
12732 throwing light on the highest place of Vish/n/u, in continuation of the
12733 simile in which the body had been compared to a chariot.

12734
12735 5. And if you maintain that the text does speak (of the pradhana as an
12736 object of knowledge) we deny that; for the intelligent (highest) Self is
12737 meant, on account of the general subject-matter.

12738
12739 Here the Sa@nkhyas raises a new objection, and maintains that the
12740 averment made in the last Sutra is not proved, since the text later on
12741 speaks of the pradhana--which had been referred to as the
12742 Undeveloped--as an object of knowledge. 'He who has perceived that which
12743 is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay, without
12744 taste, eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond
12745 the great and unchangeable, is freed from the jaws of death' (Ka. Up.
12746 II, 3, 15). For here the text speaks of the pradhana, which is beyond
12747 the great, describing it as possessing the same qualities which the
12748 Sa@nkhyas-sm/ri/ti ascribes to it, and designating it as the object of
12749 perception. Hence we conclude that the pradhana is denoted by the term
12750 avyakta.

12751
12752 To this we reply that the passage last quoted does represent as the
12753 object of perception not the pradhana but the intelligent, i.e. the
12754 highest Self. We conclude this from the general subject-matter. For that
12755 the highest Self continues to form the subject-matter is clear from the
12756 following reasons. In the first place, it is referred to in the passage,
12757 'Beyond the person there is nothing, this is the goal, the highest
12758 Road;' it has further to be supplied as the object of knowledge in the
12759 passage, 'The Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth,'
12760 because it is there spoken of as difficult to know; after that the
12761 restraint of passion, &c. is enjoined as conducive to its cognition, in
12762 the passage, 'A wise man should keep down speech within the mind;' and,
12763 finally, release from the jaws of death is declared to be the fruit of
12764 its knowledge. The Sa@nkhyas, on the other hand, do not suppose that a

12765 man is freed from the jaws of death merely by perceiving the pradhana,
12766 but connect that result rather with the cognition of the intelligent
12767 Self.--The highest Self is, moreover, spoken of in all Vedanta-texts as
12768 possessing just those qualities which are mentioned in the passage
12769 quoted above, viz. absence of sound, and the like. Hence it follows,
12770 that the pradhana is in the text neither spoken of as the object of
12771 knowledge nor denoted by the term avyakta.

12772
12773 6. And there is question and explanation relative to three things only
12774 (not to the pradhana).

12775
12776 To the same conclusion we are led by the consideration of the
12777 circumstance that the Ka/th/avalli-upanishad brings forward, as subjects
12778 of discussion, only three things, viz. the fire sacrifice, the
12779 individual soul, and the highest Self. These three things only Yama
12780 explains, bestowing thereby the boons he had granted, and to them only
12781 the questions of Na/k/iketas refer. Nothing else is mentioned or
12782 enquired about. The question relative to the fire sacrifice is contained
12783 in the passage (Ka. Up. I, 1, 13), 'Thou knowest, O Death, the fire
12784 sacrifice which leads us to Heaven; tell it to me, who am full of
12785 faith.' The question as to the individual soul is contained in I, 1, 20,
12786 'There is that doubt when a man is dead, some saying, he is; others, he
12787 is not. This I should like to know, taught by thee; this is the third of
12788 my boons.' And the question about the highest Self is asked in the
12789 passage (I, 2, 14), 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as
12790 neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future, tell me
12791 that.'--The corresponding answers are given in I, 1, 15, 'Yama then told
12792 him that fire sacrifice, the beginning of all the worlds, and what
12793 bricks are required for the altar, and how many;' in the passage met
12794 with considerably later on (II, 5, 6; 7), 'Well then, O Gautama, I shall
12795 tell thee this mystery, the old Brahman and what happens to the Self
12796 after reaching death. Some enter the womb in order to have a body as
12797 organic beings, others go into inorganic matter according to their work
12798 and according to their knowledge;' and in the passage (I, 2, 18), 'The
12799 knowing Self is not born nor does it die,' &c.; which latter passage
12800 dilates at length on the highest Self. But there is no question relative
12801 to the pradhana, and hence no opportunity for any remarks on it.

12802
12803 Here the Sa@nkhyas advance a new objection. Is, he asks, the question
12804 relative to the Self which is asked in the passage, 'There is that doubt
12805 when a man is dead,' &c., again resumed in the passage, 'That which thou
12806 seest as neither this nor that,' &c, or does the latter passage raise a
12807 distinct new question? If the former, the two questions about the Self
12808 coalesce into one, and there are therefore altogether two questions
12809 only, one relative to the fire sacrifice, the other relative to the
12810 Self. In that case the Sutra has no right to speak of questions and
12811 explanations relating to three subjects.--If the latter, you do not
12812 consider it a mistake to assume a question in excess of the number of
12813 boons granted, and can therefore not object to us if we assume an
12814 explanation about the pradhana in excess of the number of questions
12815 asked.

12816
12817 To this we make the following reply.--We by no means assume a question
12818 in excess of the number of boons granted, being prevented from doing so
12819 by the influence of the opening part of that syntactical whole which
12820 constitutes the Ka/th/avalli-upanishad. The Upanishad starts with the
12821 topic of the boons granted by Yama, and all the following part of the
12822 Upanishad--which is thrown into the form of a colloquy of Yama and
12823 Na/k/iketas--carries on that topic up to the very end. Yama grants to
12824 Na/k/iketas, who had been sent by his father, three boons. For his first
12825 boon Na/k/iketas chooses kindness on the part of his father towards him,
12826 for his second boon the knowledge of the fire sacrifice, for his third
12827 boon the knowledge of the Self. That the knowledge of the Self is the
12828 third boon appears from the indication contained in the passage (I, 1,
12829 20), 'There is that doubt--; this is the third of my boons.'--If we
12830 therefore supposed that the passage, 'That which thou seest as neither
12831 this nor that,' &c., raises a new question, we should thereby assume a
12832 question in excess of the number of boons granted, and thus destroy the
12833 connexion of the entire Upanishad.--But--the Sa@nkhyas will perhaps

interpose--it must needs be admitted that the passage last quoted does raise a new question, because the subject enquired about is a new one. For the former question refers to the individual soul, as we conclude from the doubt expressed in the words, 'There is that doubt when a man is dead--some saying, he is; others, he is not.' Now this individual soul, as having definite attributes, &c., cannot constitute the object of a question expressed in such terms as, 'This which thou seest as neither this nor that,' &c.; the highest Self, on the other hand, may be enquired about in such terms, since it is above all attributes. The appearance of the two questions is, moreover, seen to differ; for the former question refers to existence and non-existence, while the latter is concerned with an entity raised above all definite attributes, &c. Hence we conclude that the latter question, in which the former one cannot be recognised, is a separate question, and does not merely resume the subject of the former one.--All this argumentation is not valid, we reply, since we maintain the unity of the highest Self and the individual Self. If the individual Self were different from the highest Self, we should have to declare that the two questions are separate independent questions, but the two are not really different, as we know from other scriptural passages, such as 'Thou art that.' And in the Upanishad under discussion also the answer to the question, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that,' viz. the passage, 'The knowing Self is not born, it dies not'--which answer is given in the form of a denial of the birth and death of the Self--clearly shows that the embodied Self and the highest Self are non-different. For there is room for a denial of something only when that something is possible, and the possibility of birth and death exists in the embodied Self only, since it is connected with the body, but not in the highest Self.--There is, moreover, another passage conveying the same meaning, viz. II, 4, 4, 'The wise when he knows that that by which he perceives all objects in sleep or in waking, is the great omnipresent Self, grieves no more.' This passage makes the cessation of all grief dependent on the knowledge of the individual Self, in so far as it possesses the qualities of greatness and omnipresence, and thereby declares that the individual Self is not different from the highest Self. For that the cessation of all sorrow is consequent on the knowledge of the highest Self, is a recognised Vedanta tenet.--There is another passage also warning men not to look on the individual Self and the highest Self as different entities, viz. II, 4, 10, 'What is here the same is there; and what is there the same is here. He who sees any difference here goes from death to death.'--The following circumstance, too, is worthy of consideration. When Na/k/iketas has asked the question relating to the existence or non-existence of the soul after death, Yama tries to induce him to choose another boon, tempting him with the offer of various objects of desire. But Na/k/iketas remains firm. Thereupon Death, dwelling on the distinction of the Good and the Pleasant, and the distinction of wisdom and ignorance, praises Na/k/iketas, 'I believe Na/k/iketas to be one who desires knowledge, for even many pleasures did not tear thee away' (I, 2, 4); and later on praises the question asked by Na/k/iketas, 'The wise who, by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind' (I, 2, 12). Now all this means to intimate that the individual Self and the highest Self are non-different. For if Na/k/iketas set aside the question, by asking which he had earned for himself the praise of Yama, and after having received that praise asked a new question, all that praise would have been bestowed on him unduly. Hence it follows that the question implied in I, 2, 14, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that,' merely resumes the topic to which the question in I, 1, 20 had referred.--Nor is there any basis to the objection that the two questions differ in form. The second question, in reality, is concerned with the same distinction as the first. The first enquires about the existence of the soul apart from the body, &c.; the second refers to the circumstance of that soul not being subject to sa/m/sara. For as long as Nescience remains, so long the soul is affected with definite attributes, &c.; but as soon as Nescience comes to an end, the soul is one with the highest Self, as is taught by such scriptural texts as 'Thou art that.' But whether Nescience be active or inactive, no difference is made thereby in the thing itself (viz. the

soul). A man may, in the dark, mistake a piece of rope lying on the ground for a snake, and run away from it, frightened and trembling; thereon another man may tell him, 'Do not be afraid, it is only a rope, not a snake;' and he may then dismiss the fear caused by the imagined snake, and stop running. But all the while the presence and subsequent absence of his erroneous notion, as to the rope being a snake, make no difference whatever in the rope itself. Exactly analogous is the case of the individual soul which is in reality one with the highest soul, although Nescience makes it appear different. Hence the reply contained in the passage, 'It is not born, it dies not,' is also to be considered as furnishing an answer to the question asked in I, 1, 20.--The Sutra is to be understood with reference to the distinction of the individual Self and the highest Self which results from Nescience. Although the question relating to the Self is in reality one only, yet its former part (I, 1, 20) is seen specially to refer to the individual Self, since there a doubt is set forth as to the existence of the soul when, at the time of death, it frees itself from the body, and since the specific marks of the sa/m/sara-state, such as activity, &c. are not denied; while the latter part of the question (I, 2, 14), where the state of being beyond all attributes is spoken of, clearly refers to the highest Self.--For these reasons the Sutra is right in assuming three topics of question and explanation, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self. Those, on the other hand, who assume that the pradhana constitutes a fourth subject discussed in the Upanishad, can point neither to a boon connected with it, nor to a question, nor to an answer. Hence the pradhana hypothesis is clearly inferior to our own.

7. And (the case of the term avyakta) is like that of the term mahat.

While the Sa@nkhyas employ the term 'the Great one,' to denote the first-born entity, which is mere existence[232] (? viz. the intellect), the term has a different meaning in Vedic use. This we see from its being connected with the Self, &c. in such passages as the following, 'The great Self is beyond the Intellect' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 10); 'The great omnipresent Self' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23); 'I know that great person' (/S/ve. Up. III, 8). We thence conclude that the word avyakta also, where it occurs in the Veda, cannot denote the pradhana.--The pradhana is therefore a mere thing of inference, and not vouched for by Scripture.

8. (It cannot be maintained that aja means the pradhana) because no special characteristic is stated; as in the case of the cup.

Here the advocate of the pradhana comes again forward and maintains that the absence of scriptural authority for the pradhana is not yet proved. For, he says, we have the following mantra (/S/ve. Up. IV, 5), 'There is one aja[233], red, white, and black, producing manifold offspring of the same nature. There is one aja who loves her and lies by her; there is another who leaves her after having enjoyed her.'--In this mantra the words 'red,' 'white,' and 'black' denote the three constituent elements of the pradhana. Passion is called red on account of its colouring, i.e. influencing property; Goodness is called white, because it is of the nature of Light; Darkness is called black on account of its covering and obscuring property. The state of equipoise of the three constituent elements, i.e. the pradhana, is denoted by the attributes of its parts, and is therefore called red-white-black. It is further called aja, i.e. unborn, because it is acknowledged to be the fundamental matter out of which everything springs, not a mere effect.--But has not the word aja the settled meaning of she-goat?--True; but the ordinary meaning of the word cannot be accepted in this place, because true knowledge forms the general subject-matter.--That pradhana produces many creatures participating in its three constituent elements. One unborn being loves her and lies by her, i.e. some souls, deluded by ignorance, approach her, and falsely imagining that they experience pleasure or pain, or are in a state of dulness, pass through the course of transmigratory existence. Other souls, again, which have attained to discriminative knowledge, lose their attachment to prak/ri/ti, and leave her after having enjoyed her, i.e. after she has afforded to them enjoyment and release.--On the ground of this passage, as interpreted above, the followers of Kapila claim the authority of Scripture for their pradhana

12972 hypothesis.

12973

12974 To this argumentation we reply, that the quoted mantra by no means
12975 proves the Sa@nkhyā doctrine to be based on Scripture. That mantra,
12976 taken by itself, is not able to give additional strength to any
12977 doctrine. For, by means of some supposition or other, the terms aja, &c.
12978 can be reconciled with any doctrine, and there is no reason for the
12979 special assertion that the Sa@nkhyā doctrine only is meant. The case is
12980 analogous to that of the cup mentioned in the mantra, 'There is a cup
12981 having its mouth below and its bottom above' (B/ri/. Up. II, 2, 3). Just
12982 as it is impossible to decide on the ground of this mantra taken by
12983 itself what special cup is meant--it being possible to ascribe, somehow
12984 or other, the quality of the mouth being turned downward to any cup--so
12985 here also there is no special quality stated, so that it is not possible
12986 to decide from the mantra itself whether the pradhana is meant by the
12987 term aja, or something else.--But in connexion with the mantra about the
12988 cup we have a supplementary passage from which we learn what kind of cup
12989 is meant, 'What is called the cup having its mouth below and its bottom
12990 above is this head.'--Whence, however, can we learn what special being
12991 is meant by the aja of the /S/veta/s/vatara-upanishad?--To this question
12992 the next Sūtra replies.

12993

12994 9. But the (elements) beginning with light (are meant by the term aja);
12995 for some read so in their text.

12996

12997 By the term aja we have to understand the causal matter of the four
12998 classes of beings, which matter has sprung from the highest Lord and
12999 begins with light, i.e. comprises fire, water, and earth.--The word
13000 'but' (in the Sūtra) gives emphasis to the assertion.--This aja is to be
13001 considered as comprising three elementary substances, not as consisting
13002 of three gu/n/as in the Sa@nkhyā sense. We draw this conclusion from the
13003 fact that one /s/akha, after having related how fire, water, and earth
13004 sprang from the highest Lord, assigns to them red colour, and so on.
13005 'The red colour of burning fire (agni) is the colour of the elementary
13006 fire (tejas), its white colour is the colour of water, its black
13007 colour the colour of earth,' &c. Now those three elements--fire, water,
13008 and earth--we recognise in the /S/veta/s/vatara passage, as the words
13009 red, white, and black are common to both passages, and as these words
13010 primarily denote special colours and can be applied to the Sa@nkhyā
13011 gu/n/as in a secondary sense only. That passages whose sense is beyond
13012 doubt are to be used for the interpretation of doubtful passages, is a
13013 generally acknowledged rule. As we therefore find that in the
13014 /S/veta/s/vatara--after the general topic has been started in I, 1, 'The
13015 Brahman-students say, Is Brahman the cause?'--the text, previous to the
13016 passage under discussion, speaks of a power of the highest Lord which
13017 arranges the whole world ('the Sages devoted to meditation and
13018 concentration have seen the power belonging to God himself, hidden in
13019 its own qualities'); and as further that same power is referred to in
13020 two subsequent complementary passages ('Know then, Prak/ri/ti is Maya,
13021 and the great Lord he who is affected with Maya;' 'who being one only
13022 rules over every germ;' IV, 10, 11); it cannot possibly be asserted that
13023 the mantra treating of the aja refers to some independent causal matter
13024 called pradhana. We rather assert, on the ground of the general
13025 subject-matter, that the mantra describes the same divine power referred
13026 to in the other passages, in which names and forms lie unevolved, and
13027 which we assume as the antecedent condition of that state of the world
13028 in which names and forms are evolved. And that divine power is
13029 represented as three-coloured, because its products, viz. fire, water,
13030 and earth, have three distinct colours.--But how can we maintain, on the
13031 ground of fire, water, and earth having three colours, that the causal
13032 matter is appropriately called a three-coloured aja? if we consider, on
13033 the one hand, that the exterior form of the genus aja (i.e. goat) does
13034 not inhere in fire, water, and earth; and, on the other hand, that
13035 Scripture teaches fire, water, and earth to have been produced, so that
13036 the word aja cannot be taken in the sense 'non-produced[234]. '--To this
13037 question the next Sūtra replies.

13038

13039 10. And on account of the statement of the assumption (of a metaphor)
13040 there is nothing contrary to reason (in aja denoting the causal matter);

13041 just as in the case of honey (denoting the sun) and similar cases.

13042
13043 The word aja neither expresses that fire, water, and earth belong to the
13044 goat species, nor is it to be explained as meaning 'unborn;' it rather
13045 expresses an assumption, i.e. it intimates the assumption of the source
13046 of all beings (which source comprises fire, water, and earth), being
13047 compared to a she-goat. For as accidentally some she-goat might be
13048 partly red, partly white, partly black, and might have many young goats
13049 resembling her in colour, and as some he-goat might love her and lie by
13050 her, while some other he-goat might leave her after having enjoyed her;
13051 so the universal causal matter which is tri-coloured, because comprising
13052 fire, water, and earth, produces many inanimate and animate beings
13053 similar to itself, and is enjoyed by the souls fettered by Nescience,
13054 while it is abandoned by those souls which have attained true
13055 knowledge.--Nor must we imagine that the distinction of individual
13056 souls, which is implied in the preceding explanation, involves that
13057 reality of the multiplicity of souls which forms one of the tenets of
13058 other philosophical schools. For the purport of the passage is to
13059 intimate, not the multiplicity of souls, but the distinction of the
13060 states of bondage and release. This latter distinction is explained with
13061 reference to the multiplicity of souls as ordinarily conceived; that
13062 multiplicity, however, depends altogether on limiting adjuncts, and is
13063 the unreal product of wrong knowledge merely; as we know from scriptural
13064 passages such as, 'He is the one God hidden in all beings,
13065 all-pervading, the Self in all beings,' &c.--The words 'like the honey'
13066 (in the Sutra) mean that just as the sun, although not being honey, is
13067 represented as honey (Ch. Up. III, 1), and speech as a cow (B/ri/. Up.
13068 V, 8), and the heavenly world, &c. as the fires (B/ri/. Up. VI, 2, 9),
13069 so here the causal matter, although not being a she-goat, is
13070 metaphorically represented as one. There is therefore nothing contrary
13071 to reason in the circumstance of the term aja being used to denote the
13072 aggregate of fire, water, and earth.

13073
13074 11. (The assertion that there is scriptural authority for the pradhana,
13075 &c. can) also not (be based) on the mention of the number (of the
13076 Sankhya categories), on account of the diversity (of the categories) and
13077 on account of the excess (over the number of those categories).

13078
13079 The attempt to base the Sa@nkhyā doctrine on the mantra speaking of the
13080 aja having failed, the Sa@nkhyā again comes forward and points to
13081 another mantra: 'He in whom the five "five-people" and the ether rest,
13082 him alone I believe to be the Self; I who know believe him to be
13083 Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 17). In this mantra we have one word which
13084 expresses the number five, viz. the five-people, and then another word,
13085 viz. five, which qualifies the former; these two words together
13086 therefore convey the idea of five pentads, i.e. twenty-five. Now as many
13087 beings as the number twenty-five presupposes, just so many categories
13088 the Sankhya system counts. Cp. Sa@nkhyā Karika, 3: 'The fundamental
13089 causal substance (i.e. the pradhana) is not an effect. Seven
13090 (substances), viz. the Great one (Intellect), and so on, are causal
13091 substances as well as effects. Sixteen are effects. The soul is neither
13092 a causal substance nor an effect.' As therefore the number twenty-five,
13093 which occurs in the scriptural passage quoted, clearly refers to the
13094 twenty-five categories taught in the Sa@nkhyā-sm/ri/ti, it follows that
13095 the doctrine of the pradhana, &c. rests on a scriptural basis.

13096
13097 To this reasoning we make the following reply.--It is impossible to base
13098 the assertion that the pradhana, &c. have Scripture in their favour on
13099 the reference to their number which you pretend to find in the text, 'on
13100 account of the diversity of the Sa@nkhyā categories.' The Sa@nkhyā
13101 categories have each their individual difference, and there are no
13102 attributes belonging in common to each pentad on account of which the
13103 number twenty-five could be divided into five times five. For a number
13104 of individually separate things can, in general, not be combined into
13105 smaller groups of two or three, &c. unless there be a special reason for
13106 such combination.--Here the Sa@nkhyā will perhaps rejoin that the
13107 expression five (times) five is used only to denote the number
13108 twenty-five which has five pentads for its constituent parts; just as
13109 the poem says, 'five years and seven Indra did not rain,' meaning only

13110 that there was no rain for twelve years.--But this explanation also is
13111 not tenable. In the first place, it is liable to the objection that it
13112 has recourse to indirect indication.[235] In the second place, the
13113 second 'five' constitutes a compound with the word 'people,' the
13114 Brahma/n/a-accent showing that the two form one word only.[236] To the
13115 same conclusion we are led by another passage also (Taitt. Sa/m/h. I, 6,
13116 2, 2, pa/nk/ana/m/ tva pa/nk/ajananam, &c.) where the two terms
13117 constitute one word, have one accent and one case-termination. The word
13118 thus being a compound there is neither a repetition of the word 'five,'
13119 involving two pentads, nor does the one five qualify the other, as the
13120 mere secondary member of a compound cannot be qualified by another
13121 word.--But as the people are already denoted to be five by the compound
13122 'five-people,' the effect of the other 'five' qualifying the compound
13123 will be that we understand twenty-five people to be meant; just as the
13124 expression 'five five-bundles' (pa/nk/a pa/nk/apulya/h/) conveys the
13125 idea of twenty-five bundles.--The instance is not an analogous one, we
13126 reply. The word 'pa/nk/apuli' denotes a unity (i.e. one bundle made up
13127 of five bundles) and hence when the question arises, 'How many such
13128 bundles are there?' it can be qualified by the word 'five,' indicating
13129 that there are five such bundles. The word pa/nk/ajana/h/, on the other
13130 hand, conveys at once the idea of distinction (i.e. of five distinct
13131 things), so that there is no room at all for a further desire to know
13132 how many people there are, and hence no room for a further
13133 qualification. And if the word 'five' be taken as a qualifying word it
13134 can only qualify the numeral five (in five-people); the objection
13135 against which assumption has already been stated.--For all these reasons
13136 the expression the five five-people cannot denote the twenty-five
13137 categories of the Sa@nkhyas.--This is further not possible 'on account
13138 of the excess.' For on the Sa@nkhya interpretation there would be an
13139 excess over the number twenty-five, owing to the circumstance of the
13140 ether and the Self being mentioned separately. The Self is spoken of as
13141 the abode in which the five five-people rest, the clause 'Him I believe
13142 to be the Self' being connected with the 'in whom' of the antecedent
13143 clause. Now the Self is the intelligent soul of the Sa@nkhyas which is
13144 already included in the twenty-five categories, and which therefore, on
13145 their interpretation of the passage, would here be mentioned once as
13146 constituting the abode and once as what rests in the abode! If, on the
13147 other hand, the soul were supposed not to be compiled in the twenty-five
13148 categories, the Sa@nkhya would thereby abandon his own doctrine of the
13149 categories being twenty-five. The same remarks apply to the separate
13150 mention made of the ether.--How, finally, can the mere circumstance of a
13151 certain number being referred to in the sacred text justify the
13152 assumption that what is meant are the twenty-five Sa@nkhya categories of
13153 which Scripture speaks in no other place? especially if we consider that
13154 the word jana has not the settled meaning of category, and that the
13155 number may be satisfactorily accounted for on another interpretation of
13156 the passage.

13157
13158 How, then, the Sa@nkhya will ask, do you interpret the phrase 'the five
13159 five-people?'--On the ground, we reply, of the rule Pa/n/ini II, 1, 50,
13160 according to which certain compounds formed with numerals are mere
13161 names. The word pa/nk/ajana/h/ thus is not meant to convey the idea of
13162 the number five, but merely to denote certain classes of beings. Hence
13163 the question may present itself, How many such classes are there? and to
13164 this question an answer is given by the added numeral 'five.' There are
13165 certain classes of beings called five-people, and these classes are
13166 five. Analogously we may speak of the seven seven-/ri/shis, where again
13167 the compound denotes a class of beings merely, not their number.--Who
13168 then are those five-people?--To this question the next Sutra replies.

13169
13170 12. (The pa/nk/ajana/h/ are) the breath and so on, (as is seen) from the
13171 complementary passage.

13172
13173 The mantra in which the pa/nk/ajana/h/ are mentioned is followed by
13174 another one in which breath and four other things are mentioned for the
13175 purpose of describing the nature of Brahman. 'They who know the breath
13176 of breath, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of food, the
13177 mind of mind[237].' Hence we conclude, on the ground of proximity, that
13178 the five-people are the beings mentioned in this latter mantra.--But

how, the Sa@nkhya asks, can the word 'people' be applied to the breath, the eye, the ear, and so on?--How, we ask in return, can it be applied to your categories? In both cases the common meaning of the word 'people' has to be disregarded; but in favour of our explanation is the fact that the breath, the eye, and so on, are mentioned in a complementary passage. The breath, the eye, &c. may be denoted by the word 'people' because they are connected with people. Moreover, we find the word 'person,' which means as much as 'people,' applied to the pra/n/as in the passage, 'These are the five persons of Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 13, 6); and another passage runs, 'Breath is father, breath is mother,' &c. (Ch. Up. VII, 15, 1). And, owing to the force of composition, there is no objection to the compound being taken in its settled conventional meaning[238].--But how can the conventional meaning be had recourse to, if there is no previous use of the word in that meaning?--That may be done, we reply, just as in the case of udbhid and similar words[239]. We often infer that a word of unknown meaning refers to some known thing because it is used in connexion with the latter. So, for instance, in the case of the following words: 'He is to sacrifice with the udbhid; he cuts the yupa; he makes the vedi.' Analogously we conclude that the term pa/nk/ajana/h/, which, from the grammatical rule quoted, is known to be a name, and which therefore demands a thing of which it is the name, denotes the breath, the eye, and so on, which are connected with it through their being mentioned in a complementary passage.--Some commentators explain the word pa/nk/ajana/h/ to mean the Gods, the Fathers, the Gandharvas, the Asuras, and the Rakshas. Others, again, think that the four castes together with the Nishadas are meant. Again, some scriptural passage (/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. VIII, 53, 7) speaks of the tribe of 'the five-people,' meaning thereby the created beings in general; and this latter explanation also might be applied to the passage under discussion. The teacher (the Sutrakara), on the other hand, aiming at showing that the passage does not refer to the twenty-five categories of the Sa@nkhya, declares that on the ground of the complementary passage breath, &c. have to be understood.

Well, let it then be granted that the five-people mentioned in the Madhyandina-text are breath, &c. since that text mentions food also (and so makes up the number five). But how shall we interpret the Ka/n/va-text which does not mention food (and thus altogether speaks of four things only)?--To this question the next Sutra replies.

13. In the case of (the text of) some (the Ka/n/vas) where food is not mentioned, (the number five is made full) by the light (mentioned in the preceding mantra).

The Ka/n/va-text, although not mentioning food, makes up the full number five, by the light mentioned in the mantra preceding that in which the five-people are spoken of. That mantra describes the nature of Brahman by saying, 'Him the gods worship as the light of lights.'--If it be asked how it is accounted for that the light mentioned in both texts equally is in one text to be employed for the explanation of the five-people, and not in the other text; we reply that the reason lies in the difference of the requirements. As the Madhyandinas meet in one and the same mantra with breath and four other entities enabling them to interpret the term, 'the five-people,' they are in no need of the light mentioned in another mantra. The Ka/n/vas, on the other hand, cannot do without the light. The case is analogous to that of the Sho/d/a/s/in-cup, which, according to different passages, is either to be offered or not to be offered at the atiratra-sacrifice.

We have proved herewith that Scripture offers no basis for the doctrine of the pradhana. That this doctrine cannot be proved either by Sm/ri/ti or by ratiocination will be shown later on.

14. (Although there is a conflict of the Vedanta-passages with regard to the things created, such as) ether and so on; (there is no such conflict with regard to the Lord) on account of his being represented (in one passage) as described (in other passages), viz. as the cause (of the world).

13248 In the preceding part of the work the right definition of Brahman has
13249 been established; it has been shown that all the Vedanta-texts have
13250 Brahman for their common topic; and it has been proved that there is no
13251 scriptural authority for the doctrine of the pradhana.--But now a new
13252 objection presents itself.

13253
13254 It is not possible--our opponent says--to prove either that Brahman is
13255 the cause of the origin, &c. of the world, or that all Vedanta-texts
13256 refer to Brahman; because we observe that the Vedanta-texts contradict
13257 one another. All the Vedanta-passages which treat of the creation
13258 enumerate its successive steps in different order, and so in reality
13259 speak of different creations. In one place it is said that from the Self
13260 there sprang the ether (Taitt. Up. II, 1); in another place that the
13261 creation began with fire (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); in another place, again,
13262 that the Person created breath and from breath faith (Pr. Up. VI, 4); in
13263 another place, again, that the Self created these worlds, the water
13264 (above the heaven), light, the mortal (earth), and the water (below the
13265 earth) (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 2; 3). There no order is stated at all.
13266 Somewhere else it is said that the creation originated from the
13267 Non-existent. 'In the beginning this was non-existent; from it was born
13268 what exists' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); and, 'In the beginning this was
13269 non-existent; it became existent; it grew' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1). In
13270 another place, again, the doctrine of the Non-existent being the
13271 antecedent of the creation is impugned, and the Existent mentioned in
13272 its stead. 'Others say, in the beginning there was that only which is
13273 not; but how could it be thus, my dear? How could that which is be born
13274 of that which is not?' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1; 2.) And in another place,
13275 again, the development of the world is spoken of as having taken place
13276 spontaneously, 'Now all this was then undeveloped. It became developed
13277 by form and name' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7).--As therefore manifold
13278 discrepancies are observed, and as no option is possible in the case of
13279 an accomplished matter[240], the Vedanta-passages cannot be accepted as
13280 authorities for determining the cause of the world, but we must rather
13281 accept some other cause of the world resting on the authority of
13282 Sm/ri/ti and Reasoning.

13283
13284 To this we make the following reply.--Although the Vedanta-passages may
13285 be conflicting with regard to the order of the things created, such as
13286 ether and so on, they do not conflict with regard to the creator, 'on
13287 account of his being represented as described.' That means: such as the
13288 creator is described in any one Vedanta-passage, viz. as all-knowing,
13289 the Lord of all, the Self of all, without a second, so he is represented
13290 in all other Vedanta-passages also. Let us consider, for instance, the
13291 description of Brahman (given in Taitt. Up. II, 1 ff.). There it is said
13292 at first, 'Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.' Here the word
13293 'knowledge,' and so likewise the statement, made later on, that Brahman
13294 desired (II, 6), intimate that Brahman is of the nature of intelligence.
13295 Further, the text declares[241] that the cause of the world is the
13296 general Lord, by representing it as not dependent on anything else. It
13297 further applies to the cause of the world the term 'Self' (II, 1), and
13298 it represents it as abiding within the series of sheaths beginning with
13299 the gross body; whereby it affirms it to be the internal Self within all
13300 beings. Again--in the passage, 'May I be many, may I grow forth'--it
13301 tells how the Self became many, and thereby declares that the creator is
13302 non-different from the created effects. And--in the passage, 'He created
13303 all this whatever there is'--it represents the creator as the Cause of
13304 the entire world, and thereby declares him to have been without a second
13305 previously to the creation. The same characteristics which in the above
13306 passages are predicated of Brahman, viewed as the Cause of the world, we
13307 find to be predicated of it in other passages also, so, for instance,
13308 'Being only, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a
13309 second. It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire'
13310 (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1; 3), and 'In the beginning all this was Self, one
13311 only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I
13312 send forth worlds?' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1; 2.) The Vedanta-passages
13313 which are concerned with setting forth the cause of the world are thus
13314 in harmony throughout.--On the other hand, there are found conflicting
13315 statements concerning the world, the creation being in some places said
13316 to begin with ether, in other places with fire, and so on. But, in the

13317 first place, it cannot be said that the conflict of statements
13318 concerning the world affects the statements concerning the cause, i.e.
13319 Brahman, in which all the Vedanta-texts are seen to agree--for that
13320 would be an altogether unfounded generalization;--and, in the second
13321 place, the teacher will reconcile later on (II, 3) those conflicting
13322 passages also which refer to the world. And, to consider the matter more
13323 thoroughly, a conflict of statements regarding the world would not even
13324 matter greatly, since the creation of the world and similar topics are
13325 not at all what Scripture wishes to teach. For we neither observe nor
13326 are told by Scripture that the welfare of man depends on those matters
13327 in any way; nor have we the right to assume such a thing; because we
13328 conclude from the introductory and concluding clauses that the passages
13329 about the creation and the like form only subordinate members of
13330 passages treating of Brahman. That all the passages setting forth the
13331 creation and so on subserve the purpose of teaching Brahman, Scripture
13332 itself declares; compare Ch. Up. VI, 8, 4, 'As food too is an offshoot,
13333 seek after its root, viz. water. And as water too is an offshoot, seek
13334 after its root, viz. fire. And as fire too is an offshoot, seek after
13335 its root, viz. the True.' We, moreover, understand that by means of
13336 comparisons such as that of the clay (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4) the creation is
13337 described merely for the purpose of teaching us that the effect is not
13338 really different from the cause. Analogously it is said by those who
13339 know the sacred tradition, 'If creation is represented by means of (the
13340 similes of) clay, iron, sparks, and other things; that is only a means
13341 for making it understood that (in reality) there is no difference
13342 whatever' (Gau/d/ap. Ka. III, 15).--On the other hand, Scripture
13343 expressly states the fruits connected with the knowledge of Brahman, 'He
13344 who knows Brahman obtains the highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'He who knows
13345 the Self overcomes grief' (Ch. Up. VII, 1, 3); 'A man who knows him
13346 passes over death' (/S/ve. Up. III, 8). That fruit is, moreover,
13347 apprehended by intuition (pratyaksha), for as soon as, by means of the
13348 doctrine, 'That art thou,' a man has arrived at the knowledge that the
13349 Self is non-transmigrating, its transmigrating nature vanishes for him.

13350
13351 It remains to dispose of the assertion that passages such as 'Non-being
13352 this was in the beginning' contain conflicting statements about the
13353 nature of the cause. This is done in the next Sutra.

13354
13355 15. On account of the connexion (with passages treating of Brahman, the
13356 passages speaking of the Non-being do not intimate absolute
13357 Non-existence).

13358
13359 The passage 'Non-being indeed was this in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II,
13360 7) does not declare that the cause of the world is the absolutely
13361 Non-existent which is devoid of all Selfhood. For in the preceding
13362 sections of the Upanishad Brahman is distinctly denied to be the
13363 Non-existing, and is defined to be that which is ('He who knows the
13364 Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing. He who knows the
13365 Brahman as existing him we know himself as existing'); it is further, by
13366 means of the series of sheaths, viz. the sheath of food, &c.,
13367 represented as the inner Self of everything. This same Brahman is again
13368 referred to in the clause, 'He wished, may I be many;' is declared to
13369 have originated the entire creation; and is finally referred to in the
13370 clause, 'Therefore the wise call it the true.' Thereupon the text goes
13371 on to say, with reference to what has all along been the topic of
13372 discussion, 'On this there is also this /s/loka, Non-being indeed was
13373 this in the beginning,' &c.--If here the term 'Non-being' denoted the
13374 absolutely Non-existent, the whole context would be broken; for while
13375 ostensibly referring to one matter the passage would in reality treat of
13376 a second altogether different matter. We have therefore to conclude
13377 that, while the term 'Being' ordinarily denotes that which is
13378 differentiated by names and forms, the term 'Non-being' denotes the same
13379 substance previous to its differentiation, i.e. that Brahman is, in a
13380 secondary sense of the word, called Non-being, previously to the
13381 origination of the world. The same interpretation has to be applied to
13382 the passage 'Non-being this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1);
13383 for that passage also is connected with another passage which runs, 'It
13384 became being;' whence it is evident that the 'Non-being' of the former
13385 passage cannot mean absolute Non-existence. And in the passage, 'Others

say, Non-being this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1), the reference to the opinion of 'others' does not mean that the doctrine referred, to (according to which the world was originally absolutely non-existent) is propounded somewhere in the Veda; for option is possible in the case of actions but not in the case of substances. The passage has therefore to be looked upon as a refutation of the tenet of primitive absolute non-existence as fancifully propounded by some teachers of inferior intelligence; a refutation undertaken for the purpose of strengthening the doctrine that this world has sprung from that which is.--The following passage again, 'Now this was then undeveloped,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7), does not by any means assert that the evolution of the world took place without a ruler; as we conclude from the circumstance of its being connected with another passage in which the ruler is represented as entering into the evolved world of effects, 'He entered thither to the very tips of the finger-nails' &c. If it were supposed that the evolution of the world takes place without a ruler, to whom could the subsequent pronoun 'he' refer (in the passage last quoted) which manifestly is to be connected with something previously intimated? And as Scripture declares that the Self, after having entered into the body, is of the nature of intelligence ('when seeing, eye by name; when hearing, ear by name; when thinking, mind by name'), it follows that it is intelligent at the time of its entering also.--We, moreover, must assume that the world was evolved at the beginning of the creation in the same way as it is at present seen to develop itself by names and forms, viz. under the rulership of an intelligent creator; for we have no right to make assumptions contrary to what is at present actually observed. Another scriptural passage also declares that the evolution of the world took place under the superintendence of a ruler, 'Let me now enter these beings with this living Self, and let me then evolve names and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2). The intransitive expression 'It developed itself' (vyakriyata; it became developed) is to be viewed as having reference to the ease with which the real agent, viz. the Lord, brought about that evolution. Analogously it is said, for instance, that 'the cornfield reaps itself' (i.e. is reaped with the greatest ease), although there is the reaper sufficient (to account for the work being done).--Or else we may look on the form vyakriyata as having reference to a necessarily implied agent; as is the case in such phrases as 'the village is being approached' (where we necessarily have to supply 'by Devadatta or somebody else').

16. (He whose work is this is Brahman), because (the 'work') denotes the world.

In the Kaushitaki-brahma/n/a, in the dialogue of Balaki and Ajata/s/atra, we read, 'O Balaki, he who is the maker of those persons, he of whom this is the work, he alone is to be known' (Kau. Up. IV, 19). The question here arises whether what is here inculcated as the object of knowledge is the individual soul or the chief vital air or the highest Self.

The purvapakshin maintains that the vital air is meant. For, in the first place, he says, the clause 'of whom this is the work' points to the activity of motion, and that activity rests on the vital air. In the second place, we meet with the word 'pra/n/a' in a complementary passage ('Then he becomes one with that pra/n/a alone'), and that word is well known to denote the vital air. In the third place, pra/n/a is the maker of all the persons, the person in the sun, the person in the moon, &c., who in the preceding part of the dialogue had been enumerated by Balaki; for that the sun and the other divinities are mere differentiations of pra/n/a we know from another scriptural passage, viz. 'Who is that one god (in whom all the other gods are contained)? Pra/n/a and he is Brahman, and they call him That' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 9).--Or else, the purvapakshin continues, the passage under discussion represents the individual soul as the object of knowledge. For of the soul also it can be said that 'this is the work,' if we understand by 'this' all meritorious and non-meritorious actions; and the soul also, in so far as it is the enjoyer, can be viewed as the maker of the persons enumerated in so far as they are instrumental to the soul's fruition. The

13455 complementary passage, moreover, contains an inferential mark of the
13456 individual soul. For Ajata/s/atru, in order to instruct Balaki about the
13457 'maker of the persons' who had been proposed as the object of knowledge,
13458 calls a sleeping man by various names and convinces Balaki, by the
13459 circumstance that the sleeper does not hear his shouts, that the pra/n/a
13460 and so on are not the enjoyers; he thereupon wakes the sleeping man by
13461 pushing him with his stick, and so makes Balaki comprehend that the
13462 being capable of fruition is the individual soul which is distinct from
13463 the pra/n/a. A subsequent passage also contains an inferential mark of
13464 the individual soul, viz. 'And as the master feeds with his people, nay,
13465 as his people feed on the master, thus does this conscious Self feed
13466 with the other Selfs, thus those Selfs feed on the conscious Self' (Kau.
13467 Up. IV, 20). And as the individual soul is the support of the pra/n/a,
13468 it may itself be called pra/n/a.--We thus conclude that the passage
13469 under discussion refers either to the individual soul or to the chief
13470 vital air; but not to the Lord, of whom it contains no inferential marks
13471 whatever.

13472
13473 To this we make the following reply.--The Lord only can be the maker of
13474 the persons enumerated, on account of the force of the introductory part
13475 of the section. Balaki begins his colloquy with Ajata/s/atru with the
13476 offer, 'Shall I tell you Brahman?' Thereupon he enumerates some
13477 individual souls residing in the sun, the moon, and so on, which
13478 participate in the sight of the secondary Brahman, and in the end
13479 becomes silent. Ajata/s/atru then sets aside Balaki's doctrine as not
13480 referring to the chief Brahman--with the words, 'Vainly did you
13481 challenge me, saying, Shall I tell you Brahman,' &c.--and proposes the
13482 maker of all those individual souls as a new object of knowledge. If now
13483 that maker also were merely a soul participating in the sight of the
13484 secondary Brahman, the introductory statement which speaks of Brahman
13485 would be futile. Hence it follows that the highest Lord himself is
13486 meant.--None, moreover, but the highest Lord is capable of being the
13487 maker of all those persons as he only is absolutely
13488 independent.--Further, the clause 'of whom this is the work' does not
13489 refer either to the activity of motion nor to meritorious and
13490 non-meritorious actions; for neither of those two is the topic of
13491 discussion or has been mentioned previously. Nor can the term 'work'
13492 denote the enumerated persons, since the latter are mentioned
13493 separately--in the clause, 'He who is the maker of those persons'--and
13494 as inferential marks (viz. the neuter gender and the singular number of
13495 the word karman, work) contradict that assumption. Nor, again, can the
13496 term 'work' denote either the activity whose object the persons are, or
13497 the result of that activity, since those two are already implied in the
13498 mention of the agent (in the clause, 'He who is the maker'). Thus there
13499 remains no other alternative than to take the pronoun 'this' (in 'He of
13500 whom this is the work') as denoting the perceptible world and to
13501 understand the same world--as that which is made--by the term
13502 'work.'--We may indeed admit that the world also is not the previous
13503 topic of discussion and has not been mentioned before; still, as no
13504 specification is mentioned, we conclude that the term 'work' has to be
13505 understood in a general sense, and thus denotes what first presents
13506 itself to the mind, viz. everything which exists in general. It is,
13507 moreover, not true that the world is not the previous topic of
13508 discussion; we are rather entitled to conclude from the circumstance
13509 that the various persons (in the sun, the moon, &c.) which constitute a
13510 part of the world had been specially mentioned before, that the passage
13511 in question is concerned with the whole world in general. The
13512 conjunction 'or' (in 'or he of whom,' &c.) is meant to exclude the idea
13513 of limited makership; so that the whole passage has to be interpreted as
13514 follows, 'He who is the maker of those persons forming a part of the
13515 world, or rather--to do away with this limitation--he of whom this
13516 entire world without any exception is the work.' The special mention
13517 made of the persons having been created has for its purpose to show that
13518 those persons whom Balaki had proclaimed to be Brahman are not Brahman.
13519 The passage therefore sets forth the maker of the world in a double
13520 aspect, at first as the creator of a special part of the world and
13521 thereupon as the creator of the whole remaining part of the world; a way
13522 of speaking analogous to such every-day forms of expression as, 'The
13523 wandering mendicants are to be fed, and then the Brahma/n/as[242].' And

13524 that the maker of the world is the highest Lord is affirmed in all
13525 Vedanta-texts.

13526
13527 17. If it be said that this is not so, on account of the inferential
13528 marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air; we reply that that
13529 has already been explained.

13530
13531 It remains for us to refute the objection that on account of the
13532 inferential marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air, which
13533 are met with in the complementary passage, either the one or the other
13534 must be meant in the passage under discussion, and not the highest
13535 Lord.--We therefore remark that that objection has already been disposed
13536 of under I, 1, 31. There it was shown that from an interpretation
13537 similar to the one here proposed by the purvapakshin there would result
13538 a threefold meditation one having Brahman for its object, a second one
13539 directed on the individual soul, and a third one connected with the
13540 chief vital air. Now the same result would present itself in our case,
13541 and that would be unacceptable as we must infer from the introductory as
13542 well as the concluding clauses, that the passage under discussion refers
13543 to Brahman. With reference to the introductory clause this has been
13544 already proved; that the concluding passage also refers to Brahman, we
13545 infer from the fact of there being stated in it a pre-eminently high
13546 reward, 'Warding off all evil he who knows this obtains pre-eminence
13547 among all beings, sovereignty, supremacy.'--But if this is so, the sense
13548 of the passage under discussion is already settled by the discussion of
13549 the passage about Pratarda/n/a (I, 1, 31); why, then, the present
13550 Sutra?--No, we reply; the sense of our passage is not yet settled, since
13551 under I, 1, 31 it has not been proved that the clause, 'Or he whose work
13552 is this,' refers to Brahman. Hence there arises again, in connexion with
13553 the present passage, a doubt whether the individual soul and the chief
13554 vital air may not be meant, and that doubt has again to be refuted.--The
13555 word pra/n/a occurs, moreover, in the sense of Brahman, so in the
13556 passage, 'The mind settles down on pra/n/a' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2).--The
13557 inferential marks of the individual soul also have, on account of the
13558 introductory and concluding clauses referring to Brahman, to be
13559 explained so as not to give rise to any discrepancy.

13560
13561 18. But Jaimini thinks that (the reference to the individual soul) has
13562 another purport, on account of the question and answer; and thus some
13563 also (read in their text).

13564
13565 Whether the passage under discussion is concerned with the individual
13566 soul or with Brahman, is, in the opinion of the teacher Jaimini, no
13567 matter for dispute, since the reference to the individual soul has a
13568 different purport, i.e. aims at intimating Brahman. He founds this his
13569 opinion on a question and a reply met with in the text. After
13570 Ajata/s/atrū has taught Balaki, by waking the sleeping man, that the
13571 soul is different from the vital air, he asks the following question,
13572 'Balaki, where did this person here sleep? Where was he? Whence came he
13573 thus back?' This question clearly refers to something different from the
13574 individual soul. And so likewise does the reply, 'When sleeping he sees
13575 no dream, then he becomes one with that pra/n/a alone;' and, 'From that
13576 Self all pra/n/as proceed, each towards its place, from the pra/n/as the
13577 gods, from the gods the worlds.'--Now it is the general Vedanta doctrine
13578 that at the time of deep sleep the soul becomes one with the highest
13579 Brahman, and that from the highest Brahman the whole world proceeds,
13580 inclusive of pra/n/a, and so on. When Scripture therefore represents as
13581 the object of knowledge that in which there takes place the deep sleep
13582 of the soul, characterised by absence of consciousness and utter
13583 tranquillity, i.e. a state devoid of all those specific cognitions which
13584 are produced by the limiting adjuncts of the soul, and from which the
13585 soul returns when the sleep is broken; we understand that the highest
13586 Self is meant.--Moreover, the Vajasaneyi/s/akha, which likewise contains
13587 the colloquy of Balaki and Ajata/s/atrū, clearly refers to the
13588 individual soul by means of the term, 'the person consisting of
13589 cognition' (vij/n/anamaya), and distinguishes from it the highest Self
13590 ('Where was then the person consisting of cognition? and from whence did
13591 he thus come back?' B/ri/. Up. II, 1, 16); and later on, in the reply to
13592 the above question, declares that 'the person consisting of cognition

13593 lies in the ether within the heart.' Now we know that the word 'ether'
13594 may be used to denote the highest Self, as, for instance, in the passage
13595 about the small ether within the lotus of the heart (Ch. Up. VIII, 1,
13596 1). Further on the B/ri/. Up. says, 'All the Selfs came forth from that
13597 Self;' by which statement of the coming forth of all the conditioned
13598 Selfs it intimates that the highest Self is the one general cause.--The
13599 doctrine conveyed by the rousing of the sleeping person, viz. that the
13600 individual soul is different from the vital air, furnishes at the same
13601 time a further argument against the opinion that the passage under
13602 discussion refers to the vital air.

13603
13604 19. (The Self to be seen, to be heard, &c. is the highest Self) on
13605 account of the connected meaning of the sentences.
13606

13607 We read in the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka, in the Maitreyi-brahma/n/a the
13608 following passage, 'Verily, a husband is not dear that you may love the
13609 husband, &c. &c.; verily, everything is not dear that you may love
13610 everything; but that you may love the Self therefore everything is dear.
13611 Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be
13612 marked, O Maitreyi! When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and
13613 known, then all this is known' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 6).--Here the doubt
13614 arises whether that which is represented as the object to be seen, to be
13615 heard, and so on, is the cognitional Self (the individual soul) or the
13616 highest Self.--But whence the doubt?--Because, we reply, the Self is, on
13617 the one hand, by the mention of dear things such as husband and so on,
13618 indicated as the enjoyer whence it appears that the passage refers to
13619 the individual soul; and because, on the other hand, the declaration
13620 that through the knowledge of the Self everything becomes known points
13621 to the highest Self.

13622
13623 The purvapakshin maintains that the passage refers to the individual
13624 soul, on account of the strength of the initial statement. The text
13625 declares at the outset that all the objects of enjoyment found in this
13626 world, such as husband, wife, riches, and so on, are dear on account of
13627 the Self, and thereby gives us to understand that the enjoying (i.e. the
13628 individual) Self is meant; if thereupon it refers to the Self as the
13629 object of sight and so on, what other Self should it mean than the same
13630 individual Self?--A subsequent passage also (viz. 'Thus does this great
13631 Being, endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but knowledge, rise
13632 from out of these elements, and vanish again after them. When he has
13633 departed there is no more knowledge'), which describes how the great
13634 Being under discussion rises, as the Self of knowledge, from the
13635 elements, shows that the object of sight is no other than the
13636 cognitional Self, i.e. the individual soul. The concluding clause
13637 finally, 'How, O beloved, should he know the knower?' shows, by means of
13638 the term 'knower,' which denotes an agent, that the individual soul is
13639 meant. The declaration that through the cognition of the Self everything
13640 becomes known must therefore not be interpreted in the literal sense,
13641 but must be taken to mean that the world of objects of enjoyment is
13642 known through its relation to the enjoying soul.

13643
13644 To this we make the following reply.--The passage makes a statement
13645 about the highest Self, on account of the connected meaning of the
13646 entire section. If we consider the different passages in their mutual
13647 connexion, we find that they all refer to the highest Self. After
13648 Maitreyi has heard from Yaj/n/avalkya that there is no hope of
13649 immortality by wealth, she expresses her desire of immortality in the
13650 words, 'What should I do with that by which I do not become immortal?
13651 What my Lord knoweth tell that to me;' and thereupon Yaj/n/avalkya
13652 expounds to her the knowledge of the Self. Now Scripture as well as
13653 Sm/ri/ti declares that immortality is not to be reached but through the
13654 knowledge of the highest Self.--The statement further that through the
13655 knowledge of the Self everything becomes known can be taken in its
13656 direct literal sense only if by the Self we understand the highest
13657 cause. And to take it in a non-literal sense (as the purvapakshin
13658 proposes) is inadmissible, on account of the explanation given of that
13659 statement in a subsequent passage, viz. 'Whosoever looks for the Brahman
13660 class elsewhere than in the Self, is abandoned by the Brahman class.'
13661 Here it is said that whoever erroneously views this world with its

13662 Brahman and so on, as having an independent existence apart from the
13663 Self, is abandoned by that very world of which he has taken an erroneous
13664 view; whereby the view that there exists any difference is refuted. And
13665 the immediately subsequent clause, 'This everything is the Self,' gives
13666 us to understand that the entire aggregate of existing things is
13667 non-different from the Self; a doctrine further confirmed by the similes
13668 of the drum and so on.--By explaining further that the Self about which
13669 he had been speaking is the cause of the universe of names, forms, and
13670 works ('There has been breathed forth from this great Being what we have
13671 as /Ri/gveda,' &c.) Yaj/n/avalkya again shows that it is the highest
13672 Self.--To the same conclusion he leads us by declaring, in the paragraph
13673 which treats of the natural centres of things, that the Self is the
13674 centre of the whole world with the objects, the senses and the mind,
13675 that it has neither inside nor outside, that it is altogether a mass of
13676 knowledge.--From all this it follows that what the text represents as
13677 the object of sight and so on is the highest Self.

13678
13679 We now turn to the remark made by the purvapakshin that the passage
13680 teaches the individual soul to be the object of sight, because it is, in
13681 the early part of the chapter denoted as something dear.

13682
13683 20. (The circumstance of the soul being represented as the object of
13684 sight) indicates the fulfilment of the promissory statement; so
13685 A/s/marathya thinks.

13686
13687 The fact that the text proclaims as the object of sight that Self which
13688 is denoted as something, dear indicates the fulfilment of the promise
13689 made in the passages, 'When the Self is known all this is known,' 'All
13690 this is that Self.' For if the individual soul were different from the
13691 highest Self, the knowledge of the latter would not imply the knowledge
13692 of the former, and thus the promise that through the knowledge of one
13693 thing everything is to be known would not be fulfilled. Hence the
13694 initial statement aims at representing the individual Self and the
13695 highest Self as non-different for the purpose of fulfilling the promise
13696 made.--This is the opinion of the teacher A/s/marathya[243].

13697
13698 21. (The initial statement identifies the individual soul and the
13699 highest Self) because the soul when it will depart (from the body) is
13700 such (i.e. one with the highest Self); thus Au/d/ulomi thinks.

13701
13702 The individual soul which is inquinated by the contact with its
13703 different limiting adjuncts, viz. body, senses, and mind (mano-buddhi),
13704 attains through the instrumentality of knowledge, meditation, and so on,
13705 a state of complete serenity, and thus enables itself, when passing at
13706 some future time out of the body, to become one with the highest Self;
13707 hence the initial statement in which it is represented as non-different
13708 from the highest Self. This is the opinion of the teacher
13709 Au/d/ulomi.--Thus Scripture says, 'That serene being arising from this
13710 body appears in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest
13711 light' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3).--In another place Scripture intimates, by
13712 means of the simile of the rivers, that name and form abide in the
13713 individual soul, 'As the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, having
13714 lost their name and their form, thus a wise man freed from name and form
13715 goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great' (Mu. Up. III,
13716 2, 8). I.e. as the rivers losing the names and forms abiding in them
13717 disappear in the sea, so the individual soul also losing the name and
13718 form abiding in it becomes united with the highest person. That the
13719 latter half of the passage has the meaning here assigned to it, follows
13720 from the parallelism which we must assume to exist between the two
13721 members of the comparison[244].

13722
13723 22. (The initial statement is made) because (the highest Self) exists in
13724 the condition (of the individual soul); so Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna thinks.

13725
13726 Because the highest Self exists also in the condition of the individual
13727 soul, therefore, the teacher Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna thinks, the initial
13728 statement which aims at intimating the non-difference of the two is
13729 possible. That the highest Self only is that which appears as the
13730 individual soul, is evident from the Brahma/n/a-passage, 'Let me enter

13731 into them with this living Self and evolve names and forms,' and similar
13732 passages. We have also mantras to the same effect, for instance, 'The
13733 wise one who, having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling
13734 the things by their names' (Taitt. Ar. III, 12, 7)[245]. And where
13735 Scripture relates the creation of fire and the other elements, it does
13736 not at the same time relate a separate creation of the individual soul;
13737 we have therefore no right to look on the soul as a product of the
13738 highest Self, different from the latter.--In the opinion of the teacher
13739 Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna the non-modified highest Lord himself is the individual
13740 soul, not anything else. A/s/marathya, although meaning to say that the
13741 soul is not (absolutely) different from the highest Self, yet intimates
13742 by the expression, 'On account of the fulfilment of the promise'--which
13743 declares a certain mutual dependence--that there does exist a certain
13744 relation of cause and effect between the highest Self and the individual
13745 soul[246]. The opinion of Au/d/ulomi again clearly implies that the
13746 difference and non-difference of the two depend on difference of
13747 condition[247]. Of these three opinions we conclude that the one held by
13748 Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna accords with Scripture, because it agrees with what all
13749 the Vedanta-texts (so, for instance, the passage, 'That art thou') aim
13750 at inculcating. Only on the opinion of Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna immortality can
13751 be viewed as the result of the knowledge of the soul; while it would be
13752 impossible to hold the same view if the soul were a modification
13753 (product) of the Self and as such liable to lose its existence by being
13754 merged in its causal substance. For the same reason, name and form
13755 cannot abide in the soul (as was above attempted to prove by means of
13756 the simile of the rivers), but abide in the limiting adjunct and are
13757 ascribed to the soul itself in a figurative sense only. For the same
13758 reason the origin of the souls from the highest Self, of which Scripture
13759 speaks in some places as analogous to the issuing of sparks from the
13760 fire, must be viewed as based only on the limiting adjuncts of the soul.
13761

13762 The last three Sutras have further to be interpreted so as to furnish
13763 replies to the second of the purvapakshin's arguments, viz. that the
13764 B/ri/hadara/n/yaka passage represents as the object of sight the
13765 individual soul, because it declares that the great Being which is to be
13766 seen arises from out of these elements. 'There is an indication of the
13767 fulfilment of the promise; so A/s/marathya thinks.' The promise is made
13768 in the two passages, 'When the Self is known, all this is known,' and
13769 'All this is that Self.' That the Self is everything, is proved by the
13770 declaration that the whole world of names, forms, and works springs from
13771 one being, and is merged in one being[248]; and by its being
13772 demonstrated, with the help of the similes of the drum, and so on, that
13773 effect and cause are non-different. The fulfilment of the promise is,
13774 then, finally indicated by the text declaring that that great Being
13775 rises, in the form of the individual soul, from out of these elements;
13776 thus the teacher A/s/marathya thinks. For if the soul and the highest
13777 Self are non-different, the promise that through the knowledge of one
13778 everything becomes known is capable of fulfilment.--'Because the soul
13779 when it will depart is such; thus Au/d/ulomi thinks.' The statement as
13780 to the non-difference of the soul and the Self (implied in the
13781 declaration that the great Being rises, &c.) is possible, because the
13782 soul when--after having purified itself by knowledge, and so on--it will
13783 depart from the body, is capable of becoming one with the highest Self.
13784 This is Au/d/ulomi's opinion.--'Because it exists in the condition of
13785 the soul; thus Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna opines.' Because the highest Self itself
13786 is that which appears as the individual soul, the statement as to the
13787 non-difference of the two is well-founded. This is the view of the
13788 teacher Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna.
13789

13790 But, an objection may be raised, the passage, 'Rising from out of these
13791 elements he vanishes again after them. When he has departed there is no
13792 more knowledge,' intimates the final destruction of the soul, not its
13793 identity with the highest Self!--By no means, we reply. The passage
13794 means to say only that on the soul departing from the body all specific
13795 cognition vanishes, not that the Self is destroyed. For an objection
13796 being raised--in the passage, 'Here thou hast bewildered me, Sir, when
13797 thou sayest that having departed there is no more knowledge'. Scripture
13798 itself explains that what is meant is not the annihilation of the Self,
13799 'I say nothing that is bewildering. Verily, beloved, that Self is

imperishable, and of an indestructible nature. But there takes place non-connexion with the matras.' That means: The eternally unchanging Self, which is one mass of knowledge, cannot possibly perish; but by means of true knowledge there is effected its dissociation from the matras, i.e. the elements and the sense organs, which are the product of Nescience. When the connexion has been solved, specific cognition, which depended on it, no longer takes place, and thus it can be said, that 'When he has departed there is no more knowledge.'

The third argument also of the purvapakshin, viz. that the word 'knower'--which occurs in the concluding passage, 'How should he know the knower?'--denotes an agent, and therefore refers to the individual soul as the object of sight, is to be refuted according to the view of Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna.--Moreover, the text after having enumerated--in the passage, 'For where there is duality as it were, there one sees the other,' &c.--all the kinds of specific cognition which belong to the sphere of Nescience declares--in the subsequent passage, 'But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?'--that in the sphere of true knowledge all specific cognition such as seeing, and so on, is absent. And, again, in order to obviate the doubt whether in the absence of objects the knower might not know himself, Yaj/n/avalkya goes on, 'How, O beloved, should he know himself, the knower?' As thus the latter passage evidently aims at proving the absence of specific cognition, we have to conclude that the word 'knower' is here used to denote that being which is knowledge, i.e. the Self.--That the view of Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna is scriptural, we have already shown above. And as it is so, all the adherents of the Vedanta must admit that the difference of the soul and the highest Self is not real, but due to the limiting adjuncts, viz. the body, and so on, which are the product of name and form as presented by Nescience. That view receives ample confirmation from Scripture; compare, for instance, 'Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning, one, without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'The Self is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'Brahman alone is all this' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'This everything is that Self' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 6); 'There is no other seer but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23); 'There is nothing that sees but it' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 11).--It is likewise confirmed by Sm/ri/ti; compare, for instance, 'Vasudeva is all this' (Bha. Gi. VII, 19); 'Know me, O Bharata, to be the soul in all bodies' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 2); 'He who sees the highest Lord abiding alike within all creatures' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 27).--The same conclusion is supported by those passages which deny all difference; compare, for instance, 'If he thinks, that is one and I another; he does not know' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10); 'From death to death he goes who sees here any diversity' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 19). And, again, by those passages which negative all change on the part of the Self; compare, for instance, 'This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is indeed Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 24).--Moreover, if the doctrine of general identity were not true, those who are desirous of release could not be in the possession of irrefutable knowledge, and there would be no possibility of any matter being well settled; while yet the knowledge of which the Self is the object is declared to be irrefutable and to satisfy all desire, and Scripture speaks of those, 'Who have well ascertained the object of the knowledge of the Vedanta' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 6). Compare also the passage, 'What trouble, what sorrow can there be to him who has once beheld that unity?' (I/s/. Up. 7.)--And Sm/ri/ti also represents the mind of him who contemplates the Self as steady (Bha. Gi. II, 54).

As therefore the individual soul and the highest Self differ in name only, it being a settled matter that perfect knowledge has for its object the absolute oneness of the two; it is senseless to insist (as some do) on a plurality of Selves, and to maintain that the individual soul is different from the highest Self, and the highest Self from the individual soul. For the Self is indeed called by many different names, but it is one only. Nor does the passage, 'He who knows Brahman which is real, knowledge, infinite, as hidden in the cave' (Taitt. Up. II, 1), refer to some one cave (different from the abode of the individual soul)[249]. And that nobody else but Brahman is hidden in the cave we know from a subsequent passage, viz. 'Having sent forth he entered into it' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), according to which the creator only entered into

13869 the created beings.--Those who insist on the distinction of the
13870 individual and the highest Self oppose themselves to the true sense of
13871 the Vedanta-texts, stand thereby in the way of perfect knowledge, which
13872 is the door to perfect beatitude, and groundlessly assume release to be
13873 something effected, and therefore non-eternal[250]. (And if they attempt
13874 to show that moksha, although effected, is eternal) they involve
13875 themselves in a conflict with sound logic.

13876
13877 23. (Brahman is) the material cause also, on account of (this view) not
13878 being in conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative
13879 instances.

13880
13881 It has been said that, as practical religious duty has to be enquired
13882 into because it is the cause of an increase of happiness, so Brahman has
13883 to be enquired into because it is the cause of absolute beatitude. And
13884 Brahman has been defined as that from which there proceed the
13885 origination, sustentation, and retractation of this world. Now as this
13886 definition comprises alike the relation of substantial causality in
13887 which clay and gold, for instance, stand to golden ornaments and earthen
13888 pots, and the relation of operative causality in which the potter and
13889 the goldsmith stand to the things mentioned; a doubt arises to which of
13890 these two kinds the causality of Brahman belongs.

13891
13892 The purvapakshin maintains that Brahman evidently is the operative cause
13893 of the world only, because Scripture declares his creative energy to be
13894 preceded by reflection. Compare, for instance, Pra. Up. VI, 3; 4: 'He
13895 reflected, he created pra/n/a.' For observation shows that the action of
13896 operative causes only, such as potters and the like, is preceded by
13897 reflection, and moreover that the result of some activity is brought
13898 about by the concurrence of several factors[251]. It is therefore
13899 appropriate that we should view the prime creator in the same light. The
13900 circumstance of his being known as 'the Lord' furnishes another
13901 argument. For lords such as kings and the son of Vivasvat are known only
13902 as operative causes, and the highest Lord also must on that account be
13903 viewed as an operative cause only.--Further, the effect of the creator's
13904 activity, viz. this world, is seen to consist of parts, to be
13905 non-intelligent and impure; we therefore must assume that its cause also
13906 is of the same nature; for it is a matter of general observation that
13907 cause and effect are alike in kind. But that Brahman does not resemble
13908 the world in nature, we know from many scriptural passages, such as 'It
13909 is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without
13910 taint' (/Sv/e. Up. VI, 19). Hence there remains no other alternative but
13911 to admit that in addition to Brahman there exists a material cause of
13912 the world of impure nature, such as is known from Sm/ri/ti[252], and to
13913 limit the causality of Brahman, as declared by Scripture, to operative
13914 causality.

13915
13916 To this we make the following reply.--Brahman is to be acknowledged as
13917 the material cause as well as the operative cause; because this latter
13918 view does not conflict with the promissory statements and the
13919 illustrative instances. The promissory statement chiefly meant is the
13920 following one, 'Have you ever asked for that instruction by which that
13921 which is not heard becomes heard; that which is not perceived,
13922 perceived; that which is not known, known?' (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 3.) This
13923 passage intimates that through the cognition of one thing everything
13924 else, even if (previously) unknown, becomes known. Now the knowledge of
13925 everything is possible through the cognition of the material cause,
13926 since the effect is non-different from the material cause. On the other
13927 hand, effects are not non-different from their operative causes; for we
13928 know from ordinary experience that the carpenter, for instance, is
13929 different from the house he has built.--The illustrative example
13930 referred to is the one mentioned (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4), 'My dear, as by one
13931 clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e.
13932 the effect) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while
13933 the truth is that it is clay merely;' which passage again has reference
13934 to the material cause. The text adds a few more illustrative instances
13935 of similar nature, 'As by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold is
13936 known; as by one pair of nail-scissors all that is made of iron is
13937 known.'--Similar promissory statements are made in other places also,

for instance, 'What is that through which if it is known everything else becomes known?' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 3.) An illustrative instance also is given in the same place, 'As plants grow on the earth' (I, 1, 7).--Compare also the promissory statement in B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 6, 'When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is known;' and the illustrative instance quoted (IV, 5, 8), 'Now as the sounds of a drum if beaten cannot be seized externally, but the sound is seized when the drum is seized or the beater of the drum.'--Similar promissory statements and illustrative instances which are to be found in all Vedanta-texts are to be viewed as proving, more or less, that Brahman is also the material cause of the world. The ablative case also in the passage, 'That from whence (yata/h/) these beings are born,' has to be considered as indicating the material cause of the beings, according to the grammatical rule, Pa/n/. I, 4, 30.--That Brahman is at the same time the operative cause of the world, we have to conclude from the circumstance that there is no other guiding being. Ordinarily material causes, indeed, such as lumps of clay and pieces of gold, are dependent, in order to shape themselves into vessels and ornaments, on extraneous operative causes such as potters and goldsmiths; but outside Brahman as material cause there is no other operative cause to which the material cause could look; for Scripture says that previously to creation Brahman was one without a second.--The absence of a guiding principle other than the material cause can moreover be established by means of the argument made use of in the Sutra, viz. accordance with the promissory statements and the illustrative examples. If there were admitted a guiding principle different from the material cause, it would follow that everything cannot be known through one thing, and thereby the promissory statements as well as the illustrative instances would be stultified.--The Self is thus the operative cause, because there is no other ruling principle, and the material cause because there is no other substance from which the world could originate.

24. And on account of the statement of reflection (on the part of the Self).

The fact of the sacred texts declaring that the Self reflected likewise shows that it is the operative as well as the material cause. Passages like 'He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'He thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' show, in the first place, that the Self is the agent in the independent activity which is preceded by the Self's reflection; and, in the second place, that it is the material cause also, since the words 'May I be many' intimate that the reflective desire of multiplying itself has the inward Self for its object.

25. And on account of both (i.e. the origin and the dissolution of the world) being directly declared (to have Brahman for their material cause).

This Sutra supplies a further argument for Brahman's being the general material cause.--Brahman is the material cause of the world for that reason also that the origination as well as the dissolution of the world is directly spoken of in the sacred texts as having Brahman for their material cause, 'All these beings take their rise from the ether and return into the ether' (Ch. Up. I, 9, 1). That that from which some other thing springs and into which it returns is the material cause of that other thing is well known. Thus the earth, for instance, is the material cause of rice, barley, and the like.--The word 'directly' (in the Sutra) notifies that there is no other material cause, but that all this sprang from the ether only.--Observation further teaches that effects are not re-absorbed into anything else but their material causes.

26. (Brahman is the material cause) on account of (the Self) making itself; (which is possible) owing to modification.

Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that Scripture--in the passage, 'That made itself its Self' (Taitt. Up. II, 7)--represents the Self as the object of action as well as the agent.--But how can the Self which as agent was in full existence previously to the action be

made out to be at the same time that which is effected by the action?--Owing to modification, we reply. The Self, although in full existence previously to the action, modifies itself into something special, viz. the Self of the effect. Thus we see that causal substances, such as clay and the like, are, by undergoing the process of modification, changed into their products.--The word 'itself' in the passage quoted intimates the absence of any other operative cause but the Self.

The word 'pari/n/amat' (in the Sutra) may also be taken as constituting a separate Sutra by itself, the sense of which would be: Brahman is the material cause of the world for that reason also, that the sacred text speaks of Brahman and its modification into the Self of its effect as co-ordinated, viz. in the passage, 'It became sat and tyat, defined and undefined' (Taitt. Up. II, 6).

27. And because Brahman is called the source.

Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that it is spoken of in the sacred texts as the source (yoni); compare, for instance, 'The maker, the Lord, the person who has his source in Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3); and 'That which the wise regard as the source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 6). For that the word 'source' denotes the material cause is well known from the use of ordinary language; the earth, for instance, is called the yoni of trees and herbs. In some places indeed the word yoni means not source, but merely place; so, for instance, in the mantra, 'A yoni, O Indra, was made for you to sit down upon' (/Ri/k. Sa/m/h. I, 104, 1). But that in the passage quoted it means 'source' follows from a complementary passage, 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its threads,' &c.--It is thus proved that Brahman is the material cause of the world.--Of the objection, finally, that in ordinary life the activity of operative causal agents only, such as potters and the like, is preceded by reflection, we dispose by the remark that, as the matter in hand is not one which can be known through inferential reasoning, ordinary experience cannot be used to settle it. For the knowledge of that matter we rather depend on Scripture altogether, and hence Scripture only has to be appealed to. And that Scripture teaches that the Lord who reflects before creation is at the same time the material cause, we have already explained. The subject will, moreover, be discussed more fully later on.

28. Hereby all (the doctrines concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedanta) are explained, are explained.

The doctrine according to which the pradhana is the cause of the world has, in the Sutras beginning with I, 1, 5, been again and again brought forward and refuted. The chief reason for the special attention given to that doctrine is that the Vedanta-texts contain some passages which, to people deficient in mental penetration, may appear to contain inferential marks pointing to it. The doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vedanta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits the non-difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sutras, such as Devala, and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the pradhana doctrine, without paying much attention to the atomic and other theories. These latter theories, however, must likewise be refuted, as they also are opposed to the doctrine of Brahman being the general cause, and as slow-minded people might think that they also are referred to in some Vedic passages. Hence the Sutrakara formally extends, in the above Sutra, the refutation already accomplished of the pradhana doctrine to all similar doctrines which need not be demolished in detail after their great protagonist, the pradhana doctrine, has been so completely disposed of. They also are, firstly, not founded on any scriptural authority; and are, secondly, directly contradicted by various Vedic passages.--The repetition of the phrase 'are explained' is meant to intimate that the end of the adhyaya has been reached.

Notes:

14076 [Footnote 228: The Great one is the technical Sa@nkhyā-term for buddhi,
14077 avyakta is a common designation of pradhana or prak/ri/ti, and puruṣa
14078 is the technical name of the soul. Compare, for instance, Sa@nkhyā Kar.
14079 2, 3.]
14080

14081 [Footnote 229: Sa/m/kalpavikalparupamanana/s/aktya haira/n/yagarbhi
14082 buddhir manas tasya/h/ vyash/t/imana/h/su samash/t/itaya vyaptim aha
14083 mahan iti. Sa/m/kalpadi/s/ktitaya tarhi sa/m/dehatmatva/m/ tatraha matir
14084 iti. Mahatvam upapadayati brahmeti. Bhogyajatadharatvam aha pur iti.
14085 Ni/sk/ayatmakatvam aha buddhir iti. Kirti/s/aktimattvam aha khyatir iti.
14086 Niyamana/s/aktimatvam aha i/s/vara iti. Loke yat prak/ri/sh/t/a/m/
14087 j/n/anam tatosnatirekam aha praj/n/eti. Tatphalam api tato
14088 narthantaravishayam ity aha sa/m/vid iti. /K/itpradhanatvam aha /k/itir
14089 iti. J/n/atasarvartbanusa/m/dhana/s/aktim aha sm/ri/tis /k/eti. Ananda
14090 Giri.]
14091

14092 [Footnote 230: Nanu na bija/s/aktir vidyaya dahyate vastutvad atmavan
14093 nety aha avidyeti. Ke/k/it tu pratijivam avidya/s/aktibhedam i/kkh/anti
14094 tan na avyaktavyak/ri/tadi/s/abdayas tasya bhedakabhavad ekatvexpi
14095 sva/s/aktya vi/k/itrakaryakaravadv ity aha avyakteti. Na /k/a tasya
14096 jiva/s/rayatva/m/ jiva/s/abdava/k/yasya kalpitatvad avidyaruṣatvat
14097 ta/kkh/abdalakshyasya brahmavyatirekad ity aha parame/s/vareti.
14098 Mayavidyayor bhedad i/s/varasya maya/s/rayatva/m/ jivanam
14099 avidya/s/rayateti vadanta/m/ pratyaha mayamayiti. Yatha mayavino maya
14100 paratantra tathaishapity artha/h/. Pratitau tasya/s/ /k/etanapeksham aha
14101 mahasuptir iti. Ananda Giri.]
14102

14103 [Footnote 231: Sutradvayasya v/ri/ttik/ri/dvyakhyanam utthapayati. Go.
14104 An. A/k/aryade/s/iyamatam utthapayati. An. Gi.]
14105

14106 [Footnote 232: The commentators give different explanations of the
14107 Sattamatra of the text.--Sattamatre sattvapradhanaprak/ri/ter
14108 adyapari/n/ame. Go. An.--Bhogapavargapurusharthasya
14109 maha/kkh/abditabuddhikaryatvat purushapekshitaphalakara/n/a/m/ sad
14110 u/k/yate tatra bhavapratyayos'pi svarupartho na samanyava/k/i
14111 karyanumeya/m/ mahan na pratyaksham iti matra/s/abda/h/. Ananda Giri.]
14112

14113 [Footnote 233: As the meaning of the word aja is going to be discussed,
14114 and as the author of the Sutras and /S/a@nkara seem to disagree as to
14115 its meaning (see later on), I prefer to leave the word untranslated in
14116 this place.--/S/a@nkara reads--and explains,--in the mantra, sarupa/h/
14117 (not sarupam) and bhuktabhogam, not bhuktabhogyam.]
14118

14119 [Footnote 234: Here there seems to be a certain discrepancy between the
14120 views of the Sutra writer and /S/a@nkara. Govindananda notes that
14121 according to the Bhashyak/ri/t aja means simply maya--which
14122 interpretation is based on prakara/n/a--while, according to the
14123 Sutra-k/ri/t, who explains aja on the ground of the Chandogya-passage
14124 treating of the three primary elements, aja denotes the aggregate of
14125 those three elements constituting an avantaraprak/ri/ti.--On
14126 /S/a@nkara's explanation the term aja presents no difficulties, for maya
14127 is aja, i.e. unborn, not produced. On the explanation of the Sutra
14128 writer, however, aja cannot mean unborn, since the three primary
14129 elements are products. Hence we are thrown back on the ru/dh/i
14130 signification of aja, according to which it means she-goat. But how can
14131 the avantara-prak/ri/ti be called a she-goat? To this question the next
14132 Sutra replies.]
14133

14134 [Footnote 235: Indication (laksha/n/a, which consists in this case in
14135 five times five being used instead of twenty-five) is considered as an
14136 objectionable mode of expression, and therefore to be assumed in
14137 interpretation only where a term can in no way be shown to have a direct
14138 meaning.]
14139

14140 [Footnote 236: That pa/nk/ajana/h/ is only one word appears from its
14141 having only one accent, viz. the udatta on the last syllable, which
14142 udatta becomes anudatta according to the rules laid down in the Bhashika
14143 Sutra for the accentuation of the /S/atapatha-brahma/n/a.]
14144

14145 [Footnote 237: So in the Madhyandina recension of the Upanishad; the
14146 Ka/n/va recension has not the clause 'the food of food.']
14147

14148 [Footnote 238: This in answer to the Sankhya who objects to jana when
14149 applied to the prana, &c. being interpreted with the help of laksha/n/a;
14150 while if referred to the pradhana, &c. it may be explained to have a
14151 direct meaning, on the ground of yaugika interpretation (the pradhana
14152 being jana because it produces, the mahat &c. being jana because they
14153 are produced). The Vedantin points out that the compound pa/nk/ajana/h/
14154 has its own ru/dh/i-meaning, just as a/s/vakar/n/a, literally horse-ear,
14155 which conventionally denotes a certain plant.]
14156

14157 [Footnote 239: We infer that udbhid is the name of a sacrifice because
14158 it is mentioned in connexion with the act of sacrificing; we infer that
14159 the yupa is a wooden post because it is said to be cut, and so on.]
14160

14161 [Footnote 240: Option being possible only in the case of things to be
14162 accomplished, i.e. actions.]
14163

14164 [Footnote 241: According to Go. An. in the passage, 'That made itself
14165 its Self' (II, 7); according to An. Giri in the passage, 'He created
14166 all' (II, 6).]
14167

14168 [Footnote 242: By the Brahma/n/as being meant all those Brahma/n/as who
14169 are not at the same time wandering mendicants.]
14170

14171 [Footnote 243: The comment of the Bhamati on the Sutra runs as follows:
14172 As the sparks issuing from a fire are not absolutely different from the
14173 fire, because they participate in the nature of the fire; and, on the
14174 other hand, are not absolutely non-different from the fire, because in
14175 that case they could be distinguished neither from the fire nor from
14176 each other; so the individual souls also--which are effects of
14177 Brahman--are neither absolutely different from Brahman, for that would
14178 mean that they are not of the nature of intelligence; nor absolutely
14179 non-different from Brahman, because in that case they could not be
14180 distinguished from each other, and because, if they were identical with
14181 Brahman and therefore omniscient, it would be useless to give them any
14182 instruction. Hence the individual souls are somehow different from
14183 Brahman and somehow non-different.--The technical name of the doctrine
14184 here represented by A/s/marathya is bhedabhedavada.]
14185

14186 [Footnote 244: Bhamati: The individual soul is absolutely different from
14187 the highest Self; it is inquinated by the contact with its different
14188 limiting adjuncts. But it is spoken of, in the Upanishad, as
14189 non-different from the highest Self because after having purified itself
14190 by means of knowledge and meditation it may pass out of the body and
14191 become one with the highest Self. The text of the Upanishad thus
14192 transfers a future state of non-difference to that time when difference
14193 actually exists. Compare the saying of the Pa/nk/aratrikas: 'Up to the
14194 moment of emancipation being reached the soul and the highest Self are
14195 different. But the emancipated soul is no longer different from the
14196 highest Self, since there is no further cause of difference.'--The
14197 technical name of the doctrine advocated by Au/d/ulomi is
14198 satyabhedavada.]
14199

14200 [Footnote 245: Compare the note to the same mantra as quoted above under
14201 I, 1, 11.]
14202

14203 [Footnote 246: And not the relation of absolute identity.]
14204

14205 [Footnote 247: I.e. upon the state of emancipation and its absence.]
14206

14207 [Footnote 248: Upapadita/m/ /k/eti, sarvasyatmamamatratvam iti /s/esha/h/.
14208 Upapadanaprakara/m/ su/k/ayati eketi. Sa yathardrendhanagner
14209 ityadinaikaprasavatvam, yatha sarvasam apam ityadina
14210 /k/aikapralayatva/m/ sarvasyoktam. An. Gi.]
14211

14212 [Footnote 249: So according to Go. An. and An. Gi., although their
14213 interpretations seem not to account sufficiently for the ekam of the

14214 text.--Ka/mk/id evaikam iti jivasthanad anyam ity artha/h/. Go.
14215 An.--Jivabhavena pratibimbadharatiriktam ity artha/h/. An. Gi.]
14216
14217 [Footnote 250: While release, as often remarked, is eternal, it being in
14218 fact not different from the eternally unchanging Brahman.]
14219
14220 [Footnote 251: I.e. that the operative cause and the substantial cause
14221 are separate things.]
14222
14223 [Footnote 252: Viz. the Sa@nkhyas-m/ri/ti.]
14224
14225
14226
14227
14228 SECOND ADHYAYA.
14229
14230 FIRST PADA.
14231
14232 REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!
14233
14234
14235 1. If it be objected that (from the doctrine expounded hitherto) there
14236 would result the fault of there being no room for (certain) Sm/ri/tis;
14237 we do not admit that objection, because (from the rejection of our
14238 doctrine) there would result the fault of want of room for other
14239 Sm/ri/tis.
14240
14241 It has been shown in the first adhyaya that the omniscient Lord of all
14242 is the cause of the origin of this world in the same way as clay is the
14243 material cause of jars and gold of golden ornaments; that by his
14244 rulership he is the cause of the subsistence of this world once
14245 originated, just as the magician is the cause of the subsistence of the
14246 magical illusion; and that he, lastly, is the cause of this emitted
14247 world being finally reabsorbed into his essence, just as the four
14248 classes of creatures are reabsorbed into the earth. It has further been
14249 proved, by a demonstration of the connected meaning of all the
14250 Vedanta-texts, that the Lord is the Self of all of us. Moreover, the
14251 doctrines of the pradhana, and so on, being the cause of this world have
14252 been refuted as not being scriptural.--The purport of the second
14253 adhyaya, which we now begin, is to refute the objections (to the
14254 doctrine established hitherto) which might be founded on Sm/ri/ti and
14255 Reasoning, and to show that the doctrines of the pradhana, &c. have only
14256 fallacious arguments to lean upon, and that the different Vedanta-texts
14257 do not contradict one another with regard to the mode of creation and
14258 similar topics.--The first point is to refute the objections based on
14259 Sm/ri/ti.
14260
14261 Your doctrine (the purvapakshin says) that the omniscient Brahman only
14262 is the cause of this world cannot be maintained, 'because there results
14263 from it the fault of there being no room for (certain) Sm/ri/tis.' Such
14264 Sm/ri/tis are the one called Tantra which was composed by a /ri/shi and
14265 is accepted by authoritative persons, and other Sm/ri/tis based on
14266 it[253]; for all of which there would be no room if your interpretation
14267 of the Veda were the true one. For they all teach that the
14268 non-intelligent pradhana is the independent cause of the world. There is
14269 indeed room (a *raison d'etre*) for Sm/ri/tis like the Manu-sm/ri/ti,
14270 which give information about matters connected with the whole body of
14271 religious duty, characterised by injunction[254] and comprising the
14272 agnihotra and similar performances. They tell us at what time and with
14273 what rites the members of the different castes are to be initiated; how
14274 the Veda has to be studied; in what way the cessation of study has to
14275 take place; how marriage has to be performed, and so on. They further
14276 lay down the manifold religious duties, beneficial to man, of the four
14277 castes and a/s/ramas[255]. The Kapila Sm/ri/ti, on the other hand, and
14278 similar books are not concerned with things to be done, but were
14279 composed with exclusive reference to perfect knowledge as the means of
14280 final release. If then no room were left for them in that connexion
14281 also, they would be altogether purposeless; and hence we must explain
14282 the Vedanta-texts in such a manner as not to bring them into conflict

14283 with the Sm/ri/tis mentioned[256].--But how, somebody may ask the
14284 purvapakshin, can the eventual fault of there being left no room for
14285 certain Sm/ri/tis be used as an objection against that sense of /S/ruti
14286 which--from various reasons as detailed under I, 1 and ff.--has been
14287 ascertained by us to be the true one, viz. that the omniscient Brahman
14288 alone is the cause of the world?--Our objection, the purvapakshin
14289 replies, will perhaps not appear valid to persons of independent
14290 thought; but as most men depend in their reasonings on others, and are
14291 unable to ascertain by themselves the sense of /S/ruti, they naturally
14292 rely on Sm/ri/tis, composed by celebrated authorities, and try to arrive
14293 at the sense of /S/ruti with their assistance; while, owing to their
14294 esteem for the authors of the Sm/ri/tis, they have no trust in our
14295 explanations. The knowledge of men like Kapila Sm/ri/ti declares to have
14296 been /ri/shi-like and unobstructed, and moreover there is the following
14297 /S/ruti-passage, 'It is he who, in the beginning, bears in his thoughts
14298 the son, the /ri/shi, kapila[257], whom he wishes to look on while he is
14299 born' (/S/ve. Up. V, 2). Hence their opinion cannot be assumed to be
14300 erroneous, and as they moreover strengthen their position by
14301 argumentation, the objection remains valid, and we must therefore
14302 attempt to explain the Vedanta-texts in conformity with the Sm/ri/tis.
14303

14304 This objection we dispose of by the remark, 'It is not so because
14305 therefrom would result the fault of want of room for other
14306 Sm/ri/tis.'--If you object to the doctrine of the Lord being the cause
14307 of the world on the ground that it would render certain Sm/ri/tis
14308 purposeless, you thereby render purposeless other Sm/ri/tis which
14309 declare themselves in favour of the said doctrine. These latter
14310 Sm/ri/ti-texts we will quote in what follows. In one passage the highest
14311 Brahman is introduced as the subject of discussion, 'That which is
14312 subtle and not to be known;' the text then goes on, 'That is the
14313 internal Self of the creatures, their soul,' and after that remarks
14314 'From that sprang the Unevolved, consisting of the three gu/n/as, O best
14315 of Brahma/n/as.' And in another place it is said that 'the Unevolved is
14316 dissolved in the Person devoid of qualities, O Brahma/n/a.'--Thus we
14317 read also in the Pura/n/a, 'Hear thence this short statement: The
14318 ancient Naraya/n/a is all this; he produces the creation at the due
14319 time, and at the time of reabsorption he consumes it again.' And so in
14320 the Bhagavadgita also (VII, 6), 'I am the origin and the place of
14321 reabsorption of the whole world.' And Apastamba too says with reference
14322 to the highest Self, 'From him spring all bodies; he is the primary
14323 cause, he is eternal, he is unchangeable' (Dharma Sutra I, 8, 23, 2). In
14324 this way Sm/ri/ti, in many places, declares the Lord to be the efficient
14325 as well as the material cause of the world. As the purvapakshin opposes
14326 us on the ground of Sm/ri/ti, we reply to him on the ground of Sm/ri/ti
14327 only; hence the line of defence taken up in the Sutra. Now it has been
14328 shown already that the /S/ruti-texts aim at conveying the doctrine that
14329 the Lord is the universal cause, and as wherever different Sm/ri/tis
14330 conflict those maintaining one view must be accepted, while those which
14331 maintain the opposite view must be set aside, those Sm/ri/tis which
14332 follow /S/ruti are to be considered as authoritative, while all others
14333 are to be disregarded; according to the Sutra met with in the chapter
14334 treating of the means of proof (Mim. Sutra I, 3, 3), 'Where there is
14335 contradiction (between /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti) (Sm/ri/ti) is to be
14336 disregarded; in case of there being no (contradiction) (Sm/ri/ti is to
14337 be recognised) as there is inference (of Sm/ri/ti being founded on
14338 /S/ruti).'--Nor can we assume that some persons are able to perceive
14339 supersensuous matters without /S/ruti, as there exists no efficient
14340 cause for such perception. Nor, again, can it be said that such
14341 perception may be assumed in the case of Kapila and others who possessed
14342 supernatural powers, and consequently unobstructed power of cognition.
14343 For the possession of supernatural powers itself depends on the
14344 performance of religious duty, and religious duty is that which is
14345 characterised by injunction[258]; hence the sense of injunctions (i.e.
14346 of the Veda) which is established first must not be fancifully
14347 interpreted in reference to the dicta of men 'established' (i.e. made
14348 perfect, and therefore possessing supernatural powers) afterwards only.
14349 Moreover, even if those 'perfect' men were accepted as authorities to be
14350 appealed to, still, as there are many such perfect men, we should have,
14351 in all those cases where the Sm/ri/tis contradict each other in the

manner described, no other means of final decision than an appeal to /S/ruti.--As to men destitute of the power of independent judgment, we are not justified in assuming that they will without any reason attach themselves to some particular Sm/ri/ti; for if men's inclinations were so altogether unregulated, truth itself would, owing to the multiformity of human opinion, become unstable. We must therefore try to lead their judgment in the right way by pointing out to them the conflict of the Sm/ri/tis, and the distinction founded on some of them following /S/ruti and others not.--The scriptural passage which the purvapakshin has quoted as proving the eminence of Kapila's knowledge would not justify us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i.e. of some Kapila) as are contrary to Scripture; for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila (without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition with another Kapila, viz. the one who burned the sons of Sagara and had the surname Vasudeva. That passage, moreover, serves another purpose, (viz. the establishment of the doctrine of the highest Self,) and has on that account no force to prove what is not proved by any other means, (viz. the supereminence of Kapila's knowledge.) On the other hand, we have a /S/ruti-passage which proclaims the excellence of Manu[259], viz. 'Whatever Manu said is medicine' (Taitt. Sa/m/h. II, 2, 10, 2). Manu himself, where he glorifies the seeing of the one Self in everything ('he who equally sees the Self in all beings and all beings in the Self, he as a sacrificer to the Self attains self-luminousness,' i.e. becomes Brahman, Manu Sm/ri/ti XII, 91), implicitly blames the doctrine of Kapila. For Kapila, by acknowledging a plurality of Selves, does not admit the doctrine of there being one universal Self. In the Mahabharata also the question is raised whether there are many persons (souls) or one; thereupon the opinion of others is mentioned, 'There are many persons, O King, according to the Sa@nkhyas and Yoga philosophers;' that opinion is controverted 'just as there is one place of origin, (viz. the earth,) for many persons, so I will proclaim to you that universal person raised by his qualities;' and, finally, it is declared that there is one universal Self, 'He is the internal Self of me, of thee, and of all other embodied beings, the internal witness of all, not to be apprehended by any one. He the all-headed, all-armed, all-footed, all-eyed, all-nosed one moves through all beings according to his will and liking.' And Scripture also declares that there is one universal Self, 'When to a man who understands the Self has become all things, what sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who once beheld that unity?' (I/s/. Up 7); and other similar passages. All which proves that the system of Kapila contradicts the Veda, and the doctrine of Manu who follows the Veda, by its hypothesis of a plurality of Selves also, not only by the assumption of an independent pradhana. The authoritativeness of the Veda with regard to the matters stated by it is independent and direct, just as the light of the sun is the direct means of our knowledge of form and colour; the authoritativeness of human dicta, on the other hand, is of an altogether different kind, as it depends on an extraneous basis (viz. the Veda), and is (not immediate but) mediated by a chain of teachers and tradition.

Hence the circumstance that the result (of our doctrine) is want of room for certain Sm/ri/tis, with regard to matters contradicted by the Veda, furnishes no valid objection.--An additional reason for this our opinion is supplied by the following Sutra.

2. And on account of the non-perception of the others (i.e. the effects of the pradhana, according to the Sa@nkhyas system).

The principles different from the pradhana, but to be viewed as its modifications which the (Sa@nkhyas) Sm/ri/ti assumes, as, for instance, the great principle, are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary experience. Now things of the nature of the elements and the sense organs, which are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience, may be referred to in Sm/ri/ti; but with regard to things which, like Kapila's great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from experience--no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth sense--Sm/ri/ti is altogether impossible. That some scriptural passages which apparently refer to such things as the great principle have in reality quite a different meaning has already been shown under I, 4, 1.

14421 But if that part of Sm/ri/ti which is concerned with the effects (i.e.
14422 the great principle, and so on) is without authority, the part which
14423 refers to the cause (the pradhana) will be so likewise. This is what the
14424 Sutra means to say.--We have thus established a second reason, proving
14425 that the circumstance of there being no room left for certain Sm/ri/tis
14426 does not constitute a valid objection to our doctrine.--The weakness of
14427 the trust in reasoning (apparently favouring the Sa@nkhyas doctrine) will
14428 be shown later on under II, 1, 4 ff.

14429
14430 3. Thereby the Yoga (Sm/ri/ti) is refuted.
14431

14432 This Sutra extends the application of the preceding argumentation, and
14433 remarks that by the refutation of the Sa@nkhyas-sm/ri/ti the
14434 Yoga-sm/ri/ti also is to be considered as refuted; for the latter also
14435 assumes, in opposition to Scripture, a pradhana as the independent cause
14436 of the world, and the 'great principle,' &c. as its effects, although
14437 neither the Veda nor common experience favour these views.--But, if the
14438 same reasoning applies to the Yoga also, the latter system is already
14439 disposed of by the previous arguments; of what use then is it formally
14440 to extend them to the Yoga? (as the Sutra does.)--We reply that here an
14441 additional cause of doubt presents itself, the practice of Yoga being
14442 enjoined in the Veda as a means of obtaining perfect knowledge; so, for
14443 instance, B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5, '(The Self) is to be heard, to be
14444 thought, to be meditated upon[260].' In the /S/veta/s/vatara Upanishad,
14445 moreover, we find various injunctions of Yoga-practice connected with
14446 the assumption of different positions of the body; &c.; so, for
14447 instance, 'Holding his body with its three erect parts even,' &c. (II,
14448 8).

14449
14450 Further, we find very many passages in the Veda which (without expressly
14451 enjoining it) point to the Yoga, as, for instance, Ka. Up. II, 6, 11,
14452 'This, the firm holding back of the senses, is what is called Yoga;'
14453 'Having received this knowledge and the whole rule of Yoga' (Ka. Up. II,
14454 6, 18); and so on. And in the Yoga-/s/astra itself the passage, 'Now
14455 then Yoga, the means of the knowledge of truth,' &c. defines the Yoga as
14456 a means of reaching perfect knowledge. As thus one topic of the /s/astra
14457 at least (viz. the practice of Yoga) is shown to be authoritative, the
14458 entire Yoga-sm/ri/ti will have to be accepted as unobjectionable, just
14459 as the Sm/ri/ti referring to the ash/t/akas[261].--To this we reply that
14460 the formal extension (to the Yoga, of the arguments primarily directed
14461 against the Sa@nkhyas) has the purpose of removing the additional doubt
14462 stated in the above lines; for in spite of a part of the Yoga-sm/ri/ti
14463 being authoritative, the disagreement (between Sm/ri/ti and /S/ruti) on
14464 other topics remains as shown above.--Although[262] there are many
14465 Sm/ri/tis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refutation the
14466 Sa@nkhyas and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means
14467 for accomplishing the highest end of man and have found favour with many
14468 competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic
14469 passage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause which is to be
14470 apprehended by Sa@nkhyas and Yoga he is freed from all fetters' (/S/ve.
14471 Up. VI, 13). (The claims which on the ground of this last passage might
14472 be set up for the Sa@nkhyas and Yoga-sm/ri/tis in their entirety) we
14473 refute by the remark that the highest beatitude (the highest aim of man)
14474 is not to be attained by the knowledge of the Sa@nkhyas-sm/ri/ti
14475 irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice. For
14476 Scripture itself declares that there is no other means of obtaining the
14477 highest beatitude but the knowledge of the unity of the Self which is
14478 conveyed by the Veda, 'Over death passes only the man who knows him;
14479 there is no other path to go' (/S/ve. Up. III, 8). And the Sa@nkhyas and
14480 Yoga-systems maintain duality, do not discern the unity of the Self. In
14481 the passage quoted ('That cause which is to be apprehended by Sa@nkhyas
14482 and Yoga') the terms 'Sa@nkhyas' and 'Yoga' denote Vedic knowledge and
14483 meditation, as we infer from proximity[263]. We willingly allow room for
14484 those portions of the two systems which do not contradict the Veda. In
14485 their description of the soul, for instance, as free from all qualities
14486 the Sa@nkhyas are in harmony with the Veda which teaches that the person
14487 (purusha) is essentially pure; cp. B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 16. 'For that
14488 person is not attached to anything.' The Yoga again in giving rules for
14489 the condition of the wandering religious mendicant admits that state of

14490 retirement from the concerns of life which is known from scriptural
14491 passages such as the following one, 'Then the parivrajaka with
14492 discoloured (yellow) dress, shaven, without any possessions,' &c.
14493 (Jabala Upan. IV).
14494

14495 The above remarks will serve as a reply to the claims of all
14496 argumentative Sm/ri/tis. If it be said that those Sm/ri/tis also assist,
14497 by argumentation and proof, the cognition of truth, we do not object to
14498 so much, but we maintain all the same that the truth can be known from
14499 the Vedanta-texts only; as is stated by scriptural passages such as
14500 'None who does not know the Veda perceives that great one' (Taitt. Br.
14501 III, 12, 9, 7); 'I now ask thee that person taught in the Upanishads'
14502 (B/ri/. Up, III, 9, 26); and others.
14503

14504 4. (Brahman can) not (be the cause of the world) on account of the
14505 difference of character of that, (viz. the world); and its being such,
14506 (i.e. different from Brahman) (we learn) from Scripture.
14507

14508 The objections, founded on Sm/ri/ti, against the doctrine of Brahman
14509 being the efficient and the material cause of this world have been
14510 refuted; we now proceed to refute those founded on Reasoning.--But (to
14511 raise an objection at the outset) how is there room for objections
14512 founded on Reasoning after the sense of the sacred texts has once been
14513 settled? The sacred texts are certainly to be considered absolutely
14514 authoritative with regard to Brahman as well as with regard to religious
14515 duty (dharma).--(To this the purvapakshin replies), The analogy between
14516 Brahman and dharma would hold good if the matter in hand were to be
14517 known through the holy texts only, and could not be approached by the
14518 other means of right knowledge also. In the case of religious duties,
14519 i.e. things to be done, we indeed entirely depend on Scripture. But now
14520 we are concerned with Brahman which is an accomplished existing thing,
14521 and in the case of accomplished things there is room for other means of
14522 right knowledge also, as, for instance, the case of earth and the other
14523 elements shows. And just as in the case of several conflicting
14524 scriptural passages we explain all of them in such a manner as to make
14525 them accord with one, so /S/ruti, if in conflict with other means of
14526 right knowledge, has to be bent so as to accord with the letter.
14527 Moreover, Reasoning, which enables us to infer something not actually
14528 perceived in consequence of its having a certain equality of attributes
14529 with what is actually perceived, stands nearer to perception than
14530 /S/ruti which conveys its sense by tradition merely. And the knowledge
14531 of Brahman which discards Nescience and effects final release terminates
14532 in a perception (viz. the intuition--sakshatkara--of Brahman), and as
14533 such must be assumed to have a seen result (not an unseen one like
14534 dharma)[264]. Moreover, the scriptural passage, 'He is to be heard, to
14535 be thought,' enjoins thought in addition to hearing, and thereby shows
14536 that Reasoning also is to be resorted to with regard to Brahman. Hence
14537 an objection founded on Reasoning is set forth, 'Not so, on account of
14538 the difference of nature of this (effect). '--The Vedantic opinion that
14539 the intelligent Brahman is the material cause of this world is untenable
14540 because the effect would in that case be of an altogether different
14541 character from the cause. For this world, which the Vedantin considers
14542 as the effect of Brahman, is perceived to be non-intelligent and impure,
14543 consequently different in character from Brahman; and Brahman again is
14544 declared by the sacred texts to be of a character different from the
14545 world, viz. intelligent and pure. But things of an altogether different
14546 character cannot stand to each other in the relation of material cause
14547 and effect. Such effects, for instance, as golden ornaments do not have
14548 earth for their material cause, nor is gold the material cause of
14549 earthen vessels; but effects of an earthy nature originate from earth
14550 and effects of the nature of gold from gold. In the same manner this
14551 world, which is non-intelligent and comprises pleasure, pain, and
14552 dulness, can only be the effect of a cause itself non-intelligent and
14553 made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness; but not of Brahman which is of
14554 an altogether different character. The difference in character of this
14555 world from Brahman must be understood to be due to its impurity and its
14556 want of intelligence. It is impure because being itself made up of
14557 pleasure, pain, and dulness, it is the cause of delight, grief,
14558 despondency, &c., and because it comprises in itself abodes of various

character such as heaven, hell, and so on. It is devoid of intelligence because it is observed to stand to the intelligent principle in the relation of subserviency, being the instrument of its activity. For the relation of subserviency of one thing to another is not possible on the basis of equality; two lamps, for instance, cannot be said to be subservient to each other (both being equally luminous).--But, it will be said, an intelligent instrument also might be subservient to the enjoying soul; just as an intelligent servant is subservient to his master.--This analogy, we reply, does not hold good, because in the case of servant and master also only the non-intelligent element in the former is subservient to the intelligent master. For a being endowed with intelligence subserves another intelligent being only with the non-intelligent part belonging to it, viz. its internal organ, sense organs, &c.; while in so far as it is intelligent itself it acts neither for nor against any other being. For the Sa@nkhyas are of opinion that the intelligent beings (i.e. the souls) are incapable of either taking in or giving out anything[265], and are non-active. Hence that only which is devoid of intelligence can be an instrument. Nor[266] is there anything to show that things like pieces of wood and clods of earth are of an intelligent nature; on the contrary, the dichotomy of all things which exist into such as are intelligent and such as are non-intelligent is well established. This world therefore cannot have its material cause in Brahman from which it is altogether different in character.--Here somebody might argue as follows. Scripture tells us that this world has originated from an intelligent cause; therefore, starting from the observation that the attributes of the cause survive in the effect, I assume this whole world to be intelligent. The absence of manifestation of intelligence (in this world) is to be ascribed to the particular nature of the modification[267]. Just as undoubtedly intelligent beings do not manifest their intelligence in certain states such as sleep, swoon, &c., so the intelligence of wood and earth also is not manifest (although it exists). In consequence of this difference produced by the manifestation and non-manifestation of intelligence (in the case of men, animals, &c., on the one side, and wood, stones, &c. on the other side), and in consequence of form, colour, and the like being present in the one case and absent in the other, nothing prevents the instruments of action (earth, wood, &c.) from standing to the souls in the relation of a subordinate to a superior thing, although in reality both are equally of an intelligent nature. And just as such substances as flesh, broth, pap, and the like may, owing to their individual differences, stand in the relation of mutual subserviency, although fundamentally they are all of the same nature, viz. mere modifications of earth, so it will be in the case under discussion also, without there being done any violence to the well-known distinction (of beings intelligent and non-intelligent).--This reasoning--the purvapakshin replies--if valid might remove to a certain extent that difference of character between Brahman and the world which is due to the circumstance of the one being intelligent and the other non-intelligent; there would, however, still remain that other difference which results from the fact that the one is pure and the other impure. But in reality the argumentation of the objector does not even remove the first-named difference; as is declared in the latter part of the Sutra, 'And its being such we learn from Scripture.' For the assumption of the intellectuality of the entire world--which is supported neither by perception nor by inference, &c.--must be considered as resting on Scripture only in so far as the latter speaks of the world as having originated from an intelligent cause; but that scriptural statement itself is contradicted by other texts which declare the world to be 'of such a nature,' i.e. of a nature different from that of its material cause. For the scriptural passage, 'It became that which is knowledge and that which is devoid of knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), which teaches that a certain class of beings is of a non-intelligent nature intimates thereby that the non-intelligent world is different from the intelligent Brahman.--But--somebody might again object--the sacred texts themselves sometimes speak of the elements and the bodily organs, which are generally considered to be devoid of intelligence, as intelligent beings. The following passages, for instance, attribute intelligence to the elements. 'The earth spoke;' 'The waters spoke' (/S/at. Br. VI, 1, 3, 2; 4); and, again, 'Fire thought;' 'Water thought' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3;

14628 4). Other texts attribute intelligence to the bodily organs, 'These
14629 pra/n/as when quarrelling together as to who was the best went to
14630 Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. VI, 1, 7); and, again, 'They said to Speech: Do
14631 thou sing out for us' (B/ri/. Up. I, 3, 2).--To this objection the
14632 purvapakshin replies in the following Sutra.

14633
14634 5. But (there takes place) denotation of the superintending (deities),
14635 on account of the difference and the connexion.

14636
14637 The word 'but' discards the doubt raised. We are not entitled to base
14638 the assumption of the elements and the sense organs being of an
14639 intellectual nature on such passages as 'the earth spoke,' &c. because
14640 'there takes place denotation of that which presides.' In the case of
14641 actions like speaking, disputing, and so on, which require intelligence,
14642 the scriptural passages denote not the mere material elements and
14643 organs, but rather the intelligent divinities which preside over earth,
14644 &c., on the one hand, and Speech, &c., on the other hand. And why so?
14645 'On account of the difference and the connexion.' The difference is the
14646 one previously referred to between the enjoying souls, on the one hand,
14647 and the material elements and organs, on the other hand, which is
14648 founded on the distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent
14649 beings; that difference would not be possible if all beings were
14650 intelligent. Moreover, the Kaushitakins in their account of the dispute
14651 of the pra/n/as make express use of the word 'divinities' in order to
14652 preclude the idea of the mere material organs being meant, and in order
14653 to include the superintending intelligent beings. They say, 'The deities
14654 contending with each for who was the best;' and, again, 'All these
14655 deities having recognised the pre-eminence in pra/n/a' (Kau. Up. II,
14656 14).--And, secondly, Mantras, Arthavadas, Itihasas, Pura/n/as, &c. all
14657 declare that intelligent presiding divinities are connected with
14658 everything. Moreover, such scriptural passages as 'Agni having become
14659 Speech entered into the mouth' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 2, 4) show that each
14660 bodily organ is connected with its own favouring divinity. And in the
14661 passages supplementary to the quarrel of the pra/n/as we read in one
14662 place how, for the purpose of settling their relative excellence, they
14663 went to Prajapati, and how they settled their quarrel on the ground of
14664 presence and absence, each of them, as Prajapati had advised, departing
14665 from the body for some time ('They went to their father Prajapati and
14666 said,' &c.; Ch. Up. V, 1, 7); and in another place it is said that they
14667 made an offering to pra/n/a (B/ri/. Up. VI, 1, 13), &c.; all of them
14668 proceedings which are analogous to those of men, &c., and therefore
14669 strengthen the hypothesis that the text refers to the superintending
14670 deities. In the case of such passages as, 'Fire thought,' we must assume
14671 that the thought spoken of is that of the highest deity which is
14672 connected with its effects as a superintending principle.--From all this
14673 it follows that this world is different in nature from Brahman, and
14674 hence cannot have it for its material cause.

14675
14676 To this objection raised by the purvapakshin the next Sutra replies.

14677
14678 6. But it is seen.

14679
14680 The word 'but' discards the purvapaksha.

14681
14682 Your assertion that this world cannot have originated from Brahman on
14683 account of the difference of its character is not founded on an
14684 absolutely true tenet. For we see that from man, who is acknowledged to
14685 be intelligent, non-intelligent things such as hair and nails originate,
14686 and that, on the other hand, from avowedly non-intelligent matter, such
14687 as cow-dung, scorpions and similar animals are produced.--But--to state
14688 an objection--the real cause of the non-intelligent hair and nails is
14689 the human body which is itself non-intelligent, and the non-intelligent
14690 bodies only of scorpions are the effects of non-intelligent dung.--Even
14691 thus, we reply, there remains a difference in character (between the
14692 cause, for instance, the dung, and the effect, for instance, the body of
14693 the scorpion), in so far as some non-intelligent matter (the body) is
14694 the abode of an intelligent principle (the scorpion's soul), while other
14695 non-intelligent matter (the dung) is not. Moreover, the difference of
14696 nature--due to the cause passing over into the effect--between the

14697 bodies of men on the one side and hair and nails on the other side, is,
14698 on account of the divergence of colour, form, &c., very considerable
14699 after all. The same remark holds good with regard to cow-dung and the
14700 bodies of scorpions, &c. If absolute equality were insisted on (in the
14701 case of one thing being the effect of another), the relation of material
14702 cause and effect (which after all requires a distinction of the two)
14703 would be annihilated. If, again, it be remarked that in the case of men
14704 and hair as well as in that of scorpions and cow-dung there is one
14705 characteristic feature, at least, which is found in the effect as well
14706 as in the cause, viz. the quality of being of an earthy nature; we reply
14707 that in the case of Brahman and the world also one characteristic
14708 feature, viz. that of existence (satta), is found in ether, &c. (which
14709 are the effects) as well as in Brahman (which is the cause).--He,
14710 moreover, who on the ground of the difference of the attributes tries to
14711 invalidate the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world, must
14712 assert that he understands by difference of attributes either the
14713 non-occurrence (in the world) of the entire complex of the
14714 characteristics of Brahman, or the non-occurrence of any (some or other)
14715 characteristic, or the non-occurrence of the characteristic of
14716 intelligence. The first assertion would lead to the negation of the
14717 relation of cause and effect in general, which relation is based on the
14718 fact of there being in the effect something over and above the cause
14719 (for if the two were absolutely identical they could not be
14720 distinguished). The second assertion is open to the charge of running
14721 counter to what is well known; for, as we have already remarked, the
14722 characteristic quality of existence which belongs to Brahman is found
14723 likewise in ether and so on. For the third assertion the requisite
14724 proving instances are wanting; for what instances could be brought
14725 forward against the upholder of Brahman, in order to prove the general
14726 assertion that whatever is devoid of intelligence is seen not to be an
14727 effect of Brahman? (The upholder of Brahman would simply not admit any
14728 such instances) because he maintains that this entire complex of things
14729 has Brahman for its material cause. And that all such assertions are
14730 contrary to Scripture, is clear, as we have already shown it to be the
14731 purport of Scripture that Brahman is the cause and substance of the
14732 world. It has indeed been maintained by the purvapakshin that the other
14733 means of proof also (and not merely sacred tradition) apply to Brahman,
14734 on account of its being an accomplished entity (not something to be
14735 accomplished as religious duties are); but such an assertion is entirely
14736 gratuitous. For Brahman, as being devoid of form and so on, cannot
14737 become an object of perception; and as there are in its case no
14738 characteristic marks (on which conclusions, &c. might be based),
14739 inference also and the other means of proof do not apply to it; but,
14740 like religious duty, it is to be known solely on the ground of holy
14741 tradition. Thus Scripture also declares, 'That doctrine is not to be
14742 obtained by argument, but when it is declared by another then, O
14743 dearest! it is easy to understand' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 9). And again, 'Who in
14744 truth knows it? Who could here proclaim it, whence this creation
14745 sprang?' (/Ri/g-v. Sa/m/h. X, 129, 6). These two mantras show that the
14746 cause of this world is not to be known even by divine beings
14747 (i/s/vara)[268] of extraordinary power and wisdom.

14748
14749 There are also the following Sm/ri/ti passages to the same effect: 'Do
14750 not apply reasoning to those things which are uncognisable[269];'
14751 'Unevolved he is called, uncognisable, unchangeable;' 'Not the legions
14752 of the gods know my origin, not the great /ri/shis. For I myself am in
14753 every way the origin of the gods and great /ri/shis' (Bha. Gi. X,
14754 2).--And if it has been maintained above that the scriptural passage
14755 enjoining thought (on Brahman) in addition to mere hearing (of the
14756 sacred texts treating of Brahman) shows that reasoning also is to be
14757 allowed its place, we reply that the passage must not deceitfully be
14758 taken as enjoining bare independent ratiocination, but must be
14759 understood to represent reasoning as a subordinate auxiliary of
14760 intuitional knowledge. By reasoning of the latter type we may, for
14761 instance, arrive at the following conclusions; that because the state of
14762 dream and the waking state exclude each other the Self is not connected
14763 with those states; that, as the soul in the state of deep sleep leaves
14764 the phenomenal world behind and becomes one with that whose Self is pure
14765 Being, it has for its Self pure Being apart from the phenomenal world;

14766 that as the world springs from Brahman it cannot be separate from
14767 Brahman, according to the principle of the non-difference of cause and
14768 effect, &c.[270] The fallaciousness of mere reasoning will moreover be
14769 demonstrated later on (II, 1, 11).--He[271], moreover, who merely on the
14770 ground of the sacred tradition about an intelligent cause of the world
14771 would assume this entire world to be of an intellectual nature would
14772 find room for the other scriptural passage quoted above ('He became
14773 knowledge and what is devoid of knowledge') which teaches a distinction
14774 of intellect and non-intellect; for he could avail himself of the
14775 doctrine of intellect being sometimes manifested and sometimes
14776 non-manifested. His antagonist, on the other hand (i.e. the Sa@nkhyas),
14777 would not be able to make anything of the passage, for it distinctly
14778 teaches that the highest cause constitutes the Self of the entire world.

14779
14780 If, then, on account of difference of character that which is
14781 intelligent cannot pass over into what is non-intelligent, that also
14782 which is non-intelligent (i.e. in our case, the non-intelligent pradhana
14783 of the Sa@nkhyas) cannot pass over into what is intelligent.--(So much
14784 for argument's sake,) but apart from that, as the argument resting on
14785 difference of character has already been refuted, we must assume an
14786 intelligent cause of the world in agreement with Scripture.

14787
14788 7. If (it is said that the effect is) non-existent (before its
14789 origination); we do not allow that because it is a mere negation
14790 (without an object).

14791
14792 If Brahman, which is intelligent, pure, and devoid of qualities such as
14793 sound, and so on, is supposed to be the cause of an effect which is of
14794 an opposite nature, i.e. non-intelligent, impure, possessing the
14795 qualities of sound, &c., it follows that the effect has to be considered
14796 as non-existing before its actual origination. But this consequence
14797 cannot be acceptable to you--the Vedantins--who maintain the doctrine of
14798 the effect existing in the cause already.

14799
14800 This objection of yours, we reply, is without any force, on account of
14801 its being a mere negation. If you negative the existence of the effect
14802 previous to its actual origination, your negation is a mere negation
14803 without an object to be negated. The negation (implied in
14804 'non-existent') can certainly not have for its object the existence of
14805 the effect previous to its origination, since the effect must be viewed
14806 as 'existent,' through and in the Self of the cause, before its
14807 origination as well as after it; for at the present moment also this
14808 effect does not exist independently, apart from the cause; according to
14809 such scriptural passages as, 'Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere
14810 than in the Self is abandoned by everything' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 6). In
14811 so far, on the other hand, as the effect exists through the Self of the
14812 cause, its existence is the same before the actual beginning of the
14813 effect (as after it).--But Brahman, which is devoid of qualities such as
14814 sound, &c., is the cause of this world (possessing all those
14815 qualities)!--True, but the effect with all its qualities does not exist
14816 without the Self of the cause either now or before the actual beginning
14817 (of the effect); hence it cannot be said that (according to our
14818 doctrine) the effect is non-existing before its actual beginning.--This
14819 point will be elucidated in detail in the section treating of the
14820 non-difference of cause and effect.

14821
14822 8. On account of such consequences at the time of reabsorption (the
14823 doctrine maintained hitherto) is objectionable.

14824
14825 The purvapakshin raises further objections.--If an effect which is
14826 distinguished by the qualities of grossness, consisting of parts,
14827 absence of intelligence, limitation, impurity, &c., is admitted to have
14828 Brahman for its cause, it follows that at the time of reabsorption (of
14829 the world into Brahman), the effect, by entering into the state of
14830 non-division from its cause, inquinates the latter with its properties.
14831 As therefore--on your doctrine--the cause (i.e. Brahman) as well as the
14832 effect is, at the time of reabsorption, characterised by impurity and
14833 similar qualities, the doctrine of the Upanishads, according to which an
14834 omniscient Brahman is the cause of the world, cannot be upheld.--Another

14835 objection to that doctrine is that in consequence of all distinctions
14836 passing at the time of reabsorption into the state of non-distinction
14837 there would be no special causes left at the time of a new beginning of
14838 the world, and consequently the new world could not arise with all the
14839 distinctions of enjoying souls, objects to be enjoyed and so on (which
14840 are actually observed to exist).--A third objection is that, if we
14841 assume the origin of a new world even after the annihilation of all
14842 works, &c. (which are the causes of a new world arising) of the enjoying
14843 souls which enter into the state of non-difference from the highest
14844 Brahman, we are led to the conclusion that also those (souls) which have
14845 obtained final release again appear in the new world.--If you finally
14846 say, 'Well, let this world remain distinct from the highest Brahman even
14847 at the time of reabsorption,' we reply that in that case a reabsorption
14848 will not take place at all, and that, moreover, the effect's existing
14849 separate from the cause is not possible.--For all these reasons the
14850 Vedanta doctrine is objectionable.

14851
14852 To this the next Sutra replies.

14853
14854 9. Not so; as there are parallel instances.

14855
14856 There is nothing objectionable in our system.--The objection that the
14857 effect when being reabsorbed into its cause would inqurate the latter
14858 with its qualities does not damage our position 'because there are
14859 parallel instances,' i.e. because there are instances of effects not
14860 inquiring with their qualities the causes into which they are
14861 reabsorbed. Things, for instance, made of clay, such as pots, &c., which
14862 in their state of separate existence are of various descriptions, do
14863 not, when they are reabsorbed into their original matter (i.e. clay),
14864 impart to the latter their individual qualities; nor do golden ornaments
14865 impart their individual qualities to their elementary material, i.e.
14866 gold, into which they may finally be reabsorbed. Nor does the fourfold
14867 complex of organic beings which springs from earth impart its qualities
14868 to the latter at the time of reabsorption. You (i.e. the purvapakshin),
14869 on the other hand, have not any instances to quote in your favour. For
14870 reabsorption could not take place at all if the effect when passing back
14871 into its causal substance continued to subsist there with all its
14872 individual properties. And[272] that in spite of the non-difference of
14873 cause and effect the effect has its Self in the cause, but not the cause
14874 in the effect, is a point which we shall render clear later on, under
14875 II, 1, 14.

14876
14877 Moreover, the objection that the effect would impart its qualities to
14878 the cause at the time of reabsorption is formulated too narrowly
14879 because, the identity of cause and effect being admitted, the same would
14880 take place during the time of the subsistence (of the effect, previous
14881 to its reabsorption). That the identity of cause and effect (of Brahman
14882 and the world) holds good indiscriminately with regard to all time (not
14883 only the time of reabsorption), is declared in many scriptural passages,
14884 as, for instance, 'This everything is that Self' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 6);
14885 'The Self is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'The immortal Brahman is
14886 this before' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'All this is Brahman' (Ch. Up. III,
14887 14, 1).

14888
14889 With regard to the case referred to in the /S/ruti-passages we refute
14890 the assertion of the cause being affected by the effect and its
14891 qualities by showing that the latter are the mere fallacious
14892 superimpositions of nescience, and the very same argument holds good
14893 with reference to reabsorption also.--We can quote other examples in
14894 favour of our doctrine. As the magician is not at any time affected by
14895 the magical illusion produced by himself, because it is unreal, so the
14896 highest Self is not affected by the world-illusion. And as one dreaming
14897 person is not affected by the illusory visions of his dream because they
14898 do not accompany the waking state and the state of dreamless sleep; so
14899 the one permanent witness of the three states (viz. the highest Self
14900 which is the one unchanging witness of the creation, subsistence, and
14901 reabsorption of the world) is not touched by the mutually exclusive
14902 three states. For that the highest Self appears in those three states,
14903 is a mere illusion, not more substantial than the snake for which the

14904 rope is mistaken in the twilight. With reference to this point teachers
14905 knowing the true tradition of the Vedanta have made the following
14906 declaration, 'When the individual soul which is held in the bonds of
14907 slumber by the beginningless Maya awakes, then it knows the eternal,
14908 sleepless, dreamless non-duality' (Gau/d/ap. Kar. I, 16).

14909
14910 So far we have shown that--on our doctrine--there is no danger of the
14911 cause being affected at the time of reabsorption by the qualities of the
14912 effect, such as grossness and the like.--With regard to the second
14913 objection, viz. that if we assume all distinctions to pass (at the time
14914 of reabsorption) into the state of non-distinction there would be no
14915 special reason for the origin of a new world affected with distinctions,
14916 we likewise refer to the 'existence of parallel instances.' For the case
14917 is parallel to that of deep sleep and trance. In those states also the
14918 soul enters into an essential condition of non-distinction;
14919 nevertheless, wrong knowledge being not yet finally overcome, the old
14920 state of distinction re-establishes itself as soon as the soul awakes
14921 from its sleep or trance. Compare the scriptural passage, 'All these
14922 creatures when they have become merged in the True, know not that they
14923 are merged in the True. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a
14924 lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a
14925 mosquito, that they become again' (Ch. Up. VI, 9, 2; 3) For just as
14926 during the subsistence of the world the phenomenon of multifarious
14927 distinct existence, based on wrong knowledge, proceeds unimpeded like
14928 the vision of a dream, although there is only one highest Self devoid of
14929 all distinction; so, we conclude, there remains, even after
14930 reabsorption, the power of distinction (potential distinction) founded
14931 on wrong knowledge.--Herewith the objection that--according to our
14932 doctrine--even the finally released souls would be born again is already
14933 disposed of. They will not be born again because in their case wrong
14934 knowledge has been entirely discarded by perfect knowledge.--The last
14935 alternative finally (which the purvapakshin had represented as open to
14936 the Vedantin), viz. that even at the time of reabsorption the world
14937 should remain distinct from Brahman, precludes itself because it is not
14938 admitted by the Vedantins themselves.--Hence the system founded on the
14939 Upanishads is in every way unobjectionable.

14940
14941 10. And because the objections (raised by the Sa@nkhyas against the
14942 Vedanta doctrine) apply to his view also.

14943
14944 The doctrine of our opponent is liable to the very same objections which
14945 he urges against us, viz. in the following manner.--The objection that
14946 this world cannot have sprung from Brahman on account of its difference
14947 of character applies no less to the doctrine of the pradhana being the
14948 cause of the world; for that doctrine also assumes that from a pradhana
14949 devoid of sound and other qualities a world is produced which possesses
14950 those very qualities. The beginning of an effect different in character
14951 being thus admitted, the Sa@nkhyas are equally driven to the doctrine that
14952 before the actual beginning the effect was non-existent. And, moreover,
14953 it being admitted (by the Sa@nkhyas also) that at the time of
14954 reabsorption the effect passes back into the state of non-distinction
14955 from the cause, the case of the Sa@nkhyas here also is the same as
14956 ours.--And, further, if (as the Sa@nkhyas also must admit) at the time of
14957 reabsorption the differences of all the special effects are obliterated
14958 and pass into a state of general non-distinction, the special fixed
14959 conditions, which previous to reabsorption were the causes of the
14960 different worldly existence of each soul, can, at the time of a new
14961 creation, no longer be determined, there being no cause for them; and if
14962 you assume them to be determined without a cause, you are driven to the
14963 admission that even the released souls have to re-enter a state of
14964 bondage, there being equal absence of a cause (in the case of the
14965 released and the non-released souls). And if you try to avoid this
14966 conclusion by assuming that at the time of reabsorption some individual
14967 differences pass into the state of non-distinction, others not, we reply
14968 that in that case the latter could not be considered as effects of the
14969 pradhana[273].--It thus appears that all those difficulties (raised by
14970 the Sa@nkhyas) apply to both views, and cannot therefore be urged against
14971 either only. But as either of the two doctrines must necessarily be
14972 accepted, we are strengthened--by the outcome of the above

14973 discussion--in the opinion that the alleged difficulties are no real
14974 difficulties[274].

14975
14976 11. If it be said that, in consequence of the ill-foundedness of
14977 reasoning, we must frame our conclusions otherwise; (we reply that) thus
14978 also there would result non-release.

14979
14980 In matters to be known from Scripture mere reasoning is not to be relied
14981 on for the following reason also. As the thoughts of man are altogether
14982 unfettered, reasoning which disregards the holy texts and rests on
14983 individual opinion only has no proper foundation. We see how arguments,
14984 which some clever men had excogitated with great pains, are shown, by
14985 people still more ingenious, to be fallacious, and how the arguments of
14986 the latter again are refuted in their turn by other men; so that, on
14987 account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to accept
14988 mere reasoning as having a sure foundation. Nor can we get over this
14989 difficulty by accepting as well-founded the reasoning of some person of
14990 recognised mental eminence, may he now be Kapila or anybody else; since
14991 we observe that even men of the most undoubted mental eminence, such as
14992 Kapila, Ka/n/ada, and other founders of philosophical schools, have
14993 contradicted one another.

14994
14995 But (our adversary may here be supposed to say), we will fashion our
14996 reasoning otherwise, i.e. in such a manner as not to lay it open to the
14997 charge of having no proper foundation. You cannot, after all, maintain
14998 that no reasoning whatever is well-founded; for you yourself can found
14999 your assertion that reasoning has no foundation on reasoning only; your
15000 assumption being that because some arguments are seen to be devoid of
15001 foundation other arguments as belonging to the same class are likewise
15002 devoid of foundation. Moreover, if all reasoning were unfounded, the
15003 whole course of practical human life would have to come to an end. For
15004 we see that men act, with a view to obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain
15005 in the future time, on the assumption that the past, the present, and
15006 the future are uniform.--Further, in the case of passages of Scripture
15007 (apparently) contradicting each other, the ascertainment of the real
15008 sense, which depends on a preliminary refutation of the apparent sense,
15009 can be effected only by an accurate definition of the meaning of
15010 sentences, and that involves a process of reasoning. Thus Manu also
15011 expresses himself: 'Perception, inference, and the /s/astra according to
15012 the various traditions, this triad is to be known well by one desiring
15013 clearness in regard to right.--He who applies reasoning not contradicted
15014 by the Veda to the Veda and the (Sm/ri/ti) doctrine of law, he, and no
15015 other, knows the law' (Manu Sm/ri/ti XII, 105, 106). And that 'want of
15016 foundation', to which you object, really constitutes the beauty of
15017 reasoning, because it enables us to arrive at unobjectionable arguments
15018 by means of the previous refutation of objectionable arguments[275]. (No
15019 fear that because the purvapaksha is ill-founded the siddhanta should be
15020 ill-founded too;) for there is no valid reason to maintain that a man
15021 must be stupid because his elder brother was stupid.--For all these
15022 reasons the want of foundation cannot be used as an argument against
15023 reasoning.

15024
15025 Against this argumentation we remark that thus also there results 'want
15026 of release.' For although with regard to some things reasoning is
15027 observed to be well founded, with regard to the matter in hand there
15028 will result 'want of release,' viz. of the reasoning from this very
15029 fault of ill-foundedness. The true nature of the cause of the world on
15030 which final emancipation depends cannot, on account of its excessive
15031 abstruseness, even be thought of without the help of the holy texts;
15032 for, as already remarked, it cannot become the object of perception,
15033 because it does not possess qualities such as form and the like, and as
15034 it is devoid of characteristic signs, it does not lend itself to
15035 inference and the other means of right knowledge.--Or else (if we adopt
15036 another explanation of the word 'avimoksha') all those who teach the
15037 final release of the soul are agreed that it results from perfect
15038 knowledge. Perfect knowledge has the characteristic mark of uniformity,
15039 because it depends on accomplished actually existing things; for
15040 whatever thing is permanently of one and the same nature is acknowledged
15041 to be a true or real thing, and knowledge conversant about such is

called perfect knowledge; as, for instance, the knowledge embodied in the proposition, 'fire is hot.' Now, it is clear that in the case of perfect knowledge a mutual conflict of men's opinions is impossible. But that cognitions founded on reasoning do conflict is generally known; for we continually observe that what one logician endeavours to establish as perfect knowledge is demolished by another, who, in his turn, is treated alike by a third. How therefore can knowledge, which is founded on reasoning, and whose object is not something permanently uniform, be perfect knowledge?--Nor can it be said that he who maintains the pradhana to be the cause of the world (i.e. the Saṅkhya) is the best of all reasoners, and accepted as such by all philosophers; which would enable us to accept his opinion as perfect knowledge.--Nor can we collect at a given moment and on a given spot all the logicians of the past, present, and future time, so as to settle (by their agreement) that their opinion regarding some uniform object is to be considered perfect knowledge. The Veda, on the other hand, which is eternal and the source of knowledge, may be allowed to have for its object firmly established things, and hence the perfection of that knowledge which is founded on the Veda cannot be denied by any of the logicians of the past, present, or future. We have thus established the perfection of this our knowledge which reposes on the Upanishads, and as apart from it perfect knowledge is impossible, its disregard would lead to 'absence of final release' of the transmigrating souls. Our final position therefore is, that on the ground of Scripture and of reasoning subordinate to Scripture, the intelligent Brahman is to be considered the cause and substance of the world.

12. Thereby those (theories) also which are not accepted by competent persons are explained.

Hitherto we have refuted those objections against the Vedānta-texts which, based on reasoning, take their stand on the doctrine of the pradhana being the cause of the world; (which doctrine deserves to be refuted first), because it stands near to our Vedic system, is supported by somewhat weighty arguments, and has, to a certain extent, been adopted by some authorities who follow the Veda.--But now some dull-witted persons might think that another objection founded on reasoning might be raised against the Vedānta, viz. on the ground of the atomic doctrine. The Sutrakara, therefore, extends to the latter objection the refutation of the former, considering that by the conquest of the most dangerous adversary the conquest of the minor enemies is already virtually accomplished. Other doctrines, as, for instance, the atomic doctrine of which no part has been accepted by either Manu or Vyasa or other authorities, are to be considered as 'explained,' i.e. refuted by the same reasons which enabled us to dispose of the pradhana doctrine. As the reasons on which the refutation hinges are the same, there is no room for further doubt. Such common arguments are the impotence of reasoning to fathom the depth of the transcendental cause of the world, the ill-foundedness of mere Reasoning, the impossibility of final release, even in case of the conclusions being shaped 'otherwise' (see the preceding Sutra), the conflict of Scripture and Reasoning, and so on.

13. If it be said that from the circumstance of (the objects of enjoyment) passing over into the enjoyer (and vice versa) there would result non-distinction (of the two); we reply that (such distinction) may exist (nevertheless), as ordinary experience shows.

Another objection, based on reasoning, is raised against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world.--Although Scripture is authoritative with regard to its own special subject-matter (as, for instance, the causality of Brahman), still it may have to be taken in a secondary sense in those cases where the subject-matter is taken out of its grasp by other means of right knowledge; just as mantras and arthavadas have occasionally to be explained in a secondary sense (when the primary, literal sense is rendered impossible by other means of right knowledge[276]). Analogously reasoning is to be considered invalid outside its legitimate sphere; so, for instance, in the case of religious duty and its opposite[277].--Hence Scripture cannot be

15111 acknowledged to refute what is settled by other means of right
15112 knowledge. And if you ask, 'Where does Scripture oppose itself to what
15113 is thus established?' we give you the following instance. The
15114 distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is well known from
15115 ordinary experience, the enjoyers being intelligent, embodied souls,
15116 while sound and the like are the objects of enjoyment. Devadatta, for
15117 instance, is an enjoyer, the dish (which he eats) an object of
15118 enjoyment. The distinction of the two would be reduced to non-existence
15119 if the enjoyer passed over into the object of enjoyment, and vice versa.
15120 Now this passing over of one thing into another would actually result
15121 from the doctrine of the world being non-different from Brahman. But the
15122 sublation of a well-established distinction is objectionable, not only
15123 with regard to the present time when that distinction is observed to
15124 exist, but also with regard to the past and the future, for which it is
15125 inferred. The doctrine of Brahman's causality must therefore be
15126 abandoned, as it would lead to the sublation of the well-established
15127 distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment.

15128
15129 To the preceding objection we reply, 'It may exist as in ordinary
15130 experience.' Even on our philosophic view the distinction may exist, as
15131 ordinary experience furnishes us with analogous instances. We see, for
15132 instance, that waves, foam, bubbles, and other modifications of the sea,
15133 although they really are not different from the sea-water, exist,
15134 sometimes in the state of mutual separation, sometimes in the state of
15135 conjunction, &c. From the fact of their being non-different from the
15136 sea-water, it does not follow that they pass over into each other; and,
15137 again, although they do not pass over into each other, still they are
15138 not different from the sea. So it is in the case under discussion also.
15139 The enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over into each
15140 other, and yet they are not different from the highest Brahman. And
15141 although the enjoyer is not really an effect of Brahman, since the
15142 unmodified creator himself, in so far as he enters into the effect, is
15143 called the enjoyer (according to the passage, 'Having created he entered
15144 into it,' Taitt. Up. II, 6), still after Brahman has entered into its
15145 effects it passes into a state of distinction, in consequence of the
15146 effect acting as a limiting adjunct; just as the universal ether is
15147 divided by its contact with jars and other limiting adjuncts. The
15148 conclusion is, that the distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment
15149 is possible, although both are non-different from Brahman, their highest
15150 cause, as the analogous instance of the sea and its waves demonstrates.

15151
15152 14. The non-difference of them (i.e. of cause and effect) results from
15153 such terms as 'origin' and the like.

15154
15155 The[278] refutation contained in the preceding Sutra was set forth on
15156 the condition of the practical distinction of enjoyers and objects of
15157 enjoyment being acknowledged. In reality, however, that distinction does
15158 not exist because there is understood to be non-difference (identity) of
15159 cause and effect. The effect is this manifold world consisting of ether
15160 and so on; the cause is the highest Brahman. Of the effect it is
15161 understood that in reality it is non-different from the cause, i.e. has
15162 no existence apart from the cause.--How so?--'On account of the
15163 scriptural word "origin" and others.' The word 'origin' is used in
15164 connexion with a simile, in a passage undertaking to show how through
15165 the knowledge of one thing everything is known; viz. Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4,
15166 'As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the
15167 modification (i.e. the effect; the thing made of clay) being a name
15168 merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is
15169 clay merely; thus,' &c.--The meaning of this passage is that, if there
15170 is known a lump of clay which really and truly is nothing but clay[279],
15171 there are known thereby likewise all things made of clay, such as jars,
15172 dishes, pails, and so on, all of which agree in having clay for their
15173 true nature. For these modifications or effects are names only, exist
15174 through or originate from speech only, while in reality there exists no
15175 such thing as a modification. In so far as they are names (individual
15176 effects distinguished by names) they are untrue; in so far as they are
15177 clay they are true.--This parallel instance is given with reference to
15178 Brahman; applying the phrase 'having its origin in speech' to the case
15179 illustrated by the instance quoted we understand that the entire body of

15180 effects has no existence apart from Brahman.--Later on again the text,
15181 after having declared that fire, water, and earth are the effects of
15182 Brahman, maintains that the effects of these three elements have no
15183 existence apart from them, 'Thus has vanished the specific nature of
15184 burning fire, the modification being a mere name which has its origin in
15185 speech, while only the three colours are what is true' (Ch. Up. VI, 4,
15186 1).--Other sacred texts also whose purport it is to intimate the unity
15187 of the Self are to be quoted here, in accordance with the 'and others'
15188 of the Sutra. Such texts are, 'In that all this has its Self; it is the
15189 True, it is the Self, thou art that' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7); 'This
15190 everything, all is that Self' (/Bri/. Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahman alone is
15191 all this' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'The Self is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25,
15192 2); 'There is in it no diversity' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25).--On any other
15193 assumption it would not be possible to maintain that by the knowledge of
15194 one thing everything becomes known (as the text quoted above declares).
15195 We therefore must adopt the following view. In the same way as those
15196 parts of ethereal space which are limited by jars and waterpots are not
15197 really different from the universal ethereal space, and as the water of
15198 a mirage is not really different from the surface of the salty
15199 steppe--for the nature of that water is that it is seen in one moment
15200 and has vanished in the next, and moreover, it is not to be perceived by
15201 its own nature (i.e. apart from the surface of the desert[280])--; so
15202 this manifold world with its objects of enjoyment, enjoyers and so on
15203 has no existence apart from Brahman.--But--it might be objected--Brahman
15204 has in itself elements of manifoldness. As the tree has many branches,
15205 so Brahman possesses many powers and energies dependent on those powers.
15206 Unity and manifoldness are therefore both true. Thus, a tree considered
15207 in itself is one, but it is manifold if viewed as having branches; so
15208 the sea in itself is one, but manifold as having waves and foam; so the
15209 clay in itself is one, but manifold if viewed with regard to the jars
15210 and dishes made of it. On this assumption the process of final release
15211 resulting from right knowledge may be established in connexion with the
15212 element of unity (in Brahman), while the two processes of common worldly
15213 activity and of activity according to the Veda--which depend on the
15214 karmaka/nd/a--may be established in connexion with the element of
15215 manifoldness. And with this view the parallel instances of clay &c.
15216 agree very well.

15217
15218 This theory, we reply, is untenable because in the instance (quoted in
15219 the Upanishad) the phrase 'as clay they are true' asserts the cause only
15220 to be true while the phrase 'having its origin in speech' declares the
15221 unreality of all effects. And with reference to the matter illustrated
15222 by the instance given (viz. the highest cause, Brahman) we read, 'In
15223 that all this has its Self;' and, again, 'That is true;' whereby it is
15224 asserted that only the one highest cause is true. The following passage
15225 again, 'That is the Self; thou art that, O /S/vetaketu!' teaches that
15226 the embodied soul (the individual soul) also is Brahman. (And we must
15227 note that) the passage distinctly teaches that the fact of the embodied
15228 soul having its Self in Brahman is self-established, not to be
15229 accomplished by endeavour. This doctrine of the individual soul having
15230 its Self in Brahman, if once accepted as the doctrine of the Veda, does
15231 away with the independent existence of the individual soul, just as the
15232 idea of the rope does away with the idea of the snake (for which the
15233 rope had been mistaken). And if the doctrine of the independent
15234 existence of the individual soul has to be set aside, then the opinion
15235 of the entire phenomenal world--which is based on the individual
15236 soul--having an independent existence is likewise to be set aside. But
15237 only for the establishment of the latter an element of manifoldness
15238 would have to be assumed in Brahman, in addition to the element of
15239 unity.--Scriptural passages also (such as, 'When the Self only is all
15240 this, how should he see another?' B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 13) declare that for
15241 him who sees that everything has its Self in Brahman the whole
15242 phenomenal world with its actions, agents, and results of actions is
15243 non-existent. Nor can it be said that this non-existence of the
15244 phenomenal world is declared (by Scripture) to be limited to certain
15245 states; for the passage 'Thou art that' shows that the general fact of
15246 Brahman being the Self of all is not limited by any particular state.
15247 Moreover, Scripture, showing by the instance of the thief (Ch. VI, 16)
15248 that the false-minded is bound while the true-minded is released,

15249 declares thereby that unity is the one true existence while manifoldness
15250 is evolved out of wrong knowledge. For if both were true how could the
15251 man who acquiesces in the reality of this phenomenal world be called
15252 false-minded[281]? Another scriptural passage ('from death to death goes
15253 he who perceives therein any diversity,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 19) declares
15254 the same, by blaming those who perceive any distinction.--Moreover, on
15255 the doctrine, which we are at present impugning, release cannot result
15256 from knowledge, because the doctrine does not acknowledge that some kind
15257 of wrong knowledge, to be removed by perfect knowledge, is the cause of
15258 the phenomenal world. For how can the cognition of unity remove the
15259 cognition of manifoldness if both are true?

15260
15261 Other objections are started.--If we acquiesce in the doctrine of
15262 absolute unity, the ordinary means of right knowledge, perception, &c.,
15263 become invalid because the absence of manifoldness deprives them of
15264 their objects; just as the idea of a man becomes invalid after the right
15265 idea of the post (which at first had been mistaken for a man) has
15266 presented itself. Moreover, all the texts embodying injunctions and
15267 prohibitions will lose their purport if the distinction on which their
15268 validity depends does not really exist. And further, the entire body of
15269 doctrine which refers to final release will collapse, if the distinction
15270 of teacher and pupil on which it depends is not real. And if the
15271 doctrine of release is untrue, how can we maintain the truth of the
15272 absolute unity of the Self, which forms an item of that doctrine?

15273
15274 These objections, we reply, do not damage our position because the
15275 entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as true as long as
15276 the knowledge of Brahman being the Self of all has not arisen; just as
15277 the phantoms of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper
15278 wakes. For as long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the
15279 unity of the Self, so long it does not enter his mind that the world of
15280 effects with its means and objects of right knowledge and its results of
15281 actions is untrue; he rather, in consequence of his ignorance, looks on
15282 mere effects (such as body, offspring, wealth, &c.) as forming part of
15283 and belonging to his Self, forgetful of Brahman being in reality the
15284 Self of all. Hence, as long as true knowledge does not present itself,
15285 there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious
15286 activity should not hold on undisturbed. The case is analogous to that
15287 of a dreaming man who in his dream sees manifold things, and, up to the
15288 moment of waking, is convinced that his ideas are produced by real
15289 perception without suspecting the perception to be a merely apparent
15290 one.--But how (to restate an objection raised above) can the
15291 Vedanta-texts if untrue convey information about the true being of
15292 Brahman? We certainly do not observe that a man bitten by a rope-snake
15293 (i.e. a snake falsely imagined in a rope) dies, nor is the water
15294 appearing in a mirage used for drinking or bathing[282].--This
15295 objection, we reply, is without force (because as a matter of fact we do
15296 see real effects to result from unreal causes), for we observe that
15297 death sometimes takes place from imaginary venom, (when a man imagines
15298 himself to have been bitten by a venomous snake,) and effects (of what
15299 is perceived in a dream) such as the bite of a snake or bathing in a
15300 river take place with regard to a dreaming person.--But, it will be
15301 said, these effects themselves are unreal!--These effects themselves, we
15302 reply, are unreal indeed; but not so the consciousness which the
15303 dreaming person has of them. This consciousness is a real result; for it
15304 is not sublated by the waking consciousness. The man who has risen from
15305 sleep does indeed consider the effects perceived by him in his dream
15306 such as being bitten by a snake, bathing in a river, &c. to be unreal,
15307 but he does not on that account consider the consciousness he had of
15308 them to be unreal likewise.--(We remark in passing that) by this fact of
15309 the consciousness of the dreaming person not being sublated (by the
15310 waking consciousness) the doctrine of the body being our true Self is to
15311 be considered as refuted[283].--Scripture also (in the passage, 'If a
15312 man who is engaged in some sacrifice undertaken for some special wish
15313 sees in his dream a woman, he is to infer therefrom success in his
15314 work') declares that by the unreal phantom of a dream a real result such
15315 as prosperity may be obtained. And, again, another scriptural passage,
15316 after having declared that from the observation of certain unfavourable
15317 omens a man is to conclude that he will not live long, continues 'if

15318 somebody sees in his dream a black man with black teeth and that man
15319 kills him,' intimating thereby that by the unreal dream-phantom a real
15320 fact, viz. death, is notified.--It is, moreover, known from the
15321 experience of persons who carefully observe positive and negative
15322 instances that such and such dreams are auspicious omens, others the
15323 reverse. And (to quote another example that something true can result
15324 from or be known through something untrue) we see that the knowledge of
15325 the real sounds A. &c. is reached by means of the unreal written
15326 letters. Moreover, the reasons which establish the unity of the Self are
15327 altogether final, so that subsequently to them nothing more is required
15328 for full satisfaction[284]. An injunction as, for instance, 'He is to
15329 sacrifice' at once renders us desirous of knowing what is to be
15330 effected, and by what means and in what manner it is to be effected; but
15331 passages such as, 'Thou art that,' 'I am Brahman,' leave nothing to be
15332 desired because the state of consciousness produced by them has for its
15333 object the unity of the universal Self. For as long as something else
15334 remains a desire is possible; but there is nothing else which could be
15335 desired in addition to the absolute unity of Brahman. Nor can it be
15336 maintained that such states of consciousness do not actually arise; for
15337 scriptural passages such as, 'He understood what he said' (Ch. Up. VII,
15338 18, 2), declare them to occur, and certain means are enjoined to bring
15339 them about, such as the hearing (of the Veda from a teacher) and the
15340 recital of the sacred texts. Nor, again, can such consciousness be
15341 objected to on the ground either of uselessness or of erroneousness,
15342 because, firstly, it is seen to have for its result the cessation of
15343 ignorance, and because, secondly, there is no other kind of knowledge by
15344 which it could be sublated. And that before the knowledge of the unity
15345 of the Self has been reached the whole real-unreal course of ordinary
15346 life, worldly as well as religious, goes on unimpeded, we have already
15347 explained. When, however, final authority having intimated the unity of
15348 the Self, the entire course of the world which was founded on the
15349 previous distinction is sublated, then there is no longer any
15350 opportunity for assuming a Brahman comprising in itself various
15351 elements.

15352
15353 But--it may be said--(that would not be a mere assumption, but)
15354 Scripture itself, by quoting the parallel instances of clay and so on,
15355 declares itself in favour of a Brahman capable of modification; for we
15356 know from experience that clay and similar things do undergo
15357 modifications.--This objection--we reply--is without force, because a
15358 number of scriptural passages, by denying all modification of Brahman,
15359 teach it to be absolutely changeless (ku/t/astha). Such passages are,
15360 'This great unborn Self; undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is
15361 indeed Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 25); 'That Self is to be described by
15362 No, no' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 26); 'It is neither coarse nor fine' (B/ri/.
15363 Up. III, 8, 8). For to the one Brahman the two qualities of being
15364 subject to modification and of being free from it cannot both be
15365 ascribed. And if you say, 'Why should they not be both predicated of
15366 Brahman (the former during the time of the subsistence of the world, the
15367 latter during the period of reabsorption) just as rest and motion may be
15368 predicated (of one body at different times)?' we remark that the
15369 qualification, 'absolutely changeless' (ku/t/astha), precludes this. For
15370 the changeless Brahman cannot be the substratum of varying attributes.
15371 And that, on account of the negation of all attributes, Brahman really
15372 is eternal and changeless has already been demonstrated.--Moreover,
15373 while the cognition of the unity of Brahman is the instrument of final
15374 release, there is nothing to show that any independent result is
15375 connected with the view of Brahman, by undergoing a modification,
15376 passing over into the form of this world. Scripture expressly declares
15377 that the knowledge of the changeless Brahman being the universal Self
15378 leads to a result; for in the passage which begins, 'That Self is to be
15379 described by No, no,' we read later on, 'O Janaka, you have indeed
15380 reached fearlessness' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4). We have then[285] to accept
15381 the following conclusion that, in the sections treating of Brahman, an
15382 independent result belongs only to the knowledge of Brahman as devoid of
15383 all attributes and distinctions, and that hence whatever is stated as
15384 having no special fruit of its own--as, for instance, the passages about
15385 Brahman modifying itself into the form of this world--is merely to be
15386 applied as a means for the cognition of the absolute Brahman, but does

15387 not bring about an independent result; according to the principle that
15388 whatever has no result of its own, but is mentioned in connexion with
15389 something else which has such a result, is subordinate to the
15390 latter[286]. For to maintain that the result of the knowledge of Brahman
15391 undergoing modifications would be that the Self (of him who knows that)
15392 would undergo corresponding modifications[287] would be inappropriate,
15393 as the state of filial release (which the soul obtains through the
15394 knowledge of Brahman) is eternally unchanging.
15395

15396 But, it is objected, he who maintains the nature of Brahman to be
15397 changeless thereby contradicts the fundamental tenet according to which
15398 the Lord is the cause of the world, since the doctrine of absolute unity
15399 leaves no room for the distinction of a Ruler and something ruled.--This
15400 objection we ward off by remarking that omniscience, &c. (i.e. those
15401 qualities which belong to Brahman only in so far as it is related to a
15402 world) depend on the evolution of the germinal principles called name
15403 and form, whose essence is Nescience. The fundamental tenet which we
15404 maintain (in accordance with such scriptural passages as, 'From that
15405 Self sprang ether,' &c.; Taitt. Up. II, 1) is that the creation,
15406 sustentation, and reabsorption of the world proceed from an omniscient,
15407 omnipotent Lord, not from a non-intelligent pradhana or any other
15408 principle. That tenet we have stated in I, 1, 4, and here we do not
15409 teach anything contrary to it.--But how, the question may be asked, can
15410 you make this last assertion while all the while you maintain the
15411 absolute unity and non-duality of the Self?--Listen how. Belonging to
15412 the Self, as it were, of the omniscient Lord, there are name and form,
15413 the figments of Nescience, not to be defined either as being (i.e.
15414 Brahman), nor as different from it[288], the germs of the entire expanse
15415 of the phenomenal world, called in /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti the illusion
15416 (maya), power (/s/akti), or nature (prak/ri/ti) of the omniscient Lord.
15417 Different from them is the omniscient Lord himself, as we learn from
15418 scriptural passages such as the following, 'He who is called ether is
15419 the revealer of all forms and names; that within which these forms and
15420 names are contained is Brahman' (Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 1); 'Let me evolve
15421 names and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'He, the wise one, who having
15422 divided all forms and given all names, sits speaking (with those names)'
15423 (Taitt. Ar. III, 12, 7); 'He who makes the one seed manifold' (/S/ve.
15424 Up. VI, 12).--Thus the Lord depends (as Lord) upon the limiting adjuncts
15425 of name and form, the products of Nescience; just as the universal ether
15426 depends (as limited ether, such as the ether of a jar, &c.) upon the
15427 limiting adjuncts in the shape of jars, pots, &c. He (the Lord) stands
15428 in the realm of the phenomenal in the relation of a ruler to the
15429 so-called jivas (individual souls) or cognitional Selfs (vij/n/anatman),
15430 which indeed are one with his own Self--just as the portions of ether
15431 enclosed in jars and the like are one with the universal ether--but are
15432 limited by aggregates of instruments of action (i.e. bodies) produced
15433 from name and form, the presentations of Nescience. Hence the Lord's
15434 being a Lord, his omniscience, his omnipotence, &c. all depend on the
15435 limitation due to the adjuncts whose Self is Nescience; while in reality
15436 none of these qualities belong to the Self whose true nature is cleared,
15437 by right knowledge, from all adjuncts whatever. Thus Scripture also
15438 says, 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands
15439 nothing else, that is the Infinite' (Ch. Up. VII, 24, 1); 'But when the
15440 Self only has become all this, how should he see another?' (B/ri/. Up.
15441 II, 4, 13.) In this manner the Vedanta-texts declare that for him who
15442 has reached the state of truth and reality the whole apparent world does
15443 not exist. The Bhagavadgita also ('The Lord is not the cause of actions,
15444 or of the capacity of performing actions, or of the connexion of action
15445 and fruit; all that proceeds according to its own nature. The Lord
15446 receives no one's sin or merit. Knowledge is enveloped by Ignorance;
15447 hence all creatures are deluded;' Bha. Gi. V, 14; 15) declares that in
15448 reality the relation of Ruler and ruled does not exist. That, on the
15449 other hand, all those distinctions are valid, as far as the phenomenal
15450 world is concerned, Scripture as well as the Bhagavadgita states;
15451 compare B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 22, 'He is the Lord of all, the king of all
15452 things, the protector of all things; he is a bank and boundary, so that
15453 these worlds may not be confounded;' and Bha. Gi. XVIII, 61, 'The Lord,
15454 O Arjuna, is seated in the region of the heart of all beings, turning
15455 round all beings, (as though) mounted on a machine, by his delusion.'

15456 The Sutrakara also asserts the non-difference of cause and effect only
15457 with regard to the state of Reality; while he had, in the preceding
15458 Sutra, where he looked to the phenomenal world, compared Brahman to the
15459 ocean, &c., that comparison resting on the assumption of the world of
15460 effects not yet having been refuted (i.e. seen to be unreal).--The view
15461 of Brahman as undergoing modifications will, moreover, be of use in the
15462 devout meditations on the qualified (sagu/n/a) Brahman.

15463
15464 15. And because only on the existence (of the cause) (the effect) is
15465 observed.

15466
15467 For the following reason also the effect is non-different from the
15468 cause, because only when the cause exists the effect is observed to
15469 exist, not when it does not exist. For instance, only when the clay
15470 exists the jar is observed to exist, and the cloth only when the threads
15471 exist. That it is not a general rule that when one thing exists another
15472 is also observed to exist, appears, for instance, from the fact, that a
15473 horse which is other (different) from a cow is not observed to exist
15474 only when a cow exists. Nor is the jar observed to exist only when the
15475 potter exists; for in that case non-difference does not exist, although
15476 the relation between the two is that of an operative cause and its
15477 effect[289].--But--it may be objected--even in the case of things other
15478 (i.e. non-identical) we find that the observation of one thing regularly
15479 depends on the existence of another; smoke, for instance, is observed
15480 only when fire exists.--We reply that this is untrue, because sometimes
15481 smoke is observed even after the fire has been extinguished; as, for
15482 instance, in the case of smoke being kept by herdsmen in jars.--Well,
15483 then--the objector will say--let us add to smoke a certain qualification
15484 enabling us to say that smoke of such and such a kind[290] does not
15485 exist unless fire exists.--Even thus, we reply, your objection is not
15486 valid, because we declare that the reason for assuming the
15487 non-difference of cause and effect is the fact of the internal organ
15488 (buddhi) being affected (impressed) by cause and effect jointly[291].
15489 And that does not take place in the case of fire and smoke.--Or else we
15490 have to read (in the Sutra) 'bhavat,' and to translate, 'and on account
15491 of the existence or observation.' The non-difference of cause and effect
15492 results not only from Scripture but also from the existence of
15493 perception. For the non-difference of the two is perceived, for
15494 instance, in an aggregate of threads, where we do not perceive a thing
15495 called 'cloth,' in addition to the threads, but merely threads running
15496 lengthways and crossways. So again, in the threads we perceive finer
15497 threads (the aggregate of which is identical with the grosser threads),
15498 in them again finer threads, and so on. On the ground of this our
15499 perception we conclude that the finest parts which we can perceive are
15500 ultimately identical with their causes, viz. red, white, and black (the
15501 colours of fire, water, and earth, according to Ch. Up. VI, 4); those,
15502 again, with air, the latter with ether, and ether with Brahman, which is
15503 one and without a second. That all means of proof lead back to Brahman
15504 (as the ultimate cause of the world; not to pradhana, &c.), we have
15505 already explained.

15506
15507 16. And on account of that which is posterior (i.e. the effect) being
15508 that which is.

15509
15510 For the following reason also the effect is to be considered as
15511 non-different (from the cause). That which is posterior in time, i.e.
15512 the effect, is declared by Scripture to have, previous to its actual
15513 beginning, its Being in the cause, by the Self of the cause merely. For
15514 in passages like, 'In the beginning, my dear, this was that only which
15515 is' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); and, 'Verily, in the beginning this was Self,
15516 one only' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1), the effect which is denoted by the
15517 word 'this' appears in grammatical co-ordination with (the word
15518 denoting) the cause (from which it appears that both inhere in the same
15519 substratum). A thing, on the other hand, which does not exist in another
15520 thing by the Self of the latter is not produced from that other thing;
15521 for instance, oil is not produced from sand. Hence as there is
15522 non-difference before the production (of the effect), we understand that
15523 the effect even after having been produced continues to be non-different
15524 from the cause. As the cause, i.e. Brahman, is in all time neither more

15525 nor less than that which is, so the effect also, viz. the world, is in
15526 all time only that which is. But that which is is one only; therefore
15527 the effect is non-different from the cause.

15528
15529 17. If it be said that on account of being denoted as that which is not
15530 (the effect does) not (exist before it is actually produced); (we reply)
15531 not so, (because the term 'that which is not' denotes) another quality
15532 (merely); (as appears) from the complementary sentence.

15533
15534 But, an objection will be raised, in some places Scripture speaks of the
15535 effect before its production as that which is not; so, for instance, 'In
15536 the beginning this was that only which is not' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1); and
15537 'Non-existent[292] indeed this was in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7).
15538 Hence Being (sattvam) cannot be ascribed to the effect before its
15539 production.

15540
15541 This we deny. For by the Non-existence of the effect previous to its
15542 production is not meant absolute Non-existence, but only a different
15543 quality or state, viz. the state of name and form being unevolved, which
15544 state is different from the state of name and form being evolved. With
15545 reference to the latter state the effect is called, previous to its
15546 production, non-existent although then also it existed identical with
15547 its cause. We conclude this from the complementary passage, according to
15548 the rule that the sense of a passage whose earlier part is of doubtful
15549 meaning is determined by its complementary part. With reference to the
15550 passage. 'In the beginning this was non-existent only,' we remark that
15551 what is there denoted by the word 'Non-existing' is--in the
15552 complementary passage, 'That became existent'--referred to by the word
15553 'that,' and qualified as 'Existent.'

15554
15555 The word 'was' would, moreover, not apply to the (absolutely)
15556 Non-existing, which cannot be conceived as connected with prior or
15557 posterior time.--Hence with reference to the other passage also,
15558 'Non-existing indeed,' &c., the complementary part, 'That made itself
15559 its Self,' shows, by the qualification which it contains, that absolute
15560 Non-existence is not meant.--It follows from all this that the
15561 designation of 'Non-existence' applied to the effect before its
15562 production has reference to a different state of being merely. And as
15563 those things which are distinguished by name and form are in ordinary
15564 language called 'existent,' the term 'non-existent' is figuratively
15565 applied to them to denote the state in which they were previously to
15566 their differentiation.

15567
15568 18. From reasoning and from another Vedic passage.

15569
15570 That the effect exists before its origination and is non-different from
15571 the cause, follows from reasoning as well as from a further scriptural
15572 passage.

15573
15574 We at first set forth the argumentation.--Ordinary experience teaches us
15575 that those who wish to produce certain effects, such as curds, or
15576 earthen jars, or golden ornaments, employ for their purpose certain
15577 determined causal substances such as milk, clay, and gold; those who
15578 wish to produce sour milk do not employ clay, nor do those who intend to
15579 make jars employ milk and so on. But, according to that doctrine which
15580 teaches that the effect is non-existent (before its actual production),
15581 all this should be possible. For if before their actual origination all
15582 effects are equally non-existent in any causal substance, why then
15583 should curds be produced from milk only and not from clay also, and jars
15584 from clay only and not from milk as well?--Let us then maintain, the
15585 asatkaryavadin rejoins, that there is indeed an equal non-existence of
15586 any effect in any cause, but that at the same time each causal substance
15587 has a certain capacity reaching beyond itself (ati/s/aya) for some
15588 particular effect only and not for other effects; that, for instance,
15589 milk only, and not clay, has a certain capacity for curds; and clay
15590 only, and not milk, an analogous capacity for jars.--What, we ask in
15591 return, do you understand by that 'ati/s/aya?' If you understand by it
15592 the antecedent condition of the effect (before its actual origination),
15593 you abandon your doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause,

15594 and prove our doctrine according to which it does so exist. If, on the
15595 other hand, you understand by the *ati/s/aya* a certain power of the cause
15596 assumed to the end of accounting for the fact that only one determined
15597 effect springs from the cause, you must admit that the power can
15598 determine the particular effect only if it neither is other (than cause
15599 and effect) nor non-existent; for if it were either, it would not be
15600 different from anything else which is either non-existent or other than
15601 cause and effect, (and how then should it alone be able to produce the
15602 particular effect?) Hence it follows that that power is identical with
15603 the Self of the cause, and that the effect is identical with the Self of
15604 that power.--Moreover, as the ideas of cause and effect on the one hand
15605 and of substance and qualities on the other hand are not separate ones,
15606 as, for instance, the ideas of a horse and a buffalo, it follows that
15607 the identity of the cause and the effect as well as of the substance and
15608 its qualities has to be admitted. Let it then be assumed, the opponent
15609 rejoins, that the cause and the effect, although really different, are
15610 not apprehended as such, because they are connected by the so-called
15611 *samavaya* connexion[293].--If, we reply, you assume the *samavaya*
15612 connexion between cause and effect, you have either to admit that the
15613 *samavaya* itself is joined by a certain connexion to the two terms which
15614 are connected by *samavaya*, and then that connexion will again require a
15615 new connexion (joining it to the two terms which it binds together), and
15616 you will thus be compelled to postulate an infinite series of
15617 connexions; or else you will have to maintain that the *samavaya* is not
15618 joined by any connexion to the terms which it binds together, and from
15619 that will result the dissolution of the bond which connects the two
15620 terms of the *samavaya* relation[294].--Well then, the opponent rejoins,
15621 let us assume that the *samavaya* connexion as itself being a connexion
15622 may be connected with the terms which it joins without the help of any
15623 further connexion.--Then, we reply, conjunction (*sa/m/yoga*) also must be
15624 connected with the two terms which it joins without the help of the
15625 *samavaya* connexion; for conjunction also is a kind of
15626 connexion[295].--Moreover, as substances, qualities, and so on are
15627 apprehended as standing in the relation of identity, the assumption of
15628 the *samavaya* relation has really no purport.
15629

15630 In what manner again do you--who maintain that the cause and the effect
15631 are joined by the *samavaya* relation--assume a substance consisting of
15632 parts which is an effect to abide in its causes, i.e. in the material
15633 parts of which it consists? Does it abide in all the parts taken
15634 together or in each particular part?--If you say that it abides in all
15635 parts together, it follows that the whole as such cannot be perceived,
15636 as it is impossible that all the parts should be in contact with the
15637 organs of perception. (And let it not be objected that the whole may be
15638 apprehended through some of the parts only), for manyness which abides
15639 in all its substrates together (i.e. in all the many things), is not
15640 apprehended so long as only some of those substrates are
15641 apprehended.--Let it then be assumed that the whole abides in all the
15642 parts by the mediation of intervening aggregates of parts[296].--In that
15643 case, we reply, we should have to assume other parts in addition to the
15644 primary originative parts of the whole, in order that by means of those
15645 other parts the whole could abide in the primary parts in the manner
15646 indicated by you. For we see (that one thing which abides in another
15647 abides there by means of parts different from those of that other
15648 thing), that the sword, for instance, pervades the sheath by means of
15649 parts different from the parts of the sheath. But an assumption of that
15650 kind would lead us into a regressus in infinitum, because in order to
15651 explain how the whole abides in certain given parts we should always
15652 have to assume further parts[297].--Well, then, let us maintain the
15653 second alternative, viz. that the whole abides in each particular
15654 part.--That also cannot be admitted; for if the whole is present in one
15655 part it cannot be present in other parts also; not any more than
15656 Devadatta can be present in /S/rughna and in Pa/t/aliputra on one and
15657 the same day. If the whole were present in more than one part, several
15658 wholes would result, comparable to Devadatta and Yaj/n/adatta, who, as
15659 being two different persons, may live one of them at /S/rughna and the
15660 other at Pa/t/aliputra.--If the opponent should rejoin that the whole
15661 may be fully present in each part, just as the generic character of the
15662 cow is fully present in each individual cow; we point out that the

15663 generic attributes of the cow are visibly perceived in each individual
15664 cow, but that the whole is not thus perceived in each particular part.
15665 If the whole were fully present in each part, the consequence would be
15666 that the whole would produce its effects indifferently with any of its
15667 parts; a cow, for instance, would give milk from her horns or her tail.
15668 But such things are not seen to take place.

15669
15670 We proceed to consider some further arguments opposed to the doctrine
15671 that the effect does not exist in the cause.--That doctrine involves the
15672 conclusion that the actual origination of an effect is without an agent
15673 and thus devoid of substantial being. For origination is an action, and
15674 as such requires an agent[298], just as the action of walking does. To
15675 speak of an action without an agent would be a contradiction. But if you
15676 deny the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, it would have to be
15677 assumed that whenever the origination of a jar, for instance, is spoken
15678 of the agent is not the jar (which before its origination did not exist)
15679 but something else, and again that when the origination of the two
15680 halves of the jar is spoken of the agent is not the two halves but
15681 something else. From this it would follow that the sentence, 'the jar is
15682 originated' means as much as 'the potter and the other (operative)
15683 causes are originated[299].' But as a matter of fact the former sentence
15684 is never understood to mean the latter; and it is, moreover, known that
15685 at the time when the jar originates, the potter, &c. are already in
15686 existence.--Let us then say, the opponent resumes, that origination is
15687 the connexion of the effect with the existence of its cause and its
15688 obtaining existence as a Self.--How, we ask in reply, can something
15689 which has not yet obtained existence enter into connexion with something
15690 else? A connexion is possible of two existing things only, not of one
15691 existing and one non-existing thing or of two non-existing things. To
15692 something non-existing which on that account is indefinable, it is
15693 moreover not possible to assign a limit as the opponent does when
15694 maintaining that the effect is non-existing before its origination; for
15695 experience teaches us that existing things only such as fields and
15696 houses have limits, but not non-existing things. If somebody should use,
15697 for instance, a phrase such as the following one, 'The son of a barren
15698 woman was king previously to the coronation of Pur/n/avarman' the
15699 declaration of a limit in time implied in that phrase does not in
15700 reality determine that the son of the barren woman, i.e. a mere
15701 non-entity, either was or is or will be king. If the son of a barren
15702 woman could become an existing thing subsequently to the activity of
15703 some causal agent, in that case it would be possible also that the
15704 non-existing effect should be something existing, subsequently to the
15705 activity of some causal agent. But we know that the one thing can take
15706 place no more than the other thing; the non-existing effect and the son
15707 of the barren woman are both equally non-entities and can never
15708 be.--But, the asatkaryavadin here objects, from your doctrine there
15709 follows the result that the activity of causal agents is altogether
15710 purposeless. For if the effect were lying already fully accomplished in
15711 the cause and were non-different from it, nobody would endeavour to
15712 bring it about, no more than anybody endeavours to bring about the cause
15713 which is already fully accomplished previously to all endeavour. But as
15714 a matter of fact causal agents do endeavour to bring about effects, and
15715 it is in order not to have to condemn their efforts as altogether
15716 useless that we assume the non-existence of the effect previously to its
15717 origination.--Your objection is refuted, we reply, by the consideration
15718 that the endeavour of the causal agent may be looked upon as having a
15719 purpose in so far as it arranges the causal substance in the form of the
15720 effect. That, however, even the form of the effect (is not something
15721 previously non-existing, but) belongs to the Self of the cause already
15722 because what is devoid of Selfhood cannot be begun at all, we have
15723 already shown above.--Nor does a substance become another substance
15724 merely by appearing under a different aspect. Devadatta may at one time
15725 be seen with his arms and legs closely drawn up to his body, and another
15726 time with his arms and legs stretched out, and yet he remains the same
15727 substantial being, for he is recognised as such. Thus the persons also
15728 by whom we are surrounded, such as fathers, mothers, brothers, &c.,
15729 remain the same, although we see them in continually changing states and
15730 attitudes; for they are always recognised as fathers, mothers, brothers,
15731 and so on. If our opponent objects to this last illustrative example on

15732 the ground that fathers, mothers, and so on remain the same substantial
15733 beings, because the different states in which they appear are not
15734 separated from each other by birth or death, while the effect, for
15735 instance a jar, appears only after the cause, for instance the clay, has
15736 undergone destruction as it were (so that the effect may be looked upon
15737 as something altogether different from the cause); we rebut this
15738 objection by remarking that causal substances also such as milk, for
15739 instance, are perceived to exist even after they have entered into the
15740 condition of effects such as curds and the like (so that we have no
15741 right to say that the cause undergoes destruction). And even in those
15742 cases where the continued existence of the cause is not perceived, as,
15743 for instance, in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which there
15744 spring sprouts and trees, the term 'birth' (when applied to the sprout)
15745 only means that the causal substance, viz. the seed, becomes visible by
15746 becoming a sprout through the continual accretion of similar particles
15747 of matter; and the term 'death' only means that, through the secession
15748 of those particles, the cause again passes beyond the sphere of
15749 visibility. Nor can it be said that from such separation by birth and
15750 death as described just now it follows that the non-existing becomes
15751 existing, and the existing non-existing; for if that were so, it would
15752 also follow that the unborn child in the mother's womb and the new-born
15753 babe stretched out on the bed are altogether different beings.

15754
15755 It would further follow that a man is not the same person in childhood,
15756 manhood, and old age, and that terms such as father and the like are
15757 illegitimately used.--The preceding arguments may also be used to refute
15758 the (Bauddha doctrine) of all existence being momentary only[300].

15759
15760 The doctrine that the effect is non-existent previously to its actual
15761 origination, moreover, leads to the conclusion that the activity of the
15762 causal agent has no object; for what does not exist cannot possibly be
15763 an object; not any more than the ether can be cleft by swords and other
15764 weapons for striking or cutting. The object can certainly not be the
15765 inherent cause; for that would lead to the erroneous conclusion that
15766 from the activity of the causal agent, which has for its object the
15767 inherent cause, there results something else (viz. the effect). And if
15768 (in order to preclude this erroneous conclusion) the opponent should say
15769 that the effect is (not something different from the cause, but) a
15770 certain relative power (ati/s/aya) of the inherent cause; he thereby
15771 would simply concede our doctrine, according to which the effect exists
15772 in the cause already.

15773
15774 We maintain, therefore, as our final conclusion, that milk and other
15775 substances are called effects when they are in the state of curds and so
15776 on, and that it is impossible, even within hundreds of years, ever to
15777 bring about an effect which is different from its cause. The fundamental
15778 cause of all appears in the form of this and that effect, up to the last
15779 effect of all, just as an actor appears in various robes and costumes,
15780 and thereby becomes the basis for all the current notions and terms
15781 concerning the phenomenal world.

15782
15783 The conclusion here established, on the ground of reasoning, viz. that
15784 the effect exists already before its origination, and is non-different
15785 from its cause, results also from a different scriptural passage. As
15786 under the preceding Sutra a Vedic passage was instanced which speaks of
15787 the non-existing, the different passage referred to in the present Sutra
15788 is the one (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1) which refers to that which is. That
15789 passage begins, 'Being only was this in the beginning, one without a
15790 second,' refers, thereupon, to the doctrine of the Non-existent being
15791 the cause of the world ('Others say, Non-being was this in the
15792 beginning'), raises an objection against that doctrine ('How could that
15793 which is be born of that which is not?'), and, finally, reaffirms the
15794 view first set forth, 'Only Being was this in the beginning.' The
15795 circumstance that in this passage the effect, which is denoted by the
15796 word 'this,' is by Scripture, with reference to the time previous to its
15797 origination, coordinated with the cause denoted by the term 'Being,'
15798 proves that the effect exists in--and is non-different from--the cause.
15799 If it were before its origination non-existing and after it inhered in
15800 its cause by samavaya, it would be something different from the cause,

15801 and that would virtually imply an abandonment of the promise made in the
15802 passage, 'That instruction by which we hear what is not heard,' &c. (VI,
15803 1, 3). The latter assertion is ratified, on the other hand, through the
15804 comprehension that the effect exists in--and is not different from--the
15805 cause.

15806
15807 19. And like a piece of cloth.
15808

15809 As of a folded piece of cloth we do not know clearly whether it is a
15810 piece of cloth or some other thing, while on its being unfolded it
15811 becomes manifest that the folded thing was a piece of cloth; and as, so
15812 long as it is folded, we perhaps know that it is a piece of cloth but
15813 not of what definite length and width it is, while on its being unfolded
15814 we know these particulars, and at the same time that the cloth is not
15815 different from the folded object; in the same way an effect, such as a
15816 piece of cloth, is non-manifest as long as it exists in its causes, i.e.
15817 the threads, &c. merely, while it becomes manifest and is clearly
15818 apprehended in consequence of the operations of shuttle, loom, weaver,
15819 and so on.--Applying this instance of the piece of cloth, first folded
15820 and then unfolded, to the general case of cause and effect, we conclude
15821 that the latter is non-different from the former.
15822

15823 20. And as in the case of the different vital airs.
15824

15825 It is a matter of observation that when the operations of the different
15826 kinds of vital air--such as prana the ascending vital air, apana the
15827 descending vital air, &c.--are suspended, in consequence of the breath
15828 being held so that they exist in their causes merely, the only effect
15829 which continues to be accomplished is life, while all other effects,
15830 such as the bending and stretching of the limbs and so on, are stopped.
15831 When, thereupon, the vital airs again begin to act, those other effects
15832 also are brought about, in addition to mere life.--Nor must the vital
15833 airs, on account of their being divided into classes, be considered as
15834 something else than vital air; for wind (air) constitutes their common
15835 character. Thus (i.e. in the manner illustrated by the instance of the
15836 vital airs) the non-difference of the effect from the cause is to be
15837 conceived.--As, therefore, the whole world is an effect of Brahman and
15838 non-different from it, the promise held out in the scriptural passage
15839 that 'What is not heard is heard, what is not perceived is perceived,
15840 what is not known is known' (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 3) is fulfilled[301].
15841

15842 21. On account of the other (i.e. the individual soul) being designated
15843 (as non-different from Brahman) there would attach (to Brahman) various
15844 faults, as, for instance, not doing what is beneficial.
15845

15846 Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause
15847 of the world.--If that doctrine is accepted, certain faults, as, for
15848 instance, doing what is not beneficial, will attach (to the intelligent
15849 cause, i.e. Brahman), 'on account of the other being designated.' For
15850 Scripture declares the other, i.e. the embodied soul, to be one with
15851 Brahman, as is shown by the passage, 'That is the Self; that art thou, O
15852 /S/vetaketu!' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7.)--Or else (if we interpret 'the other'
15853 of the Sutra in a different way) Scripture declares the other, i.e.
15854 Brahman, to be the Self of the embodied soul. For the passage, 'Having
15855 created that he entered into it,' declares the creator, i.e. the
15856 unmodified Brahman, to constitute the Self of the embodied soul, in
15857 consequence of his entering into his products. The following passage
15858 also, 'Entering (into them) with this living Self I will evolve names
15859 and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2), in which the highest divinity designates
15860 the living (soul) by the word 'Self,' shows that the embodied Self is
15861 not different from Brahman. Therefore the creative power of Brahman
15862 belongs to the embodied Self also, and the latter, being thus an
15863 independent agent, might be expected to produce only what is beneficial
15864 to itself, and not things of a contrary nature, such as birth, death,
15865 old age, disease, and whatever may be the other meshes of the net of
15866 suffering. For we know that no free person will build a prison for
15867 himself, and take up his abode in it. Nor would a being, itself
15868 absolutely stainless, look on this altogether unclean body as forming
15869 part of its Self. It would, moreover, free itself, according to its

liking, of the consequences of those of its former actions which result in pain, and would enjoy the consequences of those actions only which are rewarded by pleasure. Further, it would remember that it had created this manifold world; for every person who has produced some clearly appearing effect remembers that he has been the cause of it. And as the magician easily retracts, whenever he likes, the magical illusion which he had emitted, so the embodied soul also would be able to reabsorb this world into itself. The fact is, however, that the embodied soul cannot reabsorb its own body even. As we therefore see that 'what would be beneficial is not done,' the hypothesis of the world having proceeded from an intelligent cause is unacceptable.

22. But the separate (Brahman, i.e. the Brahman separate from the individual souls) (is the creator); (the existence of which separate Brahman we learn) from the declaration of difference.

The word 'but' discards the purvapaksha.--We rather declare that that omniscient, omnipotent Brahman, whose essence is eternal pure cognition and freedom, and which is additional to, i.e. different from the embodied Self, is the creative principle of the world. The faults specified above, such as doing what is not beneficial, and the like, do not attach to that Brahman; for as eternal freedom is its characteristic nature, there is nothing either beneficial to be done by it or non-beneficial to be avoided by it. Nor is there any impediment to its knowledge and power; for it is omniscient and omnipotent. The embodied Self, on the other hand, is of a different nature, and to it the mentioned faults adhere. But then we do not declare it to be the creator of the world, on account of 'the declaration of difference.' For scriptural passages (such as, 'Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked,' B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5; 'The Self we must search out, we must try to understand,' Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1; 'Then he becomes united with the True,' Ch. Up. VI, 8, 1; 'This embodied Self mounted by the intelligent Self,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 35) declare differences founded on the relations of agent, object, and so on, and thereby show Brahman to be different from the individual soul.--And if it be objected that there are other passages declaratory of non-difference (for instance, 'That art thou'), and that difference and non-difference cannot co-exist because contradictory, we reply that the possibility of the co-existence of the two is shown by the parallel instance of the universal ether and the ether limited by a jar.--Moreover, as soon as, in consequence of the declaration of non-difference contained in such passages as 'that art thou,' the consciousness of non-difference arises in us, the transmigratory state of the individual soul and the creative quality of Brahman vanish at once, the whole phenomenon of plurality, which springs from wrong knowledge, being sublated by perfect knowledge, and what becomes then of the creation and the faults of not doing what is beneficial, and the like? For that this entire apparent world, in which good and evil actions are done, &c., is a mere illusion, owing to the non-discrimination of (the Self's) limiting adjuncts, viz. a body, and so on, which spring from name and form the presentations of Nescience, and does in reality not exist at all, we have explained more than once. The illusion is analogous to the mistaken notion we entertain as to the dying, being born, being hurt, &c. of ourselves (our Selves; while in reality the body only dies, is born, &c.). And with regard to the state in which the appearance of plurality is not yet sublated, it follows from passages declaratory of such difference (as, for instance, 'That we must search for,' &c.) that Brahman is superior to the individual soul; whereby the possibility of faults adhering to it is excluded.

23. And because the case is analogous to that of stones, &c. (the objections raised) cannot be established.

As among minerals, which are all mere modifications of earth, nevertheless great variety is observed, some being precious gems, such as diamonds, lapis lazuli, &c., others, such as crystals and the like, being of medium value, and others again stones only fit to be flung at dogs or crows; and as from seeds which are placed in one and the same ground various plants are seen to spring, such as sandalwood and

15939 cucumbers, which show the greatest difference in their leaves, blossoms,
15940 fruits, fragrancy, juice, &c.; and as one and the same food produces
15941 various effects, such as blood and hair; so the one Brahman also may
15942 contain in itself the distinction of the individual Selfs and the
15943 highest Self, and may produce various effects. Hence the objections
15944 imagined by others (against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of
15945 the world) cannot be maintained.--Further[302] arguments are furnished
15946 by the fact of all effect having, as Scripture declares, their origin in
15947 speech only, and by the analogous instance of the variety of dream
15948 phantoms (while the dreaming person remains one).

15949
15950 24. If you object on the ground of the observation of the employment (of
15951 instruments); (we say), No; because as milk (transforms itself, so
15952 Brahman does).

15953
15954 Your assertion that the intelligent Brahman alone, without a second, is
15955 the cause of the world cannot be maintained, on account of the
15956 observation of employment (of instruments). For in ordinary life we see
15957 that potters, weavers, and other handicraftsmen produce jars, cloth, and
15958 the like, after having put themselves in possession of the means thereto
15959 by providing themselves with various implements, such as clay, staffs,
15960 wheels, string, &c.; Brahman, on the other hand, you conceive to be
15961 without any help; how then can it act as a creator without providing
15962 itself with instruments to work with? We therefore maintain that Brahman
15963 is not the cause of the world.

15964
15965 This objection is not valid, because causation is possible in
15966 consequence of a peculiar constitution of the causal substance, as in
15967 the case of milk. Just as milk and water turn into curds and ice
15968 respectively, without any extraneous means, so it is in the case of
15969 Brahman also. And if you object to this analogy for the reason that
15970 milk, in order to turn into curds, does require an extraneous agent,
15971 viz. heat, we reply that milk by itself also undergoes a certain amount
15972 of definite change, and that its turning is merely accelerated by heat.
15973 If milk did not possess that capability of itself, heat could not compel
15974 it to turn; for we see that air or ether, for instance, is not compelled
15975 by the action of heat to turn into sour milk. By the co-operation of
15976 auxiliary means the milk's capability of turning into sour milk is
15977 merely completed. The absolutely complete power of Brahman, on the other
15978 hand, does not require to be supplemented by any extraneous help. Thus
15979 Scripture also declares, 'There is no effect and no instrument known of
15980 him, no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is revealed
15981 as manifold, as inherent, acting as force and knowledge' (/S/ve. Up. VI,
15982 8). Therefore Brahman, although one only, is, owing to its manifold
15983 powers, able to transform itself into manifold effects; just as milk is.

15984
15985 25. And (the case of Brahman is) like that of gods and other beings in
15986 ordinary experience.

15987
15988 Well, let it be admitted that milk and other non-intelligent things have
15989 the power of turning themselves into sour milk, &c. without any
15990 extraneous means, since it is thus observed. But we observe, on the
15991 other hand, that intelligent agents, as, for instance, potters, proceed
15992 to their several work only after having provided themselves with a
15993 complete set of instruments. How then can it be supposed that Brahman,
15994 which is likewise of an intelligent nature, should proceed without any
15995 auxiliary?

15996
15997 We reply, 'Like gods and others.' As gods, fathers, /ri/shis, and other
15998 beings of great power, who are all of intelligent nature, are seen to
15999 create many and various objects, such as palaces, chariots, &c., without
16000 availing themselves of any extraneous means, by their mere intention,
16001 which is effective in consequence of those beings' peculiar power--a
16002 fact vouchsafed by mantras, arthavadas, itihisas, and pura/n/as;--and as
16003 the spider emits out of itself the threads of its web; and as the female
16004 crane conceives without a male; and as the lotus wanders from one pond
16005 to another without any means of conveyance; so the intelligent Brahman
16006 also may be assumed to create the world by itself without extraneous
16007 means.

Perhaps our opponent will argue against all this in the following style.--The gods and other beings, whom you have quoted as parallel instances, are really of a nature different from that of Brahman. For the material causes operative in the production of palaces and other material things are the bodies of the gods, and not their intelligent Selves. And the web of the spider is produced from its saliva which, owing to the spider's devouring small insects, acquires a certain degree of consistency. And the female crane conceives from hearing the sound of thunder. And the lotus flower indeed derives from its indwelling intelligent principle the impulse of movement, but is not able actually to move in so far as it is a merely intelligent being[303]; it rather wanders from pond to pond by means of its non-intelligent body, just as the creeper climbs up the tree.--Hence all these illustrative examples cannot be applied to the case of Brahman.

To this we reply, that we meant to show merely that the case of Brahman is different from that of potters and similar agents. For while potters, &c., on the one side, and gods, &c., on the other side, possess the common attribute of intelligence, potters require for their work extraneous means (i.e. means lying outside their bodies) and gods do not. Hence Brahman also, although intelligent, is assumed to require no extraneous means. So much only we wanted to show by the parallel instance of the gods, &c. Our intention is to point out that a peculiarly conditioned capability which is observed in some one case (as in that of the potter) is not necessarily to be assumed in all other cases also.

26. Either the consequence of the entire (Brahman undergoing change) has to be accepted, or else a violation of the texts declaring Brahman to be without parts.

Hitherto we have established so much that Brahman, intelligent, one, without a second, modifying itself without the employment of any extraneous means, is the cause of the world.--Now, another objection is raised for the purpose of throwing additional light on the point under discussion.--The consequence of the Vedanta doctrine, it is said, will be that we must assume the entire Brahman to undergo the change into its effects, because it is not composed of parts. If Brahman, like earth and other matter, consisted of parts, we might assume that a part of it undergoes the change, while the other part remains as it is. But Scripture distinctly declares Brahman to be devoid of parts. Compare, 'He who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint' (/Sv/e. Up. VI, 19); 'That heavenly person is without body, he is both without and within, not produced' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); 'That great Being is endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 12); 'He is to be described by No, no' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 2,6); 'It is neither coarse nor fine' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8); all which passages deny the existence of any distinctions in Brahman.--As, therefore, a partial modification is impossible, a modification of the entire Brahman has to be assumed. But that involves a cutting off of Brahman from its very basis.--Another consequence of the Vedantic view is that the texts exhorting us to strive 'to see' Brahman become purposeless; for the effects of Brahman may be seen without any endeavour, and apart from them no Brahman exists.--And, finally, the texts declaring Brahman to be unborn are contradicted thereby.--If, on the other hand--in order to escape from these difficulties--we assume Brahman to consist of parts, we thereby do violence to those texts which declare Brahman not to be made up of parts. Moreover, if Brahman is made up of parts, it follows that it is non-eternal.--Hence the Vedantic point of view cannot be maintained in any way.

27. But (this is not so), on account of scriptural passages, and on account of (Brahman) resting on Scripture (only).

The word 'but' discards the objection.--We deny this and maintain that our view is not open to any objections.--That the entire Brahman undergoes change, by no means follows from our doctrine, 'on account of

16077 sacred texts.' For in the same way as Scripture speaks of the origin of
16078 the world from Brahman, it also speaks of Brahman subsisting apart from
16079 its effects. This appears from the passages indicating the difference of
16080 cause and effect '(That divinity thought) let me enter into these three
16081 divinities with this living Self and evolve names and forms;' and, 'Such
16082 is the greatness of it, greater than it is the Person; one foot of him
16083 are all things, three feet are what is immortal in heaven' (Ch. Up. III,
16084 12, 6); further, from the passages declaring the unmodified Brahman to
16085 have its abode in the heart, and from those teaching that (in dreamless
16086 sleep) the individual soul is united with the True. For if the entire
16087 Brahman had passed into its effects, the limitation (of the soul's union
16088 with Brahman) to the state of dreamless sleep which is declared in the
16089 passage, 'then it is united with the True, my dear,' would be out of
16090 place; since the individual soul is always united with the effects of
16091 Brahman, and since an unmodified Brahman does not exist (on that
16092 hypothesis). Moreover, the possibility of Brahman becoming the object of
16093 perception by means of the senses is denied while its effects may thus
16094 be perceived. For these reasons the existence of an unmodified Brahman
16095 has to be admitted.--Nor do we violate those texts which declare Brahman
16096 to be without parts; we rather admit Brahman to be without parts just
16097 because Scripture reveals it. For Brahman which rests exclusively on the
16098 holy texts, and regarding which the holy texts alone are
16099 authoritative--not the senses, and so on--must be accepted such as the
16100 texts proclaim it to be. Now those texts declare, on the one hand, that
16101 not the entire Brahman passes over into its effects, and, on the other
16102 hand, that Brahman is without parts. Even certain ordinary things such
16103 as gems, spells, herbs, and the like possess powers which, owing to
16104 difference of time, place, occasion, and so on, produce various opposite
16105 effects, and nobody unaided by instruction is able to find out by mere
16106 reflection the number of these powers, their favouring conditions, their
16107 objects, their purposes, &c.; how much more impossible is it to conceive
16108 without the aid of Scripture the true nature of Brahman with its powers
16109 unfathomable by thought! As the Pura/n/a says: 'Do not apply reasoning
16110 to what is unthinkable! The mark of the unthinkable is that it is above
16111 all material causes[304].' Therefore the cognition of what is
16112 supersensuous is based on the holy texts only.

16113
16114 But--our opponent will say--even the holy texts cannot make us
16115 understand what is contradictory. Brahman, you say, which is without
16116 parts undergoes a change, but not the entire Brahman. If Brahman is
16117 without parts, it does either not change at all or it changes in its
16118 entirety. If, on the other hand, it be said that it changes partly and
16119 persists partly, a break is effected in its nature, and from that it
16120 follows that it consists of parts. It is true that in matters connected
16121 with action (as, for instance, in the case of the two Vedic injunctions
16122 'at the atiratra he is to take the sho/d/a/s/in-cup,' and 'at the
16123 atiratra he is not to take the sho/d/a/s/in-cup') any contradiction
16124 which may present itself to the understanding is removed by the optional
16125 adoption of one of the two alternatives presented as action is dependent
16126 on man; but in the case under discussion the adoption of one of the
16127 alternatives does not remove the contradiction because an existent thing
16128 (like Brahman) does not (like an action which is to be accomplished)
16129 depend on man. We are therefore met here by a real difficulty.

16130
16131 No, we reply, the difficulty is merely an apparent one; as we maintain
16132 that the (alleged) break in Brahman's nature is a mere figment of
16133 Nescience. By a break of that nature a thing is not really broken up
16134 into parts, not any more than the moon is really multiplied by appearing
16135 double to a person of defective vision. By that element of plurality
16136 which is the fiction of Nescience, which is characterised by name and
16137 form, which is evolved as well as non-evolved, which is not to be
16138 defined either as the Existing or the Non-existing, Brahman becomes the
16139 basis of this entire apparent world with its changes, and so on, while
16140 in its true and real nature it at the same time remains unchanged,
16141 lifted above the phenomenal universe. And as the distinction of names
16142 and forms, the fiction of Nescience, originates entirely from speech
16143 only, it does not militate against the fact of Brahman being without
16144 parts.--Nor have the scriptural passages which speak of Brahman as
16145 undergoing change the purpose of teaching the fact of change; for such

16146 instruction would have no fruit. They rather aim at imparting
16147 instruction about Brahman's Self as raised above this apparent world;
16148 that being an instruction which we know to have a result of its own. For
16149 in the scriptural passage beginning 'He can only be described by No, no'
16150 (which passage conveys instruction about the absolute Brahman) a result
16151 is stated at the end, in the words 'O Janaka, you have indeed reached
16152 fearlessness' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4).--Hence our view does not involve
16153 any real difficulties.

16154
16155 28. For thus it is in the (individual) Self also, and various (creations
16156 exist in gods[305], &c.).

16157
16158 Nor is there any reason to find fault with the doctrine that there can
16159 be a manifold creation in the one Self, without destroying its
16160 character. For Scripture teaches us that there exists a multiform
16161 creation in the one Self of a dreaming person, 'There are no chariots in
16162 that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots,
16163 horses, and roads' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 10). In ordinary life too
16164 multiform creations, elephants, horses, and the like are seen to exist
16165 in gods, &c., and magicians without interfering with the unity of their
16166 being. Thus a multiform creation may exist in Brahman also, one as it
16167 is, without divesting it of its character of unity.

16168
16169 29. And because the objection (raised against our view) lies against his
16170 (the opponent's) view likewise.

16171
16172 Those also who maintain that the world has sprung from the pradhana
16173 implicitly teach that something not made up of parts, unlimited, devoid
16174 of sound and other qualities--viz. the pradhana--is the cause of an
16175 effect--viz. the world--which is made up of parts, is limited and is
16176 characterised by the named qualities. Hence it follows from that
16177 doctrine also either that the pradhana as not consisting of parts has to
16178 undergo a change in its entirety, or else that the view of its not
16179 consisting of parts has to be abandoned.--But--it might be pleaded in
16180 favour of the Sa@nkhyas--they do not maintain their pradhana to be
16181 without parts; for they define it as the state of equilibrium of the
16182 three gu/n/as, Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, so that the pradhana
16183 forms a whole containing the three gu/n/as as its parts.--We reply that
16184 such a partiteness as is here proposed does not remove the objection in
16185 hand because still each of the three qualities is declared to be in
16186 itself without parts[306]. And each gu/n/a by itself assisted merely by
16187 the two other gu/n/as constitutes the material cause of that part of the
16188 world which resembles it in its nature[307].--So that the objection lies
16189 against the Sa@nkhyas view likewise.--Well, then, as the reasoning (on
16190 which the doctrine of the impartiteness of the pradhana rests) is not
16191 absolutely safe, let us assume that the pradhana consists of parts.--If
16192 you do that, we reply, it follows that the pradhana cannot be eternal,
16193 and so on.--Let it then be said that the various powers of the pradhana
16194 to which the variety of its effects is pointing are its parts.--Well, we
16195 reply, those various powers are admitted by us also who see the cause of
16196 the world in Brahman.

16197
16198 The same objections lie against the doctrine of the world having
16199 originated from atoms. For on that doctrine one atom when combining with
16200 another must, as it is not made up of parts, enter into the combination
16201 with its whole extent, and as thus no increase of bulk takes place we do
16202 not get beyond the first atom.[308] If, on the other hand, you maintain
16203 that the atom enters into the combination with a part only, you offend
16204 against the assumption of the atoms having no parts.

16205
16206 As therefore all views are equally obnoxious to the objections raised,
16207 the latter cannot be urged against any one view in particular, and the
16208 advocate of Brahman has consequently cleared his doctrine.

16209
16210 30. And (the highest divinity is) endowed with all (powers) because that
16211 is seen (from Scripture).

16212
16213 We have stated that this multiform world of effects is possible to
16214 Brahman, because, although one only, it is endowed with various

16215 powers.--How then--it may be asked--do you know that the highest Brahman
16216 is endowed with various powers?--He is, we reply, endowed with all
16217 powers, 'because that is seen.' For various scriptural passages declare
16218 that the highest divinity possesses all powers, 'He to whom all actions,
16219 all desires, all odours, all tastes belong, he who embraces all this,
16220 who never speaks, and is never surprised' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 4); 'He who
16221 desires what is true and imagines what is true' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1);
16222 'He who knows all (in its totality), and cognizes all (in its detail)'
16223 (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'By the command of that Imperishable, O Gargi, sun
16224 and moon stand apart' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 9); and other similar
16225 passages.

16226
16227 31. If it be said that (Brahman is devoid of powers) on account of the
16228 absence of organs; (we reply that) this has been explained (before).
16229

16230 Let this be granted.--Scripture, however, declares the highest divinity
16231 to be without (bodily) organs of action[309]; so, for instance, in the
16232 passage, 'It is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without
16233 mind' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8). Being such, how should it be able to
16234 produce effects, although it may be endowed with all powers? For we know
16235 (from mantras, arthavadas, &c.) that the gods and other intelligent
16236 beings, though endowed with all powers, are capable of producing certain
16237 effects only because they are furnished with bodily instruments of
16238 action. And, moreover, how can the divinity, to whom the scriptural
16239 passage, 'No, no,' denies all attributes, be endowed with all powers?
16240

16241 The appropriate reply to this question has been already given above. The
16242 transcendent highest Brahman can be fathomed by means of Scripture only,
16243 not by mere reasoning. Nor are we obliged to assume that the capacity of
16244 one being is exactly like that which is observed in another. It has
16245 likewise been explained above that although all qualities are denied of
16246 Brahman we nevertheless may consider it to be endowed with powers, if we
16247 assume in its nature an element of plurality, which is the mere figment
16248 of Nescience. Moreover, a scriptural passage ('Grasping without hands,
16249 hastening without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears'
16250 /S/ve. Up. III, 19) declares that Brahman although devoid of bodily
16251 organs, possesses all possible capacities.
16252

16253 32. (Brahman is) not (the creator of the world), on account of (beings
16254 engaging in any action) having a motive.
16255

16256 Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause
16257 of the world.--The intelligent highest Self cannot be the creator of the
16258 sphere of this world, 'on account of actions having a purpose.'--We know
16259 from ordinary experience that man, who is an intelligent being, begins
16260 to act after due consideration only, and does not engage even in an
16261 unimportant undertaking unless it serves some purpose of his own; much
16262 less so in important business. There is also a scriptural passage
16263 confirming this result of common experience, 'Verily everything is not
16264 dear that you may have everything; but that you may love the Self
16265 therefore everything is dear' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5). Now the undertaking
16266 of creating the sphere of this world, with all its various contents, is
16267 certainly a weighty one. If, then, on the one hand, you assume it to
16268 serve some purpose of the intelligent highest Self, you thereby sublate
16269 its self-sufficiency vouched for by Scripture; if, on the other hand,
16270 you affirm absence of motive on its part, you must affirm absence of
16271 activity also.--Let us then assume that just as sometimes an intelligent
16272 person when in a state of frenzy proceeds, owing to his mental
16273 aberration, to action without a motive, so the highest Self also created
16274 this world without any motive.--That, we reply, would contradict the
16275 omniscience of the highest Self, which is vouched for by
16276 Scripture.--Hence the doctrine of the creation proceeding from an
16277 intelligent Being is untenable.
16278

16279 33. But (Brahman's creative activity) is mere sport, such as we see in
16280 ordinary life.
16281

16282 The word 'but' discards the objection raised.--We see in every-day life
16283 that certain doings of princes or other men of high position who have no

16284 unfulfilled desires left have no reference to any extraneous purpose;
16285 but proceed from mere sportfulness, as, for instance, their recreations
16286 in places of amusement. We further see that the process of inhalation
16287 and exhalation is going on without reference to any extraneous purpose,
16288 merely following the law of its own nature. Analogously, the activity of
16289 the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own
16290 nature[310], without reference to any purpose. For on the ground neither
16291 of reason nor of Scripture can we construe any other purpose of the
16292 Lord. Nor can his nature be questioned.[311]--Although the creation of
16293 this world appears to us a weighty and difficult undertaking, it is mere
16294 play to the Lord, whose power is unlimited. And if in ordinary life we
16295 might possibly, by close scrutiny, detect some subtle motive, even for
16296 sportful action, we cannot do so with regard to the actions of the Lord,
16297 all whose wishes are fulfilled, as Scripture says.--Nor can it be said
16298 that he either does not act or acts like a senseless person; for
16299 Scripture affirms the fact of the creation on the one hand, and the
16300 Lord's omniscience on the other hand. And, finally, we must remember
16301 that the scriptural doctrine of creation does not refer to the highest
16302 reality; it refers to the apparent world only, which is characterised by
16303 name and form, the figments of Nescience, and it, moreover, aims at
16304 intimating that Brahman is the Self of everything.

16305
16306 34. Inequality (of dispensation) and cruelty (the Lord can) not (be
16307 reproached with), on account of his regarding (merit and demerit); for
16308 so (Scripture) declares.

16309
16310 In order to strengthen the tenet which we are at present defending, we
16311 follow the procedure of him who shakes a pole planted in the ground (in
16312 order to test whether it is firmly planted), and raise another objection
16313 against the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world.--The
16314 Lord, it is said, cannot be the cause of the world, because, on that
16315 hypothesis, the reproach of inequality of dispensation and cruelty would
16316 attach to him. Some beings, viz. the gods and others, he renders
16317 eminently happy; others, as for instance the animals, eminently unhappy;
16318 to some again, as for instance men, he allots an intermediate position.
16319 To a Lord bringing about such an unequal condition of things, passion
16320 and malice would have to be ascribed, just as to any common person
16321 acting similarly; which attributes would be contrary to the essential
16322 goodness of the Lord affirmed by /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti. Moreover, as the
16323 infliction of pain and the final destruction of all creatures would form
16324 part of his dispensation, he would have to be taxed with great cruelty,
16325 a quality abhorred by low people even. For these two reasons Brahman
16326 cannot be the cause of the world.

16327
16328 The Lord, we reply, cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation
16329 and cruelty, "because he is bound by regards." If the Lord on his own
16330 account, without any extraneous regards, produced this unequal creation,
16331 he would expose himself to blame; but the fact is, that in creating he
16332 is bound by certain regards, i.e. he has to look to merit and demerit.
16333 Hence the circumstance of the creation being unequal is due to the merit
16334 and demerit of the living creatures created, and is not a fault for
16335 which the Lord is to blame. The position of the Lord is to be looked on
16336 as analogous to that of Parjanya, the Giver of rain. For as Parjanya is
16337 the common cause of the production of rice, barley, and other plants,
16338 while the difference between the various species is due to the various
16339 potentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds, so the Lord is the
16340 common cause of the creation of gods, men, &c., while the differences
16341 between these classes of beings are due to the different merit belonging
16342 to the individual souls. Hence the Lord, being bound by regards, cannot
16343 be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty.--And if we
16344 are asked how we come to know that the Lord, in creating this world with
16345 its various conditions, is bound by regards, we reply that Scripture
16346 declares that; compare, for instance, the two following passages, 'For
16347 he (the Lord) makes him, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, do
16348 a good deed; and the same makes him, whom he wishes to lead down from
16349 these worlds, do a bad deed' (Kaush. Up. III, 8) [312]; and, 'A man
16350 becomes good by good work, bad by bad work' (B/ri/. Up. III, 2, 13).
16351 Sm/ri/ti passages also declare the favour of the Lord and its opposite
16352 to depend on the different quality of the works of living beings; so,

16353 for instance, 'I serve men in the way in which they approach me' (Bha.
16354 Gi. IV, 11).
16355
16356 35. If it be objected that it (viz. the Lord's having regard to merit
16357 and demerit) is impossible on account of the non-distinction (of merit
16358 and demerit, previous to the first creation); we refute the objection on
16359 the ground of (the world) being without a beginning.
16360

16361 But--an objection is raised--the passage, 'Being only this was in the
16362 beginning, one, without a second,' affirms that before the creation
16363 there was no distinction and consequently no merit on account of which
16364 the creation might have become unequal. And if we assume the Lord to
16365 have been guided in his dispensations by the actions of living beings
16366 subsequent to the creation, we involve ourselves in the circular
16367 reasoning that work depends on diversity of condition of life, and
16368 diversity of condition again on work. The Lord may be considered as
16369 acting with regard to religious merit after distinction had once arisen;
16370 but as before that the cause of inequality, viz. merit, did not exist,
16371 it follows that the first creation must have been free, from
16372 inequalities.
16373

16374 This objection we meet by the remark, that the transmigratory world is
16375 without beginning.--The objection would be valid if the world had a
16376 beginning; but as it is without beginning, merit and inequality are,
16377 like seed and sprout, caused as well as causes, and there is therefore
16378 no logical objection to their operation.--To the question how we know
16379 that the world is without a beginning, the next Sutra replies.
16380

16381 36. (The beginninglessness of the world) recommends itself to reason and
16382 is seen (from Scripture).
16383

16384 The beginninglessness of the world recommends itself to reason. For if
16385 it had a beginning it would follow that, the world springing into
16386 existence without a cause, the released souls also would again enter
16387 into the circle of transmigratory existence; and further, as then there
16388 would exist no determining cause of the unequal dispensation of pleasure
16389 and pain, we should have to acquire in the doctrine of rewards and
16390 punishments being allotted, without reference to previous good or bad
16391 action. That the Lord is not the cause of the inequality, has already
16392 been remarked. Nor can Nescience by itself be the cause, and it is of a
16393 uniform nature. On the other hand, Nescience may be the cause of
16394 inequality, if it be considered as having regard to merit accruing from
16395 action produced by the mental impressions or wrath, hatred, and other
16396 afflicting passions[313]. Without merit and demerit nobody can enter
16397 into existence, and again, without a body merit and demerit cannot be
16398 formed; so that--on the doctrine of the world having a beginning--we are
16399 led into a logical see-saw. The opposite doctrine, on the other hand,
16400 explains all matters in a manner analogous to the case of the seed and
16401 sprout, so that no difficulty remains.--Moreover, the fact of the world
16402 being without a beginning, is seen in /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti. In the first
16403 place, we have the scriptural passage, 'Let me enter with this living
16404 Self (jiva)', &c. (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2). Here the circumstance of the
16405 embodied Self (the individual soul) being called, previously to
16406 creation, 'the living Self'--a name applying to it in so far as it is
16407 the sustaining principle of the pra/n/as--shows that this phenomenal
16408 world is without a beginning. For if it had a beginning, the pra/n/as
16409 would not exist before that beginning, and how then could the embodied
16410 Self be denoted, with reference to the time of the world's beginning, by
16411 a name which depends on the existence of those pra/n/as. Nor can it be
16412 said that it is so designated with a view to its future relation to the
16413 pra/n/as; it being a settled principle that a past relation, as being
16414 already existing, is of greater force than a mere future
16415 relation.--Moreover, we have the mantra, 'As the creator formerly
16416 devised (akalpaya) sun and moon (/Ri/. Sa/m/h. X, 190, 3), which
16417 intimates the existence of former Kalpas. Sm/ri/ti also declares the
16418 world to be without a beginning, 'Neither its form is known here, nor
16419 its end, nor its beginning, nor its support' (Bha. Gi. XV, 3). And the
16420 Pura/n/a also declares that there is no measure of the past and the
16421 future Kalpas.

16422
16423 37. And because all the qualities (required in the cause of the world)
16424 are present (in Brahman).
16425
16426 The teacher has now refuted all the objections, such as difference of
16427 character, and the like, which other teachers have brought forward
16428 against what he had established as the real sense of the Veda, viz. that
16429 the intelligent Brahman is the cause and matter of this world.
16430
16431 Now, before entering on a new chapter, whose chief aim it will be to
16432 refute the (positive) opinions held by other teachers, he sums up the
16433 foregoing chapter, the purport of which it was to show why his view
16434 should be accepted.--Because, if that Brahman is acknowledged as the
16435 cause of the world, all attributes required in the cause (of the world)
16436 are seen to be present--Brahman being all-knowing, all-powerful, and
16437 possessing the great power of Maya,--on that account this our system,
16438 founded on the Upanishads, is not open to any objections.
16439
16440 Notes:
16441
16442 [Footnote 253: The Sm/ri/ti called Tantra is the Sa@nkhyas/astra as
16443 taught by Kapila; the Sm/ri/ti-writers depending on him are Asuri,
16444 Pa/nk/a/s/ikha, and others.]
16445
16446 [Footnote 254: Mima/m/sa Su. I, 1, 2: /k/odanalaksha/n/osxrtho
16447 dharma/h/. Commentary: /k/odana iti kriyaya/h/ pravartaka/m/ va/k/anam
16448 ahu/h/.]
16449
16450 [Footnote 255: Purushartha; in opposition to the rules referred to in
16451 the preceding sentence which are kratvartha, i.e. the acting according
16452 to which secures the proper performance of certain rites.]
16453
16454 [Footnote 256: It having been decided by the Purva Mima/m/sa already
16455 that Sm/ri/tis contradicted by /S/ruti are to be disregarded.]
16456
16457 [Footnote 257: On the meaning of 'kapila' in the above passage, compare
16458 the Introduction to the Upanishads, translated by Max Mueller, vol. ii,
16459 p. xxxviii ff.--As will be seen later on, /S/a@nkara, in this bhashya,
16460 takes the Kapila referred to to be some /ri/shi.]
16461
16462 [Footnote 258: I.e. religious duty is known only from the injunctive
16463 passages of the Veda.]
16464
16465 [Footnote 259: After it has been shown that Kapila the dvaitavadin is
16466 not mentioned in /S/ruti, it is now shown that Manu the sarvatmavadin is
16467 mentioned there.]
16468
16469 [Footnote 260: In which passage the phrase 'to be meditated upon'
16470 (nididhyasa) indicates the act of mental concentration characteristic of
16471 the Yoga.]
16472
16473 [Footnote 261: The ash/t/akas (certain oblations to be made on the
16474 eighth days after the full moons of the seasons hemanta and /s/i/s/ira)
16475 furnish the stock illustration for the doctrine of the Purva Mim. that
16476 Sm/ri/ti is authoritative in so far as it is based on /S/ruti.]
16477
16478 [Footnote 262: But why--it will be asked--do you apply yourself to the
16479 refutation of the Sa@nkhyas and Yoga only, and not also to that of other
16480 Sm/ri/tis conflicting with the Vedanta views?]
16481
16482 [Footnote 263: I.e. from the fact of these terms being employed in a
16483 passage standing close to other passages which refer to Vedic
16484 knowledge.]
16485
16486 [Footnote 264: The cognition of Brahman terminates in an act of
16487 anubhava; hence as it has been shown that reasoning is more closely
16488 connected with anubhava than /S/ruti is, we have the right to apply
16489 reasoning to /S/ruti.--Ananda Giri comments on the passage from
16490 anubhavavasanam as follows: brahmasakshatkarasya mokshopayataya

16491 pradhanyat tatra /s/abdad api parokshago/k/arad
 16492 aparoksharthasadharmyago/k/aras tarkosxntara/ngam iti tasyaiva
 16493 balavatvam ity artha/h/. Aitihiyamatre/n/a pravada paramaryamatre/n/a
 16494 parokshatayeti yavat. Anubhavya pradhanye tarkasyoktanyayena tasminn
 16495 antara/ngatvad agamasya /k/a bahira/ngatvad antara/ngabahira/ngayor
 16496 antara/nga/m/ balavad ity nyayad ukta/m/ tarkasya balavattvam.
 16497 Anubhavapradhanya/m/ tu nadyapi siddham ity a/s/a@nkyahanubhaveti. Nanu
 16498 Brahmaj/n/adna/m/ vaidikatvad dharmavad ad/ri/sh/t/aphalam esh/t/avya/m/
 16499 tat kutosxsyannubhavavasanavidyanivartakatva/m/ tatraha moksheti.
 16500 Adhish/th/anasakshatkarasya /s/uktyadj/n/ane
 16501 tadavidyatatkaryanivartakatvad/ri/sh/t/e/h/, brahmaj/n/anasyapi
 16502 tarkava/s/ad asambhavanadinirasadvaya sakshatkaravasayinas
 16503 tadavidyadinivartakatvenaiva muktihetuteti nad/ri/sh/t/aphalatety
 16504 artha/h/.]
 16505
 16506 [Footnote 265: Nirati/s/aya/h/, upajanapayadharma/s/unyatva/m/
 16507 nirati/s/ayatvam. An. Gi.]
 16508
 16509 [Footnote 266: A sentence replying to the possible objection that the
 16510 world, as being the effect of the intelligent Brahman, might itself be
 16511 intelligent.]
 16512
 16513 [Footnote 267: In the case of things commonly considered
 16514 non-intelligent, intelligence is not influenced by an internal organ,
 16515 and on that account remains unperceived; samaste jagati satozpi
 16516 /k/aitanyasya tatra tatranta/h/kara/n/apari/n/amanuparagad anupalabdhir
 16517 aviruddha. An. Gi.]
 16518
 16519 [Footnote 268: On i/s/vara in the above meaning, compare Deussen, p. 69,
 16520 note 41.]
 16521
 16522 [Footnote 269: The line 'prak/ri/tibhya/h/ param,' &c. is wanting in all
 16523 MSS. I have consulted.]
 16524
 16525 [Footnote 270: Ananda Giri on the above passage: /s/rutyaka@nkshita/m/
 16526 tarkam eva mananavidhivishayam udaharati svapnanteti. Svapnajaritayor
 16527 mithovyabhi/k/arad atmana/h/ svabhavatas tadvattvabhavad avastha dvayena
 16528 tasya svatosxsa/m/p/ri/ktatvam ato jivasyavasthavatvena nabrahmatvam ity
 16529 artha/h/. Tathapi dehaditadatmyenatmano bhavan na
 16530 ni/h/prapa/nk/abrahmatety a/s/a@nkyaha sa/m/prasade /k/eti. Sata somya
 16531 tada sa/m/panno bhavatiti /s/rute/h/ sushupte
 16532 ni/h/prapa/nk/asadatmatvavagamad atmanas tathavidhabrahmatvasiddhir ity
 16533 artha/h/. Dvaitagrahipratyakshadivirodhat katham
 16534 atmanosxdvitiyabrahmatvam ity a/s/a@nkya tajjatvadihetuna
 16535 brahmatiriktavastvabhavasiddher adhyakshadinam atatvavedakaprama/n/yad
 16536 avirodhad yuktam atmano xsvitiyabrahmatvam ity aha prapa/nk/asyeti.]
 16537
 16538 [Footnote 271: Let us finally assume, merely for argument's sake, that a
 16539 vailaksha/n/ya of cause and effect is not admissible, and enquire
 16540 whether that assumption can be reconciled more easily with an
 16541 intelligent or a non-intelligent cause of the world.]
 16542
 16543 [Footnote 272: Nanu pralayakale karyadharma/s/ /k/en navatish/th/eran na
 16544 tarhi kara/n/adharma api tish/th/eyus taylor abhedat
 16545 tatrahananyatveszpiti. An. Gi.]
 16546
 16547 [Footnote 273: For if they are effects of the pradhana they must as such
 16548 be reabsorbed into it at the time of general reabsorption.]
 16549
 16550 [Footnote 274: And that the Vedanta view is preferable because the
 16551 nullity of the objections has already been demonstrated in its case.]
 16552
 16553 [Footnote 275: The whole style of argumentation of the Mima/m/sa would
 16554 be impossible, if all reasoning were sound; for then no purvapaksha view
 16555 could be maintained.]
 16556
 16557 [Footnote 276: The following arthavada-passage, for instance, 'the
 16558 sacrificial post is the sun,' is to be taken in a metaphorical sense;
 16559 because perception renders it impossible for us to take it in its

16560 literal meaning.]

16561

16562 [Footnote 277: Which are to be known from the Veda only.]

16563

16564 [Footnote 278: Pari/n/amavadam avalambyapatato virodha/m/ samadhaya

16565 vivartavadam a/s/ritya paramasamadhanam aha. An. Gi.]

16566

16567 [Footnote 279: Ananda Giri construes differently: etad uktam iti,

16568 paramarthato vij/n/atam iti sambandha/h/.]

16569

16570 [Footnote 280: D/ri/sh/t/eti kada/k/id dr/ri/sh/t/a/m/ punar nash/t/am

16571 anityam iti yavat.--D/ri/sh/t/agraha/n/asu/k/ita/m/ pratitikalesspi

16572 sattarahitya/m/ tatraiva hetvantaram aha svarupe/n/eti. An. Gi.]

16573

16574 [Footnote 281: In the passage alluded to he is called so by implication,

16575 being compared to the 'false-minded' thief who, knowing himself to be

16576 guilty, undergoes the ordeal of the heated hatchet.]

16577

16578 [Footnote 282: I.e. ordinary experience does not teach us that real

16579 effects spring from unreal causes.]

16580

16581 [Footnote 283: Svapnajagraddehayor vyabhi/k/arezpi pratyabhij/n/anat

16582 tadanugatatmaikyassiddhe/s/ /k/aitanyasya /k/a dehadharmatve rutmano

16583 dehadvayatiredkasiddher dehatratmavado na yukta ity artha/h/. An. Gi.]

16584

16585 [Footnote 284: As long as the 'vyavahara' presents itself to our mind,

16586 we might feel inclined to assume in Brahman an element of manifoldness

16587 whereby to account for the vyavahara; but as soon as we arrive at true

16588 knowledge, the vyavahara vanishes, and there remains no longer any

16589 reason for qualifying in any way the absolute unity of Brahman.]

16590

16591 [Footnote 285: Tatreti, s/ri/sh/t/yadi/s/rutina/m/ svarthe phatavaikalye

16592 satiti yavat. An. Gi.]

16593

16594 [Footnote 286: A Mima/m/sa principle. A sacrificial act, for instance,

16595 is independent when a special result is assigned to it by the sacred

16596 texts; an act which is enjoined without such a specification is merely

16597 auxiliary to another act.]

16598

16599 [Footnote 287: According to the /S/ruti 'in whatever mode he worships

16600 him into that mode he passes himself.']

16601

16602 [Footnote 288: Tattvanyatvabhyam iti, na hisvaratvena te niru/k/yete

16603 ja/d/ajadayor abhedayogat napi tatoxyatvenax niruktim arhata/h/

16604 svatantrye/n/a sattasphurtyasambhavat na hi j/ad/am aga/d/anapekshya/m/

16605 sattasphurtimad upalakshyate ja/d/atvabha/ngaprasa/ngat tasmad

16606 avidyatmake namarupe ity artha/h/. An. Gi.]

16607

16608 [Footnote 289: So that from the instance of the potter and the jar we

16609 cannot conclude that the relation of clay and the jar is only that of

16610 nimitta and naimittika, not that of non-difference.]

16611

16612 [Footnote 290: For instance, smoke extending in a long line whose base

16613 is connected with some object on the surface of the earth.]

16614

16615 [Footnote 291: I.e. (as An. Gi. explains) because we assume the relation

16616 of cause and effect not merely on the ground of the actual existence of

16617 one thing depending on that upon another, but on the additional ground

16618 of the mental existence, the consciousness of the one not being possible

16619 without the consciousness of the other.--Tadbhavanuvidhayibhavatvam

16620 tadbhananuvidhayibhanatva/m/ /k/a karyasya kara/n/ananyatve hetur

16621 dhumavi/s/eshasya /k/agnibhavanuvidhayibhavatvesxpi na

16622 tadbhananuvidhayibhanatvam agnibhanasya dhumabhanadhinatvat.]

16623

16624 [Footnote 292: For simplicity's sake, asat will be translated henceforth

16625 by non-existing.]

16626

16627 [Footnote 293: Samavaya, commonly translated by inherence or intimate

16628 relation, is, according to the Nyaya, the relation connecting a whole

16629 and its parts, substances, and qualities, &c.]

16630

16631 [Footnote 294: Samavayasya svatantryapaksha/m/ dushayati
16632 anabhyupagamyamane/k/eti. Samavayasya samavayibhi/h/ sambandho neshyate
16633 ki/m/ tu svatantryam evety atravayavavayavinor dravyagu/n/adina/m/ /k/a.
16634 viprakarsha/h/ syat sa/m/nidhayakabhavad ity artha/h/. An. Gi.]

16635

16636 [Footnote 295: A conclusion which is in conflict with the Nyaya tenet
16637 that sa/m/yoga, conjunction, as, for instance, of the jar and the ground
16638 on which it stands, is a quality (gu/n/a) inherent in the two conjoined
16639 substances by means of the samavaya relation.]

16640

16641 [Footnote 296: So that the whole can be apprehended by us as such if we
16642 apprehend a certain part only; analogously to our apprehending the whole
16643 thread on which a garland of flowers is strung as soon as we apprehend
16644 some few of the flowers.]

16645

16646 [Footnote 297: Kalpantaram utthapayati atheti, tatha /k/a
16647 yathavayavai/h/ sutra/m/ kusumani vyapnuvat katipayakusumagraha/n/exp
16648 g/r/ihyate tatha katipayavayavagraha/n/exp bhavaty avayavino graha/n/am
16649 ity artha/h/. Tatra kim arambhakavayavair eva teshv avayavi vartteta
16650 ki/m/ va tadatiriklavayavair iti vikalpyadyam pratyaha tadapiti. Yatra
16651 yad varttate tat tadatiriklavayavair eva tatra vartamana/m/ drish/l/am
16652 iti d/ri/sh/t/antagarbha/m/ hetum a/k/ash/l/e ko/s/eti. Dvitiyam
16653 dushayati anavastheti. Kalpitanantavayavavyavahitataya
16654 prak/ri/tavayavino duraviprakarshat tantunish/th/atvam pa/t/asya na syad
16655 iti bhava/h/. An. Gi.]

16656

16657 [Footnote 298: I.e. a something in which the action inheres; not a
16658 causal agent.]

16659

16660 [Footnote 299: Every action, /S/a@nkara says, requires an agent, i.e. a
16661 substrate in which the action takes place. If we deny that the jar
16662 exists in the clay even before it is actually originated, we lose the
16663 substrate for the action of origination, i.e. entering into existence
16664 (for the non-existing jar cannot be the substratum of any action), and
16665 have to assume, for that action, other substrates, such as the operative
16666 causes of the jar.]

16667

16668 [Footnote 300: Which doctrine will be fully discussed in the second pada
16669 of this adhyaya.]

16670

16671 [Footnote 301: Because it has been shown that cause and effect are
16672 identical; hence if the cause is known, the effect is known also.]

16673

16674 [Footnote 302: Which arguments, the commentators say, are hinted at by
16675 the 'and' of the Sutra.]

16676

16677 [Footnote 303: The right reading appears to be 'svayam eva /k/etana' as
16678 found in some MSS. Other MSS. read /k/etana/h/.]

16679

16680 [Footnote 304: Prak/ri/tibhya iti,
16681 pratyakshad/ri/sh/t/apadarthasvabhavabhyo yat para/m/ vilaksha/n/am
16682 a/k/aryadyupade/s/agamyam/ tad a/k/intyam ity arta/h/ An. Gi.]

16683

16684 [Footnote 305: This is the way in which /S/a@nkara divides the Sutra;
16685 An. Gi. remarks to 'lokezspos, &c.: atmani /k/eti vyakhyaya vi/k/itra/s/
16686 /k/a hiti vya/k/ash/t/e.']

16687

16688 [Footnote 306: So that if it undergoes modifications it must either
16689 change in its entirety, or else--against the assumption--consist of
16690 parts.]

16691

16692 [Footnote 307: The last clause precludes the justificatory remark that
16693 the stated difficulties can be avoided if we assume the three gu/n/as in
16694 combination only to undergo modification; if this were so the inequality
16695 of the different effects could not be accounted for.]

16696

16697 [Footnote 308: As an atom has no parts it cannot enter into partial

16698 contact with another, and the only way in which the two can combine is
16699 entire interpenetration; in consequence of which the compound of two
16700 atoms would not occupy more space than one atom.]

16701
16702 [Footnote 309: The Sutra is concerned with the body only as far as it is
16703 an instrument; the case of extraneous instruments having already been
16704 disposed of in Sutra 24.]

16705
16706 [Footnote 310: The nature (svabhava) of the Lord is, the commentators
16707 say, Maya joined with time and karman.]

16708
16709 [Footnote 311: This clause is an answer to the objection that the Lord
16710 might remain at rest instead of creating a world useless to himself and
16711 the cause of pain to others. For in consequence of his conjunction with
16712 Maya the creation is unavoidable. Go. An. Avidya naturally tends towards
16713 effects, without any purpose. Bha.]

16714
16715 An. Gi. remarks: Nanu liladav asmadadinam akasmad eva niv/ri/tter api
16716 darsanad i/s/varasyapi mayamayyam lilayam tatha-bhave vinapi
16717 sa/my/agj/n/ana/m/ sa/m/sarasamu/kkh/ittir ili tatraha na /ke/ti.
16718 Anirva/ky/a khalv avidya paras/yes/varasya /k/a. svabhavo lileti
16719 /kok/yate tatra na pratitikasvabhavayam anupapattir avataratity
16720 artha/h/.]

16721
16722 [Footnote 312: From this passage we must not--the commentators
16723 say--infer injustice on the part of the Lord; for the previous merit or
16724 demerit of a being determines the specific quality of the actions which
16725 he performs in his present existence, the Lord acting as the common
16726 cause only (as Parjanya does).]

16727
16728 [Footnote 313: Ragadveshamoha ragadayas le /k/a purusha/m/ dukhadibhi/h/
16729 kli/s/yantita kle/s/as tesb/am/ kartneapia/vi/uyanugu/rr/as tabhir
16730 aksbipta/m/ dharmadilaksbilaksha/n/a/m/ kurma tadapekshavidya. An. Gi.]

16731
16732
16733
16734

16735 SECOND PADA.

16736
16737 REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

16738
16739

16740 1. That which is inferred (by the Sa@nkhyas, viz. the pradhana) cannot
16741 be the cause (of the world), on account of the orderly arrangement (of
16742 the world) being impossible (on that hypothesis).

16743
16744 Although it is the object of this system to define the true meaning of
16745 the Vedanta-texts and not, like the science of Logic, to establish or
16746 refute some tenet by mere ratiocination, still it is incumbent on
16747 thorough students of the Vedanta to refute the Sa@nkhya and other
16748 systems which are obstacles in the way of perfect knowledge. For this
16749 purpose a new chapter is begun. (Nor must it be said that the refutation
16750 of the other systems ought to have preceded the establishment of the
16751 Vedanta position; for) as the determination of the sense of the
16752 Vedanta-passages directly subserves perfect knowledge, we have at first,
16753 by means of such a determination, established our own position, since
16754 this is a task more important than the refutation of the views
16755 entertained by others.

16756
16757 Here an opponent might come forward and say that we are indeed entitled
16758 to establish our own position, so as to define perfect knowledge which
16759 is the means of release to those desirous of it, but that no use is
16760 apparent of a refutation of other opinions, a proceeding productive of
16761 nothing but hate and anger.--There is a use, we reply. For there is some
16762 danger of men of inferior intelligence looking upon the Sa@nkhya and
16763 similar systems as requisite for perfect knowledge, because those
16764 systems have a weighty appearance, have been adopted by authoritative
16765 persons, and profess to lead to perfect knowledge. Such people might
16766 therefore think that those systems with their abstruse arguments were

16767 propounded by omniscient sages, and might on that account have faith in
16768 them. For this reason we must endeavour to demonstrate their intrinsic
16769 worthlessness.

16770
16771 But, it might be said, the Sa@nkhyas and similar systems have already
16772 been impugned in several Sutras of the first adhyaya (I, 1, 5, 18; I, 4,
16773 28); why, then, controvert them again?--The task--we reply--which we are
16774 now about to undertake differs from what we have already accomplished.
16775 As the Sa@nkhyas and other philosophers also quote, in order to
16776 establish their own positions, the Vedanta-passages and interpret them
16777 in such a manner as to make them agree with their own systems, we have
16778 hitherto endeavoured to show that their interpretations are altogether
16779 fallacious. Now, however, we are going to refute their arguments in an
16780 independent manner, without any reference to the Vedanta-texts.

16781
16782 The Sa@nkhyas, to make a beginning with them, argue as follows.--Just as
16783 jars, dishes, and other products which possess the common quality of
16784 consisting of clay are seen to have for their cause clay in general; so
16785 we must suppose that all the outward and inward (i.e. inanimate and
16786 animate) effects which are endowed with the characteristics of pleasure,
16787 pain, and dulness[314] have for their causes pleasure, pain, and dulness
16788 in general. Pleasure, pain, and dulness in their generality together
16789 constitute the threefold pradhana. This pradhana which is
16790 non-intelligent evolves itself spontaneously into multifarious
16791 modifications[315], in order thus to effect the purposes (i.e.
16792 enjoyment, release, and so on) of the intelligent soul.--The existence
16793 of the pradhana is to be inferred from other circumstances also, such as
16794 the limitation of all effects and the like[316].

16795
16796 Against this doctrine we argue as follows.--If you Sankhyas base your
16797 theory on parallel instances merely, we point out that a non-intelligent
16798 thing which, without being guided by an intelligent being, spontaneously
16799 produces effects capable of subserving the purposes of some particular
16800 person is nowhere observed in the world. We rather observe that houses,
16801 palaces, couches, pleasure-grounds, and the like--things which according
16802 to circumstances are conducive to the obtainment of pleasure or the
16803 avoidance of pain--are made by workmen endowed with intelligence. Now
16804 look at this entire world which appears, on the one hand, as external
16805 (i.e. inanimate) in the form of earth and the other elements enabling
16806 (the souls) to enjoy the fruits of their various actions, and, on the
16807 other hand, as animate, in the form of bodies which belong to the
16808 different classes of beings, possess a definite arrangement of organs,
16809 and are therefore capable of constituting the abodes of fruition; look,
16810 we say, at this world, of which the most ingenious workmen cannot even
16811 form a conception in their minds, and then say if a non-intelligent
16812 principle like the pradhana is able to fashion it! Other non-intelligent
16813 things such as stones and clods of earth are certainly not seen to
16814 possess analogous powers. We rather must assume that just as clay and
16815 similar substances are seen to fashion themselves into various forms, if
16816 worked upon by potters and the like, so the pradhana also (when
16817 modifying itself into its effects) is ruled by some intelligent
16818 principle. When endeavouring to determine the nature of the primal cause
16819 (of the world), there is no need for us to take our stand on those
16820 attributes only which form part of the nature of material causes such as
16821 clay, &c., and not on those also which belong to extraneous agents such
16822 as potters, &c.[317] Nor (if remembering this latter point) do we enter
16823 into conflict with any means of right knowledge; we, on the contrary,
16824 are in direct agreement with Scripture which teaches that an intelligent
16825 cause exists.--For the reason detailed in the above, i.e. on account of
16826 the impossibility of the 'orderly arrangement' (of the world), a
16827 non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred.--The word
16828 'and' (in the Sutra) adds other reasons on account of which the pradhana
16829 cannot be inferred, viz. 'on account of the non-possibility of
16830 endowment,' &c. For it cannot be maintained[318] that all outward and
16831 inward effects are 'endowed' with the nature of pleasure, pain, and
16832 dulness, because pleasure, &c. are known as inward (mental) states,
16833 while sound, &c. (i.e. the sense-objects) are known as being of a
16834 different nature (i.e. as outward things), and moreover as being the
16835 operative causes of pleasure, &c.[319] And, further, although the

sense-object such as sound and so on is one, yet we observe that owing to the difference of the mental impressions (produced by it) differences exist in the effects it produces, one person being affected by it pleasantly, another painfully, and so on[320].--(Turning to the next Sa@nkhya argument which infers the existence of the pradhana from the limitation of all effects), we remark that he who concludes that all inward and outward effects depend on a conjunction of several things, because they are limited (a conclusion based on the observation that some limited effects such as roof and sprout, &c. depend on the conjunction of several things), is driven to the conclusion that the three constituents of the pradhana, viz. Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, likewise depend on the conjunction of several antecedents[321]; for they also are limited[322].--Further[323], it is impossible to use the relation of cause and effect as a reason for assuming that all effects whatever have a non-intelligent principle for their antecedent; for we have shown already that that relation exists in the case of couches and chairs also, over whose production intelligence presides.

2. And on account of (the impossibility of) activity.

Leaving the arrangement of the world, we now pass on to the activity by which it is produced.--The three gu/n/as, passing out of the state of equipoise and entering into the condition of mutual subordination and superordination, originate activities tending towards the production of particular effects.--Now these activities also cannot be ascribed to a non-intelligent pradhana left to itself, as no such activity is seen in clay and similar substances, or in chariots and the like. For we observe that clay and the like, and chariots--which are in their own nature non-intelligent--enter on activities tending towards particular effects only when they are acted upon by intelligent beings such as potters, &c. in the one case, and horses and the like in the other case. From what is seen we determine what is not seen. Hence a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred because, on that hypothesis, the activity without which the world cannot be produced would be impossible.

But, the Sa@nkhya rejoins, we do likewise not observe activity on the part of mere intelligent beings.--True; we however see activity on the part of non-intelligent things such as chariots and the like when they are in conjunction with intelligent beings.--But, the Sa@nkhya again objects, we never actually observe activity on the part of an intelligent being even when in conjunction with a non-intelligent thing.--Very well; the question then arises: Does the activity belong to that in which it is actually observed (as the Sa@nkhya says), or to that on account of the conjunction with which it is observed (as the Vedantin avers)?--We must, the Sa@nkhya replies, attribute activity to that in which it is actually seen, since both (i.e. the activity and its abode) are matter of observation. A mere intelligent being, on the other hand, is never observed as the abode of activity while a chariot is. The[324] existence of an intelligent Self joined to a body and so on which are the abode of activity can be established (by inference) only; the inference being based on the difference observed between living bodies and mere non-intelligent things, such as chariots and the like. For this very reason, viz. that intelligence is observed only where a body is observed while it is never seen without a body, the Materialists consider intelligence to be a mere attribute of the body.--Hence activity belongs only to what is non-intelligent.

To all this we--the Vedantins--make the following reply.--We do not mean to say that activity does not belong to those non-intelligent things in which it is observed; it does indeed belong to them; but it results from an intelligent principle, because it exists when the latter is present and does not exist when the latter is absent. Just as the effects of burning and shining, which have their abode in wood and similar material, are indeed not observed when there is mere fire (i.e. are not due to mere fire; as mere fire, i.e. fire without wood, &c., does not exist), but at the same time result from fire only as they are seen when fire is present and are not seen when fire is absent; so, as the Materialists also admit, only intelligent bodies are observed to be the

16905 movers of chariots and other non-intelligent things. The motive power of
16906 intelligence is therefore incontrovertible.--But--an objection will be
16907 raised--your Self even if joined to a body is incapable of exercising
16908 moving power, for motion cannot be effected by that the nature of which
16909 is pure intelligence.--A thing, we reply, which is itself devoid of
16910 motion may nevertheless move other things. The magnet is itself devoid
16911 of motion, and yet it moves iron; and colours and the other objects of
16912 sense, although themselves devoid of motion, produce movements in the
16913 eyes and the other organs of sense. So the Lord also who is all-present,
16914 the Self of all, all-knowing and all-powerful may, although himself
16915 unmoving, move the universe.--If it finally be objected that (on the
16916 Vedanta doctrine) there is no room for a moving power as in consequence
16917 of the oneness (aduality) of Brahman no motion can take place; we reply
16918 that such objections have repeatedly been refuted by our pointing to the
16919 fact of the Lord being fictitiously connected with Maya, which consists
16920 of name and form presented by Nescience.--Hence motion can be reconciled
16921 with the doctrine of an all-knowing first cause; but not with the
16922 doctrine of a non-intelligent first cause.

16923
16924 3. If it be said (that the pradhana moves) like milk or water, (we reply
16925 that) there also (the motion is due to intelligence).

16926
16927 Well, the Sa@nkhyas resumes, listen then to the following instances.--As
16928 non-sentient milk flows forth from its own nature merely for the
16929 nourishment of the young animal, and as non-sentient water, from its own
16930 nature, flows along for the benefit of mankind, so the pradhana also,
16931 although non-intelligent, may be supposed to move from its own nature
16932 merely for the purpose of effecting the highest end of man.

16933
16934 This argumentation, we reply, is unsound again; for as the adherents of
16935 both doctrines admit that motion is not observed in the case of merely
16936 non-intelligent things such as chariots, &c., we infer that water and
16937 milk also move only because they are directed by intelligent powers.
16938 Scriptural passages, moreover (such as 'He who dwells in the water and
16939 within the water, who rules the water within,' B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 4;
16940 and, 'By the command of that Akshara, O Gargi, some rivers flow to the
16941 East,' &c., B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 9), declare that everything in this world
16942 which flows is directed by the Lord. Hence the instances of milk and
16943 water as belonging themselves to that class of cases which prove our
16944 general principle[325] cannot be used to show that the latter is too
16945 wide.--Moreover, the cow, which is an intelligent being and loves her
16946 calf, makes her milk flow by her wish to do so, and the milk is in
16947 addition drawn forth by the sucking of the calf. Nor does water move
16948 either with absolute independence--for its flow depends on the declivity
16949 of the soil and similar circumstances--or independently of an
16950 intelligent principle, for we have shown that the latter is present in
16951 all cases.--If, finally, our opponent should point to Sutra II, 1, 24 as
16952 contradicting the present Sutra, we remark that there we have merely
16953 shown on the ground of ordinary experience that an effect may take place
16954 in itself independently of any external instrumental cause; a conclusion
16955 which does not contradict the doctrine, based on Scripture, that all
16956 effects depend on the Lord.

16957
16958 4. And because (the pradhana), on account of there existing nothing
16959 beyond it, stands in no relation; (it cannot be active.)

16960
16961 The three gu/n/as of the Sa@nkhyas when in a state of equipoise form the
16962 pradhana. Beyond the pradhana there exists no external principle which
16963 could either impel the pradhana to activity or restrain it from
16964 activity. The soul (purusha), as we know, is indifferent, neither moves
16965 to--nor restrains from--action. As therefore the pradhana stands in no
16966 relation, it is impossible to see why it should sometimes modify itself
16967 into the great principle (mahat) and sometimes not. The activity and
16968 non-activity (by turns) of the Lord, on the other hand, are not contrary
16969 to reason, on account of his omniscience and omnipotence, and his being
16970 connected with the power of illusion (maya).

16971
16972 5. Nor (can it be said that the pradhana modifies itself spontaneously)
16973 like grass, &c. (which turn into milk); for (milk) does not exist

16974 elsewhere (but in the female animal).

16975

16976 Let this be (the Sa@nkhyā resumes). Just as grass, herbs, water, &c.
16977 independently of any other instrumental cause transform themselves, by
16978 their own nature, into milk; so, we assume, the pradhana also transforms
16979 itself into the great principle, and so on. And, if you ask how we know
16980 that grass transforms itself independently of any instrumental cause; we
16981 reply, 'Because no such cause is observed.' For if we did perceive some
16982 such cause, we certainly should apply it to grass, &c. according to our
16983 liking, and thereby produce milk. But as a matter of fact we do no such
16984 thing. Hence the transformation of grass and the like must be considered
16985 to be due to its own nature merely; and we may infer therefrom that the
16986 transformation of the pradhana is of the same kind.

16987

16988 To this we make the following reply.--The transformation of the pradhana
16989 might be ascribed to its own nature merely if we really could admit that
16990 grass modifies itself in the manner stated by you; but we are unable to
16991 admit that, since another instrumental cause is observed. How? 'Because
16992 it does not exist elsewhere.' For grass becomes milk only when it is
16993 eaten by a cow or some other female animal, not if it is left either
16994 uneaten or is eaten by a bull. If the transformation had no special
16995 cause, grass would become milk even on other conditions than that of
16996 entering a cow's body. Nor would the circumstance of men not being able
16997 to produce milk according to their liking prove that there is no
16998 instrumental cause; for while some effects can be produced by men,
16999 others result from divine action only[326]. The fact, however, is that
17000 men also are able, by applying a means in their power, to produce milk
17001 from grass and herbs; for when they wish to procure a more abundant
17002 supply of milk they feed the cow more plentifully and thus obtain more
17003 milk from her.--For these reasons the spontaneous modification of the
17004 pradhana cannot be proved from the instance of grass and the like.

17005

17006 6. Even if we admit (the Sa@nkhyā position refuted in what precedes, it
17007 is invalidated by other objections) on account of the absence of a
17008 purpose (on the part of the pradhana).

17009

17010 Even if we, accommodating ourselves to your (the Sa@nkhyā's) belief,
17011 should admit what has been disproved in the preceding Sūtra, viz. that
17012 the pradhana is spontaneously active, still your opinion would lie open
17013 to an objection 'on account of the absence of a purpose.' For if the
17014 spontaneous activity of the pradhana has, as you say, no reference to
17015 anything else, it will have no reference not only to any aiding
17016 principle, but also to any purpose or motive, and consequently your
17017 doctrine that the pradhana is active in order to effect the purpose of
17018 man will become untenable. If you reply that the pradhana does not
17019 indeed regard any aiding principle, but does regard a purpose, we remark
17020 that in that case we must distinguish between the different possible
17021 purposes, viz. either enjoyment (on the part of the soul), or final
17022 release, or both. If enjoyment, what enjoyment, we ask, can belong to
17023 the soul which is naturally incapable of any accretion (of pleasure or
17024 pain)[327]? Moreover, there would in that case be no opportunity for
17025 release[328].--If release, then the activity of the pradhana would be
17026 purposeless, as even antecedently to it the soul is in the state of
17027 release; moreover, there would then be no occasion for the perception of
17028 sounds, &c.[329]--If both, then, on account of the infinite number of
17029 the objects of pradhana to be enjoyed (by the soul)[330], there would be
17030 no opportunity for final release. Nor can the satisfaction of a desire
17031 be considered as the purpose of the activity of the pradhana; for
17032 neither the non-intelligent pradhana nor the essentially pure soul can
17033 feel any desire.--If, finally, you should assume the pradhana to be
17034 active, because otherwise the power of sight (belonging to the soul on
17035 account of its intelligent nature) and the creative power (belonging to
17036 the pradhana) would be purposeless; it would follow that, as the
17037 creative power of the pradhana does not cease at any time any more than
17038 the soul's power of sight does, the apparent world would never come to
17039 an end, so that no final release of the soul could take place[331].--It
17040 is, therefore, impossible to maintain that the pradhana enters on its
17041 activity for the purposes of the soul.

17042

17043 7. And if you say (that the soul may move the pradhana) as the (lame)
17044 man (moves the blind one) or as the magnet (moves the iron); thus also
17045 (the difficulty is not overcome).

17046
17047 Well then--the Sa@nkhyas resumes, endeavouring to defend his position by
17048 parallel instances--let us say that, as some lame man devoid of the
17049 power of motion, but possessing the power of sight, having mounted the
17050 back of a blind man who is able to move but not to see, makes the latter
17051 move; or as the magnet not moving itself, moves the iron, so the soul
17052 moves the pradhana.--Thus also, we reply, you do not free your doctrine
17053 from all shortcomings; for this your new position involves an
17054 abandonment of your old position, according to which the pradhana is
17055 moving of itself, and the (indifferent, inactive) soul possesses no
17056 moving power. And how should the indifferent soul move the pradhana? A
17057 man, although lame, may make a blind man move by means of words and the
17058 like; but the soul which is devoid of action and qualities cannot
17059 possibly put forth any moving energy. Nor can it be said that it moves
17060 the pradhana by its mere proximity as the magnet moves the iron; for
17061 from the permanency of proximity (of soul and pradhana) a permanency of
17062 motion would follow. The proximity of the magnet, on the other hand (to
17063 the iron), is not permanent, but depends on a certain activity and the
17064 adjustment of the magnet in a certain position; hence the (lame) man and
17065 the magnet do not supply really parallel instances.--The pradhana then
17066 being non-intelligent and the soul indifferent, and there being no third
17067 principle to connect them, there can be no connexion of the two. If we
17068 attempted to establish a connexion on the ground of capability (of being
17069 seen on the part of the pradhana, of seeing on the part of the soul),
17070 the permanency of such capability would imply the impossibility of final
17071 release.--Moreover, here as well as before (in the preceding Sutra) the
17072 different alternatives connected with the absence of purpose (on the
17073 pradhana's part) have to be considered[332].--The highest Self, on the
17074 other hand (which is the cause of the world, according to the
17075 Vedantins), is characterised by non-activity inherent in its own nature,
17076 and, at the same time, by moving power inherent in Maya and is thus
17077 superior (to the soul of the Sa@nkhyas).

17078
17079 8. And, again, (the pradhana cannot be active) because the relation of
17080 principal (and subordinate matter) is impossible (between the three
17081 gu/n/as).

17082
17083 For the following reason also activity on the part of the pradhana is
17084 not possible.--The condition of the pradhana consists in the three
17085 gu/n/as, viz. goodness, passion, and darkness, abiding in themselves in
17086 a state of equipoise without standing to one another in the relation of
17087 mutual superiority or inferiority. In that state the gu/n/as cannot
17088 possibly enter into the relation of mutual subserviency because thereby
17089 they would forfeit their essential characteristic, viz. absolute
17090 independence. And as there exists no extraneous principle to stir up the
17091 gu/n/as, the production of the great principle and the other
17092 effects--which would acquire for its operative cause a non-balanced
17093 state of the gu/n/as--is impossible.

17094
17095 9. And although another inference be made, (the objections remain in
17096 force) on account of the (pradhana) being devoid of the power of
17097 intelligence.

17098
17099 But--the Sa@nkhyas resumes--we draw another inference, so as to leave no
17100 room for the objection just stated. We do not acknowledge the gu/n/as to
17101 be characterised by absolute irrelativity and unchangeableness, since
17102 there is no proof for such an assumption. We rather infer the
17103 characteristics of the gu/n/as from those of their effects, presuming
17104 that their nature must be such as to render the production of the
17105 effects possible. Now the gu/n/as are admitted to be of an unsteady
17106 nature; hence the gu/n/as themselves are able to enter into the relation
17107 of mutual inequality, even while they are in a state of equipoise.

17108
17109 Even in that case, we reply, the objections stated above which were
17110 founded on the impossibility of an orderly arrangement of the world,
17111 &c., remain in force on account of the pradhana being devoid of the

17112 power of intelligence. And if (to escape those objections) the Sa@nkhyas
17113 should infer (from the orderly arrangement of the world, &c.), that the
17114 primal cause is intelligent, he would cease to be an antagonist, since
17115 the doctrine that there is one intelligent cause of this multi-form world
17116 would be nothing else but the Vedantic doctrine of Brahman.--Moreover,
17117 if the gu/n/as were capable of entering into the relation of mutual
17118 inequality even while in the state of equipoise, one of two things would
17119 happen; they would either not be in the condition of inequality on
17120 account of the absence of an operative cause; or else, if they were in
17121 that condition, they would always remain in it; the absence of an
17122 operative cause being a non-changing circumstance. And thus the doctrine
17123 would again be open to the objection stated before[333].

17124
17125 10. And moreover (the Sa@nkhyas doctrine) is objectionable on account of
17126 its contradictions.

17127
17128 The doctrine of the Sa@nkhyas, moreover, is full of contradictions.
17129 Sometimes they enumerate seven senses, sometimes eleven[334]. In some
17130 places they teach that the subtle elements of material things proceed
17131 from the great principle, in other places again that they proceed from
17132 self-consciousness. Sometimes they speak of three internal organs,
17133 sometimes of one only[335]. That their doctrine, moreover, contradicts
17134 /S/ruti, which teaches that the Lord is the cause of the world, and
17135 Sm/ri/ti, based on /S/ruti, is well known.--For these reasons also the
17136 Sa@nkhyas system is objectionable.

17137
17138 Here the Sa@nkhyas again brings a countercharge--The system of the
17139 Vedantins also, he says, must be declared to be objectionable; for it
17140 does not admit that that which suffers and that which causes
17141 suffering[336] are different classes of things (and thereby renders
17142 futile the well-established distinction of causes of suffering and
17143 suffering beings). For those who admit the one Brahman to be the Self of
17144 everything and the cause of the whole world, have to admit also that the
17145 two attributes of being that which causes suffering and that which
17146 suffers belong to the one supreme Self (not to different classes of
17147 beings). If, then, these two attributes belong to one and the same Self,
17148 it never can divest itself of them, and thus Scripture, which teaches
17149 perfect knowledge for the purpose of the cessation of all suffering,
17150 loses all its meaning. For--to adduce a parallel case--a lamp as long as
17151 it subsists as such is never divested of the two qualities of giving
17152 heat and light. And if the Vedantin should adduce the case of water with
17153 its waves, ripples, foam, &c.[337], we remark that there also the waves,
17154 &c. constitute attributes of the water which remain permanently,
17155 although they by turns manifest themselves, and again enter into the
17156 state of non-manifestation; hence the water is never really destitute of
17157 waves, not any more than the lamp is ever destitute of heat and
17158 light.--That that which causes suffering, and that which suffers
17159 constitute different classes of things is, moreover, well known from
17160 ordinary experience. For (to consider the matter from a more general
17161 point of view) the person desiring and the thing desired[338] are
17162 understood to be separate existences. If the object of desire were not
17163 essentially different and separate from the person desiring, the state
17164 of being desirous could not be ascribed to the latter, because the
17165 object with reference to which alone he can be called desiring would
17166 already essentially be established in him (belong to him). The latter
17167 state of things exists in the case of a lamp and its light, for
17168 instance. Light essentially belongs to the lamp, and hence the latter
17169 never can stand in want of light; for want or desire can exist only if
17170 the thing wanted or desired is not yet obtained.

17171
17172 (And just as there could be no desiring person, if the object of desire
17173 and the desiring person were not essentially separate), so the object of
17174 desire also would cease to be an object for the desiring person, and
17175 would be an object for itself only. As a matter of fact, however, this
17176 is not the case; for the two ideas (and terms), 'object of desire' and
17177 'desiring person,' imply a relation (are correlative), and a relation
17178 exists in two things, not in one only. Hence the desiring person and the
17179 object of desire are separate.--The same holds good with regard to what
17180 is not desired (object of aversion; anartha) and the non-desiring person

(anarthin).

An object of desire is whatever is of advantage to the desiring person, an object of aversion whatever is of disadvantage; with both one person enters into relation by turns. On account of the comparative paucity of the objects of desire, and the comparative multitude of the objects of aversion, both may be comprised under the general term, 'object of aversion.' Now, these objects of aversion we mean when we use the term 'causes of suffering,' while by the term 'sufferer' we understand the soul which, being one, enters into successive relations with both (i.e. the objects of desire and the objects of aversion). If, then, the causes of suffering and the sufferer constitute one Self (as the Vedanta teaches), it follows that final release is impossible.--But if, on the other hand, the two are assumed to constitute separate classes, the possibility of release is not excluded, since the cause of the connexion of the two (viz. wrong knowledge) may be removed.

All this reasoning--we, the Vedantins, reply--is futile, because on account of the unity of the Self the relation, whose two terms are the causes of suffering, and the sufferer cannot exist (in the Self).--Our doctrine would be liable to your objection if that which causes suffering and that which suffers did, while belonging to one and the same Self, stand to each other in the relation of object and subject. But they do not stand in that relation just because they are one. If fire, although it possesses different attributes, such as heat and light, and is capable of change, does neither burn nor illumine itself since it is one only; how can the one unchangeable Brahman enter with reference to itself into the relation of cause of suffering and sufferer?--Where then, it may be asked, does the relation discussed (which after all cannot be denied altogether) exist?--That, we reply, is not difficult to see[339]. The living body which is the object of the action of burning is the sufferer; the sun, for instance, is a cause of suffering (burning).--But, the opponent rejoins, burning is a pain, and as such can affect an intelligent being only, not the non-intelligent body; for if it were an affection of the mere body, it would, on the destruction of the body, cease of itself, so that it would be needless to seek for means to make it cease.--But it is likewise not observed, we reply, that a mere intelligent being destitute of a body is burned and suffers pain.--Nor would you (the Sa@nkhyas) also assume that the affection called burning belongs to a mere intelligent being. Nor can you admit[340] a real connexion of the soul and the body, because through such a connexion impurity and similar imperfections would attach to the soul[341]. Nor can suffering itself be said to suffer. And how then, we ask, can you explain the relation existing between a sufferer and the causes of suffering? If (as a last refuge) you should maintain that the sattva-gu/n/a is that which suffers, and the gu/n/a called passion that which causes suffering, we again object, because the intelligent principle (the soul) cannot be really connected with these two[342]. And if you should say that the soul suffers as it were because it leans towards[343] the sattva-gu/n/a, we point out that the employment of the phrase, 'as it were,' shows that the soul does not really suffer.

If it is understood that its suffering is not real, we do not object to the phrase 'as it were[344].' For the amphisbena also does not become venomous because it is 'a serpent as it were' ('like a serpent'), nor does the serpent lose its venom because it is 'like an amphisbena.' You must therefore admit that the relation of causes of suffering and of sufferers is not real, but the effect of Nescience. And if you admit, that, then my (the Vedantic) doctrine also is free from objections[345].

But perhaps you (the Sa@nkhyas) will say that, after all, suffering (on the part of the soul) is real[346]. In that case, however, the impossibility of release is all the more undeniable[347], especially as the cause of suffering (viz. the pradhana) is admitted to be eternal.--And if (to get out of this difficulty) you maintain that, although the potentialities of suffering (on the part of the soul) and of causing suffering (on the part of the pradhana) are eternal, yet suffering, in order to become actual, requires the conjunction of the

17250 two--which conjunction in its turn depends on a special reason, viz. the
17251 non-discrimination of the pradhana by the soul--and that hence, when
17252 that reason no longer exists, the conjunction of the two comes to an
17253 absolute termination, whereby the absolute release of the soul becomes
17254 possible; we are again unable to accept your explanation, because that
17255 on which the non-discrimination depends, viz. the gu/n/a, called
17256 Darkness, is acknowledged by you to be eternal.

17257
17258 And as[348] there is no fixed rule for the (successive) rising and
17259 sinking of the influence of the particular gu/n/as, there is also no
17260 fixed rule for the termination of the cause which effects the
17261 conjunction of soul and pradhana (i.e. non-discrimination); hence the
17262 disjunction of the two is uncertain, and so the Sa@nkhyas cannot escape
17263 the reproach of absence of final release resulting from their doctrine.
17264 To the Vedantin, on the other hand, the idea of final release being
17265 impossible cannot occur in his dreams even; for the Self he acknowledges
17266 to be one only, and one thing cannot enter into the relation of subject
17267 and object, and Scripture, moreover, declares that the plurality of
17268 effects originates from speech only. For the phenomenal world, on the
17269 other hand, we may admit the relation of sufferer and suffering just as
17270 it is observed, and need neither object to it nor refute it.

17271
17272 Herewith we have refuted the doctrine which holds the pradhana to be the
17273 cause of the world. We have now to dispose of the atomic theory.

17274
17275 We begin by refuting an objection raised by the atomists against the
17276 upholders of Brahman.--The Vai/s/eshikas argue as follows: The qualities
17277 which inhere in the substance constituting the cause originate qualities
17278 of the same kind in the substance constituting the effect; we see, for
17279 instance, that from white threads white cloth is produced, but do not
17280 observe what is contrary (viz. white threads resulting in a piece of
17281 cloth of a different colour). Hence, if the intelligent Brahman is
17282 assumed as the cause of the world, we should expect to find intelligence
17283 inherent in the effect also, viz. the world. But this is not the case,
17284 and consequently the intelligent Brahman cannot be the cause of the
17285 world.--This reasoning the Sutrakara shows to be fallacious, on the
17286 ground of the system of the Vai/s/eshikas themselves.

17287
17288 II. Or (the world may originate from Brahman) as the great and the long
17289 originate from the short and the atomic.

17290
17291 The system of the Vai/s/eshikas is the following:--The atoms which
17292 possess, according to their special kind[349], the qualities of colour,
17293 &c., and which are of spherical form[350], subsist during a certain
17294 period[351] without producing any effects[352]. After that, the unseen
17295 principle (ad/ri/sh/ta/), &c.[353], acting as operative causes and
17296 conjunction constituting the non-inherent cause[354], they produce the
17297 entire aggregate of effected things, beginning with binary atomic
17298 compounds. At the same time the qualities of the causes (i.e. of the
17299 simple atoms) produce corresponding qualities in the effects. Thus, when
17300 two atoms produce a binary atomic compound, the special qualities
17301 belonging to the simple atoms, such as white colour, &c., produce a
17302 corresponding white colour in the binary compound. One special quality,
17303 however, of the simple atoms, viz. atomic sphericity, does not produce
17304 corresponding sphericity in the binary compound; for the forms of
17305 extension belonging to the latter are said to be minuteness (a/n/utva)
17306 and shortness. And, again, when two binary compounds combining produce a
17307 quaternary atomic compound, the qualities, such as whiteness, &c.,
17308 inherent in the binary compounds produce corresponding qualities in the
17309 quaternary compounds; with the exception, however, of the two qualities
17310 of minuteness and shortness. For it is admitted that the forms of
17311 extension belonging to quaternary compounds are not minuteness and
17312 shortness, but bigness (mahattva) and length. The same happens[355] when
17313 many simple atoms or many binary compounds or a simple atom and a binary
17314 compound combine to produce new effects.

17315
17316 Well, then, we say, just as from spherical atoms binary compounds are
17317 produced, which are minute and short, and ternary compounds which are
17318 big and long, but not anything spherical; or as from binary compounds,

17319 which are minute and short, ternary compounds, &c., are produced which
17320 are big and long, not minute and short; so this non-intelligent world
17321 may spring from the intelligent Brahman. This is a doctrine to which
17322 you--the Vai/s/eshika--cannot, on your own principles, object.
17323

17324 Here the Vai/s/eshika will perhaps come forward with the following
17325 argumentation[356]. As effected substances, such as binary compounds and
17326 so on, are engrossed by forms of extension contrary to that of the
17327 causal substances, the forms of extension belonging to the latter, viz.
17328 sphericity and so on, cannot produce similar qualities in the effects.
17329 The world, on the other hand, is not engrossed by any quality contrary
17330 to intelligence owing to which the intelligence inherent in the cause
17331 should not be able to originate a new intelligence in the effect. For
17332 non-intelligence is not a quality contrary to intelligence, but merely
17333 its negation. As thus the case of sphericity is not an exactly parallel
17334 one, intelligence may very well produce an effect similar to itself.
17335

17336 This argumentation, we rejoin, is not sound. Just as the qualities of
17337 sphericity and so on, although existing in the cause, do not produce
17338 corresponding effects, so it is with intelligence also; so that the two
17339 cases are parallel so far. Nor can the circumstance of the effects being
17340 engrossed by a different form of extension be alleged as the reason of
17341 sphericity, &c. not originating qualities similar to themselves; for the
17342 power of originating effects belongs to sphericity, &c. before another
17343 form of extension begins to exist. For it is admitted that the substance
17344 produced remains for a moment devoid of qualities, and that thereupon
17345 only (i.e. after that moment) its qualities begin to exist. Nor, again,
17346 can it be said that sphericity, &c. concentrate their activity on
17347 originating other forms of extension[357], and therefore do not
17348 originate forms of extension belonging to the same class as their own;
17349 for it is admitted that the origin of other forms is due to other
17350 causes; as the Sutras of Ka/n/abhuj (Ka/n/ada) themselves declare
17351 (Vai/s/. Sut. VII, 1, 9, 'Bigness is produced from plurality inherent in
17352 the causes, from bigness of the cause and from a kind of accumulation;' VII, 1, 10, 'The contrary of this (the big) is the minute;' VII, 1, 17, 'Thereby length and shortness are explained[358]'.--Nor, again, can it
17353 be said that plurality, &c. inherent in the cause originate (like
17354 effects) in consequence of some peculiar proximity (in which they are
17355 supposed to stand to the effected substance), while sphericity, &c. (not
17356 standing in a like proximity) do not; for when a new substance or a new
17357 quality is originated, all the qualities of the cause stand in the same
17358 relation of inherence to their abode (i.e. the causal substance in which
17359 they inhere). For these reasons the fact of sphericity, &c. not
17360 originating like effects can be explained from the essential nature of
17361 sphericity, &c. only, and the same may therefore be maintained with
17362 regard to intelligence[359].
17363
17364
17365

17366 Moreover, from that observed fact also, that from conjunction
17367 (sa/m/yoga) there originate substances, &c. belonging to a class
17368 different (from that to which conjunction itself belongs), it follows
17369 that the doctrine of effects belonging to the same class as the causes
17370 from which they spring is too wide. If you remark against this last
17371 argument that, as we have to do at present with a substance (viz.
17372 Brahman), it is inappropriate to instance a quality (viz. conjunction)
17373 as a parallel case; we point out that at present we only wish to explain
17374 the origination of effects belonging to a different class in general.
17375 Nor is there any reason for the restriction that substances only are to
17376 be adduced as examples for substances, and qualities only for qualities.
17377 Your own Sutrakara adduces a quality as furnishing a parallel case for a
17378 substance (Vai/s/. Sut. IV, 2, 2, 'On account of the conjunction of
17379 things perceptible and things imperceptible being imperceptible the body
17380 is not composed of five elements'). Just as the conjunction which
17381 inheres in the perceptible earth and the imperceptible ether is not
17382 perceptible, the body also, if it had for its inherent cause the five
17383 elements which are part of them perceptible, part of them imperceptible,
17384 would itself be imperceptible; but, as a matter of fact, it is
17385 perceptible; hence it is not composed of the five elements. Here
17386 conjunction is a quality and the body a substance.--The origin of
17387 effects different in nature (from the cause) has, moreover, been already

17388 treated of under II, 1; 6.--Well then, this being so, the matter has
17389 been settled there already (why then is it again discussed
17390 here?)-Because, we reply, there we argued against the Sa@nkhyā, and at
17391 present we have to do with the Vai/s/eshika.--But, already once, before
17392 (II, 1, 3) a line of argument equally applicable to a second case was
17393 simply declared to extend to the latter also; (why then do you not
17394 simply state now that the arguments used to defeat the Sa@nkhyā are
17395 equally valid against the Vai/s/eshika?)--Because here, we reply, at the
17396 beginning of the examination of the Vai/s/eshika system we prefer to
17397 discuss the point with arguments specially adapted to the doctrine of
17398 the Vai/s/eshikas.

17399
17400 12. In both cases also (in the cases of the ad/ri/sh/t/a inhering either
17401 in the atoms or the soul) action (of the atoms) is not (possible); hence
17402 absence of that (viz. creation and pralaya).

17403
17404 The Sutrakara now proceeds to refute the doctrine of atoms being the
17405 cause of the world.--This doctrine arises in the following manner. We
17406 see that all ordinary substances which consist of parts as, for
17407 instance, pieces of cloth originate from the substances connected with
17408 them by the relation of inherence, as for instance threads, conjunction
17409 co-operating (with the parts to form the whole). We thence draw the
17410 general conclusion that whatever consists of parts has originated from
17411 those substances with which it is connected by the relation of
17412 inherence, conjunction cooperating. That thing now at which the
17413 distinction of whole and parts stops and which marks the limit of
17414 division into minuter parts is the atom.--This whole world, with its
17415 mountains, oceans, and so on, is composed of parts; because it is
17416 composed of parts it has a beginning and an end[360]; an effect may not
17417 be assumed without a cause; therefore the atoms are the cause of the
17418 world. Such is Ka/n/ada's doctrine.--As we observe four elementary
17419 substances consisting of parts, viz. earth, water, fire, and air (wind),
17420 we have to assume four different kinds of atoms. These atoms marking the
17421 limit of subdivision into minuter parts cannot be divided themselves;
17422 hence when the elements are destroyed they can be divided down to atoms
17423 only; this state of atomic division of the elements constitutes the
17424 pralaya (the periodical destruction of the world). After that when the
17425 time for creation comes, motion (karman) springs up in the aerial atoms.
17426 This motion which is due to the unseen principle[361] joins the atom in
17427 which it resides to another atom; thus binary compounds, &c. are
17428 produced, and finally the element of air. In a like manner are produced
17429 fire, water, earth, the body with its organs. Thus the whole world
17430 originates from atoms. From the qualities inhering in the atoms the
17431 qualities belonging to the binary compounds are produced, just as the
17432 qualities of the cloth result from the qualities of the threads.--Such,
17433 in short, is the teaching of the followers of Ka/n/ada.

17434
17435 This doctrine we controvert in the following manner.--It must be
17436 admitted that the atoms when they are in a state of isolation require
17437 action (motion) to bring about their conjunction; for we observe that
17438 the conjunction of threads and the like is effected by action. Action
17439 again, which is itself an effect, requires some operative cause by which
17440 it is brought about; for unless some such cause exists, no original
17441 motion can take place in the atoms. If, then, some operative cause is
17442 assumed, we may, in the first place, assume some cause analogous to seen
17443 causes, such as endeavour or impact. But in that case original motion
17444 could not occur at all in the atoms, since causes of that kind are, at
17445 the time, impossible. For in the pralaya state endeavour, which is a
17446 quality of the soul, cannot take place because no body exists then. For
17447 the quality of the soul called endeavour originates when the soul is
17448 connected with the internal organ which abides in the body. The same
17449 reason precludes the assumption of other seen causes such as impact and
17450 the like. For they all are possible only after the creation of the world
17451 has taken place, and cannot therefore be the causes of the original
17452 action (by which the world is produced).--If, in the second place, the
17453 unseen principle is assumed as the cause of the original motion of the
17454 atoms, we ask: Is this unseen principle to be considered as inhering in
17455 the soul or in the atom? In both cases it cannot be the cause of motion
17456 in the atoms, because it is non-intelligent. For, as we have shown above

17457 in our examination of the Sa@nkhya system, a non-intelligent thing which
17458 is not directed by an intelligent principle cannot of itself either act
17459 or be the cause of action, and the soul cannot be the guiding principle
17460 of the ad/ri/sh/t/a because at the time of pralaya its intelligence has
17461 not yet arisen[362]. If, on the other hand, the unseen principle is
17462 supposed to inhere in the soul, it cannot be the cause of motion in the
17463 atoms, because there exists no connexion of it with the latter. If you
17464 say that the soul in which the unseen principle inheres is connected
17465 with the atoms, then there would result, from the continuity of
17466 connexion[363], continuity of action, as there is no other restricting
17467 principle.--Hence, there being no definite cause of action, original
17468 action cannot take place in the atoms; there being no action,
17469 conjunction of the atoms which depends on action cannot take place;
17470 there being no conjunction, all the effects depending on it, viz. the
17471 formation of binary atomic compounds, &c., cannot originate.

17472
17473 How, moreover, is the conjunction of one atom with another to be
17474 imagined? Is it to be total interpenetration of the two or partial
17475 conjunction? If the former, then no increase of bulk could take place,
17476 and consequently atomic size only would exist; moreover, it would be
17477 contrary to what is observed, as we see that conjunction takes place
17478 between substances having parts (prade/s/a). If the latter, it would
17479 follow that the atoms are composed of parts.--Let then the atoms be
17480 imagined to consist of parts.--If so, imagined things being unreal, the
17481 conjunction also of the atoms would be unreal and thus could not be the
17482 non-inherent cause of real things. And without non-inherent causes
17483 effected substances such as binary compounds, &c. could not originate.
17484 And just as at the time of the first creation motion of the atoms
17485 leading to their conjunction could not take place, there being no cause
17486 of such motion; thus at the time of a general pralaya also no action
17487 could take place leading to their separation, since for that occurrence
17488 also no definite seen cause could be alleged. Nor could the unseen
17489 principle be adduced as the cause, since its purport is to effect
17490 enjoyment (of reward and punishment on the part of the soul), not to
17491 bring about the pralaya. There being then no possibility of action to
17492 effect either the conjunction or the separation of the atoms, neither
17493 conjunction nor separation would actually take place, and hence neither
17494 creation nor pralaya of the world.--For these reasons the doctrine of
17495 the atoms being the cause of the world must be rejected.

17496
17497 13. And because in consequence of samavaya being admitted a regressus in
17498 infinitum results from parity of reasoning.

17499
17500 You (the Vai/s/eshika) admit that a binary compound which originates
17501 from two atoms, while absolutely different from them, is connected with
17502 them by the relation of inherence; but on that assumption the doctrine
17503 of the atoms being the general cause cannot be established, 'because
17504 parity involves here a retrogressus ad infinitum.' For just as a binary
17505 compound which is absolutely different from the two constituent atoms is
17506 connected with them by means of the relation of inherence (samavaya), so
17507 the relation of inherence itself being absolutely different from the two
17508 things which it connects, requires another relation of inherence to
17509 connect it with them, there being absolute difference in both cases. For
17510 this second relation of inherence again, a third relation of inherence
17511 would have to be assumed and so on ad infinitum.--But--the Vai/s/eshika
17512 is supposed to reply--we are conscious of the so-called samavaya
17513 relation as eternally connected with the things between which it exists,
17514 not as either non-connected with them or as depending on another
17515 connexion; we are therefore not obliged to assume another connexion, and
17516 again another, and so on, and thus to allow ourselves to be driven into
17517 a regressus in infinitum.--Your defence is unavailing, we reply, for it
17518 would involve the admission that conjunction (sa/m/yoga) also as being
17519 eternally connected with the things which it joins does, like samavaya,
17520 not require another connexion[364]. If you say that conjunction does
17521 require another connexion because it is a different thing[365] we reply
17522 that then samavaya also requires another connexion because it is
17523 likewise a different thing. Nor can you say that conjunction does
17524 require another connexion because it is a quality (gu/n/a), and samavaya
17525 does not because it is not a quality; for (in spite of this difference)

17526 the reason for another connexion being required is the same in both
17527 cases[366], and not that which is technically called 'quality' is the
17528 cause (of another connexion being required)[367].--For these reasons
17529 those who acknowledge samavaya to be a separate existence are driven
17530 into a regressus in infinitum, in consequence of which, the
17531 impossibility of one term involving the impossibility of the entire
17532 series, not even the origination of a binary compound from two atoms can
17533 be accounted for.--For this reason also the atomic doctrine is
17534 inadmissible.

17535
17536 14. And on account of the permanent existence (of activity or
17537 non-activity).

17538
17539 Moreover, the atoms would have to be assumed as either essentially
17540 active (moving) or essentially non-active, or both or neither; there
17541 being no fifth alternative. But none of the four alternatives stated is
17542 possible. If they were essentially active, their activity would be
17543 permanent so that no pralaya could take place. If they were essentially
17544 non-active, their non-activity would be permanent, and no creation could
17545 take place. Their being both is impossible because self-contradictory.
17546 If they were neither, their activity and non-activity would have to
17547 depend on an operative cause, and then the operative causes such as the
17548 ad/ri/sh/t/a being in permanent proximity to the atoms, permanent
17549 activity would result; or else the ad/ri/sh/t/a and so on not being
17550 taken as operative causes, the consequence would be permanent
17551 non-activity on the part of the atoms.--For this reason also the atomic
17552 doctrine is untenable.

17553
17554 15. And on account of the atoms having colour, &c., the reverse (of the
17555 Vai/s/eshika tenet would take place); as thus it is observed.

17556
17557 Let us suppose, the Vai/s/eshikas say, all substances composed of parts
17558 to be disintegrated into their parts; a limit will finally be reached
17559 beyond which the process of disintegration cannot be continued. What
17560 constitutes that limit are the atoms, which are eternal (permanent),
17561 belong to four different classes, possess the qualities of colour, &c.,
17562 and are the originating principles of this whole material world with its
17563 colour, form, and other qualities.

17564
17565 This fundamental assumption of the Vai/s/eshikas we declare to be
17566 groundless because from the circumstance of the atoms having colour and
17567 other qualities there would follow the contrary of atomic minuteness and
17568 permanency, i.e. it would follow that, compared to the ultimate cause,
17569 they are gross and non-permanent. For ordinary experience teaches that
17570 whatever things possess colour and other qualities are, compared to
17571 their cause, gross and non-permanent. A piece of cloth, for instance, is
17572 gross compared to the threads of which it consists, and non permanent;
17573 and the threads again are non-permanent and gross compared to the
17574 filaments of which they are made up. Therefore the atoms also which the
17575 Vai/s/eshikas admit to have colour, &c. must have causes compared to
17576 which they are gross and non-permanent. Hence that reason also which
17577 Ka/n/ada gives for the permanence of the atoms (IV, 1, 1, 'that which
17578 exists without having a cause is permanent') does not apply at all to
17579 the atoms because, as we have shown just now, the atoms are to be
17580 considered as having a cause.--The second reason also which Ka/n/ada
17581 brings forward for the permanency of the atoms, viz. in IV, 1, 4, 'the
17582 special negation implied in the term non-eternal would not be
17583 possible[368]' (if there did not exist something eternal, viz. the
17584 atoms), does not necessarily prove the permanency of the atoms; for
17585 supposing that there exists not any permanent thing, the formation of a
17586 negative compound such as 'non-eternal' is impossible. Nor does the
17587 existence of the word 'non-permanent' absolutely presuppose the
17588 permanency of atoms; for there exists (as we Vedantins maintain) another
17589 permanent ultimate Cause, viz. Brahman. Nor can the existence of
17590 anything be established merely on the ground of a word commonly being
17591 used in that sense, since there is room for common use only if word and
17592 matter are well-established by some other means of right knowledge.--The
17593 third reason also given in the Vai/s/. Sutras (IV, 1, 5) for the
17594 permanency of the atoms ('and Nescience') is unavailing. For if we

17595 explain that Sutra to mean 'the non-perception of those actually
17596 existing causes whose effects are seen is Nescience,' it would follow
17597 that the binary atomic compounds also are permanent[369]. And if we
17598 tried to escape from that difficulty by including (in the explanation of
17599 the Sutra as given above) the qualification 'there being absence of
17600 (originating) substances,' then nothing else but the absence of a cause
17601 would furnish the reason for the permanency of the atoms, and as that
17602 reason had already been mentioned before (in IV, 1, 1) the Sutra IV, 1,
17603 5 would be a useless restatement.--Well, then (the Vai/s/eshika might
17604 say), let us understand by 'Nescience' (in the Sutra) the impossibility
17605 of conceiving a third reason of the destruction (of effects), in
17606 addition to the division of the causal substance into its parts, and the
17607 destruction of the causal substance; which impossibility involves the
17608 permanency of the atoms[370].--There is no necessity, we reply, for
17609 assuming that a thing when perishing must perish on account of either of
17610 those two reasons. That assumption would indeed have to be made if it
17611 were generally admitted that a new substance is produced only by the
17612 conjunction of several causal substances. But if it is admitted that a
17613 causal substance may originate a new substance by passing over into a
17614 qualified state after having previously existed free from
17615 qualifications, in its pure generality, it follows that the effected
17616 substance may be destroyed by its solidity being dissolved, just as the
17617 hardness of ghee is dissolved by the action of fire[371].--Thus there
17618 would result, from the circumstance of the atoms having colour, &c., the
17619 opposite of what the Vai/s/eshikas mean. For this reason also the atomic
17620 doctrine cannot be maintained.

17621
17622 16. And as there are difficulties in both cases.

17623
17624 Earth has the qualities of smell, taste, colour, and touch, and is
17625 gross; water has colour, taste, and touch, and is fine; fire has colour
17626 and touch, and is finer yet; air is finest of all, and has the quality
17627 of touch only. The question now arises whether the atoms constituting
17628 the four elements are to be assumed to possess the same greater or
17629 smaller number of qualities as the respective elements.--Either
17630 assumption leads to unacceptable consequences. For if we assume that
17631 some kinds of atoms have more numerous qualities, it follows that their
17632 solid size (murti) will be increased thereby, and that implies their
17633 being atoms no longer. That an increase of qualities cannot take place
17634 without a simultaneous increase of size we infer from our observations
17635 concerning effected material bodies.--If, on the other hand, we assume,
17636 in order to save the equality of atoms of all kinds, that there is no
17637 difference in the number of their qualities, we must either suppose that
17638 they have all one quality only; but in that case we should not perceive
17639 touch in fire nor colour and touch in water, nor taste, colour, and
17640 touch in earth, since the qualities of the effects have for their
17641 antecedents the qualities of the causes. Or else we must suppose all
17642 atoms to have all the four qualities; but in that case we should
17643 necessarily perceive what we actually do not perceive, viz. smell in
17644 water, smell and taste in fire, smell, taste, and colour in air.--Hence
17645 on this account also the atomic doctrine shows itself to be
17646 unacceptable.

17647
17648 17. And as the (atomic theory) is not accepted (by any authoritative
17649 persons) it is to be disregarded altogether.

17650
17651 While the theory of the pradhana being the cause of the world has been
17652 accepted by some adherents of the Veda--as, for instance, Manu--with a
17653 view to the doctrines of the effect existing in the cause already, and
17654 so on, the atomic doctrine has not been accepted by any persons of
17655 authority in any of its parts, and therefore is to be disregarded
17656 entirely by all those who take their stand on the Veda.

17657
17658 There are, moreover, other objections to the Vai/s/eshika doctrine.--The
17659 Vai/s/eshikas assume six categories, which constitute the subject-matter
17660 of their system, viz. substance, quality, action, generality,
17661 particularity, and inherence. These six categories they maintain to be
17662 absolutely different from each other, and to have different
17663 characteristics; just as a man, a horse, a hare differ from one another.

17664 Side by side with this assumption they make another which contradicts
17665 the former one, viz. that quality, action, &c. have the attribute of
17666 depending on substance. But that is altogether inappropriate; for just
17667 as ordinary things, such as animals, grass, trees, and the like, being
17668 absolutely different from each other do not depend on each other, so the
17669 qualities, &c. also being absolutely different from substance, cannot
17670 depend on the latter. Or else let the qualities, &c. depend on
17671 substance; then it follows that, as they are present where substance is
17672 present, and absent where it is absent, substance only exists, and,
17673 according to its various forms, becomes the object of different terms
17674 and conceptions (such as quality, action, &c.); just as Devadatta, for
17675 instance, according to the conditions in which he finds himself is the
17676 object of various conceptions and names. But this latter alternative
17677 would involve the acceptance of the Sa@nkhyas doctrine[372] and the
17678 abandonment of the Vai/s/eshika standpoint.--But (the Vai/s/eshika may
17679 say) smoke also is different from fire and yet it is dependent on
17680 it.--True, we reply; but we ascertain the difference of smoke and fire
17681 from the fact of their being apperceived in separation. Substance and
17682 quality, on the other hand, are not so apperceived; for when we are
17683 conscious of a white blanket, or a red cow, or a blue lotus, the
17684 substance is in each case cognised by means of the quality; the latter
17685 therefore has its Self in the substance. The same reasoning applies to
17686 action, generality, particularity, and inherence.

17687
17688 If you (the Vai/s/eshika) say that qualities, actions, &c. (although not
17689 non-different from substances) may yet depend on the latter because
17690 substances and qualities stand in the relation of one not being able to
17691 exist without the other (ayutasiddhi[373]); we point out that things
17692 which are ayutasiddha must either be non-separate in place, or
17693 non-separate in time, or non-separate in nature, and that none of these
17694 alternatives agrees with Vai/s/eshika principles. For the first
17695 alternative contradicts your own assumptions according to which the
17696 cloth originating from the threads occupies the place of the threads
17697 only, not that of the cloth, while the qualities of the cloth, such as
17698 its white colour, occupy the place of the cloth only, not that of the
17699 threads. So the Vai/s/eshika-sutras say (I, 1, 10), 'Substances
17700 originate another substance and qualities another quality.' The threads
17701 which constitute the causal substance originate the effected substance,
17702 viz. the cloth, and the qualities of the threads, such as white colour,
17703 &c., produce in the cloth new corresponding qualities. But this doctrine
17704 is clearly contradicted by the assumption of substance and quality being
17705 non-separate in place.--If, in the second place, you explain
17706 ayutasiddhatva as non-separation in time, it follows also that, for
17707 instance, the right and the left horn of a cow would be
17708 ayutasiddha.--And if, finally, you explain it to mean 'non-separation in
17709 character,' it is impossible to make any further distinction between the
17710 substance and the quality, as then quality is conceived as being
17711 identical with substance.

17712
17713 Moreover, the distinction which the Vai/s/eshikas make between
17714 conjunction (sa@m/yoga) as being the connexion of things which can exist
17715 separately, and inherence (samavaya) as being the connexion of things
17716 which are incapable of separate existence is futile, since the cause
17717 which exists before the effect[374] cannot be said to be incapable of
17718 separate existence. Perhaps the Vai/s/eshika will say that his
17719 definition refers to one of the two terms only, so that samavaya is the
17720 connexion, with the cause, of the effect which is incapable of separate
17721 existence. But this also is of no avail; for as a connexion requires two
17722 terms, the effect as long as it has not yet entered into being cannot be
17723 connected with the cause. And it would be equally unavailing to say that
17724 the effect enters into the connexion after it has begun to exist; for if
17725 the Vai/s/eshika admits that the effect may exist previous to its
17726 connexion with the cause, it is no longer ayutasiddha (incapable of
17727 separate existence), and thereby the principle that between effect and
17728 cause conjunction and disjunction do not take place is violated.[375]
17729 And[376] just as conjunction, and not samavaya, is the connexion in
17730 which every effected substance as soon as it has been produced stands
17731 with the all-pervading substances as ether, &c.--although no motion has
17732 taken place on the part of the effected substance--so also the connexion

17733 of the effect with the cause will be conjunction merely, not samavaya.
17734
17735 Nor is there any proof for the existence of any connexion, samavaya or
17736 sa/m/yoga, apart from the things which it connects. If it should be
17737 maintained that sa/m/yoga and samavaya have such an existence because we
17738 observe that there are names and ideas of them in addition to the names
17739 and ideas of the things connected, we point out that one and the same
17740 thing may be the subject of several names and ideas if it is considered
17741 in its relations to what lies without it. Devadatta although being one
17742 only forms the object of many different names and notions according as
17743 he is considered in himself or in his relations to others; thus he is
17744 thought and spoken of as man, Brahma/n/a learned in the Veda, generous,
17745 boy, young man, father, grandson, brother, son-in-law, &c. So, again,
17746 one and the same stroke is, according to the place it is connected with,
17747 spoken of and conceived as meaning either ten, or hundred, or thousand,
17748 &c. Analogously, two connected things are not only conceived and denoted
17749 as connected things, but in addition constitute the object of the ideas
17750 and terms 'conjunction' or 'inherence' which however do not prove
17751 themselves to be separate entities.--Things standing thus, the
17752 non-existence of separate entities (conjunction, &c.), which entities
17753 would have to be established on the ground of perception, follows from
17754 the fact of their non-perception.--Nor, again[377], does the
17755 circumstance of the word and idea of connexion having for its object the
17756 things connected involve the connexion's permanent existence, since we
17757 have already shown above that one thing may, on account of its relations
17758 to other things, be conceived and denoted in different ways.
17759

17760 Further[378], conjunction cannot take place between the atoms, the soul,
17761 and the internal organ, because they have no parts; for we observe that
17762 conjunction takes place only of such substances as consist of parts. If
17763 the Vai/s/eshika should say that parts of the atoms, soul and mind may
17764 be assumed (in order to explain their alleged conjunction), we remark
17765 that the assumption of actually non-existing things would involve the
17766 result that anything might be established; for there is no restrictive
17767 rule that only such and such non-existing things--whether contradictory
17768 to reason or not--should be assumed and not any other, and assumptions
17769 depend on one's choice only and may be carried to any extent. If we once
17770 allow assumptions, there is no reason why there should not be assumed a
17771 further hundred or thousand things, in addition to the six categories
17772 assumed by the Vai/s/eshikas. Anybody might then assume anything, and we
17773 could neither stop a compassionate man from assuming that this
17774 transmigratory world which is the cause of so much misery to living
17775 beings is not to be, nor a malicious man from assuming that even the
17776 released souls are to enter on a new cycle of existences.
17777

17778 Further, it is not possible that a binary atomic compound, which
17779 consists of parts, should be connected with the simple indivisible atoms
17780 by an intimate connexion (sa/ms/lesha) any more than they can thus be
17781 connected with ether; for between ether and earth, &c. there does not
17782 exist that kind of intimate connexion which exists, for instance,
17783 between wood and varnish[379].
17784

17785 Let it then be said (the Vai/s/eshika resumes) that the samavaya
17786 relation must be assumed, because otherwise the relation of that which
17787 abides and that which forms the abode--which relation actually exists
17788 between the effected substance and the causal substance--is not
17789 possible.--That would, we reply, involve the vice of mutual dependence;
17790 for only when the separateness of cause and effect is established, the
17791 relation of the abode and that which abides can be established; and only
17792 when the latter relation is established, the relation of separateness
17793 can be established. For the Vedantins acknowledge neither the
17794 separateness of cause and effect, nor their standing to each other in
17795 the relation of abode and thing abiding, since according to their
17796 doctrine the effect is only a certain state of the
17797 cause[380].--Moreover, as the atoms are limited (not of infinite
17798 extension), they must in reality consist of as many parts as we
17799 acknowledge regions of space[381], whether those be six or eight or ten,
17800 and consequently they cannot be permanent; conclusions contrary to the
17801 Vai/s/eshika doctrine of the indivisibility and permanency of the

atoms.--If the Vai/s/eshika replies that those very parts which are owing to the existence of the different regions of space are his (indestructible) atoms; we deny that because all things whatever, forming a series of substances of ever-increasing minuteness, are capable of dissolution, until the highest cause (Brahman) is reached. Earth--which is, in comparison with a binary compound, the grossest thing of all--undergoes decomposition; so do the substances following next which belong to the same class as earth; so does the binary compound; and so does, finally, the atom which (although the minutest thing of all) still belongs to the same general class (i.e. matter) with earth, &c. The objection (which the Vai/s/eshika might possibly raise here again) that things can be decomposed only by the separation of their parts[382], we have already disposed of above, where we pointed out that decomposition may take place in a manner analogous to the melting of ghee. Just as the hardness of ghee, gold, and the like, is destroyed in consequence of those substances being rendered liquid by their contact with fire, no separation of the parts taking place all the while; so the solid shape of the atoms also may be decomposed by their passing back into the indifferenced condition of the highest cause. In the same way the origination of effects also is brought about not merely in the way of conjunction of parts; for we see that milk, for instance, and water originate effects such as sour milk and ice without there taking place any conjunction of parts.

It thus appears that the atomic doctrine is supported by very weak arguments only, is opposed to those scriptural passages which declare the Lord to be the general cause, and is not accepted by any of the authorities taking their stand on Scripture, such as Manu and others. Hence it is to be altogether disregarded by highminded men who have a regard for their own spiritual welfare.

18. (If there be assumed) the (dyad of) aggregates with its two causes, (there takes place) non-establishment of those (two aggregates).

The reasons on account of which the doctrine of the Vai/s/eshikas cannot be accepted have been stated above. That doctrine may be called semi-destructive (or semi-nihilistic[383]). That the more thorough doctrine which teaches universal non-permanency is even less worthy of being taken into consideration, we now proceed to show.

That doctrine is presented in a variety of forms, due either to the difference of the views (maintained by Buddha at different times), or else to the difference of capacity on the part of the disciples (of Buddha). Three principal opinions may, however, be distinguished; the opinion of those who maintain the reality of everything (Realists, sarvastitvavadin); the opinion of those who maintain that thought only is real (Idealists, vij/n/anavadin); and the opinion of those who maintain that everything is void (unreal; Nihilists, /s/unyavadin[384]).--We first controvert those who maintain that everything, external as well as internal, is real. What is external is either element (bhuta) or elementary (bhautika); what is internal is either mind (/k/itta) or mental (/k/aitta). The elements are earth, water, and so on; elemental are colour, &c. on the one hand, and the eye and the other sense-organs on the other hand. Earth and the other three elements arise from the aggregation of the four different kinds of atoms; the atoms of earth being hard, those of water viscid, those of fire hot, those of air mobile.--The inward world consists of the five so-called 'groups' (skandha), the group of sensation (rupaskandha), the group of knowledge (vij/n/anaskandha), the group of feeling (vedanaskandha), the group of verbal knowledge (samj/n/askandha), and the group of impressions (sa/m/skaraskandha)[385]; which taken together constitute the basis of all personal existence[386].

With reference to this doctrine we make the following remarks.--Those two aggregates, constituting two different classes, and having two different causes which the Bauddhas assume, viz. the aggregate of the elements and elementary things whose cause the atoms are, and the aggregate of the five skandhas whose cause the skandhas are, cannot, on Bauddha principles, be established, i.e. it cannot be explained how the

aggregates are brought about. For the parts constituting the (material) aggregates are devoid of intelligence, and the kindling (abhijvalana) of intelligence depends on an aggregate of atoms having been brought about previously[387]. And the Bauddhas do not admit any other permanent intelligent being, such as either an enjoying soul or a ruling Lord, which could effect the aggregation of the atoms. Nor can the atoms and skandhas be assumed to enter on activity on their own account; for that would imply their never ceasing to be active[388]. Nor can the cause of aggregation be looked for in the so-called abode (i.e. the alayavij/n/ana-pravaha, the train of self-cognitions); for the latter must be described either as different from the single cognitions or as not different from them. (In the former case it is either permanent, and then it is nothing else but the permanent soul of the Vedantins; or non-permanent;) then being admitted to be momentary merely, it cannot exercise any influence and cannot therefore be the cause of the motion of the atoms[389]. (And in the latter case we are not further advanced than before.)--For all these reasons the formation of aggregates cannot be accounted for. But without aggregates there would be an end of the stream of mundane existence which presupposes those aggregates.

19. If it be said that (the formation of aggregates may be explained) through (Nescience, &c.) standing in the relation of mutual causality; we say 'No,' because they merely are the efficient causes of the origin (of the immediately subsequent links).

Although there exists no permanent intelligent principle of the nature either of a ruling Lord or an enjoying soul, under whose influence the formation of aggregates could take place, yet the course of mundane existence is rendered possible through the mutual causality[390] of Nescience and so on, so that we need not look for any other combining principle.

The series beginning with Nescience comprises the following members: Nescience, impression, knowledge, name and form, the abode of the six, touch, feeling, desire, activity, birth, species, decay, death, grief, lamentation, pain, mental affliction, and the like[391]. All these terms constitute a chain of causes and are as such spoken of in the Bauddha system, sometimes cursorily, sometimes at length. They are, moreover, all acknowledged as existing, not by the Bauddhas only, but by the followers of all systems. And as the cycles of Nescience, &c. forming uninterrupted chains of causes and effects revolve unceasingly like water-wheels, the existence of the aggregates (which constitute bodies and minds) must needs be assumed, as without such Nescience and so on could not take place.

This argumentation of the Bauddha we are unable to accept, because it merely assigns efficient causes for the origination of the members of the series, but does not intimate an efficient cause for the formation of the aggregates. If the Bauddha reminds us of the statement made above that the existence of aggregates must needs be inferred from the existence of Nescience and so on, we point out that, if he means thereby that Nescience and so on cannot exist without aggregates and hence require the existence of such, it remains to assign an efficient cause for the formation of the aggregates. But, as we have already shown--when examining the Vaijeshika doctrine--that the formation of aggregates cannot be accounted for even on the assumption of permanent atoms and individual souls in which the ad/ri/sh/t/a abides[392]; how much less then are aggregates possible if there exist only momentary atoms not connected with enjoying souls and devoid of abodes (i.e. souls), and that which abides in them (the ad/ri/sh/t/a).--Let us then assume (the Bauddha says) that Nescience, &c. themselves are the efficient cause of the aggregate.--But how--we ask--can they be the cause of that without which--as their abode--they themselves are not capable of existence? Perhaps you will say that in the eternal sa/m/sara the aggregates succeed one another in an unbroken chain, and hence also Nescience, and so on, which abide in those aggregates. But in that case you will have to assume either that each aggregate necessarily produces another aggregate of the same kind, or that, without any settled rule, it may produce either a like or an unlike one. In the former case a human body

17940 could never pass over into that of a god or an animal or a being of the
17941 infernal regions; in the latter case a man might in an instant be turned
17942 into an elephant or a god and again become a man; either of which
17943 consequences would be contrary to your system.--Moreover, that for the
17944 purpose of whose enjoyment the aggregate is formed is, according to your
17945 doctrine, not a permanent enjoying soul, so that enjoyment subserves
17946 itself merely and cannot be desired by anything else; hence final
17947 release also must, according to you, be considered as subserving itself
17948 only, and no being desirous of release can be assumed. If a being
17949 desirous of both were assumed, it would have to be conceived as
17950 permanently existing up to the time of enjoyment and release, and that
17951 would be contrary to your doctrine of general impermanency.--There may
17952 therefore exist a causal relation between the members of the series
17953 consisting of Nescience, &c., but, in the absence of a permanent
17954 enjoying soul, it is impossible to establish on that ground the
17955 existence of aggregates.

17956
17957 20. (Nor can there be a causal relation between Nescience, &c.), because
17958 on the origination of the subsequent (moment) the preceding one ceases
17959 to be.

17960
17961 We have hitherto argued that Nescience, and so on, stand in a causal
17962 relation to each other merely, so that they cannot be made to account
17963 for the existence of aggregates; we are now going to prove that they
17964 cannot even be considered as efficient causes of the subsequent members
17965 of the series to which they belong.

17966
17967 Those who maintain that everything has a momentary existence only admit
17968 that when the thing existing in the second moment[393] enters into being
17969 the thing existing in the first moment ceases to be. On this admission
17970 it is impossible to establish between the two things the relation of
17971 cause and effect, since the former momentary existence which ceases or
17972 has ceased to be, and so has entered into the state of non-existence,
17973 cannot be the cause of the later momentary existence.--Let it then be
17974 said that the former momentary existence when it has reached its full
17975 development becomes the cause of the later momentary existence.--That
17976 also is impossible; for the assumption that a fully developed existence
17977 exerts a further energy, involves the conclusion that it is connected
17978 with a second moment (which contradicts the doctrine of universal
17979 momentariness).--Then let the mere existence of the antecedent entity
17980 constitute its causal energy.--That assumption also is fruitless,
17981 because we cannot conceive the origination of an effect which is not
17982 imbued with the nature of the cause (i.e. in which the nature of the
17983 cause does not continue to exist). And to assume that the nature of the
17984 cause does continue to exist in the effect is impossible (on the Bauddha
17985 doctrine), as that would involve the permanency of the cause, and thus
17986 necessitate the abandonment of the doctrine of general
17987 non-permanency.--Nor can it be admitted that the relation of cause and
17988 effect holds good without the cause somehow giving its colouring to the
17989 effect; for that doctrine might unduly be extended to all
17990 cases[394].--Moreover, the origination and cessation of things of which
17991 the Bauddha speaks must either constitute a thing's own form or another
17992 state of it, or an altogether different thing. But none of these
17993 alternatives agrees with the general Bauddha principles. If, in the
17994 first place, origination and cessation constituted the form of a thing,
17995 it would follow that the word 'thing' and the words 'origination' and
17996 'cessation' are interchangeable (which is not the case).--Let then,
17997 secondly, the Bauddha says, a certain difference be assumed, in
17998 consequence of which the terms 'origination' and 'cessation' may denote
17999 the initial and final states of that which in the intermediate state is
18000 called thing.--In that case, we reply, the thing will be connected with
18001 three moments, viz. the initial, the intermediate, and the final one, so
18002 that the doctrine of general momentariness will have to be
18003 abandoned.--Let then, as the third alternative, origination and
18004 cessation be altogether different from the thing, as much as a buffalo
18005 is from a horse.--That too cannot be, we reply; for it would lead to the
18006 conclusion that the thing, because altogether disconnected with
18007 origination and cessation, is everlasting. And the same conclusion would
18008 be led up to, if we understood by the origination and cessation of a

18009 thing merely its perception and non-perception; for the latter are
18010 attributes of the percipient mind only, not of the thing itself.--Hence
18011 we have again to declare the Bauddha doctrine to be untenable.

18012
18013 21. On the supposition of there being no (cause: while yet the effect
18014 takes place), there results contradiction of the admitted principle;
18015 otherwise simultaneousness (of cause and effect).

18016
18017 It has been shown that on the doctrine of general non-permanency, the
18018 former momentary existence, as having already been merged in
18019 non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later one.--Perhaps now the
18020 Bauddha will say that an effect may arise even when there is no
18021 cause.--That, we reply, implies the abandonment of a principle admitted
18022 by yourself, viz. that the mind and the mental modifications originate
18023 when in conjunction with four kinds of causes[395]. Moreover, if
18024 anything could originate without a cause, there would be nothing to
18025 prevent that anything might originate at any time.--If, on the other
18026 hand, you should say that we may assume the antecedent momentary
18027 existence to last until the succeeding one has been produced, we point
18028 out that that would imply the simultaneousness of cause and effect, and
18029 so run counter to an accepted Bauddha tenet, viz. that all things[396]
18030 are momentary merely.

18031
18032 22. Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation
18033 not so dependent cannot be established, there being no (complete)
18034 interruption.

18035
18036 The Bauddhas who maintain that universal destruction is going on
18037 constantly, assume that 'whatever forms an object of knowledge and is
18038 different from the triad is produced (sa/m/sk/ri/ta) and momentary.' To
18039 the triad there mentioned they give the names 'cessation dependent on a
18040 sublative act of the mind,' 'cessation not dependent on such an act,'
18041 and 'space.' This triad they hold to be non-substantial, of a merely
18042 negative character (abhavamatra), devoid of all positive
18043 characteristics. By 'cessation dependent on a sublative act of the
18044 mind,' we have to understand such destruction of entities as is preceded
18045 by an act of thought[397]; by 'cessation not so dependent' is meant
18046 destruction of the opposite kind[398]; by 'space' is meant absence in
18047 general of something covering (or occupying space). Out of these three
18048 non-existences 'space' will be refuted later on (Sutra 24), the two
18049 other ones are refuted in the present Sutra.

18050
18051 Cessation which is dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and
18052 cessation which is not so dependent are both impossible, 'on account of
18053 the absence of interruption.' For both kinds of cessation must have
18054 reference either to the series (of momentary existences) or to the
18055 single members constituting the series.--The former alternative is
18056 impossible, because in all series (of momentary existences) the members
18057 of the series stand in an unbroken relation of cause and effect so that
18058 the series cannot be interrupted[399].--The latter alternative is
18059 likewise inadmissible, for it is impossible to maintain that any
18060 momentary existence should undergo complete annihilation entirely
18061 undefinable and disconnected (with the previous state of existence),
18062 since we observe that a thing is recognised in the various states
18063 through which it may pass and thus has a connected existence[400]. And
18064 in those cases also where a thing is not clearly recognised (after
18065 having undergone a change) we yet infer, on the ground of actual
18066 observations made in other cases, that one and the same thing continues
18067 to exist without any interruption.--For these reasons the two kinds of
18068 cessation which the Bauddhas assume cannot be proved.

18069
18070 23. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either
18071 case.

18072
18073 The cessation of Nescience, &c. which, on the assumption of the
18074 Bauddhas, is included in the two kinds of cessation discussed hitherto,
18075 must take place either in consequence of perfect knowledge together with
18076 its auxiliaries, or else of its own accord. But the former alternative
18077 would imply the abandonment of the Bauddha doctrine that destruction

18078 takes place without a cause, and the latter alternative would involve
18079 the uselessness of the Bauddha instruction as to the 'path'[401]. As
18080 therefore both alternatives are open to objections, the Bauddha doctrine
18081 must be declared unsatisfactory.

18082
18083 24. And in the case of space also (the doctrine of its being a
18084 non-entity is untenable) on account of its not differing (from the two
18085 other kinds of non-entity).

18086
18087 We have shown so far that of the triad declared by the Bauddhas to be
18088 devoid of all positive characteristics, and therefore non-definable, two
18089 (viz. prati-sa/m/khyavirodha and aprati) cannot be shown to be such; we
18090 now proceed to show the same with regard to space (ether, aka/s/a).

18091
18092 With regard to space also it cannot be maintained that it is
18093 non-definable, since substantiality can be established in the case of
18094 space no less than in the case of the two so-called non-entities treated
18095 of in the preceding Suttas. That space is a real thing follows in the
18096 first place from certain scriptural passages, such as 'space sprang from
18097 the Self.'--To those, again, who (like the Bauddhas) disagree with us as
18098 to the authoritativeness of Scripture we point out that the real
18099 existence of space is to be inferred from the quality of sound, since we
18100 observe that earth and other real things are the abodes of smell and the
18101 other qualities.--Moreover, if you declare that space is nothing but the
18102 absence in general of any covering (occupying) body, it would follow
18103 that while one bird is flying--whereby space is occupied--there would be
18104 no room for a second bird wanting to fly at the same time. And if you
18105 should reply that the second bird may fly there where there is absence
18106 of a covering body, we point out that that something by which the
18107 absence of covering bodies is distinguished must be a positive entity,
18108 viz. space in our sense, and not the mere non-existence of covering
18109 bodies[402].--Moreover, the Bauddha places himself, by his view of
18110 space, in opposition to other parts of his system. For we find, in the
18111 Bauddha Scriptures, a series of questions and answers (beginning, 'On
18112 what, O reverend Sir, is the earth founded?'), in which the following
18113 question occurs, 'On what is the air founded?' to which it is replied
18114 that the air is founded on space (ether). Now it is clear that this
18115 statement is appropriate only on the supposition of space being a
18116 positive entity, not a mere negation.--Further, there is a
18117 self-contradiction in the Bauddha statements regarding all the three
18118 kinds of negative entities, it being said, on the one hand, that they
18119 are not positively definable, and, on the other hand, that they are
18120 eternal. Of what is not real neither eternity nor non-eternity can be
18121 predicated, since the distinction of subjects and predicates of
18122 attribution is founded entirely on real things. Anything with regard to
18123 which that distinction holds good we conclude to be a real thing, such
18124 as jars and the like are, not a mere undefinable negation.

18125
18126 25. And on account of remembrance.

18127
18128 The philosopher who maintains that all things are momentary only would
18129 have to extend that doctrine to the perceiving person (upalabdh/ri/) also;
18130 that is, however, not possible, on account of the remembrance which is
18131 consequent on the original perception. That remembrance can take place
18132 only if it belongs to the same person who previously made the perception;
18133 for we observe that what one man has experienced is not remembered by
18134 another man. How, indeed, could there arise the conscious state expressed
18135 in the sentences, 'I saw that thing, and now I see this thing,' if the seeing
18136 person were not in both cases the same? That the consciousness of recognition
18137 takes place only in the case of the observing and remembering subject being
18138 one, is a matter known to every one; for if there were, in the two cases,
18139 different subjects, the state of consciousness arising in the mind of the
18140 remembering person would be, 'I remember; another person made the observation.'
18141 But no such state of consciousness does arise.--When, on the other hand,
18142 such a state of consciousness does arise, then everybody knows that the
18143 person who made the original observation, and the person who remembers,
18144 are different persons, and then the state of consciousness is expressed as
18145 follows, 'I remember that that other person saw that and that.'--In the case under

18147 discussion, however, the Vaina/s/ika himself--whose state of
18148 consciousness is, 'I saw that and that'--knows that there is one
18149 thinking subject only to which the original perception as well as the
18150 remembrance belongs, and does not think of denying that the past
18151 perception belonged to himself, not any more than he denies that fire is
18152 hot and gives light.

18153
18154 As thus one agent is connected with the two moments of perception and
18155 subsequent remembrance, the Vaina/s/ika has necessarily to abandon the
18156 doctrine of universal momentariness. And if he further recognises all
18157 his subsequent successive cognitions, up to his last breath, to belong
18158 to one and the same subject, and in addition cannot but attribute all
18159 his past cognitions, from the moment of his birth, to the same Self, how
18160 can he maintain, without being ashamed of himself, that everything has a
18161 momentary existence only? Should he maintain that the recognition (of
18162 the subject as one and the same) takes place on account of the
18163 similarity (of the different self-cognitions; each, however, being
18164 momentary only), we reply that the cognition of similarity is based on
18165 two things, and that for that reason the advocate of universal
18166 momentariness who denies the existence of one (permanent) subject able
18167 mentally to grasp the two similar things simply talks deceitful nonsense
18168 when asserting that recognition is founded on similarity. Should he
18169 admit, on the other hand, that there is one mind grasping the similarity
18170 of two successive momentary existences, he would thereby admit that one
18171 entity endures for two moments and thus contradict the tenet of
18172 universal momentariness.--Should it be said that the cognition 'this is
18173 similar to that' is a different (new) cognition, not dependent on the
18174 apperception of the earlier and later momentary existences, we refute
18175 this by the remark that the fact of different terms--viz. 'this' and
18176 'that'--being used points to the existence of different things (which
18177 the mind grasps in a judgment of similarity). If the mental act of which
18178 similarity is the object were an altogether new act (not concerned with
18179 the two separate similar entities), the expression 'this is similar to
18180 that' would be devoid of meaning; we should in that case rather speak of
18181 'similarity' only.--Whenever (to add a general reflexion) something
18182 perfectly well known from ordinary experience is not admitted by
18183 philosophers, they may indeed establish their own view and demolish the
18184 contrary opinion by means of words, but they thereby neither convince
18185 others nor even themselves. Whatever has been ascertained to be such and
18186 such must also be represented as such and such; attempts to represent it
18187 as something else prove nothing but the vain talkativeness of those who
18188 make those attempts. Nor can the hypothesis of mere similarity being
18189 cognised account for ordinary empirical life and thought; for (in
18190 recognising a thing) we are conscious of it being that which we were
18191 formerly conscious of, not of it being merely similar to that. We admit
18192 that sometimes with regard to an external thing a doubt may arise
18193 whether it is that or merely is similar to that; for mistakes may be
18194 made concerning what lies outside our minds. But the conscious subject
18195 never has any doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself; it
18196 rather is distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which
18197 yesterday had a certain sensation and to-day remembers that
18198 sensation.--For this reason also the doctrine of the Nihilists is to be
18199 rejected.

18200
18201 26. (Entity) does not spring from non-entity on account of that not
18202 being observed.

18203
18204 The system of the Vaina/s/ikas is objectionable for this reason also
18205 that those who deny the existence of permanent stable causes are driven
18206 to maintain that entity springs from non-entity. This latter tenet is
18207 expressly enunciated by the Bauddhas where they say, 'On account of the
18208 manifestation (of effects) not without previous destruction (of the
18209 cause).' For, they say, from the decomposed seed only the young plant
18210 springs, spoilt milk only turns into curds, and the lump of clay has
18211 ceased to be a lump when it becomes a jar. If effects did spring from
18212 the unchanged causes, all effects would originate from all causes at
18213 once, as then no specification would be required[403]. Hence, as we see
18214 that young plants, &c. spring from seeds, &c. only after the latter have
18215 been merged in non-existence, we hold that entity springs from

18216 non-entity.
18217
18218 To this Bauddha tenet we reply, '(Entity does) not (spring) from
18219 non-entity, on account of that not being observed.' If entity did spring
18220 from non-entity, the assumption of special causes would be purportless,
18221 since non-entity is in all cases one and the same. For the non-existence
18222 of seeds and the like after they have been destroyed is of the same kind
18223 as the non-existence of horns of hares and the like, i.e. non-existence
18224 is in all cases nothing else but the absence of all character of
18225 reality, and hence there would be no sense (on the doctrine of
18226 origination from non-existence) in assuming that sprouts are produced
18227 from seeds only, curds from milk only, and so on. And if
18228 non-distinguished non-existence were admitted to have causal efficiency,
18229 we should also have to assume that sprouts, &c. originate from the horns
18230 of hares, &c.--a thing certainly not actually observed.--If, again, it
18231 should be assumed that there are different kinds of non-existence having
18232 special distinctions--just as, for instance, blueness and the like are
18233 special qualities of lotuses and so on--we point out that in that case
18234 the fact of there being such special distinctions would turn the
18235 non-entities into entities no less real than lotuses and the like. In no
18236 case non-existence would possess causal efficiency, simply because, like
18237 the horn of a hare, it is non-existence merely.--Further, if existence
18238 sprang from non-existence, all effects would be affected with
18239 non-existence; while as a matter of fact they are observed to be merely
18240 positive entities distinguished by their various special
18241 characteristics. Nor[404] does any one think that things of the nature
18242 of clay, such as pots and the like, are the effects of threads and the
18243 like; but everybody knows that things of the nature of clay are the
18244 effects of clay only.--The Bauddha's tenet that nothing can become a
18245 cause as long as it remains unchanged, but has to that end to undergo
18246 destruction, and that thus existence springs from non-existence only is
18247 false; for it is observed that only things of permanent nature which are
18248 always recognised as what they are, such as gold, &c., are the causes of
18249 effects such as golden ornaments, and so on. In those cases where a
18250 destruction of the peculiar nature of the cause is observed to take
18251 place, as in the case of seeds, for instance, we have to acknowledge as
18252 the cause of the subsequent condition (i.e. the sprout) not the earlier
18253 condition in so far as it is destroyed, but rather those permanent
18254 particles of the seed which are not destroyed (when the seed as a whole
18255 undergoes decomposition).--Hence as we see on the one hand that no
18256 entities ever originate from nonentities such as the horns of a hare,
18257 and on the other hand that entities do originate from entities such as
18258 gold and the like the whole Bauddha doctrine of existence springing from
18259 non-existence has to be rejected.--We finally point out that, according
18260 to the Bauddhas, all mind and all mental modifications spring from the
18261 four skandhas discussed above and all material aggregates from the
18262 atoms; why then do they stultify this their own doctrine by the fanciful
18263 assumption of entity springing from non-entity and thus needlessly
18264 perplex the mind of every one?

18265
18266 27. And thus (on that doctrine) there would be an accomplishment (of
18267 ends) in the case of non-active people also.
18268

18269 If it were admitted that entity issues from non-entity, lazy inactive
18270 people also would obtain their purposes, since 'non-existence' is a
18271 thing to be had without much trouble. Rice would grow for the husbandman
18272 even if he did not cultivate his field; vessels would shape themselves
18273 even if the potter did not fashion the clay; and the weaver too lazy to
18274 weave the threads into a whole, would nevertheless have in the end
18275 finished pieces of cloth just as if he had been weaving. And nobody
18276 would have to exert himself in the least either for going to the
18277 heavenly world or for obtaining final release. All which of course is
18278 absurd and not maintained by anybody.--Thus the doctrine of the
18279 origination of entity from non-entity again shows itself to be futile.
18280

18281 28. The non-existence (of external things) cannot be maintained, on
18282 account of (our) consciousness (of them).
18283

18284 There having been brought forward, in what precedes, the various

18285 objections which lie against the doctrine of the reality of the external
18286 world (in the Bauddha sense), such as the impossibility of accounting
18287 for the existence of aggregates, &c., we are now confronted by those
18288 Bauddhas who maintain that only cognitions (or ideas, vij/n/ana)
18289 exist.--The doctrine of the reality of the external world was indeed
18290 propounded by Buddha conforming himself to the mental state of some of
18291 his disciples whom he perceived to be attached to external things; but
18292 it does not represent his own true view according to which cognitions
18293 alone are real.

18294
18295 According to this latter doctrine the process, whose constituting
18296 members are the act of knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the
18297 result of knowledge[405], is an altogether internal one, existing in so
18298 far only as it is connected with the mind (buddhi). Even if external
18299 things existed, that process could not take place but in connexion with
18300 the mind. If, the Bauddhas say, you ask how it is known that that entire
18301 process is internal and that no outward things exist apart from
18302 consciousness, we reply that we base our doctrine on the impossibility
18303 of external things. For if external things are admitted, they must be
18304 either atoms or aggregates of atoms such as posts and the like. But
18305 atoms cannot be comprehended under the ideas of posts and the like, it
18306 being impossible for cognition to represent (things as minute as) atoms.
18307 Nor, again, can the outward things be aggregates of atoms such as
18308 pillars and the like, because those aggregates can neither be defined as
18309 different nor as non-different from the atoms[406].--In the same way we
18310 can show that the external things are not universals and so on[407].

18311
18312 Moreover, the cognitions--which are of a uniform nature only in so far
18313 as they are states of consciousness--undergo, according to their
18314 objects, successive modifications, so that there is presented to the
18315 mind now the idea of a post, now the idea of a wall, now the idea of a
18316 jar, and so on. Now this is not possible without some distinction on the
18317 part of the ideas themselves, and hence we must necessarily admit that
18318 the ideas have the same forms as their objects. But if we make this
18319 admission, from which it follows that the form of the objects is
18320 determined by the ideas, the hypothesis of the existence of external
18321 things becomes altogether gratuitous. From the fact, moreover, of our
18322 always being conscious of the act of knowledge and the object of
18323 knowledge simultaneously it follows that the two are in reality
18324 identical. When we are conscious of the one we are conscious of the
18325 other also; and that would not happen if the two were essentially
18326 distinct, as in that case there would be nothing to prevent our being
18327 conscious of one apart from the other. For this reason also we maintain
18328 that there are no outward things.--

18329
18330 Perception is to be considered as similar to a dream and the like. The
18331 ideas present to our minds during a dream, a magical illusion, a mirage
18332 and so on, appear in the twofold form of subject and object, although
18333 there is all the while no external object; hence we conclude that the
18334 ideas of posts and the like which occur in our waking state are likewise
18335 independent of external objects; for they also are simply ideas.--If we
18336 be asked how, in the absence of external things, we account for the
18337 actual variety of ideas, we reply that that variety is to be explained
18338 from the impressions left by previous ideas[408]. In the beginningless
18339 sa/m/sara ideas and mental impressions succeed each other as causes and
18340 effects, just as the plant springs from the seed and seeds are again
18341 produced from the plant, and there exists therefore a sufficient reason
18342 for the variety of ideas actually experienced. That the variety of ideas
18343 is solely due to the impressions left on the mind by past ideas follows,
18344 moreover, from the following affirmative and negative judgments: we both
18345 (the Vedantins as well as the Bauddhas) admit that in dreams, &c. there
18346 presents itself a variety of ideas which arise from mental impressions,
18347 without any external object; we (the Bauddhas) do not admit that any
18348 variety of ideas can arise from external objects, without mental
18349 impressions.--Thus we are again led to conclude that no outward things
18350 exist.

18351
18352 To all this we (the Vedantins) make the following reply.--The
18353 non-existence of external things cannot be maintained because we are

conscious of external things. In every act of perception we are conscious of some external thing corresponding to the idea, whether it be a post or a wall or a piece of cloth or a jar, and that of which we are conscious cannot but exist. Why should we pay attention to the words of a man who, while conscious of an outward thing through its approximation to his senses, affirms that he is conscious of no outward thing, and that no such thing exists, any more than we listen to a man who while he is eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction avers that he does not eat and does not feel satisfied?--If the Bauddha should reply that he does not affirm that he is conscious of no object but only that he is conscious of no object apart from the act of consciousness, we answer that he may indeed make any arbitrary statement he likes, but that he has no arguments to prove what he says. That the outward thing exists apart from consciousness, has necessarily to be accepted on the ground of the nature of consciousness itself. Nobody when perceiving a post or a wall is conscious of his perception only, but all men are conscious of posts and walls and the like as objects of their perceptions. That such is the consciousness of all men, appears also from the fact that even those who contest the existence of external things bear witness to their existence when they say that what is an internal object of cognition appears like something external. For they practically accept the general consciousness, which testifies to the existence of an external world, and being at the same time anxious to refute it they speak of the external things as 'like something external.' If they did not themselves at the bottom acknowledge the existence of the external world, how could they use the expression 'like something external?' No one says, 'Vish/n/umitra appears like the son of a barren mother.' If we accept the truth as it is given to us in our consciousness, we must admit that the object of perception appears to us as something external, not like something external.--But--the Bauddha may reply--we conclude that the object of perception is only like something external because external things are impossible.--This conclusion we rejoin is improper, since the possibility or impossibility of things is to be determined only on the ground of the operation or non-operation of the means of right knowledge; while on the other hand, the operation and non-operation of the means of right knowledge are not to be made dependent on preconceived possibilities or impossibilities. Possible is whatever is apprehended by perception or some other means of proof; impossible is what is not so apprehended. Now the external things are, according to their nature, apprehended by all the instruments of knowledge; how then can you maintain that they are not possible, on the ground of such idle dilemmas as that about their difference or non-difference from atoms?--Nor, again, does the non-existence of objects follow from the fact of the ideas having the same form as the objects; for if there were no objects the ideas could not have the forms of the objects, and the objects are actually apprehended as external.--For the same reason (i.e. because the distinction of thing and idea is given in consciousness) the invariable concomitance of idea and thing has to be considered as proving only that the thing constitutes the means of the idea, not that the two are identical. Moreover, when we are conscious first of a pot and then of a piece of cloth, consciousness remains the same in the two acts while what varies are merely the distinctive attributes of consciousness; just as when we see at first a black and then a white cow, the distinction of the two perceptions is due to the varying blackness and whiteness while the generic character of the cow remains the same. The difference of the one permanent factor (from the two--or more--varying factors) is proved throughout by the two varying factors, and vice versa the difference of the latter (from the permanent factor) by the presence of the one (permanent factor). Therefore thing and idea are distinct. The same view is to be held with regard to the perception and the remembrance of a jar; there also the perception and the remembrance only are distinct while the jar is one and the same; in the same way as when conscious of the smell of milk and the taste of milk we are conscious of the smell and taste as different things but of the milk itself as one only.

Further, two ideas which occupy different moments of time and pass away as soon as they have become objects of consciousness cannot apprehend--or be apprehended by--each other. From this it follows that

18423 certain doctrines forming part of the Bauddha system cannot be upheld;
18424 so the doctrine that ideas are different from each other; the doctrine
18425 that everything is momentary, void, &c.; the doctrine of the distinction
18426 of individuals and classes; the doctrine that a former idea leaves an
18427 impression giving rise to a later idea; the doctrine of the distinction,
18428 owing to the influence of Nescience, of the attributes of existence and
18429 non-existence; the doctrine of bondage and release (depending on absence
18430 and presence of right knowledge) [409].
18431

18432 Further, if you say that we are conscious of the idea, you must admit
18433 that we are also conscious of the external thing. And if you rejoin that
18434 we are conscious of the idea on its own account because it is of a
18435 luminous nature like a lamp, while the external thing is not so; we
18436 reply that by maintaining the idea to be illuminated by itself you make
18437 yourself guilty of an absurdity no less than if you said that fire burns
18438 itself. And at the same time you refuse to accept the common and
18439 altogether rational opinion that we are conscious of the external thing
18440 by means of the idea different from the thing! Indeed a proof of
18441 extraordinary philosophic insight!--It cannot, moreover, be asserted in
18442 any way that the idea apart from the thing is the object of our
18443 consciousness; for it is absurd to speak of a thing as the object of its
18444 own activity. Possibly you (the Bauddha) will rejoin that, if the idea
18445 is to be apprehended by something different from it, that something also
18446 must be apprehended by something different and so on ad infinitum. And,
18447 moreover, you will perhaps object that as each cognition is of an
18448 essentially illuminating nature like a lamp, the assumption of a further
18449 cognition is uncalled for; for as they are both equally illuminating the
18450 one cannot give light to the other.--But both these objections are
18451 unfounded. As the idea only is apprehended, and there is consequently no
18452 necessity to assume something to apprehend the Self which witnesses the
18453 idea (is conscious of the idea), there results no regressus ad
18454 infinitum. And the witnessing Self and the idea are of an essentially
18455 different nature, and may therefore stand to each other in the relation
18456 of knowing subject and object known. The existence of the witnessing
18457 Self is self-proved and cannot therefore be denied.--Moreover, if you
18458 maintain that the idea, lamplike, manifests itself without standing in
18459 need of a further principle to illuminate it, you maintain thereby that
18460 ideas exist which are not apprehended by any of the means of knowledge,
18461 and which are without a knowing being; which is no better than to assert
18462 that a thousand lamps burning inside some impenetrable mass of rocks
18463 manifest themselves. And if you should maintain that thereby we admit
18464 your doctrine, since it follows from what we have said that the idea
18465 itself implies consciousness; we reply that, as observation shows, the
18466 lamp in order to become manifest requires some other intellectual agent
18467 furnished with instruments such as the eye, and that therefore the idea
18468 also, as equally being a thing to be illuminated, becomes manifest only
18469 through an ulterior intelligent principle. And if you finally object
18470 that we, when advancing the witnessing Self as self-proved, merely
18471 express in other words the Bauddha tenet that the idea is
18472 self-manifested, we refute you by remarking that your ideas have the
18473 attributes of originating, passing away, being manifold, and so on
18474 (while our Self is one and permanent).--We thus have proved that an
18475 idea, like a lamp, requires an ulterior intelligent principle to render
18476 it manifest.
18477

18478 29. And on account of their difference of nature (the ideas of the
18479 waking state) are not like those of a dream.
18480

18481 We now apply ourselves to the refutation of the averment made by the
18482 Bauddha, that the ideas of posts, and so on, of which we are conscious
18483 in the waking state, may arise in the absence of external objects, just
18484 as the ideas of a dream, both being ideas alike.--The two sets of ideas,
18485 we maintain, cannot be treated on the same footing, on account of the
18486 difference of their character. They differ as follows.--The things of
18487 which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking
18488 consciousness. 'I wrongly thought that I had a meeting with a great man;
18489 no such meeting took place, but my mind was dulled by slumber, and so
18490 the false idea arose.' In an analogous manner the things of which we are
18491 conscious when under the influence of a magic illusion, and the like,

are negated by our ordinary consciousness. Those things, on the other hand, of which we are conscious in our waking state, such as posts and the like, are never negated in any state.--Moreover, the visions of a dream are acts of remembrance, while the visions of the waking state are acts of immediate consciousness; and the distinction between remembrance and immediate consciousness is directly cognised by every one as being founded on the absence or presence of the object. When, for instance, a man remembers his absent son, he does not directly perceive him, but merely wishes so to perceive him. As thus the distinction between the two states is evident to every one, it is impossible to formulate the inference that waking consciousness is false because it is mere consciousness, such as dreaming consciousness; for we certainly cannot allow would-be philosophers to deny the truth of what is directly evident to themselves. Just because they feel the absurdity of denying what is evident to themselves, and are consequently unable to demonstrate the baselessness of the ideas of the waking state from those ideas themselves, they attempt to demonstrate it from their having certain attributes in common with the ideas of the dreaming state. But if some attribute cannot belong to a thing on account of the latter's own nature, it cannot belong to it on account of the thing having certain attributes in common with some other thing. Fire, which is felt to be hot, cannot be demonstrated to be cold, on the ground of its having attributes in common with water. And the difference of nature between the waking and the sleeping state we have already shown.

30. The existence (of mental impressions) is not possible on the Buddha view, on account of the absence of perception (of external things).

We now proceed to that theory of yours, according to which the variety of ideas can be explained from the variety of mental impressions, without any reference to external things, and remark that on your doctrine the existence of mental impressions is impossible, as you do not admit the perception of external things. For the variety of mental impressions is caused altogether by the variety of the things perceived. How, indeed, could various impressions originate if no external things were perceived? The hypothesis of a beginningless series of mental impressions would lead only to a baseless regressus ad infinitum, sublative of the entire phenomenal world, and would in no way establish your position.--The same argument, i.e. the one founded on the impossibility of mental impressions which are not caused by external things, refutes also the positive and negative judgments, on the ground of which the denier of an external world above attempted to show that ideas are caused by mental impressions, not by external things. We rather have on our side a positive and a negative judgment whereby to establish our doctrine of the existence of external things, viz. 'the perception of external things is admitted to take place also without mental impressions,' and 'mental impressions are not admitted to originate independently of the perception of external things.'--Moreover, an impression is a kind of modification, and modifications cannot, as experience teaches, take place unless there is some substratum which is modified. But, according to your doctrine, such a substratum of impressions does not exist, since you say that it cannot be cognised through any means of knowledge.

31. And on account of the momentariness (of the alayavij/n/ana, it cannot be the abode of mental impressions).

If you maintain that the so-called internal cognition (alayavij/n/ana[410]) assumed by you may constitute the abode of the mental impressions, we deny that, because that cognition also being admittedly momentary, and hence non-permanent, cannot be the abode of impressions any more than the quasi-external cognitions (prav/ri/ttivilj/n/ana). For unless there exists one continuous principle equally connected with the past, the present, and the future[411], or an absolutely unchangeable (Self) which cognises everything, we are unable to account for remembrance, recognition, and so on, which are subject to mental impressions dependent on place, time, and cause. If, on the other hand, you declare your alayavij/n/ana to be something permanent, you

18561 thereby abandon your tenet of the alayavij/n/ana as well as everything
18562 else being momentary.--Or (to explain the Sutra in a different way) as
18563 the tenet of general momentariness is characteristic of the systems of
18564 the idealistic as well as the realistic Bauddhas, we may bring forward
18565 against the doctrines of the former all those arguments dependent on the
18566 principle of general momentariness which we have above urged against the
18567 latter.

18568
18569 We have thus refuted both nihilistic doctrines, viz. the doctrine which
18570 maintains the (momentary) reality of the external world, and the
18571 doctrine which asserts that ideas only exist. The third variety of
18572 Bauddha doctrine, viz. that everything is empty (i.e. that absolutely
18573 nothing exists), is contradicted by all means of right knowledge, and
18574 therefore requires no special refutation. For this apparent world, whose
18575 existence is guaranteed by all the means of knowledge, cannot be denied,
18576 unless some one should find out some new truth (based on which he could
18577 impugn its existence)--for a general principle is proved by the absence
18578 of contrary instances.

18579
18580 32. And on account of its general deficiency in probability.
18581

18582 No further special discussion is in fact required. From whatever new
18583 points of view the Bauddha system is tested with reference to its
18584 probability, it gives way on all sides, like the walls of a well dug in
18585 sandy soil. It has, in fact, no foundation whatever to rest upon, and
18586 hence the attempts to use it as a guide in the practical concerns of
18587 life are mere folly.--Moreover, Buddha by propounding the three mutually
18588 contradictory systems, teaching respectively the reality of the external
18589 world, the reality of ideas only, and general nothingness, has himself
18590 made it clear either that he was a man given to make incoherent
18591 assertions, or else that hatred of all beings induced him to propound
18592 absurd doctrines by accepting which they would become thoroughly
18593 confused.--So that--and this the Sutra means to indicate--Buddha's
18594 doctrine has to be entirely disregarded by all those who have a regard
18595 for their own happiness.

18596
18597 33. On account of the impossibility (of contradictory attributes) in one
18598 thing, (the Jaina doctrine is) not (to be accepted).
18599

18600 Having disposed of the Bauddha doctrine we now turn to the system of the
18601 Gymnosophists (Jainas).
18602

18603 The Jainas acknowledge seven categories (tattvas), viz. soul (jiva),
18604 non-soul (ajiva), the issuing outward (asrava), restraint (sa/m/vara),
18605 destruction (nirjara), bondage (bandha), and release (moksha)[412].
18606 Shortly it may be said that they acknowledge two categories, viz. soul
18607 and non-soul, since the five other categories may be subsumed under
18608 these two.--They also set forth a set of categories different from the
18609 two mentioned. They teach that there are five so-called astikayas
18610 ('existing bodies,' i.e. categories), viz. the categories of soul
18611 (jiva), body (pudgala), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), and space
18612 (aka/s/a). All these categories they again subdivide in various fanciful
18613 ways[413].--To all things they apply the following method of reasoning,
18614 which they call the saptabha@nginaya: somehow it is; somehow it is not;
18615 somehow it is and is not; somehow it is indescribable; somehow it is and
18616 is indescribable; somehow it is not and is indescribable; somehow it is
18617 and is not and is indescribable.

18618
18619 To this unsettling style of reasoning they submit even such conceptions
18620 as that of unity and eternity[414].
18621

18622 This doctrine we meet as follows.--Your reasoning, we say, is
18623 inadmissible 'on account of the impossibility in one thing.' That is to
18624 say, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and
18625 non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing; just
18626 as observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold at the
18627 same moment. The seven categories asserted by you must either be so many
18628 and such or not be so many and such; the third alternative expressed in
18629 the words 'they either are such or not such' results in a cognition of

indefinite nature which is no more a source of true knowledge than doubt is. If you should plead that the cognition that a thing is of more than one nature is definite and therefore a source of true knowledge, we deny this. For the unlimited assertion that all things are of a non-exclusive nature is itself something, falls as such under the alternative predications 'somehow it is,' 'somehow it is not,' and so ceases to be a definite assertion. The same happens to the person making the assertion and to the result of the assertion; partly they are, partly they are not. As thus the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge are all alike indefinite, how can the Tirthakara (Jina) teach with any claim to authority, and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether indeterminate? Observation shows that only when a course of action is known to have a definite result people set about it without hesitation. Hence a man who proclaims a doctrine of altogether indefinite contents does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a madman.--Again, if we apply the Jaina reasoning to their doctrine of the five categories, we have to say that on one view of the matter they are five and on another view they are not five; from which latter point of view it follows that they are either fewer or more than five. Nor is it logical to declare the categories to be indescribable. For if they are so, they cannot be described; but, as a matter of fact, they are described so that to call them indescribable involves a contradiction. And if you go on to say that the categories on being described are ascertained to be such and such, and at the same time are not ascertained to be such and such, and that the result of their being ascertained is perfect knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that imperfect knowledge is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not the opposite; you certainly talk more like a drunken or insane man than like a sober, trustworthy person.--If you further maintain that the heavenly world and final release exist or do not exist and are eternal or non-eternal, the absence of all determinate knowledge which is implied in such statements will result in nobody's acting for the purpose of gaining the heavenly world and final release. And, moreover, it follows from your doctrine that soul, non-soul, and so on, whose nature you claim to have ascertained, and which you describe as having existed from all eternity, relapse all at once into the condition of absolute indetermination.--As therefore the two contradictory attributes of being and non-being cannot belong to any of the categories--being excluding non-being and vice versa non-being excluding being--the doctrine of the Arhat must be rejected.--The above remarks dispose likewise of the assertions made by the Jainas as to the impossibility of deciding whether of one thing there is to be predicated oneness or plurality, permanency or non-permanency, separateness or non-separateness, and so on.--The Jaina doctrine that aggregates are formed from the atoms--by them called pudgalas--we do not undertake to refute separately as its refutation is already comprised in that of the atomistic doctrine given in a previous part of this work.

34. And likewise (there results from the Jaina, doctrine)
non-universality of the Self.

We have hitherto urged against the Jaina doctrine an objection resulting from the syadvada, viz. that one thing cannot have contradictory attributes. We now turn to the objection that from their doctrine it would follow that the individual Self is not universal, i.e. not omnipresent.--The Jainas are of opinion that the soul has the same size as the body. From this it would follow that the soul is not of infinite extension, but limited, and hence non-eternal like jars and similar things. Further, as the bodies of different classes of creatures are of different size, it might happen that the soul of a man--which is of the size of the human body--when entering, in consequence of its former deeds, on a new state of existence in the body of an elephant would not be able to fill the whole of it; or else that a human soul being relegated to the body of an ant would not be able to find sufficient room in it. The same difficulty would, moreover, arise with regard to the successive stages of one state of existence, infancy, youth, and old age.--But why, the Jaina may ask, should we not look upon the soul as consisting of an infinite number of parts capable of undergoing

18699 compression in a small body and dilatation in a big one?--Do you, we ask
18700 in return, admit or not admit that those countless particles of the soul
18701 may occupy the same place or not?--If you do not admit it, it follows
18702 that the infinite number of particles cannot be contained in a body of
18703 limited dimensions.--If you do admit it, it follows that, as then the
18704 space occupied by all the particles may be the space of one particle
18705 only, the extension of all the particles together will remain
18706 inconsiderable, and hence the soul be of minute size (not of the size of
18707 the body). You have, moreover, no right to assume that a body of limited
18708 size contains an infinite number of soul particles.

18709
18710 Well the, the Jaina may reply, let us assume that by turns whenever the
18711 soul enters a big body some particles accede to it while some withdraw
18712 from it whenever it enters a small body.--To this hypothesis the next
18713 Sutra furnishes a reply.

18714
18715 35. Nor is non-contradiction to be derived from the succession (of parts
18716 acceding to and departing from the soul), on account of the change, &c.
18717 (of the soul).

18718
18719 Nor can the doctrine of the soul having the same size as the body be
18720 satisfactorily established by means of the hypothesis of the successive
18721 accession and withdrawal of particles. For this hypothesis would involve
18722 the soul's undergoing changes and the like. If the soul is continually
18723 being repleted and depleted by the successive addition and withdrawal of
18724 parts, it of course follows that it undergoes change, and if it is
18725 liable to change it follows that it is non-permanent, like the skin and
18726 similar substances. From that, again, it follows that the Jaina doctrine
18727 of bondage and release is untenable; according to which doctrine 'the
18728 soul, which in the state of bondage is encompassed by the ogdoad of
18729 works and sunk in the ocean of sa/m/sara, rises when its bonds are
18730 sundered, as the gourd rises to the surface of the water when it is
18731 freed from the encumbering clay[415]. '--Moreover, those particles which
18732 in turns come and depart have the attributes of coming and going, and
18733 cannot, on that account, be of the nature of the Self any more than the
18734 body is. And if it be said that the Self consists of some permanently
18735 remaining parts, we remark that it would be impossible to determine
18736 which are the permanent and which the temporary parts.--We have further
18737 to ask from whence those particles originate when they accede to the
18738 soul, and into what they are merged when they detach themselves from it.
18739 They cannot spring from the material elements and re-enter the elements;
18740 for the soul is immaterial. Nor have we any means to prove the existence
18741 of some other, general or special, reservoir of
18742 soul-particles.--Moreover, on the hypothesis under discussion the soul
18743 would be of indefinite nature, as the size of the particles acceding and
18744 departing is itself indefinite.--On account of all these and similar
18745 difficulties it cannot be maintained that certain particles by turns
18746 attach themselves to, and detach themselves from, the soul.

18747
18748 The Sutra may be taken in a different sense also. The preceding Sutra
18749 has proved that the soul if of the same size as the body cannot be
18750 permanent, as its entering into bigger and smaller bodies involves its
18751 limitation. To this the Gymnosophist may be supposed to rejoin that
18752 although the soul's size successively changes it may yet be permanent,
18753 just as the stream of water is permanent (although the water continually
18754 changes). An analogous instance would be supplied by the permanency of
18755 the stream of ideas while the individual ideas, as that of a red cloth
18756 and so on, are non-permanent.--To this rejoinder our Sutra replies that
18757 if the stream is not real we are led back to the doctrine of a general
18758 void, and that, if it is something real, the difficulties connected with
18759 the soul's changing, &c. present themselves and render the Jaina view
18760 impossible.

18761
18762 36. And on account of the permanency of the final (size of the soul) and
18763 the resulting permanency of the two (preceding sizes) there is no
18764 difference (of size, at any time).

18765
18766 Moreover, the Jainas themselves admit the permanency of the final size
18767 of the soul which it has in the state of release. From this it follows

also that its initial size and its intervening sizes must be permanent[416], and that hence there is no difference between the three sizes. But this would involve the conclusion that the different bodies of the soul have one and the same size, and that the soul cannot enter into bigger and smaller bodies.--Or else (to explain the Sutra in a somewhat different way) from the fact that the final size of the soul is permanent, it follows that its size in the two previous conditions also is permanent. Hence the soul must be considered as being always of the same size--whether minute or infinite--and not of the varying size of its bodies.--For this reason also the doctrine of the Arhat has to be set aside as not in any way more rational than the doctrine of Buddha.

37. The Lord (cannot be the cause of the world), on account of the inappropriateness (of that doctrine).

The Sutrakara now applies himself to the refutation of that doctrine, according to which the Lord is the cause of the world only in so far as he is the general ruler.--But how do you know that that is the purport of the Sutra (which speaks of the Lord 'without any qualification')?--From the circumstance, we reply, that the teacher himself has proved, in the previous sections of the work, that the Lord is the material cause as well as the ruler of the world. Hence, if the present Sutra were meant to impugn the doctrine of the Lord in general, the earlier and later parts of the work would be mutually contradictory, and the Sutrakara would thus be in conflict with himself. We therefore must assume that the purport of the present Sutra is to make an energetic attack on the doctrine of those who maintain that the Lord is not the material cause, but merely the ruler, i.e. the operative cause of the world; a doctrine entirely opposed to the Vedantic tenet of the unity of Brahman.

The theories about the Lord which are independent of the Vedanta are of various nature. Some taking their stand on the Sa@nkhyas and Yoga systems assume that the Lord acts as a mere operative cause, as the ruler of the pradhana and of the souls, and that pradhana, soul, and Lord are of mutually different nature.--The Mahe/s/varas (/S/aivas) maintain that the five categories, viz. effect, cause, union, ritual, the end of pain, were taught by the Lord Pa/s/upati (/S/iva) to the end of breaking the bonds of the animal (i.e. the soul); Pa/s/upati is, according to them, the Lord, the operative cause.--Similarly, the Vai/s/eshikas and others also teach, according to their various systems, that the Lord is somehow the operative cause of the world.

Against all these opinions the Sutra remarks 'the Lord, on account of the inappropriateness.' I.e. it is not possible that the Lord as the ruler of the pradhana and the soul should be the cause of the world, on account of the inappropriateness of that doctrine. For if the Lord is supposed to assign to the various classes of animate creatures low, intermediate, and high positions, according to his liking, it follows that he is animated by hatred, passion, and so on, is hence like one of us, and is no real Lord. Nor can we get over this difficulty by assuming that he makes his dispositions with a view to the merit and demerit of the living beings; for that assumption would lead us to a logical see-saw, the Lord as well as the works of living beings having to be considered in turns both as acting and as acted upon. This difficulty is not removed by the consideration that the works of living beings and the resulting dispositions made by the Lord form a chain which has no beginning; for in past time as well as in the present mutual interdependence of the two took place, so that the beginningless series is like an endless chain of blind men leading other blind men. It is, moreover, a tenet set forth by the Naiyayikas themselves that 'imperfections have the characteristic of being the causes of action' (Nyaya Sutra I, 1, 18). Experience shows that all agents, whether they be active for their own purposes or for the purposes of something else, are impelled to action by some imperfection. And even if it is admitted that an agent even when acting for some extrinsic purpose is impelled by an intrinsic motive, your doctrine remains faulty all the same; for the Lord is no longer a Lord, even if he is actuated by intrinsic motives only (such as the desire of removing the painful feeling connected with

18837 pity).--Your doctrine is finally inappropriate for that reason also that
18838 you maintain the Lord to be a special kind of soul; for from that it
18839 follows that he must be devoid of all activity.

18840
18841 38. And on account of the impossibility of the connexion (of the Lord
18842 with the souls and the pradhana).

18843
18844 Against the doctrine which we are at present discussing there lies the
18845 further objection that a Lord distinct from the pradhana and the souls
18846 cannot be the ruler of the latter without being connected with them in a
18847 certain way. But of what nature is that connexion to be? It cannot be
18848 conjunction (sa/m/yoga), because the Lord, as well as the pradhana and
18849 the souls, is of infinite extent and devoid of parts. Nor can it be
18850 inherence, since it would be impossible to define who should be the
18851 abode and who the abiding thing. Nor is it possible to assume some other
18852 connexion, the special nature of which would have to be inferred from
18853 the effect, because the relation of cause and effect is just what is not
18854 settled as yet[417].--How, then, it may be asked, do you--the
18855 Vedantins--establish the relation of cause and effect (between the Lord
18856 and the world)?--There is, we reply, no difficulty in our case, as the
18857 connexion we assume is that of identity (tadatmya). The adherent of
18858 Brahman, moreover, defines the nature of the cause, and so on, on the
18859 basis of Scripture, and is therefore not obliged to render his tenets
18860 throughout conformable to observation. Our adversary, on the other hand,
18861 who defines the nature of the cause and the like according to instances
18862 furnished by experience, may be expected to maintain only such doctrines
18863 as agree with experience. Nor can he put forward the claim that
18864 Scripture, because it is the production of the omniscient Lord, may be
18865 used to confirm his doctrine as well as that of the Vedantin; for that
18866 would involve him in a logical see-saw, the omniscience of the Lord
18867 being established on the doctrine of Scripture, and the authority of
18868 Scripture again being established on the omniscience of the Lord.--For
18869 all these reasons the Sa@nkhyas-yoga hypothesis about the Lord is devoid
18870 of foundation. Other similar hypotheses which likewise are not based on
18871 the Veda are to be refuted by corresponding arguments.

18872
18873 39. And on account of the impossibility of rulership (on the part of the
18874 Lord).

18875
18876 The Lord of the argumentative philosophers is an untenable hypothesis,
18877 for the following reason also.--Those philosophers are obliged to assume
18878 that by his influence the Lord produces action in the pradhana, &c. just
18879 as the potter produces motion in the clay, &c. But this cannot be
18880 admitted; for the pradhana, which is devoid of colour and other
18881 qualities, and therefore not an object of perception, is on that account
18882 of an altogether different nature from clay and the like, and hence
18883 cannot be looked upon as the object of the Lord's action.

18884
18885 40. If you say that as the organs (are ruled by the soul so the pradhana
18886 is ruled by the Lord), we deny that on account of the enjoyment, &c.

18887
18888 Well, the opponent might reply, let us suppose that the Lord rules the
18889 pradhana in the same way as the soul rules the organ of sight and the
18890 other organs which are devoid of colour, and so on, and hence not
18891 objects of perception.

18892
18893 This analogy also, we reply, proves nothing. For we infer that the
18894 organs are ruled by the soul, from the observed fact that the soul feels
18895 pleasure, pain, and the like (which affect the soul through the organs).
18896 But we do not observe that the Lord experiences pleasure, pain, &c.
18897 caused by the pradhana. If the analogy between the pradhana and the
18898 bodily organs were a complete one, it would follow that the Lord is
18899 affected by pleasure and pain no less than the transmigrating souls are.

18900
18901 Or else the two preceding Sutras may be explained in a different way.
18902 Ordinary experience teaches us that kings, who are the rulers of
18903 countries, are never without some material abode, i.e. a body; hence, if
18904 we wish to infer the existence of a general Lord from the analogy of
18905 earthly rulers, we must ascribe to him also some kind of body to serve

18906 as the substratum of his organs. But such a body cannot be ascribed to
18907 the Lord, since all bodies exist only subsequently to the creation, not
18908 previously to it. The Lord, therefore, is not able to act because devoid
18909 of a material substratum; for experience teaches us that action requires
18910 a material substrate.--Let us then arbitrarily assume that the Lord
18911 possesses some kind of body serving as a substratum for his organs (even
18912 previously to creation).--This assumption also will not do; for if the
18913 Lord has a body he is subject to the sensations of ordinary
18914 transmigratory souls, and thus no longer is the Lord.

18915
18916 41. And (there would follow from that doctrine) either finite duration
18917 or absence of omniscience (on the Lord's part).

18918
18919 The hypothesis of the argumentative philosophers is invalid, for the
18920 following reason also.--They teach that the Lord is omniscient and of
18921 infinite duration, and likewise that the pradhana, as well as the
18922 individual souls, is of infinite duration. Now, the omniscient Lord
18923 either defines the measure of the pradhana, the souls, and himself, or
18924 does not define it. Both alternatives subvert the doctrine under
18925 discussion. For, on the former alternative, the pradhana, the souls, and
18926 the Lord, being all of them of definite measure, must necessarily be of
18927 finite duration; since ordinary experience teaches that all things of
18928 definite extent, such as jars and the like, at some time cease to exist.
18929 The numerical measure of pradhana, souls, and Lord is defined by their
18930 constituting a triad, and the individual measure of each of them must
18931 likewise be considered as defined by the Lord (because he is
18932 omniscient). The number of the souls is a high one[418]. From among this
18933 limited number of souls some obtain release from the sa/m/sara, that
18934 means their sa/m/sara comes to an end, and their subjection to the
18935 samsara comes to an end. Gradually all souls obtain release, and so
18936 there will finally be an end of the entire sa/m/sara and the sa/m/sara
18937 state of all souls. But the pradhana which is ruled by the Lord and
18938 which modifies itself for the purposes of the soul is what is meant by
18939 sa/m/sara. Hence, when the latter no longer exists, nothing is left for
18940 the Lord to rule, and his omniscience and ruling power have no longer
18941 any objects. But if the pradhana, the souls, and the Lord, all have an
18942 end, it follows that they also have a beginning, and if they have a
18943 beginning as well as an end, we are driven to the doctrine of a general
18944 void.--Let us then, in order to avoid these untoward conclusions,
18945 maintain the second alternative, i.e. that the measure of the Lord
18946 himself, the pradhana, and the souls, is not defined by the Lord.--But
18947 that also is impossible, because it would compel us to abandon a tenet
18948 granted at the outset, viz. that the Lord is omniscient.

18949
18950 For all these reasons the doctrine of the argumentative philosophers,
18951 according to which the Lord is the operative cause of the world, appears
18952 unacceptable.

18953
18954 42. On account of the impossibility of the origination (of the
18955 individual soul from the highest Lord, the doctrine of the Bhagavatas
18956 cannot be accepted).

18957
18958 We have, in what precedes, refuted the opinion of those who think that
18959 the Lord is not the material cause but only the ruler, the operative
18960 cause of the world. We are now going to refute the doctrine of those
18961 according to whom he is the material as well as the operative
18962 cause.--But, it may be objected, in the previous portions of the present
18963 work a Lord of exactly the same nature, i.e. a Lord who is the material,
18964 as well as the operative, cause of the world, has been ascertained on
18965 the basis of Scripture, and it is a recognised principle that Sm/ri/ti,
18966 in so far as it agrees with Scripture, is authoritative; why then should
18967 we aim at controverting the doctrine stated?--It is true, we reply, that
18968 a part of the system which we are going to discuss agrees with the
18969 Vedanta system, and hence affords no matter for controversy; another
18970 part of the system, however, is open to objection, and that part we
18971 intend to attack.

18972
18973 The so-called Bhagavatas are of opinion that the one holy (bhagavat)
18974 Vasudeva, whose nature is pure knowledge, is what really exists, and

that he, dividing himself fourfold, appears in four forms (vyuha), as Vasudeva, Sa@nkarsha/n/a, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. Vasudeva denotes the highest Self, Sa@nkarsha/n/a the individual soul, Pradyumna the mind (manas), Aniruddha the principle of egoity (aha@nkara). Of these four Vasudeva constitutes the ultimate causal essence, of which the three others are the effects.--The believer after having worshipped Vasudeva for a hundred years by means of approach to the temple (abhigamana), procuring of things to be offered (upadana), oblation (ijya), recitation of prayers, &c. (svadhyaya), and devout meditation (yoga), passes beyond all affliction and reaches the highest Being.

Concerning this system we remark that we do not intend to controvert the doctrine that Naraya/n/a, who is higher than the Undeveloped, who is the highest Self, and the Self of all, reveals himself by dividing himself in multiple ways; for various scriptural passages, such as 'He is onefold, he is threefold' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2), teach us that the highest Self appears in manifold forms. Nor do we mean to object to the inculcation of unceasing concentration of mind on the highest Being which appears in the Bhagavata doctrine under the forms of reverential approach, &c.; for that we are to meditate on the Lord we know full well from Sm/ri/ti and Scripture. We, however, must take exception to the doctrine that Sa@nkarsha/n/a springs from Vasudeva, Pradyumna from Sa@nkarsha/n/a, Aniruddha from Pradyumna. It is not possible that from Vasudeva, i.e. the highest Self, there should originate Sa@nkarsha/n/a, i.e. the individual soul; for if such were the case, there would attach to the soul non-permanency, and all the other imperfections which belong to things originated. And thence release, which consists in reaching the highest Being, could not take place; for the effect is absorbed only by entering into its cause.--That the soul is not an originated thing, the teacher will prove later on (II, 3, 17). For this reason the Bhagavata hypothesis is unacceptable.

43. And (it is) not (observed that) the instrument is produced from the agent.

The Bhagavata hypothesis is to be rejected for that reason also, that observation never shows us an instrument, such as a hatchet and the like, to spring from an agent such as Devadatta, or any other workman. But the Bhagavatas teach that from an agent, viz. the individual soul termed Sa@nkarsha/n/a, there springs its instrument, viz. the internal organ termed Pradyumna, and again from this offspring of the agent another instrument, viz. the aha@nkara termed Aniruddha. Such doctrines cannot be settled without observed instances. And we do not meet with any scriptural passage in their favour.

44. Or (if) in consequence of the existence of knowledge, &c. (Vasudeva, &c. be taken as Lords), yet there is non-exclusion of that (i.e. the objection raised in Sutra 42).

Let us then--the Bhagavatas may say--understand by Sa@nkarsha/n/a, and so on, not the individual soul, the mind, &c., but rather Lords, i.e. powerful beings distinguished by all the qualities characteristic of rulers, such as pre-eminence of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength, valour, glory. All these are Vasudevas free from faults, without a substratum (not sprung from pradhana), without any imperfections. Hence the objection urged in Sutra 42 does not apply.

Even on this interpretation of your doctrine, we reply, the 'non-exclusion of that,' i.e. the non-exclusion of the impossibility of origination, can be established.--Do you, in the first place, mean to say that the four individual Lords, Vasudeva, and so on, have the same attributes, but do not constitute one and the same Self?--If so, you commit the fault of uselessly assuming more than one Lord, while all the work of the Lord can be done by one. Moreover, you offend thereby against your own principle, according to which there is only one real essence, viz. the holy Vasudeva.--Or do you perhaps mean to say that from the one highest Being there spring those four forms possessing equal attributes?--In that case the objection urged in Sutra 42 remains valid. For Sa@nkarsha/n/a cannot be produced from Vasudeva, nor

19044 Pradyumna from Sa@nkarsha/n/a, nor Aniruddha from Pradyumna, since (the
19045 attributes of all of them being the same) there is no supereminence of
19046 any one of them. Observation shows that the relation of cause and effect
19047 requires some superiority on the part of the cause--as, for instance, in
19048 the case of the clay and the jar (where the cause is more extensive than
19049 the effect)--and that without such superiority the relation is simply
19050 impossible. But the followers of the Pa/nk/aratra do not acknowledge any
19051 difference founded on superiority of knowledge, power, &c. between
19052 Vasudeva and the other Lords, but simply say that they all are forms of
19053 Vasudeva, without any special distinctions. The forms of Vasudeva cannot
19054 properly be limited to four, as the whole world, from Brahman down to a
19055 blade of grass, is understood to be a manifestation of the supreme
19056 Being.

19057
19058 45. And on account of contradictions.

19059
19060 Moreover, manifold contradictions are met with in the Bhagavata system,
19061 with reference to the assumption of qualities and their bearers.
19062 Eminence of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength, valour, and glory
19063 are enumerated as qualities, and then they are in some other place
19064 spoken of as Selfs, holy Vasudevas, and so on.--Moreover, we meet with
19065 passages contradictory of the Veda. The following passage, for instance,
19066 blames the Veda, 'Not having found the highest bliss in the Vedas
19067 /S/a/nd/ilya studied this /s/astra.'--For this reason also the
19068 Bhagavata doctrine cannot be accepted.

19069
19070 Notes:

19071
19072 [Footnote 314: The characteristics of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness,
19073 the three constituent elements (gu/n/a) of the pradhana. Sa. Ka. 12,
19074 13.]

19075
19076 [Footnote 315: Viz. the great principle (mahat). ahanka a, &c. Sa. Ka.
19077 3.]

19078
19079 [Footnote 316: The arguments here referred to are enumerated in the Sa.
19080 Ka. 15: Sa. Sutras I, 189 ff.]

19081
19082 [Footnote 317: If we attempt to infer the nature of the universal cause
19083 from its effects on the ground of parallel instances, as, for instance,
19084 that of an earthen jar whose material cause is clay, we must remember
19085 that the jar has sprung from clay not without the co-operation of an
19086 intelligent being, viz. the potter.]

19087
19088 [Footnote 318: As had been asserted above for the purpose of inferring
19089 therefrom, according to the principle of the equality of cause and
19090 effect, the existence of the three constituents of the pradhana.]

19091
19092 [Footnote 319: And a thing cannot consist of that of which it is the
19093 cause.]

19094
19095 [Footnote 320: Which differences cannot be reconciled with the Sa@nkhya
19096 hypothesis of the object itself consisting of either pleasure or pain,
19097 &c.--'If things consisted in themselves of pleasure, pain, &c., then
19098 sandal ointment (which is cooling, and on that account pleasant in
19099 summer) would be pleasant in winter also; for sandal never is anything
19100 but sandal.--And as thistles never are anything but thistles they ought,
19101 on the Sa@nkhya hypothesis, to be eaten with enjoyment not only by
19102 camels but by men also.' Bha.]

19103
19104 [Footnote 321: Sa/m/sargapurvakatvaprasa@nga iti gu/n/ana/m/
19105 sa/m/s/ri/sh/t/anekavastuprak/ri/tikatvaprasaktir ity artha/h/. An. Gi.]

19106
19107 [Footnote 322: For they limit one another.]

19108
19109 [Footnote 323: To proceed to the argument 'from the separateness of
19110 cause and effect' (Sa. Ka. 15).]

19111
19112 [Footnote 324: The next sentences furnish the answer to the question how

19113 the intelligent Self is known at all if it is not the object of
19114 perception.--Pratyakshatvabhava katham atmasiddhir ity asa@nkya anumanad
19115 ity aha, prav/ri/ttiti. Anumanasiddhasya /k/etanasya na
19116 prav/ri/ttya/s/rayateti dar/s/ayitum evakara/h/. Katham anumanam ity
19117 apekshaya/m/ tatprakara/m/; su/k/ayati kevaleti. Vailaksha/n/ya/m/
19118 pra/n/adimattvam. An. Gi.]
19119
19120 [Footnote 325: Viz. that whatever moves or acts does so under the
19121 influence of intelligence.--Sadhyapakshanikshiptatva/m/ sadhyavati
19122 pakshe pravish/t/atvam eva ta/k/ /k/a sapakshanizkshiptatvasyapy
19123 upalaksha/n/am, anpanyaso na vyabhi/k/arabhumini ity artha/h/. An. Gi.]
19124
19125 [Footnote 326: It might be held that for the transformation of grass
19126 into milk no other cause is required than the digestive heat of the
19127 cow's body; but a reflecting person will acknowledge that there also the
19128 omniscient Lord is active. Bha.]
19129
19130 [Footnote 327: Anadheyati/s/ayasya
19131 sukhadukhapraptiparihararupati/s/aya/s/unyasyety artha/h/. An. Gi.]
19132
19133 [Footnote 328: For the soul as being of an entirely inactive nature
19134 cannot of itself aim at release, and the pradhana aims--ex
19135 hypothesi--only at the soul's undergoing varied experience.]
19136
19137 [Footnote 329: I.e. for the various items constituting enjoyment or
19138 experience.]
19139
19140 [Footnote 330: T/ri/tiyes'pi katipaya/s/abdadyupalabdhir va
19141 samastatadupalabdhir va bhoga iti vikalpyadye sarvesham ekadaiva
19142 mukti/h/ syad iti manvano dvitiya/m/ pratyaha ubhayarthateti. An. Gi.]
19143
19144 [Footnote 331: The MSS. of Ananda Giri omit sa/m/saranu/kkh/edat; the
19145 Bhamati's reading is: Sarga/s/aktyanu/kkh/edavad
19146 d/ri/k/s/aktyanu/kkh/edat.]
19147
19148 [Footnote 332: On the theory that the soul is the cause of the
19149 pradhana's activity we again have to ask whether the pradhana acts for
19150 the soul's enjoyment or for its release, &c.]
19151
19152 [Footnote 333: Anantaro dosho mahadadikaryotpadayoga/h/. An. Gi.]
19153
19154 [Footnote 334: In the former case the five intellectual senses are
19155 looked upon as mere modifications of the sense of touch.]
19156
19157 [Footnote 335: Buddhi in the latter case being the generic name for
19158 buddhi, aha@nkara, and manas.]
19159
19160 [Footnote 336: Lit. that which burns and that which is burned, which
19161 literal rendering would perhaps be preferable throughout. As it is, the
19162 context has necessitated its retention in some places.--The sufferers
19163 are the individual souls, the cause of suffering the world in which the
19164 souls live.]
19165
19166 [Footnote 337: In the case of the lamp, light and heat are admittedly
19167 essential; hence the Vedantin is supposed to bring forward the sea with
19168 its waves, and so on, as furnishing a case where attributes pass away
19169 while the substance remains.]
19170
19171 [Footnote 338: 'Artha,' a useful or beneficial thing, an object of
19172 desire.]
19173
19174 [Footnote 339: In reality neither suffering nor sufferers exist, as the
19175 Vedantin had pointed out in the first sentences of his reply; but there
19176 can of course be no doubt as to who suffers and what causes suffering in
19177 the vyavaharika-state, i.e. the phenomenal world.]
19178
19179 [Footnote 340: In order to explain thereby how the soul can experience
19180 pain.]
19181

19182 [Footnote 341: And that would be against the Sa@nkhyā dogma of the
19183 soul's essential purity.]
19184
19185 [Footnote 342: So that the fact of suffering which cannot take place
19186 apart from an intelligent principle again remains unexplained.]
19187
19188 [Footnote 343: Atmanas tapte sattve pratibimitatvad yukta taptir iti
19189 /s/a@nkate sattveti. An. Gi.]
19190
19191 [Footnote 344: For it then indicates no more than a fictitious
19192 resemblance.]
19193
19194 [Footnote 345: The Sa@nkhyā Purvapakshin had objected to the Vedānta
19195 doctrine that, on the latter, we cannot account for the fact known from
19196 ordinary experience that there are beings suffering pain and things
19197 causing suffering.--The Vedāntin in his turn endeavours to show that on
19198 the Sa@nkhyā doctrine also the fact of suffering remains inexplicable,
19199 and is therefore to be considered not real, but fictitious merely, the
19200 product of Nescience.]
19201
19202 [Footnote 346: Not only 'suffering as it were,' as it had been called
19203 above.]
19204
19205 [Footnote 347: For real suffering cannot be removed by mere distinctive
19206 knowledge on which--according to the Sa@nkhyā also--release depends.]
19207
19208 [Footnote 348: This in answer to the remark that possibly the
19209 conjunction of soul and pradhāna may come to an end when the influence
19210 of Darkness declines, it being overpowered by the knowledge of Truth.]
19211
19212 [Footnote 349: I.e. according as they are atoms of earth, water, fire,
19213 or air.]
19214
19215 [Footnote 350: Parima/nd/ala, spherical is the technical term for the
19216 specific form of extension of the atoms, and, secondarily, for the atoms
19217 themselves. The latter must apparently be imagined as infinitely small
19218 spheres. Cp. Vi/s/. Sut. VII, 1, 20.]
19219
19220 [Footnote 351: Viz. during the period of each pralaya. At that time all
19221 the atoms are isolated and motionless.]
19222
19223 [Footnote 352: When the time for a new creation has come.]
19224
19225 [Footnote 353: The &c. implies the activity of the Lord.]
19226
19227 [Footnote 354: The inherent (material) cause of an atomic compound are
19228 the constituent atoms, the non-inherent cause the conjunction of those
19229 atoms, the operative causes the ad/ri/sh/ta/ and the Lord's activity
19230 which make them enter into conjunction.]
19231
19232 [Footnote 355: I.e. in all cases the special form of extension of the
19233 effect depends not on the special extension of the cause, but on the
19234 number of atoms composing the cause (and thereby the effect).]
19235
19236 [Footnote 356: In order to escape the conclusion that the non-acceptance
19237 of the doctrine of Brahman involves the abandonment of a fundamental
19238 Vai/s/eshika principle.]
19239
19240 [Footnote 357: I.e. forms of extension different from sphericity, &c.]
19241
19242 [Footnote 358: The first of the three Sūtras quoted comprises, in the
19243 present text of the Vai/s/eshika-sūtras, only the following words,
19244 'Kara/n/abahutva/k/ /k/a;' the /k/a of the Sūtra implying, according to
19245 the commentators, mahattva and pra/k/aya.--According to the
19246 Vai/s/eshikas the form of extension called a/n/u, minute, has for its
19247 cause the dvitva inherent in the material causes, i.e. the two atoms
19248 from which the minute binary atomic compound originates.--The form of
19249 extension called mahat, big, has different causes, among them bahutva,
19250 i.e. the plurality residing in the material causes of the resulting

19251 'big' thing; the cause of the mahattva of a ternary atomic compound, for
19252 instance, is the tritva inherent in the three constituent atoms. In
19253 other cases mahattva is due to antecedent mahattva, in others to
19254 pra/k/aya, i.e. accumulation. See the Upaskara on Vai/s/. Sut. VII, 1,
19255 9; 10.]

19256 [Footnote 359: I.e. if the Vai/s/eshikas have to admit that it is the
19257 nature of sphericity, &c. not to produce like effects, the Vedantin also
19258 may maintain that Brahman produces an unlike effect, viz. the
19259 non-intelligent world.]

19260 [Footnote 360: Like other things, let us say a piece of cloth, which
19261 consists of parts.]

19262 [Footnote 361: Or, more particularly, to the conjunction of the atoms
19263 with the souls to which merit and demerit belong.--Ad/ri/sh/t/apeksham
19264 ad/ri/sh/t/avatkshtetraj/n/asa/my/ogapeksham iti yavat. An. Gi.]

19265 [Footnote 362: According to the Vai/s/eshikas intelligence is not
19266 essential to the soul, but a mere adventitious quality arising only when
19267 the soul is joined to an internal organ.]

19268 [Footnote 363: The soul being all-pervading.]

19269 [Footnote 364: Which is inadmissible on Vai/s/eshika principles, because
19270 sa/m/yoga as being a quality is connected with the things it joins by
19271 samavaya.]

19272 [Footnote 365: Viz. from those things which are united by conjunction.
19273 The argument is that conjunction as an independent third entity requires
19274 another connexion to connect it with the two things related to each
19275 other in the way of conjunction.]

19276 [Footnote 366: Viz. the absolute difference of samavaya and sa/m/yoga
19277 from the terms which they connect.]

19278 [Footnote 367: Action (karman), &c. also standing in the samavaya
19279 relation to their substrates.]

19280 [Footnote 368: Our Vai/s/eshika-sutras read 'pratishedhabhava/h/;' but
19281 as all MSS. of Sa@nkara have 'pratishedhabhava/h/' I have kept the
19282 latter reading and translated according to Anandagiri's explanation:
19283 Karyam anityam iti karye vireshato nityatvanishedho na syad yadi
19284 kara/n/eszpy anityatvam atozs/n/una/m/ kara/n/ana/m/ nityateti
19285 sutrartha/h/.]

19286 [Footnote 369: Because they also are not perceptible; the ternary
19287 aggregates, the so-called trasare/n/us, constituting the minima
19288 perceptibilia.]

19289 [Footnote 370: As they have no cause which could either be disintegrated
19290 or destroyed.]

19291 [Footnote 371: This according to the Vedanta view. If atoms existed they
19292 might have originated from avidya by a mere pari/n/ama and might again
19293 be dissolved into avidya, without either disintegration or destruction
19294 of their cause taking place.]

19295 [Footnote 372: The Sa@nkhyas looking on everything (except the soul) as
19296 being the pradhana in various forms.--There is no need of assuming with
19297 Govindananda that by the Sa@nkhya of the text we have to understand the
19298 Vedanta.]

19299 [Footnote 373: Yayor dvayor madhya ekam avina/s/yad apara/s/ritam
19300 evavatish/th/ate tav ayutasiddhau yathavayavavayavinau.]

19301 [Footnote 374: The connexion of cause and effect is of course samavaya.]

19302 [Footnote 375: If the effect can exist before having entered into

19320 connexion with the cause, the subsequent connexion of the two is no
19321 longer samavaya but sa/m/yoga; and that contradicts a fundamental
19322 Vai/s/eshika principle.]

19323

19324 [Footnote 376: This clause replies to the objection that only those
19325 connexions which have been produced by previous motion are to be
19326 considered conjunctions.]

19327

19328 [Footnote 377: A clause meant to preclude the assumption that the
19329 permanent existence of the things connected involves the permanent
19330 existence of the connexion.]

19331

19332 [Footnote 378: It having been shown above that atoms cannot enter into
19333 sa/m/yoga with each other, it is shown now that sa/m/yoga of the soul
19334 with the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the latter, and that
19335 sa/m/yoga of soul and manas cannot be the cause of cognition.]

19336

19337 [Footnote 379: Ekasambandhyakarsha/n/e yatra
19338 sambandhyantarakarsha/n/a/m/ tatra sa/m/slesha/h/, sa tu savayavana/m/
19339 jatukash/th/adina/m/ d/ri/sh/t/o na tu niravayavai/h/ savayavanam, ato
19340 dvya/n/ukasya savayavasya niravayavena parama/n/una sa nopapadyate.
19341 Brahnavidyabh.]

19342

19343 [Footnote 380: In answer to the question how, in that case, the
19344 practically recognised relation of abode, &c. existing between the cause
19345 and the effect is accounted for.]

19346

19347 [Footnote 381: For they must in that case have a northern end, an
19348 eastern end, &c.]

19349

19350 [Footnote 382: And that on that account the atoms which he considers as
19351 the ultimate simple constituents of matter cannot be decomposed.]

19352

19353 [Footnote 383: Because according to their opinion difference of size
19354 constitutes difference of substance, so that the continuous change of
19355 size in animal bodies, for instance, involves the continual perishing of
19356 old and the continual origination of new substances.]

19357

19358 [Footnote 384: The following notes on Bauddha doctrines are taken
19359 exclusively from the commentaries on the /S/a@nkarabhashya, and no
19360 attempt has been made to contrast or reconcile the Brahminical accounts
19361 of Bauddha psychology with the teaching of genuine Bauddha books. Cp. on
19362 the chief sects of the Buddhistic philosophers the Bauddha chapter of
19363 the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.--The Nihilists are the Madhyamikas; the
19364 Idealists are the Yoga/k/aras; the Sautrantikas and the Vaibhashikas
19365 together constitute the class of the Realists.--I subjoin the account
19366 given of those sects in the Brahnavidyabhara/n/a.--Buddhasya hi
19367 madhyamika-yoga/k/ara-sautrantika-vaibhashikasamj/n/akas /k/atvara/h/
19368 /s/ishya/h/. Tatra buddhena prathama/m/ yan prati sarva/m/ /s/unyam ity
19369 upadish/t/a/m/ te madhyamikas te hi guru/n/a yathokta/m/ tathaiva
19370 /s/raddhaya g/ri/hitavanta iti k/ri/tva napak/ri/sh/t/a/h/ puna/s/ /k/a
19371 taduktasyarthasya buddhyanusare/n/akshepasyak/ri/tatvan
19372 notk/ri/sh/t/abuddhaya iti madhyamika/h/. Anyais tu /s/ishyair guru/n/a
19373 sarva/s/unyatva upadish/t/e j/n/anatiriktasya sarvasya /s/unyatvam astu
19374 nameti guruktir yoga iti bauddai/h/ paribhashitopeta/h/ tad upari /k/a
19375 j/n/anasya tu /s/unyatva/m/ na sa/m/bhavati tathatve
19376 jagadandhyaprasa@ngat sunyasiddher apy asa/m/bhava/k/ /k/eti buddhamate
19377 a/k/aratvena paribhashita akshepos'pi k/ri/ta iti yoga/k/ara/h/
19378 vij/n/anamatrastitvavadina/h/. Tadanataram anyai/h/ /s/ishyai/h/
19379 pratitsiddhasya katha/m/ /s/unyatva/m/ vaktu/m/ /s/akyam ato j/n/anavad
19380 vahyarthos'pi satya ity ukte tarhi tathaiva sos'stu, para/m/ tu so
19381 s'numeyo na tu pratyaksha ity ukte tatha@ngik/ri/tyaiva/m/ /s/ishyamati
19382 anus/ri/tya kiyatparyanta/m/ sutra/m/ bhavishyatiti tai/h/ p/ri/sh/t/am
19383 atas te sautrantika/h/. Anye punar yady aya/m/ gha/t/a iti pratitibalad
19384 vahyos'rtha upeyate tarhi tasya eva pratiter aparokshatvat sa katha/m/
19385 parokshos'to vahyos'rtho na pratyaksha iti bhasha viruddhety akshipann
19386 atas te vaibhashika/h/.]

19387

19388 [Footnote 385: The rupaskandha comprises the senses and their objects,

19389 colour, &c.; the sense-organs were above called bhautika, they here
19390 re-appear as /k/aittika on account of their connexion with thought.
19391 Their objects likewise are classed as /k/aittika in so far as they are
19392 perceived by the senses.--The vij/n/anaskandha comprises the series of
19393 self-cognitions (ahamaham ity alayavj/n/anapravaha/h/), according to all
19394 commentators; and in addition, according to the Brahnavidyabhara/n/a,
19395 the knowledge, determinate and indeterminate, of external things
19396 (savikalpaka/m/ nirvikalpaka/m/ /k/a prav/ri/ttivilj/n/anasamj/n/itam).--
19397 The vedanaskandha comprises pleasure, pain, &c.--The samj/n/askandha
19398 comprises the cognition of things by their names (gaur a/s/va
19399 ityadi/s/abdasamjalpitapratyaya/h/, An. Gi.; gaur a/s/va ityeva/m/
19400 namavi/s/ish/t/asavikalpaka/h/ pratyaya/h/, Go. An.; sa/m/j/n/a
19401 yaj/n/adattadipadatadullekhi savikalpapratyayo va, dvitiyapakshe
19402 vij/n/anapadena savikalpapratyayo na grahy/h/, Brahnavidyabh.). The
19403 sa/m/skaraskandha comprises passion, aversion, &c., dharma and
19404 adharma.--Compare also the Bhamati.--The vij/n/anaskandha is /k/itta,
19405 the other skandhas /k/aitta.]

19406
19407 [Footnote 386: It has to be kept in view that the sarvastitvavadins as
19408 well as the other Bauddha sects teach the momentariness (ksha/n/ikatva),
19409 the eternal flux of everything that exists, and are on that ground
19410 controverted by the upholders of the permanent Brahman.]

19411
19412 [Footnote 387: Mind, on the Bauddha doctrine, presupposes the existence
19413 of an aggregate of atoms, viz. the body.]

19414
19415 [Footnote 388: In consequence of which no release could take place.]

19416
19417 [Footnote 389: The Brahnavidyabhara/n/a explains the last clause--from
19418 ksha/n/ikatva/k/ /k/a--somewhat differently: Api /k/a parama/n/unam api
19419 ksha/n/ikatvabhyupagaman melana/m/ na sambhavati, parama/n/una/m/
19420 melana/m/ parama/n/ukriyadhinam, tatha /k/a svakriya/m/ prati
19421 parama/n/una/m/ kara/n/atvat kriyapuraksha/n/e parama/n/ubhir bhavyam
19422 kriya /s/rayataya kriyaksha/n/eszpi tesham avasthanam apekshitam eva/m/
19423 melanakshaneszpi, nahi melana/s/rayasyabhava melanarupa prav/ri/ttir
19424 upapadyate, tatha /k/a sthiraparama/n/usadhya melanarupa prav/ri/tti/h/
19425 katha/m/ tesham ksha/n/ikatve bhavet.--Ananda Giri also divides and
19426 translates differently from the translation in the text.]

19427
19428 [Footnote 390: The kara/n/atvat of /S/a@nkara explains the pratyayatvat
19429 of the Sutra; karya/m/ praty ayate janakatvena ga/kkh/ati.]

19430
19431 [Footnote 391: The commentators agree on the whole in their explanations
19432 of the terms of this series.--The following is the substance of the
19433 comment of the Brahnavidyabhara/n/a: Nescience is the error of
19434 considering that which is momentary, impure, &c. to be permanent, pure,
19435 &c.--Impression (affection, sa/m/skara) comprises desire, aversion, &c.,
19436 and the activity caused by them.--Knowledge (vij/n/ana) is the
19437 self-consciousness (aham ity alayavij/n/anasya v/ri/ttilabha/h/)
19438 springing up in the embryo.--Name and form is the rudimentary flake--or
19439 bubble-like condition of the embryo.--The abode of the six
19440 (sha/d/ayatana) is the further developed stage of the embryo in which
19441 the latter is the abode of the six senses.--Touch (spar/s/a) is the
19442 sensations of cold, warmth, &c. on the embryo's part.--Feeling (vedana)
19443 the sensations of pleasure and pain resulting therefrom.--Desire
19444 (t/ri/sh/n/a) is the wish to enjoy the pleasurable sensations and to
19445 shun the painful ones.--Activity (upadana) is the effort resulting from
19446 desire.--Birth is the passing out from the uterus.--Species (jati) is
19447 the class of beings to which the new-born creature belongs.--Decay
19448 (jara).--Death (mara/n/am) is explained as the condition of the creature
19449 when about to die (mumursha).--Grief (/s/oka) the frustration of wishes
19450 connected therewith.--Lament (paridevanam) the lamentations on that
19451 account.--Pain (du/h/kha) is such pain as caused by the five
19452 senses.--Durmanas is mental affliction.--The 'and the like' implies
19453 death, the departure to another world and the subsequent return from
19454 there.]

19455
19456 [Footnote 392: Ananda Giri and Go. Ananda explain:
19457 A/s/raja/s/rayibhuteshv iti bhokt/ri/vi/s/esha/n/am

19458 ad/ri/sh/t/a/s/rayeshv ity artha/h/.--The Brahrma-vidyabhara/n/a says:
19459 Nityeshv a/s/raya/s/rayibhuteshv a/n/ushv abhyupagamyamaneshu
19460 bhokt/ri/shu /k/a satsv ity anvaya/h/. A/s/raya/s/rayibhuteshv ity
19461 asyopakaryopakarakabhavaprapteshv ity artha/h/.--And with regard to the
19462 subsequent a/s/raya/s/rayi/s/unyeshu: a/s/raya/s/rayitva/s/unyeshu,
19463 aya/m/ bhava/h/, sthiresu parama/n/ushu yadanvaye parama/n/una/m/
19464 sa/m/ghatapatti/h/ yadvyatireke /k/a na tad upakarakam upakarya/h/
19465 parama/n/ava/h/ yena tat/ri/to bhoga/h/ prarthiyate sa tatra karteti
19466 grahitu/m/ /s/akyate, ksha/n/ikeshu tu param/n/ushu
19467 anvayavyatirekagrahasyanekaksha/n/asadyasyasa/m/bhavan
19468 nopakaryopakarakabhavo nirdharayitu/m/ /s/akya/h/.--Ananda Giri remarks
19469 on the latter: Ad/ri/sh/t/a/s/rayakart/ri/rahityam aha/s/rayeti. Another
19470 reading appears to be a/s/aya/s/raya/s/unyeshu.]

19471
19472 [Footnote 393: Bauddhana/m/ ksha/n/apadena gha/t/adir eva padartho
19473 vyavahriyate na tu tadatinkta/h/ ka/sk/it ksha/n/o nama halosti.
19474 Brahmavidyabh.]

19475
19476 [Footnote 394: And whereupon then could be established the difference of
19477 mere efficient causes such as the potter's staff, &c., and material
19478 causes such as clay, &c.?)

19479
19480 [Footnote 395: These four causes are the so-called defining cause
19481 (adhipati-pratyaya), the auxiliary cause (sahakaripratyaya), the
19482 immediate cause (samanantarapratyaya), and the substantial cause
19483 (alambanapratyaya).--I extract the explanation from the
19484 Brahmavidyabhara/n/a: Adhipatir indriya/m/ tad dhi /k/akshuradirupam
19485 utpannasya j/n/anasya rupadivishayata/m/ niya/kkh/ati niyamaka/s/ /k/a
19486 lokedhipatir ity u/k/yate. Sahakari aloka/h/.
19487 Samanantarapratyaya/h/purvaj/n/anam, bauddhamate hi
19488 ksha/n/ikaj/n/anasa/m/tatau purvaj/n/anam uttaraj/n/asya karana/m/ tad
19489 eva /k/a mana ity u/k/yate. Alambana/m/ gha/t/adi/h/. Etan hetun pratiya
19490 prapya /k/akshuradijanyam ity adi.]

19491
19492 [Footnote 396: Sa/m/skara iti, tanmate purvaksha/n/a eva hetubhuta/h/
19493 sa/m/skaro vasaneti /k/a vyavahriyate karya/m/ tu tadvishayataya
19494 karmavyutpattya sa/m/skara/h/, tatha /k/a karyakara/n/atmaka/m/ sarva/m/
19495 bhavarupa/m/ ksha/n/ikam iti pratij/n/artha/h/. Brahmavidyabhara/n/a.]

19496
19497 [Footnote 397: As when a man smashes a jar having previously formed the
19498 intention of doing so.]

19499
19500 [Footnote 398: I.e. the insensible continual decay of things.--Viparita
19501 iti pratiksha/n/a/m/ gha/t/adina/m/ yuktya sadhyamanoku/s/alair
19502 avagantum a/s/akya/h/ sukshmo vina/s/opratisa/m/khyanirodha/h/.
19503 Brahmav.]

19504
19505 [Footnote 399: A series of momentary existences constituting a chain of
19506 causes and effects can never be entirely stopped; for the last momentary
19507 existence must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to
19508 produce it. In the former case the series is continued; the latter
19509 alternative would imply that the last link does not really exist, since
19510 the Bauddhas define the satta of a thing as its causal efficiency (cp.
19511 Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha). And the non-existence of the last link
19512 would retrogressively lead to the non-existence of the whole series.]

19513
19514 [Footnote 400: Thus clay is recognised as such whether it appears in the
19515 form of a jar, or of the potsherds into which the jar is broken, or of
19516 the powder into which the potsherds are ground.--Analogously we infer
19517 that even things which seem to vanish altogether, such as a drop of
19518 water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continue to exist in some
19519 form.]

19520
19521 [Footnote 401: The knowledge that everything is transitory, pain, &c.]

19522
19523 [Footnote 402: What does enable us to declare that there is
19524 avara/n/abhava in one place and not in another? Space; which therefore
19525 is something real.]

19526

19527 [Footnote 403: If the cause were able, without having undergone any
19528 change, to produce effects, it would at the same moment produce all the
19529 effects of which it is capable.--Cp. on this point the
19530 Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.]
19531
19532 [Footnote 404: This is added to obviate the remark that it is not a
19533 general rule that effects are of the same nature as their causes, and
19534 that therefore, after all, existent things may spring from
19535 non-existence.]
19536
19537 [Footnote 405: According to the vij/n/anavadin the cognition specialised
19538 by its various contents, such as, for instance, the idea of blue colour
19539 is the object of knowledge; the cognition in so far as it is
19540 consciousness (avabhasa) is the result of knowledge; the cognition in so
19541 far as it is power is mana, knowledge; in so far as it is the abode of
19542 that power it is pramat/ri/, knowing subject.]
19543
19544 [Footnote 406: If they are said to be different from the atoms they can
19545 no longer be considered as composed of atoms; if they are non-different
19546 from atoms they cannot be the cause of the mental representations of
19547 gross non-atomic bodies.]
19548
19549 [Footnote 407: Avayavavayavirupo vahyosrtho nasti /k/en ma bhud
19550 jativyaktyadirupas tu syad ity a/s/rankyaha evam iti. Jatydina/m/
19551 vyaktyadinam /k/atyantabhinnatve svatantryaprasa@ngad atyantabhinnatve
19552 tadvadevatadbhavat bhinnabhinnatvasya viruddhatvad avayavavayavibhedavaj
19553 gativyaktyadibhedosxpi nastity artha/h/.]
19554
19555 [Footnote 408: Vasana, above translated by mental impression, strictly
19556 means any member of the infinite series of ideas which precedes the
19557 present actual idea.]
19558
19559 [Footnote 409: For all these doctrines depend on the comparison of ideas
19560 which is not possible unless there be a permanent knowing subject in
19561 addition to the transitory ideas.]
19562
19563 [Footnote 410: The vij/n/anaskandha comprises vij/n/anas of two
19564 different kinds, the alayavij/n/ana and the prav/ri/ttivilij/n/ana. The
19565 alayavij/n/ana comprises the series of cognitions or ideas which refer
19566 to the ego; the prav/ri/ttivilij/n/ana comprises those ideas which refer
19567 to apparently external objects, such as colour and the like. The ideas
19568 of the latter class are due to the mental impressions left by the
19569 antecedent ideas of the former class.]
19570
19571 [Footnote 411: Viz. in the present case the principle that what presents
19572 itself to consciousness is not non-existent.]
19573
19574 [Footnote 412: Soul and non-soul are the enjoying souls and the objects
19575 of their enjoyment; asrava is the forward movement of the senses towards
19576 their objects; sa/m/vara is the restraint of the activity of the senses;
19577 nirjara is self-mortification by which sin is destroyed; the works
19578 constitute bondage; and release is the ascending of the soul, after
19579 bondage has ceased, to the highest regions.--For the details, see
19580 Professor Cowell's translation of the Arhata chapter of the
19581 Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.]
19582
19583 [Footnote 413: Cp. translation of Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha, p. 59.]
19584
19585 [Footnote 414: And so impugn the doctrine of the one eternal Brahman.]
19586
19587 [Footnote 415: Cp. Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha translation, p. 58.]
19588
19589 [Footnote 416: The inference being that the initial and intervening
19590 sizes of the soul must be permanent because they are sizes of the soul,
19591 like its final size.]
19592
19593 [Footnote 417: The special nature of the connexion between the Lord and
19594 the pradhana and the souls cannot be ascertained from the world
19595 considered as the effect of the pradhana acted upon by the Lord; for

19596 that the world is the effect of the pradhana is a point which the
19597 Vedantins do not accept as proved.]
19598
19599 [Footnote 418: I.e. a high one, but not an indefinite one; since the
19600 omniscient Lord knows its measure.]
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19608 *** END OF THE EBOOK THE VEDANTA-SUTRAS WITH THE COMMENTARY BY SANKARACARYA ***
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19617
19618 eBook of The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja
19619
19620
19621
19622 Title: The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja
19623
19624 Translator: G. Thibaut
19625
19626 Commentator: Ramanuja
19627
19628 Release date: January 1, 2005 [eBook #7297]
19629 Most recently updated: December 30, 2020
19630
19631 Language: English
19632
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19634
19635 *** START OF EBOOK THE VEDANTA-SUTRAS WITH THE COMMENTARY BY RAMANUJA ***
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19649 TRANSLATED BY
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19651 GEORGE THIBAUT
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19653 PART III
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19655 Sacred Books of the East, Volume 48
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19665	CONTENTS.
19666	
19667	VEDĀNTA-SŪTRAS WITH THE COMMENTARY OF RĀMĀNUJA.
19668	
19669	
19670	INTRODUCTION
19671	
19672	
19673	ADHYĀYA I
19674	
19675	Pāda I
19676	
19677	Pāda II
19678	
19679	Pāda III
19680	
19681	Pāda IV
19682	
19683	
19684	ADHYĀYA II
19685	
19686	Pāda I
19687	
19688	Pāda II
19689	
19690	Pāda III
19691	
19692	Pāda IV
19693	
19694	
19695	ADHYĀYA III
19696	
19697	Pāda I
19698	
19699	Pāda II
19700	
19701	Pāda III
19702	
19703	Pāda IV
19704	
19705	
19706	ADHYĀYA IV
19707	
19708	Pāda I
19709	
19710	Pāda II
19711	
19712	Pāda III
19713	
19714	Pāda IV
19715	
19716	
19717	INDEXES BY DR. M. WINTERNITZ:--
19718	
19719	Index of Quotations
19720	
19721	Index of Sanskrit Words
19722	
19723	Index of Names and Subjects
19724	
19725	Corrigenda
19726	
19727	Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Translations of the
19728	Sacred Books of the East
19729	
19730	
19731	
19732	
19733	INTRODUCTION.

19734

19735 In the Introduction to the first volume of the translation of the
19736 'Vedānta-Sūtras with Sankara's Commentary' (vol. xxxiv of this Series) I
19737 have dwelt at some length on the interest which Rāmānuja's Commentary
19738 may claim--as being, on the one hand, the fullest exposition of what may
19739 be called the Theistic Vedānta, and as supplying us, on the other, with
19740 means of penetrating to the true meaning of Bādarāyana's Aphorisms. I do
19741 not wish to enter here into a fuller discussion of Rāmānuja's work in
19742 either of these aspects; an adequate treatment of them would, moreover,
19743 require considerably more space than is at my disposal. Some very useful
19744 material for the right understanding of Rāmānuja's work is to be found
19745 in the 'Analytical Outline of Contents' which Messrs. M. Rangākārya and
19746 M. B. Varadarāja Aiyangār have prefixed to the first volume of their
19747 scholarly translation of the Śrībhāṣya (Madras, 1899).
19748

19749 The question as to what the Sūtras really teach is a critical, not a
19750 philosophical one. This distinction seems to have been imperfectly
19751 realised by several of those critics, writing in India, who have
19752 examined the views expressed in my Introduction to the translation of
19753 Sankara's Commentary. A writer should not be taxed with 'philosophic
19754 incompetency,' 'hopeless theistic bias due to early training,' and the
19755 like, simply because he, on the basis of a purely critical investigation,
19756 considers himself entitled to maintain that a certain ancient document
19757 sets forth one philosophical view rather than another. I have nowhere
19758 expressed an opinion as to the comparative philosophical value of the
19759 systems of Sankara and Rāmānuja; not because I have no definite opinions
19760 on this point, but because to introduce them into a critical enquiry
19761 would be purposeless if not objectionable.
19762

19763 The question as to the true meaning of the Sūtras is no doubt of some
19764 interest; although the interest of problems of this kind may easily be
19765 over-estimated. Among the remarks of critics on my treatment of this
19766 problem I have found little of solid value. The main arguments which I
19767 have set forth, not so much in favour of the adequacy of Rāmānuja's
19768 interpretation, as against the validity of Sankarākārya's understanding
19769 of the Sūtras, appear to me not to have been touched. I do not by any
19770 means consider the problem a hopeless one; but its solution will not be
19771 advanced, in any direction, but by those who will be at the trouble of
19772 submitting the entire body of the Sūtras to a new and detailed
19773 investigation, availing themselves to the full of the help that is to be
19774 derived from the study of all the existing Commentaries.
19775

19776 The present translation of the Śrībhāṣya claims to be faithful on the
19777 whole, although I must acknowledge that I have aimed rather at making it
19778 intelligible and, in a certain sense, readable than scrupulously
19779 accurate. If I had to rewrite it, I should feel inclined to go even
19780 further in the same direction. Indian Philosophy would, in my opinion,
19781 be more readily and widely appreciated than it is at present, if the
19782 translators of philosophical works had been somewhat more concerned to
19783 throw their versions into a form less strange and repellent to the
19784 western reader than literal renderings from technical Sanskrit must
19785 needs be in many passages. I am not unaware of the peculiar dangers of
19786 the plan now advocated--among which the most obvious is the temptation
19787 it offers to the translator of deviating from the text more widely than
19788 regard for clearness would absolutely require. And I am conscious of
19789 having failed in this respect in more than one instance. In other cases
19790 I have no doubt gone astray through an imperfect understanding of the
19791 author's meaning. The fact is, that as yet the time has hardly come for
19792 fully adequate translations of comprehensive works of the type of the
19793 Śrībhāṣya, the authors of which wrote with reference--in many cases
19794 tacit--to an immense and highly technical philosophical literature which
19795 is only just beginning to be studied, and comprehended in part, by
19796 European scholars.
19797

19798 It gives me great pleasure to acknowledge the help which I have received
19799 from various quarters in preparing this translation. Pandit Gangādhara
19800 Sāstrin, C. I. E., of the Benares Sanskrit College, has, with unwearying
19801 kindness and patience, supplied me throughout with comments of his own
19802 on difficult sections of the text. Pandit Svāmin Rāma Misra Sāstrin has

19803 rendered me frequent assistance in the earlier portion of my task. And
19804 to Mr. A. Venis, the learned Principal of the Benares Sanskrit College,
19805 I am indebted for most instructive notes on some passages of a
19806 peculiarly technical and abstruse character. Nor can I conclude without
19807 expressing my sense of obligation to Colonel G. A. Jacob, whose
19808 invaluable 'Concordance to the Principal Upanishads' lightens to an
19809 incalculable degree the task of any scholar who is engaged in work
19810 bearing on the Vedânta.

19811
19812
19813
19814
19815 VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS

19816
19817 WITH

19818
19819 RÂMÂNUJA'S SRÎBHÂSHYA

19820
19821 FIRST ADHYÂYA.

19822
19823 FIRST PÂDA.

19824
19825 MAY my mind be filled with devotion towards the highest Brahman, the
19826 abode of Lakshmi who is luminously revealed in the Upanishads; who in
19827 sport produces, sustains, and reabsorbs the entire Universe; whose only
19828 aim is to foster the manifold classes of beings that humbly worship him.

19829
19830 The nectar of the teaching of Parâsara's son (Vyâsa),--which was brought
19831 up from the middle of the milk-ocean of the Upanishads--which restores
19832 to life the souls whose vital strength had departed owing to the heat of
19833 the fire of transmigratory existence--which was well guarded by the
19834 teachers of old--which was obscured by the mutual conflict of manifold
19835 opinions,--may intelligent men daily enjoy that as it is now presented
19836 to them in my words.

19837
19838 The lengthy explanation (vritti) of the Brahma-sûtras which was composed
19839 by the Reverend Bodhâyana has been abridged by former teachers;
19840 according to their views the words of the Sûtras will be explained in
19841 this present work.

19842
19843
19844
19845
19846 1. Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.

19847
19848 In this Sûtra the word 'then' expresses immediate sequence; the word
19849 'therefore' intimates that what has taken place (viz. the study of the
19850 karmakânda of the Veda) constitutes the reason (of the enquiry into
19851 Brahman). For the fact is that the enquiry into (lit. 'the desire to
19852 know') Brahman--the fruit of which enquiry is infinite in nature and
19853 permanent--follows immediately in the case of him who, having read the
19854 Veda together with its auxiliary disciplines, has reached the knowledge
19855 that the fruit of mere works is limited and non-permanent, and hence has
19856 conceived the desire of final release.

19857
19858 The compound 'brahmajijñâsâ' is to be explained as 'the enquiry of
19859 Brahman,' the genitive case 'of Brahman' being understood to denote the
19860 object; in agreement with the special rule as to the meaning of the
19861 genitive case, Pânini II, 3, 65. It might be said that even if we
19862 accepted the general meaning of the genitive case--which is that of
19863 connexion in general--Brahman's position (in the above compound) as an
19864 object would be established by the circumstance that the 'enquiry'
19865 demands an object; but in agreement with the principle that the direct
19866 denotation of a word is to be preferred to a meaning inferred we take
19867 the genitive case 'of Brahman' as denoting the object.

19868
19869 The word 'Brahman' denotes the highest Person (purushottama), who is
19870 essentially free from all imperfections and possesses numberless classes
19871 of auspicious qualities of unsurpassable excellence. The term 'Brahman'

19872 is applied to any things which possess the quality of greatness
19873 (brihattva, from the root 'brih'); but primarily denotes that which
19874 possesses greatness, of essential nature as well as of qualities, in
19875 unlimited fulness; and such is only the Lord of all. Hence the word
19876 'Brahman' primarily denotes him alone, and in a secondary derivative
19877 sense only those things which possess some small part of the Lord's
19878 qualities; for it would be improper to assume several meanings for the
19879 word (so that it would denote primarily or directly more than one thing).
19880 The case is analogous to that of the term 'bhagavat [FOOTNOTE 4:1].' The
19881 Lord only is enquired into, for the sake of immortality, by all those
19882 who are afflicted with the triad of pain. Hence the Lord of all is that
19883 Brahman which, according to the Sûtra, constitutes the object of enquiry.
19884 The word 'jijñâsâ' is a desiderative formation meaning 'desire to know.'
19885 And as in the case of any desire the desired object is the chief thing,
19886 the Sûtra means to enjoin knowledge--which is the object of the desire
19887 of knowledge. The purport of the entire Sûtra then is as follows: 'Since
19888 the fruit of works known through the earlier part of the Mîmâmsâ is
19889 limited and non-permanent, and since the fruit of the knowledge of
19890 Brahman--which knowledge is to be reached through the latter part of the
19891 Mîmâmsâ--is unlimited and permanent; for this reason Brahman is to be
19892 known, after the knowledge of works has previously taken place.'--The
19893 same meaning is expressed by the Vrittikâra when saying 'after the
19894 comprehension of works has taken place there follows the enquiry into
19895 Brahman.' And that the enquiry into works and that into Brahman
19896 constitute one body of doctrine, he (the Vrittikâra) will declare later
19897 on 'this Sârîraka-doctrine is connected with Jaimini's doctrine as
19898 contained in sixteen adhyâyas; this proves the two to constitute one
19899 body of doctrine.' Hence the earlier and the later Mîmâmsâ are separate
19900 only in so far as there is a difference of matter to be taught by each;
19901 in the same way as the two halves of the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ-sûtras,
19902 consisting of six adhyâyas each, are separate [FOOTNOTE 5:1]; and as each
19903 adhyâya is separate. The entire Mîmâmsâ-sâtra--which begins with the
19904 Sûtra 'Now therefore the enquiry into religious duty' and concludes with
19905 the Sûtra '(From there is) no return on account of scriptural statement'--
19906 has, owing to the special character of the contents, a definite order of
19907 internal succession. This is as follows. At first the precept 'one is to
19908 learn one's own text (svâdhyâya)' enjoins the apprehension of that
19909 aggregate of syllables which is called 'Veda,' and is here referred to
19910 as 'svâdhyâya.' Next there arises the desire to know of what nature the
19911 'Learning' enjoined is to be, and how it is to be done. Here there come
19912 in certain injunctions such as 'Let a Brahmana be initiated in his
19913 eighth year' and 'The teacher is to make him recite the Veda'; and
19914 certain rules about special observances and restrictions--such as
19915 'having performed the upâkarman on the full moon of Sravana or
19916 Praushthapada according to prescription, he is to study the sacred
19917 verses for four months and a half--which enjoin all the required details.

19918
19919 From all these it is understood that the study enjoined has for its
19920 result the apprehension of the aggregate of syllables called Veda, on
19921 the part of a pupil who has been initiated by a teacher sprung from a
19922 good family, leading a virtuous life, and possessing purity of soul; who
19923 practises certain special observances and restrictions; and who learns
19924 by repeating what is recited by the teacher.

19925
19926 And this study of the Veda is of the nature of a samskâra of the text,
19927 since the form of the injunction 'the Veda is to be studied' shows that
19928 the Veda is the object (of the action of studying). By a samskâra is
19929 understood an action whereby something is fitted to produce some other
19930 effect; and that the Veda should be the object of such a samskâra is
19931 quite appropriate, since it gives rise to the knowledge of the four
19932 chief ends of human action--viz. religious duty, wealth, pleasure, and
19933 final release--and of the means to effect them; and since it helps to
19934 effect those ends by itself also, viz. by mere mechanical repetition
19935 (apart from any knowledge to which it may give rise).

19936
19937 The injunction as to the study of the Veda thus aims only at the
19938 apprehension of the aggregate of syllables (constituting the Veda)
19939 according to certain rules; it is in this way analogous to the recital
19940 of mantras.

19941
19942 It is further observed that the Veda thus apprehended through reading
19943 spontaneously gives rise to the ideas of certain things subserving
19944 certain purposes. A person, therefore, who has formed notions of those
19945 things immediately, i.e. on the mere apprehension of the text of the
19946 Veda through reading, thereupon naturally applies himself to the study
19947 of the Mimāṃsa, which consists in a methodical discussion of the
19948 sentences constituting the text of the Veda, and has for its result the
19949 accurate determination of the nature of those things and their different
19950 modes. Through this study the student ascertains the character of the
19951 injunctions of work which form part of the Veda, and observes that all
19952 work leads only to non-permanent results; and as, on the other hand, he
19953 immediately becomes aware that the Upanishad sections--which form part
19954 of the Veda which he has apprehended through reading--refer to an
19955 infinite and permanent result, viz. immortality, he applies himself to
19956 the study of the Sârîraka-Mîmāṃsâ, which consists in a systematic
19957 discussion of the Vedānta-texts, and has for its result the accurate
19958 determination of their sense. That the fruit of mere works is transitory,
19959 while the result of the knowledge of Brahman is something permanent, the
19960 Vedānta-texts declare in many places--'And as here the world acquired by
19961 work perishes, so there the world acquired by merit perishes' (Ch. Up.
19962 VIII, 1,6); 'That work of his has an end' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 10); 'By
19963 non-permanent works the Permanent is not obtained' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 10);
19964 'Frail indeed are those boats, the sacrifices' (Mu. Up. I, 2, 7); 'Let a
19965 Brâhmana, after he has examined all these worlds that are gained by
19966 works, acquire freedom from all desires. What is not made cannot be
19967 gained by what is made. To understand this, let the pupil, with fuel in
19968 his hand, go to a teacher who is learned and dwells entirely in Brahman.
19969 To that pupil who has approached him respectfully, whose mind is
19970 altogether calm, the wise teacher truly told that knowledge of Brahman
19971 through which he knows the imperishable true Person' (Mu. Up. I, 2, 12,
19972 13). 'Told' here means 'he is to tell.'--On the other hand, 'He who
19973 knows Brahman attains the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'He who sees
19974 this does not see death' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2); 'He becomes a self-ruler'
19975 (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'Knowing him he becomes immortal here' (Taitt. Âr.
19976 III, 12, 7); 'Having known him he passes over death; there is no other
19977 path to go' (Svet. Up. VI, 15); 'Having known as separate his Self and
19978 the Mover, pleased thereby he goes to immortality' (Svet. Up. I, 6).

19979
19980 But--an objection here is raised--the mere learning of the Veda with its
19981 auxiliary disciplines gives rise to the knowledge that the heavenly
19982 world and the like are the results of works, and that all such results
19983 are transitory, while immortality is the fruit of meditation on Brahman.
19984 Possessing such knowledge, a person desirous of final release may at
19985 once proceed to the enquiry into Brahman; and what need is there of a
19986 systematic consideration of religious duty (i.e. of the study of the
19987 Purva Mimāṃsâ)?--If this reasoning were valid, we reply, the person
19988 desirous of release need not even apply himself to the study of the
19989 Sârîraka Mimāṃsâ, since Brahman is known from the mere reading of the
19990 Veda with its auxiliary disciplines.--True. Such knowledge arises indeed
19991 immediately (without deeper enquiry). But a matter apprehended in this
19992 immediate way is not raised above doubt and mistake. Hence a systematic
19993 discussion of the Vedānta-texts must be undertaken in order that their
19994 sense may be fully ascertained--We agree. But you will have to admit
19995 that for the very same reason we must undertake a systematic enquiry
19996 into religious duty!

19997
19998 [FOOTNOTE 4:1. 'Bhagavat' denotes primarily the Lord, the divinity;
19999 secondarily any holy person.]
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20001 [FOOTNOTE 5:1. The first six books of the Pûrva Mîmāṃsâ-sûtras give
20002 rules for the fundamental forms of the sacrifice; while the last six
20003 books teach how these rules are to be applied to the so-called modified
20004 forms.]
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20009 THE SMALL PÛRVAPAKSHA.

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20011 But--a further objection is urged--as that which has to precede the
20012 systematic enquiry into Brahman we should assign something which that
20013 enquiry necessarily presupposes. The enquiry into the nature of duty,
20014 however, does not form such a prerequisite, since a consideration of the
20015 Vedanta-texts may be undertaken by any one who has read those texts,
20016 even if he is not acquainted with works.--But in the Vedanta-texts there
20017 are enjoined meditations on the Udgîtha and the like which are matters
20018 auxiliary to works; and such meditations are not possible for him who is
20019 not acquainted with those works!--You who raise this objection clearly
20020 are ignorant of what kind of knowledge the Sârîraka Mîmâmsâ is concerned
20021 with! What that sâstra aims at is to destroy completely that wrong
20022 knowledge which is the root of all pain, for man, liable to birth, old
20023 age, and death, and all the numberless other evils connected with
20024 transmigratory existence--evils that spring from the view, due to
20025 beginningless Nescience, that there is plurality of existence; and to
20026 that end the sâstra endeavours to establish the knowledge of the unity
20027 of the Self. Now to this knowledge, the knowledge of works--which is
20028 based on the assumption of plurality of existence--is not only useless
20029 but even opposed. The consideration of the Udgîtha and the like, which
20030 is supplementary to works only, finds a place in the Vedânta-texts, only
20031 because like them it is of the nature of knowledge; but it has no direct
20032 connexion with the true topic of those texts. Hence some prerequisite
20033 must be indicated which has reference to the principal topic of the
20034 sâstra.--Quite so; and this prerequisite is just the knowledge of works;
20035 for scripture declares that final release results from knowledge with
20036 works added. The Sûtra-writer himself says further on 'And there is need
20037 of all works, on account of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and
20038 the like' (Ve. Sû. III, 4, 26). And if the required works were not known,
20039 one could not determine which works have to be combined with knowledge
20040 and which not. Hence the knowledge of works is just the necessary
20041 prerequisite.--Not so, we reply. That which puts an end to Nescience is
20042 exclusively the knowledge of Brahman, which is pure intelligence and
20043 antagonistic to all plurality. For final release consists just in the
20044 cessation of Nescience; how then can works--to which there attach
20045 endless differences connected with caste, âsrama, object to be
20046 accomplished, means and mode of accomplishment, &c.--ever supply a means
20047 for the cessation of ignorance, which is essentially the cessation of
20048 the view that difference exists? That works, the results of which are
20049 transitory, are contrary to final release, and that such release can be
20050 effected through knowledge only, scripture declares in many places;
20051 compare all the passages quoted above (p. 7).

20052
20053 As to the assertion that knowledge requires sacrifices and other works,
20054 we remark that--as follows from the essential contrariety of knowledge
20055 and works, and as further appears from an accurate consideration of the
20056 words of scripture--pious works can contribute only towards the rise of
20057 the desire of knowledge, in so far namely as they clear the internal
20058 organ (of knowledge), but can have no influence on the production of the
20059 fruit, i.e. knowledge itself. For the scriptural passage concerned runs
20060 as follows Brâhmanas desire to know him by the study of the Veda, by
20061 sacrifice, by gifts,' &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22).

20062
20063 According to this passage, the desire only of knowledge springs up
20064 through works; while another text teaches that calmness, self-restraint,
20065 and so on, are the direct means for the origination of knowledge itself.
20066 (Having become tranquil, calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and
20067 collected, he is to see the Self within the Self (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23).)

20068
20069 The process thus is as follows. After the mind of a man has been cleaned
20070 of all impurities through works performed in many preceding states of
20071 existence, without a view to special forms of reward, there arises in
20072 him the desire of knowledge, and thereupon--through knowledge itself
20073 originated by certain scriptural texts--'Being only, this was in the
20074 beginning, one only without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, I, 2); 'Truth,
20075 Knowledge, the Infinite, is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'Without parts,
20076 without actions, calm, without fault, without taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19);
20077 'This Self is Brahman' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19); 'Thou art that' (Ch. Up. VI,
20078 9, 7), Nescience comes to an end. Now, 'Hearing,' 'reflection,' and

20079 'meditation,' are helpful towards cognising the sense of these Vedic
20080 texts. 'Hearing' (sravana) means the apprehension of the sense of
20081 scripture, together with collateral arguments, from a teacher who
20082 possesses the true insight, viz. that the Vedānta-texts establish the
20083 doctrine of the unity of the Self. 'Reflection' (mananam) means the
20084 confirmation within oneself of the sense taught by the teacher, by means
20085 of arguments showing it alone to be suitable. 'Meditation'
20086 (nididhyāsanam) finally means the constant holding of that sense before
20087 one's mind, so as to dispel thereby the antagonistic beginningless
20088 imagination of plurality. In the case of him who through 'hearing,'
20089 'reflection,' and meditation,' has dis-dispelled the entire imagination
20090 of plurality, the knowledge of the sense of Vedānta-texts puts an end to
20091 Nescience; and what we therefore require is a statement of the
20092 indispensable prerequisites of such 'hearing,' 'reflection,' and so on.
20093 Now of such prerequisites there are four, viz. discrimination of what is
20094 permanent and what is non-permanent; the full possession of calmness of
20095 mind, self-restraint and similar means; the renunciation of all
20096 enjoyment of fruits here below as well as in the next world; and the
20097 desire of final release.

20098
20099 Without these the desire of knowledge cannot arise; and they are
20100 therefore known, from the very nature of the matter, to be necessary
20101 prerequisites. To sum up: The root of bondage is the unreal view of
20102 plurality which itself has its root in Nescience that conceals the true
20103 being of Brahman. Bondage itself thus is unreal, and is on that account
20104 cut short, together with its root, by mere knowledge. Such knowledge is
20105 originated by texts such as 'That art thou'; and work is of no help
20106 either towards its nature, or its origination, or its fruit (i.e.
20107 release). It is on the other hand helpful towards the desire of
20108 knowledge, which arises owing to an increase of the element of goodness
20109 (sattva) in the soul, due to the destruction of the elements of passion
20110 (rajas) and darkness (tamas) which are the root of all moral evil. This
20111 use is referred to in the text quoted above, 'Brāhmanas wish to know him,'
20112 &c. As, therefore, the knowledge of works is of no use towards the
20113 knowledge of Brahman, we must acknowledge as the prerequisite of the
20114 latter knowledge the four means mentioned above.

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20119 THE SMALL SIDDHĀNTA.

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20121 To this argumentation we make the following reply. We admit that release
20122 consists only in the cessation of Nescience, and that this cessation
20123 results entirely from the knowledge of Brahman. But a distinction has
20124 here to be made regarding the nature of this knowledge which the
20125 Vedānta-texts aim at enjoining for the purpose of putting an end to
20126 Nescience. Is it merely the knowledge of the sense of sentences which
20127 originates from the sentences? or is it knowledge in the form of
20128 meditation (upāsana) which has the knowledge just referred to as its
20129 antecedent? It cannot be knowledge of the former kind: for such
20130 knowledge springs from the mere apprehension of the sentence, apart from
20131 any special injunction, and moreover we do not observe that the
20132 cessation of Nescience is effected by such knowledge merely. Our
20133 adversary will perhaps attempt to explain things in the following way.
20134 The Vedānta-texts do not, he will say, produce that knowledge which
20135 makes an end of Nescience, so long as the imagination of plurality is
20136 not dispelled. And the fact that such knowledge, even when produced,
20137 does not at once and for every one put a stop to the view of plurality
20138 by no means subverts my opinion; for, to mention an analogous instance,
20139 the double appearance of the moon--presenting itself to a person
20140 affected with a certain weakness of vision--does not come to an end as
20141 soon as the oneness of the moon has been apprehended by reason.
20142 Moreover, even without having come to an end, the view of plurality is
20143 powerless to effect further bondage, as soon as the root, i.e.
20144 Nescience, has once been cut. But this defence we are unable to admit. It
20145 is impossible that knowledge should not arise when its means, i.e. the
20146 texts conveying knowledge, are once present. And we observe that even
20147 when there exists an antagonistic imagination (interfering with the rise

of knowledge), information given by competent persons, the presence of characteristic marks (on which a correct inference may be based), and the like give rise to knowledge which sublates the erroneous imagination. Nor can we admit that even after the sense of texts has been apprehended, the view of plurality may continue owing to some small remainder of beginningless imagination. For as this imagination which constitutes the means for the view of plurality is itself false, it is necessarily put an end to by the rise of true knowledge. If this did not take place, that imagination would never come to an end, since there is no other means but knowledge to effect its cessation. To say that the view of plurality, which is the effect of that imagination, continues even after its root has been cut, is mere nonsense. The instance of some one seeing the moon double is not analogous. For in his case the non-cessation of wrong knowledge explains itself from the circumstance that the cause of wrong knowledge, viz. the real defect of the eye which does not admit of being sublated by knowledge, is not removed, although that which would sublate wrong knowledge is near. On the other hand, effects, such as fear and the like, may come to an end because they can be sublated by means of knowledge of superior force. Moreover, if it were true that knowledge arises through the dispelling of the imagination of plurality, the rise of knowledge would really never be brought about. For the imagination of plurality has through gradual growth in the course of beginningless time acquired an infinite strength, and does not therefore admit of being dispelled by the comparatively weak conception of non-duality. Hence we conclude that the knowledge which the Vedānta-texts aim at inculcating is a knowledge other than the mere knowledge of the sense of sentences, and denoted by 'dhyāna,' 'upāsana' (i. e. meditation), and similar terms.

With this agree scriptural texts such as 'Having known it, let him practise meditation' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 21); 'He who, having searched out the Self, knows it' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Meditate on the Self as Om' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 6); 'Having known that, he is freed from the jaws of death' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 15); 'Let a man meditate on the Self only as his world' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 15); 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to her reflected on, to be meditated on' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 6); 'That we must search out, that we must try to understand' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1).

(According to the principle of the oneness of purport of the different sâkhâs) all these texts must be viewed as agreeing in meaning with the injunction of meditation contained in the passage quoted from the Bri. Up.; and what they enjoin is therefore meditation. In the first and second passages quoted, the words 'having known' and 'having searched out' (vijñâya; anuvidya) contain a mere reference to (not injunction of) the apprehension of the meaning of texts, such apprehension subserving meditation; while the injunction of meditation (which is the true purport of the passages) is conveyed by the clauses 'let him practise meditation' (prajñam kurvîta) and 'he knows it.' In the same way the clause 'the Self is to be heard' is a mere anuvâda, i.e. a mere reference to what is already established by other means; for a person who has read the Veda observes that it contains instruction about matters connected with certain definite purposes, and then on his own account applies himself to methodical 'hearing,' in order definitely to ascertain these matters; 'hearing' thus is established already. In the same way the clause 'the Self is to be reflected upon' is a mere anuvâda of reflection which is known as a means of confirming what one has 'heard.' It is therefore meditation only which all those texts enjoin. In agreement with this a later Sûtra also says, 'Repetition more than once, on account of instruction' (Ve. Sû. IV, I, I). That the knowledge intended to be enjoined as the means of final release is of the nature of meditation, we conclude from the circumstance that the terms 'knowing' and 'meditating' are seen to be used in place of each other in the earlier and later parts of Vedic texts. Compare the following passages: 'Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman,' and 'he who knows this shines and warms through his celebrity, fame, and glory of countenance' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 1; 6). And 'He does not know him, for he is not complete,' and 'Let men meditate on him as the Self (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7). And 'He who knows what he knows,' and 'Teach me the deity on which you meditate' (Ch. Up. IV, 1, 6; 2, 2).

20217
20218 'Meditation' means steady remembrance, i.e. a continuity of steady
20219 remembrance, uninterrupted like the flow of oil; in agreement with the
20220 scriptural passage which declares steady remembrance to be the means of
20221 release, 'on the attainment of remembrance all the ties are loosened'
20222 (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2). Such remembrance is of the same character (form)
20223 as seeing (intuition); for the passage quoted has the same purport as
20224 the following one, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are
20225 solved, and all the works of that man perish when he has been seen who
20226 is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). And this being so, we conclude that
20227 the passage 'the Self is to be seen' teaches that 'Meditation' has the
20228 character of 'seeing' or 'intuition.' And that remembrance has the
20229 character of 'seeing' is due to the element of imagination
20230 (representation) which prevails in it. All this has been set forth at
20231 length by the Vâkyakâra. 'Knowledge (vedana) means meditation (upâsana),
20232 scripture using the word in that sense'; i.e. in all Upanishads that
20233 knowledge which is enjoined as the means of final release is Meditation.
20234 The Vâkyakâra then propounds a pûrvapaksha (primâ facie view), 'Once he
20235 is to make the meditation, the matter enjoined by scripture being
20236 accomplished thereby, as in the case of the prayâjas and the like'; and
20237 then sums up against this in the words 'but (meditation) is established
20238 on account of the term meditation'; that means--knowledge repeated more
20239 than once (i.e. meditation) is determined to be the means of Release.--
20240 The Vâkyakâra then goes on 'Meditation is steady remembrance, on the
20241 ground of observation and statement.' That means--this knowledge, of the
20242 form of meditation, and repeated more than once, is of the nature of
20243 steady remembrance.

20244
20245 Such remembrance has been declared to be of the character of 'seeing,'
20246 and this character of seeing consists in its possessing the character of
20247 immediate presentation (pratyakshatâ). With reference to remembrance,
20248 which thus acquires the character of immediate presentation and is the
20249 means of final release, scripture makes a further determination, viz. in
20250 the passage Ka. Up. I, 2, 23, 'That Self cannot be gained by the study
20251 of the Veda ("reflection"), nor by thought ("meditation"), nor by much
20252 hearing. Whom the Self chooses, by him it may be gained; to him the Self
20253 reveals its being.' This text says at first that mere hearing,
20254 reflection, and meditation do not suffice to gain the Self, and then
20255 declares, 'Whom the Self chooses, by him it may be gained.' Now a
20256 'chosen' one means a most beloved person; the relation being that he by
20257 whom that Self is held most dear is most dear to the Self. That the Lord
20258 (bhagavân) himself endeavours that this most beloved person should gain
20259 the Self, he himself declares in the following words, 'To those who are
20260 constantly devoted and worship with love I give that knowledge by which
20261 they reach me' (Bha. Gî. X, 10), and 'To him who has knowledge I am dear
20262 above all things, and he is dear to me' (VII, 17). Hence, he who
20263 possesses remembrance, marked by the character of immediate presentation
20264 (sâkshâtkâra), and which itself is dear above all things since the
20265 object remembered is such; he, we say, is chosen by the highest Self,
20266 and by him the highest Self is gained. Steady remembrance of this kind
20267 is designated by the word 'devotion' (bhakti); for this term has the
20268 same meaning as upâsanâ (meditation). For this reason scripture and
20269 smriti agree in making the following declarations, 'A man knowing him
20270 passes over death' (Svet. Up. III, 8); 'Knowing him thus he here becomes
20271 immortal' (Taitt. Âr. III, 12,7); 'Neither by the Vedas, nor by
20272 austerities, nor by gifts, nor by sacrifice can I be so seen as thou
20273 hast seen me. But by devotion exclusive I may in this form be known and
20274 seen in truth, O Arjuna, and also be entered into' (Bha. Gî. XI, 53, 54);
20275 'That highest Person, O Pârtha, may be obtained by exclusive devotion'
20276 (VIII, 22).

20277
20278 That of such steady remembrance sacrifices and so on are means will be
20279 declared later on (Ve. Sû. III, 4, 26). Although sacrifices and the like
20280 are enjoined with a view to the origination of knowledge (in accordance
20281 with the passage 'They desire to know,' Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22), it is only
20282 knowledge in the form of meditation which--being daily practised,
20283 constantly improved by repetition, and continued up to death--is the
20284 means of reaching Brahman, and hence all the works connected with the
20285 different conditions of life are to be performed throughout life only

20286 for the purpose of originating such knowledge. This the Sûtrakâra
20287 declares in Ve. Sû. IV, 1, 12; 16; III, 4, 33, and other places. The
20288 Vâkyakâra also declares that steady remembrance results only from
20289 abstention, and so on; his words being 'This (viz. steady remembrance =
20290 meditation) is obtained through abstention (viveka), freeness of mind
20291 (vimoka), repetition (abhyâsa), works (kriyâ), virtuous conduct
20292 (kalyâna), freedom from dejection (anavasâda), absence of exultation
20293 (anuddharsha); according to feasibility and scriptural statement.' The
20294 Vâkyakâra also gives definitions of all these terms. Abstention (viveka)
20295 means keeping the body clean from all food, impure either owing to
20296 species (such as the flesh of certain animals), or abode (such as food
20297 belonging to a Kândâla or the like), or accidental cause (such as food
20298 into which a hair or the like has fallen). The scriptural passage
20299 authorising this point is Ch. Up. VII, 26, 'The food being pure, the
20300 mind becomes pure; the mind being pure, there results steady remembrance.'
20301 Freeness of mind (vimoka) means absence of attachment to desires. The
20302 authoritative passage here is 'Let him meditate with a calm mind' (Ch.
20303 Up. III, 14, 1). Repetition means continued practice. For this point the
20304 Bhâshya-kâra quotes an authoritative text from Smriti, viz.: 'Having
20305 constantly been absorbed in the thought of that being' (sadâ
20306 tadbhâvabhâvitah; Bha. Gî. VIII, 6).--By 'works' (kriyâ) is understood
20307 the performance, according to one's ability, of the five great
20308 sacrifices. The authoritative passages here are 'This person who
20309 performs works is the best of those who know Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 1,
20310 4); and 'Him Brâhmanas seek to know by recitation of the Veda, by
20311 sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22).--By
20312 virtuous conduct (kalyânâni) are meant truthfulness, honesty, kindness,
20313 liberality, gentleness, absence of covetousness. Confirmatory texts are
20314 'By truth he is to be obtained' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 5) and 'to them belongs
20315 that pure Brahman-world' (Pr. Up. I, 16).--That lowness of spirit or
20316 want of cheerfulness which results from unfavourable conditions of place
20317 or time and the remembrance of causes of sorrow, is denoted by the term
20318 'dejection'; the contrary of this is 'freedom from dejection.' The
20319 relevant scriptural passage is 'This Self cannot be obtained by one
20320 lacking in strength' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 4).--'Exultation' is that
20321 satisfaction of mind which springs from circumstances opposite to those
20322 just mentioned; the contrary is 'absence of exultation.' Overgreat
20323 satisfaction also stands in the way (of meditation). The scriptural
20324 passage for this is 'Calm, subdued,' &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23).--What the
20325 Vâkyakâra means to say is therefore that knowledge is realised only
20326 through the performance of the duly prescribed works, on the part of a
20327 person fulfilling all the enumerated conditions.

20328
20329 Analogously another scriptural passage says 'He who knows both knowledge
20330 and non-knowledge together, overcoming death by non-knowledge reaches
20331 the Immortal through knowledge' (Îs. Up. II). Here the term
20332 'non-knowledge' denotes the works enjoined on the different castes and
20333 âsramas; and the meaning of the text is that, having discarded by such
20334 works death, i.e. the previous works antagonistic to the origination of
20335 knowledge, a man reaches the Immortal, i.e. Brahman, through knowledge.
20336 The non-knowledge of which this passage speaks as being the means of
20337 overcoming death can only mean that which is other than knowledge, viz.
20338 prescribed works. The word has the same sense in the following passage:
20339 'Firm in traditional knowledge he offered many sacrifices, leaning on
20340 the knowledge of Brahman, so as to pass beyond death by non-knowledge'
20341 (Vi. Pu. VI, 6, 12).--Antagonistic to knowledge (as said above) are all
20342 good and evil actions, and hence--as equally giving rise to an
20343 undesirable result--they may both be designated as evil. They stand in
20344 the way of the origination of knowledge in so far as they strengthen the
20345 elements of passion and darkness which are antagonistic to the element
20346 of goodness which is the cause of the rise of knowledge. That evil works
20347 stand in the way of such origination, the following scriptural text
20348 declares: 'He makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do
20349 an evil deed' (Ka. Up. III, 8). That passion and darkness veil the
20350 knowledge of truth while goodness on the other hand gives rise to it,
20351 the Divine one has declared himself, in the passage 'From goodness
20352 springs knowledge' (Bha. Gî. XIV, 17). Hence, in order that knowledge
20353 may arise, evil works have to be got rid of, and this is effected by the
20354 performance of acts of religious duty not aiming at some immediate

20355 result (such as the heavenly world and the like); according to the text
20356 'by works of religious duty he discards all evil.' Knowledge which is
20357 the means of reaching Brahman, thus requires the works prescribed for
20358 the different âsramas; and hence the systematic enquiry into works (i.
20359 e. the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ)--from which we ascertain the nature of the works
20360 required and also the transitoriness and limitation of the fruits of
20361 mere works--forms a necessary antecedent to the systematic enquiry into
20362 Brahman. Moreover the discrimination of permanent and non-permanent
20363 things, &c. (i.e. the tetrad of 'means' mentioned above, p. 11) cannot
20364 be accomplished without the study of the Mîmâmsâ; for unless we
20365 ascertain all the distinctions of fruits of works, means, modes of
20366 procedure and qualification (on the part of the agent) we can hardly
20367 understand the true nature of works, their fruits, the transitoriness or
20368 non-transitoriness of the latter, the permanence of the Self, and
20369 similar matters. That those conditions (viz. nityânityavastuviveka,
20370 sama, dama, &c.) are 'means' must be determined on the basis of viniyoga
20371 ('application' which determines the relation of principal and
20372 subordinate matters--angin and anga); and this viniyoga which depends on
20373 direct scriptural statement (sruti), inferential signs (linga), and so
20374 on, is treated of in the third book of the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ-sûtras. And
20375 further we must, in this connexion, consider also the meditations on the
20376 Udgîtha and similar things--which, although aiming at the success of
20377 works, are of the nature of reflections on Brahman (which is viewed in
20378 them under various forms)--and as such have reference to knowledge of
20379 Brahman. Those works also (with which these meditations are connected)
20380 aim at no special results of their own, and produce and help to perfect
20381 the knowledge of Brahman: they are therefore particularly connected with
20382 the enquiry into Brahman. And that these meditations presuppose an
20383 understanding of the nature of works is admitted by every one.

20384
20385
20386
20387
20388 THE GREAT PÛRVAPAKSHA.

20389
20390 THE ONLY REALITY IS BRAHMAN.

20391
20392 Brahman, which is pure intelligence and opposed to all difference,
20393 constitutes the only reality; and everything else, i.e. the plurality of
20394 manifold knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, and acts of knowledge
20395 depending on those two, is only imagined on (or 'in') that Brahman, and
20396 is essentially false.

20397
20398 'In the beginning, my dear, there was that only which is, one only
20399 without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'The higher knowledge is that by
20400 which the Indestructible is apprehended' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5); 'That which
20401 cannot be seen nor seized, which has no eyes nor ears, no hands nor feet,
20402 the permanent, the all-pervading, the most subtle, the imperishable
20403 which the wise regard as the source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 6);
20404 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'He
20405 who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without
20406 taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19); 'By whom it is not thought, by him it is
20407 thought; he by whom it is thought knows it not. It is not known by those
20408 who know it, known by those who do not know it' (Ke. Up. II, 3); 'Thou
20409 mayest not see the seer of sight; thou mayest not think the thinker of
20410 thought' (Bri. Up. III, 4, 2); 'Bliss is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6, 1);
20411 'All this is that Self' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 7); 'There is here no diversity
20412 whatever' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'From death to death goes he who sees
20413 any difference here' (Ka. Up. II, 4, 10); 'For where there is duality as
20414 it were, there one sees the other'; 'but where the Self has become all
20415 of him, by what means, and whom, should he see? by what means, and whom,
20416 should he know?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'the effect is a name merely
20417 which has its origin in speech; the truth is that (the thing made of
20418 clay) is clay merely' (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4); 'for if he makes but the
20419 smallest distinction in it there is fear for him' (Taitt. Up. II, 7);--
20420 the two following Vedânta-sûtras: III, 2, 11; III, 2, 3--the following
20421 passages from the Vishnu-purâna: 'In which all difference vanishes,
20422 which is pure Being, which is not the object of words, which is known by
20423 the Self only--that knowledge is called Brahman' (VI, 7, 53); 'Him whose

20424 essential nature is knowledge, who is stainless in reality'; 'Him who,
20425 owing to erroneous view, abides in the form of things' (I, 2, 6); 'the
20426 Reality thou art alone, there is no other, O Lord of the world!--
20427 whatever matter is seen belongs to thee whose being is knowledge; but
20428 owing to their erroneous opinion the non-devout look on it as the form
20429 of the world. This whole world has knowledge for its essential nature,
20430 but the Unwise viewing it as being of the nature of material things are
20431 driven round on the ocean of delusion. Those however who possess true
20432 knowledge and pure minds see this whole world as having knowledge for
20433 its Self, as thy form, O highest Lord!' (Vi. Pu. I, 4, 38 ff.)--'Of
20434 that Self, although it exists in one's own and in other bodies, the
20435 knowledge is of one kind, and that is Reality; those who maintain
20436 duality hold a false view' (II, 14, 31); 'If there is some other one,
20437 different from me, then it can be said, "I am this and that one is
20438 another"' (II, 13, 86); 'As owing to the difference of the holes of the
20439 flute the air equally passing through them all is called by the names of
20440 the different notes of the musical scale; so it is with the universal
20441 Self' (II, 14, 32); 'He is I; he is thou; he is all: this Universe is
20442 his form. Abandon the error of difference. The king being thus
20443 instructed, abandoned the view of difference, having gained an intuition
20444 of Reality' (II, 16, 24). 'When that view which gives rise to difference
20445 is absolutely destroyed, who then will make the untrue distinction
20446 between the individual Self and Brahman?' (VI, 7, 94).--The following
20447 passages from the Bhagavad-Gîtâ: 'I am the Self dwelling within all
20448 beings' (X, 20); 'Know me to be the soul within all bodies' (XIII, 2);
20449 'Being there is none, movable or immovable, which is without me' (X, 39).--
20450 All these and other texts, the purport of which clearly is instruction
20451 as to the essential nature of things, declare that Brahman only, i.e.
20452 non-differenced pure intelligence is real, while everything else is
20453 false.

20454
20455 The appearance of plurality is due to avidyâ.
20456

20457 'Falsehood' (mithyâtva) belongs to what admits of being terminated by
20458 the cognition of the real thing--such cognition being preceded by
20459 conscious activity (not by mere absence of consciousness or knowledge).
20460 The snake, e.g. which has for its substrate a rope or the like is false;
20461 for it is due to an imperfection (dosha) that the snake is imagined in
20462 (or 'on') the rope. In the same way this entire world, with its
20463 distinctions of gods, men, animals, inanimate matter, and so on, is,
20464 owing to an imperfection, wrongly imagined in the highest Brahman whose
20465 substance is mere intelligence, and therefore is false in so far as it
20466 may be sublated by the cognition of the nature of the real Brahman. What
20467 constitutes that imperfection is beginningless Nescience (avidyâ), which,
20468 hiding the truth of things, gives rise to manifold illusions, and cannot
20469 be defined either as something that is or as something that is not.--'By
20470 the Untrue they are hidden; of them which are true the Untrue is the
20471 covering' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 1); 'Know Mâyâ to be Prakriti, and the great
20472 Lord him who is associated with Mâyâ' (Svet. Up. IV, 10); 'Indra appears
20473 manifold through the Mâyâs' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19); 'My Mâyâ is hard to
20474 overcome' (Bha. Gî. VII, 14); 'When the soul slumbering in beginningless
20475 Mâyâ awakes' (Gau. Kâ. I, 16).--These and similar texts teach that it is
20476 through beginningless Mâyâ that to Brahman which truly is pure
20477 non-differenced intelligence its own nature hides itself, and that it
20478 sees diversity within itself. As has been said, 'Because the Holy One is
20479 essentially of the nature of intelligence, the form of all, but not
20480 material; therefore know that all particular things like rocks, oceans,
20481 hills and so on, have proceeded from intelligence [FOOTNOTE 22:1] But
20482 when, on the cessation of all work, everything is only pure intelligence
20483 in its own proper form, without any imperfections; then no differences--
20484 the fruit of the tree of wishes--any longer exist between things.
20485 Therefore nothing whatever, at any place or any time, exists apart from
20486 intelligence: intelligence, which is one only, is viewed as manifold by
20487 those whose minds are distracted by the effects of their own works.
20488 Intelligence pure, free from stain, free from grief, free from all
20489 contact with desire and other affections, everlastingly one is the
20490 highest Lord--Vâsudeva apart from whom nothing exists. I have thus
20491 declared to you the lasting truth of things--that intelligence only is
20492 true and everything else untrue. And that also which is the cause of

20493 ordinary worldly existence has been declared to you' (Vi. Pu. II, 12,
20494 39, 40, 43-45).

20495
20496 Avidyā is put an end to by true Knowledge.

20497
20498 Other texts declare that this Nescience comes to an end through the
20499 cognition of the essential unity of the Self with Brahman which is
20500 nothing but non-differenced intelligence. 'He does not again go to death;'
20501 'He sees this as one;' 'He who sees this does not see death' (Ch. Up.
20502 VI, 27); 'When he finds freedom from fear and rest in that which is
20503 invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he has obtained the
20504 fearless' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all
20505 doubts are solved and all his works perish when he has been beheld who
20506 is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8); 'He knows Brahman, he becomes
20507 Brahman only' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9); 'Knowing him only a man passes over
20508 death; there is no other path to go' (Svet. Up. III, 8). In these and
20509 similar passages, the term 'death' denotes Nescience; analogously to the
20510 use of the term in the following words of Sanatsujāta, 'Delusion I call
20511 death; and freedom from delusion I call immortality' (Sanatsuj. II, 5).
20512 The knowledge again of the essential unity and non-difference of Brahman--
20513 which is ascertained from decisive texts such as 'The True, knowledge,
20514 the Infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'Knowledge, bliss is
20515 Brahman' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 28)--is confirmed by other passages, such as
20516 'Now if a man meditates on another deity, thinking the deity is one and
20517 he another, he does not know' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10); 'Let men meditate
20518 upon him as the Self (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7); 'Thou art that' (Ch. Up. VI, 8,
20519 7); 'Am I thou, O holy deity? and art thou me, O holy deity?'; 'What I
20520 am that is he; what he is that am I.'--This the Sūtrakāra himself will
20521 declare 'But as the Self (scriptural texts) acknowledge and make us
20522 apprehend (the Lord)' (Ve. Sū. IV, 1, 3). Thus the Vākyakāra also, 'It
20523 is the Self--thus one should apprehend (everything), for everything is
20524 effected by that.' And to hold that by such cognition of the oneness of
20525 Brahman essentially false bondage, together with its cause, comes to an
20526 end, is only reasonable.

20527
20528 Scripture is of greater force than Perception

20529
20530 But, an objection is raised--how can knowledge, springing from the
20531 sacred texts, bring about a cessation of the view of difference, in
20532 manifest opposition to the evidence of Perception?--How then, we rejoin,
20533 can the knowledge that this thing is a rope and not a snake bring about,
20534 in opposition to actual perception, the cessation of the (idea of the)
20535 snake?--You will perhaps reply that in this latter case there is a
20536 conflict between two forms of perception, while in the case under
20537 discussion the conflict is between direct perception and Scripture which
20538 is based on perception. But against this we would ask the question how,
20539 in the case of a conflict between two equal cognitions, we decide as to
20540 which of the two is refuted (sublated) by the other. If--as is to be
20541 expected--you reply that what makes the difference between the two is
20542 that one of them is due to a defective cause while the other is not: we
20543 point out that this distinction holds good also in the case of Scripture
20544 and perception being in conflict. It is not considerations as to the
20545 equality of conflicting cognitions, as to their being dependent or
20546 independent, and so on, that determine which of the two sublates the
20547 other; if that were the case, the perception which presents to us the
20548 flame of the lamp as one only would not be sublated by the cognition
20549 arrived at by inference that there is a succession of different flames.
20550 Wherever there is a conflict between cognitions based on two different
20551 means of knowledge we assign the position of the 'sublated one' to that
20552 which admits of being accounted for in some other way; while that
20553 cognition which affords no opening for being held unauthoritative and
20554 cannot be accounted for in another way, is the 'sublating one' [FOOTNOTE
20555 25:1]. This is the principle on which the relation between 'what
20556 sublates' and 'what is sublated' is decided everywhere. Now apprehension
20557 of Brahman--which is mere intelligence, eternal, pure, free,
20558 self-luminous--is effected by Scripture which rests on endless unbroken
20559 tradition, cannot therefore be suspected of any, even the least,
20560 imperfection, and hence cannot be non-authoritative; the state of
20561 bondage, on the other hand, with its manifold distinctions is proved by

20562 Perception, Inference, and so on, which are capable of imperfections and
20563 therefore may be non-authoritative. It is therefore reasonable to
20564 conclude that the state of bondage is put an end to by the apprehension
20565 of Brahman. And that imperfection of which Perception--through which we
20566 apprehend a world of manifold distinctions--may be assumed to be
20567 capable, is so-called Nescience, which consists in the beginningless
20568 wrong imagination of difference.--Well then--a further objection is
20569 raised--let us admit that Scripture is perfect because resting on an
20570 endless unbroken tradition; but must we then not admit that texts
20571 evidently presupposing the view of duality, as e.g. 'Let him who desires
20572 the heavenly world offer the Jyotishtoma-sacrifice'--are liable to
20573 refutation?--True, we reply. As in the case of the Udgâtri and
20574 Pratihatri breaking the chain (not at the same time, but) in
20575 succession [FOOTNOTE 26:1], so here also the earlier texts (which refer
20576 to duality and transitory rewards) are sublated by the later texts which
20577 teach final release, and are not themselves sublated by anything else.

20578
20579 The texts which represent Brahman as devoid of qualities have greater
20580 force

20581
20582 The same reasoning applies to those passages in the Vedânta-texts which
20583 inculcate meditation on the qualified Brahman, since the highest Brahman
20584 is without any qualities.--But consider such passages as 'He who
20585 cognises all, who knows all' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'His high power is
20586 revealed as manifold, as essential, acting as force and knowledge' (Svet.
20587 Up. VI, 8); 'He whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true' (Ch. Up.
20588 VIII, 1, 5); how can these passages, which clearly aim at defining the
20589 nature of Brahman, be liable to refutation?--Owing to the greater weight,
20590 we reply, of those texts which set forth Brahman as devoid of qualities.
20591 'It is not coarse, not fine, not short, not long' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8);
20592 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'That
20593 which is free from qualities,' 'that which is free from stain'--these
20594 and similar texts convey the notion of Brahman being changeless, eternal
20595 intelligence devoid of all difference; while the other texts--quoted
20596 before--teach the qualified Brahman. And there being a conflict between
20597 the two sets of passages, we--according to the Mîmâmsâ principle
20598 referred to above--decide that the texts referring to Brahman as devoid
20599 of qualities are of greater force, because they are later in order
20600 [FOOTNOTE 27:1] than those which speak of Brahman as having qualities.
20601 Thus everything is settled. The text Taitt. Up. II, 1 refers to Brahman
20602 as devoid of qualities.

20603
20604 But--an objection is raised--even the passage 'The True, knowledge,
20605 infinite is Brahman' intimates certain qualities of Brahman, viz. true
20606 being, knowledge, infinity!--Not so, we reply. From the circumstance
20607 that all the terms of the sentence stand in co-ordination, it follows
20608 that they convey the idea of one matter (sense) only. If against this
20609 you urge that the sentence may convey the idea of one matter only, even
20610 if directly expressing a thing distinguished by several qualities; we
20611 must remark that you display an ignorance of the meaning of language
20612 which appears to point to some weakmindedness on your part. A sentence
20613 conveys the idea of one matter (sense) only when all its constitutive
20614 words denote one and the same thing; if, on the other hand, it expresses
20615 a thing possessing several attributes, the difference of these
20616 attributes necessarily leads to a difference in meaning on the part of
20617 the individual words, and then the oneness of meaning of the sentence is
20618 lost.--But from your view of the passage it would follow that the
20619 several words are mere synonyms!--Give us your attention, we reply, and
20620 learn that several words may convey one meaning without being idle
20621 synonyms. From the determination of the unity of purport of the whole
20622 sentence [FOOTNOTE 27:2] we conclude that the several words, applied to
20623 one thing, aim at expressing what is opposite in nature to whatever is
20624 contrary to the meanings of the several words, and that thus they have
20625 meaning and unity of meaning and yet are not mere synonyms. The details
20626 are as follows. Brahman is to be defined as what is contrary in nature
20627 to all other things. Now whatever is opposed to Brahman is virtually set
20628 aside by the three words (constituting the definition of Brahman in the
20629 Taittiriya-text). The word 'true' (or 'truly being') has the purport of
20630 distinguishing Brahman from whatever things have no truth, as being the

20631 abodes of change; the word 'knowledge' distinguishes Brahman from all
20632 non-sentient things whose light depends on something else (which are not
20633 self-luminous); and the word 'infinite' distinguishes it from whatever
20634 is limited in time or space or nature. Nor is this 'distinction' some
20635 positive or negative attribute of Brahman, it rather is just Brahman
20636 itself as opposed to everything else; just as the distinction of white
20637 colour from black and other colours is just the true nature of white,
20638 not an attribute of it. The three words constituting the text thus have
20639 a meaning, have one meaning, and are non-synonymous, in so far as they
20640 convey the essential distinction of one thing, viz. Brahman from
20641 everything else. The text thus declares the one Brahman which is
20642 self-luminous and free from all difference. On this interpretation of
20643 the text we discern its oneness in purport with other texts, such as
20644 'Being only this was in the beginning, one only, without a second.'
20645 Texts such as 'That from whence these beings are born' (Taitt. Up. III,
20646 1); 'Being only this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'Self
20647 alone was this in the beginning' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 1), &c., describe
20648 Brahman as the cause of the world; and of this Brahman the Taittiriya
20649 passage 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' gives the strict
20650 definition.

20651
20652 In agreement with the principle that all sâkhâs teach the same doctrine
20653 we have to understand that, in all the texts which speak of Brahman as
20654 cause, Brahman must be taken as being 'without a second', i.e. without
20655 any other being of the same or a different kind; and the text which aims
20656 at defining Brahman has then to be interpreted in accordance with this
20657 characteristic of Brahman, viz. its being without a second. The
20658 statement of the Chândogya as to Brahman being without a second must
20659 also be taken to imply that Brahman is non-dual as far as qualities are
20660 concerned; otherwise it would conflict with those passages which speak
20661 of Brahman as being without qualities and without stain. We therefore
20662 conclude that the defining Taittiriya-text teaches Brahman to be an
20663 absolutely homogeneous substance.

20664
20665 But, the above explanation of the passage being accepted, it follows
20666 that the words 'true being,' 'knowledge,' &c., have to be viewed as
20667 abandoning their direct sense, and merely suggesting a thing distinct in
20668 nature from all that is opposite (to what the three words directly
20669 denote), and this means that we resort to so-called implication (implied
20670 meaning, lakshanâ)!--What objection is there to such a proceeding? we
20671 reply. The force of the general purport of a sentence is greater than
20672 that of the direct denotative power of the simple terms, and it is
20673 generally admitted that the purport of grammatical co-ordination is
20674 oneness (of the matter denoted by the terms co-ordinated).--But we never
20675 observe that all words of a sentence are to be understood in an implied
20676 sense!--Is it then not observed, we reply, that one word is to be
20677 taken in its implied meaning if otherwise it would contradict the
20678 purport of the whole sentence? And if the purport of the sentence, which
20679 is nothing but an aggregate of words employed together, has once been
20680 ascertained, why should we not take two or three or all words in an
20681 implied sense--just as we had taken one--and thus make them fit in with
20682 the general purport? In agreement herewith those scholars who explain to
20683 us the sense of imperative sentences, teach that in imperative sentences
20684 belonging to ordinary speech all words have an implied meaning only (not
20685 their directly denotative meaning). For, they maintain, imperative forms
20686 have their primary meaning only in (Vedic) sentences which enjoin
20687 something not established by other means; and hence in ordinary speech
20688 the effect of the action is conveyed by implication only. The other
20689 words also, which form part of those imperative sentences and denote
20690 matters connected with the action, have their primary meaning only if
20691 connected with an action not established by other means; while if
20692 connected with an ordinary action they have a secondary, implied,
20693 meaning only [FOOTNOTE 30:1]. Perception reveals to us non-differenced
20694 substance only

20695
20696 We have so far shown that in the case of a conflict between Scripture
20697 and Perception and the other instruments of knowledge, Scripture is of
20698 greater force. The fact, however, is that no such conflict is observed
20699 to exist, since Perception itself gives rise to the apprehension of a

20700 non-differenced Brahman whose nature is pure Being.--But how can it be
20701 said that Perception, which has for its object things of various kinds--
20702 and accordingly expresses itself in judgments such as 'Here is a jar,'
20703 'There is a piece of cloth'--causes the apprehension of mere Being? If
20704 there were no apprehension of difference, all cognitions would have one
20705 and the same object, and therefore would give rise to one judgment only--
20706 as takes place when one unbroken perceptual cognition is continued for
20707 some time.--True. We therefore have to enquire in what way, in the
20708 judgment 'here is a jar,' an assertion is made about being as well as
20709 some special form of being. These implied judgments cannot both be
20710 founded on perception, for they are the results of acts of cognition
20711 occupying different moments of time, while the perceptual cognition
20712 takes place in one moment (is instantaneous). We therefore must decide
20713 whether it is the essential nature of the jar, or its difference from
20714 other things, that is the object of perception. And we must adopt the
20715 former alternative, because the apprehension of difference presupposes
20716 the apprehension of the essential nature of the thing, and, in addition,
20717 the remembrance of its counterentities (i.e. the things from which the
20718 given thing differs). Hence difference is not apprehended by Perception;
20719 and all judgments and propositions relative to difference are founded on
20720 error only.

20721
20722 Difference--bheda--does not admit of logical definition
20723

20724 The Logicians, moreover, are unable to give a definition of such a thing
20725 as 'difference.' Difference cannot in the first place be the essential
20726 nature (of that which differs); for from that it would follow that on
20727 the apprehension of the essential nature of a thing there would at once
20728 arise not only the judgment as to that essential nature but also
20729 judgments as to its difference from everything else.--But, it may be
20730 objected to this, even when the essential nature of a thing is
20731 apprehended, the judgment 'this thing is different from other things'
20732 depends on the remembrance of its counterentities, and as long as this
20733 remembrance does not take place so long the judgment of difference is
20734 not formed!--Such reasoning, we reply, is inadmissible. He who maintains
20735 that 'difference' is nothing but 'essential nature' has no right to
20736 assume a dependence on counterentities since, according to him,
20737 essential nature and difference are the same, i.e. nothing but essential
20738 nature: the judgment of difference can, on his view, depend on
20739 counterentities no more than the judgment of essential nature does. His
20740 view really implies that the two words 'the jar' and 'different' (in the
20741 judgment 'the jar is different') are synonymous, just as the words
20742 'hasta' and 'kara' are (both of which mean 'hand').
20743

20744 Nor, in the second place, can 'difference' be held to be an attribute
20745 (dharma). For if it were that, we should have to assume that
20746 'difference' possesses difference (i.e. is different) from essential
20747 nature; for otherwise it would be the same as the latter. And this
20748 latter difference would have to be viewed as an attribute of the first
20749 difference, and this would lead us on to a third difference, and so in
20750 infinitum. And the view of 'difference' being an attribute would further
20751 imply that difference is apprehended on the apprehension of a thing
20752 distinguished by attributes such as generic character and so on, and at
20753 the same time that the thing thus distinguished is apprehended on the
20754 apprehension of difference; and this would constitute a logical seesaw.--
20755 'Difference' thus showing itself incapable of logical definition, we are
20756 confirmed in our view that perception reveals mere 'Being' only.
20757

20758 Moreover, it appears that in states of consciousness such as 'Here is a
20759 jar,' 'There is a piece of cloth,' 'The jar is perceived,' 'The piece of
20760 cloth is perceived,' that which constitutes the things is Being
20761 (existence; sattâ) and perception (or 'consciousness'; anubhûti). And we
20762 observe that it is pure Being only which persists in all states of
20763 cognition: this pure Being alone, therefore, is real. The differences,
20764 on the other hand, which do not persist, are unreal. The case is
20765 analogous to that of the snake-rope. The rope which persists as a
20766 substrate is real, while the non-continuous things (which by wrong
20767 imagination are superimposed on the rope) such as a snake, a cleft in
20768 the ground, a watercourse, and so on, are unreal.

20769
20770 But--our adversary objects--the instance is not truly analogous. In the
20771 case of the snake-rope the non-reality of the snake results from the
20772 snake's being sublated (bâdhita) by the cognition of the true nature of
20773 the substrate 'This is a rope, not a snake'; it does not result from the
20774 non-continuousness of the snake. In the same way the reality of the rope
20775 does not follow from its persistence, but from the fact of its being not
20776 sublated (by another cognition). But what, we ask, establishes the
20777 non-reality of jars and pieces of cloth?--All are agreed, we reply, that
20778 we observe, in jars and similar things, individual difference
20779 (vyâvritti, literally 'separation,' 'distinction'). The point to decide
20780 is of what nature such difference is. Does it not mean that the judgment
20781 'This is a jar' implies the negation of pieces of cloth and other
20782 things? But this means that by this judgment pieces of cloth and other
20783 things are sublated (bâdhita). Individual difference (vyâvritti) thus
20784 means the cessation (or absence), due to sublation, of certain objects
20785 of cognition, and it proves the non-reality of whatever has
20786 non-continuous existence; while on the other hand, pure Being, like the
20787 rope, persists non-sublated. Hence everything that is additional to pure
20788 Being is non-real.--This admits of being expressed in technical form.
20789 'Being' is real because it persists, as proved by the case of the rope
20790 in the snake-rope; jars and similar things are non-real because they are
20791 non-continuous, as proved by the case of the snake that has the rope for
20792 its substrate.

20793
20794 From all this it follows that persisting consciousness only has real
20795 being; it alone is.

20796
20797 Being and consciousness are one. Consciousness is svayamprakâsa.

20798
20799 But, our adversary objects, as mere Being is the object of consciousness,
20800 it is different therefrom (and thus there exists after all 'difference'
20801 or 'plurality').--Not so, we reply. That there is no such thing as
20802 'difference,' we have already shown above on the grounds that it is not
20803 the object of perception, and moreover incapable of definition. It
20804 cannot therefore be proved that 'Being' is the object of consciousness.
20805 Hence Consciousness itself is 'Being'--that which is.--This
20806 consciousness is self-proved, just because it is consciousness. Were it
20807 proved through something else, it would follow that like jars and
20808 similar things it is not consciousness. Nor can there be assumed, for
20809 consciousness, the need of another act of consciousness (through which
20810 its knowledge would be established); for it shines forth (prakâsate)
20811 through its own being. While it exists, consciousness--differing therein
20812 from jars and the like--is never observed not to shine forth, and it
20813 cannot therefore be held to depend, in its shining forth, on something
20814 else.--You (who object to the above reasoning) perhaps hold the
20815 following view:--even when consciousness has arisen, it is the object
20816 only which shines forth--a fact expressed in sentences such as: the jar
20817 is perceived. When a person forms the judgment 'This is a jar,' he is
20818 not at the time conscious of a consciousness which is not an object and
20819 is not of a definite character. Hence the existence of consciousness is
20820 the reason which brings about the 'shining forth' of jars and other
20821 objects, and thus has a similar office as the approximation of the
20822 object to the eye or the other organs of sense (which is another
20823 condition of perceptive consciousness). After this the existence of
20824 consciousness is inferred on the ground that the shining forth of the
20825 object is (not permanent, but) occasional only [FOOTNOTE 34:1]. And
20826 should this argumentation be objected to on the ground of its implying
20827 that consciousness--which is essentially of the nature of intelligence--
20828 is something non-intelligent like material things, we ask you to define
20829 this negation of non-intelligence (which you declare to be
20830 characteristic of unconsciousness). Have we, perhaps, to understand by it
20831 the invariable concomitance of existence and shining forth? If so, we
20832 point out that this invariable concomitance is also found in the case of
20833 pleasure and similar affections; for when pleasure and so on exist at
20834 all, they never are non-perceived (i.e. they exist in so far only as we
20835 are conscious of them). It is thus clear that we have no consciousness
20836 of consciousness itself--just as the tip of a finger, although touching
20837 other things, is incapable of touching itself.

20838
20839 All this reasoning, we reply, is entirely spun out of your own fancy,
20840 without any due consideration of the power of consciousness. The fact is,
20841 that in perceiving colour and other qualities of things, we are not
20842 aware of a 'shining forth' as an attribute of those things, and as
20843 something different from consciousness; nor can the assumption of an
20844 attribute of things called 'light,' or 'shining forth,' be proved in any
20845 way, since the entire empirical world itself can be proved only through
20846 consciousness, the existence of which we both admit. Consciousness,
20847 therefore, is not something which is inferred or proved through some
20848 other act of knowledge; but while proving everything else it is proved
20849 by itself. This may be expressed in technical form as follows--
20850 Consciousness is, with regard to its attributes and to the empirical
20851 judgments concerning it, independent of any other thing, because through
20852 its connexion with other things it is the cause of their attributes and
20853 the empirical judgments concerning them. For it is a general principle
20854 that of two things that which through its connexion with the other is
20855 the cause of the attributes of--and the empirical judgments about--the
20856 latter, is itself independent of that other as to those two points. We
20857 see e.g. that colour, through its conjunction with earth and the like,
20858 produces in them the quality of visibility, but does not itself depend
20859 for its visibility on conjunction with colour. Hence consciousness is
20860 itself the cause of its own 'shining forth,' as well as of the
20861 empirically observed shining forth of objects such as jars and the like.
20862
20863 Consciousness is eternal and incapable of change.
20864
20865 This self-luminous consciousness, further, is eternal, for it is not
20866 capable of any form of non-existence--whether so-called antecedent
20867 non-existence or any other form. This follows from its being
20868 self-established. For the antecedent non-existence of self-established
20869 consciousness cannot be apprehended either through consciousness or
20870 anything else. If consciousness itself gave rise to the apprehension of
20871 its own non-existence, it could not do so in so far as 'being,' for that
20872 would contradict its being; if it is, i.e. if its non-existence is not,
20873 how can it give rise to the idea of its non-existence? Nor can it do so
20874 if not being; for if consciousness itself is not, how can it furnish a
20875 proof for its own non-existence? Nor can the non-existence of
20876 consciousness be apprehended through anything else; for consciousness
20877 cannot be the object of anything else. Any instrument of knowledge
20878 proving the non-existence of consciousness, could do so only by making
20879 consciousness its object--'this is consciousness'; but consciousness, as
20880 being self-established, does not admit of that objectivation which is
20881 implied in the word 'this,' and hence its previous non-existence cannot
20882 be proved by anything lying outside itself.
20883
20884 As consciousness thus does not admit of antecedent non-existence, it
20885 further cannot be held to originate, and hence also all those other
20886 states of being which depend on origination cannot be predicated of it.
20887
20888 As consciousness is beginningless, it further does not admit of any
20889 plurality within itself; for we observe in this case the presence of
20890 something which is contrary to what invariably accompanies plurality
20891 (this something being 'beginninglessness' which is contrary to the
20892 quality of having a beginning--which quality invariably accompanies
20893 plurality). For we never observe a thing characterised by plurality to
20894 be without a beginning.--And moreover difference, origination, &c., are
20895 objects of consciousness, like colour and other qualities, and hence
20896 cannot be attributes of consciousness. Therefore, consciousness being
20897 essentially consciousness only, nothing else that is an object of
20898 consciousness can be its attribute. The conclusion is that consciousness
20899 is free from difference of any kind.
20900
20901 The apparent difference between Consciousness and the conscious subject
20902 is due to the unreal ahamkāra.
20903
20904 From this it further follows that there is no substrate of
20905 consciousness--different from consciousness itself--such as people
20906 ordinarily mean when speaking of a 'knower.' It is self-luminous

consciousness itself which constitutes the so-called 'knower.' This follows therefrom also that consciousness is not non-intelligent (jada); for non-intelligence invariably accompanies absence of Selfhood (anâtmatva); hence, non-intelligence being absent in consciousness, consciousness is not non-Self, that means, it is the Self.

But, our adversary again objects, the consciousness which expresses itself in the judgment 'I know,' proves that the quality of being a 'knower' belongs to consciousness!--By no means, we reply. The attribution to consciousness of this quality rests on error, no less than the attribution, to the shell, of the quality of being silver. Consciousness cannot stand in the relation of an agent toward itself: the attribute of being a knowing agent is erroneously imputed to it--an error analogous to that expressed in the judgment 'I am a man,' which identifies the Self of a person with the outward aggregate of matter that bears the external characteristics of humanity. To be a 'knower' means to be the agent in the action of knowing; and this is something essentially changeful and non-intelligent (jada), having its abode in the ahamkâra, which is itself a thing subject to change. How, on the other hand, could such agency possibly belong to the changeless 'witness' (of all change, i.e. consciousness) whose nature is pure Being? That agency cannot be an attribute of the Self follows therefrom also that, like colour and other qualities, agency depends, for its own proof, on seeing, i.e. consciousness.

That the Self does not fall within the sphere (is not an object of), the idea of 'I' is proved thereby also that in deep sleep, swoon, and similar states, the idea of the 'I' is absent, while the consciousness of the Self persists. Moreover, if the Self were admitted to be an agent and an object of the idea of 'I,' it would be difficult to avoid the conclusion that like the body it is non-intelligent, something merely outward ('being for others only, not for itself') and destitute of Selfhood. That from the body, which is the object of the idea of 'I,' and known to be an agent, there is different that Self which enjoys the results of the body's actions, viz. the heavenly word, and so on, is acknowledged by all who admit the validity of the instruments of knowledge; analogously, therefore, we must admit that different from the knower whom we understand by the term 'I,' is the 'witnessing' inward Self. The non-intelligent ahamkâra thus merely serves to manifest the nature of non-changing consciousness, and it effects this by being its abode; for it is the proper quality of manifesting agents to manifest the objects manifested, in so far as the latter abide in them. A mirror, e.g., or a sheet of water, or a certain mass of matter, manifests a face or the disc of the moon (reflected in the mirror or water) or the generic character of a cow (impressed on the mass of matter) in so far as all those things abide in them.--In this way, then, there arises the erroneous view that finds expression in the judgment 'I know.'--Nor must you, in the way of objection, raise the question how self-luminous consciousness is to be manifested by the non-intelligent ahamkâra, which rather is itself manifested by consciousness; for we observe that the surface of the hand, which itself is manifested by the rays of sunlight falling on it, at the same time manifests those rays. This is clearly seen in the case of rays passing through the interstices of network; the light of those rays is intensified by the hand on which they fall, and which at the same time is itself manifested by the rays.

It thus appears that the 'knowing agent,' who is denoted by the 'I,' in the judgment 'I know,' constitutes no real attribute of the Self, the nature of which is pure intelligence. This is also the reason why the consciousness of Egoity does not persist in the states of deep sleep and final release: in those states this special form of consciousness passes away, and the Self appears in its true nature, i.e. as pure consciousness. Hence a person who has risen from deep, dreamless sleep reflects, 'Just now I was unconscious of myself.'

Summing up of the pûrvapaksha view.

As the outcome of all this, we sum up our view as follows.--Eternal, absolutely non-changing consciousness, whose nature is pure

20976 non-differenced intelligence, free from all distinction whatever, owing
20977 to error illusorily manifests itself (vivarttate) as broken up into
20978 manifold distinctions--knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, acts of
20979 knowledge. And the purpose for which we enter on the consideration of
20980 the Vedânta-texts is utterly to destroy what is the root of that error,
20981 i.e. Nescience, and thus to obtain a firm knowledge of the oneness of
20982 Brahman, whose nature is mere intelligence--free, pure, eternal.

20983
20984 [FOOTNOTE 22:1. In agreement with the use made of this passage by the
20985 Pûrvapakshin, vijñâna must here be understood in the sense of avidyâ.
20986 Vijñânasabdena vividham jñâyate-neneti karanavyutpattyâ-vidyâ-bhidhiyate.
20987 Sru. Pra.]

20988
20989 [FOOTNOTE 25:1. The distinction is illustrated by the different views
20990 Perception and Inference cause us to take of the nature of the flame of
20991 the lamp. To Perception the flame, as long as it burns, seems one and
20992 the same: but on the ground of the observation that the different
20993 particles of the wick and the oil are consumed in succession, we infer
20994 that there are many distinct flames succeeding one another. And we
20995 accept the Inference as valid, and as sublatting or refuting the
20996 immediate perception, because the perceived oneness of the flame admits
20997 of being accounted for 'otherwise,' viz. on the ground of the many
20998 distinct flames originating in such rapid succession that the eye
20999 mistakes them for one. The inference on the other hand does not admit of
21000 being explained in another way.]

21001
21002 [FOOTNOTE 26:1. The reference is to the point discussed Pû. Mî. Sû. VI,
21003 5, 54 (Jaim. Nyâ. Mâlâ Vistara, p. 285).]

21004
21005 [FOOTNOTE 27:1. The texts which deny all qualities of Brahman are later
21006 in order than the texts which refer to Brahman as qualified, because
21007 denial presupposes that which is to be denied.]

21008
21009 [FOOTNOTE 27:2. The unity of purport of the sentence is inferred from
21010 its constituent words having the same case-ending.]

21011
21012 [FOOTNOTE 30:1. The theory here referred to is held by some of the
21013 Mîmâmsakas. The imperative forms of the verb have their primary meaning,
21014 i.e. the power of originating action, only in Vedic sentences which
21015 enjoin the performance of certain actions for the bringing about of
21016 certain ends: no other means of knowledge but the Veda informing us that
21017 such ends can be accomplished by such actions. Nobody, e.g. would offer
21018 a soma sacrifice in order to obtain the heavenly world, were he not told
21019 by the Veda to do so. In ordinary life, on the other hand, no imperative
21020 possesses this entirely unique originative force, since any action which
21021 may be performed in consequence of a command may be prompted by other
21022 motives as well: it is, in technical Indian language, established
21023 already, apart from the command, by other means of knowledge. The man
21024 who, e.g. is told to milk a cow might have proceeded to do so, apart
21025 from the command, for reasons of his own. Imperatives in ordinary speech
21026 are therefore held not to have their primary meaning, and this
21027 conclusion is extended, somewhat unwarrantably one should say, to all
21028 the words entering into an imperative clause.]

21029
21030 [FOOTNOTE 34:1. Being not permanent but occasional, it is an effect only,
21031 and as such must have a cause.]

21032
21033
21034
21035
21036 THE GREAT SIDDHÂNTA.

21037
21038 This entire theory rests on a fictitious foundation of altogether hollow
21039 and vicious arguments, incapable of being stated in definite logical
21040 alternatives, and devised by men who are destitute of those particular
21041 qualities which cause individuals to be chosen by the Supreme Person
21042 revealed in the Upanishads; whose intellects are darkened by the
21043 impression of beginningless evil; and who thus have no insight into the
21044 nature of words and sentences, into the real purport conveyed by them,

and into the procedure of sound argumentation, with all its methods depending on perception and the other instruments of right knowledge. The theory therefore must needs be rejected by all those who, through texts, perception and the other means of knowledge--assisted by sound reasoning--have an insight into the true nature of things.

There is no proof of non-differenced substance.

To enter into details.--Those who maintain the doctrine of a substance devoid of all difference have no right to assert that this or that is a proof of such a substance; for all means of right knowledge have for their object things affected with difference.--Should any one taking his stand on the received views of his sect, assert that the theory of a substance free from all difference (does not require any further means of proof but) is immediately established by one's own consciousness; we reply that he also is refuted by the fact, warranted by the witness of the Self, that all consciousness implies difference: all states of consciousness have for their object something that is marked by some difference, as appears in the case of judgments like 'I saw this.' And should a state of consciousness--although directly apprehended as implying difference--be determined by some fallacious reasoning to be devoid of difference, this determination could be effected only by means of some special attributes additional to the quality of mere Being; and owing to these special qualities on which the determination depends, that state of consciousness would clearly again be characterised by difference. The meaning of the mentioned determination could thus only be that of a thing affected with certain differences some other differences are denied; but manifestly this would not prove the existence of a thing free from all difference. To thought there at any rate belongs the quality of being thought and self-illuminatedness, for the knowing principle is observed to have for its essential nature the illumining (making to shine forth) of objects. And that also in the states of deep sleep, swoon, &c., consciousness is affected with difference we shall prove, in its proper place, in greater detail. Moreover you yourself admit that to consciousness there actually belong different attributes such as permanency (oneness, self-luminousness, &c.), and of these it cannot be shown that they are only Being in general. And even if the latter point were admitted, we observe that there takes place a discussion of different views, and you yourself attempt to prove your theory by means of the differences between those views and your own. It therefore must be admitted that reality is affected with difference well established by valid means of proof.

Sabda proves difference.

As to sound (speech; sabda) it is specially apparent that it possesses the power of denoting only such things as are affected with difference. Speech operates with words and sentences. Now a word (pada) originates from the combination of a radical element and a suffix, and as these two elements have different meanings it necessarily follows that the word itself can convey only a sense affected with difference. And further, the plurality of words is based on plurality of meanings; the sentence therefore which is an aggregate of words expresses some special combination of things (meanings of words), and hence has no power to denote a thing devoid of all difference.--The conclusion is that sound cannot be a means of knowledge for a thing devoid of all difference.

Pratyaksha--even of the nirvikalpaka kind--proves difference.

Perception in the next place--with its two subdivisions of

21114 non-determinate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka)
21115 perception--also cannot be a means of knowledge for things devoid of
21116 difference. Determinate perception clearly has for its object things
21117 affected with difference; for it relates to that which is distinguished
21118 by generic difference and so on. But also non-determinate perception has
21119 for its object only what is marked with difference; for it is on the
21120 basis of non-determinate perception that the object distinguished by
21121 generic character and so on is recognised in the act of determinate
21122 perception. Non-determinate perception is the apprehension of the object
21123 in so far as destitute of some differences but not of all difference.
21124 Apprehension of the latter kind is in the first place not observed ever
21125 to take place, and is in the second place impossible: for all
21126 apprehension by consciousness takes place by means of some distinction
21127 'This is such and such.' Nothing can be apprehended apart from some
21128 special feature of make or structure, as e.g. the triangularly shaped
21129 dewlap in the case of cows. The true distinction between non-determinate
21130 and determinate perception is that the former is the apprehension of the
21131 first individual among a number of things belonging to the same class,
21132 while the latter is the apprehension of the second, third, and so on,
21133 individuals. On the apprehension of the first individual cow the
21134 perceiving person is not conscious of the fact that the special shape
21135 which constitutes the generic character of the class 'cows' extends to
21136 the present individual also; while this special consciousness arises in
21137 the case of the perception of the second and third cow. The perception
21138 of the second individual thus is 'determinate' in so far as it is
21139 determined by a special attribute, viz. the extension, to the
21140 perception, of the generic character of a class--manifested in a certain
21141 outward shape--which connects this act of perception with the earlier
21142 perception (of the first individual); such determination being
21143 ascertained only on the apprehension of the second individual. Such
21144 extension or continuance of a certain generic character is, on the other
21145 hand, not apprehended on the apprehension of the first individual, and
21146 perception of the latter kind thence is 'non-determinate.' That it is
21147 such is not due to non-apprehension of structure, colour, generic
21148 character and so on, for all these attributes are equally objects of
21149 sensuous perception (and hence perceived as belonging to the first
21150 individual also). Moreover that which possesses structure cannot be
21151 perceived apart from the structure, and hence in the case of the
21152 apprehension of the first individual there is already perception of
21153 structure, giving rise to the judgment 'The thing is such and such.' In
21154 the case of the second, third, &c., individuals, on the other hand, we
21155 apprehend, in addition to the thing possessing structure and to the
21156 structure itself, the special attribute of the persistence of the
21157 generic character, and hence the perception is 'determinate.' From all
21158 this it follows that perception never has for its object that which is
21159 devoid of all difference.

21160
21161
21162
21163
21164 The bhedâbheda view is untenable.

21165
21166 The same arguments tend to refute the view that there is difference and
21167 absence of difference at the same time (the so-called bhedâbheda view).
21168 Take the judgment 'This is such and such'; how can we realise here the
21169 non-difference of 'being this' and 'being such and such'? The 'such and
21170 such' denotes a peculiar make characterised, e.g. by a dewlap, the
21171 'this' denotes the thing distinguished by that peculiar make; the
21172 non-difference of these two is thus contradicted by immediate
21173 consciousness. At the outset the thing perceived is perceived as
21174 separate from all other things, and this separation is founded on the
21175 fact that the thing is distinguished by a special constitution, let us
21176 say the generic characteristics of a cow, expressed by the term 'such
21177 and such.' In general, wherever we cognise the relation of
21178 distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished thereby, the two
21179 clearly present themselves to our mind as absolutely different.
21180 Somethings--e.g. staffs and bracelets--appear sometimes as having a
21181 separate, independent existence of their own; at other times they
21182 present themselves as distinguishing attributes of other things or

21183 beings (i.e. of the persons carrying staffs or wearing bracelets). Other
21184 entities--e.g. the generic character of cows--have a being only in so
21185 far as they constitute the form of substances, and thus always present
21186 themselves as distinguishing attributes of those substances. In both
21187 cases there is the same relation of distinguishing attribute and thing
21188 distinguished thereby, and these two are apprehended as absolutely
21189 different. The difference between the two classes of entities is only
21190 that staffs, bracelets, and similar things are capable of being
21191 apprehended in separation from other things, while the generic
21192 characteristics of a species are absolutely incapable thereof. The
21193 assertion, therefore, that the difference of things is refuted by
21194 immediate consciousness, is based on the plain denial of a certain form
21195 of consciousness, the one namely--admitted by every one--which is
21196 expressed in the judgment 'This thing is such and such.'--This same
21197 point is clearly expounded by the Sûtrakâra in II, 2, 33.

21198
21199
21200
21201
21202 Inference also teaches difference.

21203
21204 Perception thus having for its object only what is marked by difference,
21205 inference also is in the same case; for its object is only what is
21206 distinguished by connexion with things known through perception and
21207 other means of knowledge. And thus, even in the case of disagreement as
21208 to the number of the different instruments of knowledge, a thing devoid
21209 of difference could not be established by any of them since the
21210 instruments of knowledge acknowledged by all have only one and the same
21211 object, viz. what is marked by difference. And a person who maintains
21212 the existence of a thing devoid of difference on the ground of
21213 differences affecting that very thing simply contradicts himself without
21214 knowing what he does; he is in fact no better than a man who asserts
21215 that his own mother never had any children.

21216
21217
21218
21219
21220 Perception does not reveal mere being.

21221
21222 In reply to the assertion that perception causes the apprehension of
21223 pure Being only, and therefore cannot have difference for its object;
21224 and that 'difference' cannot be defined because it does not admit of
21225 being set forth in definite alternatives; we point out that these
21226 charges are completely refuted by the fact that the only objects of
21227 perception are things distinguished by generic character and so on, and
21228 that generic character and so on--as being relative things--give at once
21229 rise to the judgment as to the distinction between themselves and the
21230 things in which they inhere. You yourself admit that in the case of
21231 knowledge and in that of colour and other qualities this relation holds
21232 good, viz. that something which gives rise to a judgment about another
21233 thing at the same time gives rise to a judgment about itself; the same
21234 may therefore be admitted with regard to difference [FOOTNOTE 44:1].

21235
21236 For this reason the charge of a regressus in infinitum and a logical
21237 seesaw (see above, p. 32) cannot be upheld. For even if perceptive
21238 cognition takes place within one moment, we apprehend within that moment
21239 the generic character which constitutes on the one hand the difference
21240 of the thing from others, and on the other hand the peculiar character
21241 of the thing itself; and thus there remains nothing to be apprehended in
21242 a second moment.

21243
21244 Moreover, if perception made us apprehend only pure Being judgments
21245 clearly referring to different objects--such as 'Here is a jar,' 'There
21246 is a piece of cloth'--would be devoid of all meaning. And if through
21247 perception we did not apprehend difference--as marked by generic
21248 character, &c., constituting the structure or make of a thing, why
21249 should a man searching for a horse not be satisfied with finding a
21250 buffalo? And if mere Being only were the object of all our cognitions,
21251 why should we not remember, in the case of each particular cognition,

21252 all the words which are connected with all our cognitions? And further,
21253 if the cognition of a horse and that of an elephant had one object only,
21254 the later cognition would cause us to apprehend only what was
21255 apprehended before, and there being thus no difference (of object of
21256 cognition) there would be nothing to distinguish the later state of
21257 cognition from remembrance. If on the other hand a difference is
21258 admitted for each state of consciousness, we admit thereby that
21259 perception has for its objects things affected with difference.
21260
21261 If all acts of cognition had one and the same object only, everything
21262 would be apprehended by one act of cognition; and from this it would
21263 follow that there are no persons either deaf or blind!
21264
21265 Nor does, as a matter of fact, the eye apprehend mere Being only; for
21266 what it does apprehend is colour and the coloured thing, and those other
21267 qualities (viz. extension, &c.), which inhere in the thing together with
21268 colour. Nor does feeling do so; for it has for its objects things
21269 palpable. Nor have the ear and the other senses mere Being for their
21270 object; but they relate to what is distinguished by a special sound or
21271 taste or smell. Hence there is not any source of knowledge causing us to
21272 apprehend mere Being. If moreover the senses had for their object mere
21273 Being free from all difference, it would follow that Scripture which has
21274 the same object would (not be originative of knowledge but) perform the
21275 function of a mere anuvâda, i.e. it would merely make statements about
21276 something, the knowledge of which is already established by some other
21277 means. And further, according to your own doctrine, mere Being, i.e.
21278 Brahman, would hold the position of an object with regard to the
21279 instruments of knowledge; and thus there would cling to it all the
21280 imperfections indicated by yourself--non-intelligent nature,
21281 perishableness and so on.--From all this we conclude that perception has
21282 for its object only what is distinguished by difference manifesting
21283 itself in generic character and so on, which constitute the make or
21284 structure of a thing. (That the generic character of a thing is nothing
21285 else but its particular structure follows) from the fact that we do not
21286 perceive anything, different from structure, which could be claimed as
21287 constituting the object of the cognition that several individuals
21288 possess one and the same general form. And as our theory sufficiently
21289 accounts for the ordinary notions as to generic character, and as
21290 moreover even those who hold generic character to be something different
21291 from structure admit that there is such a thing as (common) structure,
21292 we adhere to the conclusion that generic character is nothing but
21293 structure. By 'structure' we understand special or distinctive form; and
21294 we acknowledge different forms of that kind according to the different
21295 classes of things. And as the current judgments as to things being
21296 different from one another can be explained on the basis of the
21297 apprehension of generic character, and as no additional entity is
21298 observed to exist, and as even those who maintain the existence of such
21299 an additional thing admit the existence of generic character, we further
21300 conclude that difference (bheda) is nothing but generic character (jâti).--
21301 But if this were so, the judgment as to difference would immediately
21302 follow from the judgment as to generic character, as soon as the latter
21303 is apprehended! Quite true, we reply. As a matter of fact the judgment
21304 of difference is immediately formulated on the basis of the judgment as
21305 to generic character. For 'the generic character' of a cow, e.g., means
21306 just the exclusion of everything else: as soon as that character is
21307 apprehended all thought and speech referring to other creatures
21308 belonging to the same wider genus (which includes buffaloes and so on
21309 also) come to an end. It is through the apprehension of difference only
21310 that the idea of non-difference comes to an end.
21311

21312 [FOOTNOTE 44:1. Colour reveals itself as well as the thing that has
21313 colour; knowledge reveals itself as well as the object known; so
21314 difference manifests itself as well as the things that differ.]
21315
21316
21317
21318

21319 Plurality is not unreal.
21320

21321 Next as to the assertion that all difference presented in our
21322 cognition--as of jars, pieces of cloth and the like--is unreal because
21323 such difference does not persist. This view, we maintain, is altogether
21324 erroneous, springs in fact from the neglect of distinguishing between
21325 persistence and non-persistence on the one hand, and the relation
21326 between what sublates and what is sublated on the other hand. Where two
21327 cognitions are mutually contradictory, there the latter relation holds
21328 good, and there is non-persistence of what is sublated. But jars, pieces
21329 of cloth and the like, do not contradict one another, since they are
21330 separate in place and time. If on the other hand the non-existence of a
21331 thing is cognised at the same time and the same place where and when its
21332 existence is cognised, we have a mutual contradiction of two cognitions,
21333 and then the stronger one sublates the other cognition which thus comes
21334 to an end. But when of a thing that is perceived in connexion with some
21335 place and time, the non-existence is perceived in connexion with some
21336 other place and time, there arises no contradiction; how then should the
21337 one cognition sublate the other? or how can it be said that of a thing
21338 absent at one time and place there is absence at other times and places
21339 also? In the case of the snake-rope, there arises a cognition of
21340 non-existence in connexion with the given place and time; hence there is
21341 contradiction, one judgment sublates the other and the sublated
21342 cognition comes to an end. But the circumstance of something which is
21343 seen at one time and in one place not persisting at another time and in
21344 another place is not observed to be invariably accompanied by falsehood,
21345 and hence mere non-persistence of this kind does not constitute a reason
21346 for unreality. To say, on the other hand, that what is is real because
21347 it persists, is to prove what is proved already, and requires no further
21348 proof.

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21352
21353 Being and consciousness are not one.

21354
21355 Hence mere Being does not alone constitute reality. And as the
21356 distinction between consciousness and its objects--which rests just on
21357 this relation of object and that for which the object is--is proved by
21358 perception, the assertion that only consciousness has real existence is
21359 also disposed of.

21360
21361
21362
21363
21364 The true meaning of Svayamprakâsatva.

21365
21366 We next take up the point as to the self-luminousness of consciousness
21367 (above, p. 33). The contention that consciousness is not an object holds
21368 good for the knowing Self at the time when it illumines (i.e.
21369 constitutes as its objects) other things; but there is no absolute rule
21370 as to all consciousness never being anything but self-luminous. For
21371 common observation shows that the consciousness of one person may become
21372 the object of the cognition of another, viz. of an inference founded on
21373 the person's friendly or unfriendly appearance and the like, and again
21374 that a person's own past states of consciousness become the object of
21375 his own cognition--as appears from judgments such as 'At one time I knew.'
21376 It cannot therefore be said 'If it is consciousness it is self-proved'
21377 (above p. 33), nor that consciousness if becoming an object of
21378 consciousness would no longer be consciousness; for from this it would
21379 follow that one's own past states, and the conscious states of others--
21380 because being objects of consciousness--are not themselves consciousness.
21381 Moreover, unless it were admitted that there is inferential knowledge of
21382 the thoughts of others, there would be no apprehension of the connexion
21383 of words and meaning, and this would imply the absolute termination of
21384 all human intercourse depending on speech. Nor also would it be possible
21385 for pupils to attach themselves to a teacher of sacred lore, for the
21386 reason that they had become aware of his wisdom and learning. The
21387 general proposition that consciousness does not admit of being an object
21388 is in fact quite untenable. The essential 'nature of consciousness or
21389 knowledge--consists therein that it shines forth, or manifests itself,

21390 through its own being to its own substrate at the present moment; or (to
21391 give another definition) that it is instrumental in proving its own
21392 object by its own being [FOOTNOTE 48:1].
21393

21394 Now these two characteristics are established by a person's own state of
21395 consciousness and do not vanish when that consciousness becomes the
21396 object of another state of consciousness; consciousness remains also in
21397 the latter case what it is. Jars and similar things, on the other hand,
21398 do not possess consciousness, not because they are objects of
21399 consciousness but because they lack the two characteristics stated
21400 above. If we made the presence of consciousness dependent on the absence
21401 of its being an object of consciousness, we should arrive at the
21402 conclusion that consciousness is not consciousness; for there are
21403 things--e.g. sky-flowers--which are not objects of consciousness and at
21404 the same time are not consciousness. You will perhaps reply to this that
21405 a sky-flower's not being consciousness is due not to its not being an
21406 object of consciousness, but to its non-existence!--Well then, we
21407 rejoin, let us say analogously that the reason of jars and the like not
21408 being contradictory to Nescience (i.e. of their being jada), is their
21409 not being of the nature of consciousness, and let us not have recourse
21410 to their being objects of consciousness!--But if consciousness is an
21411 object of consciousness, we conclude that it also is non-contradictory
21412 of Nescience, like a jar!--At this conclusion, we rejoin, you may arrive
21413 even on the opposite assumption, reasoning as follows: 'Consciousness is
21414 non-contradictory of Nescience, because it is not an object of
21415 consciousness, like a sky-flower! All which shows that to maintain as a
21416 general principle that something which is an object of consciousness
21417 cannot itself be consciousness is simply ridiculous.'
21418

21419 [FOOTNOTE 48:1. The comment of the Sru. Pra. on the above definitions
21420 runs, with a few additional explanations, as follows: The term
21421 'anubhūti' here denotes knowledge in general, not only such knowledge as
21422 is not remembrance (which limited meaning the term has sometimes). With
21423 reference to the 'shining forth' it might be said that in this way jars
21424 also and similar things know or are conscious because they also shine
21425 forth' (viz. in so far as they are known); to exclude jars and the like
21426 the text therefore adds 'to its own substrate' (the jar 'shines forth,'
21427 not to itself, but to the knowing person). There are other attributes
21428 of the Self, such as atomic extension, eternity, and so on, which are
21429 revealed (not through themselves) but through an act of knowledge
21430 different from them; to exclude those the text adds 'through its own
21431 being.' In order to exclude past states of consciousness or acts of
21432 knowledge, the text adds 'at the present moment.' A past state of
21433 consciousness is indeed not revealed without another act of knowledge
21434 (representing it), and would thus by itself be excluded; but the text
21435 adds this specification (viz. 'at the present moment') on purpose, in
21436 order to intimate that a past state of consciousness can be represented
21437 by another state--a point denied by the opponent. 'At the present
21438 moment' means 'the connexion with the object of knowledge belonging to
21439 the present time.' Without the addition of 'to its own substrate' the
21440 definition might imply that a state of consciousness is manifest to
21441 another person also; to exclude this the clause is added. This first
21442 definition might be objected to as acceptable only to those who maintain
21443 the svayamprakāsatva-theory (which need not be discussed here); hence a
21444 second definition is given. The two clauses 'to its own substrate' and
21445 'at the present moment' have to be supplied in this second definition
21446 also. 'Instrumental in bringing about' would apply to staffs, wheels,
21447 and such like implements also; hence the text adds 'its own object.'
21448 (Staffs, wheels, &c. have no 'objects.') Knowledge depending on sight
21449 does not bring about an object depending on hearing; to exclude this
21450 notion of universal instrumentality the text specifies the object by the
21451 words 'its own.' The clause 'through its own being' excludes the sense
21452 organs, which reveal objects not by their own being, but in so far as
21453 they give rise to knowledge. The two clauses 'at the present moment' and
21454 'to its own substrate' have the same office in the second definition as
21455 in the first.]
21456
21457
21458

21459
21460 Consciousness is not eternal.
21461

21462 It was further maintained by the pûrvapakshin that as consciousness is
21463 self-established it has no antecedent non-existence and so on, and that
21464 this disproves its having an origin. But this is an attempt to prove
21465 something not proved by something else that is equally unproved;
21466 comparable to a man blind from birth undertaking to guide another blind
21467 man! You have no right to maintain the non-existence of the antecedent
21468 non-existence of consciousness on the ground that there is nothing to
21469 make us apprehend that non-existence; for there is something to make us
21470 apprehend it, viz. consciousness itself!--But how can consciousness at
21471 the time when it is, make us apprehend its own previous non-existence
21472 which is contradictorily opposed to it?--Consciousness, we rejoin, does
21473 not necessarily constitute as its objects only what occupies the same
21474 time with itself; were it so it would follow that neither the past nor
21475 the future can be the object of consciousness. Or do you mean that there
21476 is an absolute rule that the Antecedent non-existence of consciousness,
21477 if proved, must be contemporaneous with consciousness? Have you then, we
21478 ask, ever observed this so as to be able to assert an absolute rule? And
21479 if it were observed, that would prove the existence of previous
21480 non-existence, not its negation!--The fact, however, is that no person
21481 in his senses will maintain the contemporaneous existence of
21482 consciousness and its own antecedent non-existence. In the case of
21483 perceptive knowledge originating from sensation, there is indeed this
21484 limitation, that it causes the apprehension of such things only as are
21485 actually present at the same time. But this limitation does not extend
21486 to cognitions of all kinds, nor to all instruments of knowledge; for we
21487 observe that remembrance, inference, and the magical perception of Yogis
21488 apprehend such things also as are not present at the time of
21489 apprehension. On this very point there rests the relation connecting the
21490 means of knowledge with their objects, viz. that the former are not
21491 without the latter. This does not mean that the instrument of knowledge
21492 is connected with its object in that way that it is not without
21493 something that is present at the time of cognition; but rather that the
21494 instrument of knowledge is opposed to the falsehood of that special form
21495 in which the object presents itself as connected with some place and
21496 time.--This disposes also of the contention that remembrance has no
21497 external object; for it is observed that remembrance is related to such
21498 things also as have perished.--Possibly you will now argue as follows.
21499 The antecedent non-existence of consciousness cannot be ascertained by
21500 perception, for it is not something present at the time of perception.
21501 It further cannot be ascertained by the other means of knowledge, since
21502 there is no characteristic mark (linga) on which an inference could be
21503 based: for we do not observe any characteristic mark invariably
21504 accompanied by the antecedent non-existence of consciousness. Nor do we
21505 meet with any scriptural text referring to this antecedent
21506 non-existence. Hence, in the absence of any valid instrument of
21507 knowledge, the antecedent non-existence of consciousness cannot be
21508 established at all.--If, we reply, you thus, altogether setting aside
21509 the force of self-provedness (on which you had relied hitherto), take
21510 your stand on the absence of valid means of knowledge, we again must
21511 request you to give in; for there is a valid means of knowledge whereby
21512 to prove the antecedent non-existence of consciousness, viz. valid
21513 non-perception (anupalabdhi).

21514
21515 Moreover, we observe that perceptive knowledge proves its object, be
21516 it a jar or something else, to exist only as long as it exists itself,
21517 not at all times; we do not, through it, apprehend the antecedent or
21518 subsequent existence of the jar. Now this absence of apprehension is due
21519 to the fact that consciousness itself is limited in time. If that
21520 consciousness which has a jar for its object were itself apprehended as
21521 non-limited in time, the object also--the jar--would be apprehended
21522 under the same form, i.e. it would be eternal. And if self-established
21523 consciousness were eternal, it would be immediately cognised as eternal;
21524 but this is not the case. Analogously, if inferential consciousness and
21525 other forms of consciousness were apprehended as non-limited in time,
21526 they would all of them reveal their objects also as non-limited, and
21527 these objects would thus be eternal; for the objects are conform in

21528 nature to their respective forms of consciousness.

21529

21530

21531

21532

21533 There is no consciousness without object.

21534

21535 Nor is there any consciousness devoid of objects; for nothing of this
21536 kind is ever known. Moreover, the self-luminousness of consciousness has,
21537 by our opponent himself, been proved on the ground that its essential
21538 nature consists in illumining (revealing) objects; the self-luminousness
21539 of consciousness not admitting of proof apart from its essential nature
21540 which consists in the lighting up of objects. And as moreover, according
21541 to our opponent, consciousness cannot be the object of another
21542 consciousness, it would follow that (having neither an object nor itself
21543 being an object) it is something altogether unreal, imaginary.

21544

21545 Nor are you justified in maintaining that in deep sleep, swoon,
21546 senselessness and similar states, pure consciousness, devoid of any
21547 object, manifests itself. This view is negatived by 'valid
21548 non-perception' (see above, p. 52). If consciousness were present in
21549 those states also, there would be remembrance of it at the time of
21550 waking from sleep or recovery from swoon; but as a matter of fact there
21551 is no such remembrance.--But it is not an absolute rule that something
21552 of which we were conscious must be remembered; how then can the absence
21553 of remembrance prove the absence of previous consciousness?--Unless, we
21554 reply, there be some cause of overpowering strength which quite
21555 obliterates all impressions--as e.g. the dissolution of the body--the
21556 absence of remembrance does necessarily prove the absence of previous
21557 consciousness. And, moreover, in the present case the absence of
21558 consciousness does not only follow from absence of remembrance; it is
21559 also proved by the thought presenting itself to the person risen from
21560 sleep, 'For so long a time I was not conscious of anything.'--Nor may it
21561 be said that even if there was consciousness, absence of remembrance
21562 would necessarily follow from the absence (during deep sleep) of the
21563 distinction of objects, and from the extinction of the consciousness of
21564 the 'I'; for the non-consciousness of some one thing, and the absence of
21565 some one thing cannot be the cause of the non-remembrance of some other
21566 thing, of which there had been consciousness. And that in the states in
21567 question the consciousness of the 'I' does persist, will moreover be
21568 shown further on.

21569

21570 But, our opponent urges, have you not said yourself that even in deep
21571 sleep and similar states there is consciousness marked by difference?--
21572 True, we have said so. But that consciousness is consciousness of the
21573 Self, and that this is affected by difference will be proved further on.
21574 At present we are only interested in denying the existence of your pure
21575 consciousness, devoid of all objects and without a substrate. Nor can we
21576 admit that your pure consciousness could constitute what we call the
21577 consciousness of the Self; for we shall prove that the latter has a
21578 substrate.

21579

21580 It thus cannot be maintained that the antecedent non-existence of
21581 consciousness does not admit of being proved, because consciousness
21582 itself does not prove it. And as we have shown that consciousness itself
21583 may be an object of consciousness, we have thereby disproved the alleged
21584 impossibility of antecedent non-existence being proved by other means.
21585 Herewith falls the assertion that the non-origination of consciousness
21586 can be proved.

21587

21588

21589

21590

21591 Consciousness is capable of change.

21592

21593 Against the assertion that the alleged non-origination of consciousness
21594 at the same time proves that consciousness is not capable of any other
21595 changes (p. 36), we remark that the general proposition on which this
21596 conclusion rests is too wide: it would extend to antecedent

21597 non-existence itself, of which it is evident that it comes to an end,
21598 although it does not originate. In qualifying the changes as changes of
21599 'Being,' you manifest great logical acumen indeed! For according to your
21600 own view Nescience also (which is not 'Being') does not originate, is
21601 the substrate of manifold changes, and comes to an end through the rise
21602 of knowledge! Perhaps you will say that the changes of Nescience are all
21603 unreal. But, do you then, we ask in reply, admit that any change is
21604 real? You do not; and yet it is only this admission which would give a
21605 sense to the distinction expressed by the word 'Being' [FOOTNOTE 54:1].
21606

21607 Nor is it true that consciousness does not admit of any division within
21608 itself, because it has no beginning (p. 36). For the non-originated Self
21609 is divided from the body, the senses, &c., and Nescience also, which is
21610 avowedly without a beginning, must needs be admitted to be divided from
21611 the Self. And if you say that the latter division is unreal, we ask
21612 whether you have ever observed a real division invariably connected with
21613 origination! Moreover, if the distinction of Nescience from the Self is
21614 not real, it follows that Nescience and the Self are essentially one.
21615 You further have yourself proved the difference of views by means of the
21616 difference of the objects of knowledge as established by non-refuted
21617 knowledge; an analogous case being furnished by the difference of acts
21618 of cleaving, which results from the difference of objects to be cleft.
21619 And if you assert that of this knowing--which is essentially knowing
21620 only--nothing that is an object of knowledge can be an attribute, and
21621 that these objects--just because they are objects of knowledge--cannot
21622 be attributes of knowing; we point out that both these remarks would
21623 apply also to eternity, self-luminousness, and the other attributes of
21624 'knowing', which are acknowledged by yourself, and established by valid
21625 means of proof. Nor may you urge against this that all these alleged
21626 attributes are in reality mere 'consciousness' or 'knowing'; for they
21627 are essentially distinct. By 'being conscious' or 'knowing', we
21628 understand the illumining or manifesting of some object to its own
21629 substrate (i.e. the substrate of knowledge), by its own existence (i.e.
21630 the existence of knowledge) merely; by self-luminousness (or
21631 'self-illuminedness') we understand the shining forth or being
21632 manifest by its own existence merely to its own substrate; the terms
21633 'shining forth', 'illumining', 'being manifest' in both these
21634 definitions meaning the capability of becoming an object of thought and
21635 speech which is common to all things, whether intelligent or
21636 non-intelligent. Eternity again means 'being present in all time';
21637 oneness means 'being defined by the number one'. Even if you say that
21638 these attributes are only negative ones, i.e. equal to the absence of
21639 non-intelligence and so on, you still cannot avoid the admission that
21640 they are attributes of consciousness. If, on the other hand, being of a
21641 nature opposite to non-intelligence and so on, be not admitted as
21642 attributes of consciousness--whether of a positive or a negative
21643 kind--in addition to its essential nature; it is an altogether unmeaning
21644 proceeding to deny to it such qualities, as non-intelligence and the
21645 like.
21646

21647 We moreover must admit the following alternative: consciousness is
21648 either proved (established) or not. If it is proved it follows that it
21649 possesses attributes; if it is not, it is something absolutely nugatory,
21650 like a sky-flower, and similar purely imaginary things.
21651

21652 [FOOTNOTE 54:1. The Sâṅkara is not entitled to refer to a distinction of
21653 real and unreal division, because according to his theory all
21654 distinction is unreal.]
21655

21658
21659 Consciousness is the attribute of a permanent Conscious self.
21660

21661 Let it then be said that consciousness is proof (siddhi) itself. Proof
21662 of what, we ask in reply, and to whom? If no definite answer can be
21663 given to these two questions, consciousness cannot be defined as
21664 'proof'; for 'proof' is a relative notion, like 'son.' You will perhaps
21665 reply 'Proof to the Self'; and if we go on asking 'But what is that

21666 Self'? you will say, 'Just consciousness as already said by us before.'
21667 True, we reply, you said so; but it certainly was not well said. For if
21668 it is the nature of consciousness to be 'proof' ('light,'
21669 'enlightenment') on the part of a person with regard to something, how
21670 can this consciousness which is thus connected with the person and the
21671 thing be itself conscious of itself? To explain: the essential character
21672 of consciousness or knowledge is that by its very existence it renders
21673 things capable of becoming objects, to its own substrate, of thought and
21674 speech. This consciousness (anubhūti), which is also termed jñāna,
21675 avagati, samvid, is a particular attribute belonging to a conscious Self
21676 and related to an object: as such it is known to every one on the
21677 testimony of his own Self--as appears from ordinary judgments such as 'I
21678 know the jar,' 'I understand this matter,' 'I am conscious of (the
21679 presence of) this piece of cloth.' That such is the essential nature of
21680 consciousness you yourself admit; for you have proved thereby its
21681 self-luminousness. Of this consciousness which thus clearly presents
21682 itself as the attribute of an agent and as related to an object, it
21683 would be difficult indeed to prove that at the same time it is itself
21684 the agent; as difficult as it would be to prove that the object of
21685 action is the agent.

21686
21687 For we clearly see that this agent (the subject of consciousness) is
21688 permanent (constant), while its attribute, i. e. consciousness, not
21689 differing herein from joy, grief, and the like, rises, persists for some
21690 time, and then comes to an end. The permanency of the conscious subject
21691 is proved by the fact of recognition, 'This very same thing was formerly
21692 apprehended by me.' The non-permanency of consciousness, on the other
21693 hand, is proved by thought expressing itself in the following forms, 'I
21694 know at present,' 'I knew at a time,' 'I, the knowing subject, no longer
21695 have knowledge of this thing.' How then should consciousness and (the
21696 conscious subject) be one? If consciousness which changes every moment
21697 were admitted to constitute the conscious subject, it would be
21698 impossible for us to recognise the thing seen to-day as the one we saw
21699 yesterday; for what has been perceived by one cannot be recognised by
21700 another. And even if consciousness were identified with the conscious
21701 subject and acknowledged as permanent, this would no better account for
21702 the fact of recognition. For recognition implies a conscious subject
21703 persisting from the earlier to the later moment, and not merely
21704 consciousness. Its expression is 'I myself perceived this thing on a
21705 former occasion.' According to your view the quality of being a
21706 conscious agent cannot at all belong to consciousness; for consciousness,
21707 you say, is just consciousness and nothing more. And that there exists a
21708 pure consciousness devoid of substrate and objects alike, we have
21709 already refuted on the ground that of a thing of this kind we have
21710 absolutely no knowledge. And that the consciousness admitted by both of
21711 us should be the Self is refuted by immediate consciousness itself. And
21712 we have also refuted the fallacious arguments brought forward to prove
21713 that mere consciousness is the only reality.--But, another objection is
21714 raised, should the relation of the Self and the 'I' not rather be
21715 conceived as follows:--In self-consciousness which expresses itself in
21716 the judgment 'I know,' that intelligent something which constitutes the
21717 absolutely non-objective element, and is pure homogeneous light, is the
21718 Self; the objective element (yushmad-artha) on the other hand, which is
21719 established through its being illumined (revealed) by the Self is the
21720 _I_--in 'I know'--and this is something different from pure
21721 intelligence, something objective or external?

21722
21723 By no means, we reply; for this view contradicts the relation of
21724 attribute and substrate of attribute of which we are directly conscious,
21725 as implied in the thought 'I know.'

21726
21727 Consider also what follows.--'If the _I_ were not the Self, the
21728 inwardness of the Self would not exist; for it is just the consciousness
21729 of the _I_ which separates the inward from the outward.

21730
21731 "May I, freeing myself from all pain, enter on free possession of
21732 endless delight?" This is the thought which prompts the man desirous of
21733 release to apply himself to the study of the sacred texts. Were it a
21734 settled matter that release consists in the annihilation of the I, the

21735 same man would move away as soon as release were only hinted at. "When I
21736 myself have perished, there still persists some consciousness different
21737 from me;" to bring this about nobody truly will exert himself.

21738
21739 'Moreover the very existence of consciousness, its being a consciousness
21740 at all, and its being self-luminous, depend on its connexion with a Self;
21741 when that connexion is dissolved, consciousness itself cannot be
21742 established, not any more than the act of cutting can take place when
21743 there is no person to cut and nothing to be cut. Hence it is certain
21744 that the I, i.e. the knowing subject, is the inward Self.'

21745
21746 This scripture confirms when saying 'By what should he know the knower?'
21747 (Bri. Up. II, 4, 15); and Smṛiti also, 'Him who knows this they call the
21748 knower of the body' (Bha. Gī. XIII, 1). And the Sūtrakāra also, in the
21749 section beginning with 'Not the Self on account of scriptural statement'
21750 (II, 3, 17), will say 'For this very reason (it is) a knower' (II, 3,
21751 18); and from this it follows that the Self is not mere consciousness.

21752
21753 What is established by consciousness of the 'I' is the I itself, while
21754 the not-I is given in the consciousness of the not-I; hence to say that
21755 the knowing subject, which is established by the state of consciousness,
21756 'I know,' is the not-I, is no better than to maintain that one's own
21757 mother is a barren woman. Nor can it be said that this 'I,' the knowing
21758 subject, is dependent on its light for something else. It rather is
21759 self-luminous; for to be self-luminous means to have consciousness for
21760 one's essential nature. And that which has light for its essential
21761 nature does not depend for its light on something else. The case is
21762 analogous to that of the flame of a lamp or candle. From the
21763 circumstance that the lamp illumines with its light other things, it
21764 does not follow either that it is not luminous, or that its luminousness
21765 depends on something else; the fact rather is that the lamp being of
21766 luminous nature shines itself and illumines with its light other things
21767 also. To explain.--The one substance tejas, i.e. fire or heat, subsists
21768 in a double form, viz. as light (prabhā), and as luminous matter.
21769 Although light is a quality of luminous substantial things, it is in
21770 itself nothing but the substance tejas, not a mere quality like e.g.
21771 whiteness; for it exists also apart from its substrates, and possesses
21772 colour (which is a quality). Having thus attributes different from those
21773 of qualities such as whiteness and so on, and possessing illumining
21774 power, it is the substance tejas, not anything else (e.g. a quality).
21775 Illumining power belongs to it, because it lights up itself and other
21776 things. At the same time it is practically treated as a quality because
21777 it always has the substance tejas for its substrate, and depends on it.
21778 This must not be objected to on the ground that what is called light is
21779 really nothing but dissolving particles of matter which proceed from the
21780 substance tejas; for if this were so, shining gems and the sun would in
21781 the end consume themselves completely. Moreover, if the flame of a lamp
21782 consisted of dissolving particles of matter, it would never be
21783 apprehended as a whole; for no reason can be stated why those particles
21784 should regularly rise in an agglomerated form to the height of four
21785 fingers breadth, and after that simultaneously disperse themselves
21786 uniformly in all directions--upwards, sideways, and downwards. The fact
21787 is that the flame of the lamp together with its light is produced anew
21788 every moment and again vanishes every moment; as we may infer from the
21789 successive combination of sufficient causes (viz. particles of oil and
21790 wick) and from its coming to an end when those causes are completely
21791 consumed.

21792
21793 Analogously to the lamp, the Self is essentially intelligent (kid-rûpa),
21794 and has intelligence (kaitanya) for its quality. And to be essentially
21795 intelligent means to be self-luminous. There are many scriptural texts
21796 declaring this, compare e.g. 'As a mass of salt has neither inside nor
21797 outside but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed that Self has
21798 neither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass of knowledge' (Bri.
21799 Up. IV, 5, 13); 'There that person becomes self-luminous, there is no
21800 destruction of the knowing of the knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 14; 30); 'He
21801 who knows, let me smell this, he is the Self (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 4); 'Who
21802 is that Self? That one who is made of knowledge, among the prānas,
21803 within the heart, the light, the person' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7); 'For it is

21804 he who sees, hears, smells, tastes, thinks, considers, acts, the person
21805 whose Self is knowledge' (Pr. Up. IV, 9); 'Whereby should one know the
21806 knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15). 'This person knows,' 'The seer does not
21807 see death nor illness nor pain' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2); 'That highest
21808 person not remembering this body into which he was born' (Ch. Up. VIII,
21809 12, 3); 'Thus these sixteen parts of the spectator that go towards the
21810 person; when they have readied the person, sink into him' (Pr. Up. VI,
21811 5); 'From this consisting of mind, there is different an interior Self
21812 consisting of knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 4). And the Sûtrakâra also will
21813 refer to the Self as a 'knower' in II, 3, 18. All which shows that the
21814 self-luminous Self is a knower, i.e. a knowing subject, and not pure
21815 light (non-personal intelligence). In general we may say that where
21816 there is light it must belong to something, as shown by the light of a
21817 lamp. The Self thus cannot be mere consciousness. The grammarians
21818 moreover tell us that words such as 'consciousness,' 'knowledge,' &c.,
21819 are relative; neither ordinary nor Vedic language uses expressions such
21820 as 'he knows' without reference to an object known and an agent who
21821 knows.

21822
21823 With reference to the assertion that consciousness constitutes the Self,
21824 because it (consciousness) is not non-intelligent (jada), we ask what
21825 you understand by this absence of non-intelligence.' If you reply
21826 'luminousness due to the being of the thing itself (i.e. of the thing
21827 which is ajada)'; we point out that this definition would wrongly
21828 include lamps also, and similar things; and it would moreover give rise
21829 to a contradiction, since you do not admit light as an attribute,
21830 different from consciousness itself. Nor can we allow you to define
21831 ajadatva as 'being of that nature that light is always present, without
21832 any exception,' for this definition would extend also to pleasure, pain,
21833 and similar states. Should you maintain that pleasure and so on,
21834 although being throughout of the nature of light, are non-intelligent
21835 for the reason that, like jars, &c., they shine forth (appear) to
21836 something else and hence belong to the sphere of the not-Self; we ask in
21837 reply: Do you mean then to say that knowledge appears to itself?
21838 Knowledge no less than pleasure appears to some one else, viz. the 'I':
21839 there is, in that respect, no difference between the judgment 'I know,'
21840 and the judgment 'I am pleased.' Non-intelligence in the sense of
21841 appearingness-to-itself is thus not proved for consciousness; and hence
21842 it follows that what constitutes the Self is the non-jada 'I' which is
21843 proved to itself by its very Being. That knowledge is of the nature of
21844 light depends altogether on its connection with the knowing 'I': it is
21845 due to the latter, that knowledge, like pleasure, manifests itself to
21846 that conscious person who is its substrate, and not to anybody else. The
21847 Self is thus not mere knowledge, but is the knowing 'I.'

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21852 The view that the conscious subject is something unreal, due to the
21853 ahamkâra, cannot be maintained.

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21855 We turn to a further point. You maintain that consciousness which is in
21856 reality devoid alike of objects and substrate presents itself, owing to
21857 error, in the form of a knowing subject, just as mother o' pearl appears
21858 as silver; (consciousness itself being viewed as a real substrate of an
21859 erroneous imputation), because an erroneous imputation cannot take place
21860 apart from a substrate. But this theory is indefensible. If things were
21861 as you describe them, the conscious 'I' would be cognised as co-ordinate
21862 with the state of consciousness 'I am consciousness,' just as the
21863 shining thing presenting itself to our eyes is judged to be silver. But
21864 the fact is that the state of consciousness presents itself as something
21865 apart, constituting a distinguishing attribute of the I, just as the
21866 stick is an attribute of Devadatta who carries it. The judgment 'I am
21867 conscious' reveals an 'I' distinguished by consciousness; and to declare
21868 that it refers only to a state of consciousness--which is a mere
21869 attribute--is no better than to say that the judgment 'Devadatta carries
21870 a stick' is about the stick only. Nor are you right in saying that the
21871 idea of the Self being a knowing agent, presents itself to the mind of
21872 him only who erroneously identifies the Self and the body, an error

21873 expressing itself in judgments such as 'I am stout,' and is on that
21874 account false; for from this it would follow that the consciousness
21875 which is erroneously imagined as a Self is also false; for it presents
21876 itself to the mind of the same person. You will perhaps rejoin that
21877 consciousness is not false because it (alone) is not sublated by that
21878 cognition which sublates everything else. Well, we reply, then the
21879 knowership of the Self also is not false; for that also is not sublated.
21880 You further maintain that the character of being a knower, i.e. the
21881 agent in the action of knowing, does not become the non-changing Self;
21882 that being a knower is something implying change, of a non-intelligent
21883 kind (jada), and residing in the ahamkāra which is the abode of change
21884 and a mere effect of the Unevolved (the Prakṛiti); that being an agent
21885 and so on is like colour and other qualities, an attribute of what is
21886 objective; and that if we admit the Self to be an agent and the object
21887 of the notion of the 'I,' it also follows that the Self is, like the
21888 body, not a real Self but something external and non-intelligent. But
21889 all this is unfounded, since the internal organ is, like the body,
21890 non-intelligent, an effect of Prakṛiti, an object of knowledge,
21891 something outward and for the sake of others merely; while being a
21892 knowing subject constitutes the special essential nature of intelligent
21893 beings. To explain. Just as the body, through its objectiveness,
21894 outwardness, and similar causes, is distinguished from what possesses
21895 the opposite attributes of subjectiveness, inwardness, and so on; for
21896 the same reason the ahamkāra also--which is of the same substantial
21897 nature as the body--is similarly distinguished. Hence the ahamkāra is
21898 no more a knower than it is something subjective; otherwise there would
21899 be an evident contradiction. As knowing cannot be attributed to the
21900 ahamkāra, which is an object of knowledge, so knowership also cannot be
21901 ascribed to it; for of that also it is the object. Nor can it be
21902 maintained that to be a knower is something essentially changing. For to
21903 be a knower is to be the substrate of the quality of knowledge, and as
21904 the knowing Self is eternal, knowledge which is an essential quality of
21905 the Self is also eternal. That the Self is eternal will be declared in
21906 the Sūtra, II, 3, 17; and in II, 3, 18 the term 'jñā' (knower) will show
21907 that it is an essential quality of the Self to be the abode of
21908 knowledge. That a Self whose essential nature is knowledge should be the
21909 substrate of the (quality of) knowledge--just as gems and the like are
21910 the substrate of light--gives rise to no contradiction whatever.

21911
21912 Knowledge (the quality) which is in itself unlimited, is capable of
21913 contraction and expansion, as we shall show later on. In the so-called
21914 kshetra-jñā--condition of the Self, knowledge is, owing to the influence
21915 of work (karman), of a contracted nature, as it more or less adapts
21916 itself to work of different kinds, and is variously determined by the
21917 different senses. With reference to this various flow of knowledge as
21918 due to the senses, it is spoken of as rising and setting, and the Self
21919 possesses the quality of an agent. As this quality is not, however,
21920 essential, but originated by action, the Self is essentially unchanging.
21921 This changeful quality of being a knower can belong only to the Self
21922 whose essential nature is knowledge; not possibly to the non-intelligent
21923 ahamkāra. But, you will perhaps say, the ahamkāra, although of non-
21924 intelligent nature, may become a knower in so far as by approximation to
21925 intelligence it becomes a reflection of the latter. How, we ask in
21926 return, is this becoming a reflection of intelligence imagined to take
21927 place? Does consciousness become a reflection of the ahamkāra, or does
21928 the ahamkāra become a reflection of consciousness? The former
21929 alternative is inadmissible, since you will not allow to consciousness
21930 the quality of being a knower; and so is the latter since, as explained
21931 above, the non-intelligent ahamkāra can never become a knower. Moreover,
21932 neither consciousness nor the ahamkāra are objects of visual perception.
21933 Only things seen by the eye have reflections.--Let it then be said that
21934 as an iron ball is heated by contact with fire, so the consciousness of
21935 being a knower is imparted to the ahamkāra through its contact with
21936 Intelligence.--This view too is inadmissible; for as you do not allow
21937 real knowership to Intelligence, knowership or the consciousness of
21938 knowership cannot be imparted to the ahamkāra by contact with
21939 Intelligence; and much less even can knowership or the consciousness of
21940 it be imparted to Intelligence by contact with the essentially non-
21941 intelligent ahamkāra. Nor can we accept what you say about

21942 'manifestation.' Neither the ahamkâra, you say, nor Intelligence is
21943 really a knowing subject, but the ahamkâra manifests consciousness
21944 abiding within itself (within the ahamkâra), as the mirror manifests the
21945 image abiding within it. But the essentially non-intelligent ahamkâra
21946 evidently cannot 'manifest' the self-luminous Self. As has been said
21947 'That the non-intelligent ahamkâra should manifest the self-luminous
21948 Self, has no more sense than to say that a spent coal manifests the Sun.'
21949 The truth is that all things depend for their proof on self-luminous
21950 consciousness; and now you maintain that one of these things, viz. the
21951 non-intelligent ahamkâra--which itself depends for its light on
21952 consciousness--manifests consciousness, whose essential light never
21953 rises or sets, and which is the cause that proves everything! Whoever
21954 knows the nature of the Self will justly deride such a view! The
21955 relation of 'manifestation' cannot hold good between consciousness and
21956 the ahamkâra for the further reason also that there is a contradiction
21957 in nature between the two, and because it would imply consciousness not
21958 to be consciousness. As has been said, 'One cannot manifest the other,
21959 owing to contradictoriness; and if the Self were something to be
21960 manifested, that would imply its being non-intelligent like a jar.' Nor
21961 is the matter improved by your introducing the hand and the sunbeams
21962 (above, p. 38), and to say that as the sunbeams while manifesting the
21963 hand, are at the same time manifested by the hand, so consciousness,
21964 while manifesting the ahamkâra, is at the same time itself manifested by
21965 the latter. The sunbeams are in reality not manifested by the hand at
21966 all. What takes place is that the motion of the sunbeams is reversed
21967 (reflected) by the opposed hand; they thus become more numerous, and
21968 hence are perceived more clearly; but this is due altogether to the
21969 multitude of beams, not to any manifesting power on the part of the hand.

21970
21971 What could, moreover, be the nature of that 'manifestation' of the Self
21972 consisting of Intelligence, which would be effected through the ahamkâra?
21973 It cannot be origination; for you acknowledge that what is self-
21974 established cannot be originated by anything else. Nor can it be
21975 'illumination' (making to shine forth), since consciousness cannot--
21976 according to you--be the object of another consciousness. For the same
21977 reason it cannot be any action assisting the means of being conscious of
21978 consciousness. For such helpful action could be of two kinds only. It
21979 would either be such as to cause the connexion of the object to be known
21980 with the sense-organs; as e.g. any action which, in the case of the
21981 apprehension of a species or of one's own face, causes connexion between
21982 the organ of sight and an individual of the species, or a looking-glass.
21983 Or it would be such as to remove some obstructive impurity in the mind
21984 of the knowing person; of this kind is the action of calmness and self-
21985 restraint with reference to scripture which is the means of apprehending
21986 the highest reality. Moreover, even if it were admitted that
21987 consciousness may be an object of consciousness, it could not be
21988 maintained that the 'I' assists the means whereby that consciousness is
21989 effected. For if it did so, it could only be in the way of removing any
21990 obstacles impeding the origination of such consciousness; analogous to
21991 the way in which a lamp assists the eye by dispelling the darkness which
21992 impedes the origination of the apprehension of colour. But in the case
21993 under discussion we are unable to imagine such obstacles. There is
21994 nothing pertaining to consciousness which obstructs the origination of
21995 the knowledge of consciousness and which could be removed by the
21996 ahamkâra.--There is something, you will perhaps reply, viz. Nescience!
21997 Not so, we reply. That Nescience is removed by the ahamkâra cannot be
21998 admitted; knowledge alone can put an end to Nescience. Nor can
21999 consciousness be the abode of Nescience, because in that case Nescience
22000 would have the same abode and the same object as knowledge.

22001
22002 In pure knowledge where there is no knowing subject and no object of
22003 knowledge--the so-called 'witnessing' principle (sâkshin)--Nescience
22004 cannot exist. Jars and similar things cannot be the abode of Nescience
22005 because there is no possibility of their being the abode of knowledge,
22006 and for the same reason pure knowledge also cannot be the abode of
22007 Nescience. And even if consciousness were admitted to be the abode of
22008 Nescience, it could not be the object of knowledge; for consciousness
22009 being viewed as the Self cannot be the object of knowledge, and hence
22010 knowledge cannot terminate the Nescience abiding within consciousness.

22011 For knowledge puts an end to Nescience only with regard to its own
22012 objects, as in the case of the snake-rope. And the consequence of this
22013 would be that the Nescience attached to consciousness could never be
22014 destroyed by any one.--If Nescience, we further remark, is viewed as
22015 that which can be defined neither as Being nor non-Being, we shall show
22016 later on that such Nescience is something quite incomprehensible.--On
22017 the other hand, Nescience, if understood to be the antecedent non-
22018 existence of knowledge, is not opposed in nature to the origination of
22019 knowledge, and hence the dispelling of Nescience cannot be viewed as
22020 promoting the means of the knowledge of the Self.--From all this it
22021 follows that the ahamkāra cannot effect in any way 'manifestation of
22022 consciousness.'

22023
22024 Nor (to finish up this point) can it be said that it is the essential
22025 nature of manifesting agents to manifest things in so far as the latter
22026 have their abode in the former; for such a relation is not observed in
22027 the case of lamps and the like (which manifest what lies outside them).
22028 The essential nature of manifesting agents rather lies therein that they
22029 promote the knowledge of things as they really are, and this is also the
22030 nature of whatever promotes knowledge and the means thereof. Nor is it
22031 even true that the mirror manifests the face. The mirror is only the
22032 cause of a certain irregularity, viz. the reversion of the ocular rays
22033 of light, and to this irregularity there is due the appearance of the
22034 face within the mirror; but the manifesting agent is the light only. And
22035 it is evident that the ahamkāra is not capable of producing an
22036 irregularity (analogous to that produced by the mirror) in consciousness
22037 which is self-luminous.--And--with regard to the second analogous
22038 instance alleged by you--the fact is that the species is known through
22039 the individual because the latter is its substrate (as expressed in the
22040 general principle, 'the species is the form of the individual'), but not
22041 because the individual 'manifests' the species. Thus there is no reason,
22042 either real or springing from some imperfection, why the consciousness
22043 of consciousness should be brought about by its abiding in the ahamkāra,
22044 and the attribute of being the knowing agent or the consciousness of
22045 that cannot therefore belong to the ahamkāra. Hence, what constitutes
22046 the inward Self is not pure consciousness but the 'I' which proves
22047 itself as the knowing subject. In the absence of egoity, 'inwardness'
22048 could not be established for consciousness.

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22053 The conscious subject persists in deep sleep.

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22055 We now come to the question as to the nature of deep sleep. In deep
22056 sleep the quality of darkness prevails in the mind and there is no
22057 consciousness of outward things, and thus there is no distinct and clear
22058 presentation of the 'I'; but all the same the Self somehow presents
22059 itself up to the time of waking in the one form of the 'I,' and the
22060 latter cannot therefore be said to be absent. Pure consciousness assumed
22061 by you (to manifest itself in deep sleep) is really in no better case;
22062 for a person risen from deep sleep never represents to himself his
22063 state of consciousness during sleep in the form, 'I was pure
22064 consciousness free from all egoity and opposed in nature to everything
22065 else, witnessing Nescience'; what he thinks is only 'I slept well.' From
22066 this form of reflection it appears that even during sleep the Self. i.e.
22067 the 'I,' was a knowing subject and perceptive of pleasure. Nor must you
22068 urge against this that the reflection has the following form: 'As now I
22069 feel pleasure, so I slept then also'; for the reflection is distinctly
22070 _not_ of that kind. [FOOTNOTE 68:1] Nor must you say that owing to the
22071 non-permanency of the 'I' its perception of pleasure during sleep
22072 cannot connect itself with the waking state. For (the 'I' is permanent
22073 as appears from the fact that) the person who has risen from sleep
22074 recalls things of which he was conscious before his sleep, 'I did such
22075 and such a thing,' 'I observed this or that,' 'I said so or so.'--But,
22076 you will perhaps say, he also reflects, 'For such and such a time I was
22077 conscious of nothing!'--'And what does this imply?' we ask.--'It implies
22078 a negation of everything!'--By no means, we rejoin. The words 'I was
22079 conscious' show that the knowing 'I' persisted, and that hence what is

negated is only the objects of knowledge. If the negation implied in 'of nothing' included everything, it would also negative the pure consciousness which you hold to persist in deep sleep. In the judgment 'I was conscious of nothing,' the word 'I' clearly refers to the 'I,' i. e. the knowing Self which persists even during deep sleep, while the words 'was conscious of nothing' negative all knowledge on the part of that 'I'; if, now, in the face of this, you undertake to prove by means of this very judgment that knowledge--which is expressly denied--existed at the time, and that the persisting knowing Self did not exist, you may address your proof to the patient gods who give no reply!--But--our opponent goes on to urge--I form the following judgment also: 'I then was not conscious of myself,' and from this I understand that the 'I' did not persist during deep sleep!--You do not know, we rejoin, that this denial of the persistence of the 'I' flatly contradicts the state of consciousness expressed in the judgment 'I was not conscious of myself' and the verbal form of the judgment itself!--But what then is denied by the words 'of myself?--This, we admit, is a reasonable question. Let us consider the point. What is negated in that judgment is not the knowing 'I' itself, but merely the distinctions of caste, condition of life, &c. which belong to the 'I' at the time of waking. We must distinguish the objects of the several parts of the judgment under discussion. The object of the '(me) myself' is the 'I' distinguished by class characteristics as it presents itself in the waking state; the object of the word 'I' (in the judgment) is that 'I' which consists of a uniform flow of self-consciousness which persists in sleep also, but is then not quite distinct. The judgment 'I did not know myself' therefore means that the sleeper was not conscious of the place where he slept, of his special characteristics, and so on.--It is, moreover, your own view that in deep sleep the Self occupies the position of a witnessing principle with regard to Nescience. But by a witness (sâkshin) we understand some one who knows about something by personal observation (sâkshât); a person who does not know cannot be a witness. Accordingly, in scripture as well as in ordinary language a knowing subject only, not mere knowledge, is spoken of as a witness; and with this the Reverend Pânini also agrees when teaching that the word 'sâkshin' means one who knows in person (Pâ. Sû. V, 2, 91). Now this witness is nothing else but the 'I' which is apprehended in the judgment 'I know'; and how then should this 'I' not be apprehended in the state of sleep? That which itself appears to the Self appears as the 'I,' and it thus follows that also in deep sleep and similar states the Self which then shines forth appears as the 'I.'

[FOOTNOTE 68:1. I. e. the reflection as to the perception of pleasure refers to the past state of sleep only, not to the present moment of reflection.]

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The conscious subject persists in the state of release.

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To maintain that the consciousness of the 'I' does not persist in the state of final release is again altogether inappropriate. It in fact amounts to the doctrine--only expressed in somewhat different words--that final release is the annihilation of the Self. The 'I' is not a mere attribute of the Self so that even after its destruction the essential nature of the Self might persist--as it persists on the cessation of ignorance; but it constitutes the very nature of the Self. Such judgments as 'I know', 'Knowledge has arisen in me', show, on the other hand, that we are conscious of knowledge as a mere attribute of the Self.--Moreover, a man who suffering pain, mental or of other kind--whether such pain be real or due to error only--puts himself in relation to pain--'I am suffering pain'--naturally begins to reflect how he may once for all free himself from all these manifold afflictions and enjoy a state of untroubled ease; the desire of final release thus having arisen in him he at once sets to work to accomplish it. If, on the other hand, he were to realise that the effect of such activity would be the loss of personal existence, he surely would turn away as soon as somebody began to tell him about 'release'. And the result of this would

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22149 be that, in the absence of willing and qualified pupils, the whole
22150 scriptural teaching as to final release would lose its authoritative
22151 character.--Nor must you maintain against this that even in the state of
22152 release there persists pure consciousness; for this by no means improves
22153 your case. No sensible person exerts himself under the influence of the
22154 idea that after he himself has perished there will remain some entity
22155 termed 'pure light!!--What constitutes the 'inward' Self thus is the 'I',
22156 the knowing subject.

22157
22158 This 'inward' Self shines forth in the state of final release also as an
22159 'I'; for it appears to itself. The general principle is that whatever
22160 being appears to itself appears as an 'I'; both parties in the present
22161 dispute establish the existence of the transmigrating Self on such
22162 appearance. On the contrary, whatever does not appear as an 'I', does
22163 not appear to itself; as jars and the like. Now the emancipated Self
22164 does thus appear to itself, and therefore it appears as an 'I'. Nor does
22165 this appearance as an 'I' imply in any way that the released Self is
22166 subject to Nescience and implicated in the Samsâra; for this would
22167 contradict the nature of final release, and moreover the consciousness
22168 of the 'I' cannot be the cause of Nescience and so on. Nescience
22169 (ignorance) is either ignorance as to essential nature, or the cognition
22170 of something under an aspect different from the real one (as when a
22171 person suffering from jaundice sees all things yellow); or cognition of
22172 what is altogether opposite in nature (as when mother o' pearl is
22173 mistaken for silver). Now the 'I' constitutes the essential nature of
22174 the Self; how then can the consciousness of the 'I,' i.e. the
22175 consciousness of its own true nature, implicate the released Self in
22176 Nescience, or, in the Samsâra? The fact rather is that such
22177 consciousness destroys Nescience, and so on, because it is essentially
22178 opposed to them. In agreement with this we observe that persons like the
22179 rishi Vâmadeva, in whom the intuition of their identity with Brahman had
22180 totally destroyed all Nescience, enjoyed the consciousness of the
22181 personal 'I'; for scripture says, 'Seeing this the rishi Vâmadeva
22182 understood, I was Manu and the Sun' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10). And the
22183 highest Brahman also, which is opposed to all other forms of Nescience
22184 and denoted and conceived as pure Being, is spoken of in an analogous
22185 way; cp. 'Let me make each of these three deities,' &c. (Ch. Up. VI, 3,
22186 3); 'May I be many, may I grow forth' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); 'He thought,
22187 shall I send forth worlds?' (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 1); and again, 'Since I
22188 transcend the Destructible, and am higher also than the Indestructible,
22189 therefore I am proclaimed in the world and in the Veda as the highest
22190 Person' (Bha. Gî. XV, 18); 'I am the Self, O Gûdâkesa.' (Bha. Gî. X, 20);
22191 'Never was I not' (Bha. Gî. II, 12); 'I am the source and the
22192 destruction of the whole world' (Bha. Gî. VII, 6); 'I am the source of
22193 all; from me proceeds everything' (Bha. Gî. X, 8); 'I am he who raises
22194 them from the ocean of the world of death' (Bha. Gî. XII, 7); 'I am the
22195 giver of seed, the father' (Bha. Gî. XIV, 4); 'I know the things past'
22196 (Bha. Gî. VII, 26).--But if the 'I' (aham) constitutes the essential
22197 nature of the Self, how is it that the Holy One teaches the principle of
22198 egoity (ahamkâra) to belong to the sphere of objects, 'The great
22199 elements, the ahamkâra, the understanding (buddhi), and the Unevolved'
22200 (Bha. Gî. XIII, 5)?--As in all passages, we reply, which give
22201 information about the true nature of the Self it is spoken of as the 'I',
22202 we conclude that the 'I' constitutes the essential nature of the inward
22203 Self. Where, on the other hand, the Holy One declares the ahamkâra--a
22204 special effect of the Unevolved--to be comprised within the sphere of
22205 the Objective, he means that principle which is called ahamkâra, because
22206 it causes the assumption of Egoity on the part of the body which belongs
22207 to the Not-self. Such egoity constitutes the ahamkâra also designated as
22208 pride or arrogance, which causes men to slight persons superior to
22209 themselves, and is referred to by scripture in many places as something
22210 evil. Such consciousness of the 'I' therefore as is not sublated by
22211 anything else has the Self for its object; while, on the other hand,
22212 such consciousness of the 'I' as has the body for its object is mere
22213 Nescience. In agreement with this the Reverend Parâsara has said, 'Hear
22214 from me the essential nature of Nescience; it is the attribution of
22215 Selfhood to what is not the Self.' If the Self were pure consciousness
22216 then pure consciousness only, and not the quality of being a knowing
22217 subject, would present itself in the body also, which is a Not-self

22218 wrongly imagined to be a Self. The conclusion therefore remains that the
22219 Self is nothing but the knowing 'I'. Thus it has been said, 'As is
22220 proved by perception, and as also results from reasoning and tradition,
22221 and from its connexion with ignorance, the Self presents itself as a
22222 knowing 'I'. And again, 'That which is different from body, senses, mind,
22223 and vital airs; which does not depend on other means; which is permanent,
22224 pervading, divided according to bodies--that is the Self blessed in
22225 itself.' Here 'not dependent on other means' means 'self-luminous'; and
22226 'pervading' means 'being of such a nature as to enter, owing to
22227 excessive minuteness, into all non-sentient things.'

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22232 In cases of Scripture conflicting with Perception, Scripture is not
22233 stronger. The True cannot be known through the Untrue.

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22235 With reference to the assertion (p. 24 ff.) that Perception, which
22236 depends on the view of plurality, is based on some defect and hence
22237 admits of being otherwise accounted for--whence it follows that it is
22238 sublated by Scripture; we ask you to point out what defect it is on
22239 which Perception is based and may hence be accounted for otherwise.--'
22240 The beginningless imagination of difference' we expect you to reply.--
22241 But, we ask in return, have you then come to know by some other means
22242 that this beginningless imagination of difference, acting in a manner
22243 analogous to that of certain defects of vision, is really the cause of
22244 an altogether perverse view of things?--If you reply that this is known
22245 just from the fact that Perception is in conflict with Scripture, we
22246 point out that you are reasoning in a circle: you prove the
22247 defectiveness of the imagination of plurality through the fact that
22248 Scripture tells us about a substance devoid of all difference; and at
22249 the same time you prove the latter point through the former. Moreover,
22250 if Perception gives rise to perverse cognition because it is based on
22251 the imagination of plurality, Scripture also is in no better case--for
22252 it is based on the very same view.--If against this you urge that
22253 Scripture, although based on a defect, yet sublates Perception in so far
22254 as it is the cause of a cognition which dispels all plurality
22255 apprehended through Perception, and thus is later in order than
22256 Perception; we rejoin that the defectiveness of the foundation of
22257 Scripture having once been recognised, the circumstance of its being
22258 later is of no avail. For if a man is afraid of a rope which he mistakes
22259 for a snake his fear does not come to an end because another man, whom
22260 he considers to be in error himself, tells him 'This is no snake, do not
22261 be afraid.' And that Scripture is founded on something defective is
22262 known at the very time of hearing Scripture, for the reflection (which
22263 follows on hearing) consists in repeated attempts to cognise the oneness
22264 of Brahman--a cognition which is destructive of all the plurality
22265 apprehended through the first hearing of the Veda.--We further ask, 'By
22266 what means do you arrive at the conclusion that Scripture cannot
22267 possibly be assumed to be defective in any way, while defects may be
22268 ascribed to Perception'? It is certainly not Consciousness--self-proved
22269 and absolutely devoid of all difference--which enlightens you on this
22270 point; for such Consciousness is unrelated to any objects whatever, and
22271 incapable of partiality to Scripture. Nor can sense-perception be the
22272 source of your conviction; for as it is founded on what is defective it
22273 gives perverse information. Nor again the other sources of knowledge;
22274 for they are all based on sense-perception. As thus there are no
22275 acknowledged means of knowledge to prove your view, you must give it up.
22276 But, you will perhaps say, we proceed by means of the ordinary empirical
22277 means and objects of knowledge!--What, we ask in reply, do you
22278 understand by 'empirical'?--What rests on immediate unreflective
22279 knowledge, but is found not to hold good when tested by logical
22280 reasoning!--But what is the use, we ask, of knowledge of this kind? If
22281 logical reasoning refutes something known through some means of
22282 knowledge, that means of knowledge is no longer authoritative!--Now you
22283 will possibly argue as follows: 'Scripture as well as Perception is
22284 founded on Nescience; but all the same Perception is sublated by
22285 Scripture. For as the object of Scripture, i.e. Brahman, which is one
22286 and without a second, is not seen to be sublated by any ulterior

22287 cognition, Brahman, i.e. pure non-differenced Consciousness, remains as
22288 the sole Reality.'--But here too you are wrong, since we must decide
22289 that something which rests on a defect is unreal, although it may remain
22290 unrefuted. We will illustrate this point by an analogous instance. Let
22291 us imagine a race of men afflicted with a certain special defect of
22292 vision, without being aware of this their defect, dwelling in some
22293 remote mountain caves inaccessible to all other men provided with sound
22294 eyes. As we assume all of these cave dwellers to be afflicted with the
22295 same defect of vision, they, all of them, will equally see and judge
22296 bright things, e.g. the moon, to be double. Now in the case of these
22297 people there never arises a subsequent cognition sublating their
22298 primitive cognition; but the latter is false all the same, and its
22299 object, viz., the doubleness of the moon, is false likewise; the defect
22300 of vision being the cause of a cognition not corresponding to reality.--
22301 And so it is with the cognition of Brahman also. This cognition is based
22302 on Nescience, and therefore is false, together with its object, viz.
22303 Brahman, although no sublating cognition presents itself.--This
22304 conclusion admits of various expressions in logical form. 'The Brahman
22305 under dispute is false because it is the object of knowledge which has
22306 sprung from what is affected with Nescience; as the phenomenal world is.'
22307 'Brahman is false because it is the object of knowledge; as the world
22308 is.' 'Brahman is false because it is the object of knowledge, the rise
22309 of which has the Untrue for its cause; as the world is.'

22310
22311 You will now perhaps set forth the following analogy. States of dreaming
22312 consciousness--such as the perception of elephants and the like in one's
22313 dreams--are unreal, and yet they are the cause of the knowledge of real
22314 things, viz. good or ill fortune (portended by those dreams). Hence
22315 there is no reason why Scripture--although unreal in so far as based on
22316 Nescience--should not likewise be the cause of the cognition of what is
22317 real, viz. Brahman.--The two cases are not parallel, we reply. The
22318 conscious states experienced in dreams are not unreal; it is only their
22319 objects that are false; these objects only, not the conscious states,
22320 are sublated by the waking consciousness. Nobody thinks 'the cognitions
22321 of which I was conscious in my dream are unreal'; what men actually
22322 think is 'the cognitions are real, but the things are not real.' In the
22323 same way the illusive state of consciousness which the magician produces
22324 in the minds of other men by means of mantras, drugs, &c., is true, and
22325 hence the cause of love and fear; for such states of consciousness also
22326 are not sublated. The cognition which, owing to some defect in the
22327 object, the sense organ, &c., apprehends a rope as a snake is real, and
22328 hence the cause of fear and other emotions. True also is the imagination
22329 which, owing to the nearness of a snake, arises in the mind of a man
22330 though not actually bitten, viz. that he has been bitten; true also is
22331 the representation of the imagined poison, for it may be the cause of
22332 actual death. In the same way the reflection of the face in the water is
22333 real, and hence enables us to ascertain details belonging to the real
22334 face. All these states of consciousness are real, as we conclude from
22335 their having a beginning and actual effects.--Nor would it avail you to
22336 object that in the absence of real elephants, and so on, the ideas of
22337 them cannot be real. For ideas require only some substrate in general;
22338 the mere appearance of a thing is a sufficient substrate, and such an
22339 appearance is present in the case in question, owing to a certain defect.
22340 The thing we determine to be unreal because it is sublated; the idea is
22341 non-sublated, and therefore real.

22342
22343 Nor can you quote in favour of your view--of the real being known
22344 through the unreal--the instance of the stroke and the letter. The
22345 letter being apprehended through the stroke (i.e. the written character)
22346 does not furnish a case of the real being apprehended through the unreal;
22347 for the stroke itself is real.--But the stroke causes the idea of the
22348 letter only in so far as it is apprehended as being a letter, and this
22349 'being a letter' is untrue!--Not so, we rejoin. If this 'being a letter'
22350 were unreal it could not be a means of the apprehension of the letter;
22351 for we neither observe nor can prove that what is non-existent and
22352 indefinable constitutes a means.--Let then the idea of the letter
22353 constitute the means!--In that case, we rejoin, the apprehension of the
22354 real does not spring from the unreal; and besides, it would follow
22355 therefrom that the means and what is to be effected thereby would be one,

i.e. both would be, without any distinction, the idea of the letter only. Moreover, if the means were constituted by the stroke in so far as it is not the letter, the apprehension of all letters would result from the sight of one stroke; for one stroke may easily be conceived as not being any letter.--But, in the same way as the word 'Devadatta' conventionally denotes some particular man, so some particular stroke apprehended by the eye may conventionally symbolise some particular letter to be apprehended by the ear, and thus a particular stroke may be the cause of the idea of a particular letter!--Quite so, we reply, but on this explanation the real is known through the real; for both stroke and conventional power of symbolisation are real. The case is analogous to that of the idea of a buffalo being caused by the picture of a buffalo; that idea rests on the similarity of picture and thing depicted, and that similarity is something real. Nor can it be said (with a view to proving the pûrvapaksha by another analogous instance) that we meet with a cognition of the real by means of the unreal in the case of sound (sabda) which is essentially uniform, but causes the apprehension of different things by means of difference of tone (nâda). For sound is the cause of the apprehension of different things in so far only as we apprehend the connexion of sound manifesting itself in various tones, with the different things indicated by those various tones [FOOTNOTE 77:1]. And, moreover, it is not correct to argue on the ground of the uniformity of sound; for only particular significant sounds such as 'ga,' which can be apprehended by the ear, are really 'sound.'--All this proves that it is difficult indeed to show that the knowledge of a true thing, viz. Brahman, can be derived from Scripture, if Scripture--as based on Nescience--is itself untrue.

Our opponent may finally argue as follows:--Scripture is not unreal in the same sense as a sky-flower is unreal; for antecedently to the cognition of universal non-duality Scripture is viewed as something that is, and only on the rise of that knowledge it is seen to be unreal. At this latter time Scripture no longer is a means of cognising Brahman, devoid of all difference, consisting of pure Intelligence; as long on the other hand as it is such a means, Scripture is; for then we judge 'Scripture is.'--But to this we reply that if Scripture is not (true), the judgment 'Scripture is' is false, and hence the knowledge resting on false Scripture being false likewise, the object of that knowledge, i.e. Brahman itself, is false. If the cognition of fire which rests on mist being mistaken for smoke is false, it follows that the object of that cognition, viz. fire itself, is likewise unreal. Nor can it be shown that (in the case of Brahman) there is no possibility of ulterior sublative cognition; for there may be such sublative cognition, viz. the one expressed in the judgment 'the Reality is a Void.' And if you say that this latter judgment rests on error, we point out that according to yourself the knowledge of Brahman is also based on error. And of our judgment (viz. 'the Reality is a Void') it may truly be said that all further negation is impossible.--But there is no need to continue this demolition of an altogether baseless theory.

[FOOTNOTE 77:1. And those manifestations of sound by means of various tones are themselves something real.]

No scriptural texts teach a Brahman devoid of all difference.

We now turn to the assertion that certain scriptural texts, as e.g. 'Being only was this in the beginning,' are meant to teach that there truly exists only one homogeneous substance, viz. Intelligence free from all difference.--This we cannot allow. For the section in which the quoted text occurs, in order to make good the initial declaration that by the knowledge of one thing all things are known, shows that the highest Brahman which is denoted by the term 'Being' is the substantial and also the operative cause of the world; that it is all-knowing, endowed with all powers; that its purposes come true; that it is the inward principle, the support and the ruler of everything; and that distinguished by these and other good qualities it constitutes the Self

22425 of the entire world; and then finally proceeds to instruct Svetaketu
22426 that this Brahman constitutes his Self also ('Thou art that'). We have
22427 fully set forth this point in the Vedârtha-samgraha and shall establish
22428 it in greater detail in the present work also, in the so-called
22429 ârambhana-adhikarana.--In the same way the passage 'the higher knowledge
22430 is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended, &c.' (Mu. Up. I, 1,
22431 5) first denies of Brahman all the evil qualities connected with Prakriti,
22432 and then teaches that to it there belong eternity, all-pervadingness,
22433 subtilty, omnipresence, omniscience, imperishableness, creativeness with
22434 regard to all beings, and other auspicious qualities. Now we maintain
22435 that also the text 'True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman', does not
22436 prove a substance devoid of all difference, for the reason that the
22437 co-ordination of the terms of which it consists explains itself in so
22438 far only as denoting one thing distinguished by several attributes. For
22439 'co-ordination' (sâmânâdhikaranya, lit. 'the abiding of several things in
22440 a common substrate') means the reference (of several terms) to one
22441 thing, there being a difference of reason for the application (of
22442 several terms to one thing). Now whether we take the several terms, '
22443 True', 'Knowledge', 'Infinite', in their primary sense, i. e. as denoting
22444 qualities, or as denoting modes of being opposed to whatever is contrary
22445 to those qualities; in either case we must needs admit a plurality of
22446 causes for the application of those several terms to one thing. There is
22447 however that difference between the two alternatives that in the former
22448 case the terms preserve their primary meaning, while in the latter case
22449 their denotative power depends on so-called 'implication' (lakshanâ).
22450 Nor can it be said that the opposition in nature to non-knowledge,
22451 &c. (which is the purport of the terms on the hypothesis of lakshanâ),
22452 constitutes nothing more than the essential nature (of one
22453 non-differenced substance; the three terms thus having one purport
22454 only); for as such essential nature would be sufficiently apprehended
22455 through one term, the employment of further terms would be purposeless.
22456 This view would moreover be in conflict with co-ordination, as it would
22457 not allow of difference of motive for several terms applied to one
22458 thing. On the other hand it cannot be urged against the former
22459 alternative that the distinction of several attributes predicated of one
22460 thing implies a distinction in the thing to which the attributes belong,
22461 and that from this it follows that the several terms denote several
22462 things--a result which also could not be reconciled with
22463 'co-ordination'; for what 'co-ordination' aims at is just to convey the
22464 idea of one thing being qualified by several attributes. For the
22465 grammarians define 'coordination' as the application, to one thing, of
22466 several words, for the application of each of which there is a different
22467 motive.

22468
22469 You have further maintained the following view:--In the text 'one only
22470 without a second', the phrase 'without a second' negatives all duality
22471 on Brahman's part even in so far as qualities are concerned. We must
22472 therefore, according to the principle that all Sâkhâs convey the same
22473 doctrine, assume that all texts which speak of Brahman as cause, aim at
22474 setting forth an absolutely non-dual substance. Of Brahman thus
22475 indirectly defined as a cause, the text 'The True, knowledge, infinite
22476 is Brahman,' contains a direct definition; the Brahman here meant to be
22477 defined must thus be devoid of all qualities. Otherwise, moreover, the
22478 text would be in conflict with those other texts which declare Brahman
22479 to be without qualities and blemish.--But this also cannot be admitted.
22480 What the phrase 'without a second' really aims at intimating is that
22481 Brahman possesses manifold powers, and this it does by denying the
22482 existence of another ruling principle different from Brahman. That
22483 Brahman actually possesses manifold powers the text shows further on,
22484 'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'it sent forth fire,'
22485 and so on.--But how are we to know that the mere phrase 'without a
22486 second' is meant to negative the existence of all other causes in
22487 general?--As follows, we reply. The clause 'Being only this was in the
22488 beginning, one only,' teaches that Brahman when about to create
22489 constitutes the substantial cause of the world. Here the idea of some
22490 further operative cause capable of giving rise to the effect naturally
22491 presents itself to the mind, and hence we understand that the added
22492 clause 'without a second' is meant to negative such an additional cause.
22493 If it were meant absolutely to deny all duality, it would deny also the

eternity and other attributes of Brahman which you yourself assume. You in this case make just the wrong use of the principle of all the--Sâkhâs containing the same doctrine; what this principle demands is that the qualities attributed in all--Sâkhâs to Brahman as cause should be taken over into the passage under discussion also. The same consideration teaches us that also the text 'True, knowledge', &c., teaches Brahman to possess attributes; for this passage has to be interpreted in agreement with the texts referring to Brahman as a cause. Nor does this imply a conflict with the texts which declare Brahman to be without qualities; for those texts are meant to negative the evil qualities depending on Prakriti.--Those texts again which refer to mere knowledge declare indeed that knowledge is the essential nature of Brahman, but this does not mean that mere knowledge constitutes the fundamental reality. For knowledge constitutes the essential nature of a knowing subject only which is the substrate of knowledge, in the same way as the sun, lamps, and gems are the substrate of Light. That Brahman is a knowing subject all scriptural texts declare; cp. 'He who is all knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'It thought' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); 'This divine being thought' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'He thought, let me send forth the worlds' (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 2); 'He who arranges the wishes--as eternal of those who are not eternal, as thinker of (other) thinkers, as one of many' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13); 'There are two unborn ones--one who knows, one who does not know--one strong, the other weak' (Svet. Up. I, 9); 'Let us know Him, the highest of Lords, the great Lord, the highest deity of deities, the master of masters, the highest above the god, the lord of the world, the adorable one' (Svet. Up. VI, 7); 'Of him there is known no effect (body) or instrument; no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is revealed as manifold, forming his essential nature, as knowledge, strength, and action' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'That is the Self, free from sin, ageless, deathless, griefless, free from hunger and thirst, whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5). These and other texts declare that to Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, there belong many excellent qualities--among which that of being a knowing subject stands first, and that Brahman is free from all evil qualities. That the texts referring to Brahman as free from qualities, and those which speak of it as possessing qualities, have really one and the same object may be inferred from the last of the passages quoted above; the earlier part of which--'free from sin,' up to 'free from thirst'--denies of Brahman all evil qualities, while its latter part--'whose wishes are true,' and so on--asserts of its certain excellent qualities. As thus there is no contradiction between the two classes of texts, there is no reason whatever to assume that either of them has for its object something that is false.--With regard to the concluding passage of the Taittiriya-text, 'from whence all speech, together with the mind, turns away, unable to reach it [FOOTNOTE 82:1], ' we point out that with the passage 'From terror of it the wind blows,' there begins a declaration of the qualities of Brahman, and that the next section 'one hundred times that human bliss,' &c., makes statements as to the relative bliss enjoyed by the different classes of embodied souls; the concluding passage 'He who knows the bliss of that Brahman from whence all speech, together with the mind, turns away unable to reach it,' hence must be taken as proclaiming with emphasis the infinite nature of Brahman's auspicious qualities. Moreover, a clause in the chapter under discussion--viz. 'he obtains all desires, together with Brahman the all-wise' (II, 1)--which gives information as to the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman clearly declares the infinite nature of the qualities of the highest all-wise Brahman. The desires are the auspicious qualities of Brahman which are the objects of desire; the man who knows Brahman obtains, together with Brahman, all qualities of it. The expression 'together with' is meant to bring out the primary importance of the qualities; as also described in the so-called dahara-vidyâ (Ch. Up. VIII, 1). And that fruit and meditation are of the same character (i.e. that in meditations on Brahman its qualities are the chief matter of meditation, just as these qualities are the principal point in Brahman reached by the Devotee) is proved by the text 'According to what a man's thought is in this world, so will he be after he has departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1). If it be said that the passage 'By whom it is not thought by him it is thought', 'not understood by those who understand' (Ke. Up. II, 3), declares Brahman

not to be an object of knowledge; we deny this, because were it so, certain other texts would not teach that final Release results from knowledge; cp. 'He who knows Brahman obtains the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman.' And, moreover, the text 'He who knows Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing; he who knows Brahman as existing, him we know himself as existing' (Taitt Up. II, 6, 1), makes the existence and non-existence of the Self dependent on the existence and non-existence of knowledge which has Brahman for its object. We thus conclude that all scriptural texts enjoin just the knowledge of Brahman for the sake of final Release. This knowledge is, as we already know, of the nature of meditation, and what is to be meditated on is Brahman as possessing qualities. (The text from the Ke. Up. then explains itself as follows:--) We are informed by the passage 'from whence speech together with mind turns away, being unable to reach it', that the infinite Brahman with its unlimited excellences cannot be defined either by mind or speech as being so or so much, and from this we conclude the Kena text to mean that Brahman is not thought and not understood by those who understand it to be of a definitely limited nature; Brahman in truth being unlimited. If the text did not mean this, it would be self-contradictory, parts of it saying that Brahman is not thought and not understood, and other parts, that it is thought and is understood.

Now as regards the assertion that the text 'Thou mayest not see the seer of seeing; thou mayest not think the thinker of thinking' (Bri. Up. III, 5, 2), denies the existence of a seeing and thinking subject different from mere seeing and thinking--This view is refuted by the following interpretation. The text addresses itself to a person who has formed the erroneous opinion that the quality of consciousness or knowledge does not constitute the essential nature of the knower, but belongs to it only as an adventitious attribute, and tells him 'Do not view or think the Self to be such, but consider the seeing and thinking Self to have seeing and thinking for its essential nature.'--Or else this text may mean that the embodied Self which is the seer of seeing and the thinker of thinking should be set aside, and that only the highest Self--the inner Self of all beings--should be meditated upon.--Otherwise a conflict would arise with texts declaring the knowership of the Self, such as 'whereby should he know the knower?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15).

Your assertion that the text 'Bliss is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6, 1) proves pure Bliss to constitute the essential nature of Brahman is already disposed of by the refutation of the view that knowledge (consciousness) constitutes the essential nature of Brahman; Brahman being in reality the substrate only of knowledge. For by bliss we understand a pleasing state of consciousness. Such passages as 'consciousness, bliss is Brahman,' therefore mean 'consciousness--the essential character of which is bliss--is Brahman.' On this identity of the two things there rests that homogeneous character of Brahman, so much insisted upon by yourself. And in the same way as numerous passages teach that Brahman, while having knowledge for its essential nature, is at the same time a knowing subject; so other passages, speaking of Brahman as something separate from mere bliss, show it to be not mere bliss but a subject enjoying bliss; cp. 'That is one bliss of Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 8, 4); 'he knowing the bliss of Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 9, 1). To be a subject enjoying bliss is in fact the same as to be a conscious subject.

We now turn to the numerous texts which, according to the view of our opponent, negative the existence of plurality.--'Where there is duality as it were' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'There is not any plurality here; from death to death goes he who sees here any plurality' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'But when for him the Self alone has become all, by what means, and whom, should he see?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15) &c.--But what all these texts deny is only plurality in so far as contradicting that unity of the world which depends on its being in its entirety an effect of Brahman, and having Brahman for its inward ruling principle and its true Self. They do not, on the other hand, deny that plurality on Brahman's part which depends on its intention to become manifold--a plurality proved by the text 'May I be many, may I grow forth' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3). Nor can our

22632 opponent urge against this that, owing to the denial of plurality
 22633 contained in other passages this last text refers to something not real;
 22634 for it is an altogether laughable assertion that Scripture should at
 22635 first teach the doctrine, difficult to comprehend, that plurality as
 22636 suggested by Perception and the other means of Knowledge belongs to
 22637 Brahman also, and should afterwards negative this very doctrine!
 22638
 22639 Nor is it true that the text 'If he makes but the smallest "antaram" (i.
 22640 e. difference, interval, break) in it there is fear for him' (Taitt. Up.
 22641 II, 7) implies that he who sees plurality within Brahman encounters fear.
 22642 For the other text 'All this is Brahman; let a man meditate with calm
 22643 mind on all this as beginning, ending and breathing in it, i.e. Brahman'
 22644 (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1) teaches directly that reflection on the plurality
 22645 of Brahman is the cause of peace of mind. For this passage declares that
 22646 peace of mind is produced by a reflection on the entire world as
 22647 springing from, abiding within, and being absorbed into Brahman, and
 22648 thus having Brahman for its Self; and as thus the view of Brahman
 22649 constituting the Self of the world with all its manifold distinctions of
 22650 gods, men, animals, inanimate matter and so on, is said to be the cause
 22651 of peace of mind, and, consequently, of absence of fear, that same view
 22652 surely cannot be a 'cause of fear!--But how then is it that the Taitt.
 22653 text declares that 'there is fear for him'?--That text, we reply,
 22654 declares in its earlier part that rest in Brahman is the cause of
 22655 fearlessness ('when he finds freedom from fear, rest, in that which is
 22656 invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported; then he has obtained
 22657 fearlessness'); its latter part therefore means that fear takes place
 22658 when there is an interval, a break, in this resting in Brahman. As the
 22659 great Rishi says 'When Vâsudeva is not meditated on for an hour or even
 22660 a moment only; that is loss, that is great calamity, that is error, that
 22661 is change.'
 22662
 22663 The Sûtra III, 2, ii does not, as our opponent alleges, refer to a
 22664 Brahman free from all difference, but to Brahman as possessing
 22665 attributes--as we shall show in its place. And the Sûtra IV, 2, 3
 22666 declares that the things seen in dreams are mere 'Mâyâ' because they
 22667 differ in character from the things perceived in the waking state; from
 22668 which it follows that the latter things are real.
 22669
 22670 [FOOTNOTE 82:1. Which passage appears to refer to a nirguna brahman,
 22671 whence it might be inferred that the connected initial passage--'Satyam
 22672 jñanam,' &c.--has a similar purport.]
 22673
 22674
 22675
 22676
 22677 Nor do Smriti and Purâna teach such a doctrine.
 22678
 22679 Nor is it true that also according to Smriti and Purânas only non-
 22680 differenced consciousness is real and everything else unreal.--'He who
 22681 knows me as unborn and without a beginning, the supreme Lord of the
 22682 worlds' (Bha. Gî. X, 3); 'All beings abide in me, I abide not in them.
 22683 Nay, the beings abide not in me--behold my lordly power. My Self
 22684 bringing forth the beings supports them but does not abide in them' (Bha.
 22685 Gî. IX, 4, 5); 'I am the origin and the dissolution of the entire world;
 22686 higher than I there is nothing else: on me all this is strung as pearls
 22687 on a thread' (Bha. Gî. VII, 6, 7); 'Pervading this entire Universe by a
 22688 portion (of mine) I abide' (Bha. Gî. X, 42); 'But another, the highest
 22689 Person, is called the highest Self who, pervading the three worlds
 22690 supports them, the eternal Lord. Because I transcend the Perishable and
 22691 am higher than the Imperishable even, I am among the people and in the
 22692 Veda celebrated as the supreme Person' (Bha. Gî. XV, 17, 18).
 22693
 22694 'He transcends the fundamental matter of all beings, its modifications,
 22695 properties and imperfections; he transcends all investing (obscuring)
 22696 influences, he who is the Self of all. Whatever (room) there is in the
 22697 interstices of the world is filled by him; all auspicious qualities
 22698 constitute his nature. The whole creation of beings is taken out of a
 22699 small part of his power. Assuming at will whatever form he desires he
 22700 bestows benefits on the whole world effected by him. Glory, strength,

22701 dominion, wisdom, energy, power and other attributes are collected in
22702 him, Supreme of the supreme in whom no troubles abide, ruler over high
22703 and low, lord in collective and distributive form, non-manifest and
22704 manifest, universal lord, all-seeing, all-knowing, all-powerful, highest
22705 Lord. The knowledge by which that perfect, pure, highest, stainless
22706 homogeneous (Brahman) is known or perceived or comprehended--that is
22707 knowledge: all else is ignorance' (Vishnu Purâna VI, 5, 82-87).--'To
22708 that pure one of mighty power, the highest Brahman to which no term is
22709 applicable, the cause of all causes, the name "Bhagavat" is suitable.
22710 The letter bha implies both the cherisher and supporter; the letter ga
22711 the leader, mover and creator. The two syllables bhaga indicate the six
22712 attributes--dominion, strength, glory, splendour, wisdom, dispassion.
22713 That in him--the universal Self, the Self of the beings--all beings
22714 dwell and that he dwells in all, this is the meaning of the letter va.
22715 Wisdom, might, strength, dominion, glory, without any evil qualities,
22716 are all denoted by the word bhagavat. This great word bhagavat is the
22717 name of Vâsudeva who is the highest Brahman--and of no one else. This
22718 word which denotes persons worthy of reverence in general is used in its
22719 primary sense with reference to Vâsudeva only; in a derived sense with
22720 regard to other persons' (Vi. Pu. VI, 5, 72 ff.); 'Where all these
22721 powers abide, that is the form of him who is the universal form: that is
22722 the great form of Hari. That form produces in its sport forms endowed
22723 with all powers, whether of gods or men or animals. For the purpose of
22724 benefiting the worlds, not springing from work (karman) is this action
22725 of the unfathomable one; all-pervading, irresistible' (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 69-
22726 71); 'Him who is of this kind, stainless, eternal, all-pervading,
22727 imperishable, free from all evil, named Vishnu, the highest abode' (Vi.
22728 Pu. I, 22,53); 'He who is the highest of the high, the Person, the
22729 highest Self, founded on himself; who is devoid of all the
22730 distinguishing characteristics of colour, caste and the like; who is
22731 exempt from birth, change, increase, decay and death; of whom it can
22732 only be said that he ever is. He is everywhere and in him everything
22733 abides; hence he is called Vâsudeva by those who know. He is Brahman,
22734 eternal, supreme, imperishable, undecaying; of one essential nature and
22735 ever pure, as free from all defects. This whole world is Brahman,
22736 comprising within its nature the Evolved and the Unevolved; and also
22737 existing in the form of the Person and in that of time' (Vi. Pu. I, 2,
22738 10-14); 'The Prakriti about which I told and which is Evolved as well as
22739 Unevolved, and the Person--both these are merged in the highest Self.
22740 The highest Self is the support of all, the highest Lord; as Vishnu he
22741 is praised in the Vedas and the Vedânta-texts' (Vi. Pu. VI, 4, 38, 39).
22742 'Two forms are there of that Brahman, one material, the other immaterial.
22743 These two forms, perishable and imperishable, are within all things: the
22744 imperishable one is the highest Brahman, the perishable one this whole
22745 world. As the light of a fire burning in one place spreads all around,
22746 so the energy of the highest Brahman constitutes this entire world' (Vi.
22747 Pu. I, 23,53-55). 'The energy of Vishnu is the highest, that which is
22748 called the embodied soul is inferior; and there is another third energy
22749 called karman or Nescience, actuated by which the omnipresent energy of
22750 the embodied soul perpetually undergoes the afflictions of worldly
22751 existence. Obscured by Nescience the energy of the embodied soul is
22752 characterised in the different beings by different degrees of
22753 perfection' (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 61-63).

22754
22755 These and other texts teach that the highest Brahman is essentially free
22756 from all imperfection whatsoever, comprises within itself all auspicious
22757 qualities, and finds its pastime in originating, preserving, reabsorbing,
22758 pervading, and ruling the universe; that the entire complex of
22759 intelligent and non-intelligent beings (souls and matter) in all their
22760 different estates is real, and constitutes the form, i.e. the body of
22761 the highest Brahman, as appears from those passages which co-ordinate it
22762 with Brahman by means of terms such as sarîra (body), rūpa (form), tanu
22763 (body), amsa (part), sakti (power), vibhûti (manifestation of power),
22764 and so on;--that the souls which are a manifestation of Brahman's power
22765 exist in their own essential nature, and also, through their connexion
22766 with matter, in the form of embodied souls (kshetrajña);--and that the
22767 embodied souls, being engrossed by Nescience in the form of good and
22768 evil works, do not recognise their essential nature, which is knowledge,
22769 but view themselves as having the character of material things.--The

22770 outcome of all this is that we have to cognise Brahman as carrying
22771 plurality within itself, and the world, which is the manifestation of
22772 his power, as something real.

22773
22774 When now the text, in the sloka 'where all difference has vanished' (Vi.
22775 Pu. VI, 7, 53), declares that the Self, although connected with the
22776 different effects of Prakriti, such as divine, human bodies, and so on,
22777 yet is essentially free from all such distinctions, and therefore not
22778 the object of the words denoting those different classes of beings, but
22779 to be defined as mere knowledge and Being; to be known by the Self and
22780 not to be reached by the mind of the practitioner of Yoga (yogayuj);
22781 this must in no way be understood as denying the reality of the world.--
22782 But how is this known?--As follows, we reply. The chapter of the Purâna
22783 in which that sloka occurs at first declares concentration (Yoga) to be
22784 the remedy of all the afflictions of the Samsâra; thereupon explains the
22785 different stages of Yoga up to the so-called pratyâhâra (complete
22786 restraining of the senses from receiving external impressions); then, in
22787 order to teach the attainment of the 'perfect object' (subhâsraya)
22788 required for dhâranâ, declares that the highest Brahman, i. e. Vishnu,
22789 possesses two forms, called powers (sakti), viz. a denuded one (mûrta)
22790 and an undefined one (amûrta); and then teaches that a portion of the
22791 'defined' form, viz. the embodied soul (kshetrajña), which is
22792 distinguished by its connexion with matter and involved in Nescience--
22793 that is termed 'action,' and constitutes a third power--is not perfect.
22794 The chapter further teaches that a portion of the undefined form which
22795 is free from Nescience called action, separated from all matter, and
22796 possessing the character of pure knowledge, is also not the 'perfect
22797 object,' since it is destitute of essential purity; and, finally,
22798 declares that the 'perfect object' is to be found in that defined form
22799 which is special to Bhagavat, and which is the abode of the three powers,
22800 viz. that non-defined form which is the highest power, that non-defined
22801 form which is termed embodied soul, and constitutes the secondary
22802 (apara) power, and Nescience in the form of work--which is called the
22803 third power, and is the cause of the Self, which is of the essence of
22804 the highest power, passing into the state of embodied soul. This defined
22805 form (which is the 'perfect object') is proved by certain Vedânta-texts,
22806 such as 'that great person of sun-like lustre' (Svet. Up. III, 8). We
22807 hence must take the sloka, 'in which all differences vanish,' &c., to
22808 mean that the pure Self (the Self in so far as knowledge only) is not
22809 capable of constituting the 'perfect object.' Analogously two other
22810 passages declare 'Because this cannot be reflected upon by the beginner
22811 in Yoga, the second (form) of Vishnu is to be meditated upon by Yogins--
22812 the highest abode.' 'That in which all these powers have their abode,
22813 that is the other great form of Hari, different from the (material)
22814 Visva form.'

22815
22816 In an analogous manner, Parâsara declares that Brahmâ, Katurmukha,
22817 Sanaka, and similar mighty beings which dwell within this world, cannot
22818 constitute the 'perfect object' because they are involved in Nescience;
22819 after that goes on to say that the beings found in the Samsâra are in
22820 the same condition--for they are essentially devoid of purity since they
22821 reach their true nature, only later on, when through Yoga knowledge has
22822 arisen in them--; and finally teaches that the essential individual
22823 nature of the highest Brahman, i.e. Vishnu, constitutes the 'perfect
22824 object.' 'From Brahmâ down to a blade of grass, all living beings that
22825 dwell within this world are in the power of the Samsâra due to works,
22826 and hence no profit can be derived by the devout from making them
22827 objects of their meditation. They are all implicated in Nescience, and
22828 stand within the sphere of the Samsâra; knowledge arises in them only
22829 later on, and they are thus of no use in meditation. Their knowledge
22830 does not belong to them by essential nature, for it comes to them
22831 through something else. Therefore the stainless Brahman which possesses
22832 essential knowledge,' &c. &c.--All this proves that the passage 'in
22833 which all difference vanishes' does not mean to deny the reality of the
22834 world.

22835
22836 Nor, again, does the passage 'that which has knowledge for its essential
22837 nature' (Vi. Pu. 1,2,6) imply that the whole complex of things different
22838 from knowledge is false; for it declares only that the appearance of the

22839 Self--the essential nature of which is knowledge--as gods, men, and so
22840 on, is erroneous. A declaration that the appearance of mother o' pearl
22841 as silver is founded on error surely does not imply that all the silver
22842 in the world is unreal!--But if, on the ground of an insight into the
22843 oneness of Brahman and the world--as expressed in texts where the two
22844 appear in co-ordination--a text declares that it is an error to view
22845 Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, under the form of material
22846 things, this after all implies that the whole aggregate of things is
22847 false!--By no means, we rejoin. As our s  tra distinctly teaches that
22848 the highest Brahman, i. e. Vishnu, is free from all imperfections
22849 whatsoever, comprises within himself all auspicious qualities, and
22850 reveals his power in mighty manifestations, the view of the world's
22851 reality cannot possibly be erroneous. That information as to the oneness
22852 of two things by means of co-ordination does not allow of sublation (of
22853 either of the two), and is non-contradictory, we shall prove further on.
22854 Hence also the sloka last referred to does not sublate the reality of
22855 the world.

22856
22857 'That from whence these beings are born, by which, when born, they live,
22858 into which they enter when they die, endeavour to know that; that is
22859 Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 1). From this scriptural text we ascertain
22860 that Brahman is the cause of the origination, and so on, of the world.
22861 After this we learn from a Pur  na text ('He should make the Veda grow by
22862 means of Itih  sa and Pur  na; the Veda fears that a man of little reading
22863 may do it harm') that the Veda should be made to grow by Itih  sa and
22864 Pur  na. By this 'making to grow' we have to understand the elucidation
22865 of the sense of the Vedic texts studied by means of other texts,
22866 promulgated by men who had mastered the entire Veda and its contents,
22867 and by the strength of their devotion had gained full intuition of Vedic
22868 truth. Such 'making to grow' must needs be undertaken, since the purport
22869 of the entire Veda with all its S  kh  s cannot be fathomed by one who has
22870 studied a small part only, and since without knowing that purport we
22871 cannot arrive at any certitude.

22872
22873 The Vishnu Pur  na relates how Maitreya, wishing to have his knowledge of
22874 Vedic matters strengthened by the holy Par  sara, who through the favour
22875 of Pulastya and Vasishtha had obtained an insight into the true nature
22876 of the highest divinity, began to question Par  sara, 'I am desirous to
22877 hear from thee how this world originated, and how it will again
22878 originate in future, and of what it consists, and whence proceed animate
22879 and inanimate things; how and into what it has been resolved, and into
22880 what it will in future be resolved?' &c. (Vi. Pu. I, 1). The questions
22881 asked refer to the essential nature of Brahman, the different modes of
22882 the manifestation of its power, and the different results of
22883 propitiating it. Among the questions belonging to the first category,
22884 the question 'whence proceed animate and inanimate things?' relates to
22885 the efficient and the material cause of the world, and hence the clause
22886 'of what the world consists' is to be taken as implying a question as to
22887 what constitutes the Self of this world, which is the object of creation,
22888 sustentation, and dissolution. The reply to this question is given in
22889 the words 'and the world is He.' Now the identity expressed by this
22890 clause is founded thereon that he (i.e. Brahman or Vishnu) pervades the
22891 world as its Self in the character of its inward Ruler; and is not
22892 founded on unity of substance of the pervading principle and the world
22893 pervaded. The phrase 'consists of' (-maya) does not refer to an effect
22894 (so that the question asked would be as to the causal substance of which
22895 this world is an effect), for a separate question on this point would be
22896 needless. Nor does the--maya express, as it sometimes does--e.g. in the
22897 case of prana-maya [FOOTNOTE 92:1], the own sense of the word to which it
22898 is attached; for in that case the form of the reply 'and the world is
22899 He' (which implies a distinction between the world and Vishnu) would be
22900 inappropriate; the reply would in that case rather be 'Vishnu only.'
22901 What 'maya' actually denotes here is abundance, prevailingness, in
22902 agreement with P  nini, V, 4, 21, and the meaning is that Brahman
22903 prevails in the world in so far as the entire world constitutes its body.
22904 The co-ordination of the two words 'the world' and 'He' thus rests on
22905 that relation between the two, owing to which the world is the body of
22906 Brahman, and Brahman the Self of the world. If, on the other hand, we
22907 maintained that the s  tra aims only at inculcating the doctrine of one

substance free from all difference, there would be no sense in all those questions and answers, and no sense in an entire nastra devoted to the explanation of that one thing. In that case there would be room for one question only, viz. 'what is the substrate of the erroneous imagination of a world?' and for one answer to this question, viz. 'pure consciousness devoid of all distinction!'"--And if the co-ordination expressed in the clause 'and the world is he' was meant to set forth the absolute oneness of the world and Brahman, then it could not be held that Brahman possesses all kinds of auspicious qualities, and is opposed to all evil; Brahman would rather become the abode of all that is impure. All this confirms the conclusion that the co-ordination expressed in that clause is to be understood as directly teaching the relation between a Self and its body.--The sloka, 'From Vishnu the world has sprung: in him he exists: he is the cause of the subsistence and dissolution of this world: and the world is he' (Vi. Pu. I, 1, 35), states succinctly what a subsequent passage--beginning with 'the highest of the high' (Vi. Pu. I, 2, 10)--sets forth in detail. Now there the sloka, 'to the unchangeable one' (I, 2, 1), renders homage to the holy Vishnu, who is the highest Brahman in so far as abiding within his own nature, and then the text proceeds to glorify him in his threefold form as Hiranyagarbha, Hari, and Sankara, as Pradhâna, Time, and as the totality of embodied souls in their combined and distributed form. Here the sloka, 'Him whose essential nature is knowledge' (I, 2, 6), describes the aspect of the highest Self in so far as abiding in the state of discrete embodied souls; the passage cannot therefore be understood as referring to a substance free from all difference. If the sâstra aimed at teaching that the erroneous conception of a manifold world has for its substrate a Brahman consisting of non-differenced intelligence, there would be room neither for the objection raised in I, 3, I ('How can we attribute agency creative and otherwise to Brahman which is without qualities, unlimited, pure, stainless?') nor for the refutation of that objection, 'Because the powers of all things are the objects of (true) knowledge excluding all (bad) reasoning, therefore there belong to Brahman also such essential powers as the power of creating, preserving, and so on, the world; just as heat essentially belongs to fire [FOOTNOTE 94:1].' In that case the objection would rather be made in the following form: 'How can Brahman, which is without qualities, be the agent in the creation, preservation, and so on, of the world?' and the answer would be, 'Creation by Brahman is not something real, but something erroneously imagined.'--The purport of the objection as it stands in the text is as follows: 'We observe that action creative and otherwise belongs to beings endowed with qualities such as goodness, and so on, not perfect, and subject to the influence of karman; how then can agency creative, and so on, be attributed to Brahman which is devoid of qualities, perfect, not under the influence of karman, and incapable of any connexion with action?' And the reply is, 'There is nothing unreasonable in holding that Brahman as being of the nature described above, and different in kind from all things perceived, should possess manifold powers; just as fire, which is different in kind from water and all other material substances, possesses the quality of heat and other qualities.' The slokas also, which begin with the words 'Thou alone art real' (Vi. Pu. I, 4, 38 ff.), do not assert that the whole world is unreal, but only that, as Brahman is the Self of the world, the latter viewed apart from Brahman is not real. This the text proceeds to confirm, 'thy greatness it is by which all movable and immovable things are pervaded.' This means--because all things movable and immovable are pervaded by thee, therefore all this world has thee for its Self, and hence 'there is none other than thee' and thus thou being the Self of all art alone real. Such being the doctrine intended to be set forth, the text rightly says, 'this all-pervasiveness of thine is thy greatness'; otherwise it would have to say, 'it is thy error.' Were this latter view intended, words such as 'Lord of the world,' 'thou,' &c., could not, moreover, be taken in their direct sense, and there would arise a contradiction with the subject-matter of the entire chapter, viz. the praise of the Holy one who in the form of a mighty boar had uplifted in play the entire earth.--Because this entire world is thy form in so far as it is pervaded as its Self by thee whose true nature is knowledge; therefore those who do not possess that devotion which enables men to view thee as the Self of all, erroneously view this world as consisting

22977 only of gods, men, and other beings; this is the purport of the next
22978 sloka, 'this which is seen.'--And it is an error not only to view the
22979 world which has its real Self in thee as consisting of gods, men, and so
22980 on, but also to consider the Selfs whose true nature is knowledge as
22981 being of the nature of material beings such as gods, men, and the like;
22982 this is the meaning of the next sloka, 'this world whose true nature is
22983 knowledge.'--Those wise men, on the other hand, who have an insight into
22984 the essentially intelligent Self, and whose minds are cleared by
22985 devotion--the means of apprehending the Holy one as the universal Self--
22986 they view this entire world with all its manifold bodies--the effects of
22987 primeval matter--as thy body--a body the Self of which is constituted by
22988 knowledge abiding apart from its world-body; this is the meaning of the
22989 following sloka: 'But those who possess knowledge,' &c.--If the
22990 different slokas were not interpreted in this way, they would be mere
22991 unmeaning reiterations; their constitutive words could not be taken in
22992 their primary sense; and we should come into conflict with the sense of
22993 the passages, the subject-matter of the chapter, and the purport of the
22994 entire sâstra. The passage, further, 'Of that Self although it exists in
22995 one's own and in other bodies, the knowledge is of one kind' (Vi. Pu. II,
22996 14, 31 ff.), refers to that view of duality according to which the
22997 different Selfs--although equal in so far as they are all of the essence
22998 of knowledge--are constituted into separate beings, gods, men, &c., by
22999 their connexion with different portions of matter all of which are
23000 modifications of primary matter, and declares that view to be false. But
23001 this does not imply a denial of the duality which holds good between
23002 matter on the one hand and Self on the other: what the passage means is
23003 that the Self which dwells in the different material bodies of gods, men,
23004 and so on, is of one and the same kind. So the Holy one himself has said,
23005 'In the dog and the low man eating dog's flesh the wise see the same';
23006 'Brahman, without any imperfection, is the same' (Bha. Gî. V, 18, 19).
23007 And, moreover, the clause 'Of the Self although existing in one's own
23008 and in other bodies' directly declares that a thing different from the
23009 body is distributed among one's own and other bodies.

23010
23011 Nor does the passage 'If there is some other (para) different (anya)
23012 from me,' &c. (Vi. Pu. II, 13, 86) intimate the oneness of the Self; for
23013 in that case the two words 'para' and 'anya' would express one meaning
23014 only (viz. 'other' in the sense of 'distinct from'). The word 'para'
23015 there denotes a Self distinct from that of one's own Self, and the word
23016 'anya' is introduced to negative a character different from that of pure
23017 intelligence: the sense of the passage thus is 'If there is some Self
23018 distinct from mine, and of a character different from mine which is pure
23019 knowledge, then it can be said that I am of such a character and he of a
23020 different character'; but this is not the case, because all Selfs are
23021 equal in as far as their nature consists of pure knowledge.--Also the
23022 sloka beginning 'Owing to the difference of the holes of the flute' (Vi.
23023 Pu. II, 14, 32) only declares that the inequality of the different Selfs
23024 is owing not to their essential nature, but to their dwelling in
23025 different material bodies; and does not teach the oneness of all Selfs.
23026 The different portions of air, again, passing through the different
23027 holes of the flute--to which the many Selfs are compared--are not said
23028 to be one but only to be equal in character; they are one in character
23029 in so far as all of them are of the nature of air, while the different
23030 names of the successive notes of the musical scale are applied to them
23031 because they pass out by the different holes of the instrument. For an
23032 analogous reason the several Selfs are denominated by different names,
23033 viz. gods and so on. Those material things also which are parts of the
23034 substance fire, or water, or earth, are one in so far only as they
23035 consist of one kind of substance; but are not absolutely one; those
23036 different portions of air, therefore, which constitute the notes of the
23037 scale are likewise not absolutely one. Where the Purâna further says 'He
23038 (or "that") I am and thou art He (or "that"); all this universe that has
23039 Self for its true nature is He (or "that"); abandon the error of
23040 distinction' (Vi. Pu. II, 16, 23); the word 'that' refers to the
23041 intelligent character mentioned previously which is common to all Selfs,
23042 and the co-ordination stated in the two clauses therefore intimates that
23043 intelligence is the character of the beings denoted 'I' and 'Thou';
23044 'abandon therefore,' the text goes on to say, 'the illusion that the
23045 difference of outward form, divine and so on, causes a corresponding

23046 difference in the Selfs.' If this explanation were not accepted (but
23047 absolute non-difference insisted upon) there would be no room for the
23048 references to difference which the passages quoted manifestly contain.
23049

23050 Accordingly the text goes on to say that the king acted on the
23051 instruction he had received, 'he abandoned the view of difference,
23052 having recognised the Real.'--But on what ground do we arrive at this
23053 decision (viz. that the passage under discussion is not meant to teach
23054 absolute non-duality)?--On the ground, we reply, that the proper topic
23055 of the whole section is to teach the distinction of the Self and the
23056 body--for this is evident from what is said in an early part of the
23057 section, 'as the body of man, characterised by hands, feet, and the like,'
23058 &c. (Vi. Pu. II, 13, 85).--For analogous reasons the sloka 'When that
23059 knowledge which gives rise to distinction' &c. (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 94)
23060 teaches neither the essential unity of all Selfs nor the oneness of the
23061 individual Self and the highest Self. And that the embodied soul and the
23062 highest Self should be essentially one, is no more possible than that
23063 the body and the Self should be one. In agreement herewith Scripture
23064 says, 'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of
23065 them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up.
23066 III, 1, 1). 'There are two drinking their reward in the world of their
23067 own works, entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those
23068 who know Brahman call them shade and light,' &c. (Ka. Up. I, 3, 1). And
23069 in this sâstra also (i.e. the Vishnu Purâna) there are passages of
23070 analogous import; cp. the stanzas quoted above, 'He transcends the
23071 causal matter, all effects, all imperfections such as the gunas' &c.
23072

23073 The Sûtras also maintain the same doctrine, cp. I, 1, 17; I, 2, 21; II,
23074 1, 22; and others. They therein follow Scripture, which in several
23075 places refers to the highest and the individual soul as standing over
23076 against each other, cp. e.g. 'He who dwells in the Self and within the
23077 Self, whom the Self does not know, whose body the Self is, who rules the
23078 Self from within' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Embraced by the intelligent
23079 Self (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 21); 'Mounted by the intelligent Self (IV, 3, 35).
23080 Nor can the individual Self become one with the highest Self by freeing
23081 itself from Nescience, with the help of the means of final Release; for
23082 that which admits of being the abode of Nescience can never become quite
23083 incapable of it. So the Purâna says, 'It is false to maintain that the
23084 individual Self and the highest Self enter into real union; for one
23085 substance cannot pass over into the nature of another substance.'
23086 Accordingly the Bhagavad Gîtâ declares that the released soul attains
23087 only the same attributes as the highest Self. 'Abiding by this knowledge,
23088 they, attaining to an equality of attributes with me, do neither come
23089 forth at the time of creation, nor are troubled at the time of general
23090 destruction' (XIV, 2). Similarly our Purâna says, 'That Brahman leads
23091 him who meditates on it, and who is capable of change, towards its own
23092 being (âtmabhâva), in the same way as the magnet attracts the iron' (Vi.
23093 Pu. VI, 7, 30). Here the phrase 'leads him towards his own being' means
23094 'imparts to him a nature like his own' (not 'completely identifies him
23095 with itself'); for the attracted body does not become essentially one
23096 with the body attracting.
23097

23098 The same view will be set forth by the Sûtrakâra in IV, 4, 17; 21, and I,
23099 3, 2. The Vritti also says (with reference to Sû. IV, 4, 17) 'with the
23100 exception of the business of the world (the individual soul in the state
23101 of release) is equal (to the highest Self) through light'; and the
23102 author of the Dramidabhâshya says, 'Owing to its equality (sâyujya) with
23103 the divinity the disembodied soul effects all things, like the divinity.'
23104 The following scriptural texts establish the same view, 'Those who
23105 depart from hence, after having known the Self and those true desires,
23106 for them there is freedom in all the worlds' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 6); 'He
23107 who knows Brahman reaches the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'He obtains
23108 all desires together with the intelligent Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1);
23109 'Having reached the Self which consists of bliss, he wanders about in
23110 these worlds having as much food and assuming as many forms as he likes'
23111 (Taitt. Up. III, 10, 5); 'There he moves about' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3);
23112 'For he is flavour; for only after having perceived a flavour can any
23113 one perceive pleasure' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); 'As the flowing rivers go to
23114 their setting in the sea, losing name and form; thus he who knows, freed

23115 from name and form, goes to the divine Person who is higher than the
 23116 high' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8); 'He who knows, shaking off good and evil,
 23117 reaches the highest oneness, free from stain' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3).
 23118
 23119 The objects of meditation in all the vidyās which refer to the highest
 23120 Brahman, are Brahman viewed as having qualities, and the fruit of all
 23121 those meditations. For this reason the author of the Sūtras declares
 23122 that there is option among the different vidyās--cp. Ve. Sū. III, 3, II;
 23123 III., 3, 59. In the same way the Vākyakāra teaches that the qualified
 23124 Brahman only is the object of meditation, and that there is option of
 23125 vidyās; where he says '(Brahman) connected (with qualities), since the
 23126 meditation refers to its qualities.' The same view is expressed by the
 23127 Bhāshyakāra in the passage beginning 'Although he who bases himself on
 23128 the knowledge of Being.'--Texts such as 'He knows Brahman, he becomes
 23129 Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9) have the same purport, for they must be
 23130 taken in connexion with the other texts (referring to the fate of him
 23131 who knows) such as 'Freed from name and form he goes to the divine
 23132 Person who is higher than the high'; 'Free from stain he reaches the
 23133 highest oneness' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8; III, 1,3); 'Having approached the
 23134 highest light he manifests himself in his own shape' (Kh. Up. VIII, 3,
 23135 4). Of him who has freed himself from his ordinary name and form, and
 23136 all the distinctions founded thereon, and has assumed the uniform
 23137 character of intelligence, it may be said that he is of the character of
 23138 Brahman.--Our Purāna also propounds the same view. The sloka (VI, 7, 91),
 23139 'Knowledge is the means to obtain what is to be obtained, viz. the
 23140 highest Brahman: the Self is to be obtained, freed from all kinds of
 23141 imagination,' states that that Self which through meditation on Brahman,
 23142 is freed from all imagination so as to be like Brahman, is the object to
 23143 be attained. (The three forms of imagination to be got rid of are so-
 23144 called karma-bhāvanā, brahma-bhāvanā and a combination of the two. See
 23145 Vi. Pu. VI, 7.) The text then goes on, 'The embodied Self is the user of
 23146 the instrument, knowledge is its instrument; having accomplished Release--
 23147 whereby his object is attained--he may leave off.' This means that the
 23148 Devotee is to practise meditation on the highest Brahman until it has
 23149 accomplished its end, viz. the attainment of the Self free from all
 23150 imagination.--The text continues, 'Having attained the being of its
 23151 being, then he is non-different from the highest Self; his difference is
 23152 founded on Nescience only.' This sloka describes the state of the
 23153 released soul. 'Its being' is the being, viz. the character or nature,
 23154 of Brahman; but this does not mean absolute oneness of nature; because
 23155 in this latter case the second 'being' would be out of place and the
 23156 sloka would contradict what had been said before. The meaning is: when
 23157 the soul has attained the nature of Brahman, i.e. when it has freed
 23158 itself from all false imagination, then it is non-different from the
 23159 highest Self. This non-difference is due to the soul, as well as the
 23160 highest Self, having the essential nature of uniform intelligence. The
 23161 difference of the soul--presenting itself as the soul of a god, a man,
 23162 &c.--from the highest Self is not due to its essential nature, but rests
 23163 on the basis of Nescience in the form of work: when through meditation
 23164 on Brahman this basis is destroyed, the difference due to it comes to an
 23165 end, and the soul no longer differs from the highest Self. So another
 23166 text says, 'The difference of things of one nature is due to the
 23167 investing agency of outward works; when the difference of gods, men,
 23168 &c., is destroyed, it has no longer any investing power' (Vi. Pu. II,
 23169 14, 33).--The text then adds a further explanation, 'when the knowledge
 23170 which gives rise to manifold difference is completely destroyed, who
 23171 then will produce difference that has no real existence?' The manifold
 23172 difference is the distinction of gods, men, animals, and inanimate
 23173 things: compare the saying of Saunaka: 'this fourfold distinction is
 23174 founded on false knowledge.' The Self has knowledge for its essential
 23175 nature; when Nescience called work--which is the cause of the manifold
 23176 distinctions of gods, men, &c.--has been completely destroyed through
 23177 meditation on the highest Brahman, who then will bring about the
 23178 distinction of gods, & c., from the highest Self--a distinction which in
 23179 the absence of a cause cannot truly exist.--That Nescience is called
 23180 karman (work) is stated in the same chapter of the Purāna (st.
 23181 61--avidyā karmasamjña).
 23182
 23183 The passage in the Bhagavad Gītā, 'Know me to be the kshetrajña' (XIII,

2), teaches the oneness of all in so far as the highest Self is the inward ruler of all; taken in any other sense it would be in conflict with other texts, such as 'All creatures are the Perishable, the unchanging soul is the Imperishable; but another is the highest Person' (Bha. Gî. XV, 16). In other places the Divine one declares that as inward Ruler he is the Self of all: 'The Lord dwells in the heart of all creatures' (XVIII, 61), and 'I dwell within the heart of all' (XV, 15). and 'I am the Self which has its abode within all creatures' (X, 20). The term 'creature' in these passages denotes the entire aggregate of body, &c., up to the Self.--Because he is the Self of all, the text expressly denies that among all the things constituting his body there is any one separate from him, 'There is not anything which is without me' (X, 39). The place where this text occurs is the winding up of a glorification of the Divine one, and the text has to be understood accordingly. The passage immediately following is 'Whatever being there is, powerful, beautiful, or glorious, even that know thou to have sprung from a portion of my glory; pervading this entire Universe by a portion of mine I do abide' (X, 41; 42).

All this clearly proves that the authoritative books do not teach the doctrine of one non-differenced substance; that they do not teach that the universe of things is false; and that they do not deny the essential distinction of intelligent beings, non-intelligent things, and the Lord.

[FOOTNOTE 92:1. 'Prânamaya' is explained as meaning 'prana' only.]

[FOOTNOTE 94:1. The sense in which this sloka has to be taken is 'As in ordinary life we ascribe to certain things (e.g. gems, mantras) certain special powers because otherwise the effects they produce could not be accounted for; so to Brahman also,' &c.]

The theory of Nescience cannot be proved.

We now proceed to the consideration of Nescience.--According to the view of our opponent, this entire world, with all its endless distinctions of Ruler, creatures ruled, and so on, is, owing to a certain defect, fictitiously superimposed upon the non-differenced, self-luminous Reality; and what constitutes that defect is beginningless Nescience, which invests the Reality, gives rise to manifold illusions, and cannot be denned either as being or non-being. Such Nescience, he says, must necessarily be admitted, firstly on the ground of scriptural texts, such as 'Hidden by what is untrue' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2), and secondly because otherwise the oneness of the individual souls with Brahman--which is taught by texts such as 'Thou are that'--cannot be established. This Nescience is neither 'being,' because in that case it could not be the object of erroneous cognition (bhrama) and sublation (bâdha); nor is it 'non-being,' because in that case it could not be the object of apprehension and sublation [FOOTNOTE 102:1]. Hence orthodox Philosophers declare that this Nescience falls under neither of these two opposite categories.

Now this theory of Nescience is altogether untenable. In the first place we ask, 'What is the substrate of this Nescience which gives rise to the great error of plurality of existence?' You cannot reply 'the individual soul'; for the individual soul itself exists in so far only as it is fictitiously imagined through Nescience. Nor can you say 'Brahman'; for Brahman is nothing but self-luminous intelligence, and hence contradictory in nature to Nescience, which is avowedly sublated by knowledge.

'The highest Brahman has knowledge for its essential nature: if Nescience, which is essentially false and to be terminated by knowledge, invests Brahman, who then will be strong enough to put an end to it?'

'What puts an end to Nescience is the knowledge that Brahman is pure

23253 knowledge!'"--'Not so, for that knowledge also is, like Brahman, of the
23254 nature of light, and hence has no power to put an end to Nescience.--And
23255 if there exists the knowledge that Brahman is knowledge, then Brahman is
23256 an object of knowledge, and that, according to your own teaching,
23257 implies that Brahman is not of the nature of consciousness.'

23258
23259 To explain the second of these slokas.--If you maintain that what
23260 sublates Nescience is not that knowledge which constitutes Brahman's
23261 essential nature, but rather that knowledge which has for its object the
23262 truth of Brahman being of such a nature, we demur; for as both these
23263 kinds of knowledge are of the same nature, viz. the nature of light,
23264 which is just that which constitutes Brahman's nature, there is no
23265 reason for making a distinction and saying that one knowledge is
23266 contradictory of Nescience, and the other is not. Or, to put it
23267 otherwise--that essential nature of Brahman which is apprehended through
23268 the cognition that Brahman is knowledge, itself shines forth in
23269 consequence of the self-luminous nature of Brahman, and hence we have no
23270 right to make a distinction between that knowledge which constitutes
23271 Brahman's nature, and that of which that nature is the object, and to
23272 maintain that the latter only is antagonistic to Nescience.--Moreover
23273 (and this explains the third sloka), according to your own view Brahman,
23274 which is mere consciousness, cannot be the object of another
23275 consciousness, and hence there is no knowledge which has Brahman for its
23276 object. If, therefore, knowledge is contradictory to non-knowledge
23277 (Nescience), Brahman itself must be contradictory to it, and hence
23278 cannot be its substrate. Shells (mistaken for silver) and the like which
23279 by themselves are incapable of throwing light upon their own true nature
23280 are not contradictory to non-knowledge of themselves, and depend, for
23281 the termination of that non-knowledge, on another knowledge (viz. on the
23282 knowledge of an intelligent being); Brahman, on the other hand, whose
23283 essential nature is established by its own consciousness, is
23284 contradictorily opposed to non-knowledge of itself, and hence does not
23285 depend, for the termination of that non-knowledge, on some other
23286 knowledge.--If our opponent should argue that the knowledge of the
23287 falsity of whatever is other than Brahman is contradictory to non-
23288 knowledge, we ask whether this knowledge of the falsity of what is other
23289 than Brahman is contradictory to the non-knowledge of the true nature of
23290 Brahman, or to that non-knowledge which consists in the view of the
23291 reality of the apparent world. The former alternative is inadmissible;
23292 because the cognition of the falsity of what is other than Brahman has a
23293 different object (from the non-knowledge of Brahman's true nature) and
23294 therefore cannot be contradictory to it; for knowledge and non-knowledge
23295 are contradictory in so far only as they refer to one and the same
23296 object. And with regard to the latter alternative we point out that the
23297 knowledge of the falsity of the world is contradictory to the non-
23298 knowledge which consists in the view of the reality of the world; the
23299 former knowledge therefore sublates the latter non-knowledge only, while
23300 the non-knowledge of the true nature of Brahman is not touched by it.--
23301 Against this it will perhaps be urged that what is here called the non-
23302 knowledge of the true nature of Brahman, really is the view of Brahman
23303 being dual in nature, and that this view is put an end to by the
23304 cognition of the falsity of whatever is other than Brahman; while the
23305 true nature of Brahman itself is established by its own consciousness.--
23306 But this too we refuse to admit. If non-duality constitutes the true
23307 nature of Brahman, and is proved by Brahman's own consciousness, there
23308 is room neither for what is contradictory to it, viz. that non-knowledge
23309 which consists in the view of duality, nor for the sublation of that non-
23310 knowledge.--Let then non-duality be taken for an attribute (not the
23311 essential nature) of Brahman!--This too we refuse to admit; for you
23312 yourself have proved that Brahman, which is pure Consciousness, is free
23313 from attributes which are objects of Consciousness.--From all this it
23314 follows that Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, cannot be the
23315 substrate of Nescience: the theory, in fact, involves a flat
23316 contradiction.

23317
23318 When, in the next place, you maintain that Brahman, whose nature is
23319 homogeneous intelligence, is invested and hidden by Nescience, you
23320 thereby assert the destruction of Brahman's essential nature. Causing
23321 light to disappear means either obstructing the origination of light, or

23322 else destroying light that exists. And as you teach that light
23323 (consciousness) cannot originate, the 'hiding' or 'making to disappear'
23324 of light can only mean its destruction.--Consider the following point
23325 also. Your theory is that self-luminous consciousness, which is without
23326 object and without substrate, becomes, through the influence of an
23327 imperfection residing within itself, conscious of itself as connected
23328 with innumerable substrata and innumerable objects.--Is then, we ask, that
23329 imperfection residing within consciousness something real or something
23330 unreal?--The former alternative is excluded, as not being admitted by
23331 yourself. Nor can we accept the latter alternative; for if we did we
23332 should have to view that imperfection as being either a knowing subject,
23333 or an object of knowledge, or Knowing itself. Now it cannot be 'Knowing,'
23334 as you deny that there is any distinction in the nature of knowing;
23335 and that 'Knowing,' which is the substrate of the imperfection, cannot
23336 be held to be unreal, because that would involve the acceptance of the
23337 Mādhyamika doctrine, viz. of a general void [FOOTNOTE 106:1].
23338

23339 And if knowers, objects of knowledge and knowing as determined by those
23340 two are fictitious, i.e. unreal, we have to assume another fundamental
23341 imperfection, and are thus driven into a regressus in infinitum.--To
23342 avoid this difficulty, it might now be said that real consciousness
23343 itself, which constitutes Brahman's nature, is that imperfection.--But
23344 if Brahman itself constitutes the imperfection, then Brahman is the
23345 basis of the appearance of a world, and it is gratuitous to assume an
23346 additional avidyā to account for the world. Moreover, as Brahman is
23347 eternal, it would follow from this hypothesis that no release could ever
23348 take place. Unless, therefore, you admit a real imperfection apart from
23349 Brahman, you are unable to account for the great world-error.
23350

23351 What, to come to the next point, do you understand by the
23352 inexplicability (anirvakaniyatā) of Nescience? Its difference in nature
23353 from that which is, as well as that which is not! A thing of such
23354 kind would be inexplicable indeed; for none of the means of knowledge
23355 apply to it. That is to say--the whole world of objects must be ordered
23356 according to our states of consciousness, and every state of
23357 consciousness presents itself in the form, either of something existing
23358 or of something non-existing. If, therefore, we should assume that of
23359 states of consciousness which are limited to this double form, the
23360 object can be something which is neither existing nor non-existing, then
23361 anything whatever might be the object of any state of consciousness
23362 whatever.
23363

23364 Against this our opponent may now argue as follows:--There is, after all,
23365 something, called avidyā, or ajñāna, or by some other name, which is a
23366 positive entity (bhāva), different from the antecedent non-existence of
23367 knowledge; which effects the obscuration of the Real; which is the
23368 material cause of the erroneous superimposition on the Real, of manifold
23369 external and internal things; and which is terminated by the cognition
23370 of the true nature of the one substance which constitutes Reality. For
23371 this avidyā is apprehended through Perception as well as Inference.
23372 Brahman, in so far as limited by this avidyā, is the material cause of
23373 the erroneous superimposition--upon the inward Self, which in itself is
23374 changeless pure intelligence, but has its true nature obscured by this
23375 superimposition--of that plurality which comprises the ahamkāra, all
23376 acts of knowledge and all objects of knowledge. Through special forms of
23377 this defect (i.e. avidyā) there are produced, in this world superimposed
23378 upon Reality, the manifold special superimpositions presenting
23379 themselves in the form of things and cognitions of things--such as
23380 snakes (superimposed upon ropes), silver (superimposed on shells), and
23381 the like. Avidyā constitutes the material cause of this entire false
23382 world; since for a false thing we must needs infer a false cause. That
23383 this avidyā or ajñāna (non-knowledge) is an object of internal
23384 Perception, follows from the fact that judgments such as 'I do not know',
23385 'I do not know either myself or others,' directly present themselves to
23386 the mind. A mental state of this kind has for its object not that non-
23387 knowledge which is the antecedent non-existence of knowledge--for such
23388 absence of knowledge is ascertained by the sixth means of proof
23389 (anupalabdhi); it rather is a state which presents its object directly,
23390 and thus is of the same kind as the state expressed in the judgment 'I

23391 am experiencing pleasure.' Even if we admit that 'absence of something'
23392 (abhâva) can be the object of perception, the state of consciousness
23393 under discussion cannot have absence of knowledge in the Self for its
23394 object. For at the very moment of such consciousness knowledge exists;
23395 or if it does not exist there can be no consciousness of the absence of
23396 knowledge. To explain. When I am conscious that I am non-knowing, is
23397 there or is there not apprehension of the Self as having non-existence
23398 of knowledge for its attribute, and of knowledge as the counterentity of
23399 non-knowledge? In the former case there can be no consciousness of the
23400 absence of knowledge, for that would imply a contradiction. In the
23401 latter case, such consciousness can all the less exist, for it
23402 presupposes knowledge of that to which absence of knowledge belongs as
23403 an attribute (viz. the Self) and of its own counterentity, viz.
23404 knowledge. The same difficulty arises if we view the absence of
23405 knowledge as either the object of Inference, or as the object of the
23406 special means of proof called 'abhâva' (i.e. anupalabdhi). If, on the
23407 other hand, non-knowledge is viewed (not as a merely negative, but) as a
23408 positive entity, there arises no contradiction even if there is (as
23409 there is in fact) at the same time knowledge of the Self as qualified by
23410 non-knowledge, and of knowledge as the counterentity of non-knowledge;
23411 and we therefore must accept the conclusion that the state of
23412 consciousness expressed by 'I am non-knowing,' has for its object a non-
23413 knowledge which is a positive entity.--But, a Nescience which is a
23414 positive entity, contradicts the witnessing consciousness, whose nature
23415 consists in the lighting up of the truth of things! Not so, we reply.
23416 Witnessing consciousness has for its object not the true nature of
23417 things, but Nescience; for otherwise the lighting up (i.e. the
23418 consciousness) of false things could not take place. Knowledge which has
23419 for its object non-knowledge (Nescience), does not put an end to that
23420 non-knowledge. Hence there is no contradiction (between kaitanya and
23421 ajñana).--But, a new objection is raised, this positive entity,
23422 Nescience, becomes an object of witnessing Consciousness, only in so far
23423 as it (Nescience) is defined by some particular object (viz. the
23424 particular thing which is not known), and such objects depend for their
23425 proof on the different means of knowledge. How then can that Nescience,
23426 which is defined by the 'I' (as expressed e. g. in the judgment, 'I do
23427 not know myself'), become the object of witnessing Consciousness?--There
23428 is no difficulty here, we reply. All things whatsoever are objects of
23429 Consciousness, either as things known or as things not known. But while
23430 the mediation of the means of knowledge is required in the case of all
23431 those things which, as being non-intelligent (jada), can be proved only
23432 in so far as being objects known (through some means of knowledge), such
23433 mediation is not required in the case of the intelligent (ajada) inner
23434 Self which proves itself. Consciousness of Nescience is thus possible in
23435 all cases (including the case 'I do not know myself'), since witnessing
23436 Consciousness always gives definition to Nescience.--From all this it
23437 follows that, through Perception confirmed by Reasoning, we apprehend
23438 Nescience as a positive entity. This Nescience, viewed as a positive
23439 entity, is also proved by Inference, viz. in the following form: All
23440 knowledge established by one of the different means of proof is preceded
23441 by something else, which is different from the mere antecedent non-
23442 existence of knowledge; which hides the object of knowledge; which is
23443 terminated by knowledge; and which exists in the same place as knowledge;
23444 because knowledge possesses the property of illumining things not
23445 illumined before;--just as the light of a lamp lit in the dark illumines
23446 things.--Nor must you object to this inference on the ground that
23447 darkness is not a substance, but rather the mere absence of light, or
23448 else the absence of visual perception of form and colour, and that hence
23449 darkness cannot be brought forward as a similar instance proving
23450 Nescience to be a positive entity. For that Darkness must be considered
23451 a positive substance follows, firstly, from its being more or less dense,
23452 and secondly, from its being perceived as having colour.

23453
23454 To all this we make the following reply. Neither Perception alone, nor
23455 Perception aided by Reasoning, reveals to us a positive entity,
23456 Nescience, as implied in judgments such as 'I am non-knowing,' 'I know
23457 neither myself nor others.' The contradiction which was urged above
23458 against the view of non-knowledge being the antecedent non-existence of
23459 knowledge, presents itself equally in connexion with non-knowledge

viewed as a positive entity. For here the following alternative presents itself--the inner Reality is either known or not known as that which gives definition to Nescience by being either its object or its substrate. If it be thus known, then there is in it no room for Nescience which is said to be that which is put an end to by the cognition of the true nature of the Inner Reality. If, on the other hand, it be not thus known, how should there be a consciousness of Nescience in the absence of that which defines it, viz. knowledge of the substrate or of the object of Nescience?--Let it then be said that what is contradictory to non-knowledge is the clear presentation of the nature of the inner Self, and that (while there is consciousness of ajñāna) we have only an obscure presentation of the nature of the Self; things being thus, there is no contradiction between the cognition of the substrate and object of Nescience on the one side, and the consciousness of ajñāna on the other.--Well, we reply, all this holds good on our side also. Even if ajñāna means antecedent non-existence of knowledge, we can say that knowledge of the substrate and object of non-knowledge has for its object the Self presented obscurely only; and thus there is no difference between our views--unless you choose to be obstinate!

Whether we view non-knowledge as a positive entity or as the antecedent non-existence of knowledge, in either case it comes out as what the word indicates, viz. non-knowledge. Non-knowledge means either absence of knowledge, or that which is other than knowledge, or that which is contradictory to knowledge; and in any of these cases we have to admit that non-knowledge presupposes the cognition of the nature of knowledge. Even though the cognition of the nature of darkness should not require the knowledge of the nature of light, yet when darkness is considered under the aspect of being contrary to light, this presupposes the cognition of light. And the non-knowledge held by you is never known in its own nature but merely as 'non-knowledge,' and it therefore presupposes the cognition of knowledge no less than our view does, according to which non-knowledge is simply the negation of knowledge. Now antecedent non-existence of knowledge is admitted by you also, and is an undoubted object of consciousness; the right conclusion therefore is that what we are conscious of in such judgments as 'I am non-knowing,' &c., is this very antecedent non-existence of knowledge which we both admit.

It, moreover, is impossible to ascribe to Brahman, whose nature is constituted by eternal free self-luminous intelligence, the consciousness of Nescience; for what constitutes its essence is consciousness of itself. If against this you urge that Brahman, although having consciousness of Self for its essential nature, yet is conscious of non-knowledge in so far as its (Brahman's) nature is hidden; we ask in return what we have to understand by Brahman's nature being hidden. You will perhaps say 'the fact of its not being illumined.' But how, we ask, can there be absence of illumination of the nature of that whose very nature consists in consciousness of Self, i.e. self-illumination? If you reply that even that whose nature is consciousness of Self may be in the state of its nature not being illumined by an outside agency, we point out that as according to you light cannot be considered as an attribute, but constitutes the very nature of Brahman, it would--illumination coming from an external agency--follow that the very nature of Brahman can be destroyed from the outside. This we have already remarked.--Further, your view implies on the one hand that this non-knowledge which is the cause of the concealment of Brahman's nature hides Brahman in so far as Brahman is conscious of it, and on the other hand that having hidden Brahman, it becomes the object of consciousness on the part of Brahman; and this evidently constitutes a logical see-saw. You will perhaps say [FOOTNOTE 111:1] that it hides Brahman in so far only as Brahman is conscious of it. But, we point out, if the consciousness of ajñāna takes place on the part of a Brahman whose nature is not hidden, the whole hypothesis of the 'hiding' of Brahman's nature loses its purport, and with it the fundamental hypothesis as to the nature of ajñāna; for if Brahman may be conscious of ajñāna (without a previous obscuration of its nature by ajñāna) it may as well be held to be in the same way conscious of the world, which, by you, is considered to be an effect of ajñāna.

23529
23530 How, further, do you conceive this consciousness of ajnâna on Brahman's
23531 part? Is it due to Brahman itself, or to something else? In the former
23532 case this consciousness would result from Brahman's essential nature,
23533 and hence there would never be any Release. Or else, consciousness of
23534 ajnâna constituting the nature of Brahman, which is admittedly pure
23535 consciousness, in the same way as the consciousness of false silver is
23536 terminated by that cognition which sublates the silver, so some
23537 terminating act of cognition would eventually put an end to Brahman's
23538 essential nature itself.--On the second alternative we ask what that
23539 something else should be. If you reply 'another ajnâna,' we are led into
23540 a regressus in infinitum.--Let it then be said [FOOTNOTE 112:1] that
23541 ajnâna having first hidden Brahman then becomes the object of its
23542 consciousness. This, we rejoin, would imply that ajnâna acting like a
23543 defect of the eye by its very essential being hides Brahman, and then
23544 ajnâna could not be sublated by knowledge. Let us then put the case as
23545 follows:--Ajnâna, which is by itself beginningless, at the very same
23546 time effects Brahman's witnessing it (being conscious of it), and
23547 Brahman's nature being hidden; in this way the regressus in infinitum
23548 and other difficulties will be avoided.--But this also we cannot admit;
23549 for Brahman is essentially consciousness of Self, and cannot become a
23550 witnessing principle unless its nature be previously hidden.--Let then
23551 Brahman be hidden by some other cause!--This, we rejoin, would take away
23552 from ajnâna its alleged beginninglessness, and further would also lead
23553 to an infinite regress. And if Brahman were assumed to become a witness,
23554 without its essential nature being hidden, it could not possess--what
23555 yet it is maintained to possess--the uniform character of consciousness
23556 of Self.--If, moreover, Brahman is hidden by avidyâ, does it then not
23557 shine forth at all, or does it shine forth to some extent? On the former
23558 alternative the not shining forth of Brahman--whose nature is mere light--
23559 reduces it to an absolute non-entity. Regarding the latter alternative
23560 we ask, 'of Brahman, which is of an absolutely homogeneous nature, which
23561 part do you consider to be concealed, and which to shine forth?' To that
23562 substance which is pure light, free from all division and distinction,
23563 there cannot belong two modes of being, and hence obscuration and light
23564 cannot abide in it together.--Let us then say that Brahman, which is
23565 homogeneous being, intelligence, bliss, has its nature obscured by
23566 avidyâ, and hence is seen indistinctly as it were.--But how, we ask, are
23567 we to conceive the distinctness or indistinctness of that whose nature
23568 is pure light? When an object of light which has parts and
23569 distinguishing attributes appears in its totality, we say that it
23570 appears distinctly; while we say that its appearance is indistinct when
23571 some of its attributes do not appear. Now in those aspects of the thing
23572 which do not appear, light (illumination) is absent altogether, and
23573 hence we cannot there speak of indistinctness of light; in those parts
23574 on the other hand which do appear, the light of which they are the
23575 object is distinct. Indistinctness is thus not possible at all where
23576 there is light. In the case of such things as are apprehended as objects,
23577 indistinctness may take place, viz. in so far as some of their
23578 distinguishing attributes are not apprehended. But in Brahman, which is
23579 not an object, without any distinguishing attributes, pure light, the
23580 essential nature of which it is to shine forth, indistinctness which
23581 consists in the non-apprehension of certain attributes can in no way be
23582 conceived, and hence not be explained as the effect of avidyâ.

23583
23584 We, moreover, must ask the following question: 'Is this indistinctness
23585 which you consider an effect of avidyâ put an end to by the rise of true
23586 knowledge or not?' On the latter alternative there would be no final
23587 release. In the former case we have to ask of what nature Reality is.
23588 'It is of an essentially clear and distinct nature.' Does this nature
23589 then exist previously (to the cessation of indistinctness), or not? If
23590 it does, there is no room whatever either for indistinctness the effect
23591 of avidyâ, or for its cessation. If it does not previously exist, then
23592 Release discloses itself as something to be effected, and therefore non-
23593 eternal.--And that such non-knowledge is impossible because there is no
23594 definable substrate for it we have shown above.--He, moreover, who holds
23595 the theory of error resting on a non-real defect, will find it difficult
23596 to prove the impossibility of error being without any substrate; for, if
23597 the cause of error may be unreal, error may be supposed to take place

23598 even in case of its substrate being unreal. And the consequence of this
23599 would be the theory of a general Void.

23600
23601 The assertion, again, that non-knowledge as a positive entity is proved
23602 by Inference, also is groundless. But the inference was actually set
23603 forth!--True; but it was set forth badly. For the reason you employed
23604 for proving ajñāna is a so-called contradictory one (i.e. it proves the
23605 contrary of what it is meant to prove), in so far as it proves what is
23606 not desired and what is different from ajñāna (for what it proves is
23607 that there is a certain _knowledge_, viz. that all knowledge resting on
23608 valid means of proof has non-knowledge for its antecedent). (And with
23609 regard to this knowledge again we must ask whether it also has non-
23610 knowledge for its antecedent.) If the reason (relied on in all this
23611 argumentation) does not prove, in this case also, the antecedent
23612 existence of positive non-knowledge, it is too general (and hence not to
23613 be trusted in any case). If, on the other hand, it does prove antecedent
23614 non-knowledge, then this latter non-knowledge stands in the way of the
23615 non-knowledge (which you try to prove by inference) being an object of
23616 consciousness, and thus the whole supposition of ajñāna as an entity
23617 becomes useless.

23618
23619 The proving instance, moreover, adduced by our opponent, has no proving
23620 power; for the light of a lamp does not possess the property of
23621 illumining things not illumined before. Everywhere illumining power
23622 belongs to knowledge only; there may be light, but if there is not also
23623 Knowledge there is no lighting up of objects. The senses also are only
23624 causes of the origination of knowledge, and possess no illumining power.
23625 The function of the light of the lamp on the other hand is a merely
23626 auxiliary one, in so far as it dispels the darkness antagonistic to the
23627 organ of sight which gives rise to knowledge; and it is only with a view
23628 to this auxiliary action that illumining power is conventionally
23629 ascribed to the lamp.--But in using the light of the lamp as a proving
23630 instance, we did not mean to maintain that it possesses illumining power
23631 equal to that of light; we introduced it merely with reference to the
23632 illumining power of knowledge, in so far as preceded by the removal of
23633 what obscures its object!--We refuse to accept this explanation.
23634 Illuminating power does not only mean the dispelling of what is
23635 antagonistic to it, but also the defining of things, i.e. the rendering
23636 them capable of being objects of empirical thought and speech; and this
23637 belongs to knowledge only (not to the light of the lamp). If you allow
23638 the power of illumining what was not illumined, to auxiliary factors
23639 also, you must first of all allow it to the senses which are the most
23640 eminent factors of that kind; and as in their case there exists no
23641 different thing to be terminated by their activity, (i.e. nothing
23642 analogous to the ajñāna to be terminated by knowledge), this whole
23643 argumentation is beside the point.

23644
23645 There are also formal inferences, opposed to the conclusion of the
23646 pūrvapakshin.--Of the ajñāna under discussion, Brahman, which is mere
23647 knowledge, is not the substrate, just because it is ajñāna; as shown by
23648 the case of the non-knowledge of the shell (mistaken for silver) and
23649 similar cases; for such non-knowledge abides within the knowing subject.--
23650 The ajñāna under discussion does not obscure knowledge, just because it
23651 is ajñāna; as shown by the cases of the shell, &c.; for such non-
23652 knowledge hides the object.--Ajñāna is not terminated by knowledge,
23653 because it does not hide the object of knowledge; whatever non-knowledge
23654 is terminated by knowledge, is such as to hide the object of knowledge;
23655 as e.g. the non-knowledge of the shell.--Brahman is not the substrate of
23656 ajñāna, because it is devoid of the character of knowing subject; like
23657 jars and similar things.--Brahman is not hidden by ajñāna, because it is
23658 not the object of knowledge; whatever is hidden by non-knowledge is the
23659 object of knowledge; so e.g. shells and similar things.--Brahman is not
23660 connected with non-knowledge to be terminated by knowledge, because it
23661 is not the object of knowledge; whatever is connected with non-knowledge
23662 to be terminated by knowledge is an object of knowledge; as e.g. shells
23663 and the like. Knowledge based on valid means of proof, has not for its
23664 antecedent, non-knowledge other than the antecedent non-existence of
23665 knowledge; just because it is knowledge based on valid proof; like that
23666 valid knowledge which proves the ajñāna maintained by you.--Knowledge

23667 does not destroy a real thing, because it is knowledge in the absence of
23668 some specific power strengthening it; whatever is capable of destroying
23669 things is--whether it be knowledge or ajñāna--strengthened by some
23670 specific power; as e.g. the knowledge of the Lord and of Yogins; and as
23671 the ajñāna consisting in a pestle (the blow of which destroys the pot).
23672

23673 Ajñāna which has the character of a positive entity cannot be destroyed
23674 by knowledge; just because it is a positive entity, like jars and
23675 similar things.
23676

23677 But, it now may be said, we observe that fear and other affections,
23678 which are positive entities and produced by previous cognitions, are
23679 destroyed by sublative acts of cognition!--Not so, we reply. Those
23680 affections are not destroyed by knowledge; they rather pass away by
23681 themselves, being of a momentary (temporary) nature only, and on the
23682 cessation of their cause they do not arise again. That they are of a
23683 momentary nature only, follows from their being observed only in
23684 immediate connexion with the causes of their origination, and not
23685 otherwise. If they were not of a temporary nature, each element of the
23686 stream of cognitions, which are the cause of fear and the like, would
23687 give rise to a separate feeling of fear, and the result would be that
23688 there would be consciousness of many distinct feelings of fear (and this
23689 we know not to be the case).--In conclusion we remark that in defining
23690 right knowledge as 'that which has for its antecedent another entity,
23691 different from its own antecedent non-existence,' you do not give proof
23692 of very eminent logical acuteness; for what sense has it to predicate of
23693 an entity that it is different from nonentity?--For all these reasons
23694 Inference also does not prove an ajñāna which is a positive entity. And
23695 that it is not proved by Scripture and arthâpatti, will be shown later
23696 on. And the reasoning under Sû. II, 1, 4. will dispose of the argument
23697 which maintains that of a false thing the substantial cause also must be
23698 false.
23699

23700 We thus see that there is no cognition of any kind which has for its
23701 object a Nescience of 'inexplicable' nature.--Nor can such an
23702 inexplicable entity be admitted on the ground of apprehension, erroneous
23703 apprehension and sublation (cp. above, p. 102). For that only which is
23704 actually apprehended, can be the object of apprehension, error and
23705 sublation, and we have no right to assume, as an object of these states
23706 of consciousness, something which is apprehended neither by them nor any
23707 other state of consciousness.--'But in the case of the shell, &c.,
23708 silver is actually apprehended, and at the same time there arises the
23709 sublating consciousness "this silver is not real," and it is not
23710 possible that one thing should appear as another; we therefore are
23711 driven to the hypothesis that owing to some defect, we actually
23712 apprehend silver of an altogether peculiar kind, viz. such as can be
23713 defined neither as real nor as unreal.'--This also we cannot allow,
23714 since this very assumption necessarily implies that one thing appears as
23715 another. For apprehension, activity, sublation, and erroneous cognition,
23716 all result only from one thing appearing as another, and it is not
23717 reasonable to assume something altogether non-perceived and groundless.
23718 The silver, when apprehended, is not apprehended as something
23719 'inexplicable,' but as something real; were it apprehended under the
23720 former aspect it could be the object neither of erroneous nor of
23721 sublative cognition, nor would the apprehending person endeavour to
23722 seize it. For these reasons you (the anirva-kaniyatva-vâdin) also must
23723 admit that the actual process is that of one thing appearing as another.
23724

23725 Those also who hold other theories as to the kind of cognition under
23726 discussion (of which the shell, mistaken for silver, is an instance)
23727 must--whatsoever effort they may make to avoid it--admit that their
23728 theory finally implies the appearing of one thing as another. The so-
23729 called asatkhyâti-view implies that the non-existing appears as existing;
23730 the âtmakhyâti-view, that the Self--which here means 'cognition'--
23731 appears as a thing; and the akhyâti-view, that the attribute of one
23732 thing appears as that of another, that two acts of cognition appear as
23733 one, and--on the view of the non-existence of the object--that the non-
23734 existing appears as existing [FOOTNOTE 118:1].
23735

23736 Moreover, if you say that there is originated silver of a totally new
23737 inexplicable kind, you are bound to assign the cause of this origination.
23738 This cause cannot be the perception of the silver; for the perception
23739 has the silver for its object, and hence has no existence before the
23740 origination of the silver. And should you say that the perception,
23741 having arisen without an object, produces the silver and thereupon makes
23742 it its object, we truly do not know what to say to such excellent
23743 reasoning!--Let it then be said that the cause is some defect in the
23744 sense-organ.--This, too, is inadmissible; for a defect abiding in the
23745 percipient person cannot produce an objective effect.--Nor can the
23746 organs of sense (apart from defects) give rise to the silver; for they
23747 are causes of cognitions only (not of things cognised). Nor, again, the
23748 sense-organs in so far as modified by some defect; for they also can
23749 only produce modifications in what is effected by them, i.e. cognition.
23750 And the hypothesis of a beginningless, false ajñāna constituting the
23751 general material cause of all erroneous cognitions has been refuted
23752 above.

23753
23754 How is it, moreover, that this new and inexplicable thing (which you
23755 assume to account for the silver perceived on the shell) becomes to us
23756 the object of the idea and word 'silver,' and not of some other idea and
23757 term, e.g. of a jar?--If you reply that this is due to its similarity to
23758 silver, we point out that in that case the idea and the word presenting
23759 themselves to our mind should be that of 'something resembling silver.'
23760 Should you, on the other hand, say that we apprehend the thing as silver
23761 because it possesses the generic characteristics of silver, we ask
23762 whether these generic characteristics are real or unreal. The former
23763 alternative is impossible, because something real cannot belong to what
23764 is unreal; and the latter is impossible because something unreal cannot
23765 belong to what is real.

23766
23767 But we need not extend any further this refutation of an altogether ill-
23768 founded theory.

23769
23770 [FOOTNOTE 102:1. 'Nescience' is sublated (refuted) by the cognition of
23771 Brahman, and thereby shown to have been the object of erroneous
23772 cognition: it thus cannot be 'being,' i.e. real. Nor can it be
23773 altogether unreal, 'non-being,' because in that case it could not be the
23774 object either of mental apprehension or of sublation.]

23775
23776 [FOOTNOTE 106:1. If the imperfection inhering in Consciousness is itself
23777 of the nature of consciousness, and at the same time unreal, we should
23778 have to distinguish two kinds of Consciousness--which is contrary to the
23779 fundamental doctrine of the oneness of Consciousness. And if, on the
23780 other hand, we should say that the Consciousness in which the
23781 imperfection inheres is of the same nature as the latter, i.e. unreal,
23782 we are landed in the view of universal unreality.]

23783
23784 [FOOTNOTE 111:1. Allowing the former view of the question only.]

23785
23786 [FOOTNOTE 112:1. Adopting the latter view only; see preceding note.]

23787
23788 [FOOTNOTE 118:1. For a full explanation of the nature of these 'khyâtis,'
23789 see A. Venis' translation of the Vedānta Siddhānta Muktāvali (Reprint
23790 from the Pandit, p. 130 ff.).]

23791
23792
23793
23794
23795 All knowledge is of the Real.

23796
23797 'Those who understand the Veda hold that all cognition has for its
23798 object what is real; for Sruti and Smriti alike teach that everything
23799 participates in the nature of everything else. In the scriptural account
23800 of creation preceded by intention on the part of the Creator it is said
23801 that each of these elements was made tripartite; and this tripartite
23802 constitution of all things is apprehended by Perception as well. The red
23803 colour in burning fire comes from (primal elementary) fire, the white
23804 colour from water, the black colour from earth--in this way Scripture

23805 explains the threefold nature of burning fire. In the same way all
23806 things are composed of elements of all things. The Vishnu Purâna, in its
23807 account of creation, makes a similar statement: "The elements possessing
23808 various powers and being unconnected could not, without combination,
23809 produce living beings, not having mingled in any way. Having combined,
23810 therefore, with one another, and entering into mutual associations--
23811 beginning with the principle called Mahat, and extending down to the
23812 gross elements--they formed an egg," &c. (Vi. Pu. I, 2, 50; 52). This
23813 tripartiteness of the elements the Sûtrakâra also declares (Ve. Sû. III,
23814 1, 3). For the same reason Sruti enjoins the use of Putîka sprouts when
23815 no Soma can be procured; for, as the Mîmâmsakas explain, there are in
23816 the Putîka plant some parts of the Soma plant (Pû. Mî. Sû.); and for the
23817 same reason nîvâra grains may be used as a substitute for rice grains.
23818 That thing is similar to another which contains within itself some part
23819 of that other thing; and Scripture itself has thus stated that in shells,
23820 &c., there is contained some silver, and so on. That one thing is
23821 called "silver" and another "shell" has its reason in the relative
23822 preponderance of one or the other element. We observe that shells are
23823 similar to silver; thus perception itself informs us that some elements
23824 of the latter actually exist in the former. Sometimes it happens that
23825 owing to a defect of the eye the silver-element only is apprehended, not
23826 the shell-element, and then the percipient person, desirous of silver,
23827 moves to pick up the shell. If, on the other hand, his eye is free from
23828 such defect, he apprehends the shell-element and then refrains from
23829 action. Hence the cognition of silver in the shell is a true one. In the
23830 same way the relation of one cognition being sublated by another
23831 explains itself through the preponderant element, according as the
23832 preponderance of the shell-element is apprehended partially or in its
23833 totality, and does not therefore depend on one cognition having for its
23834 object the false thing and another the true thing. The distinctions made
23835 in the practical thought and business of life thus explain themselves on
23836 the basis of everything participating in the nature of everything else.'

23837
23838 In dreams, again, the divinity creates, in accordance with the merit or
23839 demerit of living beings, things of a special nature, subsisting for a
23840 certain time only, and perceived only by the individual soul for which
23841 they are meant. In agreement herewith Scripture says, with reference to
23842 the state of dreaming, 'There are no chariots in that state, no horses,
23843 no roads; then he creates chariots, horses, and roads. There are no
23844 delights, no joys, no bliss; then he creates delights, joys, and bliss.
23845 There are no tanks, no lakes, no rivers; then he creates tanks, lakes,
23846 and rivers. For he is the maker' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 10). The meaning of
23847 this is, that although there are then no chariots, &c., to be perceived
23848 by other persons, the Lord creates such things to be perceived by the
23849 dreaming person only. 'For he is the maker'; for such creative agency
23850 belongs to him who possesses the wonderful power of making all his
23851 wishes and plans to come true. Similarly another passage, 'That person
23852 who is awake in those who are asleep, shaping one lovely sight after
23853 another, that indeed is the Bright, that is Brahman, that alone is
23854 called the Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one goes
23855 beyond it' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 8).--The Sûtrakâra also, after having in two
23856 Sûtras (III, 2, 1; 2) stated the hypothesis of the individual soul
23857 creating the objects appearing in dreams, finally decides that that
23858 wonderful creation is produced by the Lord for the benefit of the
23859 individual dreamer; for the reason that as long as the individual soul
23860 is in the samsâra state, its true nature--comprising the power of making
23861 its wishes to come true--is not fully manifested, and hence it cannot
23862 practically exercise that power. The last clause of the Katha text ('all
23863 worlds are contained in it,' &c.) clearly shows that the highest Self
23864 only is the creator meant. That the dreaming person who lies in his
23865 chamber should go in his body to other countries and experience various
23866 results of his merit or demerit--being at one time crowned a king,
23867 having at another time his head cut off, and so on--is possible in so
23868 far as there is created for him another body in every way resembling the
23869 body resting on the bed.

23870
23871 The case of the white shell being seen as yellow, explains itself as
23872 follows. The visual rays issuing from the eye are in contact with the
23873 bile contained in the eye, and thereupon enter into conjunction with the

23874 shell; the result is that the whiteness belonging to the shell is
23875 overpowered by the yellowness of the bile, and hence not apprehended;
23876 the shell thus appears yellow, just as if it were gilt. The bile and its
23877 yellowness is, owing to its exceeding tenuity, not perceived by the
23878 bystanders; but thin though it be it is apprehended by the person
23879 suffering from jaundice, to whom it is very near, in so far as it issues
23880 from his own eye, and through the mediation of the visual rays, aided by
23881 the action of the impression produced on the mind by that apprehension,
23882 it is apprehended even in the distant object, viz. the shell.--In an
23883 analogous way the crystal which is placed near the rose is apprehended
23884 as red, for it is overpowered by the brilliant colour of the rose; the
23885 brilliancy of the rose is perceived in a more distinct way owing to its
23886 close conjunction with the transparent substance of the crystal.--In the
23887 same way the cognition of water in the mirage is true. There always
23888 exists water in connexion with light and earth; but owing to some defect
23889 of the eye of the perceiving person, and to the mysterious influence of
23890 merit and demerit, the light and the earth are not apprehended, while
23891 the water is apprehended.--In the case again of the firebrand swung
23892 round rapidly, its appearance as a fiery wheel explains itself through
23893 the circumstance that moving very rapidly it is in conjunction with all
23894 points of the circle described without our being able to apprehend the
23895 intervals. The case is analogous to that of the perception of a real
23896 wheel; but there is the difference that in the case of the wheel no
23897 intervals are apprehended, because there are none; while in the case of
23898 the firebrand none are apprehended owing to the rapidity of the movement.
23899 But in the latter case also the cognition is true.--Again, in the case
23900 of mirrors and similar reflecting surfaces the perception of one's own
23901 face is likewise true. The fact is that the motion of the visual rays
23902 (proceeding from the eye towards the mirror) is reversed (reflected) by
23903 the mirror, and that thus those rays apprehend the person's own face,
23904 subsequently to the apprehension of the surface of the mirror; and as in
23905 this case also, owing to the rapidity of the process, there is no
23906 apprehension of any interval (between the mirror and the face), the face
23907 presents itself as being in the mirror.--In the case of one direction
23908 being mistaken for another (as when a person thinks the south to be
23909 where the north is), the fact is that, owing to the unseen principle (i.
23910 e. merit or demerit), the direction which actually exists in the other
23911 direction (for a point which is to the north of me is to the south of
23912 another point) is apprehended by itself, apart from the other elements
23913 of direction; the apprehension which actually takes place is thus
23914 likewise true. Similar is the case of the double moon. Here, either
23915 through pressure of the finger upon the eye, or owing to some abnormal
23916 affection of the eye, the visual rays are divided (split), and the
23917 double, mutually independent apparatus of vision thus originating,
23918 becomes the cause of a double apprehension of the moon. One apparatus
23919 apprehends the moon in her proper place; the other which moves somewhat
23920 obliquely, apprehends at first a place close by the moon, and then the
23921 moon herself, which thus appears somewhat removed from her proper place.
23922 Although, therefore, what is apprehended is the one moon distinguished
23923 by connection with two places at the same time--an apprehension due to
23924 the double apparatus of vision--yet, owing to the difference of
23925 apprehensions, there is a difference in the character of the object
23926 apprehended, and an absence of the apprehension of unity, and thus a
23927 double moon presents itself to perception. That the second spot is
23928 viewed as qualifying the moon, is due to the circumstance that the
23929 apprehension of that spot, and that of the moon which is not apprehended
23930 in her proper place, are simultaneous. Now here the doubleness of the
23931 apparatus is real, and hence the apprehension of the moon distinguished
23932 by connexion with two places is real also, and owing to this doubleness
23933 of apprehension, the doubleness of aspect of the object apprehended, i.e.
23934 the moon, is likewise real. That there is only one moon constituting the
23935 true object of the double apprehension, this is a matter for which
23936 ocular perception by itself does not suffice, and hence what is actually
23937 seen is a double moon. That, although the two eyes together constitute
23938 one visual apparatus only, the visual rays being divided through some
23939 defect of the eyes, give rise to a double apparatus--this we infer from
23940 the effect actually observed. When that defect is removed there takes
23941 place only one apprehension of the moon as connected with her proper
23942 place, and thus the idea of one moon only arises. It is at the same time

quite clear how the defect of the eye gives rise to a double visual apparatus, the latter to a double apprehension, and the latter again to a doubleness of the object of apprehension.

We have thus proved that all cognition is true. The shortcomings of other views as to the nature of cognition have been set forth at length by other philosophers, and we therefore do not enter on that topic. What need is there, in fact, of lengthy proofs? Those who acknowledge the validity of the different means of knowledge, perception, and so on, and-- what is vouched for by sacred tradition--the existence of a highest Brahman--free from all shadow of imperfection, of measureless excellence, comprising within itself numberless auspicious qualities, all-knowing, immediately realising all its purposes-- , what should they not be able to prove? That holy highest Brahman--while producing the entire world as an object of fruition for the individual souls, in agreement with their respective good and ill deserts--creates certain things of such a nature as to become common objects of consciousness, either pleasant or unpleasant, to all souls together, while certain other things are created in such a way as to be perceived only by particular persons, and to persist for a limited time only. And it is this distinction--viz. of things that are objects of general consciousness, and of things that are not so--which makes the difference between what is called 'things sublating' and 'things sublated.'--Everything is explained hereby.

Neither Scripture nor Smriti and Purâna teach Nescience.

The assertion that Nescience--to be defined neither as that which is nor as that which is not--rests on the authority of Scripture is untrue. In passages such as 'hidden by the untrue' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2), the word 'untrue' does not denote the Undefinable; it rather means that which is different from 'rita,' and this latter word--as we see from the passage 'enjoying the rita' (Ka. Up. 1,3, 1)--denotes such actions as aim at no worldly end, but only at the propitiation of the highest Person, and thus enable the devotee to reach him. The word 'anrita' therefore denotes actions of a different kind, i.e. such as aim at worldly results and thus stand in the way of the soul reaching Brahman; in agreement with the passage 'they do not find that Brahma-world, for they are carried away by anrita' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2). Again, in the text 'Then there was neither non-Being nor Being' (Ri. Samh. X, 129, 1), the terms 'being' and 'non-being' denote intelligent and non-intelligent beings in their distributive state. What that text aims at stating is that intelligent and non-intelligent beings, which at the time of the origination of the world are called 'sat' and 'tyat' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), are, during the period of reabsorption, merged in the collective totality of non-intelligent matter which the text denotes by the term 'darkness' (Ri. Samh. X, 129, 3). There is thus no reference whatever to something 'not definable either as being or non-being': the terms 'being' and 'non-being' are applied to different mode; of being at different times. That the term 'darkness' denotes the collective totality of non-intelligent matter appears from another scriptural passage, viz, 'The Non-evolved (avyaktam) is merged in the Imperishable (akshara), the Imperishable in darkness (tamas), darkness becomes one with the highest divinity.' True, the word 'darkness' denotes the subtle condition of primeval matter (prakriti), which forms the totality of non-intelligent things; but this very Prakriti is called Mâyâ--in the text 'Know Prakriti to be Mâyâ,' and this proves it be something 'undefinable': Not so, we reply; we meet with no passages where the word 'Mâyâ' denotes that which is undefinable. But the word 'Mâyâ' is synonymous with 'mithyâ,' i.e. falsehood, and hence denotes the Undefinable also. This, too, we cannot admit; for the word 'Mâyâ' does not in all places refer to what is false; we see it applied e.g. to such things as the weapons of Asuras and Râkshasas, which are not 'false' but real. 'Mâyâ,' in such passages, really denotes that which produces various wonderful effects, and it is in this sense that Prakriti is called Mâyâ. This appears from the passage (Svet. Up. IV, 9) 'From that the "mâyin" creates all this, and in that the other one is bound up by

mâyâ.' For this text declares that Prakriti--there called Mâyâ--produces manifold wonderful creations, and the highest Person is there called 'mâyin' because he possesses that power of mâyâ; not on account of any ignorance or nescience on his part. The latter part of the text expressly says that (not the Lord but) another one, i.e. the individual soul is bound up by mâyâ; and therewith agrees another text, viz. 'When the soul slumbering in beginningless Mâyâ awakes' (Gaud. Kâ.). Again, in the text 'Indra goes multiform through the Mâyâs' (Ri. Samh. VI, 47, 18), the manifold powers of Indra are spoken of, and with this agrees what the next verse says, 'he shines greatly as Tvashtri': for an unreal being does not shine. And where the text says 'my Mâyâ is hard to overcome' (Bha. Gî. VII, 14), the qualification given there to Mâyâ, viz. 'consisting of the gunas,' shows that what is meant is Prakriti consisting of the three gunas.--All this shows that Scripture does not teach the existence of a 'principle called Nescience, not to be defined either as that which is or that which is not.'

Nor again is such Nescience to be assumed for the reason that otherwise the scriptural statements of the unity of all being would be unmeaning. For if the text 'Thou art that,' be viewed as teaching the unity of the individual soul and the highest Self, there is certainly no reason, founded on unmeaningness, to ascribe to Brahman, intimated by the word 'that'--which is all-knowing, &c.--Nescience, which is contradictory to Brahman's nature.--Itihâsa and Purâna also do not anywhere teach that to Brahman there belongs Nescience.

But, an objection is raised, the Vishnu Purâna, in the sloka, 'The stars are Vishnu,' &c. (II, 12, 38), first refers to Brahman as one only, and comprising all things within itself; thereupon states in the next sloka that this entire world, with all its distinctions of hills, oceans, &c., is sprung out of the 'ajñâna' of Brahman, which in itself is pure 'jñâna,' i.e. knowledge; thereupon confirms the view of the world having sprung from ajñâna by referring to the fact that Brahman, while abiding in its own nature, is free from all difference (sl. 40); proves in the next two slokas the non-reality of plurality by a consideration of the things of this world; sums up, in the following sloka, the unreality of all that is different from Brahman; then (43) explains that action is the root of that ajñâna which causes us to view the one uniform Brahman as manifold; thereupon declares the intelligence constituting Brahman's nature to be free from all distinction and imperfection (44); and finally teaches (45) that Brahman so constituted, alone is truly real, while the so-called reality of the world is merely conventional.--This is not, we reply, a true representation of the drift of the passage. The passage at the outset states that, in addition to the detailed description of the world given before, there will now be given a succinct account of another aspect of the world not yet touched upon. This account has to be understood as follows. Of this universe, comprising intelligent and non-intelligent beings, the intelligent part--which is not to be reached by mind and speech, to be known in its essential nature by the Self only, and, owing to its purely intelligential character, not touched by the differences due to Prakriti--is, owing to its imperishable nature, denoted as that which is; while the non-intelligent, material; part which, in consequence of the actions of the intelligent beings undergoes manifold changes, and thus is perishable, is denoted as that which is not. Both parts, however, form the body of Vâsudeva, i.e. Brahman, and hence have Brahman for their Self. The text therefore says (37), 'From the waters which form the body of Vishnu was produced the lotus-shaped earth, with its seas and mountains': what is meant is that the entire Brahma-egg which has arisen from water constitutes the body of which Vishnu is the soul. This relation of soul and body forms the basis of the statements of co-ordination made in the next sloka (38), 'The stars are Vishnu,' &c.; the same relation had been already declared in numerous previous passages of the Purâna ('all this is the body of Hari,' &c.). All things in the world, whether they are or are not, are Vishnu's body, and he is their soul. Of the next sloka, 'Because the Lord has knowledge for his essential nature,' the meaning is 'Because of the Lord who abides as the Self of all individual souls, the essential nature is knowledge only--while bodies divine, human, &c., have no part in it--', therefore all non-intelligent things, bodies human and divine,

24081 hills, oceans, &c., spring from his knowledge, i.e. have their root in
24082 the actions springing from the volitions of men, gods, &c., in whose
24083 various forms the fundamental intelligence manifests itself. And since
24084 non-intelligent matter is subject to changes corresponding to the
24085 actions of the individual souls, it may be called 'non-being,' while the
24086 souls are 'being.'--This the next sloka further explains 'when knowledge
24087 is pure,' &c. The meaning is 'when the works which are the cause of the
24088 distinction of things are destroyed, then all the distinctions of bodies,
24089 human or divine, hills, oceans, &c.--all which are objects of fruition
24090 for the different individual souls--pass away.' Non-intelligent matter,
24091 as entering into various states of a non-permanent nature, is called
24092 'non-being'; while souls, the nature of which consists in permanent
24093 knowledge, are called 'being.' On this difference the next sloka insists
24094 (41). We say 'it is' of that thing which is of a permanently uniform
24095 nature, not connected with the idea of beginning, middle and end, and
24096 which hence never becomes the object of the notion of non-existence;
24097 while we say 'it is not' of non-intelligent matter which constantly
24098 passes over into different states, each later state being out of
24099 connexion with the earlier state. The constant changes to which non-
24100 intelligent matter is liable are illustrated in the next sloka, 'Earth
24101 is made into a jar,' &c. And for this reason, the subsequent sloka goes
24102 on to say that there is nothing but knowledge. This fundamental
24103 knowledge or intelligence is, however, variously connected with manifold
24104 individual forms of being due to karman, and hence the text adds: 'The
24105 one intelligence is in many ways connected with beings whose minds
24106 differ, owing to the difference of their own acts' (sl 43, second half).
24107 Intelligence, pure, free from stain and grief, &c., which constitutes
24108 the intelligent element of the world, and unintelligent matter--these
24109 two together constitute the world, and the world is the body of Vāsudeva;
24110 such is the purport of sloka 44.--The next sloka sums up the whole
24111 doctrine; the words 'true and untrue' there denote what in the preceding
24112 verses had been called 'being' and 'non-being'; the second half of the
24113 sloka refers to the practical plurality of the world as due to karman.

24114
24115 Now all these slokas do not contain a single word supporting the
24116 doctrine of a Brahman free from all difference; of a principle called
24117 Nescience abiding within Brahman and to be defined neither as that which
24118 is nor as that which is not; and of the world being wrongly imagined,
24119 owing to Nescience. The expressions 'that which is' and 'that which is
24120 not' (sl 35), and 'satya' (true) and 'asatya' (untrue; sl 45), can in no
24121 way denote something not to be defined either as being or non-being. By
24122 'that which is not' or 'which is untrue,' we have to understand not what
24123 is undefinable, but that which has no true being, in so far as it is
24124 changeable and perishable. Of this character is all non-intelligent
24125 matter. This also appears from the instance adduced in sl 42: the jar is
24126 something perishable, but not a thing devoid of proof or to be sublated
24127 by true knowledge. 'Non-being' we may call it, in so far as while it is
24128 observed at a certain moment in a certain form it is at some other
24129 moment observed in a different condition. But there is no contradiction
24130 between two different conditions of a thing which are perceived at
24131 different times; and hence there is no reason to call it something
24132 futile (tuchcha) or false (mithyā), &c.

24133
24134
24135
24136
24137 Scripture does not teach that Release is due to the knowledge of a non-
24138 qualified Brahman.--the meaning of 'tat tvam asi.'

24139
24140 Nor can we admit the assertion that Scripture teaches the cessation of
24141 avidyā to spring only from the cognition of a Brahman devoid of all
24142 difference. Such a view is clearly negatived by passages such as the
24143 following: 'I know that great person of sun-like lustre beyond darkness;
24144 knowing him a man becomes immortal, there is no other path to go' (Svet.
24145 Up. III, 8); 'All moments sprang from lightning, the Person--none is
24146 lord over him, his name is great glory--they who know him become
24147 immortal' (Mahānā. Up. I, 8-11). For the reason that Brahman is
24148 characterised by difference all Vedic texts declare that final release
24149 results from the cognition of a qualified Brahman. And that even those

24150 texts which describe Brahman by means of negations really aim at setting
24151 forth a Brahman possessing attributes, we have already shown above.
24152

24153 In texts, again, such as 'Thou art that,' the co-ordination of the
24154 constituent parts is not meant to convey the idea of the absolute unity
24155 of a non-differenced substance: on the contrary, the words 'that' and
24156 'thou' denote a Brahman distinguished by difference. The word 'that'
24157 refers to Brahman omniscient, &c., which had been introduced as the
24158 general topic of consideration in previous passages of the same section,
24159 such as 'It thought, may I be many'; the word 'thou,' which stands in co-
24160 ordination to 'that,' conveys the idea of Brahman in so far as having
24161 for its body the individual souls connected with non-intelligent matter.
24162 This is in accordance with the general principle that co-ordination is
24163 meant to express one thing subsisting in a twofold form. If such
24164 doubleness of form (or character) were abandoned, there could be no
24165 difference of aspects giving rise to the application of different terms,
24166 and the entire principle of co-ordination would thus be given up. And it
24167 would further follow that the two words co-ordinated would have to be
24168 taken in an implied sense (instead of their primary direct meaning). Nor
24169 is there any need of our assuming implication (lakshanā) in sentences
24170 [FOOTNOTE 130:1] such as 'this person is that Devadatta (known to me
24171 from former occasions)'; for there is no contradiction in the cognition
24172 of the oneness of a thing connected with the past on the one hand, and
24173 the present on the other, the contradiction that arises from difference
24174 of place being removed by the accompanying difference of time. If the
24175 text 'Thou art that' were meant to express absolute oneness, it would,
24176 moreover, conflict with a previous statement in the same section, viz.
24177 'It thought, may I be many'; and, further, the promise (also made in the
24178 same section) that by the knowledge of one thing all things are to be
24179 known could not be considered as fulfilled. It, moreover, is not
24180 possible (while, however, it would result from the absolute oneness of
24181 'tat' and 'tvam') that to Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge,
24182 which is free from all imperfections, omniscient, comprising within
24183 itself all auspicious qualities, there should belong Nescience; and that
24184 it should be the substrate of all those defects and afflictions which
24185 spring from Nescience. If, further, the statement of co-ordination
24186 ('thou art that') were meant to sublimate (the previously existing wrong
24187 notion of plurality), we should have to admit that the two terms 'that'
24188 and 'thou' have an implied meaning, viz. in so far as denoting, on the
24189 one hand, one substrate only, and, on the other, the cessation of the
24190 different attributes (directly expressed by the two terms); and thus
24191 implication and the other shortcomings mentioned above would cling to
24192 this interpretation as well. And there would be even further
24193 difficulties. When we form the sublative judgment 'this is not silver,'
24194 the sublation is founded on an independent positive judgment, viz. 'this
24195 is a shell': in the case under discussion, however, the sublation would
24196 not be known (through an independent positive judgment), but would be
24197 assumed merely on the ground that it cannot be helped. And, further,
24198 there is really no possibility of sublation, since the word 'that' does
24199 not convey the idea of an attribute in addition to the mere substrate.
24200 To this it must not be objected that the substrate was previously
24201 concealed, and that hence it is the special function of the word 'that'
24202 to present the substrate in its non-concealed aspect; for if, previously
24203 to the sublative judgment, the substrate was not evident (as an object
24204 of consciousness), there is no possibility of its becoming the object
24205 either of an error or its sublation.--Nor can we allow you to say that,
24206 previously to sublation, the substrate was non-concealed in so far as
24207 (i. e. was known as) the object of error, for in its 'non-concealed'
24208 aspect the substrate is opposed to all error, and when that aspect
24209 shines forth there is no room either for error or sublation.--The
24210 outcome of this is that as long as you do not admit that there is a real
24211 attribute in addition to the mere substrate, and that this attribute is
24212 for a time hidden, you cannot show the possibility either of error or
24213 sublation. We add an illustrative instance. That with regard to a man
24214 there should arise the error that he is a mere low-caste hunter is only
24215 possible on condition of a real additional attribute--e.g. the man's
24216 princely birth--being hidden at the time; and the cessation of that
24217 error is brought about by the declaration of this attribute of princely
24218 birth, not by a mere declaration of the person being a man: this latter

24219 fact being evident need not be declared at all, and if it is declared it
24220 sublates no error.--If, on the other hand, the text is understood to
24221 refer to Brahman as having the individual souls for its body, both words
24222 ('that' and 'thou') keep their primary denotation; and, the text thus
24223 making a declaration about one substance distinguished by two aspects,
24224 the fundamental principle of 'co-ordination' is preserved, On this
24225 interpretation the text further intimates that Brahman--free from all
24226 imperfection and comprising within itself all auspicious qualities--is
24227 the internal ruler of the individual souls and possesses lordly power.
24228 It moreover satisfies the demand of agreement with the teaching of the
24229 previous part of the section, and it also fulfils the promise as to all
24230 things being known through one thing, viz. in so far as Brahman having
24231 for its body all intelligent and non-intelligent beings in their gross
24232 state is the effect of Brahman having for its body the same things in
24233 their subtle state. And this interpretation finally avoids all conflict
24234 with other scriptural passages, such as 'Him the great Lord, the highest
24235 of Lords' (Svet. Up. VI, 7); 'His high power is revealed as manifold'
24236 (ibid. VI, 8); 'He that is free from sin, whose wishes are true, whose
24237 purposes are true' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1), and so on.

24238
24239 But how, a question may be asked, can we decide, on your interpretation
24240 of the text, which of the two terms is meant to make an original
24241 assertion with regard to the other?--The question does not arise, we
24242 reply; for the text does not mean to make an original assertion at all,
24243 the truth which it states having already been established by the
24244 preceding clause, 'In that all this world has its Self.' This clause
24245 does make an original statement--in agreement with the principle that
24246 'Scripture has a purport with regard to what is not established by other
24247 means'--that is, it predicates of 'all this,' i.e. this entire world
24248 together with all individual souls, that 'that,' i.e. Brahman is the
24249 Self of it. The reason of this the text states in a previous passage,
24250 'All these creatures have their root in that which is, their dwelling
24251 and their rest in that which is'; a statement which is illustrated by an
24252 earlier one (belonging to a different section), viz. 'All this is
24253 Brahman; let a man meditate with calm mind on this world as beginning,
24254 ending, and breathing in Brahman' (Ch. Up. III. 14, 1). Similarly other
24255 texts also teach that the world has its Self in Brahman, in so far as
24256 the whole aggregate of intelligent and non-intelligent beings
24257 constitutes Brahman's body. Compare 'Abiding within, the ruler of beings,
24258 the Self of all'; 'He who dwells in the earth, different from the earth,
24259 whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the
24260 earth within--he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal. He who
24261 dwells in the Self,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7,3; 22); 'He who moving within
24262 the earth, and so on--whose body is death, whom death does not know, he
24263 is the Self of all beings, free from sin, divine, the one God, Nârâyana'
24264 (Subâl. Up. VII, 1); 'Having created that he entered into it; having
24265 entered it he became sat and tyat' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). And also in the
24266 section under discussion the passage 'Having entered into them with this
24267 living Self let me evolve names and forms,' shows that it is only
24268 through the entering into them of the living soul whose Self is Brahman,
24269 that all things possess their substantiality and their connexion with
24270 the words denoting them. And as this passage must be understood in
24271 connexion with Taitt. Up. II, 6 (where the 'sat' denotes the individual
24272 soul) it follows that the individual soul also has Brahman for its Self,
24273 owing to the fact of Brahman having entered into it.--From all this it
24274 follows that the entire aggregate of things, intelligent and non-
24275 intelligent, has its Self in Brahman in so far as it constitutes
24276 Brahman's body. And as, thus, the whole world different from Brahman
24277 derives its substantial being only from constituting Brahman's body, any
24278 term denoting the world or something in it conveys a meaning which has
24279 its proper consummation in Brahman only: in other words all terms
24280 whatsoever denote Brahman in so far as distinguished by the different
24281 things which we associate with those terms on the basis of ordinary use
24282 of speech and etymology.--The text 'that art thou' we therefore
24283 understand merely as a special expression of the truth already
24284 propounded in the clause 'in that all this has its Self.'

24285
24286 This being so, it appears that those as well who hold the theory of the
24287 absolute unity of one non-differenced substance, as those who teach the

24288 doctrine of bhedâbhedha (co-existing difference and non-difference), and
24289 those who teach the absolute difference of several substances, give up
24290 all those scriptural texts which teach that Brahman is the universal
24291 Self. With regard to the first-mentioned doctrine, we ask 'if there is
24292 only one substance; to what can the doctrine of universal identity
24293 refer?'--The reply will perhaps be 'to that very same substance.'--But,
24294 we reply, this point is settled already by the texts defining the nature
24295 of Brahman [FOOTNOTE 134:1], and there is nothing left to be determined
24296 by the passages declaring the identity of everything with Brahman.--But
24297 those texts serve to dispel the idea of fictitious difference!--This, we
24298 reply, cannot, as has been shown above, be effected by texts stating
24299 universal identity in the way of co-ordination; and statements of co-
24300 ordination, moreover, introduce into Brahman a doubleness of aspect, and
24301 thus contradict the theory of absolute oneness.--The bhedâbhedha view
24302 implies that owing to Brahman's connexion with limiting adjuncts
24303 (upâdhi) all the imperfections resulting therefrom--and which avowedly
24304 belong to the individual soul--would manifest themselves in Brahman
24305 itself; and as this contradicts the doctrine that the Self of all is
24306 constituted by a Brahman free from all imperfection and comprising
24307 within itself all auspicious qualities, the texts conveying that
24308 doctrine would have to be disregarded. If, on the other hand, the theory
24309 be held in that form that 'bhedâbhedha' belongs to Brahman by its own
24310 nature (not only owing to an upâdhi), the view that Brahman by its
24311 essential nature appears as individual soul, implies that imperfections
24312 no less than perfections are essential to Brahman, and this is in
24313 conflict with the texts teaching that everything is identical with
24314 Brahman free from all imperfections.--For those finally who maintain
24315 absolute difference, the doctrine of Brahman being the Self of all has
24316 no meaning whatsoever--for things absolutely different can in no way be
24317 one--and this implies the abandonment of all Vedânta-texts together.

24318
24319 Those, on the other hand, who take their stand on the doctrine,
24320 proclaimed by all Upanishads, that the entire world forms the body of
24321 Brahman, may accept in their fulness all the texts teaching the identity
24322 of the world with Brahman. For as genus (jâti) and quality (guna), so
24323 substances (dravya) also may occupy the position of determining
24324 attributes (viseshana), in so far namely as they constitute the body of
24325 something else. Enunciations such as 'the Self (soul) is, according to
24326 its works, born either (as) a god, or a man, or a horse, or a bull,'
24327 show that in ordinary speech as well as in the Veda co-ordination has to
24328 be taken in a real primary (not implied) sense. In the same way it is
24329 also in the case of generic character and of qualities the relation of
24330 'mode' only (in which generic character and qualities stand to
24331 substances) which determines statements of co-ordination, such as 'the
24332 ox is broken-horned,' 'the cloth is white.' And as material bodies
24333 bearing the generic marks of humanity are definite things, in so far
24334 only as they are modes of a Self or soul, enunciations of co-ordination
24335 such as 'the soul has been born as a man, or a eunuch, or a woman,' are
24336 in every way appropriate. What determines statements of co-ordination is
24337 thus only the relation of 'mode' in which one thing stands to another,
24338 not the relation of generic character, quality, and so on, which are of
24339 an exclusive nature (and cannot therefore be exhibited in co-ordination
24340 with substances). Such words indeed as denote substances capable of
24341 subsisting by themselves occasionally take suffixes, indicating that
24342 those substances form the distinguishing attributes of other substances--
24343 as when from danda, 'staff,' we form dandin, 'staff-bearer'; in the case,
24344 on the other hand, of substances not capable of subsisting and being
24345 apprehended apart from others, the fact of their holding the position of
24346 attributes is ascertained only from their appearing in grammatical co-
24347 ordination.--But, an objection is raised, if it is supposed that in
24348 sentences such as 'the Self is born, as god, man, animal,' &c., the body
24349 of a man, god, &c., stands towards the Self in the relation of a mode,
24350 in the same way as in sentences such as 'the ox is broken-horned,' 'the
24351 cloth is white,' the generic characteristic and the quality stand in the
24352 relation of modes to the substances ('cow,' 'cloth') to which they are
24353 grammatically co-ordinated; then there would necessarily be simultaneous
24354 cognition of the mode, and that to which the mode belongs, i.e. of the
24355 body and the Self; just as there is simultaneous cognition of the
24356 generic character and the individual. But as a matter of fact this is

not the case; we do not necessarily observe a human, divine, or animal body together with the Self. The co-ordination expressed in the form 'the Self is a man,' is therefore an 'implied' one only (the statement not admitting of being taken in its primary literal sense).--This is not so, we reply. The relation of bodies to the Self is strictly analogous to that of class characteristics and qualities to the substances in which they inhere; for it is the Self only which is their substrate and their final cause (prayojana), and they are modes of the Self. That the Self only is their substrate, appears from the fact that when the Self separates itself from the body the latter perishes; that the Self alone is their final cause, appears from the fact that they exist to the end that the fruits of the actions of the Self may be enjoyed; and that they are modes of the Self, appears from the fact that they are mere attributes of the Self manifesting itself as god, man, or the like. These are just the circumstances on account of which words like 'cow' extend in their meaning (beyond the class characteristics) so as to comprise the individual also. Where those circumstances are absent, as in the case of staffs, earrings, and the like, the attributive position is expressed (not by co-ordination but) by means of special derivative forms--such as dandin (staff-bearer), kundalin (adorned with earrings). In the case of bodies divine, human, &c., on the other hand, the essential nature of which it is to be mere modes of the Self which constitutes their substrate and final cause, both ordinary and Vedic language express the relation subsisting between the two, in the form of co-ordination, 'This Self is a god, or a man,' &c. That class characteristics and individuals are invariably observed together, is due to the fact of both being objects of visual perception; the Self, on the other hand, is not such, and hence is not apprehended by the eye, while the body is so apprehended. Nor must you raise the objection that it is hard to understand how that which is capable of being apprehended by itself can be a mere mode of something else: for that the body's essential nature actually consists in being a mere mode of the Self is proved--just as in the case of class characteristics and so on--by its having the Self only for its substrate and final cause, and standing to it in the relation of a distinguishing attribute. That two things are invariably perceived together, depends, as already observed, on their being apprehended by means of the same apparatus, visual or otherwise. Earth is naturally connected with smell, taste, and so on, and yet these qualities are not perceived by the eye; in the same way the eye which perceives the body does not perceive that essential characteristic of the body which consists in its being a mere mode of the Self; the reason of the difference being that the eye has no capacity to apprehend the Self. But this does not imply that the body does not possess that essential nature: it rather is just the possession of that essential nature on which the judgment of co-ordination ('the Self is a man, god,' &c.) is based. And as words have the power of denoting the relation of something being a mode of the Self, they denote things together with this relation.--But in ordinary speech the word 'body' is understood to mean the mere body; it does not therefore extend in its denotation up to the Self!--Not so, we reply. The body is, in reality, nothing but a mode of the Self; but, for the purpose of showing the distinction of things, the word 'body' is used in a limited sense. Analogously words such as 'whiteness,' 'generic character of a cow,' 'species,' 'quality,' are used in a distinctive sense (although 'whiteness' is not found apart from a white thing, of which it is the prakâra, and so on). Words such as 'god,' 'man,' &c., therefore do extend in their connotation up to the Self. And as the individual souls, distinguished by their connexion with aggregates of matter bearing the characteristic marks of humanity, divine nature, and so on, constitute the body of the highest Self, and hence are modes of it, the words denoting those individual souls extend in their connotation up to the very highest Self. And as all intelligent and non-intelligent beings are thus mere modes of the highest Brahman, and have reality thereby only, the words denoting them are used in co-ordination with the terms denoting Brahman.--This point has been demonstrated by me in the Vedârthasamgraha. A Sûtra also (IV, 1, 3) will declare the identity of the world and Brahman to consist in the relation of body and Self; and the Vâkyakâra too says 'It is the Self--thus everything should be apprehended.'

24426 [FOOTNOTE 130:1. Which are alleged to prove that sāmānādhikaranya is to
24427 be explained on the basis of lakshanā.]

24428
24429 [FOOTNOTE 134:1. Such as 'The True, knowledge,' &c.]
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24431

24432
24433
24434 Summary statement as to the way in which different scriptural texts are
24435 to reconciled.
24436

24437 The whole matter may be summarily stated as follows. Some texts declare
24438 a distinction of nature between non-intelligent matter, intelligent
24439 beings, and Brahman, in so far as matter is the object of enjoyment, the
24440 souls the enjoying subjects, and Brahman the ruling principle. 'From
24441 that the Lord of Mâyâ creates all this; in that the other one is bound
24442 up through that Mâyâ' (Svet. Up. IV, 9); 'Know Prakriti to be Mâyâ, and
24443 the great Lord the ruler of Mâyâ' (10); 'What is perishable is the
24444 Pradhâna, the immortal and imperishable is Hara: the one God rules the
24445 Perishable and the Self' (Svet Up. I, 10)--In this last passage the
24446 clause 'the immortal and imperishable is Hara,' refers to the enjoying
24447 individual soul, which is called 'Hara,' because it draws (harati)
24448 towards itself the pradhâna as the object of its enjoyment.--' He is the
24449 cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither
24450 parent nor lord' (Svet. Up. VI, 9); 'The master of the pradhâna and of
24451 the individual souls' (Svet. Up. VI, 16); 'The ruler of all, the lord of
24452 the Selves, the eternal, blessed, undecaying one' (Mahânâr. Up. XI, 3);
24453 'There are two unborn ones, one knowing, the other not knowing, one a
24454 ruler, the other not a ruler' (Svet. Up. I, 9); 'The eternal among the
24455 non-eternal, the intelligent one among the intelligent, who though one
24456 fulfils the desires of many' (Svet. Up. VI, 13); 'Knowing the enjoyer,
24457 the object of enjoyment and the Mover' (Svet. Up. I, 12); 'One of them
24458 eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Svet. Up. IV,
24459 6); 'Thinking that the Self is different from the Mover, blessed by him
24460 he reaches Immortality' (Svet. Up. I, 6); 'There is one unborn female
24461 being, red, white, and black, uniform but producing manifold offspring.
24462 There is one unborn male being who loves her and lies by her; there is
24463 another who leaves her after he has enjoyed her' (Svet. Up. IV, 5). 'On
24464 the same tree man, immersed, bewildered, grieves on account of his
24465 impotence; but when he sees the other Lord contented and knows his glory,
24466 then his grief passes away' (Svet. Up. IV, 9).--Smriti expresses itself
24467 similarly.--'Thus eightfold is my nature divided. Lower is this Nature;
24468 other than this and higher know that Nature of mine which constitutes
24469 the individual soul, by which this world is supported' (Bha. Gî. VII, 4,
24470 5). 'All beings at the end of a Kalpa return into my Nature, and again
24471 at the beginning of a Kalpa do I send them forth. Resting on my own
24472 Nature again and again do I send forth this entire body of beings, which
24473 has no power of its own, being subject to the power of nature' (Bha. Gî.
24474 IX, 7, 8); 'With me as supervisor Nature brings forth the movable and
24475 the immovable, and for this reason the world ever moves round' (Bha. Gî.
24476 IX, 10); 'Know thou both Nature and the Soul to be without beginning'
24477 (XIII, 19); 'The great Brahman is my womb, in which I place the embryo,
24478 and thence there is the origin of all beings' (XIV, 3). This last
24479 passage means--the womb of the world is the great Brahman, i.e. non-
24480 intelligent matter in its subtle state, commonly called Prakriti; with
24481 this I connect the embryo, i.e. the intelligent principle. From this
24482 contact of the non-intelligent and the intelligent, due to my will,
24483 there ensues the origination of all beings from gods down to lifeless
24484 things.
24485

24486 Non-intelligent matter and intelligent beings--holding the relative
24487 positions of objects of enjoyment and enjoying subjects, and appearing
24488 in multifarious forms--other scriptural texts declare to be permanently
24489 connected with the highest Person in so far as they constitute his body,
24490 and thus are controlled by him; the highest Person thus constituting
24491 their Self. Compare the following passages: 'He who dwells in the earth
24492 and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth
24493 is, and who rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within,
24494 the immortal,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 3-23); 'He who moves within the

24495 earth, whose body the earth is, &c.; he who moves within death, whose
24496 body death is,' &c.(Subâla Up. VII, 1). In this latter passage the word
24497 'death' denotes what is also called 'darkness,' viz. non-intelligent
24498 matter in its subtle state; as appears from another passage in the same
24499 Upanishad,'the Imperishable is merged in darkness.' And compare also
24500 'Entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self of all' (Taitt. Âr.
24501 III, 24).

24502
24503 Other texts, again, aim at teaching that the highest Self to whom non-
24504 intelligent and intelligent beings stand in the relation of body, and
24505 hence of modes, subsists in the form of the world, in its causal as well
24506 as in its effected aspect, and hence speak of the world in this its
24507 double aspect as that which is (the Real); so e.g. 'Being only this was
24508 in the beginning, one only without a second--it desired, may I be many,
24509 may I grow forth--it sent forth fire,' &c., up to 'all these creatures
24510 have their root in that which is,' &c., up to 'that art thou, O
24511 Svetaketu' (Ch. Up. VI, 2-8); 'He wished, may I be many,' &c., up to 'it
24512 became the true and the untrue' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). These sections also
24513 refer to the essential distinction of nature between non-intelligent
24514 matter, intelligent beings, and the highest Self which is established by
24515 other scriptural texts; so in the Chândogya passage, 'Let me enter those
24516 three divine beings with this living Self, and let me then evolve names
24517 and forms'; and in the Taitt. passage, 'Having sent forth that he
24518 entered into it; having entered it he became sat and tyat, knowledge and
24519 (what is) without knowledge, the true and the untrue,' &c. These two
24520 passages evidently have the same purport, and hence the soul's having
24521 its Self in Brahman--which view is implied in the Ch. passage--must be
24522 understood as resting thereon that the souls (together, with matter)
24523 constitute the body of Brahman as asserted in the Taitt. passage ('it
24524 became knowledge and that which is without knowledge,' i.e. souls and
24525 matter). The same process of evolution of names and forms is described
24526 elsewhere also, 'All this was then unevolved; it became evolved by form
24527 and name' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7). The fact is that the highest Self is in
24528 its causal or in its 'effected' condition, according as it has for its
24529 body intelligent and non-intelligent beings either in their subtle or
24530 their gross state; the effect, then, being non-different from the cause,
24531 and hence being cognised through the cognition of the cause, the result
24532 is that the desired 'cognition of all things through one' can on our
24533 view be well established. In the clause 'I will enter into these three
24534 divine beings with this living Self,' &c., the term 'the three divine
24535 beings' denotes the entire aggregate of non-sentient matter, and as the
24536 text declares that the highest Self evolved names and forms by entering
24537 into matter by means of the living souls of which he is the Self, it
24538 follows that all terms whatsoever denote the highest Self as qualified
24539 by individual Selves, the latter again being qualified by non-sentient
24540 matter. A term which denotes the highest Self in its causal condition
24541 may therefore be exhibited in co-ordination with another term denoting
24542 the highest Self in its 'effected' state, both terms being used in their
24543 primary senses. Brahman, having for its modes intelligent and non-
24544 intelligent things in their gross and subtle states, thus constitutes
24545 effect and cause, and the world thus has Brahman for its material cause
24546 (upâdâna). Nor does this give rise to any confusion of the essential
24547 constituent elements of the great aggregate of things. Of some parti-
24548 coloured piece of cloth the material cause is threads white, red, black,
24549 &c.; all the same, each definite spot of the cloth is connected with one
24550 colour only white e.g., and thus there is no confusion of colours even
24551 in the 'effected' condition of the cloth. Analogously the combination of
24552 non-sentient matter, sentient beings, and the Lord constitutes the
24553 material cause of the world, but this does not imply any confusion of
24554 the essential characteristics of enjoying souls, objects of enjoyment,
24555 and the universal ruler, even in the world's 'effected' state. There is
24556 indeed a difference between the two cases, in so far as the threads are
24557 capable of existing apart from one another, and are only occasionally
24558 combined according to the volition of men, so that the web sometimes
24559 exists in its causal, sometimes in its effected state; while non-
24560 sentient matter and sentient beings in all their states form the body of
24561 the highest Self, and thus have a being only as the modes of that--on
24562 which account the highest Self may, in all cases, be denoted by any term
24563 whatsoever. But the two cases are analogous, in so far as there persists

24564 a distinction and absence of all confusion, on the part of the
24565 constituent elements of the aggregate. This being thus, it follows that
24566 the highest Brahman, although entering into the 'effected' condition,
24567 remains unchanged--for its essential nature does not become different--
24568 and we also understand what constitutes its 'effected' condition, viz.
24569 its abiding as the Self of non-intelligent and intelligent beings in
24570 their gross condition, distinguished by name and form. For becoming an
24571 effect means entering into another state of being.

24572
24573 Those texts, again, which speak of Brahman as devoid of qualities,
24574 explain themselves on the ground of Brahman being free from all touch of
24575 evil. For the passage, Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5--which at first negatives all
24576 evil qualities 'free from sin, from old age, from death, from grief,
24577 from hunger and thirst', and after that affirms auspicious qualities
24578 'whose wishes and purposes come true'--enables us to decide that in
24579 other places also the general denial of qualities really refers to evil
24580 qualities only.--Passages which declare knowledge to constitute the
24581 essential nature of Brahman explain themselves on the ground that of
24582 Brahman--which is all-knowing, all-powerful, antagonistic to all evil, a
24583 mass of auspicious qualities--the essential nature can be defined as
24584 knowledge (intelligence) only--which also follows from the 'self-
24585 luminousness' predicated of it. Texts, on the other hand, such as 'He
24586 who is all-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'His high power is revealed as
24587 manifold, as essential, acting as force and knowledge' (Svet. Up. VI, 8);
24588 'Whereby should he know the knower' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 14), teach the
24589 highest Self to be a knowing subject. Other texts, again, such as 'The
24590 True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1), declare
24591 knowledge to constitute its nature, as it can be denned through
24592 knowledge only, and is self-luminous. And texts such as 'He desired, may
24593 I be many' (Taitt. Up. II, 6); 'It thought, may I be many; it evolved
24594 itself through name and form' (Ch. Up. VI, 2), teach that Brahman,
24595 through its mere wish, appears in manifold modes. Other texts, again,
24596 negative the opposite view, viz. that there is a plurality of things not
24597 having their Self in Brahman. 'From death to death goes he who sees here
24598 any plurality'; 'There is here not any plurality' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19);
24599 'For where there is duality as it were' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 14). But these
24600 texts in no way negative that plurality of modes--declared in passages
24601 such as 'May I be many, may I grow forth'--which springs from Brahman's
24602 will, and appears in the distinction of names and forms. This is proved
24603 by clauses in those 'negating' texts themselves, 'Whosoever looks for
24604 anything elsewhere than in the Self', 'from that great Being there has
24605 been breathed forth the Rig-veda,' &c. (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6, 10).--On
24606 this method of interpretation we find that the texts declaring the
24607 essential distinction and separation of non-sentient matter, sentient
24608 beings, and the Lord, and those declaring him to be the cause and the
24609 world to be the effect, and cause and effect to be identical, do not in
24610 any way conflict with other texts declaring that matter and souls form
24611 the body of the Lord, and that matter and souls in their causal
24612 condition are in a subtle state, not admitting of the distinction of
24613 names and forms while in their 'effected' gross state they are subject
24614 to that distinction. On the other hand, we do not see how there is any
24615 opening for theories maintaining the connexion of Brahman with Nescience,
24616 or distinctions in Brahman due to limiting adjuncts (upâdhi)--such and
24617 similar doctrines rest on fallacious reasoning, and flatly contradict
24618 Scripture.

24619
24620 There is nothing contradictory in allowing that certain texts declare
24621 the essential distinction of matter, souls, and the Lord, and their
24622 mutual relation as modes and that to which the modes belong, and that
24623 other texts again represent them as standing in the relation of cause
24624 and effect, and teach cause and effect to be one. We may illustrate this
24625 by an analogous case from the Karmakânda. There six separate oblations
24626 to Agni, and so on, are enjoined by separate so-called originative
24627 injunctions; these are thereupon combined into two groups (viz. the new
24628 moon and the full-moon sacrifices) by a double clause referring to those
24629 groups, and finally a so-called injunction of qualification enjoins the
24630 entire sacrifice as something to be performed by persons entertaining a
24631 certain wish. In a similar way certain Vedânta-texts give instruction
24632 about matter, souls, and the Lord as separate entities ('Perishable is

24633 the pradhâna, imperishable and immortal Hara,' &c., Svet Up. I, 10; and
24634 others); then other texts teach that matter and souls in all their
24635 different states constitute the body of the highest Person, while the
24636 latter is their Self ('Whose body the earth is,' &c.); and finally
24637 another group of texts teaches--by means of words such as 'Being,'
24638 'Brahman,' 'Self,' denoting the highest Self to which the body belongs--
24639 that the one highest Self in its causal and effected states comprises
24640 within itself the triad of entities which had been taught in separation
24641 ('Being only this was in the beginning'; 'In that all this has its Self;
24642 'All this is Brahman').--That the highest Self with matter and souls for
24643 its body should be simply called the highest Self, is no more
24644 objectionable than that that particular form of Self which is invested
24645 with a human body should simply be spoken of as Self or soul--as when we
24646 say 'This is a happy soul.'

24647
24648
24649
24650
24651 Nescience cannot be terminated by the simple act of cognising Brahman as
24652 the universal self.

24653
24654 The doctrine, again, that Nescience is put an end to by the cognition of
24655 Brahman being the Self of all can in no way be upheld; for as bondage is
24656 something real it cannot be put an end to by knowledge. How, we ask, can
24657 any one assert that bondage--which consists in the experience of
24658 pleasure and pain caused by the connexion of souls with bodies of
24659 various kind, a connexion springing from good or evil actions--is
24660 something false, unreal? And that the cessation of such bondage is to be
24661 obtained only through the grace of the highest Self pleased by the
24662 devout meditation of the worshipper, we have already explained. As the
24663 cognition of universal oneness which you assume rests on a view of
24664 things directly contrary to reality, and therefore is false, the only
24665 effect it can have is to strengthen the ties of bondage. Moreover, texts
24666 such as 'But different is the highest Person' (Bha. Gî. XV, 17), and
24667 'Having known the Self and the Mover as separate' (Svet. Up. I, 6),
24668 teach that it is the cognition of Brahman as the inward ruler different
24669 from the individual soul, that effects the highest aim of man, i.e.
24670 final release. And, further, as that 'bondage-terminating' knowledge
24671 which you assume is itself unreal, we should have to look out for
24672 another act of cognition to put an end to it.--But may it not be said
24673 that this terminating cognition, after having put an end to the whole
24674 aggregate of distinctions antagonistic to it, immediately passes away
24675 itself, because being of a merely instantaneous nature?--No, we reply.
24676 Since its nature, its origination, and its destruction are all alike
24677 fictitious, we have clearly to search for another agency capable of
24678 destroying that avidyâ which is the cause of the fiction of its
24679 destruction!--Let us then say that the essential nature of Brahman
24680 itself is the destruction of that cognition!--From this it would follow,
24681 we reply, that such 'terminating' knowledge would not arise at all; for
24682 that the destruction of what is something permanent can clearly not
24683 originate!--Who moreover should, according to you, be the cognising
24684 subject in a cognition which has for its object the negation of
24685 everything that is different from Brahman?--That cognising subject is
24686 himself something fictitiously superimposed on Brahman!--This may not be,
24687 we reply: he himself would in that case be something to be negated,
24688 and hence an object of the 'terminating' cognition; he could not
24689 therefore be the subject of cognition!--Well, then, let us assume that
24690 the essential nature of Brahman itself is the cognising subject!--Do you
24691 mean, we ask in reply, that Brahman's being the knowing subject in that
24692 'terminating' cognition belongs to Brahman's essential nature, or that
24693 it is something fictitiously superimposed on Brahman? In the latter case
24694 that superimposition and the Nescience founded on it would persist,
24695 because they would not be objects of the terminating cognition, and if a
24696 further terminating act of knowledge were assumed, that also would
24697 possess a triple aspect (viz. knowledge, object known, and subject
24698 knowing), and we thus should be led to assume an infinite series of
24699 knowing subjects. If, on the other hand, the essential nature of Brahman
24700 itself constitutes the knowing subject, your view really coincides with
24701 the one held by us. [FOOTNOTE 146:1] And if you should say that the

terminating knowledge itself and the knowing subject in it are things separate from Brahman and themselves contained in the sphere of what is to be terminated by that knowledge, your statement would be no less absurd than if you were to say 'everything on the surface of the earth has been cut down by Devadatta with one stroke'--meaning thereby that Devadatta himself and the action of cutting down are comprised among the things cut down!--The second alternative, on the other hand--according to which the knowing subject is not Brahman itself, but a knower superimposed upon it--would imply that that subject is the agent in an act of knowledge resulting in his own destruction; and this is impossible since no person aims at destroying himself. And should it be said that the destruction of the knowing agent belongs to the very nature of Brahman itself [FOOTNOTE 147:1], it would follow that we can assume neither plurality nor the erroneous view of plurality, nor avidyâ as the root of that erroneous view.--All this confirms our theory, viz. that since bondage springs from ajnâna in the form of an eternal stream of karman, it can be destroyed only through knowledge of the kind maintained by us. Such knowledge is to be attained only through the due daily performance of religious duties as prescribed for a man's caste and âsrama, such performance being sanctified by the accompanying thought of the true nature of the Self, and having the character of propitiation of the highest Person. Now, that mere works produce limited and non-permanent results only, and that on the other hand works not aiming at an immediate result but meant to please the highest Person, bring about knowledge of the character of devout meditation, and thereby the unlimited and permanent result of the intuition of Brahman being the Self of all--these are points not to be known without an insight into the nature of works, and hence, without this, the attitude described--which is preceded by the abandonment of mere works--cannot be reached. For these reasons the enquiry into Brahman has to be entered upon after the enquiry into the nature of works.

[FOOTNOTE 146:1. According to which Brahman is not jñânam, but jñâtri.]

[FOOTNOTE 147:1. And, on that account, belongs to what constitutes man's highest aim.]

The Vedântin aiming to ascertain the nature of Brahman from Scripture, need not be disconcerted by the Mîmâmsâ-theory of all speech having informing power with regard to actions only.

Here another primâ facie view [FOOTNOTE 148:1] finally presents itself. The power of words to denote things cannot be ascertained in any way but by observing the speech and actions of experienced people. Now as such speech and action always implies the idea of something to be done (kârya), words are means of knowledge only with reference to things to be done; and hence the matter inculcated by the Veda also is only things to be done. From this it follows that the Vedânta-texts cannot claim the position of authoritative means of knowledge with regard to Brahman, which is (not a thing to be done but) an accomplished fact.--Against this view it must not be urged that in the case of sentences expressive of accomplished facts--as e.g. that a son is born to somebody--the idea of a particular thing may with certainty be inferred as the cause of certain outward signs--such as e.g. a pleased expression of countenance--which are generally due to the attainment of a desired object; for the possible causes of joy, past, present, and future, are infinite in number, and in the given case other causes of joy, as e.g. the birth having taken place in an auspicious moment, or having been an easy one, &c., may easily be imagined. Nor, again, can it be maintained that the denotative power of words with regard to accomplished things may be ascertained in the way of our inferring either the meaning of one word from the known meaning of other words, or the meaning of the radical part of a word from the known meaning of a formative element; for the fact is that we are only able to infer on the basis of a group of words known to denote a certain thing to be done, what the meaning of some particular constituent of that group may be.--Nor, again, when a person,

24771 afraid of what he thinks to be a snake, is observed to dismiss his fear
24772 on being told that the thing is not a snake but only a rope, can we
24773 determine thereby that what terminates his fear is the idea of the non-
24774 existence of a snake. For there are many other ideas which may account
24775 for the cessation of his fear--he may think, e.g., 'this is a thing
24776 incapable of moving, devoid of poison, without consciousness'--the
24777 particular idea present to his mind we are therefore not able to
24778 determine.--The truth is that from the fact of all activity being
24779 invariably dependent on the idea of something to be done, we learn that
24780 the meaning which words convey is something prompting activity. All
24781 words thus denoting something to be done, the several words of a
24782 sentence express only some particular action to be performed, and hence
24783 it is not possible to determine that they possess the power of denoting
24784 their own meaning only, in connexion with the meaning of the other words
24785 of the sentence.--(Nor must it be said that what moves to action is not
24786 the idea of the thing to be done, but the idea of the means to do it;
24787 for) the idea of the means to bring about the desired end causes action
24788 only through the idea of the thing to be done, not through itself; as is
24789 evident from the fact that the idea of means past, future, and even
24790 present (when divorced from the idea of an end to be accomplished), does
24791 not prompt to action. As long as a man does not reflect 'the means
24792 towards the desired end are not to be accomplished without an effort of
24793 mine; it must therefore be accomplished through my activity'; so long he
24794 does not begin to act. What causes activity is thus only the idea of
24795 things to be done; and as hence words denote such things only, the Veda
24796 also can tell us only about things to be done, and is not therefore in a
24797 position to give information about the attainment of an infinite and
24798 permanent result, such result being constituted by Brahman, which is
24799 (not a thing to be done, but) an accomplished entity. The Veda does, on
24800 the other hand, actually teach that mere works have a permanent result
24801 ('Imperishable is the merit of him who offers the kâurmâsya-sacrifices,'
24802 and so on); and hence it follows that to enter on an enquiry into
24803 Brahman for the reason that the knowledge of Brahman has an infinite and
24804 permanent result, while the result of works is limited and non-permanent,
24805 is an altogether unjustified proceeding.

24806
24807 To this we make the following reply.--To set aside the universally known
24808 mode of ascertaining the connexion of words and their meanings, and to
24809 assert that all words express only one non-worldly meaning (viz. those
24810 things to be done which the Veda inculcates), is a proceeding for which
24811 men paying due attention to the means of proof can have only a slight
24812 regard. A child avowedly learns the connexion of words and meanings in
24813 the following way. The father and mother and other people about him
24814 point with the finger at the child's mother, father, uncle, &c, as well
24815 as at various domestic and wild animals, birds, snakes, and so on, to
24816 the end that the child may at the same time pay attention to the terms
24817 they use and to the beings denoted thereby, and thus again and again
24818 make him understand that such and such words refer to such and such
24819 things. The child thus observing in course of time that these words of
24820 themselves give rise to certain ideas in his mind, and at the same time
24821 observing neither any different connexion of words and things, nor any
24822 person arbitrarily establishing such connexion, comes to the conclusion
24823 that the application of such and such words to such and such things is
24824 based on the denotative power of the words. And being taught later on by
24825 his elders that other words also, in addition to those learned first,
24826 have their definite meaning, he in the end becomes acquainted with the
24827 meanings of all words, and freely forms sentences conveying certain
24828 meanings for the purpose of imparting those meanings to other persons.

24829
24830 And there is another way also in which the connexion of words and things
24831 can easily be ascertained. Some person orders another, by means of some
24832 expressive gesture, to go and inform Devadatta that his father is doing
24833 well, and the man ordered goes and tells Devadatta 'Your father is doing
24834 well.' A by-stander who is acquainted with the meaning of various
24835 gestures, and thus knows on what errand the messenger is sent, follows
24836 him and hears the words employed by him to deliver his message: he
24837 therefore readily infers that such and such words have such and such a
24838 meaning.--We thus see that the theory of words having a meaning only in
24839 relation to things to be done is baseless. The Vedânta-texts tell us

24840 about Brahman, which is an accomplished entity, and about meditation on
 24841 Brahman as having an unlimited result, and hence it behoves us to
 24842 undertake an enquiry into Brahman so as fully to ascertain its nature.
 24843
 24844 We further maintain that even on the supposition of the Veda relating
 24845 only to things to be done, an enquiry into Brahman must be undertaken.
 24846 For 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be
 24847 meditated on' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5); 'He is to be searched out, him we
 24848 must try to understand' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a Brâhmana having
 24849 known him practise wisdom' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 21); 'What is within that
 24850 small ether, that is to be sought for, that is to be understood' (Ch. Up.
 24851 VIII, 1,1); 'What is in that small ether, that is to be meditated upon'
 24852 (Mahânâr. Up. X, 7)--these and similar texts enjoin a certain action,
 24853 viz. meditation on Brahman, and when we then read 'He who knows Brahman
 24854 attains the highest,' we understand that the attainment of Brahman is
 24855 meant as a reward for him who is qualified for and enters on such
 24856 meditation. Brahman itself and its attributes are thus established
 24857 thereby only--that they subserve a certain action, viz. meditation.
 24858 There are analogous instances in the Karmakânda of the Veda. When an
 24859 arthavâda-passage describes the heavenly world as a place where there is
 24860 no heat, no frost, no grief, &c., this is done merely with a view to
 24861 those texts which enjoin certain sacrifices on those who are desirous of
 24862 the heavenly world. Where another arthavâda says that 'those who perform
 24863 certain sattra-sacrifices are firmly established,' such 'firm
 24864 establishment' is referred to only because it is meant as the reward for
 24865 those acting on the text which enjoins those sattras, 'Let him perform
 24866 the râtri-sattras' (Pû. Mî. Sû. IV, 3, 17). And where a text says that a
 24867 person threatening a Brâhmana is to be punished with a fine of one
 24868 hundred gold pieces, this statement is made merely with reference to the
 24869 prohibitory passage, 'Let him not threaten a Brâhmana' (Pû. Mî. Sû. III,
 24870 4, 17).
 24871
 24872 We, however, really object to the whole theory of the meaning of words
 24873 depending on their connexion with 'things to be done,' since this is not
 24874 even the case in imperative clauses such as 'bring the cow.' For you are
 24875 quite unable to give a satisfactory definition of your 'thing to be done
 24876 '(kârya). You understand by 'kârya' that which follows on the existence
 24877 of action (kriti) and is aimed at by action. Now to be aimed at by
 24878 action is to be the object (karman) of action, and to be the object of
 24879 action is to be that which it is most desired to obtain by action
 24880 (according to the grammarian's definition). But what one desires most to
 24881 obtain is pleasure or the cessation of pain. When a person desirous of
 24882 some pleasure or cessation of pain is aware that his object is not to be
 24883 accomplished without effort on his part, he resolves on effort and
 24884 begins to act: in no case we observe an object of desire to be aimed at
 24885 by action in any other sense than that of its accomplishment depending
 24886 on activity. The prompting quality (prerakatva) also, which belongs to
 24887 objects of desire, is nothing but the attribute of their accomplishment
 24888 depending on activity; for it is this which moves to action.--Nor can it
 24889 be said that 'to be aimed at by action' means to be that which is
 24890 'agreeable' (anukûla) to man; for it is pleasure only that is agreeable
 24891 to man. The cessation of pain, on the other hand, is not what is
 24892 'agreeable' to man. The essential distinction between pleasure and pain
 24893 is that the former is agreeable to man, and the latter disagreeable
 24894 (pratikûla), and the cessation of pain is desired not because it is
 24895 agreeable, but because pain is disagreeable: absence of pain means that
 24896 a person is in his normal condition, affected neither with pain nor
 24897 pleasure. Apart from pleasure, action cannot possibly be agreeable, nor
 24898 does it become so by being subservient to pleasure; for its essential
 24899 nature is pain. Its being helpful to pleasure merely causes the resolve
 24900 of undertaking it.--Nor, again, can we define that which is aimed at by
 24901 action as that to which action is auxiliary or supplementary (sesha),
 24902 while itself it holds the position of something principal to be
 24903 subserved by other things (seshin); for of the sesha and seshin also no
 24904 proper definition can be given. It cannot be said that a sesha is that
 24905 which is invariably accompanied by an activity proceeding with a view to
 24906 something else, and that the correlate of such a sesha is the seshin;
 24907 for on this definition the action is not a sesha, and hence that which
 24908 is to be effected by the action cannot be the correlative seshin. And

24909 moreover a seshin may not be defined as what is correlative to an action
24910 proceeding with a view to--i. e. aiming at--something else; for it is
24911 just this 'being aimed at' of which we require a definition, and
24912 moreover we observe that also the seshin (or 'pradhâna') is capable of
24913 action proceeding with a view to the sesha, as when e.g. a master does
24914 something for--let us say, keeps or feeds--his servant. This last
24915 criticism you must not attempt to ward off by maintaining that the
24916 master in keeping his servant acts with a view to himself (to his own
24917 advantage); for the servant in serving the master likewise acts with a
24918 view to himself.--And as, further, we have no adequate definition of
24919 'kârya,' it would be inappropriate to define sesha as that which is
24920 correlative to kârya, and seshin as that which is correlative to sesha.--
24921 Nor, finally, may we define 'that which is aimed at by action' as that
24922 which is the final end (prayojana) of action; for by the final end of an
24923 action we could only understand the end for which the agent undertakes
24924 the action, and this end is no other than the desired object. As thus
24925 'what is aimed at by action' cannot be defined otherwise than what is
24926 desired, kârya cannot be defined as what is to be effected by action and
24927 stands to action in the relation of principal matter (pradhâna or
24928 seshin).
24929

24930 (Let it then be said that the 'niyoga,' i.e. what is commonly called the
24931 apûrva--the supersensuous result of an action which later on produces
24932 the sensible result--constitutes the prayojana--the final purpose--of
24933 the action.--But) the apûrva also can, as it is something different from
24934 the direct objects of desire, viz. pleasure and the cessation of pain,
24935 be viewed only as a means of bringing about these direct objects, and as
24936 something itself to be effected by the action; it is for this very
24937 reason that it is something different from the action, otherwise the
24938 action itself would be that which is effected by the action. The thing
24939 to be effected by the action--which is expressed by means of optative and
24940 imperative verbal forms such as yajeta, 'let him sacrifice'--is, in
24941 accordance with the fact of its being connected with words such as
24942 svargakâmah, 'he who is desirous of heaven', understood to be the means
24943 of bringing about (the enjoyment of) the heavenly world; and as the
24944 (sacrificial) action itself is transitory, there is assumed an
24945 altogether 'new' or 'unprecedented' (apûrva) effect of it which (later
24946 on) is to bring about the enjoyment of heaven. This so-called 'apûrva'
24947 can therefore be understood only with regard to its capability of
24948 bringing about the heavenly world. Now it certainly is ludicrous to
24949 assert that the apûrva, which is assumed to the end of firmly
24950 establishing the independent character of the effect of the action first
24951 recognised as such (i.e. independent), later on becomes the means of
24952 realising the heavenly world; for as the word expressing the result of
24953 the action (yajta) appears in syntactical connexion with 'svargakâmah'
24954 (desirous of heaven), it does not, from the very beginning, denote an
24955 independent object of action, and moreover it is impossible to recognise
24956 an independent result of action other than either pleasure or cessation
24957 of pain, or the means to bring about these two results.--What, moreover,
24958 do you understand by the apûrva being a final end (prayojana)?--You will
24959 perhaps reply, 'its being agreeable like pleasure.'--Is then the apûrva
24960 a pleasure? It is pleasure alone which is agreeable!--Well, let us then
24961 define the apûrva as a kind of pleasure of a special nature, called by
24962 that name!--But what proof, we ask, have you for this? You will, in the
24963 first place, admit yourself that you do not directly experience any
24964 pleasure springing from consciousness of your apûrva, which could in any
24965 way be compared to the pleasure caused by the consciousness of the
24966 objects of the senses.--Well, let us say then that as authoritative
24967 doctrine gives us the notion of an apûrva as something beneficial to man,
24968 we conclude that it will be enjoyed later on.--But, we ask, what is the
24969 authoritative doctrine establishing such an apûrva beneficial to man?
24970 Not, in the first place, ordinary, i.e. non-Vedic doctrine; for such has
24971 for its object action only which always is essentially painful. Nor, in
24972 the next place, Vedic texts; for those also enjoin action only as the
24973 means to bring about certain results such as the heavenly world. Nor
24974 again the Smṛiti texts enjoining works of either permanent or occasional
24975 obligation; for those texts always convey the notion of an apûrva only
24976 on the basis of an antecedent knowledge of the apûrva as intimated by
24977 Vedic texts containing terms such as svargakâmah. And we, moreover, do

24978 not observe that in the case of works having a definite result in this
24979 life, there is enjoyment of any special pleasure called apûrva, in
24980 addition to those advantages which constitute the special result of the
24981 work and are enjoyed here below, as e.g. abundance of food or freedom
24982 from sickness. Thus there is not any proof of the apûrva being a
24983 pleasure. The arthavâda-passages of the Veda also, while glorifying
24984 certain pleasurable results of works, as e.g. the heavenly world, do not
24985 anywhere exhibit a similar glorification of a pleasure called apûrva.

24986
24987 From all this we conclude that also in injunctory sentences that which
24988 is expressed by imperative and similar forms is only the idea that the
24989 meaning of the root--as known from grammar--is to be effected by the
24990 effort of the agent. And that what constitutes the meaning of roots, viz.
24991 the action of sacrificing and the like, possesses the quality of
24992 pleasing the highest Person, who is the inner ruler of Agni and other
24993 divinities (to whom the sacrifices are ostensibly offered), and that
24994 through the highest Person thus pleased the result of the sacrifice is
24995 accomplished, we shall show later on, under Sû. III, 2, 37--It is thus
24996 finally proved that the Vedânta-texts give information about an
24997 accomplished entity, viz. Brahman, and that the fruit of meditation on
24998 Brahman is something infinite and permanent. Where, on the other hand,
24999 Scripture refers to the fruit of mere works, such as the kâturmâsya-
25000 sacrifices, as something imperishable, we have to understand this
25001 imperishableness in a merely relative sense, for Scripture definitely
25002 teaches that the fruit of all works is perishable.

25003
25004 We thus arrive at the settled conclusion that, since the fruit of mere
25005 works is limited and perishable, while that of the cognition of Brahman
25006 is infinite and permanent, there is good reason for entering on an
25007 enquiry into Brahman--the result of which enquiry will be the accurate
25008 determination of Brahman's nature.--Here terminates the adhikarana of
25009 'Enquiry.'

25010
25011 What then is that Brahman which is here said to be an object that should
25012 be enquired into?--To this question the second Sûtra gives a reply.

25013
25014 [FOOTNOTE 148:1. This view is held by the Prâbhâkara Mîmâmsakas.]

25015
25016
25017
25018
25019 2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c., of this (world proceed).

25020
25021 The expression 'the origin', &c., means 'creation, subsistence, and
25022 reabsorption'. The 'this' (in 'of this') denotes this entire world with
25023 its manifold wonderful arrangements, not to be fathomed by thought, and
25024 comprising within itself the aggregate of living souls from Brahmâ down
25025 to blades of grass, all of which experience the fruits (of their former
25026 actions) in definite places and at definite times. 'That from which,' i.
25027 e. that highest Person who is the ruler of all; whose nature is
25028 antagonistic to all evil; whose purposes come true; who possesses
25029 infinite auspicious qualities, such as knowledge, blessedness, and so on;
25030 who is omniscient, omnipotent, supremely merciful; from whom the
25031 creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of this world proceed--he is
25032 Brahman: such is the meaning of the Sûtra.--The definition here given of
25033 Brahman is founded on the text Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'Bhrigu Vâruni went to
25034 his father Varuna, saying, Sir, teach me Brahman', &c., up to 'That from
25035 which these beings are born, that by which when born they live, that
25036 into which they enter at their death, try to know that: that is Brahman.'

25037
25038 A doubt arises here. Is it possible, or not, to gain a knowledge of
25039 Brahman from the characteristic marks stated in this passage?--It is not
25040 possible, the Pûrvapakshin contends. The attributes stated in that
25041 passage--viz. being that from which the world originates, and so on--do
25042 not properly indicate Brahman; for as the essence of an attribute lies
25043 in its separative or distinctive function, there would result from the
25044 plurality of distinctive attributes plurality on the part of Brahman
25045 itself.--But when we say 'Devadatta is of a dark complexion, is young,
25046 has reddish eyes,' &c., we also make a statement as to several

25047 attributes, and yet we are understood to refer to one Devadatta only;
25048 similarly we understand in the case under discussion also that there is
25049 one Brahman only!--Not so, we reply. In Devadatta's case we connect all
25050 attributes with one person, because we know his unity through other
25051 means of knowledge; otherwise the distinctive power of several
25052 attributes would lead us, in this case also, to the assumption of
25053 several substances to which the several attributes belong. In the case
25054 under discussion, on the other hand, we do not, apart from the statement
25055 as to attributes, know anything about the unity of Brahman, and the
25056 distinctive power of the attributes thus necessarily urges upon us the
25057 idea of several Brahman. --But we maintain that the unity of the term
25058 'Brahman' intimates the unity of the thing 'Brahman'!--By no means, we
25059 reply. If a man who knows nothing about cows, but wishes to know about
25060 them, is told 'a cow is that which has either entire horns, or mutilated
25061 horns, or no horns,' the mutually exclusive ideas of the possession of
25062 entire horns, and so on, raise in his mind the ideas of several
25063 individual cows, although the term 'cow' is one only; and in the same
25064 way we are led to the idea of several distinct Brahman. For this reason,
25065 even the different attributes combined are incapable of defining the
25066 thing, the definition of which is desired.--Nor again are the
25067 characteristics enumerated in the Taitt. passage (viz. creation of the
25068 world, &c.) capable of defining Brahman in the way of secondary marks
25069 (upalakshana), because the thing to be defined by them is not previously
25070 known in a different aspect. So-called secondary marks are the cause of
25071 something already known from a certain point of view, being known in a
25072 different aspect--as when it is said 'Where that crane is standing, that
25073 is the irrigated field of Devadatta.'--But may we not say that from the
25074 text 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman,' we already have an
25075 idea of Brahman, and that hence its being the cause of the origin, &c.,
25076 of the world may be taken as collateral indications (pointing to
25077 something already known in a certain way)?--Not so, we reply; either of
25078 these two defining texts has a meaning only with reference to an aspect
25079 of Brahman already known from the other one, and this mutual dependence
25080 deprives both of their force.--Brahman cannot therefore be known through
25081 the characteristic marks mentioned in the text under discussion.

25082
25083 To this primâ facie view we make the following reply. Brahman can be
25084 known on the basis of the origination, subsistence, and reabsorption of
25085 the world--these characteristics occupying the position of collateral
25086 marks. No objection can be raised against this view, on the ground that,
25087 apart from what these collateral marks point to, no other aspect of
25088 Brahman is known; for as a matter of fact they point to that which is
25089 known to us as possessing supreme greatness (brihattva) and power of
25090 growth (brimhana)--this being the meaning of the root brimh (from which
25091 'Brahman' is derived). Of this Brahman, thus already known (on the basis
25092 of etymology), the origination, sustentation, and reabsorption of the
25093 world are collateral marks. Moreover, in the Taitt. text under
25094 discussion, the relative pronoun--which appears in three forms, (that)
25095 'from whence,' (that) 'by which,' (that) 'into which'--refers to
25096 something which is already known as the cause of the origin, and so on,
25097 of the world. This previous knowledge rests on the Ch. passage, 'Being
25098 only this was in the beginning,' &c., up to 'it sent forth fire'--which
25099 declares that the one principle denoted as 'being' is the universal
25100 material, and instrumental cause. There the clause 'Being only this was
25101 in the beginning, one only,' establishes that one being as the general
25102 material cause; the word 'without a second' negatives the existence of a
25103 second operative cause; and the clauses 'it thought, may I be many, may
25104 I grow forth', and 'it sent forth fire', establish that one being (as
25105 the cause and substance of everything). If, then, it is said that
25106 Brahman is that which is the root of the world's origination,
25107 subsistence, and reabsorption, those three processes sufficiently
25108 indicate Brahman as that entity which is their material and operative
25109 cause; and as being the material and the operative cause implies
25110 greatness (brihattva) manifesting itself in various powers, such as
25111 omniscience, and so on, Brahman thus is something already known; and as
25112 hence origination, &c., of the world are marks of something already
25113 known, the objection founded above on the absence of knowledge of
25114 another aspect of Brahman is seen to be invalid.--Nor is there really
25115 any objection to the origination, &c., of the world being taken as

25116 characteristic marks of Brahman in so far as they are distinctive
 25117 attributes. For taken as attributes they indicate Brahman as something
 25118 different from what is opposed to those attributes. Several attributes
 25119 which do not contradict each other may serve quite well as
 25120 characteristic marks defining one thing, the nature of which is not
 25121 otherwise known, without the plurality of the attributes in any way
 25122 involving plurality of the thing defined; for as those attributes are at
 25123 once understood to belong to one substrate, we naturally combine them
 25124 within that one substrate. Such attributes, of course, as the possession
 25125 of mutilated horns (mentioned above), which are contradictorily opposed
 25126 to each other, necessarily lead to the assumption of several individual
 25127 cows to which they severally belong; but the origination, &c., of the
 25128 world are processes separated from each other by difference of time only,
 25129 and may therefore, without contradiction, be connected with one Brahman
 25130 in succession.--The text 'from whence these beings', &c., teaches us
 25131 that Brahman is the cause of the origination, &c., of the world, and of
 25132 this Brahman thus known the other text 'The True, knowledge, the
 25133 Infinite is Brahman', tells us that its essential nature marks it off
 25134 from everything else. The term 'True' expresses Brahman in so far as
 25135 possessing absolutely non-conditioned existence, and thus distinguishes
 25136 it from non-intelligent matter, the abode of change, and the souls
 25137 implicated in matter; for as both of these enter into different states
 25138 of existence called by different names, they do not enjoy unconditioned
 25139 being. The term 'knowledge' expresses the characteristic of permanently
 25140 non-contracted intelligence, and thus distinguishes Brahman from the
 25141 released souls whose intelligence is sometimes in a contracted state.
 25142 And the term 'Infinite' denotes that, whose nature is free from all
 25143 limitation of place, time, and particular substantial nature; and as
 25144 Brahman's essential nature possesses attributes, infinity belongs both
 25145 to the essential nature and to the attributes. The qualification of
 25146 Infinity excludes all those individual souls whose essential nature and
 25147 attributes are not unsurpassable, and who are distinct from the two
 25148 classes of beings already excluded by the two former terms (viz. 'true
 25149 being' and 'knowledge').--The entire text therefore defines Brahman--
 25150 which is already known to be the cause of the origination, &c., of the
 25151 world--as that which is in kind different from all other things; and it
 25152 is therefore not true that the two texts under discussion have no force
 25153 because mutually depending on each other. And from this it follows that
 25154 a knowledge of Brahman may be gained on the ground of its characteristic
 25155 marks--such as its being the cause of the origination, &c., of the world,
 25156 free from all evil, omniscient, all-powerful, and so on.
 25157
 25158 To those, on the other hand, who maintain that the object of enquiry is
 25159 a substance devoid of all difference, neither the first nor the second
 25160 Sûtra can be acceptable; for the Brahman, the enquiry into which the
 25161 first Sûtra proposes, is, according to authoritative etymology,
 25162 something of supreme greatness; and according to the second Sûtra it is
 25163 the cause of the origin, subsistence, and final destruction of the world.
 25164 The same remark holds good with regard to all following Sûtras, and the
 25165 scriptural texts on which they are based--none of them confirm the
 25166 theory of a substance devoid of all difference. Nor, again, does
 25167 Reasoning prove such a theory; for Reasoning has for its object things
 25168 possessing a 'proving' attribute which constantly goes together with an
 25169 attribute 'to be proved.' And even if, in agreement with your view, we
 25170 explained the second Sûtra as meaning 'Brahman is that whence proceeds
 25171 the error of the origination, &c., of the world', we should not thereby
 25172 advance your theory of a substance devoid of all difference. For, as you
 25173 teach, the root of all error is Nescience, and Brahman is that which
 25174 witnesses (is conscious of) Nescience, and the essence of witnessing
 25175 consciousness consists in being pure light (intelligence), and the
 25176 essence of pure light or intelligence is that, distinguishing itself
 25177 from the Non-intelligent, it renders itself, as well as what is
 25178 different from it, capable of becoming the object of empiric thought and
 25179 speech (vyavahâra). All this implies the presence of difference--if
 25180 there were no difference, light or intelligence could not be what it is,
 25181 it would be something altogether void, without any meaning.--Here
 25182 terminates the adhikarana of 'origination and so on.'
 25183
 25184 An objection to the purport of the preceding Sûtras here presents itself.--

The assertion that Brahman, as the cause of the origination, &c., of the world, must be known through the Vedânta-texts is unfounded; for as Brahman may be inferred as the cause of the world through ordinary reasoning, it is not something requiring to be taught by authoritative texts.--To this objection the next Sûtra replies.

3. Because Scripture is the source (of the knowledge of Brahman).

Because Brahman, being raised above all contact with the senses, is not an object of perception and the other means of proof, but to be known through Scripture only; therefore the text 'Whence these creatures are born,' &c., has to be accepted as instructing us regarding the true nature of Brahman.--But, our opponent points out, Scripture cannot be the source of our knowledge of Brahman, because Brahman is to be known through other means. For it is an acknowledged principle that Scripture has meaning only with regard to what is not established by other sources of knowledge.--But what, to raise a *primâ facie* counter objection, are those other sources of knowledge? It cannot, in the first place, be Perception. Perception is twofold, being based either on the sense-organs or on extraordinary concentration of mind (yoga). Of Perception of the former kind there are again two sub-species, according as Perception takes place either through the outer sense-organs or the internal organ (manas). Now the outer sense-organs produce knowledge of their respective objects, in so far as the latter are in actual contact with the organs, but are quite unable to give rise to the knowledge of the special object constituted by a supreme Self that is capable of being conscious of and creating the whole aggregate of things. Nor can internal perception give rise to such knowledge; for only purely internal things, such as pleasure and pain, fall within its cognisance, and it is incapable of relating itself to external objects apart from the outer sense-organs. Nor, again, perception based on Yoga; for although such perception--which springs from intense imagination--implies a vivid presentation of things, it is, after all, nothing more than a reproduction of objects perceived previously, and does not therefore rank as an instrument of knowledge; for it has no means of applying itself to objects other than those perceived previously. And if, after all, it does so, it is (not a means of knowledge but) a source of error.--Nor also inference either of the kind which proceeds on the observation of special cases or of the kind which rests on generalizations (cp. Nyâya Sû. I, 1,5,). Not inference of the former kind, because such inference is not known to relate to anything lying beyond the reach of the senses. Nor inference of the latter kind, because we do not observe any characteristic feature that is invariably accompanied by the presence of a supreme Self capable of being conscious of, and constructing, the universe of things.--But there is such a feature, viz. the world's being an effected thing; it being a matter of common experience that whatever is an effect or product, is due to an agent who possesses a knowledge of the material cause, the instrumental cause, the final end, and the person meant to make use of the thing produced. It further is matter of experience that whatever consists of non-sentient matter is dependent on, or ruled by, a single intelligent principle. The former generalization is exemplified by the case of jars and similar things, and the latter by a living body in good health, which consists of non-intelligent matter dependent on an intelligent principle. And that the body is an effected thing follows from its consisting of parts.--Against this argumentation also objections may be raised. What, it must be asked, do you understand by this dependence on an intelligent principle? Not, we suppose, that the origination and subsistence of the non-intelligent thing should be dependent on the intelligent principle; for in that case your example would not help to prove your contention. Neither the origin nor the subsistence of a person's healthy body depends on the intelligent soul of that person alone; they rather are brought about by the merit and demerit of all those souls which in any way share the fruition of that body--the wife, e.g. of that person, and others. Moreover, the existence of a body made up of parts means that body's being connected with its parts in the way

25254 of so-called intimate relation (sama-vâya), and this requires a certain
25255 combination of the parts but not a presiding intelligent principle. The
25256 existence of animated bodies, moreover, has for its characteristic mark
25257 the process of breathing, which is absent in the case of the earth, sea,
25258 mountains, &c.--all of which are included in the class of things
25259 concerning which you wish to prove something--, and we therefore miss a
25260 uniform kind of existence common to all those things.--Let us then
25261 understand by the dependence of a non-intelligent thing on an
25262 intelligent principle, the fact of the motion of the former depending on
25263 the latter!--This definition, we rejoin, would comprehend also those
25264 cases in which heavy things, such as carriages, masses of stone, trees,
25265 &c., are set in motion by several intelligent beings (while what you want
25266 to prove is the dependence of a moving thing on one intelligent
25267 principle). If, on the other hand, you mean to say that all motion
25268 depends on intelligence in general, you only prove what requires no
25269 proof.--Another alternative, moreover, here presents itself. As we both
25270 admit the existence of individual souls, it will be the more economical
25271 hypothesis to ascribe to them the agency implied in the construction of
25272 the world. Nor must you object to this view on the ground that such
25273 agency cannot belong to the individual souls because they do not possess
25274 the knowledge of material causes, &c., as specified above; for all
25275 intelligent beings are capable of direct knowledge of material causes,
25276 such as earth and so on, and instrumental causes, such as sacrifices and
25277 the like. Earth and other material substances, as well as sacrifices and
25278 the like, are directly perceived by individual intelligent beings at the
25279 present time (and were no doubt equally perceived so at a former time
25280 when this world had to be planned and constructed). Nor does the fact
25281 that intelligent beings are not capable of direct insight into the
25282 unseen principle--called 'apûrva,' or by similar names--which resides in
25283 the form of a power in sacrifices and other instrumental causes, in any
25284 way preclude their being agents in the construction of the world. Direct
25285 insight into powers is nowhere required for undertaking work: what is
25286 required for that purpose is only direct presentative knowledge of the
25287 things endowed with power, while of power itself it suffices to have
25288 some kind of knowledge. Potters apply themselves to the task of making
25289 pots and jars on the strength of the direct knowledge they possess of
25290 the implements of their work--the wheel, the staff, &c.--without
25291 troubling about a similar knowledge of the powers inherent in those
25292 implements; and in the same way intelligent beings may apply themselves
25293 to their work (to be effected by means of sacrifices, &c.), if only they
25294 are assured by sacred tradition of the existence of the various powers
25295 possessed by sacrifices and the like.--Moreover, experience teaches that
25296 agents having a knowledge of the material and other causes must be
25297 inferred only in the case of those effects which can be produced, and
25298 the material and other causes of which can be known: such things, on the
25299 other hand, as the earth, mountains, and oceans, can neither be produced,
25300 nor can their material and other causes ever be known; we therefore have
25301 no right to infer for them intelligent producers. Hence the quality of
25302 being an effected thing can be used as an argument for proving the
25303 existence of an intelligent causal agent, only where that quality is
25304 found in things, the production of which, and the knowledge of the
25305 causes of which, is possible at all.--Experience further teaches that
25306 earthen pots and similar things are produced by intelligent agents
25307 possessing material bodies, using implements, not endowed with the power
25308 of a Supreme Lord, limited in knowledge and so on; the quality of being
25309 an effect therefore supplies a reason for inferring an intelligent agent
25310 of the kind described only, and thus is opposed to the inference of
25311 attributes of a contrary nature, viz. omniscience, omnipotence, and
25312 those other attributes that belong--to the highest Soul, whose existence
25313 you wish to establish.--Nor does this (as might be objected) imply an
25314 abandonment of all inference. Where the thing to be inferred is known
25315 through other means of proof also, any qualities of an opposite nature
25316 which maybe suggested by the inferential mark (linga) are opposed by
25317 those other means of proof, and therefore must be dropped. In the case
25318 under discussion, however, the thine; to be inferred is something not
25319 guaranteed by any other means of proof, viz. a person capable of
25320 constructing the entire universe; here there is nothing to interfere
25321 with the ascription to such a person of all those qualities which, on
25322 the basis of methodical inference, necessarily belong to it.--The

25323 conclusion from all this is that, apart from Scripture, the existence of
25324 a Lord does not admit of proof.
25325
25326 Against all this the Pûrvapakshin now restates his case as follows:--It
25327 cannot be gainsaid that the world is something effected, for it is made
25328 up of parts. We may state this argument in various technical forms. 'The
25329 earth, mountains, &c., are things effected, because they consist of
25330 parts; in the same way as jars and similar things.' 'The earth, seas,
25331 mountains, &c., are effects, because, while being big; (i.e. non-atomic),
25332 they are capable of motion; just as jars and the like.' 'Bodies, the
25333 world, &c., are effects, because, while being big, they are solid
25334 (mûrtta); just as jars and the like.'--But, an objection is raised, in
25335 the case of things made up of parts we do not, in addition to this
25336 attribute of consisting of parts, observe any other aspect determining
25337 that the thing is an effect--so as to enable us to say 'this thing is
25338 effected, and that thing is not'; and, on the other hand, we do observe
25339 it as an indispensable condition of something being an effect, that
25340 there should be the possibility of such an effect being brought about,
25341 and of the existence of such knowledge of material causes, &c. (as the
25342 bringing about of the effect presupposes).--Not so, we reply. In the
25343 case of a cause being inferred on the ground of an effect, the knowledge
25344 and power of the cause must be inferred in accordance with the nature of
25345 the effect. From the circumstance of a thing consisting of parts we know
25346 it to be an effect and on this basis we judge of the power and knowledge
25347 of the cause. A person recognises pots, jars and the like, as things
25348 produced, and therefrom infers the constructive skill and knowledge of
25349 their maker; when, after this, he sees for the first time a kingly
25350 palace with all its various wonderful parts and structures, he concludes
25351 from the special way in which the parts are joined that this also is an
25352 effected thing, and then makes an inference as to the architect's
25353 manifold knowledge and skill. Analogously, when a living body and the
25354 world have once been recognised to be effects, we infer--as their maker--
25355 some special intelligent being, possessing direct insight into their
25356 nature and skill to construct them.--Pleasure and pain, moreover, by
25357 which men are requited for their merit and demerit, are themselves of a
25358 non-intelligent nature, and hence cannot bring about their results
25359 unless they are controlled by an intelligent principle, and this also
25360 compels us to assume a being capable of allotting to each individual
25361 soul a fate corresponding to its deserts. For we do not observe that non-
25362 intelligent implements, such as axes and the like, however much they may
25363 be favoured by circumstances of time, place, and so on, are capable of
25364 producing posts and pillars unless they be handled by a carpenter. And
25365 to quote against the generalization on which we rely the instance of the
25366 seed and sprout and the like can only spring from an ignorance and
25367 stupidity which may be called truly demoniac. The same remark would
25368 apply to pleasure and pain if used as a counter instance. (For in all
25369 these cases the action which produces an effect must necessarily be
25370 guided by an intelligent principle.)--Nor may we assume, as a 'less
25371 complicated hypothesis,' that the guiding principle in the construction
25372 of the world is the individual souls, whose existence is acknowledged by
25373 both parties. For on the testimony of observation we must deny to those
25374 souls the power of seeing what is extremely subtle or remote in time or
25375 place (while such power must necessarily be ascribed to a world-
25376 constructing intelligence). On the other hand, we have no ground for
25377 concluding that the Lord is, like the individual souls, destitute of
25378 such power; hence it cannot be said that other means of knowledge make
25379 it impossible to infer such a Lord. The fact rather is that as his
25380 existence is proved by the argument that any definite effect presupposes
25381 a causal agent competent to produce that effect, he is proved at the
25382 same time as possessing the essential power of intuitively knowing and
25383 ruling all things in the universe.--The contention that from the world
25384 being an effect it follows that its maker does not possess lordly power
25385 and so on, so that the proving reason would prove something contrary to
25386 the special attributes (belonging to a supreme agent, viz. omnipotence,
25387 omniscience, &c.), is founded on evident ignorance of the nature of the
25388 inferential process. For the inference clearly does not prove that there
25389 exist in the thing inferred all the attributes belonging to the proving
25390 collateral instances, including even those attributes which stand in no
25391 causal relation to the effect. A certain effect which is produced by

25392 some agent presupposes just so much power and knowledge on the part of
25393 that agent as is requisite for the production of the effect, but in no
25394 way presupposes any incapability or ignorance on the part of that agent
25395 with regard to things other than the particular effect; for such
25396 incapability and ignorance do not stand towards that effect in any
25397 causal relation. If the origination of the effect can be accounted for
25398 on the basis of the agent's capability of bringing it about, and of his
25399 knowledge of the special material and instrumental causes, it would be
25400 unreasonable to ascribe causal agency to his (altogether irrelevant)
25401 incapacabilities and ignorance with regard to other things, only because
25402 those incapacabilities, &c., are observed to exist together with his
25403 special capability and knowledge. The question would arise moreover
25404 whether such want of capability and knowledge (with regard to things
25405 other than the one actually effected) would be helpful towards the
25406 bringing about of that one effect, in so far as extending to all other
25407 things or to some other things. The former alternative is excluded
25408 because no agent, a potter e.g., is quite ignorant of all other things
25409 but his own special work; and the second alternative is inadmissible
25410 because there is no definite rule indicating that there should be
25411 certain definite kinds of want of knowledge and skill in the case of all
25412 agents [FOOTNOTE 168:1], and hence exceptions would arise with regard to
25413 every special case of want of knowledge and skill. From this it follows
25414 that the absence of lordly power and similar qualities which (indeed is
25415 observed in the case of ordinary agents but) in no way contributes
25416 towards the production of the effects (to which such agents give rise)
25417 is not proved in the case of that which we wish to prove (i.e. a Lord,
25418 creator of the world), and that hence Inference does not establish
25419 qualities contrary (to the qualities characteristic of a Lord).

25420
25421 A further objection will perhaps be raised, viz. that as experience
25422 teaches that potters and so on direct their implements through the
25423 mediation of their own bodies, we are not justified in holding that a
25424 bodiless Supreme Lord directs the material and instrumental causes of
25425 the universe.--But in reply to this we appeal to the fact of experience,
25426 that evil demons possessing men's bodies, and also venom, are driven or
25427 drawn out of those bodies by mere will power. Nor must you ask in what
25428 way the volition of a bodiless Lord can put other bodies in motion; for
25429 volition is not dependent on a body. The cause of volitions is not the
25430 body but the internal organ (manas), and such an organ we ascribe to the
25431 Lord also, since what proves the presence of an internal organ endowed
25432 with power and knowledge is just the presence of effects.--But volitions,
25433 even if directly springing from the internal organ, can belong to
25434 embodied beings only, such only possessing internal organs!--This
25435 objection also is founded on a mistaken generalization: the fact rather
25436 is that the internal organ is permanent, and exists also in separation
25437 from the body. The conclusion, therefore, is that--as the individual
25438 souls with their limited capacities and knowledge, and their dependence
25439 on merit and demerit, are incapable of giving rise to things so variously
25440 and wonderfully made as worlds and animated bodies are--inference
25441 directly leads us to the theory that there is a supreme intelligent
25442 agent, called the Lord, who possesses unfathomable, unlimited powers and
25443 wisdom, is capable of constructing the entire world, is without a body,
25444 and through his mere volition brings about the infinite expanse of this
25445 entire universe so variously and wonderfully planned. As Brahman may
25446 thus be ascertained by means of knowledge other than revelation, the
25447 text quoted under the preceding Sûtra cannot be taken to convey
25448 instruction as to Brahman. Since, moreover, experience demonstrates that
25449 material and instrumental causes always are things absolutely distinct
25450 from each other, as e.g. the clay and the potter with his implements;
25451 and since, further, there are substances not made up of parts, as e.g.
25452 ether, which therefore cannot be viewed as effects; we must object on
25453 these grounds also to any attempt to represent the one Brahman as the
25454 universal material and instrumental cause of the entire world.

25455
25456 Against all this we now argue as follows:--The Vedânta-text declaring
25457 the origination, &c., of the world does teach that there is a Brahman
25458 possessing the characteristics mentioned; since Scripture alone is a
25459 means for the knowledge of Brahman. That the world is an effected thing
25460 because it consists of parts; and that, as all effects are observed to

25461 have for their antecedents certain appropriate agents competent to
25462 produce them, we must infer a causal agent competent to plan and
25463 construct the universe, and standing towards it in the relation of
25464 material and operative cause--this would be a conclusion altogether
25465 unjustified. There is no proof to show that the earth, oceans, &c.,
25466 although things produced, were created at one time by one creator. Nor
25467 can it be pleaded in favour of such a conclusion that all those things
25468 have one uniform character of being effects, and thus are analogous to
25469 one single jar; for we observe that various effects are distinguished by
25470 difference of time of production, and difference of producers. Nor again
25471 may you maintain the oneness of the creator on the ground that
25472 individual souls are incapable of the creation of this wonderful
25473 universe, and that if an additional principle be assumed to account for
25474 the world--which manifestly is a product--it would be illegitimate to
25475 assume more than one such principle. For we observe that individual
25476 beings acquire more and more extraordinary powers in consequence of an
25477 increase of religious merit; and as we may assume that through an
25478 eventual supreme degree of merit they may in the end qualify themselves
25479 for producing quite extraordinary effects, we have no right to assume a
25480 highest soul of infinite merit, different from all individual souls. Nor
25481 also can it be proved that all things are destroyed and produced all at
25482 once; for no such thing is observed to take place, while it is, on the
25483 other hand, observed that things are produced and destroyed in
25484 succession; and if we infer that all things are produced and destroyed
25485 because they are effects, there is no reason why this production and
25486 destruction should not take place in a way agreeing with ordinary
25487 experience. If, therefore, what it is desired to prove is the agency of
25488 one intelligent being, we are met by the difficulty that the proving
25489 reason (viz. the circumstance of something being an effect) is not
25490 invariably connected with what it is desired to prove; there, further,
25491 is the fault of qualities not met with in experience being attributed to
25492 the subject about which something has to be proved; and lastly there is
25493 the fault of the proving collateral instances being destitute of what
25494 has to be proved--for experience does not exhibit to us one agent
25495 capable of producing everything. If, on the other hand, what you wish to
25496 prove is merely the existence of an intelligent creative agent, you
25497 prove only what is proved already (not contested by any one).--Moreover,
25498 if you use the attribute of being an effect (which belongs to the
25499 totality of things) as a means to prove the existence of one omniscient
25500 and omnipotent creator, do you view this attribute as belonging to all
25501 things in so far as produced together, or in so far as produced in
25502 succession? In the former case the attribute of being an effect is not
25503 established (for experience does not show that all things are produced
25504 together); and in the latter case the attribute would really prove what
25505 is contrary to the hypothesis of one creator (for experience shows that
25506 things produced in succession have different causes). In attempting to
25507 prove the agency of one intelligent creative being only, we thus enter
25508 into conflict with Perception and Inference, and we moreover contradict
25509 Scripture, which says that 'the potter is born' and 'the cartwright is
25510 born' (and thus declares a plurality of intelligent agents). Moreover,
25511 as we observe that all effected things, such as living bodies and so on,
25512 are connected with pleasure and the like, which are the effects of
25513 sattva (goodness) and the other primary constituents of matter, we must
25514 conclude that effected things have sattva and so on for their causes.
25515 Sattva and so on--which constitute the distinctive elements of the
25516 causal substance--are the causes of the various nature of the effects.
25517 Now those effects can be connected with their causes only in so far as
25518 the internal organ of a person possessing sattva and so on undergoes
25519 modifications. And that a person possesses those qualities is due to
25520 karman. Thus, in order to account for the origination of different
25521 effects we must necessarily assume the connexion of an intelligent agent
25522 with karman, whereby alone he can become the cause of effects; and
25523 moreover the various character of knowledge and power (which the various
25524 effects presuppose) has its reason in karman. And if it be said that it
25525 is (not the various knowledge, &c., but) the mere wish of the agent that
25526 causes the origination of effects, we point out that the wish, as being
25527 specialised by its particular object, must be based on sattva and so on,
25528 and hence is necessarily connected with karman. From all this it follows
25529 that individual souls only can be causal agents: no legitimate inference

25530 leads to a Lord different from them in nature.--This admits of various
25531 expressions in technical form. 'Bodies, worlds, &c., are effects due to
25532 the causal energy of individual souls, just as pots are'; 'the Lord is
25533 not a causal agent, because he has no aims; just as the released souls
25534 have none'; 'the Lord is not an agent, because he has no body; just as
25535 the released souls have none.' (This last argumentation cannot be
25536 objected to on the ground that individual souls take possession of
25537 bodies; for in their case there exists a beginningless subtle body by
25538 means of which they enter into gross bodies).--'Time is never devoid of
25539 created worlds; because it is time, just like the present time (which
25540 has its created world).'

25541
25542 Consider the following point also. Does the Lord produce his effects,
25543 with his body or apart from his body? Not the latter; for we do not
25544 observe causal agency on the part of any bodiless being: even the
25545 activities of the internal organ are found only in beings having a body,
25546 and although the internal organ be eternal we do not know of its
25547 producing any effects in the case of released disembodied souls. Nor
25548 again is the former alternative admissible; for in that case the Lord's
25549 body would either be permanent or non-permanent. The former alternative
25550 would imply that something made up of parts is eternal; and if we once
25551 admit this we may as well admit that the world itself is eternal, and
25552 then there is no reason to infer a Lord. And the latter alternative is
25553 inadmissible because in that case there would be no cause of the body,
25554 different from it (which would account for the origination of the body).
25555 Nor could the Lord himself be assumed as the cause of the body, since a
25556 bodiless being cannot be the cause of a body. Nor could it be maintained
25557 that the Lord can be assumed to be 'embodied' by means of some other
25558 body; for this leads us into a _regressus in infinitum._--Should we,
25559 moreover, represent to ourselves the Lord (when productive) as engaged
25560 in effort or not?--The former is inadmissible, because he is without a
25561 body. And the latter alternative is excluded because a being not making
25562 an effort does not produce effects. And if it be said that the effect, i.
25563 e. the world, has for its causal agent one whose activity consists in
25564 mere desire, this would be to ascribe to the subject of the conclusion
25565 (i.e. the world) qualities not known from experience; and moreover the
25566 attribute to be proved would be absent in the case of the proving
25567 instances (such as jars, &c., which are not the work of agents engaged
25568 in mere wishing). Thus the inference of a creative Lord which claims to
25569 be in agreement with observation is refuted by reasoning which itself is
25570 in agreement with observation, and we hence conclude that Scripture is
25571 the only source of knowledge with regard to a supreme soul that is the
25572 Lord of all and constitutes the highest Brahman. What Scripture tells us
25573 of is a being which comprehends within itself infinite, altogether
25574 unsurpassable excellences such as omnipotence and so on, is antagonistic
25575 to all evil, and totally different in character from whatever is
25576 cognised by the other means of knowledge: that to such a being there
25577 should attach even the slightest imperfection due to its similarity in
25578 nature to the things known by the ordinary means of knowledge, is thus
25579 altogether excluded.--The Pûrvapakshin had remarked that the oneness of
25580 the instrumental and the material cause is neither matter of observation
25581 nor capable of proof, and that the same holds good with regard to the
25582 theory that certain non-composite substances such as ether are created
25583 things; that these points also are in no way contrary to reason, we
25584 shall show later on under Sû. I, 4, 23, and Sû. II, 3, 1.

25585
25586 The conclusion meanwhile is that, since Brahman does not fall within the
25587 sphere of the other means of knowledge, and is the topic of Scripture
25588 only, the text 'from whence these creatures,' &c., _does_ give
25589 authoritative information as to a Brahman possessing the characteristic
25590 qualities so often enumerated. Here terminates the adhikarana of
25591 'Scripture being the source.'

25592
25593 A new objection here presents itself.--Brahman does not indeed fall
25594 within the province of the other means of knowledge; but all the same
25595 Scripture does not give authoritative information regarding it: for
25596 Brahman is not something that has for its purport activity or cessation
25597 from activity, but is something fully established and accomplished
25598 within itself.--To this objection the following Sûtra replies.

25599
25600 [FOOTNOTE 168:1. A certain potter may not possess the skill and
25601 knowledge required to make chairs and beds; but some other potter may
25602 possess both, and so on. We cannot therefore point to any definite want
25603 of skill and knowledge as invariably accompanying the capability of
25604 producing effects of some other kind.]
25605
25606
25607
25608

25609 4. But that (i.e. the authoritativeness of Scripture with regard to
25610 Brahman) exists on account of the connexion (of Scripture with the
25611 highest aim of man).
25612

25613 The word 'but' is meant to rebut the objection raised. That, i.e. the
25614 authoritativeness of Scripture with regard to Brahman, is possible, on
25615 account of samanvaya, i.e. connexion with the highest aim of man--that
25616 is to say because the scriptural texts are connected with, i.e. have for
25617 their subject, Brahman, which constitutes the highest aim of man. For
25618 such is the connected meaning of the whole aggregate of words which
25619 constitutes the Upanishads--'That from whence these beings are
25620 born'(Taitt. Up. III, 1, 1). 'Being only this was in the beginning, one,
25621 without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, 2), &c. &c. And of aggregates of words
25622 which are capable of giving information about accomplished things known
25623 through the ordinary means of ascertaining the meaning of words, and
25624 which connectedly refer to a Brahman which is the cause of the
25625 origination, subsistence, and destruction of the entire world, is
25626 antagonistic to all imperfection and so on, we have no right to say that,
25627 owing to the absence of a purport in the form of activity or cessation
25628 of activity, they really refer to something other than Brahman.
25629

25630 For all instruments of knowledge have their end in determining the
25631 knowledge of their own special objects: their action does not adapt
25632 itself to a final purpose, but the latter rather adapts itself to the
25633 means of knowledge. Nor is it true that where there is no connexion with
25634 activity or cessation of activity all aim is absent; for in such cases
25635 we observe connexion with what constitutes the general aim, i.e. the
25636 benefit of man. Statements of accomplished matter of fact--such as 'a
25637 son is born to thee.' 'This is no snake'--evidently have an aim, viz. in
25638 so far as they either give rise to joy or remove pain and fear.
25639

25640 Against this view the Pûrvapakshin now argues as follows. The Vedânta-
25641 texts do not impart knowledge of Brahman; for unless related to activity
25642 or the cessation of activity, Scripture would be unmeaning, devoid of
25643 all purpose. Perception and the other means of knowledge indeed have
25644 their aim and end in supplying knowledge of the nature of accomplished
25645 things and facts; Scripture, on the other hand, must be supposed to aim
25646 at some practical purpose. For neither in ordinary speech nor in the
25647 Veda do we ever observe the employment of sentences devoid of a
25648 practical purpose: the employment of sentences not having such a purpose
25649 is in fact impossible. And what constitutes such purpose is the
25650 attainment of a desired, or the avoidance of a non-desired object, to be
25651 effected by some action or abstention from action. 'Let a man desirous
25652 of wealth attach himself to the court of a prince'; 'a man with a weak
25653 digestion must not drink much water'; 'let him who is desirous of the
25654 heavenly world offer sacrifices'; and so on. With regard to the
25655 assertion that such sentences also as refer to accomplished things--'a
25656 son is born to thee' and so on--are connected with certain aims of man,
25657 viz. joy or the cessation of fear, we ask whether in such cases the
25658 attainment of man's purpose results from the thing or fact itself, as e.
25659 g. the birth of a son, or from the knowledge of that thing or fact.--You
25660 will reply that as a thing although actually existing is of no use to
25661 man as long as it is not known to him, man's purpose is accomplished by
25662 his knowledge of the thing.--It then appears, we rejoin, that man's
25663 purpose is effected through mere knowledge, even if there is no actual
25664 thing; and from this it follows that Scripture, although connected with
25665 certain aims, is not a means of knowledge for the actual existence of
25666 things. In all cases, therefore, sentences have a practical purpose;
25667 they determine either some form of activity or cessation from activity,

25668 or else some form of knowledge. No sentence, therefore, can have for its
25669 purport an accomplished thing, and hence the Vedānta-texts do not convey
25670 the knowledge of Brahman as such an accomplished entity.

25671
25672 At this point somebody propounds the following view. The Vedānta-texts
25673 _are_ an authoritative means for the cognition of Brahman, because as a
25674 matter of fact they also aim at something to be done. What they really
25675 mean to teach is that Brahman, which in itself is pure homogeneous
25676 knowledge, without a second, not connected with a world, but is, owing
25677 to beginningless Nescience, viewed as connected with a world, should be
25678 freed from this connexion. And it is through this process of dissolution
25679 of the world that Brahman becomes the object of an injunction.--But
25680 which texts embody this injunction, according to which Brahman in its
25681 pure form is to be realised through the dissolution of this apparent
25682 world with its distinction of knowing subjects and objects of
25683 knowledge?--Texts such as the following: 'One should not see (i. e.
25684 represent to oneself) the seer of seeing, one should not think the
25685 thinker of thinking' (Bri. Up. III, 4, 2); for this means that we should
25686 realise Brahman in the form of pure Seeing (knowledge), free from the
25687 distinction of seeing agents and objects of sight. Brahman is indeed
25688 accomplished through itself, but all the same it may constitute an
25689 object to be accomplished, viz. in so far as it is being disengaged from
25690 the apparent world.

25691
25692 This view (the Mīmāṃsaka rejoins) is unfounded. He who maintains that
25693 injunction constitutes the meaning of sentences must be able to assign
25694 the injunction itself, the qualification of the person to whom the
25695 injunction is addressed, the object of the injunction, the means to
25696 carry it out, the special mode of the procedure, and the person carrying
25697 out the injunction. Among these things the qualification of the person
25698 to whom the injunction addresses itself is something not to be enjoined
25699 (but existing previously to the injunction), and is of the nature either
25700 of cause (nimitta) or a result aimed at (phala). We then have to decide
25701 what, in the case under discussion (i.e. the alleged injunction set
25702 forth by the antagonist), constitutes the qualification of the person to
25703 whom the injunction addresses itself, and whether it be of the nature of
25704 a cause or of a result.--Let it then be said that what constitutes the
25705 qualification in our case is the intuition of the true nature of Brahman
25706 (on the part of the person to whom the injunction is addressed).--This,
25707 we rejoin, cannot be a cause, as it is not something previously
25708 established; while in other cases the nimitta is something so
25709 established, as e.g. 'life' is in the case of a person to whom the
25710 following injunction is addressed, 'As long as his life lasts he is to
25711 make the Agnihotra-oblation.' And if, after all, it were admitted to be
25712 a cause, it would follow that, as the intuition of the true nature of
25713 Brahman is something permanent, the object of the injunction would have
25714 to be accomplished even subsequently to final release, in the same way
25715 as the Agnihotra has to be performed permanently as long as life lasts.--
25716 Nor again can the intuition of Brahman's true nature be a result; for
25717 then, being the result of an action enjoined, it would be something non-
25718 permanent, like the heavenly world.--What, in the next place, would be
25719 the 'object to be accomplished' of the injunction? You may not reply
25720 'Brahman'; for as Brahman is something permanent it is not something
25721 that can be realised, and moreover it is not denoted by a verbal form
25722 (such as denote actions that can be accomplished, as e.g. yāga,
25723 sacrifice).--Let it then be said that what is to be realised is Brahman,
25724 in so far as free from the world!--But, we rejoin, even if this be
25725 accepted as a thing to be realised, it is not the object (vishaya) of
25726 the injunction--that it cannot be for the second reason just stated--but
25727 its final result (phala). What moreover is, on this last assumption, the
25728 thing to be realised--Brahman, or the cessation of the apparent world?--
25729 Not Brahman; for Brahman is something accomplished, and from your
25730 assumption it would follow that it is not eternal.--Well then, the
25731 dissolution of the world!--Not so, we reply; for then it would not be
25732 Brahman that is realised.--Let it then be said that the dissolution of
25733 the world only is the object of the injunction!--This, too, cannot be,
25734 we rejoin; that dissolution is the result (phala) and cannot therefore
25735 be the object of the injunction. For the dissolution of the world means
25736 final release; and that is the result aimed at. Moreover, if the

25737 dissolution of the world is taken as the object of the injunction, that
25738 dissolution would follow from the injunction, and the injunction would
25739 be carried out by the dissolution of the world; and this would be a case
25740 of vicious mutual dependence.--We further ask--is the world, which is to
25741 be put an end to, false or real?--If it is false, it is put an end to by
25742 knowledge alone, and then the injunction is needless. Should you reply
25743 to this that the injunction puts an end to the world in so far as it
25744 gives rise to knowledge, we reply that knowledge springs of itself from
25745 the texts which declare the highest truth: hence there is no need of
25746 additional injunctions. As knowledge of the meaning of those texts
25747 sublates the entire false world distinct from Brahman, the injunction
25748 itself with all its adjuncts is seen to be something baseless.--If, on
25749 the other hand, the world is true, we ask--is the injunction, which puts
25750 an end to the world, Brahman itself or something different from Brahman?
25751 If the former, the world cannot exist at all: for what terminates it,
25752 viz. Brahman, is something eternal; and the injunction thus being
25753 eternal itself Cannot be accomplished by means of certain actions.--Let
25754 then the latter alternative be accepted!--But in that case, the niyoga
25755 being something which is accomplished by a set of performances the
25756 function of which it is to put an end to the entire world, the
25757 performing person himself perishes (with the rest of the world), and the
25758 niyoga thus remains without a substrate. And if everything apart from
25759 Brahman is put an end to by a performance the function of which it is to
25760 put an end to the world, there remains no result to be effected by the
25761 niyoga, consequently there is no release.

25762
25763 Further, the dissolution of the world cannot constitute the instrument
25764 (karana) in the action enjoined, because no mode of procedure
25765 (itikartavyatâ) can be assigned for the instrument of the niyoga, and
25766 unless assisted by a mode of procedure an instrument cannot operate.--
25767 But why is there no 'mode of procedure'?--For the following reasons. A
25768 mode of procedure is either of a positive or a negative kind. If
25769 positive, it may be of two kinds, viz. either such as to bring about the
25770 instrument or to assist it. Now in our case there is no room for either
25771 of these alternatives. Not for the former; for there exists in our case
25772 nothing analogous to the stroke of the pestle (which has the manifest
25773 effect of separating the rice grains from the husks), whereby the
25774 visible effect of the dissolution of the whole world could be brought
25775 about. Nor, secondly, is there the possibility of anything assisting the
25776 instrument, already existing independently, to bring about its effect;
25777 for owing to the existence of such an assisting factor the instrument
25778 itself, i.e. the cessation of the apparent world, cannot be established.
25779 Nor must you say that it is the cognition of the non-duality of Brahman
25780 that brings about the means for the dissolution of the world; for, as we
25781 have already explained above, this cognition directly brings about final
25782 Release, which is the same as the dissolution of the world, and thus
25783 there is nothing left to be effected by special means.--And if finally
25784 the mode of procedure is something purely negative, it can, owing to
25785 this its nature, neither bring about nor in any way assist the
25786 instrumental cause. From all this it follows that there is no
25787 possibility of injunctions having for their object the realisation of
25788 Brahman, in so far as free from the world.

25789
25790 Here another primâ facie view of the question is set forth.--It must be
25791 admitted that the Vedânta-texts are not means of authoritative knowledge,
25792 since they refer to Brahman, which is an accomplished thing (not a thing
25793 'to be accomplished'); nevertheless Brahman itself is established, viz.
25794 by means of those passages which enjoin meditation (as something 'to be
25795 done'). This is the purport of texts such as the following: 'The Self is
25796 to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated upon' (Bri.
25797 Up. II, 4, 5); 'The Self which is free from sin must be searched out'
25798 (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a man meditate upon him as the Self' (Bri. Up.
25799 I, 4, 7); 'Let a man meditate upon the Self as his world' (Bri. Up. I, 4,
25800 15).--These injunctions have meditation for their object, and meditation
25801 again is defined by its own object only, so that the injunctive word
25802 immediately suggests an object of meditation; and as such an object
25803 there presents itself, the 'Self' mentioned in the same sentence. Now
25804 there arises the question, What are the characteristics of that Self?
25805 and in reply to it there come in texts such as 'The True, knowledge,

25806 infinite is Brahman'; 'Being only this was in the beginning, one without
25807 a second.' As these texts give the required special information, they
25808 stand in a supplementary relation to the injunctions, and hence are
25809 means of right knowledge; and in this way the purport of the Vedânta-
25810 texts includes Brahman--as having a definite place in meditation which
25811 is the object of injunction. Texts such as 'One only without a second'
25812 (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'That is the true, that is the Self (Ch. Up. VI, 8,
25813 7); 'There is here not any plurality' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19), teach that
25814 there is one Reality only, viz. Brahman, and that everything else is
25815 false. And as Perception and the other means of proof, as well as that
25816 part of Scripture which refers to action and is based on the view of
25817 plurality, convey the notion of plurality, and as there is contradiction
25818 between plurality and absolute Unity, we form the conclusion that the
25819 idea of plurality arises through beginningless avidyâ, while absolute
25820 Unity alone is real. And thus it is through the injunction of meditation
25821 on Brahman--which has for its result the intuition of Brahman--that man
25822 reaches final release, i.e. becomes one with Brahman, which consists of
25823 non-dual intelligence free of all the manifold distinctions that spring
25824 from Nescience. Nor is this becoming one with Brahman to be accomplished
25825 by the mere cognition of the sense of certain Vedânta-texts; for this is
25826 not observed--the fact rather being that the view of plurality persists
25827 even after the cognition of the sense of those texts--, and, moreover,
25828 if it were so, the injunction by Scripture of hearing, reflecting, &c.,
25829 would be purposeless.

25830
25831 To this reasoning the following objection might be raised.--We observe
25832 that when a man is told that what he is afraid of is not a snake, but
25833 only a rope, his fear comes to an end; and as bondage is as unreal as
25834 the snake imagined in the rope it also admits of being sublated by
25835 knowledge, and may therefore, apart from all injunction, be put an end
25836 to by the simple comprehension of the sense of certain texts. If final
25837 release were to be brought about by injunctions, it would follow that it
25838 is not eternal--not any more than the heavenly world and the like; while
25839 yet its eternity is admitted by every one. Acts of religious merit,
25840 moreover (such as are prescribed by injunctions), can only be the causes
25841 of certain results in so far as they give rise to a body capable of
25842 experiencing those results, and thus necessarily produce the so-called
25843 samsâra-state (which is opposed to final release, and) which consists in
25844 the connexion of the soul with some sort of body, high or low. Release,
25845 therefore, is not something to be brought about by acts of religious
25846 merit. In agreement herewith Scripture says, 'For the soul as long as it
25847 is in the body, there is no release from pleasure and pain; when it is
25848 free from the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touch it' (Ch. Up.
25849 VIII, 12, 1). This passage declares that in the state of release, when
25850 the soul is freed from the body, it is not touched by either pleasure or
25851 pain--the effects of acts of religious merit or demerit; and from this
25852 it follows that the disembodied state is not to be accomplished by acts
25853 of religious merit. Nor may it be said that, as other special results
25854 are accomplished by special injunctions, so the disembodied state is to
25855 be accomplished by the injunction of meditation; for that state is
25856 essentially something not to be effected. Thus scriptural texts say,
25857 'The wise man who knows the Self as bodiless among the bodies, as
25858 persisting among non-persisting things, as great and all-pervading; he
25859 does not grieve' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 22); 'That person is without breath,
25860 without internal organ, pure, without contact' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2).--
25861 Release which is a bodiless state is eternal, and cannot therefore be
25862 accomplished through meritorious acts.

25863
25864 In agreement herewith Scripture says, 'That which thou seest apart from
25865 merit (dharma) and non-merit, from what is done and not done, from what
25866 exists and what has to be accomplished--tell me that' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 14).--
25867 Consider what follows also. When we speak of something being
25868 accomplished (effected-sâdhya) we mean one of four things, viz. its
25869 being originated (utpatti), or obtained (prâpti), or modified (vikriti),
25870 or in some way or other (often purely ceremonial) made ready or fit
25871 (samskriti). Now in neither of these four senses can final Release be
25872 said to be accomplished. It cannot be originated, for being Brahman
25873 itself it is eternal. It cannot be attained: for Brahman, being the Self,
25874 is something eternally attained. It cannot be modified; for that would

25875 imply that like sour milk and similar things (which are capable of
25876 change) it is non-eternal. Nor finally can it be made 'ready' or 'fit.'
25877 A thing is made ready or fit either by the removal of some imperfection
25878 or by the addition of some perfection. Now Brahman cannot be freed from
25879 any imperfection, for it is eternally faultless; nor can a perfection be
25880 added to it, for it is absolutely perfect. Nor can it be improved in the
25881 sense in which we speak of improving a mirror, viz. by polishing it; for
25882 as it is absolutely changeless it cannot become the object of any action,
25883 either of its own or of an outside agent. And, again, actions affecting
25884 the body, such as bathing, do not 'purify' the Self (as might possibly
25885 be maintained) but only the organ of Egoity (ahamkartri) which is the
25886 product of avidyā, and connected with the body; it is this same
25887 ahamkartri also that enjoys the fruits springing from any action upon
25888 the body. Nor must it be said that the Self is the ahamkartri; for the
25889 Self rather is that which is conscious of the ahamkartri. This is the
25890 teaching of the mantras: 'One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other
25891 looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1); 'When he is in union with
25892 the body, the senses, and the mind, then wise men call him the Enjoyer'
25893 (Ka. Up. I, 3,4); 'The one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the
25894 Self within all beings, watching over all works, dwelling in all beings,
25895 the witness, the perceiver, the only one, free from qualities' (Svet. Up.
25896 VI, 11); 'He encircled all, bright, bodiless, scatheless, without
25897 muscles, pure, untouched by evil' (Īśa. Up. 8).--All these texts
25898 distinguish from the ahamkartri due to Nescience, the true Self,
25899 absolutely perfect and pure, free from all change. Release therefore--
25900 which is the Self--cannot be brought about in any way.--But, if this
25901 is so, what then is the use of the comprehension of the texts?--It is of
25902 use, we reply, in so far as it puts an end to the obstacles in the way
25903 of Release. Thus scriptural texts declare: 'You indeed are our father,
25904 you who carry us from our ignorance to the other shore' (Pra. Up. VI, 8);
25905 'I have heard from men like you that he who knows the Self overcomes
25906 grief. I am in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine' (Ch. Up.
25907 VII, 1, 3); 'To him whose faults had thus been rubbed out Sanatkumāra
25908 showed the other bank of Darkness' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2). This shows that
25909 what is effected by the comprehension of the meaning of texts is merely
25910 the cessation of impediments in the way of Release. This cessation
25911 itself, although something effected, is of the nature of that kind of
25912 nonexistence which results from the destruction of something existent,
25913 and as such does not pass away.--Texts such as 'He knows Brahman, he
25914 becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9); 'Having known him he passes beyond
25915 death' (Svet. Up. III,8), declare that Release follows immediately on
25916 the cognition of Brahman, and thus negative the intervention of
25917 injunctions.--Nor can it be maintained that Brahman is related to action
25918 in so far as constituting the object of the action either of knowledge
25919 or of meditation; for scriptural texts deny its being an object in
25920 either of these senses. Compare 'Different is this from what is known,
25921 and from what is unknown' (Ke. Up. II, 4); 'By whom he knows all this,
25922 whereby should he know him?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'That do thou know as
25923 Brahman, not that on which they meditate as being this' (Ke. Up. II, 4).
25924 Nor does this view imply that the sacred texts have no object at all;
25925 for it is their object to put an end to the view of difference springing
25926 from avidyā. Scripture does not objectivise Brahman in any definite form,
25927 but rather teaches that its true nature is to be non-object, and thereby
25928 puts an end to the distinction, fictitiously suggested by Nescience, of
25929 knowing subjects, acts of knowledge, and objects of knowledge. Compare
25930 the text 'You should not see a seer of seeing, you should not think a
25931 thinker of thought,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 4, 2).--Nor, again, must it be
25932 said that, if knowledge alone puts an end to bondage, the injunctions of
25933 hearing and so on are purposeless; for their function is to cause the
25934 origination of the comprehension of the texts, in so far as they divert
25935 from all other alternatives the student who is naturally inclined to
25936 yield to distractions.--Nor, again, can it be maintained that a
25937 cessation of bondage through mere knowledge is never observed to take
25938 place; for as bondage is something false (unreal) it cannot possibly
25939 persist after the rise of knowledge. For the same reason it is a mistake
25940 to maintain that the cessation of bondage takes place only after the
25941 death of the body. In order that the fear inspired by the imagined snake
25942 should come to an end, it is required only that the rope should be
25943 recognised as what it is, not that a snake should be destroyed. If the

25944 body were something real, its destruction would be necessary; but being
25945 apart from Brahman it is unreal. He whose bondage does not come to an
25946 end, in him true knowledge has not arisen; this we infer from the effect
25947 of such knowledge not being observed in him. Whether the body persist or
25948 not, he who has reached true knowledge is released from that very moment.--
25949 The general conclusion of all this is that, as Release is not something
25950 to be accomplished by injunctions of meditation, Brahman is not proved
25951 to be something standing in a supplementary relation to such injunctions;
25952 but is rather proved by (non-injunctory) texts, such as 'Thou art that';
25953 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'; 'This Self is Brahman.'

25954
25955 This view (the holder of the dhyāna-vidhi theory rejoins) is untenable;
25956 since the cessation of bondage cannot possibly spring from the mere
25957 comprehension of the meaning of texts. Even if bondage were something
25958 unreal, and therefore capable of sublation by knowledge, yet being
25959 something direct, immediate, it could not be sublated by the indirect
25960 comprehension of the sense of texts. When a man directly conscious of a
25961 snake before him is told by a competent by-stander that it is not a
25962 snake but merely a rope, his fear is not dispelled by a mere cognition
25963 contrary to that of a snake, and due to the information received; but
25964 the information brings about the cessation of his fear in that way that
25965 it rouses him to an activity aiming at the direct perception, by means
25966 of his senses, of what the thing before him really is. Having at first
25967 started back in fear of the imagined snake, he now proceeds to ascertain
25968 by means of ocular perception the true nature of the thing, and having
25969 accomplished this is freed from fear. It would not be correct to say
25970 that in this case words (viz. of the person informing) produce this
25971 perceptive knowledge; for words are not a sense-organ, and among the
25972 means of knowledge it is the sense-organs only that give rise to direct
25973 knowledge. Nor, again, can it be pleaded that in the special case of
25974 Vedic texts sentences may give rise to direct knowledge, owing to the
25975 fact that the person concerned has cleansed himself of all imperfection
25976 through the performance of actions not aiming at immediate results, and
25977 has been withdrawn from all outward objects by hearing, reflection, and
25978 meditation; for in other cases also, where special impediments in the
25979 way of knowledge are being removed, we never observe that the special
25980 means of knowledge, such as the sense-organs and so on, operate outside
25981 their proper limited sphere.--Nor, again, can it be maintained that
25982 meditation acts as a means helpful towards the comprehension of texts;
25983 for this leads to vicious reciprocal dependence--when the meaning of the
25984 texts has been comprehended it becomes the object of meditation; and
25985 when meditation has taken place there arises comprehension of the
25986 meaning of the texts!--Nor can it be said that meditation and the
25987 comprehension of the meaning of texts have different objects; for if
25988 this were so the comprehension of the texts could not be a means helpful
25989 towards meditation: meditation on one thing does not give rise to
25990 eagerness with regard to another thing!--For meditation which consists
25991 in uninterrupted remembrance of a thing cognised, the cognition of the
25992 sense of texts, moreover, forms an indispensable prerequisite; for
25993 knowledge of Brahman--the object of meditation--cannot originate from
25994 any other source.--Nor can it be said that that knowledge on which
25995 meditation is based is produced by one set of texts, while that
25996 knowledge which puts an end to the world is produced by such texts as
25997 'thou art that,' and the like. For, we ask, has the former knowledge the
25998 same object as the latter, or a different one? On the former alternative
25999 we are led to the same vicious reciprocal dependence which we noted
26000 above; and on the latter alternative it cannot be shown that meditation
26001 gives rise to eagerness with regard to the latter kind of knowledge.
26002 Moreover, as meditation presupposes plurality comprising an object of
26003 meditation, a meditating subject and so on, it really cannot in any
26004 perceptible way be helpful towards the origination of the comprehension
26005 of the sense of texts, the object of which is the oneness of a Brahman
26006 free from all plurality: he, therefore, who maintains that Nescience
26007 comes to an end through the mere comprehension of the meaning of texts
26008 really implies that the injunctions of hearing, reflection, and
26009 meditation are purposeless.

26010
26011 The conclusion that, since direct knowledge cannot spring from texts,
26012 Nescience is not terminated by the comprehension of the meaning of texts,

disposes at the same time of the hypothesis of the so-called 'Release in this life' (jīvanmukti). For what definition, we ask, can be given of this 'Release in this life'?--'Release of a soul while yet joined to a body'!--You might as well say, we reply, that your mother never had any children! You have yourself proved by scriptural passages that 'bondage' means the being joined to a body, and 'release' being free from a body!--Let us then define jīvanmukti as the cessation of embodiedness, in that sense that a person, while the appearance of embodiedness persists, is conscious of the unreality of that appearance.--But, we rejoin, if the consciousness of the unreality of the body puts an end to embodiedness, how can you say that jīvanmukti means release of a soul while joined to a body? On this explanation there remains no difference whatsoever between 'Release in this life' and Release after death; for the latter also can only be defined as cessation of the false appearance of embodiedness.--Let us then say that a person is 'jīvanmukta' when the appearance of embodiedness, although sublated by true knowledge, yet persists in the same way as the appearance of the moon being double persists (even after it has been recognised as false).--This too we cannot allow. As the sublating act of cognition on which Release depends extends to everything with the exception of Brahman, it sublates the general defect due to causal Nescience, inclusive of the particular erroneous appearance of embodiedness: the latter being sublated in this way cannot persist. In the case of the double moon, on the other hand, the defect of vision on which the erroneous appearance depends is not the object of the sublative act of cognition, i.e. the cognition of the oneness of the moon, and it therefore remains non-sublated; hence the false appearance of a double moon may persist.--Moreover, the text 'For him there is delay only as long as he is not freed from the body; then he will be released' (Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2), teaches that he who takes his stand on the knowledge of the Real requires for his Release the putting off of the body only: the text thus negatives jivanmukti. Āpastamba also rejects the view of jivanmukti, 'Abandoning the Vedas, this world and the next, he (the Samnyāsin) is to seek the Self. (Some say that) he obtains salvation when he knows (the Self). This opinion is contradicted by the sâstras. (For) if Salvation were obtained when the Self is known, he should not feel any pain even in this world. Hereby that which follows is explained' (Dh. Sû. II, 9, 13-17).--This refutes also the view that Release is obtained through mere knowledge.--The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that Release, which consists in the cessation of all Plurality, cannot take place as long as a man lives. And we therefore adhere to our view that Bondage is to be terminated only by means of the injunctions of meditation, the result of which is direct knowledge of Brahman. Nor must this be objected to on the ground that Release, if brought about by injunctions, must therefore be something non-eternal; for what is effected is not Release itself, but only the cessation of what impedes it. Moreover, the injunction does not directly produce the cessation of Bondage, but only through the mediation of the direct cognition of Brahman as consisting of pure knowledge, and not connected with a world. It is this knowledge only which the injunction produces.--But how can an injunction cause the origination of knowledge?--How, we ask in return, can, on your view, works not aiming at some immediate result cause the origination of knowledge?--You will perhaps reply 'by means of purifying the mind' (manas); but this reply may be given by me also.--But (the objector resumes) there is a difference. On my view Scripture produces knowledge in the mind purified by works; while on your view we must assume that in the purified mind the means of knowledge are produced by injunction.--The mind itself, we reply, purified by knowledge, constitutes this means.--How do you know this? our opponent questions.--How, we ask in return, do you know that the mind is purified by works, and that, in the mind so purified of a person withdrawn from all other objects by hearing, reflection and meditation, Scripture produces that knowledge which destroys bondage?--Through certain texts such as the following: 'They seek to know him by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22); 'He is to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated on' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5); 'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9).--Well, we reply, in the same way our view--viz. that through the injunction of meditation the mind is cleared, and that a clear mind gives rise to direct knowledge of Brahman--is confirmed by scriptural texts such as 'He is to

26082 be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated on' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5);
 26083 'He who knows Brahman reaches the highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'He is
 26084 not apprehended by the eye nor by speech' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 8); 'But by a
 26085 pure mind' (?); 'He is apprehended by the heart, by wisdom, by the mind'
 26086 (Ka. Up. II, 6, 9). Nor can it be said that the text 'not that which
 26087 they meditate upon as this' (Ke. Up. I, 4) negatives meditation; it does
 26088 not forbid meditation on Brahman, but merely declares that Brahman is
 26089 different from the world. The mantra is to be explained as follows:
 26090 'What men meditate upon as this world, that is not Brahman; know Brahman
 26091 to be that which is not uttered by speech, but through which speech is
 26092 uttered.' On a different explanation the clause 'know that to be
 26093 Brahman' would be irrational, and the injunctions of meditation on the
 26094 Self would--be meaningless.--The outcome of all this is that unreal
 26095 Bondage which appears in the form of a plurality of knowing subjects,
 26096 objects of knowledge, &c., is put an end to by the injunctions of
 26097 meditation, the fruit of which is direct intuitive knowledge of Brahman.
 26098
 26099 Nor can we approve of the doctrine held by some that there is no
 26100 contradiction between difference and non-difference; for difference and
 26101 non-difference cannot co-exist in one thing, any more than coldness and
 26102 heat, or light and darkness.--Let us first hear in detail what the
 26103 holder of this so-called bhedâbheda view has to say. The whole universe
 26104 of things must be ordered in agreement with our cognitions. Now we are
 26105 conscious of all things as different and non-different at the same time:
 26106 they are non-different in their causal and generic aspects, and
 26107 different in so far as viewed as effects and individuals. There indeed
 26108 is a contradiction between light and darkness and so on; for these
 26109 cannot possibly exist together, and they are actually met with in
 26110 different abodes. Such contradictoriness is not, on the other hand,
 26111 observed in the case of cause and effect, and genus and individual; on
 26112 the contrary we here distinctly apprehend one thing as having two
 26113 aspects--'this jar is clay', 'this cow is short-horned.' The fact is
 26114 that experience does not show us anything that has one aspect only. Nor
 26115 can it be said that in these cases there is absence of contradiction
 26116 because as fire consumes grass so non-difference absorbs difference; for
 26117 the same thing which exists as clay, or gold, or cow, or horse, &c., at
 26118 the same time exists as jar or diadem, or short-horned cow or mare.
 26119 There is no command of the Lord to the effect that one aspect only
 26120 should belong to each thing, non-difference to what is non-different,
 26121 and difference to what is different.--But one aspect only belongs to
 26122 each thing, because it is thus that things are perceived!--On the
 26123 contrary, we reply, things have twofold aspects, just because it is thus
 26124 that they are perceived. No man, however wide he may open his eyes, is
 26125 able to distinguish in an object--e.g. a jar or a cow--placed before him
 26126 which part is the clay and which the jar, or which part is the generic
 26127 character of the cow and which the individual cow. On the contrary, his
 26128 thought finds its true expression in the following judgments: 'this jar
 26129 is clay'; 'this cow is short-horned.' Nor can it be maintained that he
 26130 makes a distinction between the cause and genus as objects of the idea
 26131 of persistence, and the effect and individual as objects of the idea of
 26132 discontinuance (difference); for as a matter of fact there is no
 26133 perception of these two elements in separation. A man may look ever so
 26134 close at a thing placed before him, he--will not be able to perceive a
 26135 difference of aspect and to point out 'this is the persisting, general,
 26136 element in the thing, and that the non-persistent, individual, element.'
 26137 Just as an effect and an individual give rise to the idea of one thing,
 26138 so the effect plus cause, and the individual plus generic character,
 26139 also give rise to the idea of one thing only. This very circumstance
 26140 makes it possible for us to recognise each individual thing, placed as
 26141 it is among a multitude of things differing in place, time, and
 26142 character.--Each thing thus being cognised as endowed with a twofold
 26143 aspect, the theory of cause and effect, and generic character and
 26144 individual, being absolutely different, is clearly refuted by perception.
 26145
 26146 But, an objection is raised, if on account of grammatical co-ordination
 26147 and the resulting idea of oneness, the judgment 'this pot is clay' is
 26148 taken to express the relation of difference, plus non-difference, we
 26149 shall have analogously to infer from judgments such as 'I am a man', 'I
 26150 am a divine being' that the Self and the body also stand in the

26151 bhedâbhedha-relation; the theory of the co-existence of difference and
26152 non-difference will thus act like a fire which a man has lit on his
26153 hearth, and which in the end consumes the entire house!--This, we reply,
26154 is the baseless idea of a person who has not duly considered the true
26155 nature of co-ordination as establishing the bhedâbhedha-relation. The
26156 correct principle is that all reality is determined by states of
26157 consciousness not sublated by valid means of proof. The imagination,
26158 however, of the identity of the Self and the body is sublated by all the
26159 means of proof which apply to the Self: it is in fact no more valid than
26160 the imagination of the snake in the rope, and does not therefore prove
26161 the non-difference of the two. The co-ordination, on the other hand,
26162 which is expressed in the judgment 'the cow is short-horned' is never
26163 observed to be refuted in any way, and hence establishes the bhedâbhedha-
26164 relation.

26165
26166 For the same reasons the individual soul (jîva) is not absolutely
26167 different from Brahman, but stands to it in the bhedâbhedha-relation in
26168 so far as it is a part (amsa) of Brahman. Its non-difference from
26169 Brahman is essential (svâbhâvika); its difference is due to limiting
26170 adjuncts (aupâdhika). This we know, in the first place, from those
26171 scriptural texts which declare non-difference--such as 'Thou art that'
26172 (Ch. Up. VI); 'There is no other seer but he' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 23);
26173 'This Self is Brahman' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19); and the passage from the
26174 Brahmasûkta in the Samhitopanishad of the Âtharvanas which, after having
26175 said that Brahman is Heaven and Earth, continues, 'The fishermen are
26176 Brahman, the slaves are Brahman, Brahman are these gamblers; man and
26177 woman are born from Brahman; women are Brahman and so are men.' And, in
26178 the second place, from those texts which declare difference: 'He who,
26179 one, eternal, intelligent, fulfils the desires of many non-eternal
26180 intelligent beings' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13); 'There are two unborn, one
26181 knowing, the other not-knowing; one strong, the other weak' (Svet. Up. I,
26182 9); 'Being the cause of their connexion with him, through the qualities
26183 of action and the qualities of the Self, he is seen as another' (Svet.
26184 Up. V, 12); 'The Lord of nature and the souls, the ruler of the
26185 qualities, the cause of the bondage, the existence and the release of
26186 the samsâra' (Svet. Up. VI, 16); 'He is the cause, the lord of the lords
26187 of the organs' (Svet. Up. VI, 9); 'One of the two eats the sweet fruit,
26188 without eating the other looks on' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'He who dwelling
26189 in the Self (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Embraced by the intelligent Self he
26190 knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within' (Bri. Up. IV, 3,
26191 21); 'Mounted by the intelligent Self he goes groaning' (Bri. Up. IV, 3,
26192 35); 'Having known him he passes beyond death' (Svet. Up. III, 8).--On
26193 the ground of these two sets of passages the individual and the highest
26194 Self must needs be assumed to stand in the bhedâbhedha-relation. And
26195 texts such as 'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9),
26196 which teach that in the state of Release the individual soul enters into
26197 Brahman itself; and again texts such as 'But when the Self has become
26198 all for him, whereby should he see another' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 13), which
26199 forbid us to view, in the state of Release, the Lord as something
26200 different (from the individual soul), show that non-difference is
26201 essential (while difference is merely aupâdhika).

26202
26203 But, an objection is raised, the text 'He reaches all desires together
26204 in the wise Brahman,' in using the word 'together' shows that even in
26205 the state of Release the soul is different from Brahman, and the same
26206 view is expressed in two of the Sûtras, viz. IV, 4, 17; 21.--This is not
26207 so, we reply; for the text, 'There is no other seer but he' (Bri. Up.
26208 III, 7, 23), and many similar texts distinctly negative all plurality in
26209 the Self. The Taittirîya-text quoted by you means that man reaches
26210 Brahman with all desires, i.e. Brahman comprising within itself all
26211 objects of desire; if it were understood differently, it would follow
26212 that Brahman holds a subordinate position only. And if the Sûtra IV, 4,
26213 17 meant that the released soul is separate from Brahman it would follow
26214 that it is deficient in lordly power; and if this were so the Sûtra
26215 would be in conflict with other Sûtras such as IV, 4, 1.--For these
26216 reasons, non-difference is the essential condition; while the
26217 distinction of the souls from Brahman and from each other is due to
26218 their limiting adjuncts, i.e. the internal organ, the sense-organs, and
26219 the body. Brahman indeed is without parts and omnipresent; but through

26220 its adjuncts it becomes capable of division just as ether is divided by
26221 jars and the like. Nor must it be said that this leads to a
26222 reprehensible mutual dependence--Brahman in so far as divided entering
26223 into conjunction with its adjuncts, and again the division in Brahman
26224 being caused by its conjunction with its adjuncts; for these adjuncts
26225 and Brahman's connexion with them are due to action (karman), and the
26226 stream of action is without a beginning. The limiting adjuncts to which
26227 a soul is joined spring from the soul as connected with previous works,
26228 and work again springs from the soul as joined to its adjuncts: and as
26229 this connexion with works and adjuncts is without a beginning in time,
26230 no fault can be found with our theory.--The non-difference of the souls
26231 from each other and Brahman is thus essential, while their difference is
26232 due to the Upâdhis. These Upâdhis, on the other hand, are at the same
26233 time essentially non-distinct and essentially distinct from each other
26234 and Brahman; for there are no other Upâdhis (to account for their
26235 distinction if non-essential), and if we admitted such, we should again
26236 have to assume further Upâdhis, and so on in infinitum. We therefore
26237 hold that the Upâdhis are produced, in accordance with the actions of
26238 the individual souls, as essentially non-different and different from
26239 Brahman.

26240
26241 To this bhedâbheda view the Pûrvapakshin now objects on the following
26242 grounds:--The whole aggregate of Vedânta-texts aims at enjoining
26243 meditation on a non-dual Brahman whose essence is reality, intelligence,
26244 and bliss, and thus sets forth the view of non-difference; while on the
26245 other hand the karma-section of the Veda, and likewise perception and
26246 the other means of knowledge, intimate the view of the difference of
26247 things. Now, as difference and non-difference are contradictory, and as
26248 the view of difference may be accounted for as resting on beginningless
26249 Nescience, we conclude that universal non-difference is what is real.--
26250 The tenet that difference and non-difference are not contradictory
26251 because both are proved by our consciousness, cannot be upheld. If one
26252 thing has different characteristics from another there is distinction
26253 (bheda) of the two; the contrary condition of things constitutes non-
26254 distinction (abheda); who in his senses then would maintain that these
26255 two-suchness and non-suchness--can be found together? You have
26256 maintained that non-difference belongs to a thing viewed as cause and
26257 genus, and difference to the same viewed as effect and individual; and
26258 that, owing to this twofold aspect of things, non-difference and
26259 difference are not irreconcilable. But that this view also is untenable,
26260 a presentation of the question in definite alternatives will show. Do
26261 you mean to say that the difference lies in one aspect of the thing and
26262 the non-difference in the other? or that difference and non-difference
26263 belong to the thing possessing two aspects?--On the former alternative
26264 the difference belongs to the individual and the non-difference to the
26265 genus; and this implies that there is no one thing with a double aspect.
26266 And should you say that the genus and individual together constitute one
26267 thing only, you abandon the view that it is difference of aspect which
26268 takes away the contradictoriness of difference and non-difference. We
26269 have moreover remarked already that difference in characteristics and
26270 its opposite are absolutely contradictory.--On the second alternative we
26271 have two aspects of different kind and an unknown thing supposed to be
26272 the substrate of those aspects; but this assumption of a triad of
26273 entities proves only their mutual difference of character, not their non-
26274 difference. Should you say that the non-contradictoriness of two aspects
26275 constitutes simultaneous difference and non-difference in the thing
26276 which is their substrate, we ask in return--How can two aspects which
26277 have a thing for their substrate, and thus are different from the thing,
26278 introduce into that thing a combination of two contradictory attributes
26279 (viz. difference and non-difference)? And much less even are they able
26280 to do so if they are viewed as non-different from the thing which is
26281 their substrate. If, moreover, the two aspects on the one hand, and the
26282 thing in which they inhere on the other, be admitted to be distinct
26283 entities, there will be required a further factor to bring about their
26284 difference and non-difference, and we shall thus be led into a regressus
26285 in infinitum.--Nor is it a fact that the idea of a thing inclusive of
26286 its generic character bears the character of unity, in the same way as
26287 the admittedly uniform idea of an individual; for wherever a state of
26288 consciousness expresses itself in the form 'this is such and such' it

26289 implies the distinction of an attribute or mode, and that to which the
26290 attribute or mode belongs. In the case under discussion the genus
26291 constitutes the mode, and the individual that to which the mode belongs:
26292 the idea does not therefore possess the character of unity.
26293

26294 For these very reasons the individual soul cannot stand to Brahman in
26295 the bhedābheda-relation. And as the view of non-difference is founded on
26296 Scripture, we assume that the view of difference rests on beginningless
26297 Nescience.--But on this view want of knowledge and all the imperfections
26298 springing therefrom, such as birth, death, &c., would cling to Brahman
26299 itself, and this would contradict scriptural texts such as 'He who is
26300 all-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'That Self free from all evil' (Ch. Up.
26301 VIII, 1, 5). Not so, we reply. For all those imperfections we consider
26302 to be unreal. On your view on the other hand, which admits nothing but
26303 Brahman and its limiting adjuncts, all the imperfections which spring
26304 from contact with those adjuncts must really belong to Brahman. For as
26305 Brahman is without parts, indivisible, the upādhis cannot divide or
26306 split it so as to connect themselves with a part only; but necessarily
26307 connect themselves with Brahman itself and produce their effects on it.--
26308 Here the following explanation may possibly be attempted. Brahman
26309 determined by an upādhi constitutes the individual soul. This soul is of
26310 atomic size since what determines it, viz. the internal organ, is itself
26311 of atomic size; and the limitation itself is without beginning. All the
26312 imperfections therefore connect themselves only with that special place
26313 that is determined by the upādhi, and do not affect the highest Brahman
26314 which is not limited by the upādhi.--In reply to this we ask--Do you
26315 mean to say that what constitutes the atomic individual soul is a part
26316 of Brahman which is limited and cut off by the limiting adjunct; or some
26317 particular part of Brahman which, without being thereby divided off, is
26318 connected with an atomic upādhi; or Brahman in its totality as connected
26319 with an upādhi; or some other intelligent being connected with an upādhi,
26320 or finally the upādhi itself?--The first alternative is not possible,
26321 because Brahman cannot be divided; it would moreover imply that the
26322 individual soul has a beginning, for division means the making of one
26323 thing into two.--On the second alternative it would follow that, as a
26324 part of Brahman would be connected with the upādhi, all the
26325 imperfections due to the upādhis would adhere to that part. And further,
26326 if the upādhi would not possess the power of attracting to itself the
26327 particular part of Brahman with which it is connected, it would follow
26328 that when the upādhi moves the part with, which it is connected would
26329 constantly change; in other words, bondage and release would take place
26330 at every moment. If, on the contrary, the upādhi possessed the power of
26331 attraction, the whole Brahman--as not being capable of division--would
26332 be attracted and move with the upādhi. And should it be said that what
26333 is all-pervading and without parts cannot be attracted and move, well
26334 then the upādhi only moves, and we are again met by the difficulties
26335 stated above. Moreover, if all the upādhis were connected with the parts
26336 of Brahman viewed as one and undivided, all individual souls, being
26337 nothing but parts of Brahman, would be considered as non-distinct. And
26338 should it be said that they are not thus cognised as one because they
26339 are constituted by different parts of Brahman, it would follow that as
26340 soon as the upādhi of one individual soul is moving, the identity of
26341 that soul would be lost (for it would, in successive moments, be
26342 constituted by different parts of Brahman).--On the third alternative
26343 (the whole of) Brahman itself being connected with the upādhi enters
26344 into the condition of individual soul, and there remains no non-
26345 conditioned Brahman. And, moreover, the soul in all bodies will then be
26346 one only.--On the fourth alternative the individual soul is something
26347 altogether different from Brahman, and the difference of the soul from
26348 Brahman thus ceases to depend on the upādhis of Brahman.--And the fifth
26349 alternative means the embracing of the view of the Kārvāka (who makes no
26350 distinction between soul and matter).--The conclusion from all this is
26351 that on the strength of the texts declaring non-difference we must admit
26352 that all difference is based on Nescience only. Hence, Scripture being
26353 an authoritative instrument of knowledge in so far only as it has for
26354 its end action and the cessation of action, the Vedānta-texts must be
26355 allowed to be a valid means of knowledge with regard to Brahman's nature,
26356 in so far as they stand in a supplementary relation to the injunctions
26357 of meditation.

26358
26359 This view is finally combated by the Mīmāṃsaka. Even if, he says, we
26360 allow the Vedānta-texts to have a purport in so far as they are
26361 supplementary to injunctions of meditation, they cannot be viewed as
26362 valid means of knowledge with regard to Brahman. Do the texts referring
26363 to Brahman, we ask, occupy the position of valid means of knowledge in
26364 so far as they form a syntactic whole with the injunctions of meditation,
26365 or as independent sentences? In the former case the purport of the
26366 syntactic whole is simply to enjoin meditation, and it cannot therefore
26367 aim at giving instruction about Brahman. If, on the other hand, the
26368 texts about Brahman are separate independent sentences, they cannot have
26369 the purport of prompting to action and are therefore devoid of
26370 instructive power. Nor must it be said that meditation is a kind of
26371 continued remembrance, and as such requires to be defined by the object
26372 remembered; and that the demand of the injunction of meditation for
26373 something to be remembered is satisfied by texts such as 'All this is
26374 that Self', 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' &c., which set
26375 forth the nature and attributes of Brahman and--forming a syntactic
26376 whole with the injunctions--are a valid means of knowledge with regard
26377 to the existence of the matter they convey. For the fact is that the
26378 demand on the part of an injunction of meditation for an object to be
26379 remembered may be satisfied even by something unreal (not true), as in
26380 the case of injunctions such as 'Let him meditate upon mind as Brahman'
26381 (Ch. Up. III, 18, 1): the real existence of the object of meditation is
26382 therefore not demanded.--The final conclusion arrived at in this
26383 pūrvapaksha is therefore as follows. As the Vedānta-texts do not aim at
26384 prompting to action or the cessation of action; as, even on the
26385 supposition of their being supplementary to injunctions of meditation,
26386 the only thing they effect is to set forth the nature of the object of
26387 meditation; and as, even if they are viewed as independent sentences,
26388 they accomplish the end of man (i.e. please, gratify) by knowledge
26389 merely--being thus comparable to tales with which we soothe children or
26390 sick persons; it does not lie within their province to establish the
26391 reality of an accomplished thing, and hence Scripture cannot be viewed
26392 as a valid means for the cognition of Brahman.

26393
26394 To this primā facie view the Sūtrakāra replies, 'But this on account of
26395 connexion.' 'Connexion' is here to be taken in an eminent sense, as
26396 'connexion with the end of man.' That Brahman, which is measureless
26397 bliss and therefore constitutes the highest end of man, is connected
26398 with the texts as the topic set forth by them, proves Scripture to be a
26399 valid means for the cognition of Brahman. To maintain that the whole
26400 body of Vedānta-texts--which teach us that Brahman is the highest object
26401 to be attained, since it consists of supreme bliss free of all blemish
26402 whatsoever--is devoid of all use and purpose merely because it does not
26403 aim at action or the cessation of action; is no better than to say that
26404 a youth of royal descent is of no use because he does not belong to a
26405 community of low wretches living on the flesh of dogs!

26406
26407 The relation of the different texts is as follows. There are individual
26408 souls of numberless kinds--gods, Asuras, Gandharvas, Siddhas, Vidyādharas,
26409 Kinnaras, Kimpurushas, Yakshas, Rākshasas, Pisākas, men, beasts, birds,
26410 creeping animals, trees, bushes, creepers, grasses and so on--
26411 distinguished as male, female, or sexless, and having different sources
26412 of nourishment and support and different objects of enjoyment. Now all
26413 these souls are deficient in insight into the true nature of the highest
26414 reality, their understandings being obscured by Nescience operating in
26415 the form of beginningless karman; and hence those texts only are fully
26416 useful to them which teach that there exists a highest Brahman--which
26417 the souls in the state of release may cognise as non-different from
26418 themselves, and which then, through its own essential nature, qualities,
26419 power and energies, imparts to those souls bliss infinite and
26420 unsurpassable. When now the question arises--as it must arise--as to
26421 how this Brahman is to be attained, there step in certain other Vedānta-
26422 texts--such as 'He who knows Brahman reaches the highest' (Bri. Up. II, 1,
26423 1), and 'Let a man meditate on the Self as his world' (Bri. Up. 1, 4,
26424 15)--and, by means of terms denoting 'knowing' and so on, enjoin
26425 meditation as the means of attaining Brahman. (We may illustrate this
26426 relation existing between the texts setting forth the nature of Brahman

and those enjoining meditation by two comparisons.) The case is like that of a man who has been told 'There is a treasure hidden in your house'. He learns through this sentence the existence of the treasure, is satisfied, and then takes active steps to find it and make it his own.-- Or take the case of a young prince who, intent on some boyish play, leaves his father's palace and, losing his way, does not return. The king thinks his son is lost; the boy himself is received by some good Brahman who brings him up and teaches him without knowing who the boy's father is. When the boy has reached his sixteenth year and is accomplished in every way, some fully trustworthy person tells him, 'Your father is the ruler of all these lands, famous for the possession of all noble qualities, wisdom, generosity, kindness, courage, valour and so on, and he stays in his capital, longing to see you, his lost child. Hearing that his father is alive and a man so high and noble, the boy's heart is filled with supreme joy; and the king also, understanding that his son is alive, in good health, handsome and well instructed, considers himself to have attained all a man can wish for. He then takes steps to recover his son, and finally the two are reunited.

The assertion again that a statement referring to some accomplished thing gratifies men merely by imparting a knowledge of the thing, without being a means of knowledge with regard to its real existence--so that it would be comparable to the tales we tell to children and sick people--, can in no way be upheld. When it is ascertained that a thing has no real existence, the mere knowledge or idea of the thing does not gratify. The pleasure which stories give to children and sick people is due to the fact that they erroneously believe them to be true; if they were to find out that the matter present to their thought is untrue their pleasure would come to an end that very moment. And thus in the case of the texts of the Upanishads also. If we thought that these texts do not mean to intimate the real existence of Brahman, the mere idea of Brahman to which they give rise would not satisfy us in any way.

The conclusion therefore is that texts such as 'That from whence these beings are born' &c. do convey valid instruction as to the existence of Brahman, i.e. that being which is the sole cause of the world, is free from all shadow of imperfection, comprises within itself all auspicious qualities, such as omniscience and so on, and is of the nature of supreme bliss.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'connexion'.

5. On account of seeing (i.e. thinking) that which is not founded on Scripture (i.e. the Pradhâna) is not (what is taught by the texts referring to the origination of the world).

We have maintained that what is taught by the texts relative to the origination of the world is Brahman, omniscient, and so on. The present Sûtra and the following Sûtras now add that those texts can in no way refer to the Pradhâna and similar entities which rest on Inference only.

We read in the Chândogya, 'Being only was this in the beginning, one only, without a second.--It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth.--It sent forth fire' (VI, 2, 1 ff.)--Here a doubt arises whether the cause of the world denoted by the term 'Being' is the Pradhâna. assumed by others, which rests on Inference, or Brahman as defined by us.

The Pûrvapakshin maintains that the Pradhâna is meant. For he says, the Chândogya text quoted expresses the causal state of what is denoted by the word 'this', viz. the aggregate of things comprising manifold effects, such as ether, &c., consisting of the three elements of Goodness, Passion and Darkness, and forming the sphere of fruition of intelligent beings. By the 'effected' state we understand the assuming, on the part of the causal substance, of a different condition; whatever therefore constitutes the essential nature of a thing in its effected state the same constitutes its essential nature in the causal state also. Now the effect, in our case, is made up of the three elements Goodness, Passion and Darkness; hence the cause is the Pradhâna which consists in

26496 an equipoise of those three elements. And as in this Pradhâna all
26497 distinctions are merged, so that it is pure Being, the Chândogya text
26498 refers to it as 'Being, one only, without a second.' This establishes
26499 the non-difference of effect and cause, and in this way the promise that
26500 through the knowledge of one thing all things are to be known admits of
26501 being fulfilled. Otherwise, moreover, there would be no analogy between
26502 the instance of the lump of clay and the things made of it, and the
26503 matter to be illustrated thereby. The texts speaking of the origination
26504 of the world therefore intimate the Pradhâna taught by the great Sage
26505 Kapila. And as the Chândogya passage has, owing to the presence of an
26506 initial statement (pratijñâ) and a proving instance, the form of an
26507 inference, the term 'Being' means just that which rests on inference,
26508 viz. the Pradhâna.

26509
26510 This primâ facie view is set aside by the words of the Sûtra. That which
26511 does not rest on Scripture, i.e. the Pradhâna, which rests on Inference
26512 only, is not what is intimated by the texts referring to the origination
26513 of the world; for the text exhibits the root 'îksh'--which means 'to
26514 think'--as denoting a special activity on the part of what is termed
26515 'Being.' 'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth.' 'Thinking'
26516 cannot possibly belong to the non-sentient Pradhâna: the term 'Being'
26517 can therefore denote only the all-knowing highest Person who is capable
26518 of thought. In agreement with this we find that, in all sections which
26519 refer to creation, the act of creation is stated to be preceded by
26520 thought. 'He thought, shall I send forth worlds. He sent forth these
26521 worlds' (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 2); 'He thought he sent forth Prâna' (Pr. Up.
26522 VI, 3); and others.--But it is a rule that as a cause we must assume
26523 only what corresponds to the effect!--Just so; and what corresponds to
26524 the total aggregate of effects is the highest Person, all-knowing, all-
26525 powerful, whose purposes realise themselves, who has minds and matter in
26526 their subtle state for his body. Compare the texts 'His high power is
26527 revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as force and knowledge' (Svet.
26528 Up. VI, 8); 'He who is all-knowing, all-perceiving' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9);
26529 'He of whom the Unevolved is the body, of whom the Imperishable is the
26530 body, of whom Death is the body, he is the inner Self of all things'
26531 (Subâl. Up. VII).--This point (viz. as to the body of the highest
26532 Person) will be established under Sû. II, 1, 4. The present Sûtra
26533 declares that the texts treating of creation cannot refer to the
26534 Pradhâna; the Sûtra just mentioned will dispose of objections. Nor is
26535 the Pûrvapakshin right in maintaining that the Chândogya passage is of
26536 the nature of an Inference; for it does not state a reason (hetu--which
26537 is the essential thing in an Inference). The illustrative instance (of
26538 the lump of clay) is introduced merely in order to convince him who
26539 considers it impossible that all things should be known through one
26540 thing--as maintained in the passage 'through which that is heard which
26541 was not heard,' &c.,--that this is possible after all. And the mention
26542 made in the text of 'seeing' clearly shows that there is absolutely no
26543 intention of setting forth an Inference.

26544
26545 Let us assume, then, the Pûrvapakshin resumes, that the 'seeing' of the
26546 text denotes not 'seeing' in its primary, direct sense--such as belongs
26547 to intelligent beings only; but 'seeing' in a secondary, figurative
26548 sense which there is ascribed to the Pradhâna in the same way as in
26549 passages immediately following it is ascribed to fire and water--'the
26550 fire saw'; 'the water saw' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3). The transference, to non-
26551 existent things, of attributes properly belonging to sentient beings is
26552 quite common; as when we say 'the rice-fields look out for rain'; 'the
26553 rain delighted the seeds.'--This view is set aside by the next Sûtra.

26554
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26557
26558 6. If it be said that (the word 'seeing') has a secondary (figurative)
26559 meaning; we deny this, on account of the word 'Self' (being applied to
26560 the cause of the world).

26561
26562 The contention that, because, in passages standing close by, the word
26563 'seeing' is used in a secondary sense, the 'seeing' predicated of the
26564 Sat ('Being') is also to be taken in a secondary sense, viz. as denoting

(not real thought but) a certain condition previous to creation, cannot be upheld; for in other texts met with in the same section (viz. 'All this has that for its Self; that is the True, that is the Self', Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7), that which first had been spoken of as Sat is called the 'Self'. The designation 'Self' which in this passage is applied to the Sat in its relation to the entire world, sentient or non-sentient, is in no way appropriate to the Pradhâna. We therefore conclude that, as the highest Self is the Self of fire, water, and earth also, the words fire, &c. (in the passages stating that fire, &c. thought) denote the highest Self only. This conclusion agrees with the text 'Let me enter into these three beings with this living Self, and evolve names and forms', for this text implies that fire, water, &c. possess substantial being and definite names only through the highest Self having entered into them. The thought ascribed in the text to fire, water, &c. hence is thought in the proper sense, and the hypothesis that, owing to its connexion with these latter texts, the thought predicated of 'Being' ('it thought,' &c.) should be thought in a figurative sense only thus lapses altogether.

The next following Sûtra confirms the same view.

7. Because release is taught of him who takes his stand on it.

Svetaketu, who is desirous of final release, is at first--by means of the clause 'Thou art that'--instructed to meditate on himself as having his Self in that which truly is; and thereupon the passage 'for him there is delay' only as long as 'I shall not be released, then I shall be united' teaches that for a man taking his stand upon that teaching there will be Release, i.e. union with Brahman--which is delayed only until this mortal body falls away. If, on the other hand, the text would teach that the non-intelligent Pradhâna is the general cause, it could not possibly teach that meditation on this Pradhâna being a man's Self is the means towards his Release. A man taking his stand on such meditation rather would on death be united with a non-sentient principle, according to the scriptural saying, 'According as his thought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1). And Scripture, which is more loving than even a thousand parents, cannot possibly teach such union with the Non-sentient, which is acknowledged to be the cause of all the assaults of suffering in its threefold form. Moreover, those who hold the theory of the Pradhâna being the cause of the world do not themselves maintain that he who takes his stand upon the Pradhâna attains final release.

The Pradhâna is not the cause of the world for the following reason also:

8. And because there is no statement of its having to be set aside.

If the word 'Sat' denoted the Pradhâna as the cause of the world, we should expect the text to teach that the idea of having his Self in that 'Sat' should be set aside by Svetaketu as desirous of Release; for that idea would be contrary to Release. So far from teaching this, the text, however, directly inculcates that notion in the words 'Thou art that.'--The next Sûtra adds a further reason.

9. And on account of the contradiction of the initial statement.

The Pradhâna's being the cause of the world would imply a contradiction of the initial statement, viz. that through the knowledge of one thing all things are to be known. Now, on the principle of the non-difference of cause and effect, this initial statement can only be fulfilled in that way that through the knowledge of the 'Sat', which is the cause,

there is known the entire world, whether sentient or non-sentient, which constitutes the effect. But if the Pradhâna were the cause, the aggregate of sentient beings could not be known through it--for sentient beings are not the effect of a non-sentient principle, and there would thus arise a contradiction.--The next Sûtra supplies a further reason.

10. On account of (the individual soul) going to the Self.

With reference to the 'Sat' the text says, 'Learn from me the true nature of sleep. When a man sleeps here, he becomes united with the Sat, he is gone to his own (Self). Therefore they say he sleeps (svapiti), because he is gone to his own (sva-apîta)' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 1). This text designates the soul in the state of deep sleep as having entered into, or being merged or reabsorbed in, the Self. By reabsorption we understand something being merged in its cause. Now the non-intelligent Pradhâna cannot be the cause of the intelligent soul; hence the soul's going to its Self can only mean its going to the, i.e. the universal, Self. The term 'individual soul' (jîva) denotes Brahman in so far as having an intelligent substance for its body, Brahman itself constituting the Self; as we learn from the text referring to the distinction of names and forms. This Brahman, thus called jîva., is in the state of deep sleep, no less than in that of a general pralaya, free from the investment of names and forms, and is then designated as mere 'Being' (sat); as the text says, 'he is then united with the Sat'. As the soul is in the state of deep sleep free from the investment of name and form, and invested by the intelligent Self only, another text says with reference to the same state, 'Embraced by the intelligent Self he knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 21). Up to the time of final release there arise in the soul invested by name and form the cognitions of objects different from itself. During deep sleep the souls divest themselves of names and forms, and are embraced by the 'Sat' only; but in the waking state they again invest themselves with names and forms, and thus bear corresponding distinctive names and forms. This, other scriptural texts also distinctly declare, 'When a man lying in deep sleep sees no dream whatever, he becomes one with that prâna alone;--from that Self the prânas proceed, each towards its place' (Kau. Up. 111,3); 'Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion or a wolf or a boar or a gnat or a mosquito, that they become again' (Ch. Up. VI, 9, 3).--Hence the term 'Sat' denotes the highest Brahman, the all-knowing highest Lord, the highest Person. Thus the Vrittikâra also says, 'Then he becomes united with the Sat--this is proved by (all creatures) entering into it and coming back out of it.' And Scripture also says, 'Embraced by the intelligent Self.'--The next Sûtra gives an additional reason.

11. On account of the uniformity of view.

'In the beginning the Self was all this; there was nothing else whatsoever thinking. He thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds' (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 1); 'From that Self sprang ether, from ether air, from air fire, from fire water, from water earth' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'From this great Being were breathed forth the Rig-veda,' &c.--These and similar texts referring to the creation have all the same purport: they all teach us that the Supreme Lord is the cause of the world. We therefore conclude that in the Ch. passage also the Sat, which is said to be the cause of the world, is the Supreme Lord.

12. And because it is directly stated in Scripture.

The text of the same Upanishad directly declares that the being denoted

26703 by the word 'Sat' evolves, as the universal Self, names and forms; is
26704 all-knowing, all-powerful, all-embracing; is free from all evil, &c.;
26705 realises all its wishes and purposes. 'Let me, entering those beings
26706 with this living; Self, evolve names and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'All
26707 these creatures have their root in the Sat, they dwell in the Sat, they
26708 rest in the Sat' (VI, 8, 4); 'All this has that for its Self; it is the
26709 True, it is the Self (VI, 8, 7); 'Whatever there is of him here in the
26710 world, and whatever is not, all that is contained within it' (VIII, 1,
26711 3); 'In it all desires are contained. It is the Self free from sin, free
26712 from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose wishes
26713 come true, whose purposes come true' (VIII, 1, 5).--And analogously
26714 other scriptural texts, 'Of him there is no master in the world, no
26715 ruler; not even a sign of him. He is the cause, the lord of the lords of
26716 the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord' (Svet. Up. VI,
26717 9). 'The wise one who, having created all forms and having given them
26718 names, is calling them by those names' (Taitt. Ar. III, 12, 7); 'He who
26719 entered within is the ruler of all beings, the Self of all' (Taitt. Ar.
26720 III, 24); 'The Self of all, the refuge, the ruler of all, the Lord of
26721 the souls' (Mahânâr. Up. XI); 'Whatsoever is seen or heard in this world,
26722 inside or outside, pervading that all Nârâyana abides' (Mahânâr. Up. XI);
26723 'He is the inner Self of all beings, free from all evil, the divine, the
26724 only god Nârâyana.'--These and other texts which declare the world to
26725 have sprung from the highest Lord, can in no way be taken as
26726 establishing the Pradhâna. Hence it remains a settled conclusion that
26727 the highest Person, Nârâyana, free from all shadow of imperfection, &c.,
26728 is the single cause of the whole Universe, and is that Brahman which
26729 these Sûtras point out as the object of enquiry.

26730
26731 For the same reasons the theory of a Brahman, which is nothing but non-
26732 differenced intelligence, must also be considered as refuted by the
26733 Sûtrakâra, with the help of the scriptural texts quoted; for those texts
26734 prove that the Brahman, which forms the object of enquiry, possesses
26735 attributes such as thinking, and so on, in their real literal sense. On
26736 the theory, on the other hand, of a Brahman that is nothing but
26737 distinctionless intelligence even the witnessing function of
26738 consciousness would be unreal. The Sûtras propose as the object of
26739 enquiry Brahman as known from the Vedânta-texts, and thereupon teach
26740 that Brahman is intelligent (Sû. I, 1, 5 ff.) To be intelligent means to
26741 possess the quality of intelligence: a being devoid of the quality of
26742 thought would not differ in nature from the Pradhâna. Further, on the
26743 theory of Brahman being mere non-differenced light it would be difficult
26744 to prove that Brahman is self-luminous. For by light we understand that
26745 particular thing which renders itself, as well as other things, capable
26746 of becoming the object of ordinary thought and speech; but as a thing
26747 devoid of all difference does not, of course, possess these two
26748 characteristics it follows that it is as devoid of intelligence as a pot
26749 may be.--Let it then be assumed that although a thing devoid of all
26750 distinction does not actually possess these characteristics, yet it has
26751 the potentiality of possessing them!--But if it possesses the attribute
26752 of potentiality, it is clear that you abandon your entire theory of a
26753 substance devoid of all distinction!--Let us then admit, on the
26754 authority of Scripture, that the universal substance possesses this one
26755 distinguishing attribute of self-luminousness.--Well, in that case you
26756 must of course admit, on the same authority, all those other qualities
26757 also which Scripture vouches for, such as all-knowingness, the
26758 possession of all powers, and so on.--Moreover, potentiality means
26759 capability to produce certain special effects, and hence can be
26760 determined on the ground of those special effects only. But if there are
26761 no means of knowing these particular effects, there are also no means of
26762 cognising potentiality.--And those who hold the theory of a substance
26763 devoid of all difference, have not even means of proof for their
26764 substance; for as we have shown before, Perception, Inference, Scripture,
26765 and one's own consciousness, are all alike in so far as having for their
26766 objects things marked by difference.--It therefore remains a settled
26767 conclusion that the Brahman to be known is nothing else but the highest
26768 Person capable of the thought 'of becoming many' by manifesting himself
26769 in a world comprising manifold sentient and non-sentient creatures.--
26770 Here terminates the adhikarana of 'seeing'.
26771

26772 So far the Sûtras have declared that the Brahman which forms the object
26773 of enquiry is different from the non-intelligent Pradhâna, which is
26774 merely an object of fruition for intelligent beings. They now proceed to
26775 show that Brahman--which is antagonistic to all evil and constituted by
26776 supreme bliss--is different from the individual soul, which is subject
26777 to karman, whether that soul be in its purified state or in the impure
26778 state that is due to its immersion in the ocean of manifold and endless
26779 sufferings, springing from the soul's contact with Prakriti (Pradhâna).
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26784 13. The Self consisting of Bliss (is the highest Self) on account of
26785 multiplication.
26786

26787 We read in the text of the Taittirîyas, 'Different from this Self, which
26788 consists of Understanding, is the other inner Self which consists of
26789 bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 5).--Here the doubt arises whether the Self
26790 consisting of bliss be the highest Self, which is different from the
26791 inner Self subject to bondage and release, and termed 'jîva.' (i.e.
26792 living self or individual soul), or whether it be that very inner Self,
26793 i.e. the jîva.--It is that inner Self, the Pûrvapakshin contends. For
26794 the text says 'of that this, i.e. the Self consisting of bliss, is the
26795 sârîra Self'; and sârîra means that which is joined to a body, in other
26796 words, the so-called jîva.--But, an objection is raised, the text
26797 enumerates the different Selves, beginning with the Self consisting of
26798 bliss, to the end that man may obtain the bliss of Brahman, which was,
26799 at the outset, stated to be the cause of the world (II, 1), and in the
26800 end teaches that the Self consisting of bliss is the cause of the world
26801 (II, 6). And that the cause of the world is the all-knowing Lord, since
26802 Scripture says of him that 'he thought,' we have already explained.--
26803 That cause of the world, the Pûrvapakshin rejoins, is not different from
26804 the jîva; for in the text of the Chândogya that Being which first is
26805 described as the creator of the world is exhibited, in two passages, in
26806 co-ordination with the jîva ('having entered into them with that living
26807 Self' and 'Thou art that, O Svetaketu'). And the purport of co-
26808 ordination is to express oneness of being, as when we say, 'This person
26809 here is that Devadatta we knew before.' And creation preceded by thought
26810 can very well be ascribed to an intelligent jîva. The connexion of the
26811 whole Taittirîya-text then is as follows. In the introductory clause,
26812 'He who knows Brahman attains the Highest,' the true nature of the jîva,
26813 free from all connexion with matter, is referred to as something to be
26814 attained; and of this nature a definition is given in the words, 'The
26815 True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman.' The attainment of the jîva in
26816 this form is what constitutes Release, in agreement with the text, 'So
26817 long as he is in the body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain; but
26818 when he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches
26819 him' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1). This true nature of the Self, free from all
26820 avidyâ, which the text begins by presenting as an object to be attained,
26821 is thereupon declared to be the Self consisting of bliss. In order to
26822 lead up to this--just as a man points out to another the moon by first
26823 pointing out the branch of a tree near which the moon is to be seen--the
26824 text at first refers to the body ('Man consists of food'); next to the
26825 vital breath with its five modifications which is within the body and
26826 supports it; then to the manas within the vital breath; then to the
26827 buddhi within the manas--'the Self consisting of breath'; 'the Self
26828 consisting of mind' (manas); 'the Self consisting of understanding'
26829 (vijñâna). Having thus gradually led up to the jîva, the text finally
26830 points out the latter, which is the innermost of all ('Different from
26831 that is the inner Self which consists of bliss'), and thus completes the
26832 series of Selves one inside the other. We hence conclude that the Self
26833 consisting of bliss is that same jîva-self which was at the outset
26834 pointed out as the Brahman to be attained.--But the clause immediately
26835 following, 'Brahman is the tail, the support (of the Self of bliss)',
26836 indicates that Brahman is something different from the Self of bliss!--
26837 By no means (the Pûrvapakshin rejoins). Brahman is, owing to its
26838 different characteristics, there compared to an animal body, and head,
26839 wings, and tail are ascribed to it, just as in a preceding clause the
26840 body consisting of food had also been imagined as having head, wings,

26841 and tail--these members not being something different from the body, but
26842 the body itself. Joy, satisfaction, great satisfaction, bliss, are
26843 imagined as the members, non-different from it, of Brahman consisting of
26844 bliss, and of them all the unmixed bliss-constituted Brahman is said to
26845 be the tail or support. If Brahman were something different from the
26846 Self consisting of bliss, the text would have continued, 'Different from
26847 this Self consisting of bliss is the other inner Self--Brahman.' But
26848 there is no such continuation. The connexion of the different clauses
26849 stands as follows: After Brahman has been introduced as the topic of the
26850 section ('He who knows Brahman attains the Highest'), and defined as
26851 different in nature from everything else ('The True, knowledge'), the
26852 text designates it by the term 'Self,' &c. ('From that Self sprang
26853 ether'), and then, in order to make it clear that Brahman is the
26854 innermost Self of all, enumerates the pranamaya and so on--designating
26855 them in succession as more and more inward Selfs--, and finally leads up
26856 to the ânandamaya as the innermost Self('Different from this, &c., is the
26857 Self consisting of bliss'). From all which it appears that the term
26858 'Self' up to the end denotes the Brahman mentioned at the beginning.--
26859 But, in immediate continuation of the clause, 'Brahman is the tail, the
26860 support,' the text exhibits the following sloka: 'Non-existing becomes
26861 he who views Brahman as non-existing; who knows Brahman as existing, him
26862 we know as himself existing.' Here the existence and non-existence of
26863 the Self are declared to depend on the knowledge and non-knowledge of
26864 Brahman, not of the Self consisting of bliss. Now no doubt can possibly
26865 arise as to the existence or non-existence of this latter Self, which,
26866 in the form of joy, satisfaction, &c., is known to every one. Hence the
26867 sloka cannot refer to that Self, and hence Brahman is different from
26868 that Self.--This objection, the Pûrvapakshin rejoins, is unfounded. In
26869 the earlier parts of the chapter we have corresponding slokas, each of
26870 them following on a preceding clause that refers to the tail or support
26871 of a particular Self: in the case, e.g. of the Self consisting of food,
26872 we read, 'This is the tail, the support,' and then comes the sloka,
26873 'From food are produced all creatures,' &c. Now it is evident that all
26874 these slokas are meant to set forth not only what had been called 'tail,'
26875 but the entire Self concerned (Self of food, Self of breath, &c.); and
26876 from this it follows that also the sloka, 'Non-existing becomes he,'
26877 does not refer to the 'tail' only as something other than the Self of
26878 bliss, but to the entire Self of bliss. And there may very well be a
26879 doubt with regard to the knowledge or non-knowledge of the existence of
26880 that Self consisting of unlimited bliss. On your view also the
26881 circumstance of Brahman which forms the tail not being known is due to
26882 its being of the nature of limitless bliss. And should it be said that
26883 the Self of bliss cannot be Brahman because Brahman does not possess a
26884 head and other members; the answer is that Brahman also does not possess
26885 the quality of being a tail or support, and that hence Brahman cannot be
26886 a tail.--Let it then be said that the expression, 'Brahman is the tail,'
26887 is merely figurative, in so far as Brahman is the substrate of all
26888 things imagined through avidyâ!--But, the Pûrvapakshin rejoins, we may
26889 as well assume that the ascription to Brahman of joy, as its head and so
26890 on, is also merely figurative, meant to illustrate the nature of Brahman,
26891 i.e. the Self of bliss as free from all pain. To speak of Brahman or the
26892 Self as consisting of bliss has thus the purpose of separating from all
26893 pain and grief that which in a preceding clause ('The True, knowledge,
26894 the Infinite is Brahman') had already been separated from all changeful
26895 material things. As applied to Brahman (or the Self), whose nature is
26896 nothing but absolute bliss, the term 'ânandamaya' therefore has to be
26897 interpreted as meaning nothing more than 'ânanda'; just as prânamaya
26898 means prâna.

26899
26900 The outcome of all this is that the term 'ânandamaya' denotes the true
26901 essential nature--which is nothing but absolute uniform bliss--of the
26902 jiva that appears as distinguished by all the manifold individualising
26903 forms which are the figments of Nescience. The Self of bliss is the jiva
26904 or pratyag-âtman, i.e. the individual soul.

26905
26906 Against this primâ facie view the Sûtrakâra contends that the Self
26907 consisting of bliss is the highest Self 'on account of multiplication.'--
26908 The section which begins with the words, 'This is an examination of bliss,'
26909 and terminates with the sloka, 'from whence all speech turns back'

26910 (Taitt. Up. II, 8), arrives at bliss, supreme and not to be surpassed,
26911 by successively multiplying inferior stages of bliss by a hundred; now
26912 such supreme bliss cannot possibly belong to the individual soul which
26913 enjoys only a small share of very limited happiness, mixed with endless
26914 pain and grief; and therefore clearly indicates, as its abode, the
26915 highest Self, which differs from all other Selves in so far as being
26916 radically opposed to all evil and of an unmixed blessed nature. The text
26917 says, 'Different from this Self consisting of understanding (vijñāna)
26918 there is the inner Self consisting of bliss'. Now that which consists of
26919 understanding (vijñāna) is the individual soul (jīva), not the internal
26920 organ (buddhi) only; for the formative element, 'maya,' ('consisting of';
26921 in vijñānamaya) indicates a difference (between vijñāna and vijñānamaya).
26922 The term 'prāna-maya' ('consisting of breath') we explain to mean
26923 'prāna' only, because no other explanation is possible; but as
26924 vijñānamaya may be explained as,--jīva, we have no right to neglect
26925 'maya' as unmeaning. And this interpretation is quite suitable, as the
26926 soul in the states of bondage and release alike is a 'knowing' subject.
26927 That moreover even in 'prānamaya', and so on, the affix 'maya' may be
26928 taken as having a meaning will be shown further on.--But how is it then
26929 that in the sloka which refers to the vijñānamaya, 'Understanding
26930 (vijñāna) performs the sacrifice', the term 'vijñāna' only is used?--The
26931 essential nature, we reply, of the knowing subject is suitably called
26932 'knowledge', and this term is transferred to the knowing subject itself
26933 which is defined as possessing that nature. For we generally see that
26934 words which denote attributes defining the essential nature of a thing
26935 also convey the notion of the essential nature of the thing itself. This
26936 also accounts for the fact that the sloka ('Vijñāna performs the
26937 sacrifice, it performs all sacred acts') speaks of vijñāna as being the
26938 agent in sacrifices and so on; the buddhi alone could not be called an
26939 agent. For this reason the text does not ascribe agency to the other
26940 Selves (the prānamaya and so on) which are mentioned before the
26941 vijñānamaya; for they are non-intelligent instruments of intelligence,
26942 and the latter only can be an agent. With the same view the text further
26943 on (II, 6), distinguishing the intelligent and the non-intelligent by
26944 means of their different characteristic attributes, says in the end
26945 'knowledge and non-knowledge,' meaning thereby that which possesses the
26946 attribute of knowledge and that which does not. An analogous case is met
26947 with in the so-called antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa (Bri. Up. III. 7). There the
26948 Kāṇvas read, 'He who dwells in knowledge' (vijñāna; III, 7, 16), but
26949 instead of this the Mādhyandinas read 'he who dwells in the Self,' and
26950 so make clear that what the Kāṇvas designate as 'knowledge' really is
26951 the knowing Self.--That the word vijñāna, although denoting the knowing
26952 Self, yet has a neuter termination, is meant to denote it as something
26953 substantial. We hence conclude that he who is different from the Self
26954 consisting of knowledge, i.e. the individual Self, is the highest Self
26955 which consists of bliss.

26956
26957 It is true indeed that the sloka, 'Knowledge performs the sacrifice,
26958 'directly mentions knowledge only, not the knowing Self; all the same we
26959 have to understand that what is meant is the latter, who is referred to
26960 in the clause, 'different from this is the inner Self which consists of
26961 knowledge.' This conclusion is supported by the sloka referring to the
26962 Self which consists of food (II, 2); for that sloka refers to food only,
26963 'From food are produced all creatures,' &c., all the same the preceding
26964 clause 'this man consists of the essence of food' does not refer to food,
26965 but to an effect of it which consists of food. Considering all this the
26966 Sūtrakāra himself in a subsequent Sūtra (I, 1, 18) bases his view on the
26967 declaration, in the scriptural text, of difference.--We now turn to the
26968 assertion, made by the Pūrvapakshin, that the cause of the world is not
26969 different from the individual soul because in two Chândogya passages it
26970 is exhibited in co-ordination with the latter ('having entered into them
26971 with this living Self,' 'Thou art that'); and that hence the
26972 introductory clause of the Taitt. passage ('He who knows Brahman reaches
26973 the Highest') refers to the individual soul--which further on is called
26974 'consisting of bliss,' because it is free from all that is not pleasure.--
26975 This view cannot be upheld; for although the individual soul is
26976 intelligent, it is incapable of producing through its volition this
26977 infinite and wonderful Universe--a process described in texts such as
26978 'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth.--It sent forth fire,' &c.

26979 That even the released soul is unequal to such 'world business' as
26980 creation, two later Sûtras will expressly declare. But, if you deny that
26981 Brahman, the cause of the world, is identical with the individual soul,
26982 how then do you account for the co-ordination in which the two appear in
26983 the Chândogya texts?--How, we ask in return, can Brahman, the cause of
26984 all, free from all shadow of imperfection, omniscient, omnipotent, &c.
26985 &c., be one with the individual soul, all whose activities--whether it be
26986 thinking, or winking of an eye, or anything else--depend on karman,
26987 which implies endless suffering of various kind?--If you reply that this
26988 is possible if one of two things is unreal, we ask--which then do you
26989 mean to be unreal? Brahman's connexion with what is evil?--or its
26990 essential nature, owing to which it is absolutely good and antagonistic
26991 to all evil?--You will perhaps reply that, owing to the fact of Brahman,
26992 which is absolutely good and antagonistic to all evil, being the
26993 substrate of beginningless Nescience, there presents itself the false
26994 appearance of its being connected with evil. But there you maintain what
26995 is contradictory. On the one side there is Brahman's absolute perfection
26996 and antagonism to all evil; on the other it is the substrate of
26997 Nescience, and thereby the substrate of a false appearance which is
26998 involved in endless pain; for to be connected with evil means to be the
26999 substrate of Nescience and the appearance of suffering which is produced
27000 thereby. Now it is a contradiction to say that Brahman is connected with
27001 all this and at the same time antagonistic to it!--Nor can we allow you
27002 to say that there is no real contradiction because that appearance is
27003 something false. For whatever is false belongs to that group of things
27004 contrary to man's true interest, for the destruction of which the
27005 Vedânta-texts are studied. To be connected with what is hurtful to man,
27006 and to be absolutely perfect and antagonistic to all evil is self-
27007 contradictory.--But, our adversary now rejoins, what after all are we to
27008 do? The holy text at first clearly promises that through the cognition
27009 of one thing everything will be known ('by which that which is not heard
27010 is heard,' &c., Ch. Up. VI, 1, 3); thereupon declares that Brahman is
27011 the sole cause of the world ('Being only this was in the beginning'),
27012 and possesses exalted qualities such as the power of realising its
27013 intentions ('it thought, may I be many'); and then finally, by means of
27014 the co-ordination, 'Thou art that' intimates that Brahman is one with
27015 the individual soul, which we know to be subject to endless suffering!
27016 Nothing therefore is left to us but the hypothesis that Brahman is the
27017 substrate of Nescience and all that springs from it!--Not even for the
27018 purpose, we reply, of making sense of Scripture may we assume what in
27019 itself is senseless and contradictory!--Let us then say that Brahman's
27020 connexion with evil is real, and its absolute perfection unreal!--
27021 Scripture, we reply, aims at comforting the soul afflicted by the
27022 assaults of threefold pain, and now, according to you, it teaches that
27023 the assaults of suffering are real, while its essential perfection and
27024 happiness are unreal figments, due to error! This is excellent comfort
27025 indeed!--To avoid these difficulties let us then assume that both
27026 aspects of Brahman--viz. on the one hand its entering into the
27027 distressful condition of individual souls other than non-differenced
27028 intelligence, and on the other its being the cause of the world, endowed
27029 with all perfections, &c.--are alike unreal!--Well, we reply, we do not
27030 exactly admire the depth of your insight into the connected meaning of
27031 texts. The promise that through the knowledge of one thing everything
27032 will be known can certainly not be fulfilled if everything is false, for
27033 in that case there exists nothing that could be known. In so far as the
27034 cognition of one thing has something real for its object, and the
27035 cognition of all things is of the same kind, and moreover is comprised
27036 in the cognition of one thing; in so far it can be said that everything
27037 is known through one thing being known. Through the cognition of the
27038 real shell we do not cognise the unreal silver of which the shell is the
27039 substrate.--Well, our adversary resumes, let it then be said that the
27040 meaning of the declaration that through the cognition of one thing
27041 everything is to be known is that only non-differenced Being is real,
27042 while everything else is unreal.--If this were so, we rejoin, the text
27043 would not say, 'by which the non-heard is heard, the non-known is
27044 known'; for the meaning of this is, 'by which when heard and known' (not
27045 'known as false') 'the non-heard is heard,' &c. Moreover, if the meaning
27046 were that only the one non-differenced substance understood to be the
27047 cause of the world is real, the illustrative instance, 'As by one lump

27048 of clay everything made of clay is known,' would not be suitable; for
27049 what is meant there is that through the cognition of the (real) lump of
27050 clay its (real) effects are known. Nor must 'you say that in the
27051 illustrative instance also the unreality of the effect is set forth; for
27052 as the person to be informed is not in any way convinced at the outset
27053 that things made of clay are unreal, like the snake imagined in the
27054 rope, it is impossible that such unreality should be referred to as if
27055 it were something well known (and the clause, 'as by one lump of clay,'
27056 &c., undoubtedly does refer to something well known), in order to
27057 render the initial assertion plausible. And we are not aware of any
27058 means of knowledge--assisted or non-assisted by ratiocination--that
27059 would prove the non-reality of things effected, previous to the
27060 cognition produced by texts such as 'That art thou'; a point which will
27061 be discussed at length under II, 1.--'Being only this was in the
27062 beginning, one, without a second'; 'it thought, may I be many, may I
27063 grow forth; it sent forth fire'; 'Let me now enter those three beings
27064 with this living Self and evolve names and forms'; 'All these creatures,
27065 my son, have their root in the True, they dwell in the True, they rest
27066 in the True,' &c.; these passages declare in succession that that which
27067 really is is the Self of this world; that previous to creation there is
27068 no distinction of names and forms; that for the creation of the world
27069 Brahman, termed 'the True' (or 'Real'), requires no other operative
27070 cause but itself; that at the time of creation it forms a resolution,
27071 possible to itself only, of making itself manifold in the form of
27072 endless movable and immovable things; that in accordance with this
27073 resolution there takes place a creation, proceeding in a particular
27074 order, of an infinite number of manifold beings; that by Brahman
27075 entering into all non-intelligent beings with the living soul--which has
27076 its Self in Brahman--there takes place an evolution, infinite in extent,
27077 of all their particular names and forms; and that everything different
27078 from Brahman has its root and abode in that, is moved by that, lives by
27079 that, rests on that. All the different points--to be learned from
27080 Scripture only--which are here set forth agree with what numerous other
27081 scriptural texts teach about Brahman, viz. that it is free from all
27082 evil, devoid of all imperfection, all-knowing, all-powerful; that all
27083 its wishes and purposes realise themselves; that it is the cause of all
27084 bliss; that it enjoys bliss not to be surpassed. To maintain then that
27085 the word 'that,' which refers back to the Brahman mentioned before, i.e.
27086 a Brahman possessing infinite attributes, should aim at conveying
27087 instruction about a substance devoid of all attributes, is as unmeaning
27088 as the incoherent talk of a madman.

27089
27090 The word 'thou' again denotes the individual soul as distinguished by
27091 its implication in the course of transmigratory existence, and the
27092 proper sense of this term also would have to be abandoned if it were
27093 meant to suggest a substance devoid of all distinctions. And that, in
27094 the case of a being consisting of non-differenced light, obscuration by
27095 Nescience would be tantamount to complete destruction, we have already
27096 explained above.--All this being thus, your interpretation would involve
27097 that the proper meaning of the two words 'that' and 'thou'--which refer
27098 to one thing--would have to be abandoned, and both words would have to
27099 be taken in an implied sense only.

27100
27101 Against this the Pûrvapakshin now may argue as follows. Several words
27102 which are applied to one thing are meant to express one sense, and as
27103 this is not possible in so far as the words connote different attributes,
27104 this part of their connotation becomes inoperative, and they denote only
27105 the unity of one substance; implication (lakshanâ), therefore, does not
27106 take place. When we say 'blue (is) (the) lotus' we employ two words with
27107 the intention of expressing the unity of one thing, and hence do not aim
27108 at expressing a duality of attributes, viz. the quality of blueness and
27109 the generic character of a lotus. If this latter point was aimed at, it
27110 would follow that the sentence would convey the oneness of the two
27111 aspects of the thing, viz. its being blue and its being a lotus; but
27112 this is not possible, for the thing (denoted by the two terms) is not
27113 characterised by (the denotation of) the word 'lotus,' in so far as
27114 itself characterised by blueness; for this would imply a reciprocal
27115 inherence (samavâya) of class-characteristics and quality [FOOTNOTE 219:1].
27116 What the co-ordination of the two words conveys is, therefore, only the

27117 oneness of a substance characterised by the quality of blueness, and at
27118 the same time by the class attributes of a lotus. In the same way, when
27119 we say 'this (person is) that Devadatta' the co-ordination of the words
27120 cannot possibly mean that Devadatta in so far as distinguished by his
27121 connexion with a past time and a distant place is one with Devadatta in
27122 so far as distinguished by his connexion with the present time and a
27123 near place; what it means to express is only that there is oneness on
27124 the part of a personal substance--which substance is characterised by
27125 connexion with both places and moments of time. It is true indeed that
27126 when we at first hear the one word 'blue' we form the idea of the
27127 attribute of blueness, while, after having apprehended the relation of
27128 co-ordination (expressed in 'blue is the lotus'), this idea no longer
27129 presents itself, for this would imply a contradiction; but all the same
27130 'implication' does not take place. The essence of co-ordination consists,
27131 in all cases, therein that it suppresses the distinguishing elements in
27132 the words co-ordinated. And as thus our explanation cannot be charged
27133 with 'implication,' it cannot be objected to.

27134
27135 All this, we rejoin, is unfounded. What the words in all sentences
27136 whatsoever aim at conveying is only a particular connexion of the things
27137 known to be denoted by those words. Words such as 'blue,' standing in co-
27138 ordination with others, express that some matter possessing the
27139 attribute of blueness, &c., as known from the ordinary use of language,
27140 is connected with some other matter. When, e.g., somebody says 'bring
27141 the blue lotus,' a thing is brought which possesses the attribute of
27142 blueness. And when we are told that 'a herd of elephants excited with
27143 passion lives in the Vindhya-forest,' we again understand that what is
27144 meant is something possessing several attributes denoted by several
27145 words. Analogously we have to understand, as the thing intimated by
27146 Vedānta-texts in the form of coordination, Brahman as possessing such
27147 and such attributes.--It is an error to assume that, where a sentence
27148 aims at setting forth attributes, one attribute is to be taken as
27149 qualifying the thing in so far as qualified by another attribute; the
27150 case rather is that the thing itself is equally qualified by all
27151 attributes. For co-ordination means the application, to one thing, of
27152 several words having different reasons of application; and the effect of
27153 co-ordination is that one and the same thing, because being connected--
27154 positively or negatively--with some attribute other than that which is
27155 conveyed by one word, is also known through other words. As e.g. when it
27156 is said that 'Devadatta (is) dark-complexioned, young, reddish-eyed, not
27157 stupid, not poor, of irreproachable character.' Where two co-ordinate
27158 words express two attributes which cannot exist combined in one thing,
27159 one of the two words is to be taken in a secondary sense, while the
27160 other retains its primary meaning, as e.g. in the case of the sentence,
27161 'The Vāhika man is an ox.' But in the case of the 'blue lotus' and the
27162 like, where there is nothing contradictory in the connexion of the two
27163 attributes with one thing, co-ordination expresses the fact of one thing
27164 being characterised by two attributes.--Possibly our opponent will here
27165 make the following remark. A thing in so far as defined by its
27166 correlation to some one attribute is something different from the thing
27167 in so far as defined by its correlation to some second attribute; hence,
27168 even if there is equality of case affixes (as in 'nīlam utpalam'), the
27169 words co-ordinated are incapable of expressing oneness, and cannot,
27170 therefore, express the oneness of a thing qualified by several
27171 attributes; not any more than the juxtaposition of two words such as
27172 'jar' and 'cloth'--both having the same case-ending--can prove that
27173 these two things are one. A statement of co-ordination, therefore,
27174 rather aims at expressing the oneness of a thing in that way that it
27175 presents to the mind the essential nature of the thing by means of
27176 (words denoting) its attributes.--This would be so, we reply, if it were
27177 only the fact of a thing's standing in correlation to two attributes
27178 that is in the way of its unity. But this is not the case; for what
27179 stands in the way of such unity is the fact of there being several
27180 attributes which are not capable of being combined in one thing. Such
27181 incapability is, in the case of the generic character of a jar and that
27182 of a piece of cloth, proved by other means of knowledge; but there is no
27183 contradiction between a thing being blue and its being a lotus; not any
27184 more than there is between a man and the stick or the earrings he wears,
27185 or than there is between the colour, taste, smell, &c., of one and the

27186 same thing. Not only is there no contradiction, but it is this very fact
27187 of one thing possessing two attributes which makes possible co-
27188 ordination--the essence of which is that, owing to a difference of
27189 causes of application, several words express one and the same thing. For
27190 if there were nothing but essential unity of being, what reason would
27191 there be for the employment of several words? If the purport of the
27192 attributes were, not to intimate their connexion with the thing, but
27193 merely to suggest the thing itself, one attribute would suffice for such
27194 suggestion, and anything further would be meaningless. If, on the other
27195 hand, it were assumed that the use of a further 'suggestive' attribute
27196 is to bring out a difference of aspect in the thing suggested, such
27197 difference of aspect would imply differentiation in the thing (which you
27198 maintain to be free from all difference).--Nor is there any shade even
27199 of 'implication' in the judgment, 'This person is that Devadatta'; for
27200 there is absolutely no contradiction between the past Devadatta, who was
27201 connected with some distant place, and the present Devadatta, who is
27202 connected with the place before us. For this very reason those who
27203 maintain the permanency of things prove the oneness of a thing related
27204 to two moments of time on the basis of the judgment of recognition
27205 ('this is that'); if there really were a contradiction between the two
27206 representations it would follow that all things are (not permanent but)
27207 momentary only. The fact is that the contradiction involved in one thing
27208 being connected with two places is removed by the difference of the
27209 correlative moments of time. We therefore hold to the conclusion that co-
27210 ordinated words denote one thing qualified by the possession of several
27211 attributes.

27212
27213 For this very reason the Vedic passage, 'He buys the Soma by means of a
27214 cow one year old, of a tawny colour, with reddish-brown eyes' (arunayâ,
27215 ekahâyanyâ, piṅgākshyâ), must be understood to enjoin that the purchase
27216 is to be effected by means of a cow one year old, possessing the
27217 attributes of tawny colour, &c. This point is discussed Pû. Mî. Sû. III,
27218 1, 12.--The Pûrvapakshin there argues as follows: We admit that the word
27219 'arunayâ' ('by means of a tawny one') denotes the quality of tawinness
27220 inclusive of the thing possessing that quality; for qualities as well as
27221 generic character exist only in so far as being modes of substances. But
27222 it is not possible to restrict tawny colour to connexion with a cow one
27223 year old, for the injunction of two different things (which would result
27224 from such restriction; and which would necessitate the sentence to be
27225 construed as----) 'He buys by means of a cow one year old, and that a
27226 red one' is not permissible [FOOTNOTE 222:1]. We must therefore break up
27227 the sentence into two, one of which is constituted by the one word
27228 'arunayâ'--this word expressing that tawny colour extends equally to all
27229 the substances enjoined in that section (as instrumental towards the end
27230 of the sacrifice). And the use of the feminine case-termination of the
27231 word is merely meant to suggest a special instance (viz. the cow) of all
27232 the things, of whatever gender, which are enjoined in that section.
27233 Tawinness must not therefore be restricted to the cow one year old only.--
27234 Of this pûrvapaksha the Sûtra disposes in the following words: 'There
27235 being oneness of sense, and hence connexion of substance and quality
27236 with one action, there is restriction.'--The fact that the two words
27237 'arunayâ' and 'ekahâyanyâ'--which denote a substance, viz. a cow one
27238 year old, distinguished by the quality of possessing tawny colour--stand
27239 in co-ordination establishes that they have one sense; and is the
27240 substance, viz. the cow, and the quality, viz. tawny colour--which the
27241 word 'arunayâ' denotes as standing in the relation of distinguishing
27242 attribute and thing distinguished thereby--can thus, without any
27243 contradiction, be connected with the one action called 'the buying of
27244 the Soma', tawny colour is restricted to the cow one year old which is
27245 instrumental with regard to the purchase. If the connexion of tawinness
27246 with the action of buying were to be determined from syntactical
27247 connexion--in the same way as there is made out the connexion of the cow
27248 one year old with that action--then the injunctory sentence would indeed
27249 enjoin two matters (and this would be objectionable). But such is not
27250 the case; for the one word 'arunayâ' denotes a substance characterised by
27251 the quality of tawinness, and the co-ordination in which 'arunayâ'
27252 stands to 'ekahâyanyâ' makes us apprehend merely that the thing
27253 characterised by tawinness also is one year old, but does not make a
27254 special statement as to the connexion of that quality with the thing.

27255 For the purport of co-ordination is the unity of a thing distinguished
27256 by attributes; according to the definition that the application to one
27257 thing of several words possessing different reasons of application,
27258 constitutes co-ordination. For the same reason, the syntactical unity
27259 (ekavâkyatvam) of sentences such as 'the cloth is red' follows from all
27260 the words referring to one thing. The function of the syntactical
27261 collocation is to express the connexion of the cloth with the action of
27262 being; the connexion of the red colour (with the cloth) on the other
27263 hand is denoted by the word 'red' only. And what is ascertained from co-
27264 ordination (sâmânâdhikaranya) is only that the cloth is a substance to
27265 which a certain colour belongs. The whole matter may, without any
27266 contradiction, be conceived as follows. Several words--having either the
27267 affixes of the oblique cases or that of the nominative case--which
27268 denote one or two or several qualities, present to the mind the idea of
27269 that which is characterised by those qualities, and their co-ordination
27270 intimates that the thing characterised by all those attributes is one
27271 only; and the entire sentence finally expresses the connexion in which
27272 the thing with its attributes stands to the action denoted by the verb.
27273 This may be illustrated by various sentences exhibiting the co-
27274 ordination of words possessing different case-endings, as e.g. 'There
27275 stands Devadatta, a young man of a darkish complexion, with red eyes,
27276 wearing earrings and carrying a stick' (where all the words standing in
27277 apposition to Devadatta have the nominative termination); 'Let him make
27278 a stage curtain by means of a white cloth' (where 'white' and 'cloth'
27279 have instrumental case-endings), &c. &c. We may further illustrate the
27280 entire relation of co-ordinated words to the action by means of the
27281 following two examples: 'Let him boil rice in the cooking-pot by means
27282 of firewood': here we take in simultaneously the idea of an action
27283 distinguished by its connexion with several things. If we now consider
27284 the following amplified sentence, 'Let a skilful cook prepare, in a
27285 vessel of even shape, boiled rice mixed with milk, by means of sticks of
27286 dry khâdira wood,' we find that each thing connected with the action is
27287 denoted by an aggregate of co-ordinated words; but as soon as each thing
27288 is apprehended, it is at one and the same moment conceived as something
27289 distinguished by several attributes, and as such connects itself with
27290 the action expressed by the verb. In all this there is no contradiction
27291 whatever.--We must further object to the assertion that a word denoting
27292 a quality which stands in a sentence that has already mentioned a
27293 substance denotes the quality only (exclusive of the substance so
27294 qualified), and that hence the word 'arunayâ' also denotes a quality
27295 only. The fact is that neither in ordinary nor in Vedic language we ever
27296 meet with a word which--denoting a quality and at the same time standing
27297 in co-ordination with a word denoting a substance--denotes a mere
27298 quality. Nor is it correct to say that a quality-word occurring in a
27299 sentence which has already mentioned a substance denotes a mere quality:
27300 for in a sentence such as 'the cloth (is) white,' where a substance is
27301 mentioned in the first place, the quality-word clearly denotes (not mere
27302 whiteness but) something which possesses the quality of whiteness. When,
27303 on the other hand, we have a collocation of words such as 'patasya
27304 suklah' ('of the cloth'--gen.; 'white' nom.), the idea of a cloth
27305 distinguished by whiteness does not arise; but this is due not to the
27306 fact of the substance being mentioned first, but to the fact of the two
27307 words exhibiting different case-terminations. As soon as we add to those
27308 two words an appropriate third one, e.g. 'bhâgah' (so that the whole
27309 means 'The white part of a cloth'), the co-ordination of two words with
27310 the same case-termination gives rise to the idea of a thing
27311 distinguished by the attribute of whiteness.--Nor can we agree to the
27312 contention that, as the buying of the Soma is exclusively concluded by
27313 the cow one year old (as instrumental in the purchase), the quality of
27314 tawinness (denoted by the word 'arunayâ') cannot connect itself with the
27315 action expressed by the verb; for a word that denotes a quality and
27316 stands in co-ordination with a word denoting a substance which has no
27317 qualities opposed in nature to that quality, denotes a quality abiding
27318 in that substance, and thus naturally connects itself with the action
27319 expressed by the verb. And since, as shown, the quality of tawinness
27320 connects itself with its substance (the cow) on the mere basis of the
27321 form of the words, it is wrong (on the part of the Pûrvapakshin to
27322 abandon this natural connexion and) to establish their connexion on the
27323 ground of their being otherwise incapable of serving as means of the

27324 purchase.

27325

27326 All this confirms our contention, viz. that the co-ordination of 'thou'
27327 and 'that' must be understood to express oneness, without, at the same
27328 time, there being given up the different attributes denoted by the two
27329 words. This however is not feasible for those who do not admit a highest
27330 Self free from all imperfection and endowed with all perfections, and
27331 different from that intelligent soul which is conditioned by Nescience,
27332 involved in endless suffering and undergoing alternate states of purity
27333 and impurity.--But, an objection is raised, even if such a highest Self
27334 be acknowledged, it would have to be admitted that the sentence aims at
27335 conveying the oneness of that which is distinguished by the different
27336 attributes denoted by the words co-ordinated, and from this it follows
27337 that the highest Self participates in all the suffering expressed by the
27338 word 'thou'!--This is not so, we reply; since the word 'thou' also
27339 denotes the highest Self, viz. in so far as it is the inner Ruler
27340 (antaryāmin) of all souls.--The connected meaning of the text is as
27341 follows. That which is denoted as 'Being,' i.e. the highest Brahman
27342 which is the cause of all, free from all shadow of imperfection, &c.,
27343 resolved 'to be many'; it thereupon sent forth the entire world,
27344 consisting of fire, water, &c.; introduced, in this world so sent forth,
27345 the whole mass of individual souls into different bodies divine, human,
27346 &c., corresponding to the desert of each soul--the souls thus
27347 constituting the Self of the bodies; and finally, itself entering
27348 according to its wish into these souls--so as to constitute their inner
27349 Self--evolved in all these aggregates, names and forms, i.e. rendered
27350 each aggregate something substantial (vastu) and capable of being
27351 denoted by a word. 'Let me enter into these beings with this living Self
27352 (jīvena ātmana) means 'with this living _me_, ' and this shows the living
27353 Self, i.e. the individual soul to have Brahman for its Self. And that
27354 this having Brahman for its Self means Brahman's being the inner Self of
27355 the soul (i.e. the Self inside the soul, but not identical with it),
27356 Scripture declares by saying that Brahman entered into it. This is
27357 clearly stated in the passage Taitt. Up. II, 6, 'He sent forth all this,
27358 whatever there is. Having sent forth he entered into it. Having entered
27359 it he became _sat_ and _tyat_.' For here 'all this' comprises beings
27360 intelligent as well as non-intelligent, which afterwards are
27361 distinguished as _sat_ and _tyat_, as knowledge (vijñāna) and non-
27362 knowledge. Brahman is thus said to enter into intelligent beings also.
27363 Hence, owing to this evolution of names and forms, all words denote the
27364 highest Self distinguished by non-intelligent matter and intelligent
27365 souls.--Another text, viz. Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7, 'All this has its Self in
27366 that,' denotes by 'all this' the entire world inclusive of intelligent
27367 souls, and says that of this world that (i.e. Brahman) is the Self.
27368 Brahman thus being the Self with regard to the whole universe of matter
27369 and souls, the universe inclusive of intelligent souls is the body of
27370 Brahman.--Other scriptural texts teach the same doctrine; cp. 'Entered
27371 within, the ruler of beings, the Self of all' (Taitt. Ār. III, 24); 'He
27372 who dwelling in the earth is within the earth--whose body is the earth,'
27373 & c., up to 'he who dwelling within the Self is within the Self, whom
27374 the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who rules the Self
27375 from within, he is thy Self, the Ruler within, the Immortal' (Bri. Up.
27376 III, 7, 3-22; Mādhyand. Sā.); 'He who moves within the earth, of whom
27377 the earth is the body, &c.--who moves within the Imperishable, of whom
27378 the Imperishable is the body, whom the Imperishable does not know; he
27379 the inward ruler of all beings, free from evil, the divine, the one god,
27380 Nārāyana' (Subā. Up. VII). All these texts declare that the world
27381 inclusive of intelligent souls is the body of the highest Self, and the
27382 latter the Self of everything. Hence those words also that denote
27383 intelligent souls designate the highest Self as having intelligent souls
27384 for his body and constituting the Self of them; in the same way as words
27385 denoting non-sentient masses of matter, such as the bodies of gods, men,
27386 & c., designate the individual souls to which those bodies belong. For
27387 the body stands towards the embodied soul in the relation of a mode
27388 (prakāra); and as words denoting a mode accomplish their full function
27389 only in denoting the thing to which the mode belongs, we must admit an
27390 analogous comprehensiveness of meaning for those words which denote a
27391 body. For, when a thing is apprehended under the form 'this is such,'
27392 the element apprehended as 'such' is what constitutes a mode; now as

27393 this element is relative to the thing, the idea of it is also relative
 27394 to the thing, and finds its accomplishment in the thing only; hence the
 27395 word also which expresses the mode finds its accomplishment in the
 27396 thing. Hence words such as 'cow', 'horse', 'man', which denote a mode,
 27397 viz. a species, comprise in their meaning also that mass of matter which
 27398 exhibits the characteristics of the species, and as that mass of matter
 27399 constitutes the body and therefore is a mode of a soul, and as that soul
 27400 again, so embodied, is a mode of the highest Self; it follows that all
 27401 these words extend in their signification up to the highest Self. The
 27402 meaning of all words then is the highest Self, and hence their co-
 27403 ordination with words directly denoting that highest Self is a primary
 27404 (not merely 'implied') one.
 27405
 27406 But, an objection is raised, we indeed observe that words denoting
 27407 species or qualities stand in co-ordination to words denoting substances,
 27408 'the ox is short-horned,' 'the sugar is white'; but where substances
 27409 appear as the modes of other substances we find that formative affixes
 27410 are used, 'the man is dandin, kundalin' (bearing a stick; wearing
 27411 earrings).--This is not so, we reply. There is nothing to single out
 27412 either species, or quality, or substance, as what determines co-
 27413 ordination: co-ordination disregards such limitations. Whenever a thing
 27414 (whether species, or quality, or substance) has existence as a mode
 27415 only--owing to its proof, existence and conception being inseparably
 27416 connected with something else--the words denoting it, as they designate
 27417 a substance characterised by the attribute denoted by them,
 27418 appropriately enter into co-ordination with other words denoting the
 27419 same substance as characterised by other attributes. Where, on the other
 27420 hand, a substance which is established in separation from other things
 27421 and rests on itself, is assumed to stand occasionally in the relation of
 27422 mode to another substance, this is appropriately expressed by the use of
 27423 derived forms such as 'dandin, kundalin.' Hence such words as 'I,' 'thou,'
 27424 &c., which are different forms of appellation of the individual soul,
 27425 at bottom denote the highest Self only; for the individual souls
 27426 together with non-sentient matter are the body--and hence modes--of the
 27427 highest Self. This entire view is condensed in the co-ordination 'Thou
 27428 art that.' The individual soul being thus connected with the highest
 27429 Self as its body, its attributes do not touch the highest Self, not any
 27430 more than infancy, youth, and other attributes of the material body
 27431 touch the individual soul. Hence, in the co-ordination 'Thou art that,'
 27432 the word 'that' denotes the highest Brahman which is the cause of the
 27433 world, whose purposes come true, which comprises within itself all
 27434 blessed qualities, which is free from all shadow of evil; while the word
 27435 'thou' denotes the same highest Self in so far as having for its body
 27436 the individual souls together with their bodies. The terms co-ordinated
 27437 may thus be taken in their primary senses; there is no contradiction
 27438 either with the subject-matter of the section, or with scripture in
 27439 general; and not a shadow of imperfection such as Nescience, and so on,
 27440 attaches to Brahman, the blameless, the absolutely blessed. The co-
 27441 ordination with the individual soul thus proves only the difference of
 27442 Brahman from the soul, which is a mere mode of Brahman; and hence we
 27443 hold that different from the Self consisting of knowledge, i.e. the
 27444 individual soul, is the Self consisting of bliss, i.e. the highest Self.
 27445
 27446 Nor is there any force in the objection that as the Self of bliss is
 27447 said to be 'sâkira,' i.e. embodied--viz. in the clause 'of him the
 27448 embodied Self is the same' (Taitt. Up. II, 5, 6)--it cannot be different
 27449 from the individual soul. For throughout this section the recurring
 27450 clause 'of him the embodied Self is the same as of the preceding one,'
 27451 refers to the highest Self, calling that the 'embodied' one. The clause
 27452 'From that same Self sprang ether' (II, 1) designates the highest
 27453 Brahman--which is different from the individual soul and is introduced as
 27454 the highest cause of all things created--as the 'Self'; whence we
 27455 conclude that all things different from it--from ether up to the Self of
 27456 food constitute its body. The Subâla-upanishad moreover states quite
 27457 directly that all beings constitute the body of the highest Self: 'He of
 27458 whom the earth is the body, of whom water is the body, of whom fire is
 27459 the body, of whom wind is the body, of whom ether is the body, of whom
 27460 the Imperishable is the body, of whom Death is the body, he the inner
 27461 Self of all, the divine one, the one god Nârâyana.' From this it follows

27462 that what constitutes the embodied Self of the Self of food is nothing
27463 else but the highest Self referred to in the clause 'From that same Self
27464 sprang ether.' When, then, the text further on says with regard to the
27465 Self of breath, 'of him the embodied Self is the same as of the
27466 preceding one' (II, 3), the meaning can only be that what constitutes
27467 the embodied Self of the 'preceding' Self of food, viz. the highest Self
27468 which is the universal cause, is also the embodied Self of the Self
27469 consisting of breath. The same reasoning holds good with regard to the
27470 Self consisting of mind and the Self consisting of knowledge. In the
27471 case, finally, of the Self consisting of bliss, the expression 'the
27472 same' (esha eva) is meant to convey that that Self has its Self in
27473 nothing different from itself. For when, after having understood that
27474 the highest Self is the embodied Self of the vijñānamaya also, we are
27475 told that the embodied Self of that vijñānamaya is also the embodied
27476 Self of the ānandamaya, we understand that of the ānandamaya--which we
27477 know to be the highest Self on the ground of 'multiplication'--its own
27478 Self is the Self. The final purport of the whole section thus is that
27479 everything different from the highest Self, whether of intelligent or
27480 non-intelligent nature, constitutes its body, while that Self alone is
27481 the non-conditioned embodied Self. For this very reason competent
27482 persons designate this doctrine which has the highest Brahman for its
27483 subject-matter as the 'sârîraka,' i. e. the doctrine of the 'embodied'
27484 Self.--We have thus arrived at the conclusion that the Self of bliss is
27485 something different from the individual Self, viz. the highest Self.

27486
27487 Here the Pûrvapakshin raises the following objection.--The Self
27488 consisting of bliss (ānandamaya) is not something different from the
27489 individual soul, because the formative element--maya denotes something
27490 made, a thing effected. That this is the meaning of--maya in ānandamaya
27491 we know from Pāṇini IV, 3, 144.--But according to Pā. V, 4, 21,--maya
27492 has also the sense of 'abounding in'; as when we say 'the sacrifice is
27493 annamaya,' i.e. abounds in food. And this may be its sense in
27494 'ānandamaya' also!--Not so, the Pûrvapakshin replies. In 'annamaya,' in
27495 an earlier part of the chapter,--maya has the sense of 'made of',
27496 'consisting of'; and for the sake of consistency, we must hence ascribe
27497 the same sense to it in 'ānandamaya.' And even if, in the latter word,
27498 it denoted abundance, this would not prove that the ānandamaya is other
27499 than the individual soul. For if we say that a Self 'abounds' in bliss,
27500 this implies that with all this bliss there is mixed some small part of
27501 pain; and to be 'mixed with pain' is what constitutes the character of
27502 the individual soul. It is therefore proper to assume, in agreement with
27503 its previous use, that 'ānandamaya' means 'consisting of bliss.' In
27504 ordinary speech as well as in Vedic language (cp. common words such as
27505 'mrinmaya,' 'hiraṇmaya'; and Vedic clauses such as 'parṇamayijuhûh')
27506 -maya as a rule means 'consisting of,' and this meaning hence presents
27507 itself to the mind first. And the individual soul _may_ be denoted as
27508 'made of bliss'; for in itself it is of the essence of bliss, and its
27509 Samsâra state therefore is something 'made of bliss.' The conclusion
27510 therefore is that, owing to the received meaning of -maya, the
27511 ānandamaya is none other than the individual soul.--To this primâ facie
27512 view the next Sûtra refers and refutes it.

27513
27514 [FOOTNOTE 219:1. I.e. we should not in that case be able to decide
27515 whether the quality (i.e., here, the blueness) inheres in the class (i.e.,
27516 here, the lotus), or vice versa.]

27517
27518 [FOOTNOTE 222:1. For it would imply so-called vâkyabheda, 'split of the
27519 sentence,' which arises when one injunctory clause is made to enjoin two
27520 different things.]

27521
27522
27523
27524
27525 14. If, on account of its being a word denoting an effect, (ānandamaya
27526 be said) not (to denote the highest Self); (we say) no, on account of
27527 abundance.

27528
27529 We deny the conclusion of the Pûrvapakshin, on the ground of there being
27530 abundance of bliss in the highest Brahman, and 'abundance' being one of

the possible meanings of -maya.--Since bliss such as described in the
Taitt. Up.--bliss which is reached by successively multiplying by
hundred all inferior kinds of bliss--cannot belong to the individual
soul, we conclude that it belongs to Brahman; and as Brahman cannot be
an effect, and as -maya, may have the sense of 'abounding in,' we
conclude that the ânandamaya is Brahman itself; inner contradiction
obliging us to set aside that sense of -maya which is recommended by
regard to 'consequence' and frequency of usage. The regard for
consistency, moreover, already has to be set aside in the case of the
'prânamaya'; for in that term -maya cannot denote 'made of.' The
'prânamaya' Self can only be called by that name in so far as air with
its five modifications has (among others) the modification called prâna,
i.e. breathing out, or because among the five modifications or functions
of air prâna is the 'abounding,' i.e. prevailing one.--Nor can it be
truly said that -maya is but rarely used in the sense of 'abounding in':
expressions such as 'a sacrifice abounding in food' (annamaya), 'a
procession with many carriages' (sakatamayî), are by no means uncommon.--
Nor can we admit that to call something 'abounding in bliss' implies the
presence of some pain. For 'abundance' precludes paucity on the part
of that which is said to abound, but does not imply the presence of what
is contrary. The presence or absence of what is contrary has to be
ascertained by other means of proof; and in our case we do ascertain the
absence of what is contrary to bliss by such means, viz. the clause
'free from evil,' &c. Abundance of bliss on the part of Brahman
certainly implies a relation to paucity on the part of some other bliss;
and in accordance with this demand the text says 'That is one measure of
human bliss,' &c. (II, 8, 1). The bliss of Brahman is of measureless
abundance, compared to the bliss of the individual soul.--Nor can it be
maintained that the individual soul may be viewed as being an effect of
bliss. For that a soul whose essential nature is knowledge and bliss
should in any way be changed into something else, as a lump of clay is
made into a pot, is an assumption contradicted by all scripture, sacred
tradition, and reasoning. That in the Samsâra state the soul's bliss and
knowledge are contracted owing to karman will be shown later on.--The
Self of bliss therefore is other than the individual soul; it is Brahman
itself.

A further reason for this conclusion is supplied by the next Sûtra.

15. And because he is declared to be the cause of thatra.

'For who could breathe, who could breathe forth, if that bliss existed
not in the ether? He alone causes bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). This means--
He alone is the cause of bliss on the part of the individual souls.--
Some one is here designated as the cause of bliss enjoyed by the souls;
and we thus conclude that the causer of bliss, who must be other than
the souls to which bliss is imparted, is the highest Self abounding in
bliss.

In the passage quoted the term 'bliss' denotes him who abounds in bliss,
as will be shown later on.--A further reason is given in the next Sûtra.

16. And because that (Brahman) which is referred to in the mantra is
declared (to be the ânandamaya).

That Brahman which is described in the mantra, 'True Being, knowledge,
infinite is Brahman,' is proclaimed as the Self abounding in bliss. And
that Brahman is the highest Brahman, other than the individual soul; for
the passage 'He who knows Brahman attains the Highest' refers to Brahman
as something to be obtained by the individual soul, and the words 'On
this the following verse is recorded' show that the verse is related to
that same Brahman. The mantra thus is meant to render clear the meaning
of the Brâhmana passage. Now the Brahman to be reached by the meditating

27600 Devotee must be something different from him. The same point is rendered
27601 clear by all the following Brâhmana passages and mantras: 'from that
27602 same Self sprang ether,' and so on. The Self abounding in bliss
27603 therefore is other than the individual soul.
27604

27605 Here an opponent argues as follows:--We indeed must acknowledge that the
27606 object to be reached is something different from the meditating Devotee;
27607 but the fact is that the Brahman described in the mantra does not
27608 substantially differ from the individual soul; that Brahman is nothing
27609 but the soul of the Devotee in its pure state, consisting of mere non-
27610 differentiated intelligence, free from all shade of Nescience. To this pure
27611 condition it is reduced in the mantra describing it as true Being,
27612 knowledge, infinite. A subsequent passage, 'that from which all speech,
27613 with the mind, turns away, unable to reach it' (II. 9), expresses this
27614 same state of non-differentiation, describing it as lying beyond mind
27615 and speech. It is this therefore to which the mantra refers, and the
27616 Self of bliss is identical with it.--To this view the next Sûtra replies.
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27621 17. Not the other, on account of impossibility.
27622

27623 The other than the highest Self, i.e. the one called jîva, even in the
27624 state of release, is not that Self which the mantra describes; for this
27625 is not possible. For to a Self of that kind unconditioned intelligence
27626 (such as is, in the mantra, ascribed to Brahman; cp. the term
27627 'vipaskitâ') cannot belong. Unconditioned intelligence is illustrated by
27628 the power of all one's purposes realising themselves; as expressed in
27629 the text 'He desired, may I be many, may I grow forth.' Intelligence
27630 (vipaskittvam, i.e. power of insight into various things) does indeed
27631 belong to the soul in the state of release; but as in the Samsâra state
27632 the same soul is devoid of such insight, we cannot ascribe to it non-
27633 conditioned intelligence. And if the released soul is viewed as being
27634 mere non-differentiated intelligence, it does not possess the capacity of
27635 seeing different things, and hence cannot of course possess vipaskittva
27636 in the sense stated above. That, however, the existence of a substance
27637 devoid of all difference cannot be proved by any means of knowledge, we
27638 have already shown before. Again, if the clause 'from whence speech
27639 returns,' &c., were meant to express that speech and mind return from
27640 Brahman, this could not mean that the Real is devoid of all difference,
27641 but only that mind and speech are not means for the knowledge of Brahman.
27642 And from this it would follow that Brahman is something altogether empty,
27643 futile. Let us examine the context. The whole section, beginning with
27644 'He who knows Brahman reaches Brahman,' declares that Brahman is all-
27645 knowing, the cause of the world, consisting of pure bliss, the cause of
27646 bliss in others; that through its mere wish it creates the whole
27647 universe comprising matter and souls; that entering into the universe of
27648 created things it constitutes their Self; that it is the cause of fear
27649 and fearlessness; that it rules Vâyu Âditya and other divine beings;
27650 that its bliss is ever so much superior to all other bliss; and many
27651 other points. Now, all at once, the clause 'from whence speech returns'
27652 is said to mean that neither speech nor mind applies to Brahman, and
27653 that thus there are no means whatever of knowing Brahman! This is idle
27654 talk indeed! In the clause '(that) from which speech returns,' the
27655 relative pronoun 'from which' denotes bliss; this bliss is again
27656 explicitly referred to in the clause 'knowing the bliss of Brahman'--the
27657 genitive 'of Brahman' intimating that the bliss belongs to Brahman; what
27658 then could be the meaning of this clause which distinctly speaks of a
27659 knowledge of Brahman, if Brahman had at the same time to be conceived as
27660 transcending all thought and speech? What the clause really means rather
27661 is that if one undertakes to state the definite amount of the bliss of
27662 Brahman--the superabundance of which is illustrated by the successive
27663 multiplications with hundred--mind and speech have to turn back
27664 powerless, since no such definite amount can be assigned. He who knows
27665 the bliss of Brahman as not to be defined by any definite amount, does
27666 not fear anything.--That, moreover, the all-wise being referred to in
27667 the mantra is other than the individual soul in the state of release, is
27668 rendered perfectly clear by what--in passages such as 'it desired,' &c.--

27669 is said about its effecting, through its mere volition, the origination
27670 and subsistence of the world, its being the inner Self of the world, and
27671 so on.

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27675
27676 18. And on account of the declaration of difference.

27677

27678 The part of the chapter--beginning with the words 'From that same Self
27679 there sprang ether'--which sets forth the nature of the Brahman referred
27680 to in the mantra, declares its difference from the individual soul, no
27681 less than from the Selfs consisting of food, breath, and mind, viz. in
27682 the clause 'different from this which consists of knowledge, is the
27683 other inner Self which consists of bliss.'--Through this declaration of
27684 difference from the individual soul we know that the Self of bliss
27685 referred to in the mantra is other than the individual soul.

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27690 19. And on account of desire, there is no regard to what is inferred (i.
27691 e. matter).

27692

27693 In order that the individual soul which is enthralled by Nescience may
27694 operate as the cause of the world, it must needs be connected with non-
27695 sentient matter, called by such names as pradhâna, or ânumânika (that
27696 which is inferred). For such is the condition for the creative energy of
27697 Brahmâ and similar beings. Our text, on the other hand, teaches that the
27698 creation of the aggregate of sentient and non-sentient things results
27699 from the mere wish of a being free from all connexion with non-sentient
27700 matter, 'He desired, may I be many, may I grow forth;' 'He sent forth
27701 all, whatever there is' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). We thus understand that that
27702 Self of bliss which sends forth the world does not require connexion
27703 with non-sentient matter called ânumânika, and hence conclude that it is
27704 other than the individual soul.--A further reason is stated in the next
27705 Sûtra.

27706

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27709

27710 20. And Scripture teaches the joining of this (i.e. the individual soul)
27711 with that (i.e. bliss) in that (i.e. the ânandamaya).

27712

27713 'A flavour he is indeed; having obtained a flavour this one enjoys
27714 bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). This text declares that this one, i.e. the so-
27715 called individual soul, enjoys bliss through obtaining the ânandamaya,
27716 here called 'flavour.' Now to say that any one is identical with that by
27717 obtaining which he enjoys bliss, would be madness indeed.--It being thus
27718 ascertained that the Self of bliss is the highest Brahman, we conclude
27719 that in passages such as 'if that bliss were not in the ether' (Taitt.
27720 Up. II, 7). and 'knowledge, bliss is Brahman' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 28), the
27721 word 'ânanda' denotes the 'ânandamaya'; just as vijñâna means the
27722 vijñânamaya. It is for the same reason (viz. of ânanda meaning the same
27723 as ânandamaya) that the clause 'he who knows the bliss of Brahman'
27724 exhibits Brahman as being connected with ânanda, and that the further
27725 clause 'he who knows this reaches the Self of bliss,' declares the
27726 reaching of the Self of bliss to be the fruit of the knowledge of bliss.
27727 In the subsequent anuvâka also, in the clauses 'he perceived that food
27728 is Brahman,' 'he perceived that breath is Brahman,' &c. (III, i; 2, &c.),
27729 the words 'food,' 'breath,' and so on, are meant to suggest the Self
27730 made of food, the Self made of breath, &c., mentioned in the preceding
27731 anuvâka; and hence also in the clause 'he perceived that bliss is
27732 Brahman,' the word 'bliss' must be understood to denote the Self of
27733 bliss. Hence, in the same anuvâka, the account of the fate after death
27734 of the man who knows concludes with the words 'having reached the Self
27735 of bliss' (III, 10,5). It is thus finally proved that the highest
27736 Brahman--which in the previous adhikarana had to be shown to be other
27737 than the so-called Pradhâna--is also other than the being called

27738 individual soul.--This concludes the topic of the ānandamaya.

27739
27740 A new doubt here presents itself.--It must indeed be admitted that such
27741 individual souls as possess only a moderate degree of merit are unable
27742 to accomplish the creation of the world by their mere wish, to enjoy
27743 supreme bliss, to be the cause of fearlessness, and so on; but why
27744 should not beings like Āditya and Prajāpati, whose merit is
27745 extraordinarily great, be capable of all this?--Of this suggestion the
27746 next Sūtra disposes.

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27750
27751 21. The one within (the sun and the eye); on account of his qualities
27752 being declared.

27753
27754 It is said in the Chāndogya: 'Now that person bright as gold, who is
27755 seen within the sun, with beard bright as gold and hair bright as gold,
27756 golden altogether to the very tips of his nails, whose eyes are like
27757 blue lotus; his name is Ut, for he has risen (udita) above all evil. He
27758 also who knows this rises above all evil. Rik and Sāman are his joints.--
27759 So much with reference to the devas.--Now with reference to the body.--
27760 Now that person who is seen within the eye, he is Rik, he is Sāman,
27761 Uktha, Yajus, Brahman. The form of this person (in the eye) is the same
27762 as of that person yonder (in the sun), the joints of the one are the
27763 joints of the other, the name of the one is the--name of the other' (Ch.
27764 Up. I, 7).--Here there arises the doubt whether that person dwelling
27765 within the eye and the sun be the individual soul called Āditya, who
27766 through accumulation of religious merit possesses lordly power, or the
27767 highest Self other than that soul.

27768
27769 That individual soul of high merit, the Pūrvapakshin maintains. For the
27770 text states that that person has a body, and connexion with a body
27771 belongs to individual souls only, for it is meant to bring the soul into
27772 contact with pleasure and pain, according to its deserts. It is for this
27773 reason that Scripture describes final Release where there is no
27774 connexion with works as a state of disembodiedness. 'So long as he is in
27775 the body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain. But when he is free
27776 from the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (Ch. Up. VIII,
27777 12, 1). And a soul of transcendent merit may possess surpassing wisdom
27778 and power, and thus be capable of being lord of the worlds and the
27779 wishes (I, 6, 8). For the same reason such a soul may be the object of
27780 devout meditation, bestow rewards, and by being instrumental in
27781 destroying evil, be helpful towards final release. Even among men some
27782 are seen to be of superior knowledge and power, owing to superior
27783 religious merit; and this holds good with regard to the Siddhas and
27784 Gandharvas also; then with regard to the devas; then with regard to the
27785 divine beings, beginning with Indra. Hence, also, one among the divine
27786 beings, beginning with Brahmā, may in each kalpa reach, through a
27787 particularly high degree of merit, vast lordly power and thus effect the
27788 creation of the world, and so on. On this supposition the texts about
27789 that which constitutes the cause of the world and the inward Self of the
27790 world must also be understood to refer to some such soul which, owing to
27791 superiority of merit, has become all-knowing and all-powerful. A so-
27792 called highest Self, different from the individual souls, does not
27793 therefore exist. Where the texts speak of that which is neither coarse
27794 nor fine nor short, &c., they only mean to characterise the individual
27795 soul; and those texts also which refer to final Release aim only at
27796 setting forth the essential nature of the individual soul and the means
27797 of attaining that essential nature.

27798
27799 This primā facie view is set aside by the Sūtra. The person who is
27800 perceived within the sun and within the eye, is something different from
27801 the individual soul, viz. the highest Self; because there are declared
27802 qualities belonging to that. The text ascribes to him the quality of
27803 having risen above, i.e. being free from all evil, and this can belong
27804 to the highest Self only, not to the individual soul. For to be free
27805 from all evil means to be free from all influence of karman, and this
27806 quality can belong to the highest Self only, differing from all

individual souls which, as is shown by their experience of pleasure and pain, are in the bonds of karman. Those essential qualities also which presuppose freedom from all evil (and which are mentioned in other Vedic passages), such as mastery over all worlds and wishes, capability of realising one's purposes, being the inner Self of all, &c., belong to the highest Self alone. Compare passages such as 'It is the Self free from evil, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose wishes come true, whose purposes come true' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5); and 'He is the inner Self of all, free from evil, the divine one, the one god Nârâyana' (Subâ. Up.). Attributes such as the attribute of being the creator of the whole universe--which presupposes the power of realising one's wishes--(cp. the passage 'it desired, may I be many'); the attribute of being the cause of fear and fearlessness; the attribute of enjoying transcending bliss not limited by the capabilities of thought and speech and the like, are essential characteristics of that only which is not touched by karman, and they cannot therefore belong to the individual soul.--Nor is there any truth in the contention that the person within the sun, &c., cannot be a being different from individual souls because it possesses a body. For since a being which possesses the power of realising all its desires can assume a body through its mere wish, it is not generally true that embodiedness proves dependence on karman.--But, it may be said, by a body we understand a certain combination of matter which springs from the primal substance (prakriti) with its three constituents. Now connexion with such a body cannot possibly be brought about by the wish of such souls even as are free from all evil and capable of realising their desires; for such connexion would not be to the soul's benefit. In the case, on the other hand, of a soul subject to karman and not knowing its own essential nature, such connexion with a body necessarily takes place in order that the soul may enjoy the fruit of its actions--quite apart from the soul's desire.--Your objection would be well founded, we reply, if the body of the highest Self were an effect of Prakriti with its three constituents; but it is not so, it rather is a body suitable to the nature and intentions of that Self. The highest Brahman, whose nature is fundamentally antagonistic to all evil and essentially composed of infinite knowledge and bliss--whereby it differs from all other souls--possesses an infinite number of qualities of unimaginable excellence, and, analogously, a divine form suitable to its nature and intentions, i.e. adorned with infinite, supremely excellent and wonderful qualities--splendour, beauty, fragrance, tenderness, loveliness, youthfulness, and so on. And in order to gratify his devotees he individualises that form so as to render it suitable to their apprehension--he who is a boundless ocean as it were of compassion, kindness and lordly power, whom no shadow of evil may touch--he who is the highest Self, the highest Brahman, the supreme soul, Nârâyana!--Certain texts tell us that the highest Brahman is the sole cause of the entire world: 'From which these beings originate' (Taitt. Up.); 'Being only was this in the beginning' (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'The Self only was this in the beginning' (Ai. Up. I, 1); 'Nârâyana alone existed, not Brahmâ nor Siva.' Other texts define his nature: 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'Knowledge, bliss is Brahman' (Bri. Up. III. 9. 28); and others again deny of Brahman all connexion with evil qualities and inferior bodies sprung from Prakriti, and all dependence on karman, and proclaim his glorious qualities and glorious forms: 'Free from qualities' (?); 'Free from taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19); 'Free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, realising his wishes and purposes' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5); 'There is no effect and no cause known of him, no one is seen like to him or superior: his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent action of force and knowledge' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'That highest great lord of lords, the highest deity of deities' (Svet. Up. VI, 7); 'He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord' (Svet. Up. VI, 9); 'Having created all forms and given names to them the wise one goes on calling them by those names' (Taitt. Âr. III, 12, 7); 'I know that great Person of sunlike lustre beyond the darkness' (Svet. Up. III, 8); 'All moments originated from the Person shining like lightning' (Mahânâr. Up. I, 6).--This essential form of his the most compassionate Lord by his mere will individualises as a shape human or divine or otherwise, so as to render it suitable to the apprehension of the devotee and thus satisfy him.

This the following scriptural passage declares, 'Unborn he is born in many ways' (Gau. Kâ. III, 24); and likewise Smriti. 'Though unborn I, the imperishable Self, the Lord of the beings, presiding over my Nature, manifest myself by my Mâyâ for the protection of the Good and the destruction of the evil doers' (Bha. Gî. IV, 6. 8). The 'Good' here are the Devotees; and by 'Mâyâ' is meant the purpose, the knowledge of the Divine Being--; in agreement with the Naighantukas who register 'Mâyâ' as a synonym of jñâna (knowledge). In the Mahâbhârata also the form assumed by the highest Person in his avatâras is said not to consist of Prakriti, 'the body of the highest Self does not consist of a combination of material elements.'--For these reasons the Person within the Sun and the eye is the highest Self which is different from the individual soul of the Sun, &c.

22. And on account of the declaration of difference (the highest Self is) other (than the individual souls of the sun, &c.).

There are texts which clearly state that the highest Self is different from Âditya and the other individual souls: 'He who, dwelling within Aditya (the sun), is different from Âditya, whom Âditya does not know, of whom Âditya is the body, who rules Âditya from within; who dwelling within the Self is different from the Self,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 9 ff.); 'Of whom the Imperishable is the body, whom the Imperishable does not know; who moves within Death, of whom Death is the body, whom Death does not know; he is the inner self of all beings, free from evil, divine, the one God Nârâyana' (Sub. Up. VII). These texts declare all individual souls to be the body of the sinless highest Self which is said to be the inward principle of all of them.--It is thereby completely proved that the highest Self is something different from all individual souls such as Âditya, and so on.--Here terminates the adhikarana of the 'one within.'

The text, 'That from which these beings are born,' teaches that Brahman is the cause of the world; to the question thence arising of what nature that cause of the world is, certain other texts give a reply in general terms ('Being only this was in the beginning'; 'It sent forth fire'; 'The Self only this was in the beginning,' &c.); and thereupon it is shown on the basis of the special nature of that cause as proved by the attributes of 'thought' and 'bliss,' that Brahman is different from the pradhâna and the individual souls. The remaining part of this Pâda now is devoted to the task of proving that where such special terms as Ether and the like are used in sections setting forth the creation and government of the world, they designate not the thing-sentient or non-sentient--which is known from ordinary experience, but Brahman as proved so far.

23. Ether (is Brahman), on account of the characteristic marks.

We read in the Chândogya (I, 9), 'What is the origin of this world?' 'Ether,' he replied. 'For all these beings spring from the ether only, and return into the ether. Ether is greater than these; ether is their rest.' Here there arises the doubt whether the word 'ether' denotes the well-known element or Brahman.--The Pûrvapakshin maintains the former alternative. For, he says, in the case of things to be apprehended through words we must accept that sense of the word which, proved by etymology, is immediately suggested by the word. We therefore conclude from the passage that the well-known Ether is the cause of the entire aggregate of things, moving or non-moving, and that hence Brahman is the same as Ether.--But has it not been shown that Brahman is something different from non-sentient things because its creative activity is preceded by thought?--This has been asserted indeed, but by no means proved. For the proper way to combine the different texts is as follows. Having been told that 'that from which these beings are born is Brahman', we desire to know more especially what that source of all beings is, and

27945 this desire is satisfied by the special information given by the text,
27946 'All these things spring from the ether.' It thus being ascertained that
27947 the ether only is the cause of the origin, and so on, of the world, we
27948 conclude that also such general terms as 'Being' ('Being only was this
27949 in the beginning') denote the particular substance called 'ether.' And
27950 we further conclude that in passages such as 'the Self only was all this
27951 in the beginning', the word 'Self (âtman) also denotes the ether; for
27952 that word is by no means limited to non-sentient things--cp., e.g., the
27953 phrase, 'Clay constitutes the Self of the jar'--and its etymology also
27954 (âtman from âp, to reach) shows that it may very well be applied to the
27955 ether. It having thus been ascertained that the ether is the general
27956 cause or Brahman, we must interpret such words as 'thinking' (which we
27957 meet with in connexion with the creative activity of the general cause)
27958 in a suitable, i.e. secondary, or metaphorical sense. If the texts
27959 denoted the general cause by general terms only, such as 'Being', we
27960 should, in agreement with the primary sense of 'thinking', and similar
27961 terms, decide that that cause is an intelligent being; but since, as a
27962 matter of fact, we ascertain a particular cause on the basis of the word
27963 'ether', our decision cannot be formed on general considerations of what
27964 would suit the sense.--But what then about the passage, 'From the Self
27965 there sprang the ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1), from which it appears
27966 that the ether itself is something created?--All elementary substances,
27967 we reply, such as ether, air, and so on, have two different states, a
27968 gross material one, and a subtle one. The ether, in its subtle state, is
27969 the universal cause; in its gross state it is an effect of the primal
27970 cause; in its gross state it thus springs from itself, i.e. ether in the
27971 subtle state. The text, 'All these beings spring from ether only' (Ch.
27972 Up. I, 9, 1), declares that the whole world originates from ether only,
27973 and from this it follows that ether is none other than the general cause
27974 of the world, i.e. Brahman. This non-difference of Brahman from the
27975 empirically known ether also gives a satisfactory sense to texts such as
27976 the following: 'If this ether were not bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, 1);
27977 'Ether, indeed, is the evolver of names and forms' (Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 1,
27978 and so on).--It thus appears that Brahman is none other than the well-
27979 known elemental ether.

27980
27981 This primâ facie view is set aside by the Sûtra. The word 'ether' in the
27982 text under discussion denotes the highest Self with its previously
27983 established characteristics--which is something quite different from the
27984 non-sentient elemental ether. For the qualities which the passage
27985 attributes to ether, viz. its being the one cause of the entire world,
27986 its being greater than all, and the rest of all, clearly indicate the
27987 highest Self. The non-intelligent elemental ether cannot be called the
27988 cause of all, since intelligent beings clearly cannot be its effects;
27989 nor can it be called the 'rest' of intelligent beings, for non-sentient
27990 things are evil and antagonistic to the true aim of man; nor can it be
27991 called 'greater' than all, for it is impossible that a non-sentient
27992 element should possess all excellent qualities whatever and thus be
27993 absolutely superior to everything else.--Nor is the Pûrvapakshin right
27994 when maintaining that, as the word 'ether' satisfies the demand for a
27995 special cause of the world, all other texts are to be interpreted in
27996 accordance herewith. The words, 'All these beings indeed spring from the
27997 ether only,' merely give expression to something generally known, and
27998 statements of this nature presuppose other means of knowledge to prove
27999 them. Now these other means required are, in our case, supplied by such
28000 texts as 'Being only was this in the beginning,' and these, as we have
28001 shown, establish the existence of Brahman. To Brahman thus established,
28002 the text mentioning the ether merely refers as to something well known.
28003 Brahman may suitably be called 'ether' (âkâsa), because being of the
28004 nature of light it shines (âkâsate) itself, and makes other things shine
28005 forth (âkâsayati). Moreover, the word 'ether' is indeed capable of
28006 conveying the idea of a special being (as cause), but as it denotes a
28007 special non-intelligent thing which cannot be admitted as the cause of
28008 the intelligent part of the world we must deny all authoritativeness to
28009 the attempt to tamper, in the interest of that one word, with the sense
28010 of other texts which have the power of giving instruction as to an
28011 entirely new thing (viz. Brahman), distinguished by the possession of
28012 omniscience, the power of realising its purposes and similar attributes,
28013 which we ascertain from certain complementary texts--such as 'it thought,

28014 may I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'it desired, may I be many, may I
28015 grow forth.' We also point out that the agreement in purport of a number
28016 of texts capable of establishing the existence of a wonderful being
28017 possessing infinite wonderful attributes is not lightly to be
28018 disregarded in favour of one single text which moreover (has not the
28019 power of intimating something not known before, but) only makes a
28020 reference to what is already established by other texts.--As to the
28021 averment that the word 'Self' is not exclusively limited to sentient
28022 beings, we remark that that word is indeed applied occasionally to non-
28023 sentient things, but prevailing to that which is the correlative of a
28024 body, i.e. the soul or spirit; in texts such as 'the Self only was this
28025 in the beginning,' and 'from the Self there sprang the ether,' we must
28026 therefore understand by the 'Self,' the universal spirit. The denotative
28027 power of the term 'atman,' which is thus proved by itself, is moreover
28028 confirmed by the complementary passages 'it desired, may I send forth
28029 the worlds', 'it desired, may I be many, may I grow forth.'--We thus
28030 arrive at the following conclusion: Brahman, which--by the passage
28031 'Being only this was in the beginning'--is established as the sole cause
28032 of the world, possessing all those manifold wonderful attributes which
28033 are ascertained from the complementary passages, is, in the text under
28034 discussion, referred to as something already known, by means of the term
28035 'ether.'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'ether.'

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28040 24. For the same reason breath (is Brahman).

28041

28042 We read in the Chândogya (I, 10; ii), 'Prastotri, that deity which
28043 belongs to the Prastâva,' &c.; and further on, 'which then is that deity?
28044 He said--Breath. For all these beings merge into breath alone, and from
28045 breath they arise. This is the deity belonging to the Prastâva. If
28046 without knowing that deity you had sung forth, your head would have
28047 fallen off.' Here the word 'breath,' analogously to the word 'ether'
28048 denotes the highest Brahman, which is different from what is commonly
28049 called breath; we infer this from the fact that special characteristics
28050 of Brahman, viz. the whole world's entering into and rising from it, are
28051 in that text referred to as well-known things. There indeed here arises
28052 a further doubt; for as it is a matter of observation that the existence,
28053 activity, &c., of the whole aggregate of creatures depend on breath,
28054 breath--in its ordinary acceptation--may be called the cause of the
28055 world. This doubt is, however, disposed of by the consideration that
28056 breath is not present in things such as stones and wood, nor in
28057 intelligence itself, and that hence of breath in the ordinary sense it
28058 cannot be said that 'all beings enter into it,' &c. We therefore
28059 conclude that Brahman is here called 'breath' in so far as he bestows
28060 the breath of life on all beings. And the general result of the
28061 discussion carried on in connexion with the last two Sûtras thus is that
28062 the words 'ether' and 'breath' denote something other than what is
28063 ordinarily denoted by those terms, viz. the highest Brahman, the sole
28064 cause of this entire world, free from all evil, &c. &c.--Here terminates
28065 the adhikarana of 'breath.'

28066

28067 The subsequent Sûtras up to the end of the Pâda demonstrate that the
28068 being which the texts refer to as 'Light' or 'Indra'--terms which in
28069 ordinary language are applied to certain other well-known beings--and
28070 which is represented as possessing some one or other supremely exalted
28071 quality that is invariably connected with world-creative power, is no
28072 other than the highest Brahman.

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28076

28077 25. The light (is Brahman), on account of the mention of feet.

28078

28079 We read in the Chândogya. (III, 13, 7), 'Now that light which shines
28080 above this heaven, higher than everything, in the highest worlds beyond
28081 which there are no other worlds, that is the same light which is within
28082 man.'--Here a doubt arises, viz. whether the brightly shining thing here

28083 called 'light' is the well-known light of the sun and so on, viewed as a
28084 causal universal principle (Brahman); or the all-knowing, &c., highest
28085 Person of infinite splendour, who is different in nature from all
28086 sentient and non-sentient beings, and is the highest cause.--The
28087 Pûrvapakshin maintains that the reference is to ordinary light. For, he
28088 says, the passage does not mention a particular characteristic attribute
28089 which can belong to the highest Self only--while such attributes were
28090 met with in the texts referring to Ether and Breath--, and as thus there
28091 is no opening for a recognition of the highest Self, and as at the same
28092 time the text identifies 'light' with the intestinal heat of living
28093 beings, we conclude that the text represents the well-known ordinary
28094 light as Brahman, the cause of the world--which is possible as causal
28095 agency is connected with extreme light and heat.--This primâ facie view
28096 the Sûtra sets aside. The light which the text states to be connected
28097 with heaven and possessing supreme splendour can be the highest Person
28098 only, since a preceding passage in the same section--' All the beings
28099 are one foot of it, three feet are the Immortal in heaven'--refers to
28100 all beings as being a foot of that same being which is connected with
28101 heaven. Although the passage, 'That light which shines above,' &c., does
28102 not mention a special attribute of the highest Person, yet the passage
28103 previously quoted refers to the highest Person as connected with heaven,
28104 and we therefore recognise that Person as the light connected with
28105 heaven, mentioned in the subsequent passage.

28106
28107 Nor does the identification, made in a clause of the text, of light with
28108 the intestinal heat give rise to any difficulty; for that clause is
28109 meant to enjoin meditation on the highest Brahman in the form of
28110 intestinal heat, such meditation having a special result of its own.
28111 Moreover, the Lord himself declares that he constitutes the Self of the
28112 intestinal fire, 'Becoming the Vaisvânara-fire I abide in the body of
28113 living creatures' (Bha. Gî. XV, 14).

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28118 26. If it be objected that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the
28119 metre being denoted; (we reply) not so, because thus the direction of
28120 the mind (on Brahman) is declared; for thus it is seen.

28121
28122 The previous section at first refers to the metre called Gâyatrî, 'The
28123 Gâyatrî indeed is everything' (III, 12, 1), and then introduces--with
28124 the words 'this is also declared by a Rik_verse'--the verse, 'Such is
28125 the greatness of it (viz. the Gâyatrî),' &c. Now, as this verse also
28126 refers to the metre, there is not any reference to the highest Person.--
28127 To this objection the second part of the Sûtra replies. The word
28128 'Gâyatrî' does not here denote the metre only, since this cannot
28129 possibly be the Self of all; but the text declares the application of
28130 the idea of Gâyatrî to Brahman, i.e. teaches, to the end of a certain
28131 result being obtained, meditation on Brahman in so far as similar to
28132 Gâyatrî. For Brahman having four feet, in the sense indicated by the rik_,
28133 may be compared to the Gâyatrî with its four (metrical) feet. The
28134 Gâyatrî (indeed has as a rule three feet, but) occasionally a Gâyatrî
28135 with four feet is met with; so, e.g., 'Indras sakîpatih | valena pîditah |
28136 duskyavano vrishâ | samitsu sâsahih.' We see that in other passages also
28137 words primarily denoting metres are employed in other senses; thus, e.g.,
28138 in the samvargavidyâ (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 8), where Virâj (the name of a
28139 metre of ten syllables) denotes a group of ten divine beings.

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28141 For this conclusion the next Sûtra supplies a further argument.

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28146 27. And thus also, because (thus only) the designation of the beings,
28147 and so on, being the (four) feet is possible.

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28149 The text, moreover, designates the Gâyatrî as having four feet, after
28150 having referred to the beings, the earth, the body, and the heart; now
28151 this has a sense only if it is Brahman, which here is called Gâyatrî.

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28. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (recognised) on account of the difference of designation; (we say) not so, on account of there being no contradiction in either (designation).

In the former passage, 'three feet of it are what is immortal in heaven,' heaven is referred to as the abode of the being under discussion; while in the latter passage, 'that light which shines above this heaven,' heaven is mentioned as marking its boundary. Owing to this discrepancy, the Brahman referred to in the former text is not recognised in the latter.--This objection the Sûtra disposes of by pointing out that owing to the essential agreement of the two statements, nothing stands in the way of the required recognition. When we say, 'The hawk is on the top of the tree,' and 'the hawk is above the top of the tree,' we mean one and the same thing.--The 'light,' therefore, is nothing else but the most glorious and luminous highest Person. Him who in the former passage is called four-footed, we know to have an extraordinarily beautiful shape and colour--(cp., e.g., 'I know that great Person of sunlike colour beyond the darkness' (Svet. Up. III, 9))--and as hence his brilliancy also must be extraordinary, he is, in the text under discussion, quite appropriately called 'light.'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'light.'

It has been shown that the being endowed with supreme brilliance, called 'Light,' which the text mentions as something well known, is the highest Person. The Sûtrakâra will now show that the being designated as Indra and Prâna, which the text enjoins as an object of meditation, for the reason that it is the means for attaining immortality--a power which is inseparable from causal power--is likewise the highest Person.

29. Prâna is Brahman, on account of connexion.

We read in the Pratardana-vidyâ in the Kaushîtaki-brâhmana that 'Pratardana, the son of Divodâsa, came, by fighting and strength, to the beloved abode of Indra.' Being asked by Indra to choose a boon he requests the God to bestow on him that boon which he himself considers most beneficial to man; whereupon Indra says, 'I am prâna (breath), the intelligent Self, meditate on me as Life, as Immortality.' Here the doubt arises whether the being called Prâna and Indra, and designating itself as the object of a meditation most beneficial to man, is an individual soul, or the highest Self.--An individual soul, the Pûrvapakshin maintains. For, he says, the word 'Indra' is known to denote an individual God, and the word 'Prâna,' which stands in grammatical co-ordination with Indra, also applies to individual souls. This individual being, called Indra, instructs Pratardana that meditation on himself is most beneficial to man. But what is most beneficial to man is only the means to attain immortality, and such a means is found in meditation on the causal principle of the world, as we know from the text, 'For him there is delay only so long as he is not delivered; then he will be perfect' (Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2). We hence conclude that Indra, who is known as an individual soul, is the causal principle, Brahman.

This view is rejected by the Sûtra. The being called Indra and Prâna is not a mere individual soul, but the highest Brahman, which is other than all individual souls. For on this supposition only it is appropriate that the being introduced as Indra and Prâna should, in the way of grammatical co-ordination, be connected with such terms as 'blessed,' 'non-ageing,' 'immortal.' ('That Prâna indeed is the intelligent Self, blessed, non-ageing, immortal,' Kau. Up. III, 9.)

28221 30. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the
 28222 speaker denoting himself; (we say, not so), because the multitude of
 28223 connexions with the inner Self (is possible only) in that (speaker if
 28224 viewed as Brahman).

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28226 An objection is raised.--That the being introduced as Indra and Prâna
 28227 should be the highest Brahman, for the reason that it is identical with
 28228 him who, later on, is called 'blessed,' 'non-ageing,' 'immortal'--this we
 28229 cannot admit. 'Know me only, I am prâna, meditate on me as the
 28230 intelligent Self, as life, as immortality'--the speaker of these words
 28231 is Indra, and this Indra enjoins on Pratardana meditation on his own
 28232 person only, the individual character of which is brought out by
 28233 reference to certain deeds of strength such as the slaying of the son of
 28234 Tvashtri ('I slew the three-headed son of Tvashtri,' &c.). As thus the
 28235 initial part of the section clearly refers to an individual being, the
 28236 terms occurring in the concluding part ('blessed,' 'non-ageing,'
 28237 'immortal') must be interpreted so as to make them agree with what
 28238 precedes.--This objection the Sûtra disposes of. 'For the multitude of
 28239 connexions with the Self'--i.e. the multitude of things connected with
 28240 the Self as its attributes--is possible only 'in that,' i.e. in that
 28241 speaker viewed as the highest Brahman. 'For, as in a car, the
 28242 circumference of the wheel is placed on the spokes, and the spokes on
 28243 the nave, thus are these objects placed on the subjects, and the
 28244 subjects on the prâna. That prâna indeed is the intelligent Self,
 28245 blessed, non-ageing, immortal.' The 'objects' (bhûtamâtrâh) here are the
 28246 aggregate of non-sentient things; the 'subjects' (prajñâmâtrâh) are the
 28247 sentient beings in which the objects are said to abide; when thereupon
 28248 the texts says that of these subjects the being called Indra and Prâna
 28249 is the abode, and that he is blessed, non-ageing, immortal; this
 28250 qualification of being the abode of this Universe, with all its non-
 28251 sentient and sentient beings, can belong to the highest Self only, which
 28252 is other than all individual souls.

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28254 The Sûtra may also be explained in a somewhat different way, viz. 'there
 28255 is a multitude of connexions belonging to the highest Self, i.e. of
 28256 attributes special to the highest Self, in that, viz. section.' The text
 28257 at first says, 'Choose thou that boon for me which thou deemest most
 28258 beneficial to man'--to which the reply is, 'Meditate on me.' Here Indra-
 28259 prâna is represented as the object of a meditation which is to bring
 28260 about Release; the object of such meditation can be none but the highest
 28261 Self.--'He makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a
 28262 good deed; and him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds he
 28263 makes do a bad deed.' The causality with regard to all actions which is
 28264 here described is again a special attribute of the highest Self.--The
 28265 same has to be said with regard to the attribute of being the abode of
 28266 all, in the passage about the wheel and spokes, quoted above; and with
 28267 regard to the attributes of bliss, absence of old age and immortality,
 28268 referred to in another passage quoted before. Also the attributes of
 28269 being 'the ruler of the worlds, the lord of all,' can belong to the
 28270 highest Self only.--The conclusion therefore is that the being called
 28271 Indra and Prâna is none other but the highest Self.--But how then can
 28272 Indra, who is known to be an individual person only, enjoin meditation
 28273 on himself?--To this question the next Sûtra replies.

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28278 31. The instruction (given by Indra about himself) (is possible) through
 28279 insight based on Scripture, as in the case of Vâmadeva.

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28281 The instruction which, in the passages quoted, Indra gives as to the
 28282 object of meditation, i.e. Brahman constituting his Self, is not based
 28283 on such an insight into his own nature as is established by other means
 28284 of proof, but on an intuition of his own Self, mediated by Scripture.
 28285 'Having entered into them with this living Self let me evolve names and
 28286 forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'In it all that exists has its Self (Ch. Up.
 28287 VI, 8, 7); Entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self of all'
 28288 (Taitt. Ar. III, 21); 'He who dwelling in the Self is different from the
 28289 Self,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22)--from these and similar texts Indra has

28290 learned that the highest Self has the individual souls for its body, and
28291 that hence words such as 'I' and 'thou,' which denote individual beings,
28292 extend in their connotation up to the highest Self; when, therefore, he
28293 says, 'Know me only', and 'Meditate on me', he really means to teach
28294 that the highest Self, of which his own individual person is the body,
28295 is the proper object of meditation. 'As in the case of Vāmadeva.' As the
28296 Rishi Vāmadeva perceiving that Brahman is the inner Self of all, that
28297 all things constitute its body, and that the meaning of words denoting a
28298 body extends up to the principle embodied, denotes with the word 'I' the
28299 highest Brahman to which he himself stands in the relation of a body,
28300 and then predicates of this 'I' Manu Sûrya and other beings--'Seeing
28301 this the Rishi. Vāmadeva understood, I am Manu, I am Sûrya' (Bri. Up. I,
28302 4, 10). Similarly Prahlâda says, 'As the Infinite one abides within all,
28303 he constitutes my "I" also; all is from me, I am all, within me is all.'
28304 (Vi. Pu. I, 19, 85.) The next Sûtra states, in reply to an objection,
28305 the reason why, in the section under discussion, terms denoting the
28306 individual soul, and others denoting non-sentient things are applied to
28307 Brahman.

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28312 32. If it be said (that Brahman is not meant) on account of
28313 characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air; we
28314 say no, on account of the threefoldness of meditation; on account of
28315 (such threefold meditation) being met (in other texts also); and on
28316 account of (such threefold meditation) being appropriate here (also).
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28318 An objection is raised. 'Let none try to find out what speech is, let
28319 him know the speaker'; 'I slew the three-headed son of Tvashtri; I
28320 delivered the Arunmukhas, the devotees, to the wolves'; these passages
28321 state characteristic marks of an individual soul (viz. the god Indra).--
28322 'As long as Prâna dwells in this body, so long there is life'; 'Prâna
28323 alone is the conscious Self, and having laid hold of this body, it makes
28324 it rise up.'--These passages again mention characteristic attributes of
28325 the chief vital air. Hence there is here no 'multitude of attributes
28326 belonging to the Self.'--The latter part of the Sûtra refutes this
28327 objection. The highest Self is called by these different terms in order
28328 to teach threefoldness of devout meditation; viz. meditation on Brahman
28329 in itself as the cause of the entire world; on Brahman as having for its
28330 body the totality of enjoying (individual) souls; and on Brahman as
28331 having for its body the objects and means of enjoyment.--This threefold
28332 meditation on Brahman, moreover, is met with also in other chapters of
28333 the sacred text. Passages such as 'The True, knowledge, infinite is
28334 Brahman,' 'Bliss is Brahman,' dwell on Brahman in itself. Passages again
28335 such as 'Having created that he entered into it. Having entered it he
28336 became _sat_ and _tyat_, defined and undefined,' &c. (Taitt. Up. II, 6),
28337 represent Brahman as having for its body the individual souls and
28338 inanimate nature. Hence, in the chapter under discussion also, this
28339 threefold view of Brahman is quite appropriate. Where to particular
28340 individual beings such as Hiranyagarbha, and so on, or to particular
28341 inanimate things such as prakriti, and so on, there are attributed
28342 qualities especially belonging--to the highest Self; or where with words
28343 denoting such persons and things there are co-ordinated terms denoting
28344 the highest Self, the intention of the texts is to convey the idea of
28345 the highest Self being the inner Self of all such persons and things.--
28346 The settled conclusion, therefore, is that the being designated as Indra
28347 and Prâna is other than an individual soul, viz. the highest Self.

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28352 SECOND PÂDA.
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28354 THE contents of the first Pâda may be summed up as follows:--It has been
28355 shown that a person who has read the text of the Veda; who further,
28356 through the study of the Karma-Mîmâmsa, has acquired a full knowledge of
28357 the nature of (sacrificial and similar) works, and has recognised that
28358 the fruits of such works are limited and non-permanent; in whom there

28359 has arisen the desire for the highest aim of man, i.e. Release, which,
28360 as he has come to know in the course of reading the Vedânta portions of
28361 scripture, is effected by meditation on the nature of Brahman--such
28362 meditation having an infinite and permanent result; who has convinced
28363 himself that words are capable of conveying information about
28364 accomplished things (not only about things to be done), and has arrived
28365 at the conclusion that the Vedânta-texts are an authoritative means of
28366 knowledge with regard to the highest Brahman;--that such a person, we
28367 say, should begin the study of the Sârîraka-Mîmâmsâ which indicates the
28368 method how Brahman is to be known through the Vedânta-texts.

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28370 We next have shown that the text 'That from which these creatures are
28371 born,' &c., conveys the idea of the highest Brahman as that being which
28372 in sport, as it were, creates, sustains, and finally reabsorbs this
28373 entire universe, comprising within itself infinite numbers of variously
28374 constituted animated beings--moving and non-moving--, of objects of
28375 enjoyment for those beings, of means of enjoyment, and of abodes of
28376 enjoyment; and which is the sole cause of all bliss. We have established
28377 that this highest Brahman, which is the sole cause of the world, cannot
28378 be the object of the other means of knowledge, and hence is to be known
28379 through scripture only. We have pointed out that the position of
28380 scripture as an authoritative means of knowledge is established by the
28381 fact that all the Vedânta-texts connectedly refer to the highest Brahman,
28382 which, although not related to any injunctions of action or abstention
28383 from action, by its own essential nature constitutes the highest end of
28384 man. We have proved that Brahman, which the Vedânta-texts teach to be
28385 the sole cause of the world, must be an intelligent principle other than
28386 the non-sentient pradhâna, since Brahman is said to think. We have
28387 declared that this intelligent principle is other than the so-called
28388 individual soul, whether in the state of bondage or that of release;
28389 since the texts describe it as in the enjoyment of supreme bliss, all-
28390 wise, the cause of fear or fearlessness on the part of intelligent
28391 beings, the inner Self of all created things, whether intelligent or non-
28392 intelligent, possessing the power of realising all its purposes, and so
28393 on.--We have maintained that this highest Being has a divine form,
28394 peculiar to itself, not made of the stuff of Prakriti, and not due to
28395 karman.--We have explained that the being which some texts refer to as a
28396 well-known cause of the world--designating it by terms such as ether or
28397 breath, which generally denote a special non-sentient being--is that
28398 same highest Self which is different from all beings, sentient or non-
28399 sentient.--We have declared that, owing to its connexion with heaven,
28400 this same highest Self is to be recognised in what the text calls a
28401 'light,' said to possess supreme splendour, such as forms a special
28402 characteristic of the highest Being. We have stated that, as we
28403 recognise through insight derived from scripture, that same highest
28404 Person is denoted by terms such as Indra, and so on; as the text
28405 ascribes to that 'Indra' qualities exclusively belonging to the highest
28406 Self, such, e.g., as being the cause of the attainment of immortality.--
28407 And the general result arrived at was that the Vedânta-texts help us to
28408 the knowledge of one being only, viz. Brahman, or the highest Person, or
28409 Nârâyana--of whom it is shown that he cannot possibly be the object of
28410 the other means of knowledge, and whom the possession of an unlimited
28411 number of glorious qualities proves to differ totally from all other
28412 beings whatsoever.

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28414 Now, although Brahman is the only object of the teaching of the Vedânta-
28415 texts, yet some of these texts might give rise to the notion that they
28416 aim at setting forth (not Brahman), but some particular being comprised
28417 within either the pradhâna or the aggregate of individual souls. The
28418 remaining Pâdas of the first Adhyâya therefore apply themselves to the
28419 task of dispelling this notion and proving that what the texts in
28420 question aim at is to set forth certain glorious qualities of Brahman.
28421 The second Pâda discusses those texts which contain somewhat obscure
28422 references to the individual soul; the third Pâda those which contain
28423 clear references to the same; and the fourth Pâda finally those texts
28424 which appear to contain even clearer intimations of the individual soul,
28425 and so on.

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1. Everywhere; because there is taught what is known.

We read in the Chândogya, 'Man is made of thought; according to what his thought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life. Let him form this thought: he who consists of mind, whose body is breath, whose form is light,' &c. (III, 14). We here understand that of the meditation enjoined by the clause 'let him form this thought' the object is the being said to consist of mind, to have breath for its body, &c. A doubt, however, arises whether the being possessing these attributes be the individual soul or the highest Self.--The Pûrvapakshin maintains the former alternative. For, he says, mind and breath are instruments of the individual soul; while the text 'without breath, without mind,' distinctly denies them to the highest Self. Nor can the Brahman mentioned in a previous clause of the same section ('All this indeed is Brahman') be connected as an object with the meditation enjoined in the passage under discussion; for Brahman is there referred to in order to suggest the idea of its being the Self of all--which idea constitutes a means for bringing about that calmness of mind which is helpful towards the act of meditation enjoined in the clause 'Let a man meditate with calm mind,' &c. Nor, again, can it be said that as the meditation conveyed by the clause 'let him form this thought' demands an object, Brahman, although mentioned in another passage, only admits of being connected with the passage under discussion; for the demand for an object is fully satisfied by the being made of mind, &c., which is mentioned in that very passage itself; in order to supply the object we have merely to change the case-terminations of the words 'manomayah prânasarîrah,' &c. It having thus been determined that the being made of mind is the individual soul, we further conclude that the Brahman mentioned in the concluding passage of the section ('That is Brahman') is also the individual soul, there called Brahman in order to glorify it.

This primâ facie view is set aside by the Sûtra. The being made of mind is the highest Self; for the text states certain qualities, such as being made of mind, &c., which are well known to denote, in all Vedânta-texts, Brahman only. Passages such as 'He who is made of mind, the guide of the body of breath' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 7); 'There is the ether within the heart, and in it there is the Person, consisting of mind, immortal, golden' (Taitt. Up. I. 6, 1); 'He is conceived by the heart, by wisdom, by the mind. Those who know him are immortal' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 9); 'He is not apprehended by the eye nor by speech, but by a purified mind' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 8); 'The breath of breath' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 183); 'Breath alone is the conscious Self, and having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up' (Kau. Up. III, 3); 'All these beings merge into breath alone, and from breath they arise' (Ch. Up. I, 11, 5)--these and similar texts refer to Brahman as consisting of mind, to be apprehended by a purified mind, having breath for its body, and being the abode and ruler of breath. This being so, we decide that in the concluding passage, 'my Self within the heart, that is Brahman,' the word 'Brahman' has to be taken in its primary sense (and does not denote the individual soul). The text which declares Brahman to be without mind and breath, merely means to deny that the thought of Brahman depends on a mind (internal organ), and that its life depends on breath.

Or else we may interpret the Vedic text and the Sûtra as follows. The passage 'All this is Brahman; let a man meditate with a calm mind on this world as originating, ending, and breathing in Brahman,' conveys the imagination of meditation on Brahman as the Self of all. The subsequent clause 'Let him form the thought,' &c., forms an additional statement to that injunction, the purport of which is to suggest certain attributes of Brahman, such as being made of mind. So that the meaning of the whole section is 'Let a man meditate on Brahman, which is made of mind, has breath for its body, &c., as the Self of the whole world.'--Here a doubt presents itself. Does the term 'Brahman' in this section denote the individual soul or the highest Self?--The individual soul, the Pûrvapakshin maintains, for that only admits of being exhibited in co-ordination with the word 'all.' For the word 'all' denotes the entire world from Brahmâ down to a blade of grass; and the existence of Brahmâ

28497 and other individual beings is determined by special forms of karman,
28498 the root of which is the beginningless Nescience of the individual soul.
28499 The highest Brahman, on the other hand, which is all-knowing, all-
28500 powerful, free from all evil and all shadow of Nescience and similar
28501 imperfections, cannot possibly exist as the 'All' which comprises within
28502 itself everything that is bad. Moreover we find that occasionally the
28503 term 'Brahman' is applied to the individual soul also; just as the
28504 highest Lord (paramesvara) may be called 'the highest Self' (paramâtman)
28505 or 'the highest Brahman.' That 'greatness' (brihattva; which is the
28506 essential characteristic of 'brahman') belongs to the individual soul
28507 when it has freed itself from its limiting conditions, is moreover
28508 attested by scripture: 'That (soul) is fit for infinity' (Svet. Up. V,
28509 9). And as the soul's Nescience is due to karman (only), the text may
28510 very well designate it--as it does by means of the term 'tajjalân'--as
28511 the cause of the origin, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world.
28512 That is to say--the individual soul which, in its essential nature, is
28513 non-limited, and therefore of the nature of Brahman, owing to the
28514 influence of Nescience enters into the state of a god, or a man, or an
28515 animal, or a plant.

28516
28517 This view is rejected by the Sûtra. 'Everywhere,' i.e. in the whole
28518 world which is referred to in the clause 'All this is Brahman' we have
28519 to understand the highest Brahman--which the term 'Brahman' denotes as
28520 the Self of the world--and not the individual soul; 'because there is
28521 taught what is known,' i.e. because the clause 'All this is Brahman'--
28522 for which clause the term 'tajjalân' supplies the reason--refers to
28523 Brahman as something generally known. Since the world springs from
28524 Brahman, is merged in Brahman, and depends on Brahman for its life,
28525 therefore--as the text says--'All this has its Self in Brahman'; and
28526 this shows to us that what the text understands by Brahman is that being
28527 from which, as generally known from the Vedânta texts, there proceed the
28528 creation, and so on, of the world. That the highest Brahman only, all-
28529 wise and supremely blessed, is the cause of the origin, &c., of the
28530 world, is declared in the section which begins. 'That from which these
28531 beings are born,' &c., and which says further on, 'he knew that Bliss is
28532 Brahman, for from bliss these beings are born' (Taitt. Up. III, 6); and
28533 analogously the text 'He is the cause, the lord of lords of the organs,'
28534 &c. (Svet. Up. VI, 9), declares the highest Brahman to be the cause of
28535 the individual soul. Everywhere, in fact, the texts proclaim the
28536 causality of the highest Self only. As thus the world which springs from
28537 Brahman, is merged in it, and breathes through it, has its Self in
28538 Brahman, the identity of the two may properly be asserted; and hence the
28539 text--the meaning of which is 'Let a man meditate with calm mind on the
28540 highest Brahman of which the world is a mode, which has the world for
28541 its body, and which is the Self of the world'--first proves Brahman's
28542 being the universal Self, and then enjoins meditation on it. The highest
28543 Brahman, in its causal condition as well as in its so-called 'effected'
28544 state, constitutes the Self of the world, for in the former it has for
28545 its body all sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle form, and
28546 in the latter the same beings in their gross condition. Nor is there any
28547 contradiction between such identity with the world on Brahman's part,
28548 and the fact that Brahman treasures within itself glorious qualities
28549 antagonistic to all evil; for the imperfections adhering to the bodies,
28550 which are mere modes of Brahman, do not affect Brahman itself to which
28551 the modes belong. Such identity rather proves for Brahman supreme lordly
28552 power, and thus adds to its excellences. Nor, again, can it rightly be
28553 maintained that of the individual soul also identity with the world can
28554 be predicated; for the souls being separate according to the bodies with
28555 which they are joined cannot be identical with each other. Even in the
28556 state of release, when the individual soul is not in any way limited, it
28557 does not possess that identity with the world on which there depends
28558 causality with regard to the world's creation, sustentation, and
28559 reabsorption; as will be declared in Sûtra IV, 4, 17. Nor, finally, does
28560 the Pûrvapakshin improve his case by contending that the individual soul
28561 may be the cause of the creation, &c., of the world because it (viz. the
28562 soul) is due to karman; for although the fact given as reason is true,
28563 all the same the Lord alone is the cause of the Universe.--All this
28564 proves that the being to which the text refers as Brahman is none other
28565 than the highest Self.

This second alternative interpretation of the Sûtra is preferred by most competent persons. The Vrittikâra, e.g. says, 'That Brahman which the clause "All this is Brahman" declares to be the Self of all is the Lord.'

2. And because the qualities meant to be stated are possible (in Brahman).

The qualities about to be stated can belong to the highest Self only. 'Made of mind, having breath for its body,' &c. 'Made of mind' means to be apprehended by a purified mind only. The highest Self can be apprehended only by a mind purified by meditation on that Self, such meditation being assisted by the seven means, viz. abstention, &c. (see above, p. 17). This intimates that the highest Self is of pure goodness, precluding all evil, and therefore different in nature from everything else; for by the impure minded impure objects only can be apprehended.-- 'Having the vital breath for its body' means--being the supporter of all life in the world. To stand in the relation of a body to something else, means to abide in that other thing, to be dependent on it, and to subserve it in a subordinate capacity, as we shall fully show later on. And all 'vital breath' or 'life' stands in that relation to the highest Self. 'Whose form is light'; i.e. who is of supreme splendour, his form being a divine one of supreme excellence peculiar to him, and not consisting of the stuff of Prakriti.--'Whose purposes are true'; i.e. whose purposes realise themselves without any obstruction. 'Who is the (or "of the") Self of ether'; i.e. who is of a delicate and transparent nature, like ether; or who himself is the Self of ether, which is the causal substance of everything else; or who shines forth himself and makes other things shine forth.--'To whom all works belong'; i.e. he of whom the whole world is the work; or he to whom all activities belong.-- 'To whom all wishes belong'; i.e. he to whom all pure objects and means of desire and enjoyment belong. 'He to whom all odours and tastes belong'; i.e. he to whom there belong, as objects of enjoyment, all kinds of uncommon, special, perfect, supremely excellent odours and tastes; ordinary smells and tastes being negatived by another text, viz. 'That which is without sound, without touch, without taste,' &c. (Ka. Up. I, 3, 15).--'He who embraces all this'; i.e. he who makes his own the whole group of glorious qualities enumerated.--'He who does not speak,' because, being in possession of all he could desire, he 'has no regard for anything'; i.e. he who, in full possession of lordly power, esteems this whole world with all its creatures no higher than a blade of grass, and hence abides in silence.--All these qualities stated in the text can belong to the highest Self only.

3. But, on account of impossibility, not the embodied soul.

Those who fully consider this infinite multitude of exalted qualities will recognise that not even a shadow of them can belong to the individual soul--whether in the state of bondage or that of release--which is a thing as insignificant as a glow-worm and, through its connexion with a body, liable to the attacks of endless suffering. It is not possible therefore to hold that the section under discussion should refer to the individual soul.

4. And because there is (separate) denotation of the object and the agent.

The clause 'When I shall have departed from hence I shall obtain him' denotes the highest Brahman as the object to be obtained, and the individual soul as that which obtains it. This shows that the soul which

28635 obtains is the person meditating, and the highest Brahman that is to be
28636 obtained, the object of meditation: Brahman, therefore, is something
28637 different from the attaining soul.

28642 5. On account of the difference of words.

28644 The clause 'That is the Self of me, within the heart' designates the
28645 embodied soul by means of a genitive form, while the object of
28646 meditation is exhibited in the nominative case. Similarly, a text of the
28647 Vâjasaneyins, which treats of the same topic, applies different terms to
28648 the embodied and the highest Self, 'Like a rice grain, or a barley grain,
28649 or a canary seed, or the kernel of a canary seed, thus that golden
28650 Person is within the Self' (Sat. Br. X, 6, 3, 2). Here the locative form,
28651 'within the Self,' denotes the embodied Self, and the nominative, 'that
28652 golden Person,' the object to be meditated on.--All this proves the
28653 highest Self to be the object of meditation.

28658 6. And on account of Smriti.

28660 'I dwell within the hearts of all, from me come memory and knowledge, as
28661 well as their loss'; 'He who free from delusion knows me to be the
28662 highest Person'; 'The Lord, O Arjuna, is seated in the heart of all
28663 Beings, driving round by his mysterious power all beings as if mounted
28664 on a machine; to him fly for refuge' (Bha. Gi. XV, 15, 19; XVIII, 61).
28665 These Smriti-texts show the embodied soul to be the meditating subject,
28666 and the highest Self the object of meditation.

28671 7. Should it be said that (the passage does) not (refer to Brahman) on
28672 account of the smallness of the abode, and on account of the denotation
28673 of that (viz. minuteness of the being meditated on); we say no, because
28674 (Brahman) has thus to be meditated upon, and because (in the same
28675 passage) it is said to be like ether.

28677 It might be contended that, as the text 'he is my Self within the heart'
28678 declares the being meditated on to dwell within a minute abode, viz. the
28679 heart; and as moreover another text--'smaller than a grain of rice,' &c.,
28680 declares it to be itself of minute size, that being cannot be the
28681 highest Self, but only the embodied soul. For other passages speak of
28682 the highest Self as unlimited, and of the embodied soul as having the
28683 size of the point of a goad (cp. e.g. Mu. Up. I, 1, 6, and Svet. Up. V,
28684 8).--This objection the Sûtra rebuts by declaring that the highest Self
28685 is spoken of as such, i.e. minute, on account of its having to be
28686 meditated upon as such. Such minuteness does not, however, belong to its
28687 true nature; for in the same section it is distinctly declared to be
28688 infinite like ether--'greater than the earth, greater than the sky,
28689 greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 3).
28690 This shows that the designation of the highest Self as minute is for the
28691 purpose of meditation only.--The connexion of the whole section then is
28692 as follows. The clause 'All this is Brahman; let a man meditate with
28693 calm mind on this world as beginning, ending, and breathing in Brahman,'
28694 enjoins meditation on Brahman as being the Self of all, in so far as it
28695 is the cause of the origin and destruction of all, and entering into all
28696 beings as their soul gives life to them. The next clause, 'Man is made
28697 of thought; according as his thought is in this world, so will he be
28698 when he has departed this life,' declares the attainment of the desired
28699 object to depend on the nature of the meditation; and the following
28700 clause, 'Let him therefore form the following thought,' thereupon
28701 repeats the injunction with a view to the declaration of details. The
28702 clause 'He who consists of mind,' &c., up to 'who is never surprised,'
28703 then states the nature and qualities, of the being to be meditated upon,

which are to be comprised in the meditation. Next, the clause 'He is my Self,' up to 'the kernel of a canary seed,' declares that the highest Person, for the purpose of meditation, abides in the heart of the meditating devotee; representing it as being itself minute, since the heart is minute. After this the clause 'He also is my Self,' up to 'who is never surprised,' describes those aspects of the being meditated upon as within the heart, which are to be attained by the devotee. Next, the words 'this my Self within the heart is that Brahman' enjoins the reflection that the highest Brahman, as described before, is, owing to its supreme kindness, present in our hearts in order thereby to refresh and inspirit us. Then the clause 'When I shall have departed from hence I shall obtain him' suggests the idea that there is a certainty of obtaining him on the basis of devout meditation; and finally the clause 'He who has this faith has no doubt' declares that the devotee who is firmly convinced of his aim being attainable in the way described, will attain it beyond any doubt.--From all this it appears that the 'limitation of abode,' and the 'minuteness' ascribed to Brahman, are merely for the purpose of meditation.

8. Should it be said that there is attainment of fruition (of pleasure and pain); we reply, not so, on account of difference.

But, if the highest Brahman is assumed to dwell within bodies, like the individual soul, it follows that, like the latter, it is subject to the experience of pleasure and pain, such experience springing from connexion with bodies!--Of this objection the Sûtra disposes by remarking 'not so, on account of difference (of reason).' For what is the cause of experiences, pleasurable or painful, is not the mere dwelling within a body, but rather the subjection to the influence of good and evil deeds; and such subjection is impossible in the case of the highest Self to which all evil is foreign. Compare the scriptural text 'One of the two eats the sweet fruit, the other one looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1).--Here finishes the adhikarana of 'what is known everywhere.'

Well then, if the highest Self is not an enjoyer, we must conclude that wherever fruition is referred to, the embodied soul only is meant!--Of this view the next adhikarana disposes.

9. The eater (is the highest Self) on account of there being taken all that is movable and immovable.

We read in the Kathavallî (I, 3, 25), 'Who then knows where he is to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food, and death itself a condiment?' A doubt here arises whether the 'eater', suggested by the words 'food' and 'condiment,' is the individual soul or the highest Self.--The individual soul, the Pûrvapakshin maintains; for all enjoyment presupposes works, and works belong to the individual soul only.--Of this view the Sûtra disposes. The 'eater' can be the highest Self only, because the taking, i. e. eating, of the whole aggregate of movable and immovable things can be predicated of that Self only. 'Eating' does not here mean fruition dependent on work, but rather the act of reabsorption of the world on the part of the highest Brahman, i. e. Vishnu, who is the cause of the origination, subsistence, and final destruction of the universe. This appears from the fact that Vishnu is mentioned in the same section, 'He reaches the end of his journey, and that is the highest place of Vishnu' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 9). Moreover the clause 'to whom death is a condiment' shows that by the Brahmans and Kshattriyas, mentioned in the text, we have to understand the whole universe of moving and non-moving things, viewed as things to be consumed by the highest Self. For a condiment is a thing which, while itself being eaten, causes other things to be eaten; the meaning of the passage, therefore, is that while death itself is consumed, being a condiment as it were,

28773 there is at the same time eaten whatever is flavoured or made palatable
28774 by death, and that is the entire world of beings in which the Brahmans
28775 and Kshattriyas hold the foremost place. Now such eating of course is
28776 destruction or reabsorption, and hence such enjoyment--meaning general
28777 reabsorption--can belong to the highest Self only.

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28782 10. And on account of the topic of the whole section.

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28784 Moreover the highest Brahman constitutes the topic of the entire section.
28785 Cp. 'The wise who knows the Self as great and omnipresent does not
28786 grieve' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 22); 'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda, nor
28787 by understanding, nor by much learning. He whom the Self chooses, by him
28788 the Self can be gained; the Self chooses him as his own' (I, 2, 23).--
28789 Moreover, the clause (forming part of the text under discussion), 'Who
28790 knows him (i.e. the being which constitutes the topic of the section)
28791 where he is?' clearly shows that we have to recognise here the Self of
28792 which it had previously been said that it is hard to know unless it
28793 assists us with its grace.

28794

28795 To this conclusion a new objection presents itself.--Further on in the
28796 same Upanishad (I, 3, 1) we meet with the following text: 'There are two,
28797 drinking their reward in the world of their own works, entered into the
28798 cave, dwelling on the highest summit; those who know Brahman call them
28799 shade and light, likewise those householders who perform the Trinakiketa-
28800 sacrifice.' Now this text clearly refers to the individual soul which
28801 enjoys the reward of its works, together with an associate coupled to it.
28802 And this associate is either the vital breath, or the organ of knowledge
28803 (buddhi). For the drinking of 'rita' is the enjoyment of the fruit of
28804 works, and such enjoyment does not suit the highest Self. The buddhi, or
28805 the vital breath, on the other hand, which are instruments of the
28806 enjoying embodied soul, may somehow be brought into connexion with the
28807 enjoyment of the fruit of works. As the text is thus seen to refer to
28808 the embodied soul coupled with some associate, we infer, on the ground
28809 of the two texts belonging to one section, that also the 'eater'
28810 described in the former text is none other than the individual soul.--To
28811 this objection the next Sûtra replies.

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28816 11. The 'two entered into the cave' are the two Selfs; on account of
28817 this being seen.

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28819 The two, entered into the cave and drinking their reward, are neither
28820 the embodied soul together with the vital breath, nor the embodied soul
28821 together with the buddhi; it is rather the embodied Self and the highest
28822 Self which are designated by those terms. For this is seen, i.e. it is
28823 seen that in that section the individual Self and the highest Self only
28824 are spoken of as entered into the cave. To the highest Self there refers
28825 I, 2, 12, 'The wise who by meditation on his Self recognises the Ancient
28826 who is difficult to see, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in
28827 the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and
28828 sorrow far behind.' And to the individual soul there refers I, 4, 7,
28829 'Who is together with the vital breath, who is Aditi, who is made of the
28830 deities, who entering into the cave abides therein, who was born
28831 variously through the elements.' Aditi here means the individual soul
28832 which enjoys (atti) the fruits of its works; which is associated with
28833 the vital breath; which is made of the deities, i.e. whose enjoyment is
28834 dependent on the different sense-organs; which abides in the hollow of
28835 the heart; and which, being connected with the elementary substances,
28836 earth, and so on, is born in various forms--human, divine, &c.--That the
28837 text speaks of the two Selfs as drinking their reward (while actually
28838 the individual soul only does so) is to be understood in the same way as
28839 the phrase 'there go the umbrella-bearers' (one of whom only carries the
28840 umbrella). Or else we may account for this on the ground that both are
28841 agents with regard to the drinking, in so far as the 'drinking'

28842 individual soul is caused to drink by the highest Self.

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28847 12. And on account of distinctive qualities.

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28849 Everywhere in that section we meet with statements of distinctive
28850 attributes of the two Selves, the highest Self being represented as the
28851 object of meditation and attainment, and the individual Self as the
28852 meditating and attaining subject. The passage 'When he has known and
28853 understood that which is born from Brahman, the intelligent, to be
28854 divine and venerable, then he obtains everlasting peace' (I, 1, 17)
28855 refers to the meditating individual soul which recognises itself as
28856 being of the nature of Brahman. On the other hand, I, 3, 2, 'That which
28857 is a bridge for sacrificers, the highest imperishable Brahman for those
28858 who wish to cross over to the fearless shore, the Nâkiketa, may we be
28859 able to know that,' refers to the highest Self as the object of
28860 meditation; 'Nâkiketa' here meaning that which is to be reached through
28861 the Nâkiketa-rite. Again, the passage 'Know the Self to be sitting in
28862 the chariot and the body to be the chariot' (I, 3, 3) refers to the
28863 meditating individual soul; and the verse, I, 3, 9, 'But he who has
28864 understanding for his charioteer, and holds the reins of the mind, he
28865 reaches the end of his journey, and that is the highest place of Vishnu.'
28866 refers to the embodied and the highest Selves as that which attains and
28867 that which is to be attained. And in the text under discussion also (I,
28868 3, 1), the two Selves are distinctly designated as light and shade, the
28869 one being all-knowing, the other devoid of knowledge.

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28871 But, a new objection is raised, the initial passage, I, 1, 20, 'That
28872 doubt which there is when a man is dead--some saying, he is; others, he
28873 is not,' clearly asks a question as to the true nature of the individual
28874 soul, and we hence conclude that that soul forms the topic of the whole
28875 chapter.--Not so, we reply. That question does not spring from any doubt
28876 as to the existence or non-existence of the soul apart from the body;
28877 for if this were so the two first boons chosen by Nâkiketas would be
28878 unsuitable. For the story runs as follows: When the sacrifice offered by
28879 the father of Nâkiketas--at which all the possessions of the sacrificer
28880 were to be given to the priests--is drawing towards its close, the boy,
28881 feeling afraid that some deficiency on the part of the gifts might
28882 render the sacrifice unavailing, and dutifully wishing to render his
28883 father's sacrifice complete by giving his own person also, repeatedly
28884 asks his father, 'And to whom will you give me'? The father, irritated
28885 by the boy's persistent questioning, gives an angry reply, and in
28886 consequence of this the boy goes to the palace of Yama, and Yama being
28887 absent, stays there for three days without eating. Yama on his return is
28888 alarmed at this neglect of hospitality, and wishing to make up for it
28889 allows him to choose three boons. Nâkiketas, thereupon, full of faith
28890 and piety, chooses as his first boon that his father should forgive him.
28891 Now it is clear that conduct of this kind would not be possible in the
28892 case of one not convinced of the soul having an existence independent of
28893 the body. For his second boon, again, he chooses the knowledge of a
28894 sacrificial fire, which has a result to be experienced only by a soul
28895 that has departed from the body; and this choice also can clearly be
28896 made only by one who knows that the soul is something different from the
28897 body. When, therefore, he chooses for his third boon the clearing up of
28898 his doubt as to the existence of the soul after death (as stated in v.
28899 20), it is evident that his question is prompted by the desire to
28900 acquire knowledge of the true nature of the highest Self--which
28901 knowledge has the form of meditation on the highest Self--, and by means
28902 thereof, knowledge of the true nature of final Release which consists in
28903 obtaining the highest Brahman. The passage, therefore, is not concerned
28904 merely with the problem as to the separation of the soul from the body,
28905 but rather with the problem of the Self freeing itself from all bondage
28906 whatever--the same problem, in fact, with which another scriptural
28907 passage also is concerned, viz. 'When he has departed there is no more
28908 knowledge' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 12). The full purport of Nâkiketas' question,
28909 therefore, is as follows: When a man qualified for Release has died and
28910 thus freed himself from all bondage, there arises a doubt as to his

28911 existence or non-existence--a doubt due to the disagreement of
28912 philosophers as to the true nature of Release; in order to clear up this
28913 doubt I wish to learn from thee the true nature of the state of Release.--
28914 Philosophers, indeed, hold many widely differing opinions as to what
28915 constitutes Release. Some hold that the Self is constituted by
28916 consciousness only, and that Release consists in the total destruction
28917 of this essential nature of the Self. Others, while holding the same
28918 opinion as to the nature of the Self, define Release as the passing away
28919 of Nescience (avidyâ). Others hold that the Self is in itself non-
28920 sentient, like a stone, but possesses, in the state of bondage, certain
28921 distinctive qualities, such as knowledge, and so on. Release then
28922 consists in the total removal of all these qualities, the Self remaining
28923 in a state of pure isolation (kaivalya). Others, again, who acknowledge
28924 a highest Self free from all imperfection, maintain that through
28925 connexion with limiting adjuncts that Self enters on the condition of an
28926 individual soul; Release then means the pure existence of the highest
28927 Self, consequent on the passing away of the limiting adjuncts. Those,
28928 however, who understand the Vedânta, teach as follows: There is a
28929 highest Brahman which is the sole cause of the entire universe, which is
28930 antagonistic to all evil, whose essential nature is infinite knowledge
28931 and blessedness, which comprises within itself numberless auspicious
28932 qualities of supreme excellence, which is different in nature from all
28933 other beings, and which constitutes the inner Self of all. Of this
28934 Brahman, the individual souls--whose true nature is unlimited knowledge,
28935 and whose only essential attribute is the intuition of the supreme Self--
28936 are modes, in so far, namely, as they constitute its body. The true
28937 nature of these souls is, however, obscured by Nescience, i.e. the
28938 influence of the beginningless chain of works; and by Release then we
28939 have to understand that intuition of the highest Self, which is the
28940 natural state of the individual souls, and which follows on the
28941 destruction of Nescience.--When Nâkiketâs desires Yama graciously to
28942 teach him the true nature of Release and the means to attain it, Yama at
28943 first tests him by dwelling on the difficulty of comprehending Release,
28944 and by tempting him with various worldly enjoyments. But having in this
28945 way recognised the boy's thorough fitness, he in the end instructs him
28946 as to the kind of meditation on the highest Self which constitutes
28947 knowledge of the highest Reality, as to the nature of Release--which
28948 consists in reaching the abode of the highest Self--, and as to all the
28949 required details. This instruction begins, I, 2, 12, 'The Ancient one
28950 who is difficult to see,' &c., and extends up to I, 3, 9. 'and that is
28951 the highest place of Vishnu.'--It thus is an established conclusion that
28952 the 'eater' is no other than the highest Self.--Here terminates the
28953 adhikarana of 'the eater.'

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28958 13. (The Person) within the eye (is the highest Self) on account of
28959 suitability.

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28961 The Chandogâs have the following text: 'The Person that is seen within
28962 the eye, that is the Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this is
28963 Brahman' (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 1). The doubt here arises whether the person
28964 that is here spoken of as abiding within the eye is the reflected Self,
28965 or some divine being presiding over the sense of sight, or the embodied
28966 Self, or the highest Self.--It is the reflected Self, the Pûrvapakshin
28967 maintains; for the text refers to the person seen as something well
28968 known, and the expression, 'is seen,' clearly refers to something
28969 directly perceived. Or it may be the individual soul, for that also may
28970 be referred to as something well known, as it is in special connexion
28971 with the eye: people, by looking into the open eye of a person,
28972 determine whether the living soul remains in him or is departing. Or
28973 else we may assume that the Person seen within the eye is some
28974 particular divine being, on the strength of the scriptural text, Bri. Up.
28975 V, 5, 2, 'He (the person seen within the sun) rests with his rays in him
28976 (the person within the eye).' Any of these beings may quite suitably be
28977 referred to as something well known.--Of these alternatives the Sûtra
28978 disposes by declaring that the Person within the eye is the highest Self.
28979 For the text goes on to say about the Person seen within the eye, 'They

28980 call him Samyadvâma, for all blessings go towards him. He is also Vâmanî,
28981 for he leads all blessings. He is also Bhâmanî, for he shines in all
28982 worlds.' And all these attributes can be reconciled with the highest
28983 Self only.

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28988 14. And on account of the statement as to abode, and so on.

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28990 Abiding within the eye, ruling the eye, and so on are predicated by
28991 scripture of the highest Self only, viz. in Bri. Up. III, 7, 18, 'He who
28992 dwells within the eye, who rules the eye within.' We therefore recognise
28993 that highest Self in the text, 'That Person which is seen within the eye.'
28994 The argument founded on reference to 'something well known' thus suits
28995 the highest Self very well; and also the clause which denotes immediate
28996 perception ('is seen') appears quite suitable, since the highest Self is
28997 directly intuited by persons practising mystic concentration of mind
28998 (Yoga).

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29003 15. And on account of the text referring only to what is characterised
29004 by pleasure.

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29006 The Person abiding within the eye is the highest Person, for the
29007 following reason also. The topic of the whole section is Brahman
29008 characterised by delight, as indicated in the passage 'Ka (pleasure) is
29009 Brahman, Kha (ether) is Brahman' (Ch. Up. IV, 10, 5). To that same Brahman
29010 the passage under discussion ('The Person that is seen in the eye')
29011 refers for the purpose of enjoining first a place with which Brahman is
29012 to be connected in meditation, and secondly some special qualities--such
29013 as comprising and leading all blessings--to be attributed to Brahman in
29014 meditation.--The word 'only' in the Sûtra indicates the independence of
29015 the argument set forth.

29016

29017 But--an objection is raised--between the Brahman introduced in the
29018 passage 'Ka is Brahman,' &c., and the text under discussion there
29019 intervenes the vidyâ of the Fires (Ch. Up. IV, 11-13), and hence Brahman
29020 does not readily connect itself with our passage. For the text says that
29021 after the Fires had taught Upakosala the knowledge of Brahman ('Breath
29022 is Brahman, Ka is Brahman,' &c.), they taught him a meditation on
29023 themselves ('After that the Gârhapatya fire taught him,' &c., Ch. Up.
29024 IV, 11, 1). And this knowledge of the Fires cannot be considered a mere
29025 subordinate part of the knowledge of Brahman, for the text declares that
29026 it has special fruits of its own--viz. the attainment of a ripe old age
29027 and prosperous descendants, &c.--which are not comprised in the results
29028 of the knowledge of Brahman, but rather opposed to them in nature.--To
29029 this we make the following reply. As both passages (viz. IV, 10, 5,
29030 'Breath is Brahman,' &c.; and IV, 15, 1, 'this is Brahman') contain the
29031 word Brahman, and as from the words of the Fires, 'the teacher will tell
29032 you the way,' it follows that the knowledge of Brahman is not complete
29033 before that way has been taught, we determine that the knowledge of the
29034 Fires which stands between the two sections of the knowledge of Brahman
29035 is a mere subordinate member of the latter. This also appears from the
29036 fact that the Gârhapatya fire begins to instruct Upakosala only after he
29037 has been introduced into the knowledge of Brahman. Upakosala moreover
29038 complains that he is full of sorrows (I, 10, 3), and thus shows himself
29039 to be conscious of all the sufferings incidental to human life--birth,
29040 old age, death, &c.--which result from man being troubled by manifold
29041 desires for objects other than the attainment of Brahman; when therefore
29042 the Fires conclude their instruction by combining in saying, 'This, O
29043 friend, is the knowledge of us and the knowledge of the Self which we
29044 impart to thee,' it is evident that the vidyâ of the Fires has to be
29045 taken as a subordinate member of the knowledge of the Self whose only
29046 fruit is Release. And from this it follows that the statement of the
29047 results of the Agnividya has to be taken (not as an injunction of
29048 results-phalavidhi--but) merely as an arthavâda (cp. Pû. Mî. Sû. IV, 3,

1). It, moreover, is by no means true that the text mentions such fruits of the Agnividya as would be opposed to final Release; all the fruits mentioned suit very well the case of a person qualified for Release. 'He destroys sin' (Ch. Up. IV, 11, 2; 12, 2; 13, 2), i.e. he destroys all evil works standing in the way of the attainment of Brahman. 'He obtains the world,' i.e. all impeding evil works having been destroyed he obtains the world of Brahman. 'He reaches his full age,' i.e. he fully reaches that age which is required for the completion of meditation on Brahman. 'He lives long,' i.e. he lives unassailed by afflictions until he reaches Brahman. 'His descendants do not perish,' i.e. his pupils, and their pupils, as well as his sons, grandsons, &c., do not perish; i.e. they are all knowers of Brahman, in agreement with what another text declares to be the reward of knowledge of Brahman--'In his family no one is born ignorant of Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). 'We guard him in this world and the other,' i.e. we Fires guard him from all troubles until he reaches Brahman.--The Agnividya thus being a member of the Brahavidya, there is no reason why the Brahman introduced in the earlier part of the Brahavidya should not be connected with the latter part--the function of this latter part being to enjoin a place of meditation (Brahman being meditated on as the Person within the eye), and some special qualities of Brahman to be included in the meditation.--But (an objection is raised) as the Fires tell Upakosala 'the teacher will tell you the way,' we conclude that the teacher has to give information as to the way to Brahman only; how then can his teaching refer to the place of meditation and the special qualities of Brahman?--We have to consider, we reply, in what connexion the Fires address those words to Upakosala. His teacher having gone on a journey without having imparted to him the knowledge of Brahman, and Upakosala being dejected on that account, the sacred fires of his teacher, well pleased with the way in which Upakosala had tended them, and wishing to cheer him up, impart to him the general knowledge of the nature of Brahman and the subsidiary knowledge of the Fires. But remembering that, as scripture says, 'the knowledge acquired from a teacher is best,' and hence considering it advisable that the teacher himself should instruct Upakosala as to the attributes of the highest Brahman, the place with which it is to be connected in meditation and the way leading to it, they tell him 'the teacher will tell you the way,' the 'way' connoting everything that remains to be taught by the teacher. In agreement herewith the teacher--having first said, 'I will tell you this; and as water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil clings to one who knows it'--instructs him about Brahman as possessing certain auspicious attributes, and to be meditated upon as abiding within the eye, and about the way leading to Brahman.--It is thus a settled conclusion that the text under discussion refers to that Brahman which was introduced in the passage 'Ka is Brahman,' and that hence the Person abiding within the eye is the highest Self.

But--an objection is raised--how do you know that the passage 'Ka (pleasure) is Brahman, Kha (ether) is Brahman' really refers to the highest Brahman, so as to be able to interpret on that basis the text about the Person within the eye? It is a more obvious interpretation to take the passage about Ka and Kha as enjoining a meditation on Brahman viewed under the form of elemental ether and of ordinary worldly pleasure. This interpretation would, moreover, be in agreement with other similarly worded texts (which are generally understood to enjoin meditation on Brahman in a definite form), such as 'Name is Brahman', 'Mind is Brahman.'

16. For that very reason that (ether) is Brahman.

Because the clause 'What is Ka the same is Kha' speaks of ether as characterised by pleasure, the ether which is denoted by 'Kha' is no other than the highest Brahman. To explain. On the Fires declaring 'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' Upakosala says, 'I understand that breath is Brahman, but I do not understand Ka and Kha.' The meaning of this is as follows. The Fires cannot speak of meditation on Brahman under the form of breath and so on, because they are engaged

in giving instruction to me, who am afraid of birth, old age, death, &c., and desirous of final Release. What they declare to me therefore is meditation on Brahman itself. Now here Brahman is exhibited in co-ordination with certain well-known things, breath and so on. That Brahman should be qualified by co-ordination with breath is suitable, either from the point of view of Brahman having the attribute of supporting the world, or on account of Brahman being the ruler of breath, which stands to it in the relation of a body. Hence Upakosala says, 'I understand that breath is Brahman.' With regard to pleasure and ether, on the other hand, there arises the question whether they are exhibited in the relation of qualifying attributes of Brahman on the ground of their forming the body of Brahman, and hence being ruled by it, or whether the two terms are meant to determine each other, and thus to convey a notion of the true nature of Brahman being constituted by supreme delight. On the former alternative the declaration of the Fires would only state that Brahman is the ruler of the elemental ether and of all delight depending on the sense-organs, and this would give no notion of Brahman's true nature; on the latter alternative the Fires would declare that unlimited delight constitutes Brahman's true nature. In order to ascertain which of the two meanings has to be taken, Upakosala therefore says, 'I do not understand Ka and Kha.' The Fires, comprehending what is in his mind, thereupon reply, 'What is Ka the same is Kha, what is Kha the same is Ka,' which means that the bliss which constitutes Brahman's nature is unlimited. The same Brahman therefore which has breath for its attribute because breath constitutes its body, is of the nature of unlimited bliss; the text therefore adds, 'They taught him that (viz. Brahman) as breath and as ether.' What the text, 'Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' teaches thus is Brahman as consisting of unlimited bliss, and this Brahman is resumed in the subsequent text about the Person seen within the eye. That Person therefore is the highest Self.

17. And on account of the statement of the way of him who has heard the Upanishads.

Other scriptural texts give an account of the way--the first station of which is light--that leads up to the highest Person, without any subsequent return, the soul of him who has read the Upanishads, and has thus acquired a knowledge of the true nature of the highest Self. Now this same way is described by the teacher to Upakosala in connexion with the instruction as to the Person in the eye, 'They go to light, from light to day,' &c. This also proves that the Person within the eye is the highest Self.

18. Not any other, on account of non-permanency of abode, and of impossibility.

As the reflected Self and the other Selfs mentioned by the Pûrvapakshin do not necessarily abide within the eye, and as conditionless immortality and the other qualities (ascribed in the text to the Person within the eye) cannot possibly belong to them, the Person within the eye cannot be any Self other than the highest Self. Of the reflected Self it cannot be said that it permanently abides within the eye, for its presence there depends on the nearness to the eye of another person. The embodied Self again has its seat within the heart, which is the root of all sense-organs, so as to assist thereby the activities of the different senses; it cannot therefore abide within the eye. And with regard to the divinity the text says that 'he rests with his rays in him, i.e. the eye': this implies that the divine being may preside over the organ of sight although itself abiding in another place; it does not therefore abide in the eye. Moreover, non-conditioned immortality and similar qualities cannot belong to any of these three Selfs. The Person seen within the eye therefore is the highest Self.

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29188 We have, under Sû. I, 2, 14, assumed as proved that the abiding within
29189 the eye and ruling the eye, which is referred to in Bri. Up. III, 7, 18
29190 ('He who dwells in the eye,' &c.), can belong to the highest Self only,
29191 and have on that basis proved that the Self within the eye is the
29192 highest Self.--Here terminates the adhikarana of that 'within.'--The
29193 next Sûtra now proceeds to prove that assumption.
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29198 19. The internal Ruler (referred to) in the clauses with respect to the
29199 gods, with respect to the worlds, &c. (is the highest Self), because the
29200 attributes of that are designated.
29201

29202 The Vâjasaneyins, of the Kânva as well as the Mâdhyandina branch, have
29203 the following text: 'He who dwelling in the earth is within the earth,
29204 whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the
29205 earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the Immortal.' The text
29206 thereupon extends this teaching as to a being that dwells in things, is
29207 within them, is not known by them, has them for its body and rules them;
29208 in the first place to all divine beings, viz. water, fire, sky, air, sun,
29209 the regions, moon, stars, ether, darkness, light; and next to all
29210 material beings, viz. breath, speech, eye, ear, mind, skin, knowledge,
29211 seed--closing each section with the words, 'He is thy Self, the ruler
29212 within, the Immortal.' The Mâdhyandinas, however, have three additional
29213 sections, viz. 'He who dwells in all worlds,' &c.; 'he who dwells in all
29214 Vedas,' &c.; 'He who dwells in all sacrifices'; and, moreover, in place
29215 of 'He who dwells in knowledge' (vijñāna) they read 'He who dwells in
29216 the Self.'--A doubt here arises whether the inward Ruler of these texts
29217 be the individual Self or the highest Self.
29218

29219 The individual Self, the Pûrvapakshin maintains. For in the
29220 supplementary passage (which follows upon the text considered so far)
29221 the internal Ruler is called the 'seer' and 'hearer,' i.e. his knowledge
29222 is said to depend on the sense-organs, and this implies the view that
29223 the 'seer' only (i.e. the individual soul only) is the inward Ruler; and
29224 further the clause 'There is no other seer but he' negatives any other
29225 seer.
29226

29227 This view is set aside by the Sûtra. The Ruler within, who is spoken of
29228 in the clauses marked in the text by the terms 'with respect of the gods,'
29229 'with respect of the worlds,' &c., is the highest Self free from all
29230 evil, Nârâyana. The Sûtra purposely joins the two terms 'with respect to
29231 the gods' and 'with respect to the worlds' in order to intimate that, in
29232 addition to the clauses referring to the gods and beings (bhûta)
29233 exhibited by the Kânva-text, the Mâdhyandina-text contains additional
29234 clauses referring to the worlds, Vedas, &c. The inward Ruler spoken of
29235 in both these sets of passages is the highest Self; for attributes of
29236 that Self are declared in the text. For it is a clear attribute of the
29237 highest Self that being one only it rules all worlds, all Vedas, all
29238 divine beings, and so on. Uddâkalaka asks, 'Dost thou know that Ruler
29239 within who within rules this world and the other world and all beings?
29240 &c.--tell now that Ruler within'; and Yâjñavalkya replies with the long
29241 passus, 'He who dwells in the earth,' &c., describing the Ruler within
29242 as him who, abiding within all worlds, all beings, all divinities, all
29243 Vedas, and all sacrifices, rules them from within and constitutes their
29244 Self, they in turn constituting his body. Now this is a position which
29245 can belong to none else but the highest Person, who is all-knowing, and
29246 all whose purposes immediately realise themselves. That it is the
29247 highest Self only which rules over all and is the Self of all, other
29248 Upanishad-texts also declare; cp. e.g. 'Entered within, the ruler of
29249 creatures, the Self of all'; 'Having sent forth this he entered into it.
29250 Having entered it he became sat and tyat,' &c. (Taitt. Up. II, 6).
29251 Similarly the text from the Subâla-Up., which begins, 'there was not
29252 anything here in the beginning,' and extends up to 'the one God,
29253 Nârâyana,' shows that it is the highest Brahman only which rules all, is
29254 the Self of all, and has all beings for its body. Moreover, essential
29255 immortality (which the text ascribes to the Ruler within) is an

attribute of the highest Self only.--Nor must it be thought that the power of seeing and so on that belongs to the highest Self is dependent on sense-organs; it rather results immediately from its essential nature, since its omniscience and power to realise its purposes are due to its own being only. In agreement herewith scripture says, 'He sees without eyes, he hears without ears, without hands and feet he grasps and hastes' (Svet. Up. III, 19). What terms such as 'seeing' and 'hearing' really denote is not knowledge in so far as produced by the eye and ear, but the intuitive presentation of colour and sound. In the case of the individual soul, whose essentially intelligising nature is obscured by karman, such intuitive knowledge arises only through the mediation of the sense-organs; in the case of the highest Self, on the other hand, it springs from its own nature.--Again, the clause 'there is no other seer but he' means that there is no seer other than the seer and ruler described in the preceding clauses. To explain. The clauses 'whom the earth does not know,' &c., up to 'whom the Self does not know' mean to say that the Ruler within rules without being perceived by the earth, Self, and the other beings which he rules. This is confirmed by the subsequent clauses, 'unseen but a seer', 'unheard but a hearer,' &c. And the next clauses, 'there is no other seer but he,' &c., then mean to negative that there is any other being which could be viewed as the ruler of that Ruler. Moreover, the clauses 'that is the Self of thee,' 'He is the Self of thee' exhibit the individual Self in the genitive form ('of thee'), and thus distinguish it from the Ruler within, who is declared to be their Self.

20. And not that which Smṛiti assumes, on account of the declaration of qualities not belonging to that; nor the embodied one.

'That which Smṛiti assumes' is the Pradhâna; the 'embodied one' is the individual soul. Neither of these can be the Ruler within, since the text states attributes which cannot possibly belong to either. For there is not even the shadow of a possibility that essential capability of seeing and ruling all things, and being the Self of all, and immortality should belong either to the non-sentient Pradhâna or to the individual soul.--The last two Sûtras have declared that the mentioned qualities belong to the highest Self, while they do not belong to the individual soul. The next Sûtra supplies a new, independent argument.

21. For both also speak of it as something different.

Both, i.e. the Mādhyandinas as well as the Kânvas, distinguish in their texts the embodied soul, together with speech and other non-intelligent things, from the Ruler within, representing it as an object of his rule. The Mādhyandinas read, 'He who dwells in the Self, whom the Self does not know,' &c.; the Kânvas, 'He who dwells within understanding', &c. The declaration of the individual Self being ruled by the Ruler within implies of course the declaration of the former being different from the latter.

The conclusion from all this is that the Ruler within is a being different from the individual soul, viz. the highest Self free from all evil, Nârâyana.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the internal Ruler'.

22. That which possesses the qualities of invisibility, &c., on account of the declaration of attributes.

The Âtharvanikas read in their text, 'The higher knowledge is that by which that Indestructible is apprehended. That which is invisible, unseizable, without origin and qualities, &c., that it is which the wise

29325 regard as the source of all beings'; and further on, 'That which is
29326 higher than the high Imperishable' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5, 6; II, 1, 2). The
29327 doubt here arises whether the Indestructible, possessing the qualities
29328 of imperceptibility, &c., and that which is higher than the
29329 Indestructible, should be taken to denote the Pradhâna and the soul of
29330 the Sâmkhyas, or whether both denote the highest Self.--The Pûrvapakshin
29331 maintains the former alternative. For, he says, while in the text last
29332 discussed there is mentioned a special attribute of an intelligent being,
29333 viz. in the clause 'unseen but a seer', no similar attribute is stated
29334 in the former of the two texts under discussion, and the latter text
29335 clearly describes the collective individual soul, which is higher than
29336 the imperishable Pradhâna, which itself is higher than all its effects.
29337 The reasons for this decision are as follows:--Colour and so on reside
29338 in the gross forms of non-intelligent matter, viz. the elements, earth,
29339 and so on. When, therefore, visibility and so on are expressly negated,
29340 such negation suggests a non-sentient thing cognate to earth, &c., but
29341 of a subtle kind, and such a thing is no other than the Pradhâna. And as
29342 something higher than this Pradhâna there are known the collective souls
29343 only, under whose guidance the Pradhâna gives birth to all its effects,
29344 from the so-called Mahat downwards to individual things. This
29345 interpretation is confirmed by the comparisons set forth in the next
29346 sloka, 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its threads, as plants
29347 spring from the earth, as hair grows on the head and body of the living
29348 man, thus does everything arise here from the Indestructible.' The
29349 section therefore is concerned only with the Pradhâna and the individual
29350 soul.

29351
29352 This primâ facie view is set aside by the Sûtra. That which possesses
29353 invisibility and the other qualities stated in the text, and that which
29354 is higher than the high Indestructible, is no other than the highest
29355 Self. For the text declares attributes which belong to the highest Self
29356 only, viz. in I, 1, 9, 'He who knows all, cognises all,' &c. Let us
29357 shortly consider the connexion of the text. The passage beginning 'the
29358 higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended'
29359 declares an indestructible being possessing the attributes of
29360 invisibility and so on. The clause 'everything arises here from the
29361 Indestructible' next declares that from that being all things originate.
29362 Next the sloka, 'He who knows all and cognises all,' predicates of that
29363 Indestructible which is the source of all beings, omniscience, and
29364 similar qualities. And finally the text, 'That which is higher than the
29365 high Indestructible,' characterises that same being--which previously
29366 had been called invisible, the source of beings, indestructible, all-
29367 knowing, &c.--as the highest of all. Hence it is evident that in the
29368 text 'higher than the high Indestructible' the term 'Indestructible'
29369 does not denote the invisible, &c. Indestructible, which is the chief
29370 topic of the entire section; for there can of course be nothing higher
29371 than that which, as being all-knowing, the source of all, &c., is itself
29372 higher than anything else. The 'Indestructible' in that text therefore
29373 denotes the elements in their subtle condition.

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29378 23. Not the two others, on account of distinction and statement of
29379 difference.

29380
29381 The section distinguishes the indestructible being, which is the source
29382 of all, &c., from the Pradhâna as well as the individual soul, in so far,
29383 namely, as it undertakes to prove that by the cognition of one thing
29384 everything is known; and it moreover, in passages such as 'higher than
29385 the high Indestructible,' explicitly states the difference of the
29386 indestructible being from those other two.--The text first relates that
29387 Brahmâ told the knowledge of Brahman, which is the foundation of the
29388 knowledge of all, to his eldest son Atharvan: this introduces the
29389 knowledge of Brahman as the topic of the section. Then, the text
29390 proceeds, in order to obtain this knowledge of Brahman, which had been
29391 handed down through a succession of teachers to Angiras, Saunaka
29392 approached Angiras respectfully and asked him: 'What is that through
29393 which, if known, all this is known?' i.e. since all knowledge is founded

29394 on the knowledge of Brahman, he enquires after the nature of Brahman.
29395 Angiras replies that he who wishes to attain Brahman must acquire two
29396 kinds of knowledge, both of them having Brahman for their object: an
29397 indirect one which springs from the study of the sâstras, viz. the Veda,
29398 Sikshâ, Kalpa, and so on, and a direct one which springs from
29399 concentrated meditation (yoga). The latter kind of knowledge is the
29400 means of obtaining Brahman, and it is of the nature of devout meditation
29401 (bhakti), as characterised in the text 'He whom the Self chooses, by him
29402 the Self can be gained' (III, 2, 3). The means again towards this kind
29403 of knowledge is such knowledge as is gained from sacred tradition,
29404 assisted by abstention and the other six auxiliary means (sec above, p.
29405 17); in agreement with the text, 'Him the Brahmattas seek to know by the
29406 study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting' (Bri.
29407 Up. IV, 4, 22).--Thus the Reverend Parâsara also says, 'The cause of
29408 attaining him is knowledge and work, and knowledge is twofold, according
29409 as it is based on sacred tradition or springs from discrimination.' The
29410 Mundaka-text refers to the inferior kind of knowledge in the passage
29411 'the lower knowledge is the Rig-veda,' &c., up to 'and the dharma-
29412 sâstras'; this knowledge is the means towards the intuition of Brahman;
29413 while the higher kind of knowledge, which is called 'upâsanâ,' has the
29414 character of devout meditation (bhakti), and consists in direct
29415 intuition of Brahman, is referred to in the clause 'the higher knowledge
29416 is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended.' The text next
29417 following, 'That which is invisible, &c., then sets forth the nature of
29418 the highest Brahman, which is the object of the two kinds of knowledge
29419 previously described. After this the passage 'As the spider sends forth
29420 and draws in its thread' declares that from that indestructible highest
29421 Brahman, as characterised before, there originates the whole universe of
29422 things, sentient and non-sentient. The next soka (tapasâ kîyate, &c.)
29423 states particulars about this origination of the universe from Brahman.
29424 'Brahman swells through brooding'; through brooding, i.e. thought--in
29425 agreement with a later text, 'brooding consists of thought'--Brahman
29426 swells, i.e. through thought in the form of an intention, viz. 'may I
29427 become many,' Brahman becomes ready for creation. From it there springs
29428 first 'anna,' i.e. that which is the object of fruition on the part of
29429 all enjoying agents, viz. the non-evolved subtle principles of all
29430 elements. From this 'anna' there spring successively breath, mind, and
29431 all other effected things up to work, which is the means of producing
29432 reward in the form of the heavenly world, and Release. The last sloka of
29433 the first chapter thereupon first states the qualities, such as
29434 omniscience and so on, which capacitate the highest Brahman for creation,
29435 and then declares that from the indestructible highest Brahman there
29436 springs the effected (kârya) Brahman, distinguished by name and form,
29437 and comprising all enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment.--The
29438 first sloka of the second chapter declares first that the highest
29439 Brahman is absolutely real ('That is true'), and then admonishes those
29440 who desire to reach the indestructible highest Self, which possesses all
29441 the blessed qualities stated before and exists through itself, to turn
29442 away from other rewards and to perform all those sacrificial works
29443 depending on the three sacred fires which were seen and revealed by
29444 poets in the four Vedas and are incumbent on men according to caste and
29445 âsrama. The section 'this is your path' (I, 2, 1) up to 'this is the
29446 holy Brahma-world gained by your good works' (I, 2, 6) next states the
29447 particular mode of performing those works, and declares that an omission
29448 of one of the successive works enjoined in Druti and Smriti involves
29449 fruitlessness of the works actually performed, and that something not
29450 performed in the proper way is as good as not performed at all. Stanzas
29451 7 and ff. ('But frail in truth are those boats') declare that those who
29452 perform this lower class of works have to return again and again into
29453 the Samsâra, because they aim at worldly results and are deficient in
29454 true knowledge. Stanza 8 ('but those who practise penance and faith')
29455 then proclaims that works performed by a man possessing true knowledge,
29456 and hence not aiming at worldly rewards, result in the attainment of
29457 Brahman; and stanzas 12 a, 13 ('having examined all these worlds')
29458 enjoin knowledge, strengthened by due works, on the part of a man who
29459 has turned away from mere works, as the means of reaching Brahman; and
29460 due recourse to a teacher on the part of him who is desirous of such
29461 knowledge.--The first chapter of the second section of the Upanishad (II,
29462 1) then clearly teaches how the imperishable highest Brahman, i.e. the

highest Self--as constituting the Self of all things and having all things for its body--has all things for its outward form and emits all things from itself. The remainder of the Upanishad ('Manifest, near,' &c.) teaches how this highest Brahman, which is imperishable and higher than the soul, which itself is higher than the Unevolved; which dwells in the highest Heaven; and which is of the nature of supreme bliss, is to be meditated upon as within the hollow of the heart; how this meditation has the character of devout faith (bhakti); and how the devotee, freeing himself from Nescience, obtains for his reward intuition of Brahman, which renders him like Brahman.

It thus clearly appears that 'on account of distinction and statement of difference' the Upanishad does not treat of the Pradhâna and the soul. For that the highest Brahman is different from those two is declared in passages such as 'That heavenly Person is without body; he is both without and within, not produced, without breath and without mind, pure, higher than what is higher than the Imperishable' (II, 1, 2); for the last words mean 'that imperishable highest Self possessing invisibility and similar qualities, which is higher than the aggregate of individual souls, which itself is higher than the non-evolved subtle elements.' The term 'akshara' (imperishable) is to be etymologically explained either as that which pervades (asnute) or that which does not pass away (aksharati), and is on either of these explanations applicable to the highest Self, either because that Self pervades all its effects or because it is like the so-called Mahat (which is also called akshara), free from all passing away or decaying.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'invisibility and so on.'

24. And on account of the description of its form.

'Fire is his head, his eyes the sun and the moon, the regions his ears, his speech the Vedas disclosed, the wind his breath, his heart the universe; from his feet came the earth; he is indeed the inner Self of all things' (II, 1, 4)--the outward form here described can belong to none but the highest Self; that is, the inner Self of all beings. The section therefore treats of the highest Self.

25. Vaisvânara (is the highest Self), on account of the distinctions qualifying the common term.

The Chandogya read in their text, 'You know at present that Vaisvânara Self, tell us that,' &c., and further on, 'But he who meditates on the Vaisvânara Self as a span long,' &c. (Ch. Up. V, 11, 6; 18, 1). The doubt here arises whether that Vaisvânara Self can be made out to be the highest Self or not. The Pûrvapakshin maintains the latter alternative. For, he says, the word Vaisvânara is used in the sacred texts in four different senses. It denotes in the first place the intestinal fire, so in Bri. Up, V, 9, 'That is the Vaisvânara fire by which the food that is eaten is cooked, i.e. digested. Its noise is that which one hears when one covers one's ears. When man is on the point of departing this life he does not hear that noise.'--It next denotes the third of the elements, so in Ri. Samh. X, 88, 12, 'For the whole world the gods have made the Agni Vaisvânara a sign of the days.'--It also denotes a divinity, so Ri. Samh. I, 98, 1, 'May we be in the favour of Vaisvânara, for he is the king of the kings,' &c. And finally it denotes the highest Self, as in the passage, 'He offered it in the Self, in the heart, in Agni Vaisvânara'; and in Pra. Up. I, 7, 'Thus he rises as Vaisvânara, assuming all forms, as breath of life, as fire.'--And the characteristic marks mentioned in the introductory clauses of the Chandogya-text under discussion admit of interpretations agreeing with every one of these meanings of the word Vaisvânara.

Against this primâ facie view the Sûtra declares itself. The term

29532 'Vaisvânara' in the Chândogya-text denotes the highest Self, because the
29533 'common' term is there qualified by attributes specially belonging to
29534 the highest Self. For the passage tells us how Aupamanyava and four
29535 other great Rishis, having met and discussed the question as to what was
29536 their Self and Brahman, come to the conclusion to go to Uddâlaka because
29537 he is reputed to know the Vaisvânara Self. Uddâlaka, recognising their
29538 anxiety to know the Vaisvânara Self, and deeming himself not to be fully
29539 informed on this point, refers them to Asvapati Kaikeya as thoroughly
29540 knowing the Vaisvânara Self; and they thereupon, together with Uddâlaka,
29541 approach Asvapati. The king duly honours them with presents, and as they
29542 appear unwilling to receive them, explains that they may suitably do so,
29543 he himself being engaged in the performance of a religious vow; and at
29544 the same time instructs them that even men knowing Brahman must avoid
29545 what is forbidden and do what is prescribed. When thereupon he adds that
29546 he will give them as much wealth as to the priests engaged in his
29547 sacrifice, they, desirous of Release and of knowing the Vaisvânara Self,
29548 request him to explain that Self to them. Now it clearly appears that as
29549 the Rishis are said to be desirous of knowing--that Brahman which is the
29550 Self of the individual souls ('what is our Self, what is Brahman'), and
29551 therefore search for some one to instruct them on that point, the
29552 Vaisvânara Self--to a person acquainted with which they address
29553 themselves--can be the highest Self only. In the earlier clauses the
29554 terms used are 'Self' and 'Brahman,' in the later 'Self' and 'Vaisvânara';
29555 from this it appears also that the term 'Vaisvânara,' which takes the
29556 place of 'Brahman,' denotes none other but the highest Self. The results,
29557 moreover, of the knowledge of the Vaisvânara Self, which are stated in
29558 subsequent passages, show that the Vaisvânara Self is the highest
29559 Brahman. 'He eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selves'; 'as
29560 the fibres of the Ishîkâ reed when thrown into the fire are burnt, thus
29561 all his sins are burned' (V, 18, I; 24, 3).

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29563 The next Sûtra supplies a further reason for the same conclusion.
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29568 26. That which the text refers to is an inferential mark--thus.
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29570 The text describes the shape of Vaisvânara, of whom heaven, &c., down to
29571 earth constitute the several limbs; and it is known from Scripture and
29572 Smriti that such is the shape of the highest Self. When, therefore, we
29573 recognise that shape as referred to in the text, this supplies an
29574 inferential mark of Vaisvânara being the highest Self.--The 'thus' (iti)
29575 in the Sûtra denotes a certain mode, that is to say, 'a shape of such a
29576 kind being recognised in the text enables us to infer that Vaisvânara is
29577 the highest Self.' For in Scripture and Smriti alike the highest Person
29578 is declared to have such a shape. Cp. e.g. the text of the Âtharvanas.
29579 'Agni is his head, the sun and moon his eyes, the regions his cars, his
29580 speech the Vedas disclosed, the wind his breath, his heart the Universe;
29581 from his feet came the earth; he is indeed the inner Self of all things'
29582 (Mu. Up. II, I, 4). 'Agni' in this passage denotes the heavenly world,
29583 in agreement with the text 'that world indeed is Agni.' And the
29584 following Smriti texts: 'He of whom the wise declare the heavenly world
29585 to be the head, the ether the navel, sun and moon the eyes, the regions
29586 the ears, the earth the feet; he whose Self is unfathomable is the
29587 leader of all beings'; and 'of whom Agni is the mouth, heaven the head,
29588 the ether the navel, the earth the feet, the sun the eye, the regions
29589 the ear; worship to him, the Self of the Universe!--Now our text
29590 declares the heavenly world and so on to constitute the head and the
29591 other limbs of Vaisvânara. For Kaikeya on being asked by the Rishis to
29592 instruct them as to the Vaisvânara Self recognises that they all know
29593 something about the Vaisvânara Self while something they do not know
29594 (for thus only we can explain his special questions), and then in order
29595 to ascertain what each knows and what not, questions them separately.
29596 When thereupon Aupamanyava replies that he meditates on heaven only as
29597 the Self, Kaikeya, in order to disabuse him from the notion that heaven
29598 is the whole Vaisvânara Self, teaches him that heaven is the head of
29599 Vaisvânara, and that of heaven which thus is a part only of Vaisvânara,
29600 Sutejas is the special name. Similarly he is thereupon told by the other

29601 Rishis that they meditate only on sun, air, ether, and earth, and
29602 informs them in return that the special names of these beings are 'the
29603 omniform,' 'he who moves in various ways,' 'the full one,' 'wealth and
29604 'firm rest,' and that these all are mere members of the Vaisvânara Self,
29605 viz. its eyes, breath, trunk, bladder, and feet. The shape thus
29606 described in detail can belong to the highest Self only, and hence
29607 Vaisvânara is none other but the highest Self.
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29609 The next Sûtra meets a further doubt as to this decision not yet being
29610 well established.
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29615 27. Should it be said that it is not so, on account of the word, &c.,
29616 and on account of the abiding within; we say, no; on account of
29617 meditation being taught thus, on account of impossibility; and because
29618 they read of him as person.
29619

29620 An objection is raised. Vaisvânara cannot be ascertained to be the
29621 highest Self, because, on the account of the text and of the abiding
29622 within, we can understand by the Vaisvânara in our text the intestinal
29623 fire also. The text to which we refer occurs in the Vaisvânara-vidyâ of
29624 the Vâjasaneyins, 'This one is the Agni Vaisvânara,' where the two words
29625 'Agni' and 'Vaisvânara' are exhibited in co-ordination. And in the
29626 section under discussion the passage, 'the heart is the Gârhapatya fire,
29627 the mind the Anvâhârya-pakana fire, the mouth the Âhavanîya fire' (Ch.
29628 Up. V, 18, 2), represents the Vaisvânara in so far as abiding within the
29629 heart and so on as constituting the triad of sacred fires. Moreover the
29630 text, 'The first food which a man may take is in the place of Soma. And
29631 he who offers that first oblation should offer it to Prâna' (V, 19, 1),
29632 intimates that Vaisvânara is the abode of the offering to Prâna. In the
29633 same way the Vâjasaneyins declare that Vaisvânara abides within man, viz.
29634 in the passage 'He who knows this Agni Vaisvânara shaped like a man
29635 abiding within man.' As thus Vaisvânara appears in co-ordination with
29636 the word 'Agni,' is represented as the triad of sacred fires, is said to
29637 be the abode of the oblation to Breath, and to abide within man, he must
29638 be viewed as the intestinal fire, and it is therefore not true that he
29639 can be identified with the highest Self only.
29640

29641 This objection is set aside by the Sûtra. It is not so 'on account of
29642 meditation (on the highest Self) being taught thus,' i.e. as the text
29643 means to teach that the highest Brahman which, in the manner described
29644 before, has the three worlds for its body should be meditated upon as
29645 qualified by the intestinal fire which (like other beings) constitutes
29646 Brahman's body. For the word 'Agni' denotes not only the intestinal fire,
29647 but also the highest Self in so far as qualified by the intestinal fire.--
29648 But how is this to be known?--'On account of impossibility;' i.e.
29649 because it is impossible that the mere intestinal fire should have the
29650 three worlds for its body. The true state of the case therefore is that
29651 the word Agni, which is understood to denote the intestinal fire, when
29652 appearing in co-ordination with the term Vaisvânara represented as
29653 having the three worlds for his body, denotes (not the intestinal fire,
29654 but) the highest Self as qualified by that fire viewed as forming the
29655 body of the Self. Thus the Lord also says, 'As Vaisvânara fire I abide
29656 in the body of living creatures and, being assisted by breath inspired
29657 and expired, digest the fourfold food' (Bha Gî. XIV, 15). 'As Vaisvânara
29658 fire' here means 'embodied in the intestinal fire.'--The Chândogya text
29659 under discussion enjoins meditation on the highest Self embodied in the
29660 Vaisvânara fire.--Moreover the Vâjasaneyins read of him, viz. the
29661 Vaisvânara, as man or person, viz. in the passage 'That Agni Vaisvânara
29662 is the person' (Sa. Brâ. X, 6, 1, 11). The intestinal fire by itself
29663 cannot be called a person; unconditioned personality belongs to the
29664 highest Self only. Compare 'the thousand-headed person' (Ri. Samh.), and
29665 'the Person is all this' (Sve. Up. III, 15).
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29670 28. For the same reasons not the divinity and the element.
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29672 For the reasons stated Vaisvânara can be neither the deity Fire, nor the
29673 elemental fire which holds the third place among the gross elements.
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29678 29. Jaimini thinks that there is no objection to (the word 'Agni')
29679 directly (denoting the highest Self).
29680
29681 So far it has been maintained that the word 'Agni,' which stands in co-
29682 ordination with the term 'Vaisvânara,' denotes the highest Self in so
29683 far as qualified by the intestinal fire constituting its body; and that
29684 hence the text under discussion enjoins meditation on the highest Self.
29685 Jaimini, on the other hand, is of opinion that there is no reasonable
29686 objection to the term 'Agni,' no less than the term: 'Vaisvânara,' being
29687 taken directly to denote the highest Self. That is to say--in the same
29688 way as the term 'Vaisvânara,' although a common term, yet when qualified
29689 by attributes especially belonging to the highest Self is known to
29690 denote the latter only as possessing the quality of ruling all men; so
29691 the word 'Agni' also when appearing in connexion with special attributes
29692 belonging to the highest Self denotes that Self only. For any quality on
29693 the ground of which 'Agni' may be etymologically explained to denote
29694 ordinary fire--as when e.g. we explain 'agni' as he who 'agre nayati'--
29695 may also, in its highest non-conditioned degree, be ascribed to the
29696 supreme Self. Another difficulty remains. The passage (V, 18, 1) 'yas tv
29697 etam evam prâdesamâtram abhivimânam,' &c. declares that the non-limited
29698 highest Brahman is limited by the measure of the pradesas, i.e. of the
29699 different spaces--heaven, ether, earth, &c.--which had previously been
29700 said to constitute the limbs of Vaisvânara. How is this possible?
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29705 30. On account of definiteness; thus Âsmarathya opines.
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29707 The teacher Âsmarathya is of opinion that the text represents the
29708 highest Self as possessing a definite extent, to the end of rendering
29709 the thought of the meditating devotee more definite. That is to say--the
29710 limitation due to the limited extent of heaven, sun, &c. has the purpose
29711 of rendering definite to thought him who pervades (abhi) all this
29712 Universe and in reality transcends all measure (vimâna).--A further
29713 difficulty remains. For what purpose is the highest Brahman here
29714 represented like a man, having a head and limbs?--This point the next
29715 Sûtra elucidates.
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29720 31. On account of meditation, Bâdari thinks.
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29722 The teacher Bâdari thinks that the representation in the text of the
29723 supreme Self in the form of a man is for the purpose of devout
29724 meditation. 'He who in this way meditates on that Vaisvânara Self as
29725 "prâdesamâtra" and "abhivimâna," he eats food in all worlds, in all
29726 beings, in all Selves.' What this text enjoins is devout meditation for
29727 the purpose of reaching Brahman. 'In this way' means 'as having a human
29728 form.' And 'the eating' of food in all worlds, &c. means the gaining of
29729 intuitional knowledge of Brahman which abides everywhere and is in
29730 itself of the nature of supreme bliss. The special kind of food, i.e.
29731 the special objects of enjoyment which belong to the different Selves
29732 standing under the influence of karman cannot be meant here; for those
29733 limited objects have to be shunned by those who desire final release. A
29734 further question arises. If Vaisvânara is the highest Self, how can the
29735 text say that the altar is its chest, the grass on the altar its hairs,
29736 and so on? (V, 18, 2.) Such a statement has a sense only if we
29737 understand by Vaisvânara the intestinal fire.--This difficulty the next
29738 Sûtra elucidates.

32. On account of imaginative identification, thus Jaimini thinks; for thus the text declares.

The teacher Jaimini is of opinion that the altar is stated to be the chest of Vaisvânara, and so on, in order to effect an imaginative identification of the offering to Prâna which is daily performed by the meditating devotees and is the means of pleasing Vaisvânara, having the heaven and so on for his body, i.e. the highest Self, with the Agnihotra-offering. For the fruit due to meditation on the highest Self, as well as the identity of the offering to breath with the Agnihotra, is declared in the following text, 'He who without knowing this offers the Agnihotra--that would be as if removing the live coals he were to pour his libation on dead ashes. But he who offers this Agnihotra with a full knowledge of its purport, he offers it in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selves. As the fibres of the Ishikâ reed when thrown into the fire are burnt, thus all his sins are burnt.' (V, 24, 1-3.)

33. Moreover, they record him in that.

They (i.e. the Vâjasaneyins) speak of him, viz. Vaisvânara who has heaven for his head, &c.--i.e. the highest Self--as within that, i.e. the body of the devotee, so as to form the abode of the oblation to Prâna; viz. in the text, 'Of that Vaisvânara Self the head is Sutejas,' and so on. The context is as follows. The clause 'He who meditates on the Vaisvânara Self as prâdesamâtra,' &c. enjoins meditation on the highest Self having the three worlds for its body, i.e. on Vaisvânara. The following clause 'he eats food in all worlds' teaches that the attaining of Brahman is the reward of such meditation. And then the text proceeds to teach the Agnihotra offered to Prâna, which is something subsidiary to the meditation taught. The text here establishes an identity between the members--fire, sun, &c.--of the Vaisvânara enjoined as object of meditation (which members are called Sutejas, Visvarûpa, &c.), and parts--viz. head, eye, breath, trunk, bladder, feet--of the worshipper's body. 'The head is Sutejas'--that means: the head of the devotee is (identical with) heaven, which is the head of the highest Self; and so on up to 'the feet,' i.e. the feet of the devotee are identical with the earth, which constitutes the feet of the highest Self, The devotee having thus reflected on the highest Self, which has the three worlds for its body, as present within his own body, thereupon is told to view his own chest, hair, heart, mind and mouth as identical with the altar, grass and the other things which are required for the Agnihotra; further to identify the oblation to Prâna with the Agnihotra, and by means of this Prâna-agnihotra to win the favour of Vaisvânara, i.e. the highest Self. The final--conclusion then remains that Vaisvânara is none other than the highest Self, the supreme Person.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'Vaisvânara.'

THIRD PÂDA.

1. The abode of heaven, earth, &c. (is the highest Self), on account of terms which are its own.

The followers of the Atharva-veda have the following text, 'He in whom the heaven, the earth and the sky are woven, the mind also, with all the vital airs, know him alone as the Self, and leave off other words; he is the bank (setu) of the Immortal' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 5). The doubt here arises whether the being spoken of as the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, is the individual soul or the highest Self.

29808 The Pûrvapakshin maintains the former alternative. For, he remarks, in
29809 the next sloka, 'where like spokes in the nave of a wheel the arteries
29810 meet, he moves about within, becoming manifold,' the word 'where' refers
29811 back to the being which in the preceding sloka had been called the abode
29812 of heaven, earth, and so on, the clause beginning with 'where' thus
29813 declaring that that being is the basis of the arteries; and the next
29814 clause declares that same being to become manifold or to be born in many
29815 ways. Now, connexion with the arteries is clearly characteristic of the
29816 individual soul; and so is being born in many forms, divine and so on.
29817 Moreover, in the very sloka under discussion it is said that that being
29818 is the abode of the mind and the five vital airs, and this also is a
29819 characteristic attribute of the individual soul. It being, on these
29820 grounds, ascertained that the text refers to the individual soul we must
29821 attempt to reconcile therewith, as well as we can, what is said about
29822 its being the abode of heaven, earth, &c.

29823
29824 This primâ facie view is set aside by the Sûtra. That which is described
29825 as the abode of heaven, earth, &c. is none other than the highest
29826 Brahman, on account of a term which is 'its own,' i.e. which specially
29827 belongs to it. The clause we have in view is 'he is the bank of the
29828 Immortal.' This description applies to the highest Brahman only, which
29829 alone is, in all Upanishads, termed the cause of the attainment of
29830 Immortality; cp. e.g. 'Knowing him thus a man becomes immortal; there is
29831 no other path to go' (Sve. Up. III, 8). The term 'setu' is derived from
29832 _si_, which means to bind, and therefore means that which binds, i.e.
29833 makes one to attain immortality; or else it may be understood to mean
29834 that which leads towards immortality that lies beyond the ocean of
29835 samsâra, in the same way as a bank or bridge (setu) leads to the further
29836 side of a river.--Moreover the word 'Self (âtman) (which, in the text
29837 under discussion, is also applied to that which is the abode of heaven,
29838 earth, &c.), without any further qualification, primarily denotes
29839 Brahman only; for 'âtman' comes from _âp_, to reach, and means that
29840 which 'reaches' all other things in so far as it rules them. And further
29841 on (II, 2, 7) there are other terms, 'all knowing,' 'all cognising,'
29842 which also specially belong to the highest Brahman only. This Brahman
29843 may also be represented as the abode of the arteries; as proved e.g. by
29844 Mahânâr. Up. (XI, 8-12), 'Surrounded by the arteries he hangs ... in the
29845 middle of this pointed flame there dwells the highest Self.' Of that
29846 Self it may also be said that it is born in many ways; in accordance
29847 with texts such as 'not born, he is born in many ways; the wise know the
29848 place of his birth.' For in order to fit himself to be a refuge for
29849 gods, men, &c. the supreme Person, without however putting aside his
29850 true nature, associates himself with the shape, make, qualities and
29851 works of the different classes of beings, and thus is born in many ways.
29852 Smriti says the same: 'Though being unborn, of non-perishable nature,
29853 the Lord of all beings, yet presiding over my Prakriti I am born by my
29854 own mysterious power' (Bha. Gî. IV, 6). Of the mind also and the other
29855 organs of the individual soul the highest Self is strictly the abode;
29856 for it is the abode of everything.--The next Sûtra supplies a further
29857 reason.

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29861
29862 2. And on account of its being declared that to which the released have
29863 to resort.

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29865 The Person who is the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, is also
29866 declared by the text to be what is to be reached by those who are
29867 released from the bondage of Samsâra existence. 'When the seer sees the
29868 brilliant maker and Lord as the Person who has his source in Brahman,
29869 then possessing true knowledge he shakes off good and evil, and, free
29870 from passion, reaches the highest oneness' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3). 'As the
29871 flowing rivers disappear in the sea, losing their name and form, thus a
29872 wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is
29873 higher than the high' (III, 2, 8). For it is only those freed from the
29874 bondage of Samsâra who shake off good and evil, are free from passion,
29875 and freed from name and form.

29876

For the Samsâra state consists in the possession of name and form, which is due to connexion with non-sentient matter, such connexion springing from good and evil works. The Person therefore who is the abode of heaven, earth, &c., and whom the text declares to be the aim to be reached by those who, having freed themselves from good and evil, and hence from all contact with matter, attain supreme oneness with the highest Brahman, can be none other than this highest Brahman itself.

This conclusion, based on terms exclusively applicable to the highest Brahman, is now confirmed by reference to the absence of terms specially applicable to the individual soul.

3. Not that which is inferred, on account of the absence of terms denoting it, and (so also not) the bearer of the Prânas (i. e. the individual soul).

As the section under discussion does not treat of the Pradhâna, there being no terms referring to that, so it is with regard to the individual soul also. In the text of the Sûtra we have to read either anumânam, i. e. 'inference,' in the sense of 'object of inference,' or else ânumânam, 'object of inference'; what is meant being in both cases the Pradhana inferred to exist by the Sâmkhyas.

4. On account of the declaration of difference.

'On the same tree man sits immersed in grief, bewildered by "anîsâ"; but when he sees the other one, the Lord, contented, and his glory; then his grief passes away' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 2). This, and similar texts, speak of that one, i.e. the one previously described as the abode of heaven, earth, &c., as different from the individual soul.--The text means--the individual soul grieves, being bewildered by her who is not 'îsa,' i.e. Prakriti, the object of fruition. But its grief passes away when it sees him who is other than itself, i.e. the beloved Lord of all, and his greatness which consists in his ruling the entire world.

5. On account of the subject-matter.

It has been already shown, viz. under I, 2, 21, that the highest Brahman constitutes the initial topic of the Upanishad. And by the arguments set forth in the previous Sûtras of the present Pâda, we have removed all suspicion as to the topic started being dropped in the body of the Upanishad.

6. And on account of abiding and eating.

'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit; without eating, the other looks on' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1). This text declares that one enjoys the fruit of works while the other, without enjoying, shining abides within the body. Now this shining being which does not enjoy the fruit of works can only be the being previously described as the abode of heaven, earth, &c., and characterised as all knowing, the bridge of immortality, the Self of all; it can in no way be the individual Self which, lamenting, experiences the results of its works. The settled conclusion, therefore, is that the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, is none other than the highest Self.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'heaven, earth, and so on.'

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29949 7. The bhūman (is the highest Self), as the instruction about it is
29950 additional to that about serenity.
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29952 The Chandogas read as follows: 'Where one sees nothing else, hears
29953 nothing else, knows nothing else, that is fulness (bhūman). Where one
29954 sees something else, hears something else, knows something else, that is
29955 the Little' (Ch. Up. VII, 23, 24).
29956

29957 The term 'bhūman' is derived from bahu (much, many), and primarily
29958 signifies 'muchness.' By 'much' in this connexion, we have however to
29959 understand, not what is numerous, but what is large, for the text uses
29960 the term in contrast with the 'Little' (alpa), i.e. the 'Small.' And the
29961 being qualified as 'large,' we conclude from the context to be the Self;
29962 for this section of the Upanishad at the outset states that he who knows
29963 the Self overcomes grief (VII, 1, 3), then teaches the knowledge of the
29964 bhūman, and concludes by saying that 'the Self is all this' (VII, 25, 2).
29965

29966 The question now arises whether the Self called bhūman is the individual
29967 Self or the highest Self.--The Pûrvapakshin maintains the former view.
29968 For, he says, to Narada who had approached Sanatkumâra with the desire
29969 to be instructed about the Self, a series of beings, beginning with
29970 'name' and ending with 'breath,' are enumerated as objects of devout
29971 meditation; Nârada asks each time whether there be anything greater than
29972 name, and so on, and each time receives an affirmative reply ('speech is
29973 greater than name,' &c.); when, however, the series has advanced as far
29974 as Breath, there is no such question and reply. This shows that the
29975 instruction about the Self terminates with Breath, and hence we conclude
29976 that breath in this place means the individual soul which is associated
29977 with breath, not a mere modification of air. Also the clauses 'Breath is
29978 father, breath is mother,' &c. (VII, 15, 1), show that breath here is
29979 something intelligent. And this is further proved by the clause 'Slayer
29980 of thy father, slayer of thy mother,' &c. (VII, 15, 2; 3), which
29981 declares that he who offends a father, a mother, &c., as long as there
29982 is breath in them, really hurts them, and therefore deserves reproach;
29983 while no blame attaches to him who offers even the grossest violence to
29984 them after their breath has departed. For a conscious being only is
29985 capable of being hurt, and hence the word 'breath' here denotes such a
29986 being only. Moreover, as it is observed that also in the case of such
29987 living beings as have no vital breath (viz. plants), suffering results,
29988 or does not result, according as injury is inflicted or not, we must for
29989 this reason also decide that the breath spoken of in the text as
29990 something susceptible of injury is the individual soul. It consequently
29991 would be an error to suppose, on the ground of the comparison of Prâna
29992 to the nave of a wheel in which the spokes are set, that Prâna here
29993 denotes the highest Self; for the highest Self is incapable of being
29994 injured. That comparison, on the other hand, is quite in its place, if
29995 we understand by Prâna the individual soul, for the whole aggregate of
29996 non-sentient matter which stands to the individual soul in the relation
29997 of object or instrument of enjoyment, has an existence dependent on the
29998 individual soul. And this soul, there called Prâna, is what the text
29999 later on calls Bhūman; for as there is no question and reply as to
30000 something greater than Prâna, Prâna continues, without break, to be the
30001 subject-matter up to the mention of bhūman. The paragraphs intervening
30002 between the section on Prâna (VII, 15) and the section on the bhūman
30003 (VII, 23 ff.) are to be understood as follows. The Prâna section closes
30004 with the remark that he who fully knows Prâna is an ativâdin, i.e. one
30005 who makes a final supreme declaration. In the next sentence then, 'But
30006 this one in truth is an ativâdin who makes a supreme statement by means
30007 of the True,' the clause 'But this one is an ativâdin' refers back to
30008 the previously mentioned person who knows the Prâna, and the relative
30009 clause 'who makes,' &c., enjoins on him the speaking of the truth as an
30010 auxiliary element in the meditation on Prâna. The next paragraph, 'When
30011 one understands the truth then one declares the truth,' intimates that
30012 speaking the truth stands in a supplementary relation towards the
30013 cognition of the true nature of the Prâna as described before. For the
30014 accomplishment of such cognition the subsequent four paragraphs enjoin

30015 reflection, faith, attendance on a spiritual guide, and the due
30016 performance of sacred duties. In order that such duties may be
30017 undertaken, the next paragraphs then teach that bliss constitutes the
30018 nature of the individual soul, previously called Prâna, and finally that
30019 the Bhûman, i.e. the supreme fulness of such bliss, is the proper object
30020 of inquiry. The final purport of the teaching, therefore, is that the
30021 true nature of the individual soul, freed from Nescience, is abundant
30022 bliss--a conclusion which perfectly agrees with the initial statement
30023 that he who knows the Self passes beyond sorrow. That being, therefore,
30024 which has the attribute of being 'bhûman,' is the individual Self. This
30025 being so, it is also intelligible why, further on, when the text
30026 describes the glory and power of the individual Self, it uses the term
30027 'I'; for 'I' denotes just the individual Self: 'I am below, I am above,
30028 &c., I am all this' (VII, 25, 1). This conclusion having been settled,
30029 all remaining clauses must be explained so as to agree with it.

30030
30031 This primâ facie view is set aside by the Sûtra. The being characterised
30032 in the text as 'bhûman' is not the individual Self, but the highest Self,
30033 since instruction is given about the bhûman in addition to 'serenity'
30034 (samprasâda). 'Samprasâda' denotes the individual soul, as we know from
30035 the following text, 'Now that "serenity", having risen from out this
30036 body, and having reached the highest light, appears in its true form'
30037 (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 4). Now in the text under discussion instruction is
30038 given about a being called 'the True,' and possessing the attribute of
30039 'bhûman,' as being something additional to the individual soul; and this
30040 being called 'the True' is none other than the highest Brahman. Just as
30041 in the series of beings beginning with name and ending with breath, each
30042 successive being is mentioned in addition to the preceding one--
30043 wherefrom we conclude that it is something really different from what
30044 precedes; so that being also which is called 'the True,' and which is
30045 mentioned in addition to the individual Self called Prâna, is something
30046 different from the individual Self, and this being called 'the True' is
30047 the same as the Bhûman; in other words, the text teaches that the Bhûman
30048 is the highest Brahman called 'the True.' This the Vrittikâra also
30049 declares: 'But the Bhûman only. The Bhûman is Brahman, because in the
30050 series beginning with name instruction is given about it subsequently to
30051 the individual Self.'

30052
30053 But how do we know that the instruction as to 'the True' is in addition
30054 to, and refers to something different from, the being called Prâna?--The
30055 text, after having declared that he who knows the Prâna is an ativâdin,
30056 goes on, 'But really that one is an ativâdin who makes a supreme
30057 declaration by means of the True.' The 'but' here clearly separates him
30058 who is an ativâdin by means of the True from the previous ativâdin, and
30059 the clause thus does not cause us to recognise him who is ativâdin by
30060 means of Prâna; hence 'the True' which is the cause of the latter
30061 ativâdin being what he is must be something different from the Prâna
30062 which is the cause of the former ativâdin's quality.--But we have
30063 maintained above that the text enjoins the speaking of 'the True' merely
30064 as an auxiliary duty for him who knows Prâna; and that hence the Prâna
30065 continues to be the general subject-matter!--This contention is
30066 untenable, we reply. The conjunction 'but' shows that the section gives
30067 instruction about a new ativâdin, and does not merely declare that the
30068 ativâdin previously mentioned has to speak the truth. It is different
30069 with texts such as 'But that one indeed is an Agnihotrin who speaks the
30070 truth'; there we have no knowledge of any further Agnihotrin, and
30071 therefore must interpret the text as enjoining truthfulness as an
30072 obligation incumbent on the ordinary Agnihotrin. In the text under
30073 discussion, on the other hand, we have the term 'the True', which makes
30074 us apprehend that there is a further ativâdin different from the
30075 preceding one; and we know that that term is used to denote the highest
30076 Brahman, as e.g. in the text, 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is
30077 Brahman.' The ativâdin who takes his stand on this Brahman, therefore,
30078 must be viewed as different from the preceding ativâdin; and a
30079 difference thus established on the basis of the meaning and connexion of
30080 the different sentences cannot be set aside. An ativâdin ('one who in
30081 his declaration goes beyond') is one who maintains, as object of his
30082 devotion, something which, as being more beneficial to man, surpasses
30083 other objects of devotion. The text at first declares that he who knows

30084 Prâna, i.e. the individual soul, is an ativâdin, in so far as the object
30085 of his devout meditation surpasses the objects from name up to hope; and
30086 then goes on to say that, as that object also is not of _supreme_
30087 benefit to man, an ativâdin in the full sense of the term is he only who
30088 proclaims as the object of his devotion the highest Brahman, which alone
30089 is of supreme unsurpassable benefit to man. 'He who is an ativâdin by
30090 the True,' i.e. he who is an ativâdin characterised by the highest
30091 Brahman as the object of his meditation. For the same reason the pupil
30092 entreats, 'Sir, may I be an ativâdin with the True!' and the teacher
30093 replies, 'But we must desire to know the True!'--Moreover, the text, VII,
30094 26, I, 'Prâna springs from the Self,' declares the origination from the
30095 Self of the being called Prâna; and from this we infer that the Self
30096 which is introduced as the general subject-matter of the section, in the
30097 clause 'He who knows the Self passes beyond death,' is different from
30098 the being called Prâna.--The contention that, because there is no
30099 question and answer as to something greater than Prâna, the instruction
30100 about the Self must be supposed to come to an end with the instruction
30101 about Prâna, is by no means legitimate. For that a new subject is
30102 introduced is proved, not only by those questions and answers; it may be
30103 proved by other means also, and we have already explained such means.
30104 The following is the reason why the pupil does not ask the question
30105 whether there is anything greater than Prâna. With regard to the non-
30106 sentient objects extending from name to hope--each of which surpasses
30107 the preceding one in so far as it is more beneficial to man--the teacher
30108 does not declare that he who knows them is an ativâdin; when, however,
30109 he comes to the individual soul, there called Prâna, the knowledge of
30110 whose true nature he considers highly beneficial, he expressly says that
30111 'he who sees this, notes this, understands this is an ativâdin' (VII, 15,
30112 4). The pupil therefore imagines that the instruction about the Self is
30113 now completed, and hence asks no further question. The teacher on the
30114 other hand, holding that even that knowledge is not the highest,
30115 spontaneously continues his teaching, and tells the pupil that truly he
30116 only is an ativâdin who proclaims the supremely and absolutely
30117 beneficial being which is called 'the True,' i.e. the highest Brahman.
30118 On this suggestion of the highest Brahman the pupil, desirous to learn
30119 its true nature and true worship, entreats the teacher, 'Sir, may I
30120 become an ativâdin by the True!' Thereupon the teacher--in order to help
30121 the pupil to become an ativâdin,--a position which requires previous
30122 intuition of Brahman--enjoins on him meditation on Brahman which is the
30123 means to attain intuition ('You must desire to know the True!'); next
30124 recommends to him reflection (manana) which is the means towards
30125 meditation ('You must desire to understand reflection'); then--taking it
30126 for granted that the injunction of reflection implies the injunction of
30127 'hearing' the sacred texts which is the preliminary for reflecting--
30128 advises him to cherish faith in Brahman which is the preliminary means
30129 towards hearing ('You must desire to understand faith'); after that
30130 tells him to practise, as a preliminary towards faith, reliance on
30131 Brahman ('You must desire to understand reliance'); next admonishes him,
30132 to apply himself to 'action,' i.e. to make the effort which is a
30133 preliminary requisite for all the activities enumerated ('You must
30134 desire to understand action'). Finally, in order to encourage the pupil
30135 to enter on all this, the teacher tells him to recognise that bliss
30136 constitutes the nature of that Brahman which is the aim of all his
30137 effort ('You must desire to understand bliss'); and bids him to realise
30138 that the bliss which constitutes Brahman's nature is supremely large and
30139 full ('You must endeavour to understand the "bhûman," i.e. the supreme
30140 fulness of bliss'). And of this Brahman, whose nature is absolute bliss,
30141 a definition is then given as follows, 'Where one sees nothing else,
30142 hears nothing else, knows nothing else, that is bhûman.' This means--
30143 when the meditating devotee realises the intuition of this Brahman,
30144 which consists of absolute bliss, he does not see anything apart from it,
30145 since the whole aggregate of things is contained within the essence and
30146 outward manifestation (vibhûti) of Brahman. He, therefore, who has an
30147 intuitive knowledge of Brahman as qualified by its attributes and its
30148 vibhûti--which also is called aisvarya, i.e. lordly power--and
30149 consisting of supreme bliss, sees nothing else since there _is_ nothing
30150 apart from Brahman; and sees, i.e. feels no pain since all possible
30151 objects of perception and feeling are of the nature of bliss or pleasure;
30152 for pleasure is just that which, being experienced, is agreeable to

man's nature.--But an objection is raised, it is an actual fact that this very world is perceived as something different from Brahman, and as being of the nature of pain, or at the best, limited pleasure; how then can it be perceived as being a manifestation of Brahman, as having Brahman for its Self, and hence consisting of bliss?--The individual souls, we reply, which are under the influence of karman, are conscious of this world as different from Brahman, and, according to their individual karman, as either made up of pain or limited pleasure. But as this view depends altogether on karman, to him who has freed himself from Nescience in the form of karman, this same world presents itself as lying within the intuition of Brahman, together with its qualities and vibhûti, and hence as essentially blissful. To a man troubled with excess of bile the water he drinks has a taste either downright unpleasant or moderately pleasant, according to the degree to which his health is affected; while the same water has an unmingled pleasant taste for a man in good health. As long as a boy is not aware that some plaything is meant to amuse him, he does not care for it; when on the other hand he apprehends it as meant to give him delight, the thing becomes very dear to him. In the same way the world becomes an object of supreme love to him who recognises it as having Brahman for its Self, and being a mere plaything of Brahman--of Brahman, whose essential nature is supreme bliss, and which is a treasure-house, as it were, of numberless auspicious qualities of supreme excellence. He who has reached such intuition of Brahman, sees nothing apart from it and feels no pain. This the concluding passages of the text set forth in detail, 'He who sees, perceives and understands this, loves the Self, delights in the Self, revels in the Self, rejoices in the Self; he becomes a Self ruler, he moves and rules in all worlds according to his pleasure. But those who have a different knowledge from this, they are ruled by others, they live in perishable worlds, they do not move in all the worlds according to their liking.' 'They are ruled by others,' means 'they are in the power of karman.' And further on, 'He who sees this does not see death, nor illness, nor pain; he who sees this sees everything and obtains everything everywhere.'

That Brahman is of the nature of supreme bliss has been shown in detail under I, 1, 12 ff.--The conclusion from all this is that, as the text applies the term 'bhûman' to what was previously called the Real or True, and which is different from the individual soul there called Prâna, the bhûman is the highest Brahman.

8. And on account of the suitability of the attributes.

The attributes also which the text ascribes to the bhûman suit the highest Self only. So immortality ('The Bhûman is immortal,' VII, 24, 1); not being based on something else ('it rests in its own greatness'); being the Self of all ('the bhûman is below,' &c., 'it is all this'); being that which produces all ('from the Self there springs breath,' &c.). All these attributes can be reconciled with the highest Self only.--The Pûrvapakshin has pointed to the text which declares the 'I' to be the Self of all (VII, 25, 1); but what that text really teaches is meditation on Brahman under the aspect of the 'I.' This appears from the introductory clause 'Now follows the instruction with regard to the I.' That of the 'I,' i.e. the individual Self, also the highest Self is the true Self, scripture declares in several places, so e.g. in the text about the inward Ruler (Bri. Up. III, 7). As therefore the individual soul finds its completion in the highest Self only, the word 'I' also extends in its connotation up to the highest Self; and the instruction about the 'I' which is given in the text has thus for its object meditation on the highest Self in so far as having the individual Self for its body. As the highest Self has all beings for its body and thus is the Self of all, it is the Self of the individual soul also; and this the text declares in the passage beginning 'Now follows the instruction about the Self,' and ending 'Self is all this.' In order to prove this the text declares that everything originates from the highest Self which forms the Self of the individual soul also, viz. in the passage 'From

30222 the Self of him who sees this, perceives this, knows this, there springs
30223 breath,' &c.--that means: breath and all other beings spring from the
30224 highest Self which abides within the Self of the meditating devotee as
30225 its inner ruler. Hence, the text means to intimate, meditation should be
30226 performed on the 'I,' in order thus firmly to establish the cognition
30227 that the highest Self has the 'I,' i.e. the individual soul for its body.

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30229 It is thus an established conclusion that the bhūman is the highest Self.
30230 Here terminates the adhikarana of 'fulness.'

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30235 9. The Imperishable (is Brahman), on account of its supporting that
30236 which is the end of ether.

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30238 The Vâjasaneyins, in the chapter recording the questions asked by Gârgî,
30239 read as follows: 'He said, O Gârgî, the Brâhmanas call that the
30240 Imperishable. It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long, it
30241 is not red, not fluid, it is without a shadow,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8).
30242 A doubt here arises whether that Imperishable be the Pradhâna, or the
30243 individual soul, or the highest Self.--The Pradhâna, it may be
30244 maintained in the first place. For we see that in passages such as
30245 'higher than that which is higher than the Imperishable' the term
30246 'Imperishable' actually denotes the Pradhâna; and moreover the qualities
30247 enumerated, viz. not being either coarse or fine, &c., are
30248 characteristic of the Pradhâna.--But, an objection is raised, in texts
30249 such as 'That knowledge by which the Imperishable is apprehended' (Mu.
30250 Up. I, 1, 5), the word 'Imperishable' is seen to denote the highest
30251 Brahman!--In cases, we reply, where the meaning of a word may be
30252 determined on the basis either of some other means of proof or of
30253 Scripture, the former meaning presents itself to the mind first, and
30254 hence there is no reason why such meaning should not be accepted.--But
30255 how do you know that the ether of the text is not ether in the ordinary
30256 sense?--From the description, we reply, given of it in the text, 'That
30257 above the heavens,' &c. There it is said that all created things past,
30258 present and future rest on ether as their basis; ether cannot therefore
30259 be taken as that elementary substance which itself is comprised in the
30260 sphere of things created. We therefore must understand by 'ether' matter
30261 in its subtle state, i.e. the Pradhâna; and the Imperishable which
30262 thereupon is declared to be the support of that Pradhâna, hence cannot
30263 itself be the Pradhâna.--Nor is there any force in the argument that a
30264 sense established by some other means of proof presents itself to the
30265 mind more immediately than a sense established by Scripture; for as the
30266 word 'akshara' (i.e. the non-perishable) intimates its sense directly
30267 through the meaning of its constituent elements other means of proof
30268 need not be regarded at all.

30269
30270 Moreover Yājñavalkya had said previously that the ether is the cause and
30271 abode of all things past, present and future, and when Gârgî thereupon
30272 asks him in what that ether 'is woven,' i.e. what is the causal
30273 substance and abode of ether, he replies 'the Imperishable.' Now this
30274 also proves that by the 'Imperishable' we have to understand the
30275 Pradhâna which from other sources is known to be the causal substance,
30276 and hence the abode, of all effected things whatsoever.

30277
30278 This primâ facie view is set aside by the Sûtra. The 'Imperishable' is
30279 the highest Brahman, because the text declares it to support that which
30280 is the end, i. e. that which lies beyond ether, viz. unevolved matter
30281 (avyâkritam). The ether referred to in Gârgî's question is not ether in
30282 the ordinary sense, but what lies beyond ether, viz. unevolved matter,
30283 and hence the 'Imperishable' which is said to be the support of that
30284 'unevolved' cannot itself be the 'unevolved,' i.e. cannot be the
30285 Pradhâna. Let us, then, the Pûrvapakshin resumes, understand by the
30286 'Imperishable,' the individual soul; for this may be viewed as the
30287 support of the entire aggregate of non-sentient matter, inclusive of the
30288 elements in their subtle condition; and the qualities of non-coarseness,
30289 &c., are characteristic of that soul also. Moreover there are several
30290 texts in which the term 'Imperishable' is actually seen to denote the

30291 individual soul; so e.g. 'the non-evolved' is merged in the
30292 'Imperishable'; 'That of which the non-evolved is the body; that of
30293 which the Imperishable is the body'; 'All the creatures are the
30294 Perishable, the non-changing Self is called the Imperishable' (Bha. Gî.
30295 XV, 16).

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30297 To this alternative primâ facie view the next Sûtra replies.
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30301
30302 10. And this (supporting) (springs) from command.
30303

30304 The text declares that this supporting of ether and all other things
30305 proceeds from command. 'In the command of that Imperishable sun and moon
30306 stand, held apart; in the command of that Imperishable heaven and earth
30307 stand, held apart,' &c. Now such supreme command, through which all
30308 things in the universe are held apart, cannot possibly belong to the
30309 individual soul in the state either of bondage or of release. The
30310 commanding 'Imperishable' therefore is none other than the supreme
30311 Person.
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30316 11. And on account of the exclusion of (what is of) another nature (than
30317 Brahman).
30318

30319 Another nature, i. e. the nature of the Pradhâna, and so on. A
30320 supplementary passage excludes difference on the part of the
30321 Imperishable from the supreme Person. 'That Imperishable, O Gârgî, is
30322 unseen but seeing; unheard but hearing; unthought but thinking; unknown
30323 but knowing. There is nothing that sees but it, nothing that hears but
30324 it, nothing that thinks but it, nothing that knows but it. In that
30325 Imperishable, O Gârgî, the ether is woven, warp and woof.' Here the
30326 declaration as to the Imperishable being what sees, hears, &c. excludes
30327 the non-intelligent Pradhâna; and the declaration as to its being all-
30328 seeing, &c. while not seen by any one excludes the individual soul. This
30329 exclusion of what has a nature other than that of the highest Self thus
30330 confirms the view of that Self being meant.--Or else the Sûtra may be
30331 explained in a different way, viz. 'On account of the exclusion of the
30332 existence of another.' On this alternative the text 'There is nothing
30333 that sees but it,' &c., is to be understood as follows: 'while this
30334 Imperishable, not seen by others but seeing all others, forms the basis
30335 of all things different from itself; there is no other principle which,
30336 unseen by the Imperishable but seeing it, could form its basis,' i.e.
30337 the text would exclude the existence of any other thing but the
30338 Imperishable, and thus implicitly deny that the Imperishable is either
30339 the Pradhâna or the individual Self.--Moreover the text 'By the command
30340 of that Imperishable men praise those who give, the gods follow the
30341 Sacrificer, the fathers the Darvî-offering,' declares the Imperishable to
30342 be that on the command of which there proceed all works enjoined by
30343 Scripture and Smṛiti. such as sacrificing, giving, &c., and this again
30344 shows that the Imperishable must be Brahman, the supreme Person. Again,
30345 the subsequent passus, 'Whosoever without knowing that Imperishable,'
30346 &c., declares that ignorance of the Imperishable leads to the Samsâra,
30347 while knowledge of it helps to reach Immortality: this also proves that
30348 the Imperishable is the highest Brahman.--Here terminates the adhikarana
30349 of 'the Imperishable.'
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30354 12. On account of his being designated as the object of seeing, he (i.e.
30355 the highest Self) (is that object).
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30357 The followers of the Atharva-veda, in the section containing the
30358 question asked by Satyakâma, read as follows: 'He again who meditates
30359 with this syllable Aum of three Mâtrâs on the highest Person, he comes

30360 to light and to the sun. As a snake frees itself from its skin, so he
30361 frees himself from evil. He is led up by the Sâman verses to the Brahma-
30362 world; he sees the person dwelling in the castle who is higher than the
30363 individual souls concreted with bodies and higher (than those)' (Pra. Up.
30364 V, 2). Here the terms 'he meditates' and 'he sees' have the same sense,
30365 'seeing' being the result of devout meditation; for according to the
30366 principle expressed in the text (Ch. Up. III, 14) 'According as man's
30367 thought is in this world,' what is reached by the devotee is the object
30368 of meditation; and moreover the text exhibits the same object, viz. 'the
30369 highest Person' in connexion with both verbs.

30370
30371 The doubt here presents itself whether the highest Person in this text
30372 be the so-called four-faced Brahmâ, the Lord of the mundane egg who
30373 represents the individual souls in their collective aspect, or the
30374 supreme Person who is the Lord of all.--The Pûrvapakshin maintains the
30375 former view. For, he argues, on the introductory question, 'He who here
30376 among men should meditate until death on the syllable Om, what would he
30377 obtain by it?' The text first declares that he who meditates on that
30378 syllable as having one Mâtrâ, obtains the world of men; and next, that
30379 he who meditates on it as having two Mâtrâs obtains the world of the
30380 atmosphere. Hence the Brahma-world, which the text after that represents
30381 as the object reached by him who meditates on Om as having three
30382 syllables, must be the world of Brahmâ Katurmukha who is constituted by
30383 the aggregate of the individual souls. What the soul having reached that
30384 world sees, therefore is the same Brahmâ Katurmukha; and thus only the
30385 attribute 'etasmâj' jîvaghanât parât param' is suitable; for the
30386 collective soul, i. e. Brahmâ Katurmukha, residing in the Brahma-world
30387 is higher (para) than the distributive or discrete soul (jîva) which is
30388 concreted (ghanî-bhûta) with the body and sense-organs, and at the same
30389 time is higher (para) than these. The highest Person mentioned in the
30390 text, therefore, is Brahmâ Katurmukha; and the qualities mentioned
30391 further on, such as absence of decay, &c., must be taken in such a way
30392 as to agree with that Brahmâ.

30393
30394 To this primâ facie view the Sûtra replies that the object of seeing is
30395 He, i.e. the highest Self, on account of designation. The text clearly
30396 designates the object of seeing as the highest Self. For the concluding
30397 sloka, which refers to that object of seeing, declares that 'by means of
30398 the Omkâra he who knows reaches that which is tranquil, free from decay,
30399 immortal, fearless, the highest'--all which attributes properly belong
30400 to the highest Self only, as we know from texts such as 'that is the
30401 Immortal, that is the fearless, that is Brahman' (Ch. Up. IV, 15, i).
30402 The qualification expressed in the clause 'etasmâj_ jîva.--ghanât,' &c.
30403 may also refer to the highest Self only, not to Brahmâ Katurmukha; for
30404 the latter is himself comprehended by the term 'jîvaghana.' For that
30405 term denotes all souls which are embodied owing to karman; and that
30406 Katurmukha is one of those we know from texts such as 'He who first
30407 creates Brahmâ' (Svet. Up. VI, 18). Nor is there any strength in the
30408 argument that, since the Brahma-world mentioned in the text is known to
30409 be the world of Katurmukha, as it follows next on the world of the
30410 atmosphere, the being abiding there must needs be Katurmukha. We rather
30411 argue as follows--as from the concluding clause 'that which is tranquil,
30412 free from decay,' &c., we ascertain that the object of intuition is the
30413 highest Brahman, the Brahma-world spoken of as the abode of the seeing
30414 devotee cannot be the perishable world of Brahmâ Katurmukha. A further
30415 reason for this conclusion is supplied by what the text says about 'him
30416 who is freed from all evil being led up by the Sâman verses to the world
30417 of Brahman'; for the place reached by him who is freed from all evil
30418 cannot be the mere abode of Katurmukha. Hence also the concluding sloka
30419 says with reference to that Brahma-world 'that which the wise teach':
30420 what the wise see and teach is the abode of the highest, of Vishnu; cp.
30421 the text 'the wise ever see that highest abode of Vishnu.' Nor is it
30422 even strictly true that the world of Brahmâ follows on the atmosphere,
30423 for the svarga-world and several others lie between the two.

30424
30425 We therefore shortly explain the drift of the whole chapter as follows.
30426 At the outset of the reply given to Satyakâma there is mentioned, in
30427 addition to the highest (para) Brahman, a lower (apara) Brahman. This
30428 lower or effected (kârya) Brahman is distinguished as twofold, being

30429 connected either with this terrestrial world or yonder, non-terrestrial,
30430 world. Him who meditates on the Pranava as having one syllable, the text
30431 declares to obtain a reward in this world--he reaches the world of men.
30432 He, on the other hand, who meditates on the Pranava as having two
30433 syllables is said to obtain his reward in a super-terrestrial sphere--he
30434 reaches the world of the atmosphere. And he finally who, by means of the
30435 trisyllabic Pranava which denotes the highest Brahman, meditates on this
30436 very highest Brahman, is said to reach that Brahman, i. e. the supreme
30437 Person.--The object of seeing is thus none other than the highest Self.--
30438 Here terminates the adhikarana of the 'object of seeing.'

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30443 13. The small (ether) (is Brahman), on account of the subsequent
30444 (arguments).
30445

30446 The Chandogas have the following text, 'Now in that city of Brahman
30447 there is the palace, the small lotus, and in it that small ether. Now
30448 what is within that small ether that is to be sought for, that is to be
30449 understood' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 1).--The question here arises whether that
30450 small ether (space) within the lotus of the heart be the material
30451 clement called ether, or the individual Self, or the highest Self.--The
30452 first view presenting itself is that the element is meant, for the
30453 reason that the word 'ether' is generally used in that sense; and
30454 because the clause 'what is within that small ether' shows that the
30455 ether mentioned constitutes the abode of something else that is to be
30456 enquired into.--This view is set aside by the Sûtra. The small ether
30457 within the heart is the highest Brahman, on account of the subsequent
30458 reasons, contained in clauses of the same section. The passage 'That
30459 Self which is free from evil, free from old age, free from death, free
30460 from grief, free from hunger and thirst, whose wishes and purposes come
30461 true' (VIII, 7, 1) ascribes to that small ether qualities--such as
30462 unconditioned Selfhood, freedom from evil, &c.--which clearly show that
30463 ether to be the highest Brahman. And this conclusion is confirmed by
30464 what other texts say about him who knows the small ether attaining the
30465 power of realising his own wishes, 'Those who depart from hence having
30466 come to know the Self and those real wishes, for them there is freedom
30467 in all worlds'; and 'whatever object he desires, by his mere will it
30468 comes to him; having obtained it he is happy' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 6; 2, 9).
30469 If moreover the ether within the heart were the elemental ether, the
30470 comparison instituted in the passage 'As large as that (elemental) ether
30471 is, so large is this ether within the heart' would be wholly
30472 inappropriate. Nor must it be said that that comparison rests on the
30473 limitation of the ether within the heart (so that the two terms compared
30474 would be the limited elemental ether within the heart, and the universal
30475 elemental ether); for there still would remain the inappropriate
30476 assertion that the ether within the heart is the abode of heaven, earth
30477 and all other things.--But, an objection is raised, also on the
30478 alternative of the small ether being the highest Brahman, the comparison
30479 to the universal elemental ether is unsuitable; for scripture explicitly
30480 states that the highest Self is (not as large but) larger than
30481 everything else, 'larger than the earth, larger than the sky,' &c. (Ch.
30482 Up. III, 14, 3). Not so, we reply; what the text says as to the ether
30483 within the heart being as large as the universal ether is meant (not to
30484 make a conclusive statement as to its extent but only) to negative that
30485 smallness of the ether which is established by its abiding within the
30486 heart. Similarly we say 'the sun moves with the speed of an arrow'; the
30487 sun indeed moves much faster than an arrow, but what our assertion means
30488 is merely that he does not move slowly.--But, a further doubt is started,
30489 the passage 'That Self which is free from sin,' &c. does not appear to
30490 refer back to the small ether within the heart. For the text makes a
30491 distinction between that ether and that within that ether which it
30492 declares to be the due object of search and enquiry. This latter object
30493 therefore is the topic of discussion, and when the text says later on
30494 'That Self, free from sin, &c. is to be searched out' we must understand
30495 it to refer to the same object of search.--This would be so, we reply,
30496 if the text did not distinguish the small ether and that which abides
30497 within it; but as a matter of fact it does distinguish the two. The

30498 connexion is as follows. The text at first refers to the body of the
30499 devotee as the city of Brahman, the idea being that Brahman is present
30500 therein as object of meditation; and then designates an organ of that
30501 body, viz. the small lotus-shaped heart as the palace of Brahman. It
30502 then further refers to Brahman--the all knowing, all powerful, whose
30503 love towards his devotees is boundless like the ocean--as the small
30504 ether within the heart, meaning thereby that Brahman who for the benefit
30505 of his devotees is present within that palace should be meditated upon
30506 as of minute size, and finally--in the clause 'that is to be searched
30507 out'--enjoins as the object of meditation that which abides in that
30508 Brahman, i.e. on the one hand, its essential freedom from all evil
30509 qualities, and on the other the whole treasure of its auspicious
30510 qualities, its power of realising its wishes and so on. The 'that' (in
30511 'that is to be searched out') enjoins as objects of search the small
30512 ether, i.e. Brahman itself as well as the qualities abiding within it.--
30513 But how, it may be asked, do you know that the word 'that' really refers
30514 to both, viz. the highest Brahman, there called 'small ether,' and the
30515 qualities abiding in it, and that hence the clause enjoins an enquiry
30516 into both these entities?--Listen, attentively, we reply, to our
30517 explanation! The clause 'As large as this ether is, so large is this
30518 ether within the heart' declares the exceeding greatness of the small
30519 ether; the clause 'Both heaven and earth are contained within it' up to
30520 'lightning and stars' declares that same small ether to be the abode of
30521 the entire world; and the clause 'And whatever there is for him in this
30522 world, and whatever there is not, all that is contained within it'
30523 declares that whatever objects of enjoyment there are for the devotee in
30524 this world, and whatever other objects there are not for him, i.e. are
30525 merely wishes but not obtained by him, all those objects are contained
30526 within that same small ether. The text next declares that that small
30527 ether, although dwelling within the heart which is a part of the body,
30528 is not affected by the body's old age and decay, for being extremely
30529 minute it is not capable of change; and adds 'that true being is the
30530 Brahman-city,' i.e. that Reality which is the cause of all is the city
30531 called Brahman, i.e. the abode of the entire Universe. The following
30532 clause 'in it all desires are contained' again referring to the small
30533 ether ('in it') declares that in it all desires, i.e. all desirable
30534 qualities are contained. The text next proceeds to set forth that the
30535 small ether possesses Selfhood and certain desirable auspicious
30536 qualities--this is done in the passage 'It is the Self free from sin' &c.
30537 up to 'whose purposes realise themselves.' The following section--'And
30538 as here on earth' down to 'for them there is freedom in all the worlds'--
30539 declares that those who do not know those eight qualities and the Self,
30540 called 'small ether,' which is characterised by them, and who perform
30541 actions aiming at objects of enjoyment different from that Self, obtain
30542 perishable results only, and do not attain the power of realising their
30543 wishes; while those on the other hand who know the Self called 'small
30544 ether' and the qualities abiding within it, through the grace of that
30545 very same highest Self, obtain all their wishes and the power of
30546 realising their purposes. On the ground of this connected consideration
30547 of the whole chapter we are able to decide that the text enjoins as the
30548 object of search and enquiry both the highest Brahman and the whole body
30549 of auspicious qualities abiding within it. This the Vâkyakâra also
30550 renders clear in the passage beginning 'In the text "what is within
30551 that" there is designation of wishes (i.e. desirable qualities).--For
30552 all these reasons the small ether is the highest Brahman.

30553
30554
30555
30556
30557 14. On account of the going and of the word; for thus it is seen; and
30558 (there is) an inferential sign.

30559
30560 'As people who do not know the country walk again and again over a gold
30561 treasure' &c., 'thus do all these creatures day after day go into _that_
30562 Brahma-world' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2). The circumstance, here stated, of
30563 all individual souls going to a place which the qualification '_that_'
30564 connects with the subject-matter of the whole chapter, i.e. the small
30565 ether; and the further circumstance of the goal of their going being
30566 called the Brahma-world, also prove that the small ether is none other

than the highest Brahman.--But in what way do these two points prove what they are claimed to prove?--'For thus it is seen'; the Sûtra adds. For we see it stated in other texts, that all individual souls go daily to Brahman, viz. in the state of deep sleep, 'All these creatures having become united with the True do not know that they are united with the True'; 'Having come back from the True they know not that they have come back from the True' (Ch. Up. VI, 9, 2; 10, 2). And in the same way we see that the word 'Brahma-world' denotes the highest Brahman; so e.g. 'this is the Brahma-world, O King' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 32).--The Sûtra subjoins a further reason. Even if the going of the souls to Brahman were not seen in other texts, the fact that the text under discussion declares the individual souls to abide in Brahman in the state of deep sleep, enjoying freedom from all pain and trouble just as if they were merged in the pralaya state, is a sufficient 'inferential sign' to prove that the 'small ether' is the highest Brahman. And similarly the term 'Brahma-world' as exhibited in the text under discussion, if understood as denoting co-ordination (i.e. 'that world which is Brahman'), is sufficient to prove by itself that the 'small ether'--to which that term is applied--is the highest Brahman; it therefore is needless to appeal to other passages. That this explanation of 'Brahma-world' is preferable to the one which understands by Brahma-world 'the world of Brahman' is proved by considerations similar to those by which the Pû. Mî. Sûtras prove that 'Nishâda-sthapati' means a headman who at the same time is a Nishâda.--Another explanation of the passage under discussion may also be given. What is said there about all these creatures daily 'going into the Brahma-world,' may not refer at all to the state of deep sleep, but rather mean that although 'daily going into the Brahman-world,' i. e. although at all time moving above the small ether, i. e. Brahman which as the universal Self is everywhere, yet all these creatures not knowing Brahman do not find, i.e. obtain it; just as men not knowing the place where a treasure is hidden do not find it, although they constantly pass over it. This constant moving about on the part of ignorant creatures on the surface, as it were, of the small ether abiding within as their inward Ruler, proves that small ether to be the highest Brahman. That the highest Brahman abides within as the inner Self of creatures who dwell in it and are ruled by it, we are told in other texts also, so e.g. in the Antaryâmin-brâhmana. 'He who dwells in the Self, within the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who rules the Self within; unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22; 23).--On this interpretation we explain the last part of the Sûtra as follows. Even if other texts did not refer to it, this daily moving about on the part of ignorant creatures, on the ether within the heart--which the comparison with the treasure of gold shows to be the supreme good of man--, is in itself a sufficient proof for the small ether being Brahman.

15. And on account of there being observed in that (small ether), supporting which is a greatness of that (i. e. Brahman).

In continuation of the passage 'It is the Self free from Sin,' &c., which refers to the small ether, the text says: 'it is a bank, a limitary support, that these worlds may not be confounded.' What the text here says about the small ether supporting the world proves it to be the highest Brahman; for to support the world is the glory of Brahman. Compare 'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things. He is a bank and a boundary, so that these worlds may not be confounded' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22); 'By the command of that Imperishable, O Gârgî, heaven and earth stand, held apart' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 9). Now this specific greatness of the highest Brahman, which consists in its supporting the world, is also observed in the small ether--which proves the latter to be none other than Brahman.

16. And on account of the settled meaning.

The word 'ether,' moreover, is known to have, among other meanings, that of Brahman. Compare 'For who could breathe, who could breathe forth, if that ether were not bliss?' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); 'All these beings take their rise from the ether' (Ch. Up. I, 9, 1). It has to be kept in view that in the text under discussion the meaning 'Brahman' is supported by what is said about the qualities of the small ether--viz. freedom from sin, &c.--and hence is stronger than the other meaning--, according to which âkâsa signifies the elemental ether.

So far the Sûtras have refuted the view of the small ether being the element. They now enter on combating the notion that the small ether may possibly be the individual soul.

17. If it be said that on account of reference to the other one he is meant; we say no, on account of impossibility.

An objection is raised to the argumentation that, on account of complementary passages, the small ether must be explained to mean the highest Self.

For, the objector says, a clear reference to him who is 'other' than the highest Self, i.e. to the individual soul, is contained in the following passage (VIII, 12, 3): 'Thus does that serenity (samprasâda), having risen from this body and approached the highest light, appear in its own form.' 'That is the Self,' he said. 'That is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman' (VIII, 7, 3?). We admit that for the different reasons stated above the ether within the heart cannot be the elemental ether; but owing to the force of the intimations conveyed by the complementary passages just quoted, we must adopt the view that what is meant is the individual soul. And as the word 'âkâsa' may be connected with prakâsa (light), it may be applied to the individual soul also.--This view is set aside by the Sûtra. The small ether cannot be the individual soul because the qualities attributed in the text to the former, viz. freedom from sin, &c., cannot possibly belong to the individual soul.

18. Should it be said that from a subsequent passage (it appears that the individual Soul is meant); rather (the soul) in so far as its true nature has become manifest.

The Pûrvapakshin now maintains that we ascertain from a subsequent declaration made by Prajâpati that it is just the individual Soul that possesses freedom from sin and the other qualities enumerated. The whole teaching of Prajâpati, he says, refers to the individual Soul only. Indra having heard that Prajâpati had spoken about a Self free from sin, old age, &c., the enquiry into which enables the soul to obtain all worlds and desires, approaches Prajâpati with the wish to learn the true nature of that Self which should be enquired into. Prajâpati thereupon, wishing to test the capacity of his pupil for receiving true instruction, gives him successive information about the embodied soul in the state of waking, dream and dreamless sleep. When he finds that Indra sees no good in instruction of this kind and thus shows himself fit to receive instruction about the true nature of the disembodied Self, he explains to him that the body is a mere abode for a ruling Self; that that bodiless Self is essentially immortal; and that the soul, as long as it is joined to a body due to karman, is compelled to experience pleasure and pain corresponding to its embodied state, while it rises above all this when it has freed itself from the body (VIII, 12, 1). He then continues: 'Thus that serenity having risen from this body and approached the highest light, appears in its own form'; thus teaching him the true nature, free from a body, of the individual soul. He next informs him that the 'highest light' which the soul reaches is the supreme Person ('That is the supreme Person'), and that the soul having

30705 reached that highest light and freed itself from what obscured its own
30706 true nature, obtains in the world of Brahman whatever enjoyments it
30707 desires, and is no longer connected with a body springing from karman
30708 and inseparable from pain and pleasure, or with anything else that
30709 causes distress. ('He moves about there laughing,' &c.). He next
30710 illustrates the connexion with a body, of the soul in the Samsâra state,
30711 by means of a comparison: 'Like as a horse attached to a cart,' &c.
30712 After that he explains that the eye and the other sense-organs are
30713 instruments of knowledge, colour, and so on, the objects of knowledge,
30714 and the individual Self the knowing subject; and that hence that Self is
30715 different from the body and the sense-organs ('Now where the sight has
30716 entered' up to 'the mind is his divine eye'). Next he declares that,
30717 after having divested itself of the body and the senses, the Self
30718 perceives all the objects of its desire by means of its 'divine eye,' i.
30719 e. the power of cognition which constitutes its essential nature ('He by
30720 means of the divine eye,' &c.). He further declares that those who have
30721 true knowledge know the Self as such ('on that Self the devas meditate');
30722 and in conclusion teaches that he who has that true knowledge of the
30723 Self obtains for his reward the intuition of Brahman--which is suggested
30724 by what the text says about the obtaining of all worlds and all desires
30725 ('He obtains all worlds and all desires,' &c., up to the end of the
30726 chapter).--It thus appears that the entire chapter proposes as the
30727 object of cognition the individual soul free from sin, and so on. The
30728 qualities, viz. freedom from guilt, &c., may thus belong to the
30729 individual Self, and on this ground we conclude that the small ether is
30730 the individual Self.

30731
30732 This view the second half of the Sûtra sets aside. The two sections,
30733 that which treats of the small ether and that which contains the
30734 teaching of Prajâpati, have different topics. Prajâpati's teaching
30735 refers to the individual soul, whose true nature, with its qualities
30736 such as freedom from evil, &c., is at first hidden by untruth, while
30737 later on, when it has freed itself from the bondage of karman, risen
30738 from the body, and approached the highest light, it manifests itself in
30739 its true form and then is characterised by freedom from all evil and by
30740 other auspicious qualities. In the section treating of the small ether,
30741 on the other hand, we have to do with the small ether, i.e. the highest
30742 Brahman, whose true nature is never hidden, and which therefore is
30743 unconditionally characterised by freedom from evil, and so on.--
30744 Moreover, the daharâkâsa-section ascribes to the small ether other
30745 attributes which cannot belong to the individual Self even 'when its
30746 true nature has manifested itself.' The small ether is there called a
30747 bank and support of all worlds; and one of its names, 'satyam,' is
30748 explained to imply that it governs all sentient and non-sentient beings.
30749 All this also proves that the small ether is none other than the highest
30750 Self. That the individual soul, 'even when its true nature is manifest,'
30751 cannot be viewed as a bank and support of the worlds, &c., we shall show
30752 under IV, 4.

30753
30754 But if this is so, what then is the meaning of the reference to the
30755 individual soul which is made in the section treating of the small ether,
30756 viz. in the passage, 'Now that serene being, which after having risen
30757 from this body,' &c. (VIII, 3, 4)?

30758
30759 To this question the next Sûtra replies.

30760
30761
30762
30763
30764 19. And the reference has a different meaning.

30765
30766 The text in question declares that the released individual soul when
30767 reaching the highest light, i.e. Brahman, which is free from all sin,
30768 and so on, attains its true nature, which is characterised by similar
30769 freedom from sin, and so on. Now this reference to the individual soul,
30770 as described in the teaching of Prajâpati, has the purpose of giving
30771 instruction (not about the qualities of the individual soul, but) about
30772 the nature of that which is the cause of the qualities of the individual
30773 soul, i.e. the qualities specially belonging to the supreme Person. The

reason why, in the section containing the teaching of Prajâpati, information is given as to the true nature of the released individual soul is that such knowledge assists the doctrine referring to the small ether. For the individual Self which wishes to reach Brahman must know his own true nature also, so as to realise that he, as being himself endowed with auspicious qualities, will finally arrive at an intuition of the highest Brahman, which is a mass of auspicious qualities raised to the highest degree of excellence. The cognition of the soul's own true nature is itself comprised in the result of the meditation on Brahman, and the results which are proclaimed in the teaching of Prajâpati ('He obtains all worlds and all wishes'; 'He moves about there laughing,' &c.) thus really are results of the knowledge of the small ether.

20. If it be said, owing to the scriptural declaration of smallness; that has been explained.

The text describes the ether within the heart as being of small compass, and this agrees indeed with the individual soul which elsewhere is compared to the point of an awl, but not with Brahman, which is greater than everything.--The reply to this objection has virtually been given before, viz. under I, 2, 7, where it is said that Brahman may be viewed as of small size, for the purpose of devout meditation.

It thus remains a settled conclusion that the small ether is none other but the highest Person who is untouched by even a shadow of imperfection, and is an ocean of infinite, supremely exalted, qualities--knowledge, strength, lordly power, &c. The being, on the other hand, which in the teaching of Prajâpati is described as first having a body due to karman--as we see from passages such as 'they strike it as it were, they cut it as it were'--and as afterwards approaching the highest light, and then manifesting its essential qualities, viz. freedom from sin, &c., is the individual soul; not the small ether (or Brahman).

The next Sûtra supplies a further reason for this conclusion.

21. And on account of the imitation of that.

The individual soul, free from bondage, and thus possessing the qualities of freedom from sin, &c., cannot be the small ether, i.e. the highest Brahman, because it is stated to 'imitate,' i.e. to be equal to that Brahman. The text making that statement is Mu. Up. III, 1, 3, 'When the seer (i.e. the individual soul) sees the brilliant maker, the Lord, the Person who has his source in Brahman; then becoming wise and shaking off good and evil, he reaches the highest equality, free from passions.' The being to which the teaching of Prajâpati refers is the 'imitator,' i.e. the individual soul; the Brahman which is 'imitated' is the small ether.

22. The same is declared by Smriti also.

Smriti also declares that the transmigrating soul when reaching the state of Release 'imitates,' i.e. attains supreme equality of attributes with the highest Brahman. 'Abiding by this knowledge they, attaining to equality of attributes with me, are not born again at the time of creation, nor are they affected by the general dissolution of the world' (Bha. Gî. XIV, 2).

Some maintain that the last two Sûtras constitute a separate adhikarana (head of discussion), meant to prove that the text Mu. Up. II, 2, 10

('After him the shining one, everything shines; by the light of him all this is lighted'), refers to the highest Brahman. This view is, however, inadmissible, for the reason that with regard to the text quoted no pûrvapaksha can arise, it having been proved under I, 2, 21 ff., and 1,3, 1, ff., that the whole section of which that text forms part is concerned with Brahman; and it further having been shown under I, 1, 24 ff., that Brahman is apprehended under the form of light.--The interpretation moreover does not fit in with the wording of the Sûtras.--Here terminates the adhikarana of the 'small one.'

23. On account of the term, the one measured.

We read in the Kathavallî 'The Person of the size of a thumb stands in the middle of the Self, as lord of the past and the future, and henceforward fears no more'; 'That Person of the size of a thumb is like a light without smoke,' &c. (Ka. Up. II, 4, 1; 13). And 'The Person not larger than a thumb, the inner Self, is always settled in the heart of men' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 17). A doubt here arises whether the being measured by the extent of a span be the individual soul or the highest Self.--The Pûrvapakshin maintains the former view; for, he says, another scriptural text also declares the individual soul to have that measure, 'the ruler of the vital airs moves through his own works, of the size of a thumb, brilliant like the sun, endowed with purposes and egoity' (Svet. Up. V, 7; 8). Moreover, the highest Self is not anywhere else, not even for the purpose of meditation, represented as having the size of a thumb. It thus being determined that the being of the length of a thumb is the individual Self, we understand the term 'Lord,' which is applied to it, as meaning that it is the Lord of the body, the sense-organs, the objects and the instruments of fruition.--Of this view the Sûtra disposes, maintaining that the being a thumb long can be none but the highest Self, just on account of that term. For lordship over all things past and future cannot possibly belong to the individual Self, which is under the power of karman.--But how can the highest Self be said to have the measure of a thumb?--On this point the next Sûtra satisfies us.

24. But with reference to the heart, men being qualified.

In so far as the highest Self abides, for the purpose of devout meditation, in the heart of the devotee--which heart is of the measure of a thumb--it may itself be viewed as having the measure of a thumb. The individual soul also can be said to have the measure of a thumb only in so far as dwelling within the heart; for scripture directly states that its real size is that of the point of a goad, i.e. minute. And as men only are capable of devout meditation, and hence alone have a claim on scripture, the fact that the hearts of other living creatures also, such as donkeys, horses, snakes, &c., have the same size, cannot give rise to any objection.--The discussion of this matter will be completed later on [FOOTNOTE 326:1].

25. Also beings above them (i.e. men), Bâdarâyana thinks, on account of possibility.

In order to prove that the highest Brahman may be viewed as having the size of a thumb, it has been declared that the scriptural texts enjoining meditation on Brahman are the concern of men. This offers an opportunity for the discussion of the question whether also other classes of individual souls, such as devas, are qualified for knowledge of Brahman. The Pûrvapakshin denies this qualification in the case of gods and other beings, on the ground of absence of capability. For, he says, bodiless beings, such as gods, are incapable of the accomplishment

of meditation on Brahman, which requires as its auxiliaries the seven means enumerated above (p. 17)--This must not be objected to on the ground of the devas, and so on, having bodies; for there is no means of proof establishing such embodiedness. We have indeed proved above that the Vedânta-texts may intimate accomplished things, and hence are an authoritative means for the cognition of Brahman; but we do not meet with any Vedânta-text, the purport of which is to teach that the devas, and so on, possess bodies. Nor can this point be established through mantras and arthavâda texts; for these are merely supplementary to the injunctions of actions (sacrificial, and so on), and therefore have a different aim. And the injunctions themselves prove nothing with regard to the devas, except that the latter are that with a view to which those actions are performed. In the same way it also cannot be shown that the gods have any desires or wants (to fulfil or supply which they might enter on meditation of Brahman). For the two reasons above we therefore conclude that the devas, and so on, are not qualified for meditation on Brahman.--This view is contradicted by the Sûtra. Such meditation is possible in the case of higher beings also Bâdarâyana thinks; on account of the possibility of want and capacity on their part also. Want and wish exist in their case since they also are liable to suffering, springing from the assaults, hard to be endured, of the different kinds of pain, and since they also know that supreme enjoyment is to be found in the highest Brahman, which is untouched by the shadow even of imperfection, and is a mass of auspicious qualities in their highest perfection. 'Capability', on the other hand, depends on the possession of a body and sense-organs of whatever degree of tenuity; and that the devas, from Brahma downward, possess a body and sense-organs, is declared in all the Upanishads, in the chapters treating of creation and the chapters enjoining meditation. In the Chândogya, e.g. it is related how the highest Being having resolved on creation, evolved the aggregate of non-sentient matter with its different kinds, and then produced the fourfold multitude of living creatures, each having a material body corresponding to its karman, and a suitable name of its own. Similarly, all the other scriptural accounts of creation declare that there are four classes of creatures--devas, men, animals, and non-moving beings, such as plants--and the difference of these classes depends on the individual Selfs being joined to various bodies capacitating them to experience the results of their works, each in that one of the fourteen worlds--beginning with the world of Brahmâ--which is the suitable place for retribution. For in themselves, apart from bodies, the individual Selfs are not distinguished as men, gods, and so on. In the same way the story of the devas and Asuras approaching Prajâpati with fuel in their hands, staying with him as pupils for thirty-two years, &c. (Ch. Up. VIII, 7 ff.), clearly shows that the devas possess bodies and sense-organs. Analogously, mantras and arthavâdas, which are complementary to injunctions of works, contain unmistakeable references to the corporeal nature of the gods ('Indra holding in his hand the thunderbolt'; 'Indra lifted the thunderbolt', &c.); and as the latter is not contradicted by any other means of proof it must be accepted on the authority stated. Nor can it be said that those mantras and arthavâdas are really meant to express something else (than those details mentioned above), in so far, namely, as they aim at proclaiming or glorifying the action with which they are connected; for those very details subserve the purpose of glorification, and so on, and without them glorification is not possible. For we praise or glorify a thing by declaring its qualities; if such qualities do not exist all glorification lapses. It cannot by any means be maintained that anything may be glorified by the proclamation of its qualities, even if such qualities do not really exist. Hence the arthavâdas which glorify a certain action, just thereby intimate the real existence of the qualities and details of the action. The mantras again, which are prescribed in connexion with the actions, serve the purpose of throwing light on the use to be derived from the performance of the actions, and this they accomplish by making statements as to the particular qualities, such as embodiedness and the like, which belong to the devas and other classes of beings. Otherwise Indra, and so on, would not be remembered at the time of performance; for the idea of a divinity presents itself to the mind only in connexion with the special attributes of that divinity. In the case of such qualities as are not established by other means of proof, the primary statement is made by

the arthavâda or the mantra: the former thereby glorifies the action, and the latter proclaims it as possessing certain qualities or details; and both these ends are accomplished by making statements as to the gods, &c., possessing certain qualities, such as embodiedness and the like. In the case, again, of certain qualities being already established by other means of proof, the mantras and arthavâdas merely refer to them (as something already known), and in this way perform their function of glorification and elucidation. And where, thirdly, there is a contradiction between the other means of knowledge and what mantras and arthavâdas state (as when, e.g. a text of the latter kind says that 'the sacrificial post is the sun'), the intention of the text is metaphorically to denote, by means of those apparently unmeaning terms, certain other qualities which are not excluded by the other means of knowledge; and in this way the function of glorification and elucidation is again accomplished. Now what the injunction of a sacrificial action demands as its supplement, is a statement as to the power of the divinity to whom the sacrifice is offered; for the performance which scripture enjoins on men desirous of certain results, is itself of a merely transitory nature, and hence requires some agent capable of bringing about, at some future time, the result desired as, e.g. the heavenly world. 'Vâyu is the swiftest god; he (the sacrificer) approaches Vâyu with his own share; the god then leads him to prosperity' (Taitt. Samh. I, 2, 1); 'What he seeks by means of that offering, may he obtain that, may he prosper therein, may the gods favourably grant him that' (Taitt. Br. III, 5, 10, 5); these and similar arthavâdas and mantras intimate that the gods when propitiated by certain sacrificial works, give certain rewards and possess the power to do so; and they thus connect themselves with the general context of scripture as supplying an evidently required item of information. Moreover, the mere verb 'to sacrifice' (yaj), as denoting worship of the gods, intimates the presence of a deity which is to be propitiated by the action called sacrifice, and thus constitutes the main element of that action. A careful consideration of the whole context thus reveals that everything which is wanted for the due accomplishment of the action enjoined is to be learned from the text itself, and that hence we need not have recourse to such entities as the 'unseen principle' (apûrva), assumed to be denoted by, or to be imagined in connexion with, the passages enjoining certain actions. Hence the dharmasâstras, itihâsas, and purânas also, which are founded on the different brâhmanas, mantras and arthavâdas, clearly teach that Brahma and the other gods, as well as the Asuras and other superhuman beings, have bodies and sense-organs, constitutions of different kinds, different abodes, enjoyments, and functions.--Owing to their having bodies, the gods therefore are also qualified for meditation on Brahman.

[FOOTNOTE 326:1. The 'pramitâdhikarana' is resumed in Sûtra 41.]

26. If it be said that there results a contradiction to work; we deny this, on account of the observation of the assumption of several (bodies).

An objection here presents itself. If we admit the gods to have bodies, a difficulty arises at the sacrifices, as it is impossible that one and the same corporeal Indra--who is at the same time invited by many sacrificers 'come, O Indra', 'come, O Lord of the red horses,' &c.--should be present at all those places. And that the gods, Agni and so on, really do come to the sacrifices is proved by the following scriptural text: 'To whose sacrifice do the gods go, and to whose not? He who first receives the gods, sacrifices to them on the following day' (Taitt. Samh. I, 6, 7, 1). In refutation of this objection the Suûtra points out that there is seen, i.e. recorded, the assumption of several bodies at the same time, on the part of beings endowed with special powers, such as Saubhari.

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31051 27. If it be said (that a contradiction will result) with regard to
31052 words; we say no, since beings originate from them (as appears) from
31053 perception and inference.

31054

31055 Well then let us admit that there is no difficulty as far as sacrifices
31056 are concerned, for the reason stated in the preceding Sûtra. But another
31057 difficulty presents itself with regard to the words of which the Veda
31058 consists. For if Indra and the other gods are corporeal beings, it
31059 follows that they are made up of parts and hence non-permanent. This
31060 implies either that the Vedic words denoting them--not differing therein
31061 from common worldly words such as Devadatta--are totally devoid of
31062 meaning during all those periods which precede the origination of the
31063 beings called Indra and so on, or follow on their destruction; or else
31064 that the Veda itself is non-permanent, non-eternal.--This objection is
31065 not valid, the Sûtra points out, for the reason that those beings, viz.
31066 Indra and so on, again and again originate from the Vedic words. To
31067 explain. Vedic words, such as Indra and so on, do not, like the word
31068 Devadatta and the like, denote, on the basis of convention, one
31069 particular individual only: they rather denote by their own power
31070 particular species of beings, just as the word 'cow' denotes a
31071 particular species of animals. When therefore a special individual of
31072 the class called Indra has perished, the creator, apprehending from the
31073 Vedic word 'Indra' which is present to his mind the class
31074 characteristics of the beings denoted by that word, creates another
31075 Indra possessing those very same characteristics; just as the potter
31076 fashions a new jar, on the basis of the word 'jar' which is stirring in
31077 _his_ mind.--But how is this known?--'Through perception and inference,'
31078 i.e. through Scripture and Smriti. Scripture says, e.g. 'By means of the
31079 Veda Prajâpati evolved names and forms, the being and the non-being';
31080 and 'Saying "bhûh" (earth) he created the earth; saying "bhuvah" he
31081 created the air,' and so on; which passages teach that the creator at
31082 first bethinks himself of the characteristic make of a thing, in
31083 connexion with the word denoting it, and thereupon creates an individual
31084 thing characterised by that make. Smriti makes similar statements;
31085 compare, e. g. 'In the beginning there was sent forth by the creator,
31086 divine speech--beginningless and endless--in the form of the Veda, and
31087 from it there originated all creatures'; and 'He, in the beginning,
31088 separately created from the words of the Veda the names and works and
31089 shapes of all things'; and 'The names and forms of beings, and all the
31090 multiplicity of works He in the beginning created from the Veda.' This
31091 proves that from the corporeality of the gods, and so on, it follows
31092 neither that the words of the Veda are unmeaning nor that the Veda
31093 itself is non-eternal.

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31098 28. And for this very reason eternity (of the Veda).

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31100 As words such as Indra and Vasishtha, which denote gods and Rishis,
31101 denote (not individuals only, but) classes, and as the creation of those
31102 beings is preceded by their being suggested to the creative mind through
31103 those words; for this reason the eternity of the Veda admits of being
31104 reconciled with what scripture says about the mantras and kândas
31105 (sections) of the sacred text having 'makers' and about Rishis seeing
31106 the hymns; cp. such passages as 'He chooses the makers of mantras';
31107 'Reverence to the Rishis who are the makers of mantras'; 'That is Agni;
31108 this is a hymn of Visvâmitra.' For by means of these very texts
31109 Prajâpati presents to his own mind the characteristics and powers of the
31110 different Rishis who make the different sections, hymns, and mantras,
31111 thereupon creates them endowed with those characteristics and powers,
31112 and appoints them to remember the very same sections, hymns, &c. The
31113 Rishis being thus gifted by Prajâpati with the requisite powers, undergo
31114 suitable preparatory austerities and finally _see_ the mantras, and so
31115 on, proclaimed by the Vasishthas and other Rishis of former ages of the
31116 world, perfect in all their sounds and accents, without having learned
31117 them from the recitation of a teacher. There is thus no conflict between
31118 the eternity of the Veda and the fact that the Rishis are the _makers_

31119 of its sections, hymns, and so on. A further objection is raised. Let it
31120 be admitted that after each pralaya of the kind called 'contingent'
31121 (naimittika), Prajâpati may proceed to create new Indras, and so on, in
31122 the way of remembering on the basis of the Veda the Indras, and so on,
31123 of preceding periods. In the case, on the other hand, of a pralaya of
31124 the kind called elemental (prâkritika), in which the creator, Prajâpati
31125 himself, and words--which are the effects of the elemental ahankâra--
31126 pass away, what possibility is there of Prajâpati undertaking a new
31127 creation on the basis of Vedic words, and how can we speak of the
31128 permanency of a Veda which perishes? He who maintains the eternity of
31129 the Veda and the corporeality of gods, and so on, is thus really driven
31130 to the hypothesis of the course of mundane existence being without a
31131 beginning (i.e. not preceded by a pralaya).--Of this difficulty the next
31132 Sûtra disposes.

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31137 29. And on account of the equality of names and forms there is no
31138 contradiction, even in the renovation (of the world); as appears from--
31139 Sruti and Smriti.

31140
31141 On account of the sameness of names and forms, as stated before, there
31142 is no difficulty in the way of the origination of the world, even in the
31143 case of total pralayas. For what actually takes place is as follows.
31144 When the period of a great pralaya draws towards its close, the divine
31145 supreme Person, remembering the constitution of the world previous to
31146 the pralaya, and forming the volition 'May I become manifold' separates
31147 into its constituent elements the whole mass of enjoying souls and
31148 objects of enjoyment which, during the pralaya state, had been merged in
31149 him so as to possess a separate existence (not actual but) potential
31150 only, and then emits the entire world just as it had been before, from
31151 the so-called Mahat down to the Brahman-egg, and Hiranyagarbha
31152 (Prajâpati). Having thereupon manifested the Vedas in exactly the same
31153 order and arrangement they had had before, and having taught them to
31154 Hiranyagarbha, he entrusts to him the new creation of the different
31155 classes of beings, gods, and so on, just as it was before; and at the
31156 same time abides himself within the world so created as its inner Self
31157 and Ruler. This view of the process removes all difficulties. The
31158 superhuman origin and the eternity of the Veda really mean that
31159 intelligent agents having received in their minds an impression due to
31160 previous recitations of the Veda in a fixed order of words, chapters,
31161 and so on, remember and again recite it in that very same order of
31162 succession. This holds good both with regard to us men and to the
31163 highest Lord of all; there however is that difference between the two
31164 cases that the representations of the Veda which the supreme Person
31165 forms in his own mind are spontaneous, not dependent on an impression
31166 previously made.

31167
31168 To the question whence all this is known, the Sûtra replies 'from
31169 Scripture and Smriti.' The scriptural passage is 'He who first creates
31170 Brahmâ and delivers the Vedas to him' (Svet. Up. VI, 18). And as to
31171 Smriti we have the following statement in Manu, 'This universe existed
31172 in the shape of darkness, &c.--He desiring to produce beings of many
31173 kinds from his own body, first with a thought created the waters and
31174 placed his seed in them. That seed became a golden egg equal to the sun
31175 in brilliancy; in that he himself was born as Brahmâ, the progenitor of
31176 the whole world' (Manu I, 5; 8-9). To the same effect are the texts of
31177 the Paurânikas, 'From the navel of the sleeping divinity there sprung up
31178 a lotus, and in that lotus there was born Brahma fully knowing all Vedas
31179 and Vedângas. And then Brahmâ was told by him (the highest Divinity),
31180 'Do thou create all beings, O Great-minded one'; and the following
31181 passage, 'From the highest Nârâyana there was born the Four-faced one.'--
31182 And in the section which begins 'I will tell the original creation,' we
31183 read 'Because having created water (nâra) I abide within it, therefore
31184 my name shall be Nârâyana. There I lie asleep in every Kalpa, and as I
31185 am sleeping there springs from my navel a lotus, and in that lotus there
31186 is born the Four-faced one, and I tell him "Do thou, Great-minded one,
31187 create all beings."--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the deities.'

30. On account of the impossibility (of qualification for the madhuvidyâ, &c.) (Jaimini maintains the non-qualification (of gods, &c.).)

So far it has been proved that also the gods, and so on, are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. But a further point here presents itself for consideration, viz. whether the gods are qualified or not to undertake those meditations of which they themselves are the objects. The Sûtra states as a pûrvapaksha view held by Jaimini, that they are not so qualified, for the reason that there are no other Âdityas, Vasus, and so on, who could be meditated on by the Âdityas and Vasus themselves; and that moreover for the Âdityas and Vasus the qualities and position of those classes of deities cannot be objects of desire, considering that they possess them already. The so-called Madhuvidyâ (Ch. Up. III) represents as objects of devout meditation certain parts of the sun which are being enjoyed by the different classes of divine beings, Vasus, Âdityas, and so on--the sun being there called 'madhu.' i.e. honey or nectar, on account of his being the abode of a certain nectar to be brought about by certain sacrificial works to be known from the Rig-veda, and so on; and as the reward of such meditation the text names the attainment of the position of the Vasus, Âdityas, and so on.

31. And on account of (meditating on the part of the gods) being in the Light.

'Him the devas meditate upon as the light of lights, as immortal time' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 16). This text declares that the meditation of the gods has for its object the Light, i.e. the highest Brahman. Now this express declaration as to the gods being meditating devotees with regard to meditations on Brahman which are common to men and gods, implies a denial of the gods being qualified for meditations on other objects. The conclusion therefore is that the Vasus, and so on, are not qualified for meditations on the Vasus and other classes of deities.

32. But Bâdarâyana (maintains) the existence (of qualification); for there is (possibility of such).

The Reverend Bâdarâyana thinks that the Âdityas, Vasus, and so on, are also qualified for meditations on divinities. For it is in their case also possible that their attainment of Brahman should be viewed as preceded by their attainment of Vasu-hood or Âditya-hood, in so far, namely, as they meditate on Brahman as abiding within themselves. They may be Vasus and Âdityas in the present age of the world, but at the same time be desirous of holding the same position in future ages also. In the Madhuvidyâ we have to distinguish two sections, concerned respectively with Brahman in its causal and its effected state. The former section, extending from the beginning up to 'when from thence he has risen upwards,' enjoins meditation on Brahman in its condition as effect, i.e. as appearing in the form of creatures such as the Vasus, and so on; while the latter section enjoins meditation on the causal Brahman viewed as abiding within the sun as its inner Self. The purport of the whole vidyâ is that he who meditates on Brahman in this its twofold form will in a future age of the world enjoy Vasu-hood, and will finally attain Brahman in its causal aspect, i.e. the very highest Brahman. From the fact that the text, 'And indeed to him who thus knows the Brahma-upanishad, the sun does not rise and does not set; for him there is day once and for all,' calls the whole Madhuvidyâ a 'Brahma'--upanishad, and that the reward declared is the attainment of Vasu-hood, and so on, leading up to the attainment of Brahman, we clearly are

31257 entitled to infer that the meditations which the text enjoins, viz. on
31258 the different parts of the sun viewed as objects of enjoyment for the
31259 Vasus, and so on, really are meant as meditations on Brahman as abiding
31260 in those different forms. Meditation on the Vasus and similar beings is
31261 thus seen to be possible for the Vasus themselves. And as Brahman really
31262 constitutes the only object of meditation, we also see the
31263 appropriateness of the text discussed above, 'On him the gods meditate
31264 as the light of lights.' The Vrittikâra expresses the same opinion, 'For
31265 there is possibility with regard to the Madhu-vidyâ, and so on, Brahman
31266 only being the object of meditation everywhere.'--Here terminates the
31267 adhikarana of 'honey.'

31268
31269 The Sûtras now enter on a discussion of the question whether the Sûdras
31270 also are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.

31271
31272 The Pûrvapakshin maintains that they are so qualified; for qualification,
31273 he says, depends on want and capacity, and both these are possible in
31274 the case of Sûdras also. The Sûdra is not indeed qualified for any works
31275 depending on a knowledge of the sacred fires, for from such knowledge he
31276 is debarred; but he possesses qualification for meditation on Brahman,
31277 which after all is nothing but a certain mental energy. The only works
31278 prerequisite for meditation are those works which are incumbent on a man
31279 as a member of a caste or âsrama, and these consist, in the Sûdra's case,
31280 in obedience to the higher castes. And when we read 'therefore the Sûdra
31281 is not qualified for sacrifices,' the purport of this passage is only to
31282 make a confirmatory reference to something already settled by reason,
31283 viz. that the Sûdra is not qualified for the performance of sacrifices
31284 which cannot be accomplished by one not acquainted with the sacred fires
31285 (and not to deny the Sûdra's competence for devout meditation).--But how
31286 can meditation on Brahman be undertaken by a man who has not studied the
31287 Vedas, inclusive of the Vedânta, and hence knows nothing about the
31288 nature of Brahman and the proper modes of meditation?--Those also, we
31289 reply, who do not study Veda and Vedânta may acquire the requisite
31290 knowledge by hearing Itihâsas and Purânas; and there are texts which
31291 allow Sûdras to become acquainted with texts of that kind; cp. e.g. 'one
31292 is to make the four castes to hear texts, the Brâhmana coming first.'
31293 Moreover, those Purânas and Itihâsas make mention of Sûdras, such as
31294 Vidura, who had a knowledge of Brahman. And the Upanishads themselves,
31295 viz. in the so-called Samvarga-vidyâ, show that a Sûdra is qualified for
31296 the knowledge of Brahman; for there the teacher Raikva addresses
31297 Jânasruti, who wishes to learn from him, as Sûdra, and thereupon
31298 instructs him in the knowledge of Brahman (Ch. Up. IV, 2, 3). All this
31299 proves that Sûdras also have a claim to the knowledge of Brahman.

31300
31301 This conclusion we deny, on the ground of the absence of capability. It
31302 is impossible that the capability of performing meditations on Brahman
31303 should belong to a person not knowing the nature of Brahman and the due
31304 modes of meditation, and not qualified by the knowledge of the requisite
31305 preliminaries of such meditation, viz. recitation of the Veda,
31306 sacrifices, and so on. Mere want or desire does not impart qualification
31307 to a person destitute of the required capability. And this absence of
31308 capability is due, in the Sûdra's case, to absence of legitimate study
31309 of the Veda. The injunctions of sacrificial works naturally connect
31310 themselves with the knowledge and the means of knowledge (i.e. religious
31311 ceremonies and the like) that belong to the three higher castes, for
31312 these castes actually possess the knowledge (required for the
31313 sacrifices), owing to their studying the Veda in agreement with the
31314 injunction which prescribes such study for the higher castes; the same
31315 injunctions do not, on the other hand, connect themselves with the
31316 knowledge and means of knowledge belonging to others (than members of
31317 the three higher castes). And the same naturally holds good with regard
31318 to the injunctions of meditation on Brahman. And as thus only such
31319 knowledge as is acquired by study prompted by the Vedic injunction of
31320 study supplies a means for meditation on Brahman, it follows that the
31321 Sûdra for whom that injunction is not meant is incapable of such
31322 meditation. Itihâsas and Purânas hold the position of being helpful
31323 means towards meditation in so far only as they confirm or support the
31324 Veda, not independently of the Veda. And that Sûdras are allowed to hear
31325 Itihâsas and Purânas is meant only for the end of destroying their sins,

31326 not to prepare them for meditation on Brahman. The case of Vidura and
31327 other Sûdras having been 'founded on Brahman,' explains itself as
31328 follows:--Owing to the effect of former actions, which had not yet
31329 worked themselves out, they were born in a low caste, while at the same
31330 time they possessed wisdom owing to the fact that the knowledge acquired
31331 by them in former births had not yet quite vanished.

31332
31333 (On these general grounds we object to Sûdras being viewed as qualified
31334 for meditation on Brahman.) The Sûtra now refutes that argument, which
31335 the Pûrvapakshin derives from the use of the word 'Sûdra' in the
31336 Samvarga-vidyâ.

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31341 33. (That) grief of him (arose), this is intimated by his (Jânasruti's)
31342 resorting to him (Raikva) on hearing a disrespectful speech about
31343 himself.

31344
31345 From what the text says about Jânasruti Pautrâyana having been taunted
31346 by a flamingo for his want of knowledge of Brahman, and having thereupon
31347 resorted to Raikva, who possessed the knowledge of Brahman, it appears
31348 that sorrow (suk) had taken possession of him; and it is with a view to
31349 this that Raikva addresses him as Sûdra. For the word Sûdra,
31350 etymologically considered, means one who grieves or sorrows (sokati).
31351 The appellation 'sûdra' therefore refers to his sorrow, not to his being
31352 a member of the fourth caste. This clearly appears from a consideration
31353 of the whole story. Jânasruti Pautrâyana was a very liberal and pious
31354 king. Being much pleased with his virtuous life, and wishing to rouse in
31355 him the desire of knowing Brahman, two noble-minded beings, assuming the
31356 shape of flamingoes, flew past him at night time, when one of them
31357 addressed the other, 'O Bhallâksha. the light of Jânasruti has spread
31358 like the sky; do not go near that it may not burn thee.' To this praise
31359 of Jânasruti the other flamingo replied, 'How can you speak of him,
31360 being what he is, as if he were Raikva "sayuktvân"?' i.e. 'how can you
31361 speak of Jânasruti, being what he is, as if he were Raikva, who knows
31362 Brahman and is endowed with the most eminent qualities? Raikva, who
31363 knows Brahman, alone in this world is truly eminent. Janasruti may be
31364 very pious, but as he does not know Brahman what quality of his could
31365 produce splendour capable of burning me like the splendour of Raikva?'
31366 The former flamingo thereupon asks who that Raikva is, and its companion
31367 replies, 'He in whose work and knowledge there are comprised all the
31368 works done by good men and all the knowledge belonging to intelligent
31369 creatures, that is Raikva.' Jânasruti, having heard this speech of the
31370 flamingo--which implied a reproach to himself as being destitute of the
31371 knowledge of Brahman, and a glorification of Raikva as possessing that
31372 knowledge--at once sends his door-keeper to look for Raikva; and when
31373 the door-keeper finds him and brings word, the king himself repairs to
31374 him with six hundred cows, a golden necklace, and a carriage yoked with
31375 mules, and asks him to teach him the deity on which he meditates, i.e.
31376 the highest deity. Raikva, who through the might of his Yoga-knowledge
31377 is acquainted with everything that passes in the three worlds, at once
31378 perceives that Jânasruti is inwardly grieved at the slighting speech of
31379 the flamingo, which had been provoked by the king's want of knowledge of
31380 Brahman, and is now making an effort due to the wish of knowing Brahman;
31381 and thus recognises that the king is fit for the reception of that
31382 knowledge. Reflecting thereupon that a knowledge of Brahman may be
31383 firmly established in this pupil even without long attendance on the
31384 teacher if only he will be liberal to the teacher to the utmost of his
31385 capability, he addresses him: 'Do thou take away (apâhara) (these
31386 things), O Sûdra; keep (the chariot) with the cows for thyself.' What he
31387 means to say is, 'By so much only in the way of gifts bestowed on me,
31388 the knowledge of Brahman cannot be established in thee, who, through the
31389 desire for such knowledge, art plunged in grief'--the address 'O Sûdra'
31390 intimating that Raikva knows Jânasruti to be plunged in grief, and on
31391 that account fit to receive instruction about Brahman. Jânasruti
31392 thereupon approaches Raikva for a second time, bringing as much wealth
31393 as he possibly can, and moreover his own daughter. Raikva again
31394 intimates his view of the pupil's fitness for receiving instruction by

31395 addressing him a second time as 'Sûdra,' and says, 'You have brought
31396 these, O Sûdra; by this mouth only you made me speak,' i.e. 'You now
31397 have brought presents to the utmost of your capability; by this means
31398 only you will induce me, without lengthy service on your part, to utter
31399 speech containing that instruction about Brahman which you desire.'--
31400 Having said this he begins to instruct him.--We thus see that the
31401 appellation 'sûdra' is meant to intimate the grief of Jânasruti--which
31402 grief in its turn indicates the king's fitness for receiving instruction;
31403 and is not meant to declare that Jânasruti belongs to the lowest caste.
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31408 34. And on account of (Jânasruti) kshattriya-hood being understood.
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31410 The first section of the vidyâ tells us that Jânasruti bestowed much
31411 wealth and food; later on he is represented as sending his door-keeper
31412 on an errand; and in the end, as bestowing on Raikva many villages--
31413 which shows him to be a territorial lord. All these circumstances
31414 suggest Jânasruti's being a Kshattriya, and hence not a member of the
31415 lowest caste.--The above Sûtra having declared that the kshattriya-hood
31416 of Jânasruti is indicated in the introductory legend, the next Sûtra
31417 shows that the same circumstance is indicated in the concluding legend.
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31422 35. On account of the inferential sign further on, together with
31423 Kaitraratha.
31424

31425 The kshattriya-hood of Jânasruti is further to be accepted on account of
31426 the Kshattriya Abhipratârin Kaitraratha, who is mentioned further on in
31427 this very same Samvargavidyâ which Raikva imparts to Jânasruti.--But why?--
31428 As follows. The section beginning 'Once a Brahmakârin begged of Saunaka
31429 Kâpeya and Abhipratârin Kâkshaseni while being waited on at their meal,'
31430 and ending 'thus do we, O Brahmakârin, meditate on that being,' shows
31431 Kâpeya, Abhipratârin, and the Brahmakârin to be connected with the
31432 Samvarga-vidyâ. Now Abhipratârin is a Kshattriya, the other two are
31433 Brâhmanas. This shows that there are connected with the vidyâ, Brâhmanas,
31434 and from among non-Brâhmanas, a Kshattriya only, but not a Sûdra. It
31435 therefore appears appropriate to infer that the person, other than the
31436 Brâhmana Raikva, who is likewise connected with this vidyâ, viz.
31437 Jânasruti, is likewise a Kshattriya, not a Sûdra.--But how do we know
31438 that Abhipratârin is a Kaitraratha and a Kshattriya? Neither of these
31439 circumstances is stated in the legend in the Samvarga-vidyâ! To this
31440 question the Sûtra replies, 'on account of the inferential mark.' From
31441 the inferential mark that Saunaka Kâpeya and Abhipratârin Kâkshaseni are
31442 said to have been sitting together at a meal we understand that there is
31443 some connexion between Abhipratârin and the Kâpeyas. Now another
31444 scriptural passage runs as follows: 'The Kâpeyas made Kaitraratha
31445 perform that sacrifice' (Tând Brâ. XX, 12, 5), and this shows that one
31446 connected with the Kâpeyas was a Kaitraratha; and a further text shows
31447 that a Kaitraratha is a Kshattriya. 'from him there was descended a
31448 Kaitraratha who was a prince.' All this favours the inference that
31449 Abhipratârin was a Kaitraratha and a Kshattriya.
31450

31451 So far the Sûtras have shown that there is no inferential mark to prove
31452 what is contradicted by reasoning, viz. the qualification of the Sûdras.
31453 The next Sûtra declares that the non-qualification of the Sûdra proved
31454 by reasoning is confirmed by Scripture and Smriti.
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31459 36. On account of the reference to ceremonial purifications, and on
31460 account of the declaration of their absence.
31461

31462 In sections the purport of which is to give instruction about Brahman
31463 the ceremony of initiation is referred to, 'I will initiate you; he

initiated him' (Ch. Up. IV, 4). And at the same time the absence of such ceremonies in the case of Sûdras is stated: 'In the Sûdra there is not any sin, and he is not fit for any ceremony' (Manu X, 126); and 'The fourth caste is once born, and not fit for any ceremony' (Manu X, 4).

37. And on account of the procedure, on the ascertainment of the non-being of that.

That a Sûdra is not qualified for knowledge of Brahman appears from that fact also that as soon as Gautama has convinced himself that Jâbâla, who wishes to become his pupil, is not a Sûdra, he proceeds to teach him the knowledge of Brahman.

38. And on account of the prohibition of hearing, studying, and performance of (Vedic) matter.

The Sûdra is specially forbidden to hear and study the Veda and to perform the things enjoined in it. 'For a Sûdra is like a cemetery, therefore the Veda must not be read in the vicinity of a Sûdra;' 'Therefore the Sûdra is like a beast, unfit for sacrifices.' And he who does not hear the Veda recited cannot learn it so as to understand and perform what the Veda enjoins. The prohibition of hearing thus implies the prohibition of understanding and whatever depends on it.

39. And on account of Smriti.

Smriti also declares this prohibition of hearing, and so on. 'The ears of him who hears the Veda are to be filled with molten lead and lac; if he pronounces it his tongue is to be slit; if he preserves it his body is to be cut through.' And 'He is not to teach him sacred duties or vows. '--It is thus a settled matter that the Sûdras are not qualified for meditations on Brahman.

We must here point out that the non-qualification of Sûdras for the cognition of Brahman can in no way be asserted by those who hold that a Brahman consisting of pure non-differenced intelligence constitutes the sole reality; that everything else is false; that all bondage is unreal; that such bondage may be put an end to by the mere cognition of the true nature of Reality--such cognition resulting from the hearing of certain texts; and that the cessation of bondage thus effected constitutes final Release. For knowledge of the true nature of Reality, in the sense indicated, and the release resulting from it, may be secured by any one who learns from another person that Brahman alone is real and that everything else is falsely superimposed on Brahman. That the cognition of such truth can be arrived at only on the basis of certain Vedic texts, such as 'Thou art that,' is a restriction which does not admit of proof; for knowledge of the truth does not depend on man's choice, and at once springs up in the mind even of an unwilling man as soon as the conditions for such origination are present. Nor can it be proved in any way that bondage can be put an end to only through such knowledge of the truth as springs from Vedic texts; for error comes to an end through the knowledge of the true nature of things, whatever agency may give rise to such knowledge. True knowledge, of the kind described, will spring up in the mind of a man as soon as he hears the non-scriptural declaration, 'Brahman, consisting of non-differenced intelligence, is the sole Reality; everything else is false,' and this will suffice to free him from error. When a competent and trustworthy person asserts that what was mistaken for silver is merely a sparkling shell, the error of a Sûdra no less than of a Brâhmana comes to an end; in the same way a Sûdra also will free himself from the great cosmic error as soon as the

31533 knowledge of the true nature of things has arisen in his mind through a
31534 statement resting on the traditional lore of men knowing the Veda. Nor
31535 must you object to this on the ground that men knowing the Veda do not
31536 instruct Sûdras, and so on, because the text, 'he is not to teach him
31537 sacred things,' forbids them to do so; for men who have once learned--
31538 from texts such as 'Thou art that'--that Brahman is their Self, and thus
31539 are standing on the very top of the Veda as it were, move no longer in
31540 the sphere of those to whom injunctions and prohibitions apply, and the
31541 prohibition quoted does not therefore touch them. Knowledge of Brahman
31542 may thus spring up in the mind of Sûdras and the like, owing to
31543 instruction received from one of those men who have passed beyond all
31544 prohibition. Nor must it be said that the instance of the shell and the
31545 silver is not analogous, in so far, namely, as the error with regard to
31546 silver in the shell comes to an end as soon as the true state of things
31547 is declared; while the great cosmic error that clouds the Sûdra's mind
31548 does not come to an end as soon as, from the teaching of another man, he
31549 learns the truth about Reality. For the case of the Sûdra does not
31550 herein differ from that of the Brâhmana; the latter also does not at
31551 once free himself from the cosmic error. Nor again will it avail to
31552 plead that the sacred texts originate the demanded final cognition in
31553 the mind of the Brâhmana as soon as meditation has dispelled the
31554 obstructive imagination of plurality; for in the same way, i.e. helped
31555 by meditation, the non-Vedic instruction given by another person
31556 produces the required cognition in the mind of the Sûdra. For meditation
31557 means nothing but a steady consideration of the sense which sentences
31558 declaratory of the unity of Brahman and the Self may convey, and the
31559 effect of such meditation is to destroy all impressions opposed to such
31560 unity; you yourself thus admit that the injunction of meditation aims at
31561 something visible (i.e. an effect that can be definitely assigned,
31562 whence it follows that the Sûdra also is qualified for it, while he
31563 would not be qualified for an activity having an 'adrishta,' i.e.
31564 supersensuous, transcendental effect). The recital of the text of the
31565 Veda also and the like (are not indispensable means for bringing about
31566 cognition of Brahman, but) merely subserve the origination of the _desire_
31567 of knowledge. The desire of knowledge may arise in a Sûdra also (viz. in
31568 some other way), and thereupon real knowledge may result from non-Vedic
31569 instruction, obstructive imaginations having previously been destroyed
31570 by meditation. And thus in his case also non-real bondage will come to
31571 an end.--The same conclusion may also be arrived at by a different road.
31572 The mere ordinary instruments of knowledge, viz. perception and
31573 inference assisted by reasoning, may suggest to the Sûdra the theory
31574 that there is an inward Reality constituted by non-differenced self-
31575 luminous intelligence, that this inward principle witnesses Nescience,
31576 and that owing to Nescience the entire apparent world, with its manifold
31577 distinctions of knowing subjects and objects of knowledge, is
31578 superimposed upon the inner Reality. He may thereupon, by uninterrupted
31579 meditation on this inner Reality, free himself from all imaginations
31580 opposed to it, arrive at the intuitive knowledge of the inner principle,
31581 and thus obtain final release. And this way being open to release, there
31582 is really no use to be discerned in the Vedânta-texts, suggesting as
31583 they clearly do the entirely false view that the real being (is not
31584 absolutely homogeneous intelligence, but) possesses infinite
31585 transcendent attributes, being endowed with manifold powers, connected
31586 with manifold creations, and so on. In this way the qualification of
31587 Sûdras for the knowledge of Brahman is perfectly clear. And as the
31588 knowledge of Brahman may be reached in this way not only by Sûdras but
31589 also by Brâhmanas and members of the other higher castes, the poor
31590 Upanishad is practically defunct.--To this the following objection will
31591 possibly be raised. Man being implicated in and confused by the
31592 beginningless course of mundane existence, requires to receive from
31593 somewhere a suggestion as to this empirical world being a mere error and
31594 the Reality being something quite different, and thus only there arises
31595 in him a desire to enter on an enquiry, proceeding by means of
31596 perception, and so on. Now that which gives the required suggestion is
31597 the Veda, and hence we cannot do without it.--But this objection is not
31598 valid. For in the minds of those who are awed by all the dangers and
31599 troubles of existence, the desire to enter on a philosophical
31600 investigation of Reality, proceeding by means of Perception and
31601 Inference, springs up quite apart from the Veda, owing to the

observation that there are various sects of philosophers. Sāṅkhyas, and so on, who make it their business to carry on such investigations. And when such desire is once roused, Perception and Inference alone (in the way allowed by the Sāṅkaras themselves) lead on to the theory that the only Reality is intelligence eternal, pure, self-luminous, non-dual, non-changing, and that everything else is fictitiously superimposed thereon. That this self-luminous Reality possesses no other attribute to be learned from scripture is admitted; for according to your opinion also scripture sublates everything that is not Brahman and merely superimposed on it. Nor should it be said that we must have recourse to the Upanishads for the purpose of establishing that the Real found in the way of perception and inference is at the same time of the nature of bliss; for the merely and absolutely Intelligent is seen of itself to be of that nature, since it is different from everything that is not of that nature.--There are, on the other hand, those who hold that the knowledge which the Vedānta-texts enjoin as the means of Release is of the nature of devout meditation; that such meditation has the effect of winning the love of the supreme Spirit and is to be learned from scripture only; that the injunctions of meditation refer to such knowledge only as springs from the legitimate study of the Veda on the part of a man duly purified by initiation and other ceremonies, and is assisted by the seven means (see above, p. 17); and that the supreme Person pleased by such meditation bestows on the devotee knowledge of his own true nature, dissolves thereby the Nescience springing from works, and thus releases him from bondage. And on this view the proof of the non-qualification of the Sūdra, as given in the preceding Sūtras, holds good.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the exclusion of the Sūdras.'

Having thus completed the investigation of qualification which had suggested itself in connexion with the matter in hand, the Sūtras return to the being measured by a thumb, and state another reason for its being explained as Brahman--as already understood on the basis of its being declared the ruler of what is and what will be.

40. On account of the trembling.

In the part of the Katha-Upanishad which intervenes between the passage 'The Person of the size of a thumb stands in the middle of the Self (II, 4, 12), and the passage 'The Person of the size of a thumb, the inner Self' (II, 6, 17), we meet with the text 'whatever there is, the whole world, when gone forth, trembles in its breath. A great terror, a raised thunderbolt; those who knew it became immortal. From fear of it fire burns, from fear the sun shines, from fear Indra and Vāyu, and Death as the fifth run away' (II, 6, 2; 3). This text declares that the whole world and Agni, Sūrya, and so on, abiding within that Person of the size of a thumb, who is here designated by the term 'breath,' and going forth from him, tremble from their great fear of him. 'What will happen to us if we transgress his commandments?'--thinking thus the whole world trembles on account of great fear, as if it were a raised thunderbolt. In this explanation we take the clause 'A great fear, a raised thunderbolt,' in the sense of '(the world trembles) from great fear,' &c., as it is clearly connected in meaning with the following clause: 'from fear the fire burns,' &c.--Now what is described here is the nature of the highest Brahman; for that such power belongs to Brahman only we know from other texts, viz.: 'By the command of that Imperishable, O Gārgī, sun and moon stand apart' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 9); and 'From fear of it the wind blows, from fear the sun rises; from fear of it Agni and Indra, yea Death runs as the fifth' (Taitt. Up. II, 8, 1).--The next Sūtra supplies a further reason.

41. On account of light being seen (declared in the text).

31671 Between the two texts referring to the Person of the size of a thumb,
31672 there is a text declaring that to that Person there belongs light that
31673 obscures all other light, and is the cause and assistance of all other
31674 light; and such light is characteristic of Brahman only. 'The sun does
31675 not shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, and
31676 much less this fire. After him, the shining one, everything shines; by
31677 his light all this is lighted' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 15)--This very same sloka
31678 is read in the Âtharvana (i.e. Mundaka) with reference to Brahman.
31679 Everywhere, in fact, the texts attribute supreme luminousness to Brahman
31680 only. Compare: 'Having approached the highest light he manifests himself
31681 in his own shape' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3); 'Him the gods meditate on as
31682 the light of lights, as immortal time' (Bri. Up. IV, 4,16); 'Now that
31683 light which shines above this heaven' (Ch. Up. III, 13, 7).--It is thus
31684 a settled conclusion that the Person measured by a thumb is the highest
31685 Brahman.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'him who is measured' (by a
31686 thumb).

31687
31688
31689
31690
31691 42. The ether, on account of the designation of something different, and
31692 so on.

31693
31694 We read in the Chândogya. 'The ether is the evolver of forms and names.
31695 That within which these forms and names are (or "that which is within--
31696 or without--these forms and names") is Brahman, the Immortal, the Self'
31697 (VIII, 14). A doubt here arises whether the being here called ether be
31698 the released individual soul, or the highest Self.--The Pûrvapakshin
31699 adopts the former view. For, he says, the released soul is introduced as
31700 subject-matter in an immediately preceding clause, 'Shaking off all as a
31701 horse shakes his hair, and as the moon frees himself from the mouth of
31702 Râhu; having shaken off the body I obtain, satisfied, the uncreated
31703 world of Brahman' Moreover, the clause 'That which is without forms and
31704 names' clearly designates the released soul freed from name and form.
31705 And 'the evolver of names and forms' is again that same soul
31706 characterised with a view to its previous condition; for the individual
31707 soul in its non-released state supported the shapes of gods, and so on,
31708 and their names. With a view, finally, to its present state in which it
31709 is free from name and form, the last clause declares 'that is Brahman,
31710 the Immortal'. The term 'ether' may very well be applied to the released
31711 soul which is characterised by the possession of non-limited splendour.--
31712 But, as the text under discussion is supplementary to the section
31713 dealing with the small ether within the heart (VIII, 1, 1 ff.), we
31714 understand that that small ether is referred to here also; and it has
31715 been proved above that that small ether is Brahman!--Not so, we reply.
31716 The text under discussion is separated from the section treating of the
31717 small ether within the heart, by the teaching of Prajâpati. and that
31718 teaching is concerned with the characteristics of the individual soul in
31719 its different conditions up to Release; and moreover the earlier part of
31720 the section under discussion speaks of the being which shakes off evil,
31721 and this undoubtedly is the released individual soul introduced in the
31722 teaching of Prajâpati. All this shows that the ether in our passage
31723 denotes the released individual soul.

31724
31725 This view is set aside by the Sûtra. The ether in our passage is the
31726 highest Brahman, because the clause 'Ether is the evolver of forms and
31727 names' designates something other than the individual soul. The ether
31728 which evolves names and forms cannot be the individual soul either in
31729 the state of bondage or that of release. In the state of bondage the
31730 soul is under the influence of karman, itself participates in name and
31731 form, and hence cannot bring about names and forms. And in its released
31732 state it is expressly said not to take part in the world-business (Ve.
31733 Sû. IV, 4, 17), and therefore is all the less qualified to evolve names
31734 and forms. The Lord, on the other hand, who is the ruling principle in
31735 the construction of the Universe is expressly declared by scripture to
31736 be the evolver of names and forms; cp. 'Entering into them with this
31737 living Self, let me evolve names and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'Who is
31738 all-knowing, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born this
31739 Brahman, name, form, and matter' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9), &c. Hence the ether

which brings about names and forms is something different from the soul for which name and form are brought about; it is in fact the highest Brahman. This the next clause of the text confirms, 'That which is within those forms and names'; the purport of which is: because that ether is within names and forms, not being touched by them but being something apart, therefore it is the evolver of them; this also following from his being free from evil and endowed with the power of realising his purposes. The 'and so on' in the Sûtra refers to the Brahma-hood, Self-hood, and immortality mentioned in the text ('That is the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self'). For Brahma-hood, i.e. greatness, and so on, in their unconditioned sense, belong to the highest Self only. It is thus clear that the ether is the highest Brahman.--Nor is the Pûrvapakshin right in maintaining that a clause immediately preceding ('shaking off all evil') introduces the individual soul as the general topic of the section. For what the part of the text immediately preceding the passage under discussion does introduce as general topic, is the highest Brahman, as shown by the clause 'I obtain the Brahma-world.' Brahman is, it is true, represented there as the object to be obtained by the released soul; but as the released soul cannot be the evolver of names and forms, &c., we must conclude that it is Brahman (and not the released soul), which constitutes the topic of the whole section. Moreover (to take a wider view of the context of our passage) the term 'ether' prompts us to recognise here the small ether (mentioned in the first section of the eighth book) as the general topic of the book; and as the teaching of Prajâpati is meant to set forth (not the individual soul by itself but) the nature of the soul of the meditating devotee, it is proper to conclude that the text under discussion is meant finally to represent, as the object to be obtained, the small ether previously inculcated as object of meditation. In conclusion we remark that the term 'ether' is nowhere seen to denote the individual Self.--The ether that evolves names and forms, therefore, is the highest Brahman.

But, an objection is raised, there is no other Self different from the individual Self; for scripture teaches the unity of all Selfs and denies duality. Terms such as 'the highest Self,' 'the highest Brahman,' 'the highest Lord,' are merely designations of the individual soul in the state of Release. The Brahma-world to be attained, therefore, is nothing different from the attaining individual soul; and hence the ether also that evolves names and forms can be that soul only.--To this objection the next Sûtra replies.

43. On account of difference in deep sleep and departing.

We have to supply 'on account of designation' from the preceding Sûtra. Because the text designates the highest Self as something different from the individual Self in the state of deep sleep as well as at the time of departure, the highest Self is thus different. For the Vâjasaneyaka, after having introduced the individual Self in the passage 'Who is that Self?--He who consisting of knowledge is among the prânas,' &c. (_Bri_. Up. IV, 3, 7), describes how, in the state of deep sleep, being not conscious of anything it is held embraced by the all-knowing highest Self, embraced by the intelligent Self it knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within' (IV, 3, 21). So also with reference to the time of departure, i.e. dying 'Mounted by the intelligent Self it moves along groaning' (IV, 3, 35). Now it is impossible that the unconscious individual Self, either lying in deep sleep or departing from the body, should at the same time be embraced or mounted by itself, being all-knowing. Nor can the embracing and mounting Self be some other individual Self; for no such Self can be all-knowing.--The next Sûtra supplies a further reason.

44. And on account of such words as Lord.

31809
31810 That embracing highest Self is further on designated by terms such as
31811 Lord, and so on. 'He is the Lord of all, the master of all, the ruler of
31812 all. He does not become greater by good works, nor smaller by evil works.
31813 He is the lord of all, the king of beings, the protector of beings. He
31814 is a bank and a boundary so that these worlds may not be confounded.
31815 Brâhmanas seek to know him by the study of the Veda. He who knows him
31816 becomes a Muni. Wishing for that world only, mendicants leave their
31817 homes' (IV, 4, 22). 'This indeed is the great unborn Self, the strong,
31818 the giver of wealth,--undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is
31819 Brahman' (IV, 4, 24; 25). Now all the qualities here declared, viz.
31820 being the lord of all, and so on, cannot possibly belong to the
31821 individual Self even in the state of Release; and we thus again arrive
31822 at the conclusion that the ether evolving forms and names is something
31823 different from the released individual soul. The declarations of general
31824 Unity which we meet with in the texts rest thereon, that all sentient
31825 and non-sentient beings are effects of Brahman, and hence have Brahman
31826 for their inner Self. That this is the meaning of texts such as 'All
31827 this is Brahman,' &c., we have explained before. And the texts denying
31828 plurality are to be understood in the same way.--Here terminates the
31829 adhikarana of 'the designation of something different, and so on.'

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31833

31834 FOURTH PÂDA.

31835
31836 1. If it be said that some (mention) that which rests on Inference; we
31837 deny this because (the form) refers to what is contained in the simile
31838 of the body; and (this the text) shows.

31839
31840 So far the Sûtras have given instruction about a Brahman, the enquiry
31841 into which serves as a means to obtain what is the highest good of man,
31842 viz. final release; which is the cause of the origination, and so on, of
31843 the world; which differs in nature from all non-sentient things such as
31844 the Pradhâna, and from all intelligent beings whether in the state of
31845 bondage or of release; which is free from all shadow of imperfection;
31846 which is all knowing, all powerful, has the power of realising all its
31847 purposes, comprises within itself all blessed qualities, is the inner
31848 Self of all, and possesses unbounded power and might. But here a new
31849 special objection presents itself. In order to establish the theory
31850 maintained by Kapila, viz. of there being a Pradhâna and individual
31851 souls which do not have their Self in Brahman, it is pointed out by
31852 some that in certain branches of the Veda there are met with certain
31853 passages which appear to adumbrate the doctrine of the Pradhâna being
31854 the universal cause. The Sûtras now apply themselves to the refutation
31855 of this view, in order thereby to confirm the theory of Brahman being
31856 the only cause of all.

31857
31858 We read in the Katha-Upanishad, 'Beyond the senses there are the objects,
31859 beyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the mind there is the
31860 intellect, the great Self is beyond the intellect. Beyond the Great
31861 there is the Unevolved, beyond the Unevolved there is the Person. Beyond
31862 the Person there is nothing--this is the goal, the highest road' (Ka. Up.
31863 I, 3, 11). The question here arises whether by the 'Unevolved' be or be
31864 not meant the Pradhâna, as established by Kapila's theory, of which
31865 Brahman is not the Self.--The Pûrvapakshin maintains the former
31866 alternative. For, he says, in the clause 'beyond the Great is the
31867 Unevolved, beyond the Unevolved is the Person,' we recognise the
31868 arrangement of entities as established by the Sâṅkhya-system, and hence
31869 must take the 'Unevolved' to be the Pradhâna. This is further confirmed
31870 by the additional clause 'beyond the Person there is nothing,' which (in
31871 agreement with Sâṅkhya principles) denies that there is any being beyond
31872 the soul, which itself is the twenty-fifth and last of the principles
31873 recognised by the Sâṅkhyas. This primâ facie view is expressed in the
31874 former part of the Sûtra, 'If it be said that in the sâkhâs of some that
31875 which rests on Inference, i.e. the Pradhâna, is stated as the universal
31876 cause.'

31877

31878 The latter part of the Sûtra refutes this view. The word 'Unevolved'
31879 does not denote a Pradhâna independent of Brahman; it rather denotes the
31880 body represented as a chariot in the simile of the body, i.e. in the
31881 passage instituting a comparison between the Self, body, intellect, and
31882 so on, on the one side, and the charioteer, chariot, &c. on the other
31883 side.--The details are as follows. The text at first--in the section
31884 beginning 'Know the Self to be the person driving,' &c., and ending 'he
31885 reaches the end of the journey, and that is the highest place of Vishnu'
31886 (I, 3, 3-9)--compares the devotee desirous of reaching the goal of his
31887 journey through the samsâra, i.e. the abode of Vishnu, to a man driving
31888 in a chariot; and his body, senses, and so on, to the chariot and parts
31889 of the chariot; the meaning of the whole comparison being that he only
31890 reaches the goal who has the chariot, &c. in his control. It thereupon
31891 proceeds to declare which of the different beings enumerated and
31892 compared to a chariot, and so on, occupy a superior position to the
31893 others in so far, namely, as they are that which requires to be
31894 controlled--'higher than the senses are the objects,' and so on. Higher
31895 than the senses compared to the horses--are the objects--compared to
31896 roads,--because even a man who generally controls his senses finds it
31897 difficult to master them when they are in contact with their objects;
31898 higher than the objects is the mind--compared to the reins--because when
31899 the mind inclines towards the objects even the non-proximity of the
31900 latter does not make much difference; higher than the mind (manas) is
31901 the intellect (buddhi)--compared to the charioteer--because in the
31902 absence of decision (which is the characteristic quality of buddhi) the
31903 mind also has little power; higher than the intellect again is the
31904 (individual) Self, for that Self is the agent whom the intellect serves.
31905 And as all this is subject to the wishes of the Self, the text
31906 characterises it as the 'great Self.' Superior to that Self again is the
31907 body, compared to the chariot, for all activity whereby the individual
31908 Self strives to bring about what is of advantage to itself depends on
31909 the body. And higher finally than the body is the highest Person, the
31910 inner Ruler and Self of all, the term and goal of the journey of the
31911 individual soul; for the activities of all the beings enumerated depend
31912 on the wishes of that highest Self. As the universal inner Ruler that
31913 Self brings about the meditation of the Devotee also; for the Sûtra (II,
31914 3, 41) expressly declares that the activity of the individual soul
31915 depends on the Supreme Person. Being the means for bringing about the
31916 meditation and the goal of meditation, that same Self is the highest
31917 object to be attained; hence the text says 'Higher than the Person there
31918 is nothing--that is the goal, the highest road.' Analogously scripture,
31919 in the antaryâmin-Brâhmana, at first declares that the highest Self
31920 within witnesses and rules everything, and thereupon negatives the
31921 existence of any further ruling principle 'There is no other seer but he,'
31922 &c. Similarly, in the Bhagavad-gîtâ, 'The abode, the agent, the
31923 various senses, the different and manifold functions, and fifth the
31924 Divinity (i.e. the highest Person)' (XVIII, 14); and 'I dwell within the
31925 heart of all; memory and perception, as well as their loss, come from
31926 me' (XV, 15). And if, as in the explanation of the text under discussion,
31927 we speak of that highest Self being 'controlled,' we must understand
31928 thereby the soul's taking refuge with it; compare the passage Bha. Gî.
31929 XVIII, 61-62, 'The Lord dwells in the heart of all creatures, whirling
31930 them round as if mounted on a machine; to Him go for refuge.'

31931
31932 Now all the beings, senses, and so on, which had been mentioned in the
31933 simile, are recognised in the passage 'higher than the senses are the
31934 objects,' &c., being designated there by their proper names; but there
31935 is no mention made of the body which previously had been compared to the
31936 chariot; we therefore conclude that it is the body which is denoted by
31937 the term 'the Unevolved.' Hence there is no reason to see here a
31938 reference to the Pradhâna as established in the theory of Kapila. Nor do
31939 we recognise, in the text under discussion, the general system of Kapila.
31940 The text declares the objects, i.e. sounds and so on, to be superior to
31941 the senses; but in Kapila's system the objects are not viewed as the
31942 causes of the senses. For the same reason the statement that the manas
31943 is higher than the objects does not agree with Kapila's doctrine. Nor is
31944 this the case with regard to the clause 'higher than the buddhi is the
31945 great one, the Self; for with Kapila the 'great one' (mahat) is the
31946 buddhi, and it would not do to say 'higher than the great one is the

31947 great one.' And finally the 'great one,' according to Kapila, cannot be
31948 called the 'Self.' The text under discussion thus refers only to those
31949 entities which had previously appeared in the simile. The text itself
31950 further on proves this, when saying 'That Self is hidden in all beings
31951 and does not shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their
31952 sharp and subtle intellect. A wise man should keep down speech in the
31953 mind, he should keep that within knowledge (which is) within the Self;
31954 he should keep knowledge within the great Self, and that he should keep
31955 within the quiet Self.' For this passage, after having stated that the
31956 highest Self is difficult to see with the inner and outer organs of
31957 knowledge, describes the mode in which the sense-organs, and so on, are
31958 to be held in control. The wise man should restrain the sense-organs and
31959 the organs of activity within the mind; he should restrain that (i.e.
31960 the mind) within knowledge, i.e. within the intellect (buddhi), which
31961 abides within the Self; he should further restrain the intellect within
31962 the great Self, i.e. the active individual Self; and that Self finally
31963 he should restrain within the quiet Self, i.e. the highest Brahman,
31964 which is the inner ruler of all; i.e. he should reach, with his
31965 individual Self so qualified, the place of Vishnu, i.e. Brahman.--But
31966 how can the term 'the Unevolved' denote the evolved body?--To this
31967 question the next Sûtra furnishes a reply.

31968
31969
31970
31971

31972 2. But the subtle (body), on account of its capability.

31973

31974 The elements in their fine state are what is called the 'Unevolved,' and
31975 this entering into a particular condition becomes the body. It is the
31976 'Unevolved' in the particular condition of the body, which in the text
31977 under discussion is called the 'Unevolved.' 'On account of its
31978 capability,' i.e. because Unevolved non-sentient matter, when assuming
31979 certain states and forms, is capable of entering on activities promoting
31980 the interest of man. But, an objection is raised, if the 'Unevolved' is
31981 taken to be matter in its subtle state, what objection is there to our
31982 accepting for the explanation of our text that which is established in
31983 the Sâṅkhya-system? for there also the 'Unevolved' means nothing else
31984 but matter in its subtle state.

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31989 To this the next Sûtra replies--

31990

31991 3. (Matter in its subtle state) subserves an end, on account of its
31992 dependence on him (viz. the Supreme Person).

31993

31994 Matter in its subtle state subserves ends, in so far only as it is
31995 dependent on the Supreme Person who is the cause of all. We by no means
31996 wish to deny unevolved matter and all its effects in themselves, but in
31997 so far only as they are maintained not to have their Self in the Supreme
31998 Person. For the fact is that they constitute his body and He thus
31999 constitutes their Self; and it is only through this their relation to
32000 him that the Pradhâna, and so on, are capable of accomplishing their
32001 several ends. Otherwise the different essential natures of them all
32002 could never exist,--nor persist, nor act. It is just on the ground of
32003 this dependence on the Lord not being acknowledged by the Sâṅkhyas that
32004 their system is disproved by us. In Scripture and Smṛiti alike, wherever
32005 the origination and destruction of the world are described, or the
32006 greatness of the Supreme Person is glorified, the Pradhâna and all its
32007 effects, no less than the individual souls, are declared to have their
32008 Self in that Supreme Person. Compare, e.g. the text which first says
32009 that the earth is merged in water, and further on 'the elements are
32010 merged in the Mahat, the Mahat in the Unevolved, the Unevolved in the
32011 Imperishable, the Imperishable in Darkness; Darkness becomes one with
32012 the highest divinity.' And 'He of whom the earth is the body,' &c. up to
32013 'he of whom the Unevolved is the body; of whom the Imperishable is the
32014 body; of whom death is the body; he the inner Self of all beings, free
32015 from all evil, the divine one, the one God Nârâyana.' And Earth, water,

fire, air, ether, mind, intellect, egoity--thus eightfold is my nature divided. Lower is this nature; other than this and higher know that nature of mine which has become the individual soul by which this world is supported. Remember that all beings spring from this; I am the origin and the dissolution of the whole Universe. Higher than I there is none else; all this is strung on me as pearls on a thread' (Bha. Gī VII, 4-7). And 'the Evolved is Vishnu, and the Unevolved, he is the Person and time.-- The nature (prakriti) declared by me, having the double form of the Evolved and the Unevolved, and the soul--both these are merged in the highest Self. That Self is the support of all, the Supreme Person who under the name of Vishnu is glorified in the Vedas and the Vedānta books.'

4. And on account of there being no statement of its being an object of knowledge.

If the text meant the Non-evolved as understood by the Sāṅkhyas it would refer to it as something to be known; for the Sāṅkhyas, who hold the theory of Release resulting from the discriminative knowledge of the Evolved, the Non-evolved, and the soul, admit that all these are objects of knowledge. Now our text does not refer to the Un-evolved as an object of knowledge, and it cannot therefore be the Pradhāna assumed by the Sāṅkhyas.

5. Should it be said that (the text) declares (it); we say, not so; for the intelligent Self (is meant), on account of subject-matter.

'He who has meditated on that which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay, without taste, eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond the Great, unchangeable; is freed from the jaws of death' (Ka. Up. II, 3,15), this scriptural text, closely following on the text under discussion, represents the 'Unevolved' as the object of knowledge!--Not so, we reply. What that sloka represents as the object of meditation is (not the Unevolved but) the intelligent Self, i.e. the Supreme Person. For it is the latter who forms the general subject-matter, as we infer from two preceding passages, viz. 'He who has knowledge for his charioteer, and who holds the reins of the mind, he reaches the end of his journey, the highest place of Vishnu'; and 'That Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect.' For this reason, also, the clause 'Higher than the person there is nothing' cannot be taken as meant to deny the existence of an entity beyond the 'purusha' in the Sāṅkhya sense. That the highest Self possesses the qualities of being without sound, &c., we moreover know from other scriptural texts, such as Mu. Up. I, 1, 6 'That which is not to be seen, not to be grasped,' &c. And the qualification 'beyond the Great, unchangeable' is meant to declare that the highest Self is beyond the individual Self which had been called 'the Great' in a previous passage 'beyond the intellect is the Great Self.'

6. And of three only there is this mention and question.

In the Upanishad under discussion there is mention made of three things only as objects of knowledge--the three standing to one another in the relation of means, end to be realised by those means, and persons realising,--and questions are asked as to those three only. There is no mention of, nor question referring to, the Unevolved.--Nakiketas desirous of Release having been allowed by Death to choose three boons, chooses for his first boon that his father should be well disposed towards him--without which he could not hope for spiritual welfare. For his second boon he chooses the knowledge of the Nakiketa-fire, which is

32085 a means towards final Release. 'Thou knowest, O Death, the fire-
 32086 sacrifice which leads to heaven; tell it to me, full of faith. Those who
 32087 live in the heaven-world reach Immortality--this I ask as my second boon.'
 32088 The term 'heaven-world' here denotes the highest aim of man, i.e.
 32089 Release, as appears from the declaration that those who live there enjoy
 32090 freedom from old age and death; from the fact that further on (I, 1, 26)
 32091 works leading to perishable results are disparaged; and from what Yama
 32092 says in reply to the second demand 'He who thrice performs this Nâkiketa-
 32093 rite overcomes birth and death.' As his third boon he, in the form of a
 32094 question referring to final release, actually enquires about three
 32095 things, viz. 'the nature of the end to be reached, i.e. Release; the
 32096 nature of him who wishes to reach that end; and the nature of the means
 32097 to reach it, i.e. of meditation assisted by certain works. Yama, having
 32098 tested Nakiketas' fitness to receive the desired instruction, thereupon
 32099 begins to teach him. 'The Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has
 32100 entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the
 32101 abyss; having known him as God, by means of meditation on his Self, the
 32102 wise one leaves joy and sorrow behind.' Here the clause 'having known
 32103 the God,' points to the divine Being that is to be meditated upon; the
 32104 clause 'by means of meditation on his Self points to the attaining agent,
 32105 i.e. the individual soul as an object of knowledge; and the clause
 32106 'having known him the wise ones leave joy and sorrow behind' points to
 32107 the meditation through which Brahman is to be reached. Nakiketas,
 32108 pleased with the general instruction received, questions again in order
 32109 to receive clearer information on those three matters, 'What thou seest
 32110 as different from dharma and different from adharma, as different from
 32111 that, from that which is done and not done, as different from what is
 32112 past or future, tell me that'; a question referring to three things, viz.
 32113 an object to be effected, a means to effect it, and an effecting agent--
 32114 each of which is to be different from anything else past, present, or
 32115 future [FOOTNOTE 362:1]. Yama thereupon at first instructs him as to the
 32116 Pranava, 'That word which all the Vedas record, which all penances
 32117 proclaim, desiring which men become religious students; that word I tell
 32118 thee briefly--it is Om'--an instruction which implies praise of the
 32119 Pranava, and in a general way sets forth that which the Pranava
 32120 expresses, e.g. the nature of the object to be reached, the nature of
 32121 the person reaching it, and the means for reaching it, such means here
 32122 consisting in the word 'Om,' which denotes the object to be reached
 32123 [FOOTNOTE 362:2]. He then continues to glorify the Pranava (I, a,
 32124 16-17), and thereupon gives special information in the first place about
 32125 the nature of the attaining subject, i.e., the individual soul, 'The
 32126 knowing Self is not born, it dies not,' &c. Next he teaches Nakiketas as
 32127 to the true nature of the object to be attained, viz. the highest
 32128 Brahman or Vishnu, in the section beginning 'The Self smaller than
 32129 small,' and ending 'Who then knows where he is?' (I, 2, 20-25). Part of
 32130 this section, viz. 'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda,' &c., at the
 32131 same time teaches that the meditation through which Brahman is attained
 32132 is of the nature of devotion (bhakti). Next the sloka I, 3, 1 'There are
 32133 the two drinking their reward' shows that, as the object of devout
 32134 meditation and the devotee abide together, meditation is easily
 32135 performed. Then the section beginning 'Know the Self to be him who
 32136 drives in the chariot,' and ending 'the wise say the path is hard' (I,
 32137 3, 3-14), teaches the true mode of meditation, and how the devotee
 32138 reaches the highest abode of Vishnu; and then there is a final reference
 32139 to the object to be reached in I, 3, 15, 'That which is without sound,
 32140 without touch,' &c. It thus appears that there are references and
 32141 questions regarding those three matters only; and hence the 'Un-evolved'
 32142 cannot mean the Pradhâna of the Sâmkhyas.

32143
 32144 [FOOTNOTE 362:1. The commentary proposes different ways of finding those
 32145 three objects of enquiry in the words of Nakiketas. According to the
 32146 first explanation, 'that which is different from dharma' is a means
 32147 differing from all ordinary means; 'adharma' 'not-dharma' is what is not
 32148 a means, but the result to be reached: hence 'that which is different
 32149 from adharma' is a result differing from all ordinary results. 'What is
 32150 different from that' is an agent different from 'that'; i.e. an ordinary
 32151 agent, and so on. (Sru. Prakâs. p. 1226.)]

32152
 32153 [FOOTNOTE 362:2. The syllable 'Om,' which denotes Brahman, is a means

32154 towards meditation (Brahman being meditated upon under this form), and
32155 thus indirectly a means towards reaching Brahman.]

32156
32157
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32159

32160 7. And as in the case of the 'Great.'

32161

32162 In the case of the passage 'Higher than the intellect is the Great Self,'
32163 we conclude from the co-ordination of 'the Great' with the Self that
32164 what the text means is not the 'Great' principle of the Sankhyas;
32165 analogously we conclude that the 'Unevolved,' which is said to be higher
32166 than the Self, cannot be the Pradhâna of Kapila's system.

32167

32168

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32170

32171 8. On account of there being no special characteristic; as in the case
32172 of the cup.

32173

32174 In the discussion of the following passages also we aim only at refuting
32175 the system of the Sankhyas; not at disproving the existence and nature
32176 of Prakriti, the 'great' principle, the ahamâra, and so on, viewed as
32177 dependent on Brahman. For that they exist in this latter relation is
32178 proved by Scripture as well as Smriti.--A text of the followers of the
32179 Atharvan runs as follows: 'Her who produces all effects, the non-knowing
32180 one, the unborn one, wearing eight forms, the firm one--she is known (by
32181 the Lord) and ruled by him, she is spread out and incited and ruled by
32182 him, gives birth to the world for the benefit of the souls. A cow she is
32183 without beginning and end, a mother producing all beings; white, black,
32184 and red, milking all wishes for the Lord. Many babes unknown drink her.
32185 the impartial one; but one God only, following his own will, drinks her
32186 submitting to him. By his own thought and work the mighty God strongly
32187 enjoys her, who is common to all, the milkgiver, who is pressed by the
32188 sacrifices. The Non-evolved when being counted by twenty-four is called
32189 the Evolved.' This passage evidently describes the nature of Prakriti,
32190 and so on, and the same Upanishad also teaches the Supreme Person who
32191 constitutes the Self of Prakriti, and so on. 'Him they call the twenty-
32192 sixth or also the twenty-seventh; as the Person devoid of all qualities
32193 of the Sâmkhyas he is known by the followers of the Atharvan [FOOTNOTE
32194 364:1]. '--Other followers of the Atharvan read in their text that there
32195 are sixteen originating principles (prakriti) and eight effected things
32196 (vikâra; Garbha Up. 3).--The Svetâsvataras again set forth the nature of
32197 Prakriti, the soul and the Lord as follows. 'The Lord supports all this
32198 together, the Perishable and the Imperishable, the Evolved and the
32199 Unevolved; the other one is in bondage, since he is an enjoyer; but
32200 having known the God he is free from all fetters. There are two unborn
32201 ones, the one knowing and a Lord, the other without knowledge and lordly
32202 power; there is the one unborn female on whom the enjoyment of all
32203 enjoyers depends; and there is the infinite Self appearing in all shapes,
32204 but itself inactive. When a man finds out these three, that is Brahman.
32205 The Perishable is the Pradhâna, the Immortal and Imperishable is Hara;
32206 the one God rules the Perishable and the Self. From meditation on him,
32207 from union with him, from becoming one with him there is in the end
32208 cessation of all Mâyâ' (Svet. Up. I, 8-10). And 'The sacred verses, the
32209 offerings, the sacrifices, the vows, the past, the future, and all that
32210 the Vcdas declare--from that the Ruler of Mâyâ creates all this; and in
32211 this the other one is bound up through Mâyâ. Know then Prakriti to be
32212 Mâyâ and the great Lord the ruler of Mâyâ; with his members this whole
32213 world is filled' (Svet. Up. V, 9-10). And, further on, 'The master of
32214 Pradhâna and the soul, the lord of the gunas, the cause of the bondage,
32215 existence, and release of worldly existence' (VI, 16). Thus likewise in
32216 Smriti, 'Do thou know both Nature and the soul to be without beginning,
32217 and know all effects and qualities to have sprung from Nature. Nature is
32218 declared to be the cause of the activity of causes and effects, whilst
32219 the soul is the cause of there being enjoyment of pleasure and pain. For
32220 the soul abiding in Nature experiences the qualities derived from Nature,
32221 the reason being its connexion with the qualities, in its births in good
32222 and evil wombs' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 19-21). And 'Goodness, Passion, and

32223 Darkness--these are the qualities which, issuing from nature, bind in
32224 the body the embodied soul, the undecaying one' (XIV, 5). And 'All
32225 beings at the end of a kalpa return into my Nature, and again, at the
32226 beginning of a kalpa, do I send them forth. Presiding over my own nature
32227 again and again do I send forth this vast body of beings which has no
32228 freedom of its own, being subject to Nature.--With me as ruler Nature
32229 brings forth all moving and non-moving things, and for this reason the
32230 world does ever go round' (Bha. Gî. IX, 7, 8, 10). What we therefore
32231 refuse to accept are a Prakriti, and so on, of the kind assumed by
32232 Kapila, i.e. not having their Self in Brahman.--We now proceed to
32233 explain the Sûtra.

32234
32235 We read in the Svetâsvatara-Upanishad 'There is one ajâ, red, white, and
32236 black, producing manifold offspring of the same nature. One aja loves
32237 her and lies by her; another leaves her after having enjoyed her.' A
32238 doubt arises here whether this mantra declares a mere Prakriti as
32239 assumed in Kapila's system, or a Prakriti having its Self in Brahman.

32240
32241 The Pûrvapakshin maintains the former alternative. For, he points out,
32242 the text refers to the non-originatedness of Prakriti, calling her ajâ,
32243 i.e. unborn, and further says that she by herself independently produces
32244 manifold offspring resembling herself. This view is rejected by the
32245 Sûtra, on the ground that there is no intimation of a special
32246 circumstance determining the acceptance of the Prakriti as assumed by
32247 the Sâmkhyas, i.e. independent of Brahman; for that she is ajâ, i. e.
32248 not born, is not a sufficiently special characteristic. The case is
32249 analogous to that of the 'cup.' In the mantra 'There is a cup having its
32250 mouth below and its bottom above' (Bri. Up. II, 2, 3), the word kamasa
32251 conveys to us only the idea of some implement used in eating, but we are
32252 unable to see what special kind of kamasa is meant; for in the case of
32253 words the meaning of which is ascertained on the ground of their
32254 derivation (as 'kamasa' from 'kam,' to eat or drink), the special sense
32255 of the word in any place cannot be ascertained without the help of
32256 considerations of general possibility, general subject-matter, and so on.
32257 Now in the case of the cup we are able to ascertain that the cup meant
32258 is the head, because there is a complementary passage 'What is called
32259 the cup with its mouth below and its bottom above is the head'; but if
32260 we look out for a similar help to determine the special meaning of ajâ,
32261 we find nothing to convince us that the aja, i. e. the 'unborn'
32262 principle, is the Prakriti of the Sâmkhyas. Nor is there anything in the
32263 text to convey the idea of that ajâ having the power of independent
32264 creation; for the clause 'giving birth to manifold offspring' declares
32265 only that she creates, not that she creates unaided. The mantra does not
32266 therefore tell us about an 'unborn' principle independent of Brahman.--
32267 There moreover is a special reason for understanding by the ajâ
32268 something that depends on Brahman. This the following Sûtra states.

32269
32270 [FOOTNOTE 364:1. These quotations are from the Kulikâ-Upanishad (transl.
32271 by Deussen, Seventy Upanishads, p. 638 ff.) The translation as given
32272 above follows the readings adopted by Râmânuja and explained in the--
32273 Sruta-Prakâsikâ.]

32274
32275
32276
32277
32278 9. But she begins with light; for thus some read in their text.

32279
32280 The 'but' has assertory force. 'Light' in the Sûtra means Brahman, in
32281 accordance with the meaning of the term as known from texts such as 'On
32282 him the gods meditate, the light of lights' (Bri. Up. X, 4, 16); 'That
32283 light which shines beyond heaven' (Ch. Up. III, 13, 7). 'She begins with
32284 light' thus means 'she has Brahman for her cause.'--'For thus some read
32285 in their text,' i.e. because the members of one Sâkhâ, viz the
32286 Taittiriya read in their text that this 'ajâ' has Brahman for her cause.
32287 The Mahânârâyana-Upanishad (of the Taittirîyas) at first refers to
32288 Brahman abiding in the hollow of the heart as the object of meditation.
32289 'Smaller than the small, greater than the great, the Self placed in the
32290 hollow of this creature'; next declares that all the worlds and Brahma
32291 and the other gods originated from that Self; and then says that there

sprung from it also this ajâ which is the cause of all 'The one ajâ (goat), red, white and black, which gives birth to numerous offspring of the same shape, one aja (he-goat) loves and lies by her; another one forsakes her after having enjoyed her.' The subject-matter of the entire section evidently is to give instruction as to the whole aggregate of things other than Brahman originating from Brahman and thus having its Self in it; hence we conclude that also the ajâ which gives birth to manifold creatures like her, and is enjoyed by the soul controlled by karman, while she is abandoned by the soul possessing true knowledge is, no less than vital airs, seas, mountains, &c., a creature of Brahman, and hence has its Self in Brahman. We then apply to the interpretation of the Svetâsvatara-text the meaning of the analogous Mahânârâyana-text, as determined by the complementary passages, and thus arrive at the conclusion that the ajâ in the former text also is a being having its Self in Brahman. That this is so, moreover, appears from the Svetâsvatara itself. For in the early part of that Upanishad, we have after the introductory question, 'Is Brahman the cause?' the passage 'The sages devoted to meditation and concentration have seen the person whose Self is the divinity, hidden in its own qualities' (I, 1, 3); which evidently refers to the ajâ as being of the nature of a power of the highest Brahman. And as further on also (viz. in the passages 'From that the Mâyin creates all this, and in this the other is bound up through Mâyâ'; 'Know then Prakriti to be Mâyâ and the Great Lord the ruler of Mâyâ'; and 'he who rules every place of birth,' V, 9-11) the very same being is referred to, there remains not even a shadow of proof for the assertion that the mantra under discussion refers to an independent Prakriti as assumed by the Sâmkhyas.

But a further objection is raised, if the Prakriti denoted by ajâ begins with, i.e. is caused by Brahman, how can it be called ajâ, i.e. the non-produced one; or, if it is non-produced, how can it be originated by Brahman? To this the next Sûtra replies.

10. And on account of the teaching of formation (i.e. creation) there is no contradiction; as in the case of the honey.

The 'and' expresses disposal of a doubt that had arisen. There is no contradiction between the Prakriti being ajâ and originating from light. On account of instruction being given about the formation (kalpana), i.e. creation of the world. This interpretation of 'kalpana' is in agreement with the use of the verb klip in the text, 'as formerly the creator made (akalpayat) sun and moon.'

In our text the sloka 'from that the Lord of Mâyâ creates all this' gives instruction about the creation of the world. From that, i.e. from matter in its subtle causal state when it is not yet divided, the Lord of all creates the entire Universe. From this statement about creation we understand that Prakriti exists in a twofold state according as it is either cause or effect. During a pralaya it unites itself with Brahman and abides in its subtle state, without any distinction of names and forms; it then is called the 'Unevolved,' and by other similar names. At the time of creation, on the other hand, there reveal themselves in Prakriti Goodness and the other gunas, it divides itself according to names and forms, and then is called the 'Evolved,' and so on, and, transforming itself into fire, water, and earth, it appears as red, white, and black. In its causal condition it is ajâ, i.e. unborn, in its effected condition it is 'caused by light, i.e. Brahman'; hence there is no contradiction. The case is analogous to that of the 'honey.' The sun in his causal state is one only, but in his effected state the Lord makes him into honey in so far namely as he then, for the purpose of enjoyment on the part of the Vasus and other gods, is the abode of nectar brought about by sacrificial works to be learned from the Rik and the other Vedas; and further makes him to rise and to set. And between these two conditions there is no contradiction. This is declared in the Madhuvidyâ (Ch. Up. III), from 'The sun is indeed the honey of the Devas,' down to 'when from thence he has risen upwards he neither rises nor

sets; being one he stands in the centre'--'one' here means 'of one nature.'--The conclusion therefore is that the Svetâsvatara mantra under discussion refers to Prakriti as having her Self in Brahman, not to the Prakriti assumed by the Sâmkhyas.

Others, however, are of opinion that the one ajâ of which the mantra speaks has for its characteristics light, water, and earth. To them we address the following questions. Do you mean that by what the text speaks of as an ajâ, consisting of fire, water, and earth, we have to understand those three elements only; or Brahman in the form of those three elements; or some power or principle which is the cause of the three elements? The first alternative is in conflict with the circumstance that, while fire, water, and earth are several things, the text explicitly refers to one Ajâ. Nor may it be urged that fire, water, and earth, although several, become one, by being made tripartite (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 3); for this making them tripartite, does not take away their being several; the text clearly showing that each several element becomes tripartite, 'Let me make each of these three divine beings tripartite.'--The second alternative again divides itself into two alternatives. Is the one ajâ Brahman in so far as having passed over into fire, water, and earth; or Brahman in so far as abiding within itself and not passing over into effects? The former alternative is excluded by the consideration that it does not remove plurality (which cannot be reconciled with the one ajâ). The second alternative is contradicted by the text calling that ajâ red, white, and black; and moreover Brahman viewed as abiding within itself cannot be characterised by fire, water, and earth. On the third alternative it has to be assumed that the text denotes by the term 'ajâ' the three elements, and that on this basis there is imagined a causal condition of these elements; but better than this assumption it evidently is to accept the term 'ajâ' as directly denoting the causal state of those three elements as known from scripture.

Nor can we admit the contention that the term 'ajâ' is meant to teach that Prakriti should metaphorically be viewed as a she-goat; for such a view would be altogether purposeless. Where--in the passage 'Know the Self to be him who drives in the chariot'--the body, and so on, are compared to a chariot, and so on, the object is to set forth the means of attaining Brahman; where the sun is compared to honey, the object is to illustrate the enjoyment of the Vasus and other gods; but what similar object could possibly be attained by directing us to view Prakriti as a goat? Such a metaphorical view would in fact be not merely useless; it would be downright irrational. Prakriti is a non-intelligent principle, the causal substance of the entire material Universe, and constituting the means for the experience of pleasure and pain, and for the final release, of all intelligent souls which are connected with it from all eternity. Now it would be simply contrary to good sense, metaphorically to transfer to Prakriti such as described the nature of a she-goat--which is a sentient being that gives birth to very few creatures only, enters only occasionally into connexion with others, is of small use only, is not the cause of herself being abandoned by others, and is capable of abandoning those connected with her. Nor does it recommend itself to take the word ajâ (understood to mean 'she-goat') in a sense different from that in which we understand the term 'aja' which occurs twice in the same mantra.--Let then all three terms be taken in the same metaphorical sense (aja meaning he-goat).--It would be altogether senseless, we reply, to compare the soul which absolutely dissociates itself from Prakriti ('Another aja leaves her after having enjoyed her') to a he-goat which is able to enter again into connexion with what he has abandoned, or with anything else.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the cup.'

11. Not from the mention of the number even, on account of the diversity and of the excess.

The Vâjasaneyins read in their text 'He in whom the five "five-people"

32430 and the ether rest, him alone I believe to be the Self; I, who know,
32431 believe him to be Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 17). The doubt here arises
32432 whether this text be meant to set forth the categories as established in
32433 Kapila's doctrine, or not.--The Pûrvapakshin maintains the former view,
32434 on the ground that the word 'five-people,' qualified by the word 'five,'
32435 intimates the twenty-five categories of the Sâmkhyas. The compound 'five-
32436 people' (pañkajanâh) denotes groups of five beings, just as the term
32437 pañka-pûlyah denotes aggregates of five bundles of grass. And as we want
32438 to know how many such groups there are, the additional qualification
32439 'five' intimates that there are five such groups; just as if it were
32440 said 'five five-bundles, i. e. five aggregates consisting of five
32441 bundles each.' We thus understand that the 'five five-people' are twenty-
32442 five things, and as the mantra in which the term is met with refers to
32443 final release, we recognise the twenty-five categories known from the
32444 Sâmkhya-smṛiti which are here referred to as objects to be known by
32445 persons desirous of release. For the followers of Kapila teach that
32446 'there is the fundamental causal substance which is not an effect. There
32447 are seven things, viz. the Mahat, and so on, which are causal substances
32448 as well as effects. There are sixteen effects. The soul is neither a
32449 causal substance nor an effect' (Sân. Kâ. 3). The mantra therefore is
32450 meant to intimate the categories known from the Sâmkhya.--To this the
32451 Sûtra replies that from the mention of the number twenty-five supposed
32452 to be implied in the expression 'the five five-people,' it does not
32453 follow that the categories of the Sâmkhyas are meant. 'On account of the
32454 diversity,' i.e. on account of the five-people further qualified by the
32455 number five being different from the categories of the Sâmkhyas. For in
32456 the text 'in whom the five five-people and the ether rest,' the 'in
32457 whom' shows the five-people to have their abode, and hence their Self,
32458 in Brahman; and in the continuation of the text, 'him I believe the Self,'
32459 the 'him' connecting itself with the preceding 'in whom' is recognised
32460 to be Brahman. The five five-people must therefore be different from the
32461 categories of the Sâmkhya-system. 'And on account of the excess.'
32462 Moreover there is, in the text under discussion, an excess over and
32463 above the Sâmkhya categories, consisting in the Self denoted by the
32464 relative pronoun 'in whom,' and in the specially mentioned Ether. What
32465 the text designates therefore is the Supreme Person who is the Universal
32466 Lord in whom all things abide--such as he is described in the text
32467 quoted above, 'Therefore some call him the twenty-sixth, and others the
32468 twenty-seventh.' The 'even' in the Sûtra is meant to intimate that the
32469 'five five-people' can in no way mean the twenty-five categories, since
32470 there is no pentad of groups consisting of five each. For in the case of
32471 the categories of the Sâmkhyas there are no generic characteristics or
32472 the like which could determine the arrangement of those categories in
32473 fives. Nor must it be urged against this that there is a determining
32474 reason for such an arrangement in so far as the tattvas of the Sâmkhyas
32475 form natural groups comprising firstly, the five organs of action;
32476 secondly, the five sense-organs; thirdly, the five gross elements;
32477 fourthly, the subtle parts of those elements; and fifthly, the five
32478 remaining tattvas; for as the text under discussion mentions the ether
32479 by itself, the possibility of a group consisting of the five gross
32480 elements is precluded. We cannot therefore take the compound 'five
32481 people' as denoting a group consisting of five constituent members, but,
32482 in agreement with Pân. II, 1, 50, as merely being a special name. There
32483 are certain beings the special name of which is 'five-people,' and of
32484 these beings the additional word 'pañka' predicates that they are five
32485 in number. The expression is thus analogous to the term 'the seven seven-
32486 rishis' (where the term 'seven-rishis' is to be understood as the name of
32487 a certain class of rishis only).--Who then are the beings called 'five-
32488 people?'--To this question the next Sûtra replies.

32489
32490
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32492
32493 12. The breath, and so on, on the ground of the complementary passage.

32494
32495 We see from a complementary passage, viz. 'They who know the breath of
32496 breath, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of food, the
32497 mind of mind,' that the 'five-people' are the breath, and eye, and so on,
32498 all of which have their abode in Brahman.

32499
32500 But, an objection is raised, while the mantra 'in whom the five five-
32501 people,' &c., is common to the Kânvas and the Mâdhyandinas, the
32502 complementary passage 'they who know the breath of breath,' &c., in the
32503 text of the former makes no mention of food, and hence we have no reason
32504 to say that the 'five-people' in their text are the breath, eye, and so
32505 on.

32506
32507 To this objection the next Sûtra replies.
32508

32509
32510
32511
32512 13. By light, food not being (mentioned in the text) of some.
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32514 In the text of some, viz. the Kânvas, where food is not mentioned, the
32515 five-people are recognised to be the five senses, owing to the phrase
32516 'of lights' which is met with in another complementary passage. In the
32517 mantra, 'him the gods worship as the light of lights,' which precedes
32518 the mantra about the 'five-people,' Brahman is spoken of as the light of
32519 lights, and this suggests the idea of certain lights the activity of
32520 which depends on Brahman. The mantra leaves it undetermined what these
32521 lights are; but from what follows about the 'five-people,' &c., we learn
32522 that what is meant are the senses which light up as it were their
32523 respective objects. In 'the breath of breath' the second 'breath' (in
32524 the genitive case) denotes the sense-organ of touch, as that organ is
32525 connected with air, and as the vital breath (which would otherwise
32526 suggest itself as the most obvious explanation of prâna) does not
32527 harmonise with the metaphorical term 'light.' 'Of the eye' refers to the
32528 organ of sight; 'of the ear' to the organ of hearing. 'Of food'
32529 comprises the senses of smell and taste together: it denotes the sense
32530 of smell on the ground that that sense is connected with earth, which
32531 may be 'food,' and the sense of taste in so far as 'anna' may be also
32532 explained as that by means of which eating goes on (adyate). 'Of mind'
32533 denotes mind, i. e. the so-called internal organ. Taste and smell thus
32534 being taken in combination, we have the required number of five, and we
32535 thus explain the 'five-people' as the sense-organs which throw light on
32536 their objects, together with the internal organ, i.e. mind. The meaning
32537 of the clause about the 'five-people' therefore is that the senses--
32538 called 'five-people'--and the elements, represented by the Ether, have
32539 their basis in Brahman; and as thus all beings are declared to abide in
32540 Brahman, the five 'five-people' can in no way be the twenty-five
32541 categories assumed by the Sâmkhyas.--The general Conclusion is that the
32542 Vedânta-texts, whether referring to numbers or not, nowhere set forth
32543 the categories established in Kapila's system.
32544
32545
32546
32547

32548 14. And on account of (Brahman) as described being declared to be the
32549 cause with regard to Ether, and so on.
32550

32551 Here the philosopher who holds the Pradhâna to be the general cause
32552 comes forward with another objection. The Vedânta-texts, he says, do not
32553 teach that creation proceeds from one and the same agent only, and you
32554 therefore have no right to hold that Brahman is the sole cause of the
32555 world. In one place it is said that our world proceeded from 'Being',
32556 'Being only this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1). In other
32557 places the world is said to have sprung from 'Non-being', 'Non-being
32558 indeed this was in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, 1); and 'Non-being
32559 only was this in the beginning; it became Being' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1).
32560 As the Vedânta-texts are thus not consequent in their statements
32561 regarding the creator, we cannot conclude from them that Brahman is the
32562 sole cause of the world. On the other hand, those texts do enable us to
32563 conclude that the Pradhâna only is the universal cause. For the text
32564 'Now all this was then undeveloped' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7) teaches that the
32565 world was merged in the undeveloped Pradhâna. and the subsequent clause,
32566 'That developed itself by form and name,' that from that Undeveloped
32567 there resulted the creation of the world. For the Undeveloped is that

which is not distinguished by names and forms, and this is none other than the Pradhâna. And as this Pradhâna is at the same time eternal, as far as its essential nature is concerned, and the substrate of all change, there is nothing contradictory in the different accounts of creation calling it sometimes 'Being' and sometimes 'Non-being'; while, on the other hand, these terms cannot, without contradiction, both be applied to Brahman. The causality of the Undeveloped having thus been ascertained, such expressions as 'it _thought_, may I be many,' must be interpreted as meaning its being about to proceed to creation. The terms 'Self' and 'Brahman' also may be applied to the Pradhâna in so far as it is all-pervading (atman from âpnoti), and preeminently great (brihat). We therefore conclude that the only cause of the world about which the Vedânta-texts give information is the Pradhâna.

This view is set aside by the Sûtra. The word _and_ is used in the sense of _but_. It is possible to ascertain from the Vedânta-texts that the world springs from none other than the highest Brahman, which is all-knowing, lord of all, free from all shadow of imperfection, capable of absolutely realising its purposes, and so on; since scripture declares Brahman as described to be the cause of Ether, and so on. By 'Brahman as described' is meant 'Brahman distinguished by omniscience and other qualities, as described in the Sûtra "that from which the origination, and so on, of the world proceed," and in other places.' That Brahman only is declared by scripture to be the cause of Ether, and so on, i.e. the being which is declared to be the cause in passages such as 'From that Self sprang Ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'that sent forth fire' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3), is none other than Brahman possessing omniscience and similar qualities. For the former of these texts follows on the passage 'The True, intelligence, infinite is Brahman; he reaches all desires together with the intelligent Brahman,' which introduces Brahman as the general subject-matter--that Brahman being then referred to by means of the connecting words 'from that.' In the same way the 'that' (in 'that sent forth fire') refers back to the omniscient Brahman introduced in the clause 'that thought, may I be many.' This view is confirmed by a consideration of all the accounts of creation, and we hence conclude that Brahman is the sole cause of the world.--But the text 'Non-being indeed this was in the beginning' calls the general cause 'something that is not'; how then can you say that we infer from the Vedânta-texts as the general cause of the world a Brahman that is all-knowing, absolutely realises its purposes, and so on?--To this question the next Sûtra replies.

15. From connexion.

The fact is that Brahman intelligent, consisting of bliss, &c., connects itself also with the passage 'Non-being was this in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). For the section of the text which precedes that passage (viz. 'Different from this Self consisting of understanding is the Self consisting of Bliss;--he wished, may I be many;--he created all whatever there is. Having created he entered into it; having entered it he became sat and tyat') clearly refers to Brahman consisting of Bliss, which realises its purposes, creates all beings, and entering into them is the Self of all. When, therefore, after this we meet with the sloka ('Non-being this was in the beginning') introduced by the words 'On this there is also this sloka'--which shows that the sloka is meant to throw light on what precedes; and when further on we have the passage 'From fear of it the wind blows' &c., which, referring to the same Brahman, predicates of it universal rulership, bliss of nature, and so on; we conclude with certainty that the sloka about 'Non-being' also refers to Brahman. As during a pralaya the distinction of names and forms does not exist, and Brahman also then does not exist in so far as connected with names and forms, the text applies to Brahman the term 'Non-being.' The text 'Non-being only this was in the beginning' explains itself in the same way.--Nor can we admit the contention that the text 'Now all this was then undeveloped' refers to the Pradhâna as the cause of the world; for the Undeveloped there spoken of is nothing else but Brahman in so

far as its body is not yet evolved. For the text continues 'That same being entered thither to the very tips of the finger-nails;' 'When seeing, eye by name; when hearing, ear by name; when thinking, mind by name;' 'Let men meditate upon him as Self;' where the introductory words 'that same being' refer back to the Undeveloped--which thus is said to enter into all things and thereby to become their ruler. And it is known from another text also (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2) that it is the all-creative highest Brahman which enters into its creation and evolves names and forms. The text 'Having entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self of all' moreover shows that the creative principle enters into its creatures for the purpose of ruling them, and such entering again cannot be attributed to the non-sentient Pradhâna. The Undeveloped therefore is Brahman in that state where its body is not yet developed; and when the text continues 'it developed itself by names and forms' the meaning is that Brahman developed itself in so far as names and forms were distinguished in the world that constitutes Brahman's body. On this explanation of the texts relating to creation we further are enabled to take the thought, purpose, &c., attributed to the creative principle, in their primary literal sense. And, we finally remark, neither the term 'Brahman' nor the term 'Self in any way suits the Pradhâna, which is neither absolutely great nor pervading in the sense of entering into things created with a view to ruling them. It thus remains a settled conclusion that Brahman is the sole cause of the world.--Here terminates the adhikarana of '(Brahman's) causality.'

16. Because it denotes the world.

The Sâṅkhya comes forward with a further objection. Although the Vedānta-texts teach an intelligent principle to be the cause of the world, they do not present to us as objects of knowledge anything that could be the cause of the world, apart from the Pradhâna and the soul as established by the Sâṅkhya-system. For the Kaushîtakins declare in their text, in the dialogue of Bâlâki and Ajâtasatru, that none but the enjoying (individual) soul is to be known as the cause of the world, 'Shall I tell you Brahman? He who is the maker of those persons and of whom this is the work (or "to whom this work belongs") he indeed is to be known' (Kau. Up. IV, 19). Bâlâki at the outset proposes Brahman as the object of instruction, and when he is found himself not to know Brahman, Ajâtasatru instructs him about it, 'he indeed is to be known.' But from the relative clause 'to whom this work belongs,' which connects the being to be known with work, we infer that by Brahman we have here to understand the enjoying soul which is the ruler of Prakriti, not any other being. For no other being is connected with work; work, whether meritorious or the contrary, belongs to the individual soul only. Nor must you contest this conclusion on the ground that 'work' is here to be explained as meaning the object of activity, so that the sense of the clause would be 'he of whom this entire world, as presented by perception and the other means of knowledge, is the work.' For in that case the separate statements made in the two clauses, 'who is the maker of those persons' and 'of whom this is the work,' would be devoid of purport (the latter implying the former). Moreover, the generally accepted meaning of the word 'karman,' both in Vedic and worldly speech, is work in the sense of good and evil actions. And as the origination of the world is caused by actions of the various individual souls, the designation of 'maker of those persons' also suits only the individual soul. The meaning of the whole passage therefore is 'He who is the cause of the different persons that have their abode in the disc of the sun, and so on, and are instrumental towards the retributive experiences of the individual souls; and to whom there belongs karman, good and evil, to which there is due his becoming such a cause; he indeed is to be known, his essential nature is to be cognised in distinction from Prakriti.' And also in what follows, 'The two came to a person who was asleep. He pushed him with a stick,' &c., what is said about the sleeping man being pushed, roused, &c., all points only to the individual soul being the topic of instruction. Further on also the text treats of the individual soul only, 'As the master feeds with his

32706 people, nay as his people feed on the master, thus does this conscious
32707 Self feed with the other Selves.' We must consider also the following
32708 passage--which contains the explanation given by Ajatasatru to Bâlâki,
32709 who had been unable to say where the soul goes at the time of deep
32710 sleep--' There are the arteries called Hitas. In these the person is;
32711 when sleeping he sees no dream, then he (or that, i.e. the aggregate of
32712 the sense-organs) becomes one with this prâna alone. Then speech goes to
32713 him with all names, &c., the mind with all thoughts. And when he awakes,
32714 then, as from a burning fire sparks proceed in all directions, thus from
32715 that Self the prânas proceed each towards its place, from the prânas the
32716 gods, from the gods the worlds.' The individual soul which passes
32717 through the states of dream, deep sleep and waking, and is that into
32718 which there are merged and from which there proceed speech and all the
32719 other organs, is here declared to be the abode of deep sleep 'then it
32720 (viz. the aggregate of the organs) becomes one in that prâna.' Prâna
32721 here means the individual soul in so far as supporting life; for the
32722 text continues 'when that one awakes' and neither the vital breath nor
32723 the Lord (both of whom might be proposed as explanations of prâna) can
32724 be said to be asleep and to wake. Or else 'asmin prâne' might be
32725 explained as 'in the vital breath (which abides) in the individual
32726 soul,' the meaning of the clause being 'all the organs, speech and so
32727 on, become one in the vital breath which itself abides in this soul.'
32728 The word 'prâna' would thus be taken in its primary literal sense; yet
32729 all the same the soul constitutes the topic of the section, the vital
32730 breath being a mere instrument of the soul. The Brahman mentioned at the
32731 outset therefore is none other than the individual soul, and there is
32732 nothing to prove a lord different from it. And as the attributes which
32733 the texts ascribe to the general cause, viz. thought and so on, are
32734 attributes of intelligent beings only, we arrive at the conclusion that
32735 what constitutes the cause of the world is the non-intelligent Pradhâna
32736 guided by the intelligent soul.

32737
32738 This primâ facie view the Sûtra disposes of, by saying 'because (the
32739 work) denotes the world.' It is not the insignificant individual soul--
32740 which is under the influence of its good and evil works, and by
32741 erroneously imputing to itself the attributes of Prakriti becomes the
32742 cause of the effects of the latter--that is the topic of our text; but
32743 rather the Supreme Person who is free from all shadow of imperfection
32744 such as Nescience and the like, who is a treasure of all possible
32745 auspicious qualities in their highest degree of perfection, who is the
32746 sole cause of this entire world. This is proved by the circumstance that
32747 the term 'work' connected with 'this' (in 'of whom this (is) the work')
32748 denotes the Universe which is an effect of the Supreme Person. For the
32749 word 'this' must, on account of its sense, the general topic of the
32750 section and so on, be taken in a non-limited meaning, and hence denotes
32751 the entire world, as presented by Perception and the other means of
32752 knowledge, with all its sentient and non-sentient beings. That the term
32753 'work' does not here denote good and evil actions, appears from the
32754 following consideration of the context. Bâlâki at first offers to teach
32755 Brahman ('Shall I tell you Brahman?') and thereupon holds forth on
32756 various persons abiding in the sun, and so on, as being Brahman.
32757 Ajatasatru however refuses to accept this instruction as not setting
32758 forth Brahman, and finally, in order to enlighten Bâlâki, addresses him
32759 'He, O Bâlâki, who is the maker of those persons,' &c. Now as the
32760 different personal souls abiding in the sun, &c., and connected with
32761 karman in the form of good and evil actions, are known already by Bâlâki,
32762 the term 'karman'--met with in the next clause--is clearly meant to
32763 throw light on some Person so far not known to Bâlâki, and therefore
32764 must be taken to mean not good and evil deeds or action in general, but
32765 rather the entire Universe in so far as being the outcome of activity.
32766 On this interpretation only the passage gives instruction about
32767 something not known before. Should it be said that this would be the
32768 case also if the subject to which the instruction refers were the true
32769 essential nature of the soul, indicated here by its connexion with
32770 karman, we reply that this would involve the (objectionable) assumption
32771 of so-called implication (lakshanâ), in so far namely as what the clause
32772 would directly intimate is (not the essential nature of the soul as free
32773 from karman but rather) the connexion of the soul with karman. Moreover
32774 if the intention of the passage were this, viz. to give instruction as

to the soul, the latter being pointed at by means of the reference to karman, the intention would be fully accomplished by saying 'to whom karman belongs, he is to be known;' while in the text as it actually stands 'of whom this is the karman' the 'this' would be unmeaning. The meaning of the two separate clauses 'who is the maker of those persons' and 'of whom this is the work' is as follows. He who is the creator of those persons whom you called Brahman, and of whom those persons are the creatures; he of whom this entire world is the effect, and before whom all things sentient and non-sentient are equal in so far as being produced by him; he, the highest and universal cause, the Supreme Person, is the object to be known. The meaning implied here is--although the origination of the world has for its condition the deeds of individual souls, yet those souls do not independently originate the means for their own retributive experience, but experience only what the Lord has created to that end in agreement with their works. The individual soul, hence, cannot stand in creative relation to those persons.--What the text under discussion inculcates as the object of knowledge therefore is the highest Brahman which is known from all Vedânta-texts as the universal cause.

17. Should it be said that this is not so on account of the inferential marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air; we reply that this has been explained before.

With reference to the plea urged by the Pûrvapakshin that, owing to inferential marks pointing to the individual soul, and the circumstance of mention being made of the chief vital air, we must decide that the section treats of the enjoying individual soul and not of the highest Self, the Sûtra remarks that this argumentation has already been disposed of, viz. in connexion with the Pratardana vidyâ. For there it was shown that when a text is ascertained, on the ground of a comprehensive survey of initial and concluding clauses, to refer to Brahman, all inferential marks which point to other topics must be interpreted so as to fall in with the principal topic. Now in our text Brahman is introduced at the outset 'Shall I tell you Brahman?' it is further mentioned in the middle of the section, for the clause 'of whom this is the work' does not refer to the soul in general but to the highest Person who is the cause of the whole world; and at the end again we hear of a reward which connects itself only with meditations on Brahman, viz. supreme sovereignty preceded by the conquest of all evil. 'Having overcome all evil he obtains pre-eminence among all beings, sovereignty and supremacy--yea, he who knows this.' The section thus being concerned with Brahman, the references to the individual soul and to the chief vital air must also be interpreted so as to fall in with Brahman. In the same way it was shown above that the references to the individual soul and the chief vital air which are met with in the Pratardana vidyâ really explain themselves in connexion with a threefold meditation on Brahman. As in the passage 'Then with this prâna alone he becomes one' the two words 'this' and 'prâna' may be taken as co-ordinated and it hence would be inappropriate to separate them (and to explain 'in the prâna which abides in this soul'), and as the word 'prâna' is ascertained to mean Brahman also, we must understand the mention of prâna to be made with a view to meditation on Brahman in so far as having the prâna for its body. But how can the references to the individual soul be put in connexion with Brahman?--This point is taken up by the next Sûtra.

18. But Jaimini thinks that it has another purport, on account of the question and answer; and thus some also.

The 'but' is meant to preclude the idea that the mention made of the individual soul enables us to understand the whole section as concerned with that soul.--The teacher Jaimini is of opinion that the mention made

of the individual soul has another meaning, i.e. aims at conveying the idea of what is different from the individual soul, i.e. the nature of the highest Brahman. 'On account of question and answer.' According to the story told in the Upanishad, Ajâtasatru leads Bâlâki to where a sleeping man is resting, and convinces him that the soul is different from breath, by addressing the sleeping person, in whom breath only is awake, with names belonging to prâna [FOOTNOTE 383:1] without the sleeper being awaked thereby, and after that rousing him by a push of his staff. Then, with a view to teaching Bâlâki the difference of Brahman from the individual soul, he asks him the following questions: 'Where, O Bâlâki, did this person here sleep? Where was he? Whence did he thus come back?' To these questions he thereupon himself replies, 'When sleeping he sees no dream, then he becomes one in that prâna alone.--From that Self the organs proceed each towards its place, from the organs the gods, from the gods the worlds.' Now this reply, no less than the questions, clearly refers to the highest Self as something different from the individual Self. For that entering into which the soul, in the state of deep sleep, attains its true nature and enjoys complete serenity, being free from the disturbing experiences of pleasure and pain that accompany the states of waking and of dream; and that from which it again returns to the fruition of pleasure and pain; that is nothing else but the highest Self. For, as other scriptural texts testify ('Then he becomes united with the True,' Ch. Up. VI, 8, 1; 'Embraced by the intelligent Self he knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within,' Bri. Up. IV, 3, 21), the abode of deep sleep is the intelligent Self which is different from the individual Self, i.e. the highest Self. We thus conclude that the reference, in question and answer, to the individual soul subserves the end of instruction being given about what is different from that soul, i.e. the highest Self. We hence also reject the Pûrvapakshin's contention that question and answer refer to the individual soul, that the veins called hita are the abode of deep sleep, and that the well-known clause as to the prâna must be taken to mean that the aggregate of the organs becomes one in the individual soul called prâna. For the veins are the abode, not of deep sleep, but of dream, and, as we have shown above, Brahman only is the abode of deep sleep; and the text declares that the individual soul, together with all its ministering organs, becomes one with, and again proceeds from, Brahman only--which the text designates as Prâna.--Moreover some, viz. the Vâjasaneyins in this same colloquy of Bâlâki and Ajâtasatru as recorded in their text, clearly distinguish from the vijñâna-maya, i.e. the individual soul in the state of deep sleep, the highest Self which then is the abode of the individual soul. 'Where was then the person, consisting of intelligence, and from whence did he thus come back?--When he was thus asleep, then the intelligent person, having through the intelligence of the senses absorbed within himself all intelligence, lies in the ether that is within the heart.' Now the word 'ether' is known to denote the highest Self; cf. the text 'there is within that the small ether' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 1). This shows us that the individual soul is mentioned in the Vâjasaneyin passage to the end of setting forth what is different from it, viz. the prâjña Self, i.e. the highest Brahman. The general conclusion therefore is that the Kaushîtaki-text under discussion proposes as the object of knowledge something that is different from the individual soul, viz. the highest Brahman which is the cause of the whole world, and that hence the Vedânta-texts nowhere intimate that general causality belongs either to the individual soul or to the Pradhâna under the soul's guidance. Here terminates the adhikarana of 'denotation of the world.'

[FOOTNOTE 383:1. The names with which the king addresses the sleeper are _Great one_, clad in white raiment, Soma, king._ The Sru. Pra. comments as follows: _Great one_; because according to Sruti Prâna is the oldest and best. _Clad in white raiment_; because Sruti says that water is the raiment of Prâna; and elsewhere, that what is white belongs to water. _Soma_; because scripture says 'of this prâna water is the body, light the form, viz. yonder moon.' _King_; for Sruti says 'Prâna indeed is the ruler.']

32913
32914 19. On account of the connected meaning of the sentences.
32915

32916 In spite of the conclusion arrived at there may remain a suspicion that
32917 here and there in the Upanishads texts are to be met with which aim at
32918 setting forth the soul as maintained in Kapila's system, and that hence
32919 there is no room for a being different from the individual soul and
32920 called Lord. This suspicion the Sûtra undertakes to remove, in connexion
32921 with the Maitreyi-brâhmana, in the Brihadaranyaka. There we read 'Verily,
32922 a husband is dear, not for the love of the husband, but for the love of
32923 the Self a husband is dear, and so on. Everything is dear, not for the
32924 love of everything, but for the love of the Self everything is dear. The
32925 Self should be seen, should be heard, should be reflected on, should be
32926 meditated upon. When the Self has been seen, heard, reflected upon,
32927 meditated upon, then all this is known' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 6).--Here the
32928 doubt arises whether the Self enjoined in this passage as the object of
32929 seeing, &c., be the soul as held by the Sâmkhyas, or the Supreme Lord,
32930 all-knowing, capable of realising all his purposes, and so on. The
32931 Pûrvapakshin upholds the former alternative. For, he says, the beginning
32932 no less than the middle and the concluding part of the section conveys
32933 the idea of the individual soul only. In the beginning the individual
32934 soul only is meant, as appears from the connexion of the Self with
32935 husband, wife, children, wealth, cattle, and so on. This is confirmed by
32936 the middle part of the section where the Self is said to be connected
32937 with origination and destruction, 'a mass of knowledge, he having risen
32938 from these elements vanishes again into them. When he has departed there
32939 is no more consciousness.' And in the end we have 'whereby should he
32940 know the knower'; where we again recognise the knowing subject, i.e. the
32941 individual soul, not the Lord. We thus conclude that the whole text is
32942 meant to set forth the soul as held by the Sâmkhyas.--But in the
32943 beginning there is a clause, viz. 'There is no hope of immortality by
32944 wealth,' which shows that the whole section is meant to instruct us as
32945 to the means of immortality; how then can it be meant to set forth the
32946 individual soul only?--You state the very reason proving that the text
32947 is concerned with the individual soul only! For according to the Sâmkhya-
32948 system immortality is obtained through the cognition of the true nature
32949 of the soul viewed as free from all erroneous imputation to itself of
32950 the attributes of non-sentient matter; and the text therefore makes it
32951 its task to set forth, for the purpose of immortality, the essential
32952 nature of the soul free from all connexion with Prakriti, 'the Self
32953 should be heard,' and so on. And as the souls dissociated from Prakriti
32954 are all of a uniform nature, all souls are known through the knowledge
32955 of the soul free from Prakriti, and the text therefore rightly says that
32956 through the Self being known everything is known. And as the essential
32957 nature of the Self is of one and the same kind, viz. knowledge or
32958 intelligence, in all beings from gods down to plants, the text rightly
32959 asserts the unity of the Self 'that Self is all this'; and denies all
32960 otherness from the Self, on the ground of the characteristic attributes
32961 of gods and so on really being of the nature of the Not-self, 'he is
32962 abandoned by everything,' &c. The clause, 'For where there is duality as
32963 it were,' which denies plurality, intimates that the plurality
32964 introduced into the homogeneous Self by the different forms--such as of
32965 gods, and so on--assumed by Prakriti, is false. And there is also no
32966 objection to the teaching that 'the Rig-veda and so on are breathed
32967 forth from that great being (i.e. Prakriti); for the origination of the
32968 world is caused by the soul in its quality as ruler of Prakriti.--It
32969 thus being ascertained that the whole Maitreyî-brâhmana is concerned
32970 with the soul in the Sâmkhya sense, we, according to the principle of
32971 the unity of purport of all Vedânta-texts, conclude that they all treat
32972 of the Sâmkhya soul only, and that hence the cause of the world is to be
32973 found not in a so-called Lord but in Prakriti ruled and guided by the
32974 soul.

32975
32976 This primâ facie view is set aside by the Sûtra. The whole text refers
32977 to the Supreme Lord only; for on this supposition only a satisfactory
32978 connexion of the parts of the text can be made out. On being told by
32979 Yâjñavalkya that there is no hope of immortality through wealth,
32980 Maitreyî expresses her slight regard for wealth and all such things as
32981 do not help to immortality, and asks to be instructed as to the means of

32982 immortality only ('What should I do with that by which I do not become
32983 immortal? What my lord knows tell that clearly to me'). Now the Self
32984 which Yājñavalkya, responding to her requests, points out to her as the
32985 proper object of knowledge, can be none other than the highest Self; for
32986 other scriptural texts clearly teach that the only means of reaching
32987 immortality is to know the Supreme Person--'Having known him thus man
32988 passes beyond death'; 'Knowing him thus he becomes immortal here, there
32989 is no other path to go' (Svet. Up. III, 8). The knowledge of the true
32990 nature of the individual soul which obtains immortality, and is a mere
32991 manifestation of the power of the Supreme Person, must be held to be
32992 useful towards the cognition of the Supreme Person who brings about
32993 Release, but is not in itself instrumental towards such Release; the
32994 being the knowledge of which the text declares to be the means of
32995 immortality is therefore the highest Self only. Again, the causal power
32996 with regard to the entire world which is expressed in the passage, 'from
32997 that great Being there were breathed forth the Rig veda,' &c., cannot
32998 possibly belong to the mere individual soul which in its state of
32999 bondage is under the influence of karman and in the state of release has
33000 nothing to do with the world; it can in fact belong to the Supreme
33001 Person only. Again, what the text says as to everything being known by
33002 the knowledge of one thing ('By the seeing indeed of the Self,' &c.) is
33003 possible only in the case of a Supreme Self which constitutes the Self
33004 of all. What the Pûrvapakshin said as to everything being known through
33005 the cognition of the one individual soul, since all individual souls are
33006 of the same type--this also cannot be upheld; for as long as there is a
33007 knowledge of the soul only and not also of the world of non-sentient
33008 things, there is no knowledge of everything. And when the text
33009 enumerates different things ('this Brahman class, this Kshatra class,'
33010 &c.), and then concludes 'all this is that Self'--where the 'this' denotes
33011 the entire Universe of animate and inanimate beings as known through
33012 Perception, Inference, and so on--universal unity such as declared here
33013 is possible only through a highest Self which is the Self of all. It is
33014 not, on the other hand, possible that what the word 'this' denotes, i.e.
33015 the whole world of intelligent and non-intelligent creatures, should be
33016 one with the personal soul as long as it remains what it is, whether
33017 connected with or disassociated from non-sentient matter. In the same
33018 spirit the passage, 'All things abandon him who views all things
33019 elsewhere than in the Self,' finds fault with him who views anything
33020 apart from the universal Self. The qualities also which in the earlier
33021 Maitreyî-brâhmana (II, 4, 12) are predicated of the being under
33022 discussion, viz. greatness, endlessness, unlimitedness, cannot belong to
33023 any one else but the highest Self. That Self therefore is the topic of
33024 the Brâhmana.

33025
33026 We further demur to our antagonist's maintaining that the entire
33027 Brâhmana treats of the individual soul because that soul is at the
33028 outset represented as the object of enquiry, this being inferred from
33029 its connexion with husband, wife, wealth, &c. For if the clause 'for the
33030 love (literally, for the desire) of the Self refers to the individual
33031 Self, we cannot help connecting (as, in fact, we must do in any case)
33032 that Self with the Self referred to in the subsequent clause, 'the Self
33033 indeed is to be seen,' &c.; the connexion having to be conceived in that
33034 way that the information given in the former clause somehow subserves
33035 the cognition of the Self enjoined in the latter clause. 'For the desire
33036 of the Self would then mean 'for the attainment of the objects desired
33037 by the Self.' But if it is first said that husband, wife, &c., are dear
33038 because they fulfil the wishes of the individual Self, it could hardly
33039 be said further on that the nature of that Self must be enquired into;
33040 for what, in the circumstances of the case, naturally is to be enquired
33041 into and searched for are the dear objects but not the true nature of
33042 him to whom those objects are dear, apart from the objects themselves.
33043 It would certainly be somewhat senseless to declare that since husband,
33044 wife, &c., are dear because they fulfil the desires of the individual
33045 soul, therefore, setting aside those dear objects, we must enquire into
33046 the true nature of that soul apart from all the objects of its desire.
33047 On the contrary, it having been declared that husband, wife, &c., are
33048 dear not on account of husband, wife, &c., but on account of the Self,
33049 they should not be dropped, but included in the further investigation,
33050 just because they subserve the Self. And should our opponent (in order

33051 to avoid the difficulty of establishing a satisfactory connexion between
33052 the different clauses) maintain that the clause, 'but everything is dear
33053 for the love of the Self,' is not connected with the following clause,
33054 'the Self is to be seen,' &c., we point out that this would break the
33055 whole connexion of the Brahmāna. And if we allowed such a break, we
33056 should then be unable to point out what is the use of the earlier part
33057 of the Brahmāna. We must therefore attempt to explain the connexion in
33058 such a way as to make it clear why all search for dear objects--husband,
33059 wife, children, wealth, &c.--should be abandoned and the Self only
33060 should be searched for. This explanation is as follows. After having
33061 stated that wealth, and so on, are no means to obtain immortality which
33062 consists in permanent absolute bliss, the text declares that the
33063 pleasant experiences which we derive from wealth, husband, wife, &c..
33064 and which are not of a permanent nature and always alloyed with a great
33065 deal of pain, are caused not by wealth, husband, wife, &c., themselves,
33066 but rather by the highest Self whose nature is absolute bliss. He
33067 therefore who being himself of the nature of perfect bliss causes other
33068 beings and things also to be the abodes of partial bliss, he--the
33069 highest Self--is to be constituted the object of knowledge. The clauses,
33070 'not for the wish of the husband a husband is dear,' &c., therefore must
33071 be understood as follows--a husband, a wife, a son, &c., are not dear to
33072 us in consequence of a wish or purpose on their part, 'may I, for my own
33073 end or advantage be dear to him,' but they are dear to us for the wish
33074 of the Self, i.e. to the end that there may be accomplished the desire
33075 of the highest Self--which desire aims at the devotee obtaining what is
33076 dear to him. For the highest Self pleased with the works of his devotees
33077 imparts to different things such dearness, i.e. joy-giving quality as
33078 corresponds to those works, that 'dearness' being bound in each case to
33079 a definite place, time, nature and degree. This is in accordance with
33080 the scriptural text, 'For he alone bestows bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7).
33081 Things are not dear, or the contrary, to us by themselves, but only in
33082 so far as the highest Self makes them such. Compare the text, 'The same
33083 thing which erst gave us delight later on becomes the source of grief;
33084 and what was the cause of wrath afterwards tends to peace. Hence there
33085 is nothing that in itself is of the nature either of pleasure or of pain.'

33086
33087 But, another view of the meaning of the text is proposed, even if the
33088 Self in the clause 'for the desire of the Self' were accepted as
33089 denoting the individual Self, yet the clause 'the Self must be seen'
33090 would refer to the highest Self only. For in that case also the sense
33091 would be as follows--because the possession of husband, wife, and other
33092 so-called dear things is aimed at by a person to whom they are dear, not
33093 with a view of bringing about what is desired by them (viz. husband,
33094 wife, &c.), but rather to the end of bringing about what is desired by
33095 himself; therefore that being which is, to the individual soul,
33096 absolutely and unlimitedly dear, viz. the highest Self, must be
33097 constituted the sole object of cognition, not such objects as husband,
33098 wife, wealth, &c., the nature of which depends on various external
33099 circumstances and the possession of which gives rise either to limited
33100 pleasure alloyed with pain or to mere pain.--But against this we remark
33101 that as, in the section under discussion, the words designating the
33102 individual Self denote the highest Self also, [FOOTNOTE 391:1], the term
33103 'Self' in both clauses, 'For the desire of the Self' and 'The Self is to
33104 be seen,' really refers to one and the same being (viz. the highest
33105 Self), and the interpretation thus agrees with the one given above.--In
33106 order to prove the tenet that words denoting the individual soul at the
33107 same time denote the highest Self, by means of arguments made use of by
33108 other teachers also, the Sūtrakāra sets forth the two following Sūtras.

33109
33110
33111
33112
33113 20. (It is) a mark indicating that the promissory statement is proved;
33114 thus Āsmarathya thinks.

33115
33116 According to the teacher Āsmarathya the circumstance that terms denoting
33117 the individual soul are used to denote Brahman is a mark enabling us to
33118 infer that the promissory declaration according to which through the
33119 knowledge of one thing everything is known is well established. If the

individual soul were not identical with Brahman in so far as it is the effect of Brahman, then the knowledge of the soul--being something distinct from Brahman--would not follow from the knowledge of the highest Self. There are the texts declaring the oneness of Brahman previous to creation, such as 'the Self only was this in the beginning' (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 1), and on the other hand those texts which declare that the souls spring from and again are merged in Brahman; such as 'As from a blazing fire sparks being like unto fire fly forth a thousandfold, thus are various beings brought forth from the Imperishable, and return thither also' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 1). These two sets of texts together make us apprehend that the souls are one with Brahman in so far as they are its effects. On this ground a word denoting the individual soul denotes the highest Self as well.

[FOOTNOTE 391:1. If it be insisted upon that the Self in 'for the desire of the Self' is the individual Self, we point out that terms denoting the individual Self at the same time denote the highest Self also. This tenet of his Râmânuja considers to be set forth and legitimately proved in Sûtra 23, while Sûtras 21 and 22 although advocating the right principle fail to assign valid arguments.]

21. Because (the soul) when it will depart is such; thus Audulomi thinks.

It is wrong to maintain that the designation of Brahman by means of terms denoting the individual soul is intended to prove the truth of the declaration that through the knowledge of one thing everything is known, in so far namely as the soul is an effect of Brahman and hence one with it. For scriptural texts such as 'the knowing Self is not born, it dies not' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18), declare the soul not to have originated, and it moreover is admitted that the world is each time created to the end of the souls undergoing experiences retributive of their former deeds; otherwise the inequalities of the different parts of the creation would be inexplicable. If moreover the soul were a mere effect of Brahman, its Release would consist in a mere return into the substance of Brahman,--analogous to the refunding into Brahman of the material elements, and that would mean that the injunction and performance of acts leading to such Release would be purportless. Release, understood in that sense, moreover would not be anything beneficial to man; for to be refunded into Brahman as an earthen vessel is refunded into its own causal substance, i.e. clay, means nothing else but complete annihilation. How, under these circumstances, certain texts can speak of the origination and reabsorption of the individual soul will be set forth later on.--According to the opinion of the teacher Audulomi, the highest Self being denoted by terms directly denoting the individual soul is due to the soul's becoming Brahman when departing from the body. This is in agreement with texts such as the following, 'This serene being having risen from this body and approached the highest light appears in its true form' (Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 4); 'As the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, losing their name and form, thus a wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is higher than the high' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8).

22. On account of (Brahman's) abiding (within the individual soul); thus Kâsakritsna (holds).

We must object likewise to the view set forth in the preceding Sûtra, viz. that Brahman is denoted by terms denoting the individual soul because that soul when departing becomes one with Brahman. For that view cannot stand the test of being submitted to definite alternatives.--Is the soul's not being such, i.e. not being Brahman, previously to its departure from the body, due to its own essential nature or to a limiting adjunct, and is it in the latter case real or unreal? In the first case the soul can never become one with Brahman, for if its

33189 separation from Brahman is due to its own essential nature, that
33190 separation can never vanish as long as the essential nature persists.
33191 And should it be said that its essential nature comes to an end together
33192 with its distinction from Brahman, we reply that in that case it
33193 perishes utterly and does not therefore become Brahman. The latter view,
33194 moreover, precludes itself as in no way beneficial to man, and so on.--
33195 If, in the next place, the difference of the soul from Brahman depends
33196 on the presence of real limiting adjuncts, the soul is Brahman even
33197 before its departure from the body, and we therefore cannot reasonably
33198 accept the distinction implied in saying that the soul becomes Brahman
33199 only when it departs. For on this view there exists nothing but Brahman
33200 and its limiting adjuncts, and as those adjuncts cannot introduce
33201 difference into Brahman which is without parts and hence incapable of
33202 difference, the difference resides altogether in the adjuncts, and hence
33203 the soul is Brahman even before its departure from the body.--If, on the
33204 other hand, the difference due to the adjuncts is not real, we ask--what
33205 is it then that becomes Brahman on the departure of the soul?--Brahman
33206 itself whose true nature had previously been obscured by Nescience, its
33207 limiting adjunct!--Not so, we reply. Of Brahman whose true nature
33208 consists in eternal, free, self-luminous intelligence, the true nature
33209 cannot possibly be hidden by Nescience. For by 'hiding' or 'obscuring'
33210 we understand the cessation of the light that belongs to the essential
33211 nature of a thing. Where, therefore, light itself and alone constitutes
33212 the essential nature of a thing, there can either be no obscuration at
33213 all, or if there is such it means complete annihilation of the thing.
33214 Hence Brahman's essential nature being manifest at all times, there
33215 exists no difference on account of which it could be said to become
33216 Brahman at the time of the soul's departure; and the distinction
33217 introduced in the last Sûtra ('when departing') thus has no meaning. The
33218 text on which Audulomi relies, 'Having risen from this body,' &c., does
33219 not declare that that which previously was not Brahman becomes such at
33220 the time of departure, but rather that the true nature of the soul which
33221 had previously existed already becomes manifest at the time of departure.
33222 This will be explained under IV, 4, 1.

33223
33224 The theories stated in the two preceding Sûtras thus having been found
33225 untenable, the teacher Kâsakritsna states his own view, to the effect
33226 that words denoting the jîva are applied to Brahman because Brahman
33227 abides as its Self within the individual soul which thus constitutes
33228 Brahman's body. This theory rests on a number of well-known texts,
33229 'Entering into them with this living (individual) soul let me evolve
33230 names and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'He who dwelling within the Self,
33231 &c., whose body the Self is,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'He who moves
33232 within the Imperishable, of whom the Imperishable is the body,' &c;
33233 'Entered within, the ruler of beings, the Self of all.' That the term
33234 'jîva' denotes not only the jîva itself, but extends in its denotation
33235 up to the highest Self, we have explained before when discussing the
33236 text, 'Let me evolve names and forms.' On this view of the identity of
33237 the individual and the highest Self consisting in their being related to
33238 each other as body and soul, we can accept in their full and un mutilated
33239 meaning all scriptural texts whatever--whether they proclaim the
33240 perfection and omniscience of the highest Brahman, or teach how the
33241 individual soul steeped in ignorance and misery is to be saved through
33242 meditation on Brahman, or describe the origination and reabsorption of
33243 the world, or aim at showing how the world is identical with Brahman.
33244 For this reason the author of the Sûtras, rejecting other views, accepts
33245 the theory of Kâsakritsna. Returning to the Maitreyî-brâhmana we proceed
33246 to explain the general sense, from the passage previously discussed
33247 onwards. Being questioned by Maitreyî as to the means of immortality,
33248 Yâjñavalkya teaches her that this means is given in meditation on the
33249 highest Self ('The Self is to be seen,' &c.). He next indicates in a
33250 general way the nature of the object of meditation ('When the Self is
33251 seen,' &c.), and--availing himself of the similes of the drum, &c.--of
33252 the government over the organs, mind, and so on, which are instrumental
33253 towards meditation. He then explains in detail that the object of
33254 meditation, i.e. the highest Brahman, is the sole cause of the entire
33255 world; and the ruler of the aggregate of organs on which there depends
33256 all activity with regard to the objects of the senses ('As clouds of
33257 smoke proceed,' &c.; 'As the ocean is the home of all the waters'). He,

33258 next, in order to stimulate the effort which leads to immortality, shows
33259 how the highest Self abiding in the form of the individual Self, is of
33260 one uniform character, viz. that of limitless intelligence ('As a lump
33261 of salt,' &c.), and how that same Self characterised by homogeneous
33262 limitless intelligence connects itself in the Samsâra state with the
33263 products of the elements ('a mass of knowledge, it rises from those
33264 elements and again vanishes into them'). He then adds, 'When he has
33265 departed, there is no more knowledge'; meaning that in the state of
33266 Release, where the soul's unlimited essential intelligence is not
33267 contracted in any way, there is none of those specific cognitions by
33268 which the Self identifying itself with the body, the sense-organs, &c.,
33269 views itself as a man or a god, and so on. Next--in the passage, 'For
33270 where there is duality as it were'--he, holding that the view of a
33271 plurality of things not having their Self in Brahman is due to ignorance,
33272 shows that for him who has freed himself from the shackles of ignorance
33273 and recognises this whole world as animated by Brahman, the view of
33274 plurality is dispelled by the recognition of the absence of any
33275 existence apart from Brahman. He then proceeds, 'He by whom he knows all
33276 this, by what means should he know Him?' This means--He, i.e. the
33277 highest Self, which abiding within the individual soul as its true Self
33278 bestows on it the power of knowledge so that the soul knows all this
33279 through the highest Self; by what means should the soul know Him? In
33280 other words, there is no such means of knowledge: the highest Self
33281 cannot be fully understood by the individual soul. 'That Self,' he
33282 continues, 'is to be expressed as--not so, not so!' That means--He, the
33283 highest Lord, different in nature from everything else, whether sentient
33284 or non-sentient, abides within all beings as their Self, and hence is
33285 not touched by the imperfections of what constitutes his body merely. He
33286 then concludes, 'Whereby should he know the Knower? Thus, O Maitreyî,
33287 thou hast been instructed. Thus far goes Immortality'; the purport of
33288 these words being--By what means, apart from the meditation described,
33289 should man know Him who is different in nature from all other beings,
33290 who is the sole cause of the entire world, who is the Knower of all, Him
33291 the Supreme Person? It is meditation on Him only which shows the road to
33292 Immortality. It thus appears that the Maitreyî-brâhmana is concerned
33293 with the highest Brahman only; and this confirms the conclusion that
33294 Brahman only, and with it Prakriti as ruled by Brahman, is the cause of
33295 the world.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the connexion of
33296 sentences.'

33297
33298
33299
33300
33301 23. (Brahman is) the material cause on account of this not being in
33302 conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative instances.

33303
33304 The claims raised by the atheistic Sâṅkhya having thus been disposed of,
33305 the theistic Sâṅkhya comes forward as an opponent. It must indeed be
33306 admitted, he says, that the Vedânta-texts teach the cause of the world
33307 to be an all-knowing Lord; for they attribute to that cause thought and
33308 similar characteristics. But at the same time we learn from those same
33309 texts that the material cause of the world is none other than the
33310 Pradhâna; with an all-knowing, unchanging superintending Lord they
33311 connect a Pradhâna, ruled by him, which is non-intelligent and undergoes
33312 changes, and the two together only they represent as the cause of the
33313 world. This view is conveyed by the following texts, 'who is without
33314 parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint' (Svet.
33315 Up. VI, 18); 'This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying' (Bri. Up. IV,
33316 4, 25); 'He knows her who produces all effects, the non-knowing one, the
33317 unborn one, wearing eight forms, the firm one. Ruled by him she is
33318 spread out, and incited and guided by him gives birth to the world for
33319 the benefit of the souls. A cow she is without beginning and end, a
33320 mother producing all beings' (see above, p. 363). That the Lord creates
33321 this world in so far only as guiding Prakriti, the material cause, we
33322 learn from the following text, 'From that the Lord of Mâyâ creates all
33323 this. Know Mâyâ to be Prakriti and the Lord of Mâyâ the great Lord'
33324 (Svet. Up. IV, 9, 10). And similarly Smṛiti, 'with me as supervisor
33325 Prakriti brings forth the Universe of the movable and the immovable'
33326 (Bha. Gî. IX, 10). Although, therefore, the Pradhâna is not expressly

33327 stated by Scripture to be the material cause, we must assume that there
 33328 is such a Pradhâna and that, superintended by the Lord, it constitutes
 33329 the material cause, because otherwise the texts declaring Brahman to be
 33330 the cause of the world would not be fully intelligible. For ordinary
 33331 experience shows us on all sides that the operative cause and the
 33332 material cause are quite distinct: we invariably have on the one side
 33333 clay, gold, and other material substances which form the material causes
 33334 of pots, ornaments, and so on, and on the other hand, distinct from them,
 33335 potters, goldsmiths, and so on, who act as operative causes. And we
 33336 further observe that the production of effects invariably requires
 33337 several instrumental agencies. The Vedânta-texts therefore cannot
 33338 possess the strength to convince us, in open defiance of the two
 33339 invariable rules, that the one Brahman is at the same time the material
 33340 and the operative cause of the world; and hence we maintain that Brahman
 33341 is only the operative but not the material cause, while the material
 33342 cause is the Pradhâna guided by Brahman.
 33343
 33344 This primâ facie view the Sûtra combats. Prakriti, i.e. the material
 33345 cause, not only the operative cause, is Brahman only; this view being in
 33346 harmony with the promissory declaration and the illustrative instances.
 33347 The promissory declaration is the one referring to the knowledge of all
 33348 things through the knowledge of one, 'Did you ever ask for that
 33349 instruction by which that which is not heard becomes heard?' &c. (Ch. Up.
 33350 VI, 1, 3). And the illustrative instances are those which set forth the
 33351 knowledge of the effect as resulting from the knowledge of the cause,
 33352 'As by one lump of clay there is made known all that is made of clay; as
 33353 by one nugget of gold, &c.; as by one instrument for paring the nails,'
 33354 &c. (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4). If Brahman were merely the operative cause of the
 33355 world, the knowledge of the entire world would not result from the
 33356 knowledge of Brahman; not any more than we know the pot when we know the
 33357 potter. And thus scriptural declaration and illustrative instances would
 33358 be stultified. But if Brahman is the general material cause, then the
 33359 knowledge of Brahman implies the knowledge of its effect, i.e. the world,
 33360 in the same way as the knowledge of such special material causes as a
 33361 lump of clay, a nugget of gold, an instrument for paring the nails,
 33362 implies the knowledge of all things made of clay, gold or iron--such as
 33363 pots, bracelets, diadems, hatchets, and so on. For an effect is not a
 33364 substance different from its cause, but the cause itself which has
 33365 passed into a different state. The initial declaration thus being
 33366 confirmed by the instances of clay and its products, &c., which stand in
 33367 the relation of cause and effect, we conclude that Brahman only is the
 33368 material cause of the world. That Scripture teaches the operative and
 33369 the material causes to be separate, is not true; it rather teaches the
 33370 unity of the two. For in the text, 'Have you asked for that âdesa (above,
 33371 and generally, understood to mean "instruction"), by which that which is
 33372 not heard becomes heard?' the word 'âdesa' has to be taken to mean _ruler_,
 33373 in agreement with the text, 'by the command--or rule--of that
 33374 Imperishable sun and moon stand apart' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 9), so that the
 33375 passage means, 'Have you asked for that Ruler by whom, when heard and
 33376 known, even that which is not heard and known, becomes heard and known?'
 33377 This clearly shows the unity of the operative (ruling or supervising)
 33378 cause and the material cause; taken in conjunction with the subsequent
 33379 declaration of the unity of the cause previous to creation, 'Being only,
 33380 this was in the beginning, one only,' and the denial of a further
 33381 operative cause implied in the further qualification 'advitîyam,' i.e.
 33382 'without a second.'--But how then have we to understand texts such as
 33383 the one quoted above (from the Kûlika-Upanishad) which declare Prakriti
 33384 to be eternal and the material cause of the world?--Prakriti, we reply,
 33385 in such passages denotes Brahman in its causal phase when names and
 33386 forms are not yet distinguished. For a principle independent of Brahman
 33387 does not exist, as we know from texts such as 'Everything abandons him
 33388 who views anything as apart from the Self; and 'But where for him the
 33389 Self has become all, whereby should he see whom?' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6;
 33390 15). Consider also the texts, 'All this is Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1);
 33391 and 'All this has its Self in that' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7); which declare
 33392 that the world whether in its causal or its effected condition has
 33393 Brahman for its Self. The relation of the world to Brahman has to be
 33394 conceived in agreement with scriptural texts such as 'He who moves
 33395 within the earth,' &c., up to 'He who moves within the Imperishable';

and 'He who dwells within the earth,' &c., up to 'He who dwells within the Self (Bri. Up. III, 7, 3-23). The highest Brahman, having the whole aggregate of non-sentient and sentient beings for its body, ever is the Self of all. Sometimes, however, names and forms are not evolved, not distinguished in Brahman; at other times they are evolved, distinct. In the latter state Brahman is called an effect and manifold; in the former it is called one, without a second, the cause. This causal state of Brahman is meant where the text quoted above speaks of the cow without beginning and end, giving birth to effects, and so on.--But, the text, 'The great one is merged in the Unevolved, the Unevolved is merged in the Imperishable,' intimates that the Unevolved originates and again passes away; and similarly the Mahâbhârata says, 'from that there sprung the Non-evolved comprising the three gunas; the Non-evolved is merged in the indivisible Person.'--These texts, we reply, present no real difficulty. For Brahman having non-sentient matter for its body, that state which consists of the three gunas and is denoted by the term 'Unevolved' is something effected. And the text, 'When there was darkness, neither day nor night,' states that also in a total pralaya non-sentient matter having Brahman for its Self continues to exist in a highly subtle condition. This highly subtle matter stands to Brahman the cause of the world in the relation of a mode (prakâra), and it is Brahman viewed as having such a mode that the text from the Kûl. Upanishad refers to. For this reason also the text, 'the Imperishable is merged in darkness, darkness becomes one with the highest God,' declares not that darkness is completely merged and lost in the Divinity but only that it becomes one with it; what the text wants to intimate is that state of Brahman in which, having for its mode extremely subtle matter here called 'Darkness,' it abides without evolving names and forms. The mantra, 'There was darkness, hidden in darkness,' &c. (Ri. Samh. X, 129, 3), sets forth the same view; and so does Manu (I, 5), 'This universe existed in the shape of Darkness, unperceived, destitute of distinctive marks, unattainable by reasoning, unknowable, wholly immersed as it were in deep sleep.' And, as to the text, 'from that the Lord of Mâya creates everything,' we shall prove later on the unchangeableness of Brahman, and explain the scriptural texts asserting it.

As to the contention raised by the Pûrvapakshin that on the basis of invariable experience it must be held that one and the same principle cannot be both material and operative cause, and that effects cannot be brought about by one agency, and that hence the Vedânta-texts can no more establish the view of Brahman being the sole cause than the command 'sprinkle with fire' will convince us that fire may perform the office of water; we simply remark that the highest Brahman which totally differs in nature from all other beings, which is omnipotent and omniscient, can by itself accomplish everything. The invariable rule of experience holds good, on the other hand, with regard to clay and similar materials which are destitute of intelligence and hence incapable of guiding and supervising; and with regard to potters and similar agents who do not possess the power of transforming themselves into manifold products, and cannot directly realise their intentions.--The conclusion therefore remains that Brahman alone is the material as well as the operative cause of the Universe.

24. And on account of the statement of reflection.

Brahman must be held to be both causes for that reason also that texts such as 'He desired, may I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' declare that the creative Brahman forms the purpose of its own Self multiplying itself. The text clearly teaches that creation on Brahman's part is preceded by the purpose 'May I, and no other than I, become manifold in the shape of various non-sentient and sentient beings.'

33465 25. And on account of both being directly declared.

33466
33467 The conclusion arrived at above is based not only on scriptural
33468 declaration, illustrative instances and statements of reflection; but in
33469 addition Scripture directly states that Brahman alone is the material as
33470 well as operative cause of the world. 'What was the wood, what the tree
33471 from which they have shaped heaven and earth? You wise ones, search in
33472 your minds, whereon it stood, supporting the worlds.--Brahman was the
33473 wood, Brahman the tree from which they shaped heaven and earth; you wise
33474 ones, I tell you, it stood on Brahman, supporting the worlds.'--Here a
33475 question is asked, suggested by the ordinary worldly view, as to what
33476 was the material and instruments used by Brahman when creating; and the
33477 answer--based on the insight that there is nothing unreasonable in
33478 ascribing all possible powers to Brahman which differs from all other
33479 beings--declares that Brahman itself is the material and the instruments;--
33480 whereby the ordinary view is disposed of.--The next Sûtra supplies a
33481 further reason.

33482
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33485
33486 26. On account of (the Self) making itself.

33487
33488 Of Brahman which the text had introduced as intent on creation, 'He
33489 wished, may I be many' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), a subsequent text says, 'That
33490 itself made its Self (II, 7), so that Brahman is represented as the
33491 object as well as the agent in the act of creation. It being the Self
33492 only which here is made many, we understand that the Self is material
33493 cause as well as operative one. The Self with names and forms non-
33494 evolved is agent (cause), the same Self with names and forms evolved is
33495 object (effect). There is thus nothing contrary to reason in one Self
33496 being object as well as agent.

33497
33498 A new doubt here presents itself.--'The True, knowledge, infinite is
33499 Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'Bliss is Brahman' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 28);
33500 'Free from sin, free from old age, free from death and grief, free from
33501 hunger and thirst' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1,5); 'Without parts, without action,
33502 tranquil, without fault, without taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19); 'This great
33503 unborn Self, undecaying, undying' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25)--from all these
33504 texts it appears that Brahman is essentially free from even a shadow of
33505 all the imperfections which afflict all sentient and non-sentient beings,
33506 and has for its only characteristics absolutely supreme bliss and
33507 knowledge. How then is it possible that this Brahman should form the
33508 purpose of becoming, and actually become, manifold, by appearing in the
33509 form of a world comprising various sentient and non-sentient beings--all
33510 of which are the abodes of all kinds of imperfections and afflictions?
33511 To this question the next Sûtra replies.

33512
33513
33514
33515
33516 27. Owing to modification.

33517
33518 This means--owing to the essential nature of modification (parinâma).
33519 The modification taught in our system is not such as to introduce
33520 imperfections into the highest Brahman, on the contrary it confers on it
33521 limitless glory. For our teaching as to Brahman's modification is as
33522 follows. Brahman--essentially antagonistic to all evil, of uniform
33523 goodness, differing in nature from all beings other than itself, all-
33524 knowing, endowed with the power of immediately realising all its
33525 purposes, in eternal possession of all it wishes for, supremely blessed--
33526 has for its body the entire universe, with all its sentient and non-
33527 sentient beings--the universe being for it a plaything as it were--and
33528 constitutes the Self of the Universe. Now, when this world which forms
33529 Brahman's body has been gradually reabsorbed into Brahman, each
33530 constituent element being refunded into its immediate cause, so that in
33531 the end there remains only the highly subtle, elementary matter which
33532 Scripture calls Darkness; and when this so-called Darkness itself, by
33533 assuming a form so extremely subtle that it hardly deserves to be called

33534 something separate from Brahman, of which it constitutes the body, has
33535 become one with Brahman; then Brahman invested with this ultra-subtle
33536 body forms the resolve 'May I again possess a world-body constituted by
33537 all sentient and non-sentient beings, distinguished by names and forms
33538 just as in the previous aeon,' and modifies (parināmayati) itself by
33539 gradually evolving the world-body in the inverse order in which
33540 reabsorption had taken place.

33541
33542 All Vedānta-texts teach such modification or change on Brahman's part.
33543 There is, e.g., the text in the Brihad-Āranyaka which declares that the
33544 whole world constitutes the body of Brahman and that Brahman is its Self.
33545 That text teaches that earth, water, fire, sky, air, heaven, sun, the
33546 regions, moon and stars, ether, darkness, light, all beings, breath,
33547 speech, eye, ear, mind, skin, knowledge form the body of Brahman which
33548 abides within them as their Self and Ruler. Thus in the Kāṇva-text; the
33549 Mādhyandina-text reads 'the Self' instead of 'knowledge'; and adds the
33550 worlds, sacrifices and vedas. The parallel passage in the Subāla-
33551 Upanishad adds to the beings enumerated as constituting Brahman's body
33552 in the Brihad-Āranyaka, buddhi, ahamkāra, the mind (kitta), the Un-
33553 evolved (avyakta), the Imperishable (akshara), and concludes 'He who
33554 moves within death, of whom death is the body, whom death does not know,
33555 he is the inner Self of all, free from all evil, divine, the one god
33556 Nārāyaṇa. The term 'Death' here denotes matter in its extremely subtle
33557 form, which in other texts is called Darkness; as we infer from the
33558 order of enumeration in another passage in the same Upanishad, 'the
33559 Unevolved is merged in the Imperishable, the Imperishable in Darkness.'
33560 That this Darkness is called 'Death' is due to the fact that it obscures
33561 the understanding of all souls and thus is harmful to them. The full
33562 text in the Subāla-Up. declaring the successive absorption of all the
33563 beings forming Brahman's body is as follows, 'The earth is merged in
33564 water, water in fire, fire in air, air in the ether, the ether in the
33565 sense-organs, the sense-organs in the tanmātras, the tanmātras in the
33566 gross elements, the gross elements in the great principle, the great
33567 principle in the Unevolved, the Unevolved in the Imperishable; the
33568 Imperishable is merged in Darkness; Darkness becomes one with the
33569 highest Divinity.' That even in the state of non-separation (to which
33570 the texts refer as 'becoming one') non-sentient matter as well as
33571 sentient beings, together with the impressions of their former deeds,
33572 persists in an extremely subtle form, will be shown under II, 1, 35. We
33573 have thus a Brahman all-knowing, of the nature of supreme bliss and so
33574 on, one and without a second, having for its body all sentient and non-
33575 sentient beings abiding in an extremely subtle condition and having
33576 become 'one' with the Supreme Self in so far as they cannot be
33577 designated as something separate from him; and of this Brahman Scripture
33578 records that it forms the resolve of becoming many--in so far, namely,
33579 as investing itself with a body consisting of all sentient and non-
33580 sentient beings in their gross, manifest state which admits of
33581 distinctions of name and form--and thereupon modifies (parināma) itself
33582 into the form of the world. This is distinctly indicated in the
33583 Taittirīya-Upanishad, where Brahman is at first described as 'The True,
33584 knowledge, infinite,' as 'the Self of bliss which is different from the
33585 Self of Understanding,' as 'he who bestows bliss'; and where the text
33586 further on says, 'He desired, may I be many, may I grow forth. He
33587 brooded over himself, and having thus brooded he sent forth all whatever
33588 there is. Having sent forth he entered it. Having entered it he became
33589 sat and tyat, defined and undefined, supported and non-supported,
33590 knowledge and non-knowledge, real and unreal.' The 'brooding' referred
33591 to in this text denotes knowing, viz. reflection on the shape and
33592 character of the previous world which Brahman is about to reproduce.
33593 Compare the text 'whose brooding consists of knowledge' (Mu. Up. I, 1,
33594 9). The meaning therefore is that Brahman, having an inward intuition of
33595 the characteristics of the former world, creates the new world on the
33596 same pattern. That Brahman in all kalpas again and again creates the
33597 same world is generally known from Sruti and Smṛiti. Cp. 'As the creator
33598 formerly made sun and moon, and sky and earth, and the atmosphere and
33599 the heavenly world,' and 'whatever various signs of the seasons are seen
33600 in succession, the same appear again and again in successive yugas and
33601 kalpas.'

33602

33603 The sense of the Taittiriya-text therefore is as follows. The highest
33604 Self, which in itself is of the nature of unlimited knowledge and bliss,
33605 has for its body all sentient and non-sentient beings--instruments of
33606 sport for him as it were--in so subtle a form that they may be called
33607 non-existing; and as they are his body he may be said to consist of them
33608 (tan-maya). Then desirous of providing himself with an infinity of
33609 playthings of all kinds he, by a series of steps beginning with Prakriti
33610 and the aggregate of souls and leading down to the elements in their
33611 gross state, so modifies himself as to have those elements for his body--
33612 when he is said to consist of them--and thus appears in the form of our
33613 world containing what the text denotes as sat and tyat, i.e. all
33614 intelligent and non-intelligent things, from gods down to plants and
33615 stones. When the text says that the Self having entered into it became
33616 sat and tyat, the meaning is that the highest Self, which in its causal
33617 state had been the universal Self, abides, in its effected state also,
33618 as the Self of the different substances undergoing changes and thus
33619 becomes this and that. While the highest Self thus undergoes a change--
33620 in the form of a world comprising the whole aggregate of sentient and
33621 non-sentient beings--all imperfection and suffering are limited to the
33622 sentient beings constituting part of its body, and all change is
33623 restricted to the non-sentient things which constitute another part. The
33624 highest Self is effected in that sense only that it is the ruling
33625 principle, and hence the Self, of matter and souls in their gross or
33626 evolved state; but just on account of being this, viz. their inner Ruler
33627 and Self, it is in no way touched by their imperfections and changes.
33628 Consisting of unlimited knowledge and bliss he for ever abides in his
33629 uniform nature, engaged in the sport of making this world go round. This
33630 is the purport of the clause 'it became the real and the unreal':
33631 although undergoing a change into the multiplicity of actual sentient
33632 and non-sentient things, Brahman at the same time was the Real, i.e.
33633 that which is free from all shadow of imperfection, consisting of
33634 nothing but pure knowledge and bliss. That all beings, sentient and non-
33635 sentient, and whether in their non-evolved or evolved states, are mere
33636 playthings of Brahman, and that the creation and reabsorption of the
33637 world are only his sport, this has been expressly declared by Dvaipâyana,
33638 Parâsara and other Rishis, 'Know that all transitory beings, from the
33639 Unevolved down to individual things, are a mere play of Hari'; 'View his
33640 action like that of a playful child,' &c. The Sûtrakâra will distinctly
33641 enounce the same view in II, 1, 33. With a similar view the text 'from
33642 that the Lord of Mâyâ sends forth all this; and in that the other is
33643 bound by Mâyâ' (Svet. Up. IV, 9), refers to Prakriti and soul, which
33644 together constitute the body of Brahman, as things different from
33645 Brahman, although then, i.e. at the time of a pralaya, they are one with
33646 Brahman in so far as their extreme subtlety does not admit of their
33647 being conceived as separate; this it does to the end of suggesting that
33648 even when Brahman undergoes the change into the shape of this world, all
33649 changes exclusively belong to non-sentient matter which is a mode of
33650 Brahman, and all imperfections and sufferings to the individual souls
33651 which also are modes of Brahman. The text has to be viewed as agreeing
33652 in meaning with 'that Self made itself.' Of a similar purport is the
33653 account given in Manu, 'He being desirous to send forth from his body
33654 beings of many kinds, first with a thought created the waters and placed
33655 his seed in them' (I, 8).

33656
33657 It is in this way that room is found for those texts also which proclaim
33658 Brahman to be free from all imperfection and all change. It thus remains
33659 a settled conclusion that Brahman by itself constitutes the material as
33660 well as the operative cause of the world.

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33662
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33664
33665 28. And because it is called the womb.

33666
33667 Brahman is the material as well as the operative cause of the world for
33668 that reason also that certain texts call it the womb, 'the maker, the
33669 Lord, the Person, Brahman, the womb' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3); 'that which
33670 the wise regard as the womb of all beings' (I, 1, 6). And that 'womb'
33671 means as much as material cause, appears from the complementary passage

'As a spider sends forth and draws in its threads' (I, 1, 7)--

29. Herewith all (texts) are explained, explained.

Hereby, i.e. by the whole array of arguments set forth in the four pâdas of the first adhyâya; all those particular passages of the Vedânta-texts which give instruction as to the cause of the world, are explained as meaning to set forth a Brahman all-wise, all-powerful, different in nature from all beings intelligent and non-intelligent. The repetition of the word 'explained' is meant to indicate the termination of the adhyâya.

SECOND ADHYÂYA

FIRST PÂDA.

1. If it be said that there would result the fault of there being no room for (certain) Smritis: (we reply) 'no,' because there would result the fault of want of room for other Smritis.

The first adhyâya has established the truth that what the Vedânta-texts teach is a Supreme Brahman, which is something different as well from non-sentient matter known through the ordinary means of proof, viz. Perception and so on, as from the intelligent souls whether connected with or separated from matter; which is free from even a shadow of imperfection of any kind; which is an ocean as it were of auspicious qualities and so on; which is the sole cause of the entire Universe; which constitutes the inner Self of all things. The second adhyâya is now begun for the purpose of proving that the view thus set forth cannot be impugned by whatever arguments may possibly be brought forward. The Sûtrakâra at first turns against those who maintain that the Vedânta-texts do not establish the view indicated above, on the ground of that view being contradicted by the Smriti of Kapila, i. e. the Sâṅkhya-system.

But how can it be maintained at all that Scripture does not set forth a certain view because thereby it would enter into conflict with Smriti? For that Smriti if contradicted by Scripture is to be held of no account, is already settled in the Pûrva Mīmāṃsâ ('But where there is contradiction Smriti is not to be regarded,' I, 3, 3).--Where, we reply, a matter can be definitely settled on the basis of Scripture--as e.g. in the case of the Vedic injunction, 'he is to sing, after having touched the Udumbara branch' (which clearly contradicts the Smriti injunction that the whole branch is to be covered up)--Smriti indeed need not be regarded. But the topic with which the Vedânta-texts are concerned is hard to understand, and hence, when a conflict arises between those texts and a Smriti propounded by some great Rishi, the matter does not admit of immediate decisive settlement: it is not therefore unreasonable to undertake to prove by Smriti that Scripture does not set forth a certain doctrine. That is to say--we possess a Smriti composed with a view to teach men the nature and means of supreme happiness, by the great Rishi Kapila to whom Scripture, Smriti, Itihâsa and Purâna alike refer as a person worthy of all respect (compare e. g. 'the Rishi Kapila,' Svet. Up. V, 2), and who moreover (unlike Brihaspati and other Smriti--writers) fully acknowledges the validity of all the means of earthly happiness which are set forth in the karmakânda of the Veda, such as the daily oblations to the sacred fires, the New and Full Moon offerings and the great Soma sacrifices. Now, as men having only an imperfect knowledge of the Veda, and moreover naturally slow-minded, can hardly ascertain the sense of the Vedânta-texts without the assistance of such a Smriti, and as to be satisfied with that sense of the Vedânta which discloses itself on a mere superficial study of the text would imply the admission that the whole Sâṅkhya Smriti, although composed by an able

33741 and trustworthy person, really is useless; we see ourselves driven to
 33742 acknowledge that the doctrine of the Vedânta-texts cannot differ from
 33743 the one established by the Sâmkhyas. Nor must you object that to do so
 33744 would force on us another unacceptable conclusion, viz. that those
 33745 Smritis, that of Manu e.g., which maintain Brahman to be the universal
 33746 cause, are destitute of authority; for Manu and similar works inculcate
 33747 practical religious duty and thus have at any rate the uncontested
 33748 function of supporting the teaching of the karmakânda of the Veda. The
 33749 Sâmkhya Smriti, on the other hand, is entirely devoted to the setting
 33750 forth of theoretical truth (not of practical duty), and if it is not
 33751 accepted in that quality, it is of no use whatsoever.--On this ground
 33752 the Sûtra sets forth the primâ facie view, 'If it be said that there
 33753 results the fault of there being no room for certain Smritis.'
 33754
 33755 The same Sûtra replies 'no; because there would result the fault of want
 33756 of room for other Smritis.' For other Smritis, that of Manu e.g., teach
 33757 that Brahman is the universal cause. Thus Manu says, 'This (world)
 33758 existed in the shape of darkness, and so on. Then the divine Self
 33759 existent, indiscernible but making discernible all this, the great
 33760 elements and the rest, appeared with irresistible power, dispelling the
 33761 darkness. He, desiring to produce beings of many kinds from his own body,
 33762 first with a thought created the waters, and placed his seed in them'
 33763 (Manu I, 5-8). And the Bhagavad-gîtâ, 'I am the origin and the
 33764 dissolution of the whole Universe' (VII, 6). 'I am the origin of all;
 33765 everything proceeds from me' (X, 8). Similarly, in the Mahâbhârata, to
 33766 the question 'Whence was created this whole world with its movable and
 33767 immovable beings?' the answer is given, 'Nârâyana assumes the form of
 33768 the world, he the infinite, eternal one'; and 'from him there originates
 33769 the Unevolved consisting of the three gunas'; and 'the Unevolved is
 33770 merged in the non-acting Person.' And Parâsara says, 'From Vishnu there
 33771 sprang the world and in him it abides; he makes this world persist and
 33772 he rules it--he is the world.' Thus also Âpastamba, 'The living beings
 33773 are the dwelling of him who lies in all caves, who is not killed, who is
 33774 spotless'; and 'From him spring all bodies; he is the primary cause, he
 33775 is eternal, permanent.' (Dharmasû. I, 8, 22, 4; 23, 2).--If the question
 33776 as to the meaning of the Vedânta-texts were to be settled by means of
 33777 Kapila's Smriti, we should have to accept the extremely undesirable
 33778 conclusion that all the Smritis quoted are of no authority. It is true
 33779 that the Vedânta-texts are concerned with theoretical truth lying
 33780 outside the sphere of Perception and the other means of knowledge, and
 33781 that hence students possessing only a limited knowledge of the Veda
 33782 require some help in order fully to make out the meaning of the Vedânta.
 33783 But what must be avoided in this case is to give any opening for the
 33784 conclusion that the very numerous Smritis which closely follow the
 33785 doctrine of the Vedânta, are composed by the most competent and
 33786 trustworthy persons and aim at supporting that doctrine, are irrelevant;
 33787 and it is for this reason that Kapila's Smriti which contains a doctrine
 33788 opposed to Scripture must be disregarded. The support required is
 33789 elucidation of the sense conveyed by Scripture, and this clearly cannot
 33790 be effected by means of a Smriti contradicting Scripture. Nor is it of
 33791 any avail to plead, as the Pûrvapakshin does, that Manu and other
 33792 Smritis of the same kind fulfil in any case the function of elucidating
 33793 the acts of religious duty enjoined in the karmakânda. For if they
 33794 enjoin acts of religious duty as means to win the favour of the Supreme
 33795 Person but do not impress upon us the idea of that Supreme Person
 33796 himself who is to be pleased by those acts, they are also not capable of
 33797 impressing upon us the idea of those acts themselves. That it is the
 33798 character of all religious acts to win the favour of the Supreme Spirit,
 33799 Smriti distinctly declares, 'Man attains to perfection by worshipping
 33800 with his proper action Him from whom all Beings proceed; and by whom all
 33801 this is stretched out' (Bha. Gî. XVIII, 46); 'Let a man meditate on
 33802 Nârâyana, the divine one, at all works, such as bathing and the like; he
 33803 will then reach the world of Brahman and not return hither' (Daksha-
 33804 smriti); and 'Those men with whom, intent on their duties, thou art
 33805 pleased, O Lord, they pass beyond all this Mâya and find Release for
 33806 their souls' (Vi. Pu.). Nor can it be said that Manu and similar Smritis
 33807 have a function in so far as setting forth works (not aiming at final
 33808 Release but) bringing about certain results included in transmigratory
 33809 existence, whether here on earth or in a heavenly world; for the

essential character of those works also is to please the highest Person. As is said in the Bhagavad-gîtâ (IX, 23, 24); 'Even they who devoted to other gods worship them with faith, worship me, against ordinance. For I am the enjoyer and the Lord of all sacrifices; but they know me not in truth and hence they fall,' and 'Thou art ever worshipped by me with sacrifices; thou alone, bearing the form of pitris and of gods, enjoyest all the offerings made to either.' Nor finally can we admit the contention that it is rational to interpret the Vedânta-texts in accordance with Kapila's Smriti because Kapila, in the Svetâsvatara text, is referred to as a competent person. For from this it would follow that, as Brihaspati is, in Sruti and Smriti, mentioned as a pattern of consummate wisdom, Scripture should be interpreted in agreement with the openly materialistic and atheistic Smriti composed by that authority. But, it may here be said, the Vedânta-texts should after all be interpreted in agreement with Kapila's Smriti, for the reason that Kapila had through the power of his concentrated meditation (yoga) arrived at an insight into truth.--To this objection the next Sûtra replies.

2. And on account of the non-perception (of truth on the part) of others.

The 'and' in the Sûtra has the force of 'but,' being meant to dispel the doubt raised. There are many other authors of Smritis, such as Manu, who through the power of their meditation had attained insight into the highest truth, and of whom it is known from Scripture that the purport of their teaching was a salutary medicine to the whole world ('whatever Manu said that was medicine'). Now, as these Rishis did not see truth in the way of Kapila, we conclude that Kapila's view, which contradicts Scripture, is founded on error, and cannot therefore be used to modify the sense of the Vedânta-texts.--Here finishes the adhikarana treating of 'Smriti.'

3. Hereby the Yoga is refuted.

By the above refutation of Kapila's Smriti the Yoga-smriti also is refuted.--But a question arises, What further doubt arises here with regard to the Yoga system, so as to render needful the formal extension to the Yoga of the arguments previously set forth against the Sâṅkhya?--It might appear, we reply, that the Vedânta should be supported by the Yoga-smriti, firstly, because the latter admits the existence of a Lord; secondly, because the Vedânta-texts mention Yoga as a means to bring about final Release; and thirdly, because Hiranyagarbha, who proclaimed the Yoga-smriti is qualified for the promulgation of all Vedânta-texts.--But these arguments refute themselves as follows. In the first place the Yoga holds the Pradhâna, which is independent of Brahman, to be the general material cause, and hence the Lord acknowledged by it is a mere operative cause. In the second place the nature of meditation, in which Yoga consists, is determined by the nature of the object of meditation, and as of its two objects, viz. the soul and the Lord, the former does not have its Self in Brahman, and the latter is neither the cause of the world nor endowed with the other auspicious qualities (which belong to Brahman), the Yoga is not of Vedic character. And as to the third point, Hiranyagarbha himself is only an individual soul, and hence liable to be overpowered by the inferior gunas, i.e. passion and darkness; and hence the Yoga-smriti is founded on error, no less than the Purâṇas, promulgated by him, which are founded on rajas and tamas. The Yoga cannot, therefore, be used for the support of the Vedânta.--Here finishes the adhikarana of 'the refutation of the Yoga.'

4. Not, on account of the difference of character of that; and its being

33879 such (appears) from Scripture.

33880

33881 The same opponent who laid stress on the conflict between Scripture and
33882 Smṛiti now again comes forward, relying this time (not on Smṛiti but) on
33883 simple reasoning. Your doctrine, he says, as to the world being an
33884 effect of Brahman which you attempted to prove by a refutation of the
33885 Sāṅkhya Smṛiti shows itself to be irrational for the following reason.
33886 Perception and the other means of knowledge show this world with all its
33887 sentient and non-sentient beings to be of a non-intelligent and impure
33888 nature, to possess none of the qualities of the Lord, and to have pain
33889 for its very essence; and such a world totally differs in nature from
33890 the Brahman, postulated by you, which is said to be all-knowing, of
33891 supreme lordly power, antagonistic to all evil, enjoying unbroken
33892 uniform blessedness. This difference in character of the world from
33893 Brahman is, moreover, not only known through Perception, and so on, but
33894 is seen to be directly stated in Scripture itself; compare 'Knowledge
33895 and non-knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 6, 1); 'Thus are these objects placed
33896 on the subjects, and the subjects on the prāṇa' (Kau. Up. III, 9); 'On
33897 the same tree man sits grieving, immersed, bewildered by his own
33898 impotence' (Svet. Up. IV, 7); 'The soul not being a Lord is bound
33899 because he has to enjoy' (Svet. Up. I, 8); and so on; all which texts
33900 refer to the effect, i.e. the world as being non-intelligent, of the
33901 essence of pain, and so on. The general rule is that an effect is non-
33902 different in character from its cause; as e.g. pots and bracelets are
33903 non-different in character from their material causes--clay and gold.
33904 The world cannot, therefore, be the effect of Brahman from which it
33905 differs in character, and we hence conclude that, in agreement with the
33906 Sāṅkhya Smṛiti, the Pradhāna which resembles the actual world in
33907 character must be assumed to be the general cause. Scripture, although
33908 not dependent on anything else and concerned with super-sensuous objects,
33909 must all the same come to terms with ratiocination (tarka); for all the
33910 different means of knowledge can in many cases help us to arrive at a
33911 decisive conclusion, only if they are supported by ratiocination. For by
33912 tarka we understand that kind of knowledge (intellectual activity) which
33913 in the case of any given matter, by means of an investigation either
33914 into the essential nature of that matter or into collateral (auxiliary)
33915 factors, determines what possesses proving power, and what are the
33916 special details of the matter under consideration: this kind of
33917 cognitional activity is also called ūha. All means of knowledge equally
33918 stand in need of tarka; Scripture however, the authoritative character
33919 of which specially depends on expectancy (ākāṅkṣhā), proximity
33920 (sannidhi), and compatibility (yogyatā), throughout requires to be
33921 assisted by tarka. In accordance with this Manu says, 'He who
33922 investigates by means of reasoning, he only knows religious duty, and
33923 none other.' It is with a view to such confirmation of the sense of
33924 Scripture by means of Reasoning that the texts declare that certain
33925 topics such as the Self must be 'reflected on' (mantavya).--Now here it
33926 might possibly be said that as Brahman is ascertained from Scripture to
33927 be the sole cause of the world, it must be admitted that intelligence
33928 exists in the world also, which is an effect of Brahman. In the same way
33929 as the consciousness of an intelligent being is not perceived when it is
33930 in the states of deep sleep, swoon, &c., so the intelligent nature of
33931 jars and the like also is not observed, although it really exists; and
33932 it is this very difference of manifestation and non-manifestation of
33933 intelligence on which the distinction of intelligent and non-intelligent
33934 beings depends.--But to this we reply that permanent non-perception of
33935 intelligence proves its non-existence. This consideration also refutes
33936 the hypothesis of things commonly called non-intelligent possessing the
33937 power, or potentiality, of consciousness. For if you maintain that a
33938 thing possesses the power of producing an effect while yet that effect
33939 is never and nowhere _seen_ to be produced by it, you may as well
33940 proclaim at a meeting of sons of barren women that their mothers possess
33941 eminent procreative power! Moreover, to prove at first from the Vedānta-
33942 texts that Brahman is the material cause of the world, and from this
33943 that pots and the like possess potential consciousness, and therefrom
33944 the existence of non-manifested consciousness; and then, on the other
33945 hand, to start from the last principle as proved and to deduce therefrom
33946 that the Vedānta-texts prove Brahman to be the material cause of the
33947 world, is simply to argue in a circle; for that the relation of cause

33948 and effect should exist between things different in character is just
33949 what cannot be proved.--What sameness of character, again, of causal
33950 substance and effects, have you in mind when you maintain that from the
33951 absence of such sameness it follows that Brahman cannot be proved to be
33952 the material cause of the world? It cannot be complete sameness of all
33953 attributes, because in that case the relation of cause and effect (which
33954 after all requires some difference) could not be established. For we
33955 do not observe that in pots and jars which are fashioned out of a lump
33956 of clay there persists the quality of 'being a lump' which belongs to
33957 the causal substance. And should you say that it suffices that there
33958 should be equality in some or any attribute, we point out that such is
33959 actually the case with regard to Brahman and the world, both of which
33960 have the attribute of 'existence' and others. The true state of the case
33961 rather is as follows. There is equality of nature between an effect and
33962 a cause, in that sense that those essential characteristics by which the
33963 causal substance distinguishes itself from other things persist in its
33964 effects also: those characteristic features, e.g., which distinguish
33965 gold from clay and other materials, persist also in things made of gold-
33966 bracelets and the like. But applying this consideration to Brahman and
33967 the world we find that Brahman's essential nature is to be antagonistic
33968 to all evil, and to consist of knowledge, bliss and power, while the
33969 world's essential nature is to be the opposite of all this. Brahman
33970 cannot, therefore, be the material cause of the world.

33971
33972 But, it may be objected, we observe that even things of different
33973 essential characteristics stand to each other in the relation of cause
33974 and effect. From man, e.g., who is a sentient being, there spring nails,
33975 teeth, and hair, which are non-sentient things; the sentient scorpion
33976 springs from non-sentient dung; and non-sentient threads proceed from
33977 the sentient spider.--This objection, we reply, is not valid; for in the
33978 instances quoted the relation of cause and effect rests on the non-
33979 sentient elements only (i.e. it is only the non-sentient matter of the
33980 body which produces nails, &c.).

33981
33982 But, a further objection is raised, Scripture itself declares in many
33983 places that things generally held to be non-sentient really possess
33984 intelligence; compare 'to him the earth said'; 'the water desired'; 'the
33985 prânas quarrelling among themselves as to their relative pre-eminence
33986 went to Brahman.' And the writers of the Purânas also attribute
33987 consciousness to rivers, hills, the sea, and so on. Hence there is after
33988 all no essential difference in nature between sentient and so-called non-
33989 sentient beings.--To this objection the Pûrvapakshin replies in the next
33990 Sûtra.

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33994
33995 5. But (there is) denotation of the superintending (deities), on account
33996 of distinction and entering.

33997
33998 The word 'but' is meant to set aside the objection started. In texts
33999 such as 'to him the earth said,' the terms 'earth' and so on, denote the
34000 divinities presiding over earth and the rest.--How is this known?--'
34001 Through distinction and connexion.' For earth and so on are denoted by
34002 the distinctive term 'divinities'; so e.g. 'Let me enter into those
34003 three divinities' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2), where fire, water, and earth are
34004 called divinities; and Kau. Up. II, 14, 'All divinities contending with
34005 each other as to pre-eminence,' and 'all these divinities having
34006 recognised pre-eminence in prâna.' The 'entering' of the Sûtra refers to
34007 Ait. Ar. II, 4, 2, 4, 'Agni having become speech entered into the mouth;
34008 Aditya having become sight entered into the eyes,' &c., where the text
34009 declares that Agni and other divine beings entered into the sense-organs
34010 as their superintendents.

34011
34012 We therefore adhere to our conclusion that the world, being non-
34013 intelligent and hence essentially different in nature from Brahman,
34014 cannot be the effect of Brahman; and that therefore, in agreement with
34015 Smṛiti confirmed by reasoning, the Vedânta-texts must be held to teach
34016 that the Pradhâna is the universal material cause. This primâ facie view

34017 is met by the following Sûtra.

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34021

34022 6. But it is seen.

34023

34024 The 'but' indicates the change of view (introduced in the present Sûtra).

34025 The assertion that Brahman cannot be the material cause of the world

34026 because the latter differs from it in essential nature, is unfounded;

34027 since it is a matter of observation that even things of different nature

34028 stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. For it is

34029 observed that from honey and similar substances there originate worms

34030 and other little animals.--But it has been said above that in those

34031 cases there is sameness of nature, in so far as the relation of cause

34032 and effect holds good only between the non-intelligent elements in both!--

34033 This assertion was indeed made, but it does not suffice to prove that

34034 equality of character between cause and effect which you have in view.

34035 For, being apprehensive that from the demand of equality of character in

34036 some point or other only it would follow that, as all things have

34037 certain characteristics in common, anything might originate from

34038 anything, you have declared that the equality of character necessary for

34039 the relation of cause and effect is constituted by the persistence, in

34040 the effect, of those characteristic points which differentiate the cause

34041 from other things. But it is evident that this restrictive rule does not

34042 hold good in the case of the origination of worms and the like from

34043 honey and so on; and hence it is not unreasonable to assume that the

34044 world also, although differing in character from Brahman, may originate

34045 from the latter. For in the case of worms originating from honey,

34046 scorpions from dung, &c., we do not observe--what indeed we do

34047 observe in certain other cases, as of pots made of clay, ornaments made

34048 of gold--that the special characteristics distinguishing the causal

34049 substance from other things persist in the effects also.

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34054 7. If it be said that (the effect is) non-existing; we say no, there

34055 being a mere denial.

34056

34057 But, an objection is raised, if Brahman, the cause, differs in nature

34058 from the effect, viz. the world, this means that cause and effect are

34059 separate things and that hence the effect does not exist in the cause, i.

34060 e. Brahman; and this again implies that the world originates from what

34061 has no existence!--Not so, we reply. For what the preceding Sûtra has

34062 laid down is merely the denial of an absolute rule demanding that cause

34063 and effect should be of the same nature; it was not asserted that the

34064 effect is a thing altogether different and separate from the cause. We

34065 by no means abandon our tenet that Brahman the cause modifies itself so

34066 as to assume the form of a world differing from it in character. For

34067 such is the case with the honey and the worms also. There is difference

34068 of characteristics, but--as in the case of gold and golden bracelets--

34069 there is oneness of substance.--An objection is raised.

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34074 8. On account of such consequences in reabsorption (the Vedânta-texts

34075 would be) inappropriate.

34076

34077 The term 'reabsorption' here stands as an instance of all the states of

34078 Brahman, reabsorption, creation, and so on--among which it is the first

34079 as appears from the texts giving instruction about those several states

34080 'Being only was this in the beginning'; 'The Self only was this in the

34081 beginning.' If we accept the doctrine of the oneness of substance of

34082 cause and effect, then, absorption, creation, &c. of the world all being

34083 in Brahman, the different states of the world would connect themselves

34084 with Brahman, and the latter would thus be affected by all the

34085 imperfections of its effect; in the same way as all the attributes of

34086 the bracelet are present in the gold also. And the undesirable
34087 consequence of this would be that contradictory attributes as predicated
34088 in different Vedānta-texts would have to be attributed to one and the
34089 same substance; cp. 'He who is all-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'Free
34090 from sin, free from old age and death' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5); 'Of him
34091 there is known neither cause nor effect' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'Of these
34092 two one eats the sweet fruit' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'The Self that is not a
34093 Lord is bound because he has to enjoy' (Svet. Up. I, 8); 'On account of
34094 his impotence he laments, bewildered' (Svet. Up. IV, 7).--Nor can we
34095 accept the explanation that, as Brahman in its causal as well as its
34096 effected state has all sentient and non-sentient beings for its body;
34097 and as all imperfections inhere in that body only, they do not touch
34098 Brahman in either its causal or effected state. For it is not possible
34099 that the world and Brahman should stand to each other in the relation of
34100 effect and cause, and if it were possible, the imperfections due to
34101 connexion with a body would necessarily cling to Brahman. It is not, we
34102 say, possible that the intelligent and non-intelligent beings together
34103 should constitute the body of Brahman. For a body is a particular
34104 aggregate of earth and the other elements, depending for its subsistence
34105 on vital breath with its five modifications, and serving as an abode to
34106 the sense-organs which mediate the experiences of pleasure and pain
34107 retributive of former works: such is in Vedic and worldly speech the
34108 sense connected with the term 'body.' But numerous Vedic texts--'Free
34109 from sin, from old age and death' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1); 'Without eating the
34110 other one looks on' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'Grasping without hands, hasting
34111 without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears' (Svet. Up.
34112 III, 19); 'Without breath, without mind' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2)--declare
34113 that the highest Self is free from karman and the enjoyment of its
34114 fruits, is not capable of enjoyment dependent on sense-organs, and has
34115 no life dependent on breath: whence it follows that he cannot have a
34116 body constituted by all the non-sentient and sentient beings. Nor can
34117 either non-sentient beings in their individual forms such as grass,
34118 trees, &c., or the aggregate of all the elements in their subtle state
34119 be viewed as the abode of sense-activity (without which they cannot
34120 constitute a body); nor are the elements in their subtle state combined
34121 into earth and the other gross elements (which again would be required
34122 for a body). And sentient beings which consist of mere intelligence are
34123 of course incapable of all this, and hence even less fit to constitute a
34124 body. Nor may it be said that to have a body merely means to be the
34125 abode of fruition, and that Brahman may possess a body in this latter
34126 sense; for there are abodes of fruition, such as palaces and the like,
34127 which are not considered to be bodies. Nor will it avail, narrowing the
34128 last definition, to say that that only is an abode of enjoyment directly
34129 abiding in which a being enjoys pain and pleasure; for if a soul enters
34130 a body other than its own, that body is indeed the abode in which it
34131 enjoys the pains and pleasures due to such entering, but is not admitted
34132 to be in the proper sense of the word the body of the soul thus
34133 entered. In the case of the Lord, on the other hand, who is in the
34134 enjoyment of self-established supreme bliss, it can in no way be
34135 maintained that he must be joined to a body, consisting of all sentient
34136 and non-sentient beings, for the purpose of enjoyment.--That view also
34137 according to which a 'body' means no more than a means of enjoyment is
34138 refuted hereby.

34139
34140 You will now possibly try another definition, viz. that the body of a
34141 being is constituted by that, the nature, subsistence and activity of
34142 which depend on the will of that being, and that hence a body may be
34143 ascribed to the Lord in so far as the essential nature, subsistence, and
34144 activity of all depend on him.--But this also is objectionable; since in
34145 the first place it is not a fact that the nature of a body depends on
34146 the will of the intelligent soul joined with it; since, further, an
34147 injured body does not obey in its movements the will of its possessor;
34148 and since the persistence of a dead body does not depend on the soul
34149 that tenanted it. Dancing puppets and the like, on the other hand, are
34150 things the nature, subsistence, and motions of which depend on the will
34151 of intelligent beings, but we do not on that account consider them to be
34152 the bodies of those beings. As, moreover, the nature of an eternal
34153 intelligent soul does not depend on the will of the Lord, it cannot be
34154 its body under the present definition.--Nor again can it be said that

34155 the body of a being is constituted by that which is exclusively ruled
34156 and supported by that being and stands towards it in an exclusive
34157 subservient relation (sesha); for this definition would include actions
34158 also. And finally it is a fact that several texts definitely declare
34159 that the Lord is without a body, 'Without hands and feet he grasps and
34160 hastens' &c.

34161
34162 As thus the relation of embodied being and body cannot subsist between
34163 Brahman and the world, and as if it did subsist, all the imperfections
34164 of the world would cling to Brahman; the Vedânta--texts are wrong in
34165 teaching that Brahman is the material cause of the world.

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34167 To this primâ facie view the next Sûtra replies.
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34172 9. Not so; as there are parallel instances.
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34174 The teaching of the Vedânta-texts is not inappropriate, since there are
34175 instances of good and bad qualities being separate in the case of one
34176 thing connected with two different states. The 'but' in the Sûtra
34177 indicates the impossibility of Brahman being connected with even a
34178 shadow of what is evil. The meaning is as follows. As Brahman has all
34179 sentient and non-sentient things for its body, and constitutes the Self
34180 of that body, there is nothing contrary to reason in Brahman being
34181 connected with two states, a causal and an effected one, the essential
34182 characteristics of which are expansion on the one hand and contraction
34183 on the other; for this expansion and contraction belong (not to Brahman
34184 itself, but) to the sentient and non-sentient beings. The imperfections
34185 adhering to the body do not affect Brahman, and the good qualities
34186 belonging to the Self do not extend to the body; in the same way as
34187 youth, childhood, and old age, which are attributes of embodied beings,
34188 such as gods or men, belong to the body only, not to the embodied Self;
34189 while knowledge, pleasure and so on belong to the conscious Self only,
34190 not to the body. On this understanding there is no objection to
34191 expressions such as 'he is born as a god or as a man' and 'the same
34192 person is a child, and then a youth, and then an old man' That the
34193 character of a god or man belongs to the individual soul only in so far
34194 as it has a body, will be shown under III, 1, 1.

34195
34196 The assertion made by the Pûrvapakshin as to the impossibility of the
34197 world, comprising matter and souls and being either in its subtle or its
34198 gross condition, standing to Brahman in the relation of a body, we
34199 declare to be the vain outcome of altogether vicious reasoning springing
34200 from the idle fancies of persons who have never fully considered the
34201 meaning of the whole body of Vedânta-texts as supported by legitimate
34202 argumentation. For as a matter of fact all Vedânta-texts distinctly
34203 declare that the entire world, subtle or gross, material or spiritual,
34204 stands to the highest Self in the relation of a body. Compare e.g. the
34205 antaryâmin-brâhmana, in the Kânva as well as the Mâdhyandina-text, where
34206 it is said first of non-sentient things ('he who dwells within the earth,
34207 whose body the earth is' &c.), and afterwards separately of the
34208 intelligent soul ('he who dwells in understanding,' according to the
34209 Kânvas; 'he who dwells within the Self,' according to the Mâdhyandinas)
34210 that they constitute the body of the highest Self. Similarly the Subâla-
34211 Upanishad declares that matter and souls in all their states constitute
34212 the body of the highest Self ('He who dwells within the earth' &c.), and
34213 concludes by saying that that Self is the soul of all those beings ('He
34214 is the inner Self of all' &c.). Similarly Smriti, 'The whole world is
34215 thy body'; 'Water is the body of Vishnu'; 'All this is the body of Hari';
34216 'All these things are his body'; 'He having reflected sent forth from
34217 his body'--where the 'body' means the elements in their subtle state. In
34218 ordinary language the word 'body' is not, like words such as _jar_,
34219 limited in its denotation to things of one definite make or character,
34220 but is observed to be applied directly (not only secondarily or
34221 metaphorically) to things of altogether different make and
34222 characteristics--such as worms, insects, moths, snakes, men, four-footed
34223 animals, and so on. We must therefore aim at giving a definition of the

word that is in agreement with general use. The definitions given by the Pûrvapakshin--'a body is that which causes the enjoyment of the fruit of actions' &c.--do not fulfil this requirement; for they do not take in such things as earth and the like which the texts declare to be the body of the Lord. And further they do not take in those bodily forms which the Lord assumes according to his wish, nor the bodily forms released souls may assume, according to 'He is one' &c. (Ch. Up. VII, 36, 2); for none of those embodiments subserve the fruition of the results of actions. And further, the bodily forms which the Supreme Person assumes at wish are not special combinations of earth and the other elements; for Smriti says, 'The body of that highest Self is not made from a combination of the elements.' It thus appears that it is also too narrow a definition to say that a body is a combination of the different elements. Again, to say that a body is that, the life of which depends on the vital breath with its five modifications is also too narrow, viz in respect of plants; for although vital air is present in plants, it does not in them support the body by appearing in five special forms. Nor again does it answer to define a body as either the abode of the sense-organs or as the cause of pleasure and pain; for neither of these definitions takes in the bodies of stone or wood which were bestowed on Ahalyâ and other persons in accordance with their deeds. We are thus led to adopt the following definition--Any substance which a sentient soul is capable of completely controlling and supporting for its own purposes, and which stands to the soul in an entirely subordinate relation, is the body of that soul. In the case of bodies injured, paralysed, &c., control and so on are not actually perceived because the power of control, although existing, is obstructed; in the same way as, owing to some obstruction, the powers of fire, heat, and so on may not be actually perceived. A dead body again begins to decay at the very moment in which the soul departs from it, and is actually dissolved shortly after; it (thus strictly speaking is not a body at all but) is spoken of as a body because it is a part of the aggregate of matter which previously constituted a body. In this sense, then, all sentient and non-sentient beings together constitute the body of the Supreme Person, for they are completely controlled and supported by him for his own ends, and are absolutely subordinate to him. Texts which speak of the highest Self as 'bodiless among bodies' (e.g. Ka. Up. I. 2, 22), only mean to deny of the Self a body due to karman; for as we have seen, Scripture declares that the Universe is his body. This point will be fully established in subsequent adhikaranas also. The two preceding Sûtras (8 and 9) merely suggest the matter proved in the adhikarana beginning with II, 1, 21.

10. And on account of the objections to his view.

The theory of Brahman being the universal cause has to be accepted not only because it is itself free from objections, but also because the pradhâna theory is open to objections, and hence must be abandoned. For on this latter theory the origination of the world cannot be accounted for. The Sâṅkhyas hold that owing to the soul's approximation to Prakriti the attributes of the latter are fictitiously superimposed upon the soul which in itself consists entirely of pure intelligence free from all change, and that thereon depends the origination of the empirical world. Now here we must raise the question as to the nature of that approximation or nearness of Prakriti which causes the superimposition on the changeless soul of the attributes of Prakriti. Does that nearness mean merely the existence of Prakriti or some change in Prakriti? or does it mean some change in the soul?--Not the latter; for the soul is assumed to be incapable of change.--Nor again a change in Prakriti; for changes in Prakriti are supposed, in the system, to be the effects of superimposition, and cannot therefore be its cause. And if, finally, the nearness of Prakriti means no more than its existence, it follows that even the released soul would be liable to that superimposition (for Prakriti exists always).--The Sâṅkhya is thus unable to give a rational account of the origination of the world. This same point will be treated of fully in connexion with the special refutation of the Sâṅkhya theory. (II, 2, 6.)

11. Also in consequence of the ill-foundedness of reasoning.

The theory, resting on Scripture, of Brahman being the universal cause must be accepted, and the theory of the Pradhâna must be abandoned, because all (mere) reasoning is ill-founded. This latter point is proved by the fact that the arguments set forth by Buddha, Kanâda, Akshapâda, Jina, Kapila and Patañjali respectively are all mutually contradictory.

12. Should it be said that inference is to be carried on in a different way; (we reply that) thus also it follows that (the objection raised) is not got rid of.

Let us then view the matter as follows. The arguments actually set forth by Buddha and others may have to be considered as invalid, but all the same we may arrive at the Pradhâna theory through other lines of reasoning by which the objections raised against the theory are refuted.-- But, we reply, this also is of no avail. A theory which rests exclusively on arguments derived from human reason may, at some other time or place, be disestablished by arguments devised by people more skilful than you in reasoning; and thus there is no getting over the objection founded on the invalidity of all mere argumentation. The conclusion from all this is that, with regard to supersensuous matters, Scripture alone is authoritative, and that reasoning is to be applied only to the support of Scripture. In agreement herewith Manu says, 'He who supports the teaching of the Rishis and the doctrine as to sacred duty with arguments not conflicting with the Veda, he alone truly knows sacred duty' (Manu XII, 106). The teaching of the Sâmkhyas which conflicts with the Veda cannot therefore be used for the purpose of confirming and elucidating the meaning of the Veda.--Here finishes the section treating of 'difference of nature.'

13. Thereby also the remaining (theories) which are not comprised (within the Veda) are explained.

Not comprised means those theories which are not known to be comprised within (countenanced by) the Veda. The Sûtra means to say that by the demolition given above of the Sâmkhya doctrine which is not comprised within the Veda the remaining theories which are in the same position, viz. the theories of Kanâda, Akshapâda, Jina, and Buddha, must likewise be considered as demolished.

Here, however, a new objection may be raised, on the ground namely that, since all these theories agree in the view of atoms constituting the general cause, it cannot be said that their reasoning as to the causal substance is ill-founded.--They indeed, we reply, are agreed to that extent, but they are all of them equally founded on Reasoning only, and they are seen to disagree in many ways as to the nature of the atoms which by different schools are held to be either fundamentally void or non-void, having either a merely cognitional or an objective existence, being either momentary or permanent, either of a definite nature or the reverse, either real or unreal, &c. This disagreement proves all those theories to be ill-founded, and the objection is thus disposed of.--Here finishes the section of 'the remaining (theories) non-comprised (within the Veda).'

14. If it be said that from (Brahman) becoming an enjoyer, there follows

34362 non-distinction (of Brahman and the individual soul); we reply--it may
34363 be as in ordinary life.
34364

34365 The Sāṅkhya here comes forward with a new objection. You maintain, he
34366 says, that the highest Brahman has the character either of a cause or an
34367 effect according as it has for its body sentient and non-sentient beings
34368 in either their subtle or gross state; and that this explains the
34369 difference in nature between the individual soul and Brahman. But such
34370 difference is not possible, since Brahman, if embodied, at once becomes
34371 an enjoying subject (just like the individual soul). For if, possessing
34372 a body, the Lord necessarily experiences all pain and pleasure due to
34373 embodiedness, no less than the individual soul does.--But we have, under
34374 I, 2, 8, refuted the view of the Lord's being liable to experiences of
34375 pleasure and pain!--By no means! There you have shown only that the
34376 Lord's abiding within the heart of a creature so as to constitute the
34377 object of its devotion does not imply fruition on his part of pleasure
34378 and pain. Now, however, you maintain that the Lord is embodied just like
34379 an individual soul, and the unavoidable inference from this is that,
34380 like that soul, he undergoes pleasurable and painful experiences. For we
34381 observe that embodied souls, although not capable of participating in
34382 the changing states of the body such as childhood, old age, &c., yet
34383 experience pleasures and pains caused by the normal or abnormal
34384 condition of the matter constituting the body. In agreement with this
34385 Scripture says, 'As long as he possesses a body there is for him no
34386 escape from pleasure and pain; but when he is free of the body then
34387 neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1). As thus,
34388 the theory of an embodied Brahman constituting the universal cause does
34389 not allow of a distinction in nature between the Lord and the individual
34390 soul; and as, further, the theory of a mere Brahman (i.e. an absolutely
34391 homogeneous Brahman) leads to the conclusion that Brahman is the abode
34392 of all the imperfections attaching to the world, in the same way as a
34393 lump of clay or gold participates in the imperfections of the thing
34394 fashioned out of it; we maintain that the theory of the Pradhāna being
34395 the general cause is the more valid one.
34396

34397 To this objection the Sūtra replies in the words, 'it may be, as in
34398 ordinary life.' The desired distinction in nature between the Lord and
34399 the individual soul may exist all the same. That a soul experiences
34400 pleasures and pains caused by the various states of the body is not due
34401 to the fact of its being joined to a body, but to its karman in the form
34402 of good and evil deeds. The scriptural text also which you quote refers
34403 to that body only which is originated by karman; for other texts ('He is
34404 onefold, he is threefold'; 'If he desires the world of the Fathers'; 'He
34405 moves about there eating, playing, rejoicing'; Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2; VIII,
34406 2, 1; 12, 3) show that the person who has freed himself from the bondage
34407 of karman and become manifest in his true nature is not touched by a
34408 shadow of evil while all the same he has a body. The highest Self, which
34409 is essentially free from all evil, thus has the entire world in its
34410 gross and its subtle form for its body; but being in no way connected
34411 with karman it is all the less connected with evil of any kind.--'As in
34412 ordinary life.' We observe in ordinary life that while those who either
34413 observe or transgress the ordinances of a ruler experience pleasure or
34414 pain according as the ruler shows them favour or restrains them, it does
34415 not follow from the mere fact of the ruler's having a body that he
34416 himself also experiences the pleasure and pain due to the observance or
34417 transgression of his commands. The author of the Dramida-bhāṣya gives
34418 expression to the same view, 'As in ordinary life a prince, although
34419 staying in a very unpleasant place infested with mosquitoes and full of
34420 discomforts of all kind is yet not touched by all these troubles, his
34421 body being constantly refreshed by fans and other means of comfort,
34422 rules the countries for which he cares and continues to enjoy all
34423 possible pleasures, such as fragrant odours and the like; so the Lord of
34424 creation, to whom his power serves as an ever-moving fan as it were, is
34425 not touched by the evils of that creation, but rules the world of
34426 Brahman and the other worlds for which he cares, and continues to enjoy
34427 all possible delights.' That the nature of Brahman should undergo
34428 changes like a lump of clay or gold we do not admit, since many texts
34429 declare Brahman to be free from all change and imperfection.--Others
34430 give a different explanation of this Sūtra. According to them it refutes

34431 the pûrvapaksha that on the view of Brahman being the general cause the
34432 distinction of enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment cannot be
34433 accounted for--proving the possibility of such distinction by means of
34434 the analogous instance of the sea and its waves and flakes of foam. But
34435 this interpretation is inappropriate, since for those who hold that
34436 creation proceeds from Brahman connected with some power or Nescience or
34437 a limiting adjunct (upâdhi) no such primâ facie view can arise. For on
34438 their theory the enjoying subject is that which is conditioned by the
34439 power or Nescience or upâdhi inhering in the causal substance, and the
34440 power or Nescience or upâdhi is the object of enjoyment; and as the two
34441 are of different nature, they cannot pass over into each other. The view
34442 of Brahman itself undergoing an essential change (on which that primâ
34443 facie view might possibly be held to arise) is not admitted by those
34444 philosophers; for Sûtra II, 1, 35 teaches that the individual souls and
34445 their deeds form a stream which has no beginning (so that the
34446 distinction of enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment is eternal).
34447 But even if it be held that Brahman itself undergoes a change, the doubt
34448 as to the non-distinction of subjects and objects of enjoyment does not
34449 arise; for the distinction of the two groups will, on that view, be
34450 analogous to that of jars and platters which are modifications of the
34451 one substance clay, or to that of bracelets and crowns fashioned out of
34452 the one substance gold. And on the view of Brahman itself undergoing a
34453 change there arises a further difficulty, viz. in so far as Brahman
34454 (which is nothing but pure non-conditioned intelligence) is held to
34455 transform itself into (limited) enjoying souls and (non-sentient)
34456 objects of enjoyment.
34457
34458
34459
34460

34461 15. The non-difference (of the world) from that (viz. Brahman) follows
34462 from what begins with the word ârambhana.
34463

34464 Under II, 1, 7 and other Sûtras the non-difference of the effect, i.e.
34465 the world from the cause, i.e. Brahman was assumed, and it was on this
34466 basis that the proof of Brahman being the cause of the world proceeded.
34467 The present Sûtra now raises a primâ facie objection against that very
34468 non-difference, and then proceeds to refute it.
34469

34470 On the point in question the school of Kanâda argues as follows. It is
34471 in no way possible that the effect should be non-different from the
34472 cause. For cause and effect are the objects of different ideas: the
34473 ideas which have for their respective objects threads and a piece of
34474 cloth, or a lump of clay and a jar, are distinctly not of one and the
34475 same kind. The difference of words supplies a second argument; nobody
34476 applies to mere threads the word 'piece of cloth,' or vice versâ. A
34477 third argument rests on the difference of effects: water is not fetched
34478 from the well in a lump of clay, nor is a well built with jars. There,
34479 fourthly, is the difference of time; the cause is prior in time, the
34480 effect posterior. There is, fifthly, the difference of form: the cause
34481 has the shape of a lump, the effect (the jar) is shaped like a belly
34482 with a broad basis; clay in the latter condition only is meant when we
34483 say 'The jar has gone to pieces.' There, sixthly, is a numerical
34484 difference: the threads are many, the piece of cloth is one only. In the
34485 seventh place, there is the uselessness of the activity of the producing
34486 agent (which would result from cause and effect being identical); for if
34487 the effect were nothing but the cause, what could be effected by the
34488 activity of the agent?--Let us then say that, although the effect _exists_
34489 (at all times), the activity of the agent must be postulated as helpful
34490 towards the effect.--But in that case the activity of the agent would
34491 have to be assumed as taking place perpetually, and as hence everything
34492 would exist always, there would be no distinction between eternal and
34493 non-eternal things!--Let us then say that the effect, although always
34494 existing, is at first non-manifest and then is manifested through the
34495 activity of the agent; in this way that activity will not be purposeless,
34496 and there will be a distinction between eternal and non-eternal things!--
34497 This view also is untenable. For if that manifestation requires another
34498 manifestation (to account for it) we are driven into a _regressus in
34499 infinitum_. If, on the other hand, it is independent of another

34500 manifestation (and hence eternal), it follows that the effect also is
34501 eternally perceived. And if, as a third alternative, the manifestation
34502 is said to originate, we lapse into the asatkâryavâda (according to
34503 which the effect does not exist before its origination). Moreover, if
34504 the activity of the agent serves to manifest the effect, it follows that
34505 the activity devoted to a jar will manifest also waterpots and similar
34506 things. For things which admittedly possess manifesting power, such as
34507 lamps and the like, are not observed to be restricted to particular
34508 objects to be manifested by them: we do not see that a lamp lit for
34509 showing a jar does not at the same time manifest waterpots and other
34510 things. All this proves that the activity of the agent has a purpose in
34511 so far only as it is the cause of the origination of an effect which
34512 previously did not exist; and thus the theory of the previous
34513 existence of the effect cannot be upheld. Nor does the fact of definite
34514 causes having to be employed (in order to produce definite effects; clay
34515 e.g. to produce a jar) prove that that only which already exists can
34516 become an effect; for the facts explain themselves also on the
34517 hypothesis of the cause having definite potentialities (determining the
34518 definite effect which will result from the cause).

34519
34520 But, an objection is raised, he also who holds the theory of the
34521 previous non-existence of the effect, can really do nothing with the
34522 activity of the agent. For as, on his view, the effect has no existence
34523 before it is originated, the activity of the agent must be supposed to
34524 operate elsewhere than on the effect; and as this 'elsewhere' comprises
34525 without distinction all other things, it follows that the agent's
34526 activity with reference to threads may give rise to waterpots also (not
34527 only to cloth).--Not so, the Vaiseshika replies. Activity applied to a
34528 certain cause gives rise to those effects only the potentiality of which
34529 inheres in that cause.

34530
34531 Now, against all this, the following objection is raised. The effect is
34532 non-different from the cause. For in reality there is no such thing as
34533 an effect different from the cause, since all effects, and all empirical
34534 thought and speech about effects, are based on Nescience. Apart from the
34535 causal substance, clay, which is seen to be present in effected things
34536 such as jars, the so-called effect, i.e. the jar or pot, rests
34537 altogether on Nescience. All effected things whatever, such as jars,
34538 waterpots, &c., viewed as different from their causal substance, viz.
34539 clay, which is perceived to exist in these its effects, rest merely on
34540 empirical thought and speech, and are fundamentally false, unreal; while
34541 the causal substance, i.e. clay, alone is real. In the same way the
34542 entire world in so far as viewed apart from its cause, i.e. Brahman
34543 which is nothing but pure non-differenced Being, rests exclusively on
34544 the empirical assumption of Egoity and so on, and is false; while
34545 reality belongs to the causal Brahman which is mere Being. It follows
34546 that there is no such thing as an effect apart from its cause; the
34547 effect in fact is identical with the cause. Nor must you object to our
34548 theory on the ground that the corroborative instance of the silver
34549 erroneously imagined in the shell is inappropriate because the non-
34550 reality of such effected things as jars is by no means well proved while
34551 the non-reality of the shell-silver is so proved; for as a matter of
34552 fact it is determined by reasoning that it is the causal substance of
34553 jars, viz. clay, only that is real while the reality of everything apart
34554 from clay is disproved by reasoning. And if you ask whereupon that
34555 reasoning rests, we reply--on the fact that the clay only is continuous,
34556 permanent, while everything different from it is discontinuous, non-
34557 permanent. For just as in the case of the snake-rope we observe that the
34558 continuously existing rope only--which forms the substrate of the
34559 imagined snake--is real, while the snake or cleft in the ground, which
34560 is non-continuous, is unreal; so we conclude that it is the permanently
34561 enduring clay-material only which is real, while the non-continuous
34562 effects, such as jars and pots, are unreal. And, further, since what is
34563 real, i. e. the Self, does not perish, and what is altogether unreal, as
34564 e.g. the horn of a hare, is not perceived, we conclude that an effected
34565 thing, which on the one hand is perceived and on the other is liable to
34566 destruction, must be viewed as something to be defined neither as that
34567 which is nor as that which is not. And what is thus undefinable, is
34568 false, no less than the silver imagined in the shell, the

34569 anirvakanīyatva of which is proved by perception and sublation (see
34570 above, p. 102 ff.).--We further ask, 'Is a causal substance, such as
34571 clay, when producing its effect, in a non-modified state, or has it
34572 passed over into some special modified condition?' The former
34573 alternative cannot be allowed, because thence it would follow that the
34574 cause originates effects at all times; and the latter must equally be
34575 rejected, because the passing over of the cause into a special state
34576 would oblige us to postulate a previous passing over into a different
34577 state (to account for the latter passing over) and again a previous one,
34578 &c., so that a regressus in infinitum would result.--Let it then be
34579 said that the causal substance when giving rise to the effect is indeed
34580 unchanged, but connected with a special operative cause, time and place
34581 (this connexion accounting for the origination of the effect).--But this
34582 also we cannot allow; for such connexion would be with the causal
34583 substance either as unchanged or as having entered on a changed
34584 condition; and thus the difficulties stated above would arise again.--
34585 Nor may you say that the origination of jars, gold coins, and sour milk
34586 from clay, gold, and milk respectively is actually perceived; that this
34587 perception is not sublated with regard to time and place--while, on the
34588 other hand, the perception of silver in the shell is so sublated--and
34589 that hence all those who trust perception must necessarily admit that
34590 the effect does originate from the cause. For this argumentation does
34591 not stand the test of being set forth in definite alternatives. Does the
34592 mere gold, &c., by itself originate the svastika-ornament? or is it the
34593 gold coins (used for making ornaments) which originate? or is it the
34594 gold, as forming the substrate of the coins [FOOTNOTE 434:1]? The mere
34595 gold, in the first place, cannot be originative as there exists no
34596 effect different from the gold (to which the originative activity could
34597 apply itself); and a thing cannot possibly display originative activity
34598 with regard to itself.--But, an objection is raised, the svastika-
34599 ornament is perceived as different from the gold!--It is not, we reply,
34600 different from the gold; for the gold is recognised in it, and no other
34601 thing but gold is perceived.--But the existence of another thing is
34602 proved by the fact of there being a different idea, a different word,
34603 and so on!--By no means, we reply. Other ideas, words, and so on, which
34604 have reference to an altogether undefined thing are founded on error, no
34605 less than the idea of, and the word denoting, shell-silver, and hence
34606 have no power of proving the existence of another thing. Nor, in the
34607 second place, is the gold coin originative of the svastika-ornament;
34608 for we do not perceive the coin in the svastika, as we do perceive the
34609 threads in the cloth. Nor, in the third place, is the effect originated
34610 by the gold in so far as being the substrate of the coin; for the gold
34611 in so far as forming the substrate of the coin is not perceived in the
34612 svastika. As it thus appears that all effects viewed apart from their
34613 causal substances are unreal, we arrive at the conclusion that the
34614 entire world, viewed apart from Brahman, is also something unreal; for
34615 it also is an effect.

34616
34617 In order to facilitate the understanding of the truth that everything
34618 apart from Brahman is false, we have so far reasoned on the assumption
34619 of things such as clay, gold, &c., being real, and have thereby proved
34620 the non-reality of all effects. In truth, however, all special causal
34621 substances are unreal quite as much as jars and golden ornaments are;
34622 for they are all of them equally effects of Brahman.

34623
34624 'In that all this has its Self; it is the True' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7);
34625 'There is here no plurality; from death to death goes he who sees here
34626 plurality as it were' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'For where there is duality
34627 as it were, there one sees another; but when for him the Self only has
34628 become all, whereby then should he see and whom should he see?' (Bri. Up.
34629 II, 4, 13); 'Indra goes manifold by means of his māyās' (Bri. Up. II, 5,
34630 19);--these and other similar texts teach that whatever is different
34631 from Brahman is false. Nor must it be imagined that the truth intimated
34632 by Scripture can be in conflict with Perception; for in the way set
34633 forth above we prove that all effects are false, and moreover Perception
34634 really has for its object pure Being only (cp. above, p. 30). And if
34635 there is a conflict between the two, superior force belongs to Scripture,
34636 to which no imperfection can be attributed; which occupies a final
34637 position among the means of knowledge; and which, although dependent on

34638 Perception, and so on, for the apprehension of the form and meaning of
34639 words, yet is independent as far as proving power is concerned. Hence it
34640 follows that everything different from Brahman, the general cause, is
34641 unreal.

34642
34643 Nor must this conclusion be objected to on the ground that from the
34644 falsity of the world it follows that the individual souls also are non-
34645 real. For it is Brahman itself which constitutes the individual souls:
34646 Brahman alone takes upon itself the condition of individual soul in all
34647 living bodies; as we know from many texts: 'Having entered into them
34648 with this living Self (Ch. Up. VI, 3); 'The one god hidden within all
34649 beings' (Svet. Up. VI, 11); 'The one god entered in many places'; 'That
34650 Self hidden in all beings does not shine forth' (Ka. Up. I, 3,12);
34651 'There is no other seer but he' (Bri. Up. III, 3, 23); and others.--But
34652 if you maintain that the one Brahman constitutes the soul in all living
34653 bodies, it follows that any particular pain or pleasure should affect
34654 the consciousness of all embodied beings, just as an agreeable sensation
34655 affecting the foot gives rise to a feeling of pleasure in the head; and
34656 that there would be no distinction of individual soul and Lord, released
34657 souls and souls in bondage, pupils and teachers, men wise and ignorant,
34658 and so on.

34659
34660 Now, in reply to this, some of those who hold the non-duality of Brahman
34661 give the following explanation. The many individual souls are the
34662 reflections of the one Brahman, and their states of pain, pleasure, and
34663 so on, remain distinct owing to the different limiting adjuncts (on
34664 which the existence of each individual soul as such depends), in the
34665 same way as the many reflected images of one and the same face in
34666 mirrors, crystals, sword-blades, &c., remain distinct owing to their
34667 limiting adjuncts (viz. mirrors, &c.); one image being small, another
34668 large, one being bright, another dim, and so on.--But you have said that
34669 scriptural texts such as 'Having entered with this living Self show that
34670 the souls are not different from Brahman!--They are indeed not different
34671 in reality, but we maintain their distinction on the basis of an
34672 imagined difference.--To whom then does that imagination belong? Not to
34673 Brahman surely whose nature, consisting of pure intelligence, allows no
34674 room for imagination of any kind! Nor also to the individual souls; for
34675 this would imply a faulty mutual dependence, the existence of the soul
34676 depending on imagination and that imagination residing in the soul! Not
34677 so, the advaita-vâdin replies. Nescience (wrong imagination) and the
34678 existence of the souls form an endless retrogressive chain; their
34679 relation is like that of the seed and the sprout. Moreover, mutual
34680 dependence and the like, which are held to constitute defects in the
34681 case of real things, are unable to disestablish Nescience, the very
34682 nature of which consists in being that which cannot rationally be
34683 established, and which hence may be compared to somebody's swallowing a
34684 whole palace and the like (as seen in a dream or under the influence of
34685 a magical illusion). In reality the individual souls are non-different
34686 from Brahman, and hence essentially free from all impurity; but as they
34687 are liable to impurity caused by their limiting adjuncts--in the same
34688 way as the face reflected in a mirror is liable to be dimmed by the
34689 dimness of the mirror--they may be the abodes of Nescience and hence may
34690 be viewed as the figments of wrong imagination. Like the dimness of the
34691 reflected face, the imperfection adhering to the soul is a mere error;
34692 for otherwise it would follow that the soul can never obtain release.
34693 And as this error of the souls has proceeded from all eternity, the
34694 question as to its cause is not to be raised.

34695
34696 This, we reply, is the view of teachers who have no insight into the
34697 true nature of aduality, and are prompted by the wish of capturing the
34698 admiration and applause of those who believe in the doctrine of duality.
34699 For if, as a first alternative, you should maintain that the abode of
34700 Nescience is constituted by the soul in its essential, not fictitiously
34701 imagined, form; this means that Brahman itself is the abode of Nescience.
34702 If, in the second place, you should say that the abode of Nescience is
34703 the soul, viewed as different from Brahman and fictitiously imagined in
34704 it, this would mean that the Non-intelligent (jada) is the abode of
34705 Nescience. For those who hold the view of Non-duality do not acknowledge
34706 a third aspect different from these two (i.e. from Brahman which is pure

intelligence, and the Non-intelligent fictitiously superimposed on
Brahman). And if, as a third alternative, it be maintained that the
abode of Nescience is the soul in its essential nature, this nature
being however qualified by the fictitiously imagined aspect; we must
negative this also, since that which has an absolutely homogeneous
nature cannot in any way be shown to be qualified, apart from Nescience.
The soul is qualified in so far only as it is the abode of Nescience,
and you therefore define nothing.--Moreover, the theory of Nescience
abiding within the individual soul is resorted to for the purpose of
establishing a basis for the distinction of bondage and release, but it
really is quite unable to effect this. For if by Release be understood
the destruction of Nescience, it follows that when one soul attains
Release and Nescience is thus destroyed, the other souls also will be
released.--But Nescience persists because other souls are not released!--
Well then the one soul also is not released since Nescience is not
destroyed!--But we assume a different Nescience for each soul; that soul
whose Nescience is destroyed will be released, and that whose Nescience
is not destroyed will remain in Bondage!--You now argue on the
assumption of a special avidyā for each soul. But what about the
distinction of souls implied therein? Is that distinction essential to
the nature of the soul, or is it the figment of Nescience? The former
alternative is excluded, as it is admitted that the soul essentially is
pure, non-differenced intelligence; and because on that alternative the
assumption of avidyā to account for the distinction of souls would be
purposeless. On the latter alternative two subordinate alternatives
arise--Does this avidyā which gives rise to the fictitious distinction
of souls belong to Brahman? or to the individual souls?--If you say 'to
Brahman', your view coincides with mine.--Well then, 'to the souls'!--
But have you then quite forgotten that Nescience is assumed for the
purpose of accounting for the distinction of souls?--Let us then view
the matter as follows--those several avidyās which are assumed for the
purpose of establishing the distinction of souls bound and released, to
those same avidyās the distinction of souls is due.--But here you reason
in a manifest circle: the avidyās are established on the basis of the
distinction of souls, and the distinction of souls is established when
the avidyās are established. Nor does the argument of the seed and
sprout apply to the present question. For in the case of seeds and
plants each several seed gives rise to a different plant; while in the
case under discussion you adopt the impossible procedure of establishing
the several avidyās on the basis of the very souls which are assumed to
be due to those avidyās. And if you attempt to give to the argument a
somewhat different turn, by maintaining that it is the avidyās abiding
in the earlier souls which fictitiously give rise to the later souls, we
point out that this implies the souls being short-lived only, and
moreover that each soul would have to take upon itself the consequences
of deeds not its own and escape the consequences of its own deeds. The
same reasoning disposes of the hypothesis that it is Brahman which
effects the fictitious existence of the subsequent souls by means of the
avidyās abiding within the earlier souls. And if there is assumed a
beginningless flow of avidyās, it follows that there is also a
beginningless flow of the condition of the souls dependent on those
avidyās, and that steady uniformity of the state of the souls which is
supposed to hold good up to the moment of Release could thus not be
established. Concerning your assertion that, as Nescience is something
unreal and hence altogether unproved, it is not disestablished by such
defects as mutual dependence which touch real things only; we remark
that in that case Nescience would cling even to released souls and the
highest Brahman itself.--But impure Nescience cannot cling to what has
for its essence pure cognition!--Is Nescience then to be dealt with by
rational arguments? If so, it will follow that, on account of the
arguments set forth (mutual dependence, and so on), it likewise does not
cling to the individual souls. We further put the following question--
When the Nescience abiding in the individual soul passes away, owing to
the rise of the knowledge of truth, does then the soul also perish or
does it not perish? In the former case Release is nothing else but
destruction of the essential nature of the soul; in the latter case the
soul does not attain Release even on the destruction of Nescience, since
it continues to exist as soul different from Brahman.--You have further
maintained that the distinction of souls as pure and impure, &c., admits

34776 of being accounted for in the same way as the dimness or clearness, and
34777 so on, of the different images of a face as seen reflected in mirrors,
34778 crystals, sword-blades and the like. But here the following point
34779 requires consideration. On what occasion do the smallness, dimness and
34780 other imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts (i.e. the mirrors, &c.)
34781 pass away?--When the mirrors and other limiting adjuncts themselves pass
34782 away!--Does then, we ask, the reflected image which is the substrate of
34783 those imperfections persist or not? If you say that it persists, then by
34784 analogy the individual soul also must be assumed to persist, and from
34785 this it follows that it does not attain Release. And if the reflected
34786 image is held to perish together with its imperfections, by analogy the
34787 soul also will perish and then Release will be nothing but annihilation.--
34788 Consider the following point also. The destruction of a non-advantageous
34789 (apurushârtha) defect is of advantage to him who is conscious of that
34790 disadvantage. Is it then, we ask, in the given case Brahman--which
34791 corresponds to the thing reflected--that is conscious of the
34792 imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts? or is it the soul which
34793 corresponds to the reflected image? or is it something else? On the two
34794 former alternatives it appears that the comparison (between Brahman and
34795 the soul on the one hand, and the thing reflected and the reflection on
34796 the other--on which comparison your whole theory is founded) does not
34797 hold good; for neither the face nor the reflection of the face is
34798 conscious of the imperfections due to the adjuncts; for neither of the
34799 two is a being capable of consciousness. And, moreover, Brahman's being
34800 conscious of imperfections would imply its being the abode of Nescience.
34801 And the third alternative, again, is impossible, since there is no other
34802 knowing subject _but_ Brahman and the soul.--It would, moreover, be
34803 necessary to define who is the imaginatively shaping agent (kalpaka)
34804 with regard to the soul as formed from Nescience. It cannot be Nescience
34805 itself, because Nescience is not an intelligent principle. Nor can it be
34806 the soul, because this would imply the defect of what has to be proved
34807 being presupposed for the purposes of the proof; and because the
34808 existence of the soul is that which _is formed_ by Nescience, just as
34809 shell-silver is. And if, finally, you should say that Brahman is the
34810 fictitiously forming agent, we have again arrived at a Brahman that is
34811 the abode of Nescience.--If Brahman is not allowed to be the abode of
34812 Nescience, we further must ask whether Brahman sees (is conscious of)
34813 the individual souls or not. If not, it is not possible that Brahman
34814 should give rise to this manifold creation which, as Scripture declares,
34815 is preceded by 'seeing' on his part, and to the differentiation of names
34816 and forms. If, on the other hand, Brahman which is of an absolutely
34817 homogeneous nature sees the souls, it cannot do so without Nescience;
34818 and thus we are again led to the view of Nescience abiding in Brahman.
34819

34820 For similar reasons the theory of the distinction of Mâyâ and Nescience
34821 must also be abandoned. For even if Brahman possesses Mâyâ, i.e.
34822 illusive power, it cannot, without Nescience, be conscious of souls. And
34823 without being conscious of others the lord of Mâyâ is unable to delude
34824 them by his Mâyâ; and Mâyâ herself cannot bring about the consciousness
34825 of others on the part of its Lord, for it is a mere means to delude
34826 others, after they have (by other means) become objects of consciousness.--
34827 Perhaps you will say that the Mâyâ of Brahman causes him to be conscious
34828 of souls, and at the same time is the cause of those souls' delusion.
34829 But if Mâyâ causes Brahman--which is nothing but self-illuminated
34830 intelligence, absolutely homogeneous and free from all foreign elements--
34831 to become conscious of other beings, then Mâyâ is nothing but another
34832 name for Nescience.--Let it then be said that Nescience is the cause of
34833 the cognition of what is contrary to truth; such being the case, Mâyâ
34834 which presents all false things different from Brahman as false, and
34835 thus is not the cause of wrong cognition on the part of Brahman, is _not_
34836 avidyâ.--But this is inadmissible; for, when the oneness of the moon is
34837 known, that which causes the idea of the moon being double can be
34838 nothing else but avidyâ. Moreover, if Brahman recognises all beings
34839 apart from himself as false, he does not delude them; for surely none
34840 but a madman would aim at deluding beings known by him to be unreal!--
34841 Let us then define avidyâ as the cause of a disadvantageous cognition of
34842 unreal things. Mâyâ then, as not being the cause of such a
34843 disadvantageous cognition on Brahman's part, cannot be of the nature of
34844 avidyâ!--But this also is inadmissible; for although the idea of the

34845 moon being double is not the cause of any pain, and hence not
34846 disadvantageous to man, it is all the same caused by avidyâ; and if, on
34847 the other hand, Mâyâ which aims at dispelling that idea (in so far as it
34848 presents the image and idea of one moon) did not present what is of
34849 disadvantage, it would not be something to be destroyed, and hence would
34850 be permanently connected with Brahman's nature.--Well, if it were so,
34851 what harm would there be?--The harm would be that such a view implies
34852 the theory of duality, and hence would be in conflict with the texts
34853 inculcating non-duality such as 'For where there is duality as it were,
34854 &c.; but when for him the Self only has become all, whereby then should
34855 he see, and whom should he see?'--But those texts set forth the Real;
34856 Mâyâ on the other hand is non-real, and hence the view of its permanency
34857 is not in real conflict with the texts!--Brahman, we reply, has for its
34858 essential nature unlimited bliss, and hence cannot be conscious of, or
34859 affected with, unreal Mâyâ, without avidyâ. Of what use, we further ask,
34860 should an eternal non-real Mâyâ be to Brahman?--Brahman by means of it
34861 deludes the individual souls!--But of what use should such delusion be
34862 to Brahman?--It affords to Brahman a kind of sport or play!--But of what
34863 use is play to a being whose nature is unlimited bliss?--Do we not then
34864 see in ordinary life also that persons in the enjoyment of full
34865 happiness and prosperity indulge all the same in play?--The cases are
34866 not parallel, we reply. For none but persons not in their right mind
34867 would take pleasure in an unreal play, carried on by means of implements
34868 unreal and known by them to be unreal, and in the consciousness, itself,
34869 unreal of such a play!--The arguments set forth previously also prove
34870 the impossibility of the fictitious existence of an individual soul
34871 considered as the abode of avidyâ, apart from Brahman considered as the
34872 abode of Mâyâ.

34873
34874 We thus arrive at the conclusion that those who hold the non-duality of
34875 Brahman must also admit that it is Brahman alone which is affected with
34876 beginningless avidyâ, and owing to this avidyâ is conscious of plurality
34877 within itself. Nor must it be urged against him who holds this view of
34878 avidyâ belonging to Brahman that he is unable to account for the
34879 distinction of bondage and release, for as there is only the one Brahman
34880 affected with Nescience and to be released by the cessation of that
34881 Nescience, the distinction of souls bound and released, &c., has no true
34882 existence: the empirical distinction of souls bound and released, of
34883 teachers and pupils, &c. is a merely fictitious one, and all such
34884 fiction can be explained by means of the avidyâ of one intelligent being.
34885 The case is analogous to that of a person dreaming: the teachers and
34886 pupils and all the other persons and things he may see in his dream are
34887 fictitiously shaped out of the avidyâ of the one dreaming subject. For
34888 the same reason there is no valid foundation for the assumption of many
34889 avidyâs. For those also who hold that avidyâ belongs to the individual
34890 souls do not maintain that the distinction of bondage and release, of
34891 one's own self and other persons, is real; and if it is unreal it can be
34892 accounted for by the avidyâ of one subject. This admits of being stated
34893 in various technical ways.--The distinctions of bondage and of one's own
34894 self and other persons are fictitiously shaped by one's own avidyâ; for
34895 they are unreal like the distinctions seen by a dreaming person.--Other
34896 bodies also have a Self through me only; for they are bodies like this
34897 my body.--Other bodies also are fictitiously shaped by my avidyâ; for
34898 they are bodies or effects, or non-intelligent or fictitious creations,
34899 as this my body is.--The whole class of intelligent subjects is nothing
34900 but me; for they are of intelligent nature; what is not me is seen
34901 to be of non-intelligent nature; as e.g. jars.--It thus follows that the
34902 distinctions of one's own self and other persons, of souls bound and
34903 released, of pupils and teachers, and so on, are fictitiously created by
34904 the avidyâ of one intelligent subject.

34905
34906 The fact is that the upholder of Duality himself is not able to account
34907 for the distinction of souls bound and released. For as there is an
34908 infinity of past aeons, it follows that, even if one soul only should
34909 attain release in each aeon, all souls would by this time have attained
34910 release; the actual existence of non-released souls cannot thus be
34911 rationally accounted for.--But the souls are 'infinite'; this accounts
34912 for there being souls not yet released!--What, pray, do you understand
34913 by this 'infinity' of souls? Does it mean that they cannot be counted?

34914 This we cannot allow, for although a being of limited knowledge may not
34915 be able to count them, owing to their large number, the all-knowing Lord
34916 surely can count them; if he could not do so it would follow that he is
34917 not all-knowing.--But the souls are really numberless, and the Lord's
34918 not knowing a definite number which does not exist does not prove that
34919 he is not all-knowing!--Not so, we reply. Things which are definitely
34920 separate (bhinna) from each other cannot be without number. Souls have a
34921 number, because they are separate; just as mustard seeds, beans, earthen
34922 vessels, pieces of cloth, and so on. And from their being separate it
34923 moreover follows that souls, like earthen vessels, and so on, are non-
34924 intelligent, not of the nature of Self, and perishable; and it further
34925 follows therefrom that Brahman is not infinite. For by infinity we
34926 understand the absence of all limitation. Now on the theory which holds
34927 that there is a plurality of separate existences, Brahman which is
34928 considered to differ in character from other existences cannot be said
34929 to be free from substantial limitation; for substantial limitation means
34930 nothing else than the existence of other substances. And what is
34931 substantially limited cannot be said to be free from temporal and
34932 spatial limitation; for observation shows that it is just those things
34933 which differ in nature from other things and thus are substantially
34934 limited--such as earthen vessels, and so on--which are also limited in
34935 point of space and time. Hence all intelligent existences, including
34936 Brahman, being substantially limited, are also limited in point of space
34937 and time. But this conclusion leads to a conflict with those scriptural
34938 texts which declare Brahman to be free from all limitation whatsoever
34939 ('The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' and similar texts), and
34940 moreover would imply that the souls as well as Brahman are liable to
34941 origination, decay, and so on; for limitation in time means nothing else
34942 but a being's passing through the stages of origination, decay, and so
34943 on.

34944
34945 The dvaita-view thus being found untenable on all sides, we adhere to
34946 our doctrine that this entire world, from Brahmā down to a blade of
34947 grass, springs from the avidyā attached to Brahman which in itself is
34948 absolutely unlimited; and that the distinctions of consciousness of
34949 pleasure and pain, and all similar distinctions, explain themselves from
34950 the fact of all of them being of the nature of avidya, just as the
34951 distinctions of which a dreaming person is conscious. The one Brahman,
34952 whose nature is eternal self-illuminedness, free from all heterogeneous
34953 elements, owing to the influence of avidyā illusorily manifests itself
34954 (vivarttate) in the form of this world; and as thus in reality there
34955 exists nothing whatever different from Brahman, we hold that the world
34956 is 'non-different' from Brahman.

34957
34958 To this the Dvaitavâdin, i.e. the Vaiseshika, replies as follows. The
34959 doctrine that Brahman, which in itself is pure, non-differenced self-
34960 illuminedness, has its own true nature hidden by avidyā and hence sees
34961 plurality within itself, is in conflict with all the valid means of
34962 right knowledge; for as Brahman is without parts, obscuration, i.e.
34963 cessation, of the light of Brahman, would mean complete destruction of
34964 Brahman; so that the hypothesis of obscuration is altogether excluded.
34965 This and other arguments have been already set forth; as also that the
34966 hypothesis of obscuration contradicts other views held by the Advaitin.
34967 Nor is there any proof for the assertion that effects apart from their
34968 causes are mere error, like shell-silver, the separate existence of the
34969 effect being refuted by Reasoning; for as a matter of fact there is no
34970 valid reasoning of the kind. The assertion that the cause only is real
34971 because it persists, while the non-continuous effects--such as jars and
34972 waterpots--are unreal, has also been refuted before, on the ground that
34973 the fact of a thing not existing at one place and one time does not
34974 sublate its real existence at another time and place. Nor is there any
34975 soundness in the argumentation that the effect is false because, owing
34976 to its being perceived and its being perishable, it cannot be defined
34977 either as real or unreal. For a thing's being perceived and its being
34978 perishable does not prove the thing's falseness, but only its non-
34979 permanency. To prove a thing's falseness it is required to show that it
34980 is sublated (i.e. that its non-existence is proved by valid means) with
34981 reference to that very place and time in connexion with which it is
34982 perceived; but that a thing is sublated with reference to a place and

34983 time _other_ than those in connexion with which it is perceived, proves
34984 only that the thing does not exist in connexion with that place and time,
34985 but not that it is false. This view also may be put in technical form,
34986 viz. effects such as jars and the like are real because they are not
34987 sublated with regard to their definite place and time; just as the Self
34988 is.--Nor is there any truth in the assertion that the effect cannot
34989 originate from the cause either modified or unmodified; for the effect
34990 may originate from the cause if connected with certain favouring
34991 conditions of place, time, &c. Nor can you show any proof for the
34992 assertion that the cause, whether modified or non-modified, cannot enter
34993 into connexion with such favouring conditions; as a matter of fact the
34994 cause may very well, without being modified, enter into such connexion.--
34995 But from this it follows that the cause must have been previously
34996 connected with those conditions, since previously also it was equally
34997 unmodified!--Not so, we reply. The connexion with favouring conditions
34998 of time, place, &c., into which the cause enters, depends on some other
34999 cause, and not therefore on the fact of its not being modified. No fault
35000 then can be found with the view of the cause, when having entered into a
35001 special state depending on its connexion with time, place, &c.,
35002 producing the effect. Nor can it be denied in any way that the cause
35003 possesses originative agency with regard to the effect; for such agency
35004 is actually observed, and cannot be proved to be irrational.--Further
35005 there is no proof for the assertion that originative agency cannot
35006 belong either to mere gold or to a (first) effect of gold such as coined
35007 gold, or to gold in so far as forming the substrate for coins and the
35008 like; for as a matter of fact mere gold (gold in general), if connected
35009 with the helpful factors mentioned above, may very well possess
35010 originative capacity. To say that we do not perceive any effect
35011 different from gold is futile; for as a matter of fact we perceive the
35012 svastika-ornament which is different from mere gold, and the existence
35013 of different terms and ideas moreover proves the existence of different
35014 things. Nor have we here to do with a mere error analogous to that of
35015 shell-silver. For a real effected thing, such as a golden ornament, is
35016 perceived during the whole period intervening between its origination
35017 and destruction, and such perception is not sublated with regard to that
35018 time and place. Nor is there any valid line of reasoning to sublimate that
35019 perception. That at the same time when the previously non-perceived
35020 svastika-ornament is perceived the gold also is recognised, is due to
35021 the fact of the gold persisting as the substrate of the ornament, and
35022 hence such recognition of the causal substance does not disprove the
35023 reality of the effect.--And the attempts to prove the unreality of the
35024 world by means of scriptural texts we have already disposed of in a
35025 previous part of this work.

35026
35027 We further object to the assertion that it is one Self which bestows on
35028 all bodies the property of being connected with the Self; as from this
35029 it would follow that one person is conscious of all the pains and
35030 pleasures caused by all bodies. For, as seen in the case of Saubhari and
35031 others, it is owing to the oneness of the Self that one person is
35032 conscious of the pains and pleasures due to several bodies. Nor again
35033 must you allege that the non-consciousness (on the part of one Self of
35034 all pleasures and pains whatever), is due to the plurality of the Egos,
35035 which are the subjects of cognition, and not to the plurality of Selves;
35036 for the Self is none other than the subject of cognition and the Ego.
35037 The organ of egoity (ahamkâra), on the other hand, which is the same as
35038 the internal organ (antahkarana), cannot be the knowing subject, for it
35039 is of a non-intelligent nature, and is a mere instrument like the body
35040 and the sense-organs. This also has been proved before.--Nor is there
35041 any proof for your assertion that all bodies must be held to spring from
35042 the avidyâ of one subject, because they are bodies, non-intelligent,
35043 effects, fictitious. For that all bodies are the fictitious creations of
35044 avidyâ is not true; since that which is not sublated by valid means of
35045 proof must be held to be real.--Nor again can you uphold the assertion
35046 that all intelligent subjects are non-different, i.e. one, because we
35047 observe that whatever is other than a subject of cognition is non-
35048 intelligent; for this also is disproved by the fact of the plurality of
35049 intelligent subjects as proved by the individual distribution, among
35050 them, of pleasures and pains.--You have further maintained 'Through me
35051 only all bodies are animated by a Self; they are the fictitious

35052 creations of my avidyâ; I alone constitute the whole aggregate of
35053 intelligent subjects,' and, on the basis of these averments, have
35054 attempted to prove the oneness of the Ego. But all this is nothing but
35055 the random talk of a person who has not mastered even the principles of
35056 his own theory; for according to your theory the Self is pure
35057 intelligence to which the whole distinction of 'I,' 'Thou,' &c., is
35058 altogether foreign. Moreover, if it be held that everything different
35059 from pure, non-differenced intelligence is false, it follows that all
35060 effort spent on learning the Veda with a view to Release is fruitless,
35061 for the Veda also is the effect of avidyâ, and the effort spent on it
35062 therefore is analogous to the effort of taking hold of the silver
35063 wrongly imagined in the shell. Or, to put it from a different point of
35064 view, all effort devoted to Release is purposeless, since it is the
35065 effect of knowledge depending on teachers of merely fictitious existence.
35066 Knowledge produced by texts such as 'Thou art that' does not put an end
35067 to bondage, because it is produced by texts which are the fictitious
35068 product of avidyâ; or because it is itself of the nature of avidyâ; or
35069 because it has for its abode knowing subjects, who are mere creatures of
35070 avidyâ; or because it is the product of a process of study which depends
35071 on teachers who are the mere creatures of avidyâ; it is thus no better
35072 than knowledge resting on texts teaching how bondage is to be put an end
35073 to, which one might have heard in a dream. Or, to put the matter again
35074 from a different point of view, Brahman constituted by pure non-
35075 differenced intelligence is false, since it is to be attained by
35076 knowledge, which is the effect of avidyâ; or since it is to be attained
35077 by knowledge abiding in knowing subjects who are mere figments of avidyâ;
35078 or because it is attained through knowledge which is the mere figment of
35079 avidyâ. For whatever is attained through knowledge of that kind is false;
35080 as e.g. the things seen in dreams or a town of the Gandharvas (Fata
35081 Morgana).

35082
35083 Nor does Brahman, constituted by pure non-differenced intelligence,
35084 shine forth by itself, so as not to need--for its cognition--other means
35085 of knowledge. And that that self-luminous knowledge which you declare to
35086 be borne witness to by itself, really consists in the knowledge of
35087 particular objects of knowledge--such knowledge abiding in particular
35088 cognising subjects--this also has been proved previously. And the
35089 different arguments which were set forth as proving Brahman's non-
35090 differenced nature, are sufficiently refuted by what we have said just
35091 now as to all such arguments themselves being the products of avidyâ.

35092
35093 Nor again is there any sense in the theory that the principle of non-
35094 differenced intelligence 'witnesses' avidyâ, and implicates itself in
35095 the error of the world. For 'witnessing' and error are observed to abide
35096 only in definite conscious subjects, not in consciousness in general.
35097 Nor can that principle of pure intelligence be proved to possess
35098 illumining power or light depending on itself only. For by light
35099 (enlightenment) we can understand nothing but definite well-established
35100 knowledge (siddhi) on the part of some knowing subject with regard to
35101 some particular object. It is on this basis only that you yourself prove
35102 the self-illuminedness of your universal principle; to an absolutely non-
35103 differenced intelligence not implying the distinction of subject and
35104 object such 'svayamprakâsatâ' could not possibly belong. With regard
35105 again to what you so loudly proclaim at your meetings, viz. that real
35106 effects are seen to spring even from unreal causes, we point out that
35107 although you allow to such effects, being non-sublated as it were, a
35108 kind of existence called 'empirical' (or 'conventional'--vyâvahârika),
35109 you yourself acknowledge that fundamentally they are nothing but
35110 products of avidyâ; you thus undermine your own position. We have, on
35111 the other hand, already disposed of this your view above, when proving
35112 that in all cases effects are originated by real causes only. Nor may
35113 you plead that what perception tells us in such cases is contradicted by
35114 Scripture; for as, according to you, Scripture itself is an effect, and
35115 hence of the essence of avidyâ, it is in no better case than the
35116 instances quoted. You have further declared that, although Brahman is to
35117 be attained only through unreal knowledge, yet it is real since when
35118 once attained it is not sublated by any subsequent cognition. But this
35119 reasoning also is not valid; for when it has once been ascertained that
35120 some principle is attained through knowledge resting on a vicious basis,

35121 the fact that we are not aware of a subsequent sublation of that
35122 principle is irrelevant. That the principle 'the reality of things is a
35123 universal Void' is false, we conclude therefrom that the reasoning
35124 leading to that principle is ascertained to be ill-founded, although we
35125 are not aware of any subsequent truth sublating that principle. Moreover,
35126 for texts such as 'There is here no plurality whatsoever', 'Knowledge,
35127 bliss is Brahman,' the absence of subsequent sublation is claimed on the
35128 ground that they negative the whole aggregate of things different from
35129 mere intelligence, and hence are later in order than all other texts
35130 (which had established that aggregate of things). But somebody may rise
35131 and say 'the Reality is a Void', and thus negative the existence of the
35132 principle of mere Intelligence also; and the latter principle is thus
35133 sublated by the assertion as to the Void, which is later in order than
35134 the texts which it negatives. On the other hand the assertion as to the
35135 Void being the universal principle is not liable to subsequent sublation;
35136 for it is impossible for any negation to go beyond it. And as to resting
35137 on a vicious basis, there is in that respect no difference between
35138 Perception and the other means of knowledge, and the view of general
35139 unreality, founded on the Vedānta. The proper conclusion therefore is
35140 that all cognitions whatsoever abide in real subjects of cognition and
35141 are themselves real, consisting in mental certainty with regard to
35142 special objects. Some of these cognitions rest on defects which
35143 themselves are real; others spring from a combination of causes, real
35144 and free from all defect. Unless we admit all this we shall not be able
35145 to account in a satisfactory way for the distinction of things true and
35146 things false, and for all empirical thought. For empirical thought,
35147 whether true or of the nature of error, presupposes inward light
35148 (illumination) in the form of certainty with regard to a particular
35149 object, and belonging to a real knowing subject; mere non-differenced
35150 Being, on the other hand (not particularised in the form of a knowing
35151 subject), cannot be the cause of states of consciousness, whether
35152 referring to real or Unreal things, and cannot therefore form the basis
35153 of empirical thought.

35154
35155 Against our opponent's argument that pure Being must be held the real
35156 substrate of all erroneous superimposition (adhyāsa), for the reason
35157 that no error can exist without a substrate, we remark that an error may
35158 take place even when its substrate is unreal, in the same way as an
35159 error may exist even when the defect (giving rise to the error), the
35160 abode of the defect, the subject of cognition and the cognition itself
35161 are unreal. The argument thus loses its force. Possibly he will now
35162 argue that as an error is never seen to exist where the substrate is
35163 unreal, the reality of pure Being (as furnishing the required basis for
35164 error) must necessarily be admitted. But, we point out, it also is a
35165 fact that errors are never observed where the defect, the abode of the
35166 defect, the knowing subject and the act of knowledge are unreal; and if
35167 we pay regard to observation, we must therefore admit the reality of all
35168 these factors as well. There is really no difference between the two
35169 cases, unless our opponent chooses to be obstinate.

35170
35171 You further asserted that, on the theory of many really different Selves,
35172 it would follow from the infinity of the past aeons that all souls must
35173 have been released before this, none being left in the state of bondage;
35174 and that hence the actually observed distinction of souls bound and
35175 released remains unexplained. But this argumentation is refuted by the
35176 fact of the souls also being infinite. You indeed maintained that, if
35177 the souls are really separate, they must necessarily have a definite
35178 number like beans, mustard-seeds, earthen vessels, and so on; but these
35179 instances are beside the point, as earthen vessels, and so on, are also
35180 infinite in number.--But do we not actually see that all these things
35181 have definite numbers, 'Here are ten jars; a thousand beans,' &c.--True,
35182 but those numbers do not belong to the essential nature of jars, and so
35183 on, but only to jars in so far as connected with time, place, and other
35184 limiting adjuncts. And that souls also have definite numbers in this
35185 sense, we readily admit. And from this it does not follow that all souls
35186 should be released; for essentially the souls are infinite (in number).--
35187 Nor are you entitled to maintain that the real separation of individual
35188 souls would imply that, as earthen vessels and the like, they are non-
35189 intelligent, not of the nature of Self, and perishable. For the

35190 circumstance of individuals of one species being distinct from each
35191 other, does in no way imply that they possess the characteristics of
35192 things belonging to another species: the individual separation of jars
35193 does not imply their having the characteristics of pieces of cloth.--You
35194 further maintain that from the hypothesis of a real plurality of souls
35195 it follows that Brahman is substantially limited, and in consequence of
35196 this limited with regard to time and space also, and that hence its
35197 infinity is disproved. But this also is a mistaken conclusion. Things
35198 substantially limited may be limited more or less with regard to time
35199 and place: there is no invariable rule on this point, and the measure of
35200 their connexion with space and time has hence to be determined in
35201 dependence on other means of knowledge. Now Brahman's connexion with _all_
35202 space and _all_ time results from such other means of proof, and hence
35203 there is no contradiction (between this non-limitation with regard to
35204 space and time, and its limitation in point of substance--which is due
35205 to the existence of other souls).--But mere substantial limitation, as
35206 meaning the absence of non-limitation of any kind, by itself proves that
35207 Brahman is not infinite!--Well, then you yourself are in no better case;
35208 for you admit that Brahman is something different from avidyâ. From this
35209 admission it follows that Brahman also is something 'different', and
35210 thus all the disadvantages connected with the view of difference cling
35211 to your theory as well. If on the other hand it should not be allowed
35212 that Brahman differs in nature from avidyâ, then Brahman's nature itself
35213 is constituted by avidyâ, and the text defining Brahman as 'the True,
35214 knowledge, infinite' is contrary to sense.--If the reality of
35215 'difference' is not admitted, then there is no longer any distinction
35216 between the proofs and the mutual objections set forth by the advocates
35217 of different theories, and we are landed in general confusion. The proof
35218 of infinity, we further remark, rests altogether on the absence of
35219 limitation of space and time, not on absence of substantial limitation;
35220 absence of such limitation is something very much akin to the 'horn of a
35221 hare' and is perceived nowhere. On the view of difference, on the other
35222 hand, the whole world, as constituting Brahman's body, is its mode, and
35223 Brahman is thus limited neither through itself nor through other things.--
35224 We thus arrive at the conclusion that, as effects are real in so far as
35225 different from their cause, the effect of Brahman, i.e. the entire world,
35226 is different from Brahman.

35227
35228 Against this view the Sûtra now declares itself as follows.--The non-
35229 difference of the world from Brahman, the highest cause, follows from
35230 'what begins with the word ârambhana'--which proves such non-difference;
35231 'what begins with the word ârambhana' means those clauses at the head of
35232 which that word is met with, viz. 'vâkârambhanam vikâro nâmadheyam
35233 mrittikety eva satyam'; 'Being only this was in the beginning, one only,
35234 without a second'; 'it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth; it sent
35235 forth fire'; 'having entered with this living Self; 'In the True, my son,
35236 all these creatures have their root, in the True they dwell, in the True
35237 they rest'; 'In that all that exists has its Self; it is the True, it is
35238 the Self; and thou art it, O Svetaketu' (Ch. Up. VI, 1-8)--it is these
35239 clauses and others of similar purport which are met with in other
35240 chapters, that the Sûtra refers to. For these texts prove the non-
35241 difference from Brahman of the world consisting of non-sentient and
35242 sentient beings. This is as follows. The teacher, bearing in his mind
35243 the idea of Brahman constituting the sole cause of the entire world and
35244 of the non-difference of the effect from the cause, asks the pupil,
35245 'Have you ever asked for that instruction by which the non-heard is
35246 heard, the non-perceived is perceived, the not known is known'; wherein
35247 there is implied the promise that, through the knowledge of Brahman the
35248 general cause, its effect, i.e. the whole Universe, will be known? The
35249 pupil, not knowing that Brahman is the sole cause of the Universe,
35250 raises a doubt as to the possibility of one thing being known through
35251 another, 'How then, Sir, is that instruction?' and the teacher thereupon,
35252 in order to convey the notion of Brahman being the sole universal cause,
35253 quotes an instance showing that the non-difference of the effect from
35254 the cause is proved by ordinary experience, 'As by one clod of clay
35255 there is known everything that is made of clay'; the meaning being 'as
35256 jars, pots, and the like, which are fashioned out of one piece of clay,
35257 are known through the cognition of that clay, since their substance is
35258 not different from it.' In order to meet the objection that according to

35259 Kanāda's doctrine the effect constitutes a substance different from the
35260 cause, the teacher next proceeds to prove the non-difference of the
35261 effect from the cause by reference to ordinary experience,
35262 'vākārambhanam vikāro namadheyam mrīttikety eva satyam'. Ārambhanam must
35263 here be explained as that which is taken or touched (ā-rabh = ā-labh;
35264 and 'ālabhah sparsahimsayoh'); compare Pāṇini III, 3, 113, as to the
35265 form and meaning of the word. 'Vākā,' 'on account of speech,' we take to
35266 mean 'on account of activity preceded by speech'; for activities such as
35267 the fetching of water in a pitcher are preceded by speech, 'Fetch water
35268 in the pitcher,' and so on. For the bringing about of such activity, the
35269 material clay (which had been mentioned just before) touches (enters
35270 into contact with) an effect (vikāra), i.e. a particular make or
35271 configuration, distinguished by having a broad bottom and resembling the
35272 shape of a belly, and a special name (nāmadheya), viz. pitcher, and so
35273 on, which is applied to that effect; or, to put it differently, to the
35274 end that certain activities may be accomplished, the substance clay
35275 receives a new configuration and a new name. [FOOTNOTE 455:1] Hence jars
35276 and other things of clay are clay (mrīttikā), i.e. are of the substance
35277 of clay, only; this only is true (satyam), i.e. known through
35278 authoritative means of proof; only (eva), because the effects are not
35279 known as different substances. One and the same substance therefore,
35280 such as clay or gold, gives occasion for different ideas and words only
35281 as it assumes different configurations; just as we observe that one and
35282 the same Devadatta becomes the object of different ideas and terms, and
35283 gives rise to different effects, according to the different stages of
35284 life--youth, old age, &c.--which he has reached.--The fact of our saying
35285 'the jar has perished' while yet the clay persists, was referred to by
35286 the Pūrvapakshin as proving that the effect is something different from
35287 the cause; but this view is disproved by the view held by us that
35288 origination, destruction, and so on, are merely different states of one
35289 and the same causal substance. According as one and the same substance
35290 is in this or that state, there belong to it different terms and
35291 different activities, and these different states may rightly be viewed
35292 as depending on the activity of an agent. The objections again which are
35293 connected with the theory of 'manifestation' are refuted by our not
35294 acknowledging such a thing at all as 'manifestation.' Nor does the
35295 admission of origination render the doctrine of the reality of the
35296 effect irrational; for it is only the Real that originates.--But it is a
35297 contradiction to maintain that that which previously exists is
35298 originated!--This, we reply, is the objection of a person who knows
35299 nothing about the true nature of origination and destruction. A
35300 substance enters into different states in succession; what passes away
35301 is the substance in its previous states, what originates is the
35302 substance in its subsequent states. As thus the substance in all its
35303 states has being, there is nothing irrational in the satkārya theory.--
35304 But the admission of the origination of a non-existing state lands us in
35305 the asatkārya theory!--If he, we retort, who holds the asatkārya theory
35306 is of opinion that the origination of the effect does not itself
35307 originate, he is similarly landed in the satkārya theory; and if he
35308 holds that the origination itself originates, he is led into a
35309 regressus in infinitum. According to us, on the other hand, who hold
35310 that states are incapable of being apprehended and of acting apart from
35311 that of which they are states, origination, destruction, and so on,
35312 belong only to a substance which is in a certain state; and on this
35313 theory no difficulty remains. And in the same way as the state of being
35314 a jar results from the clay abandoning the condition of being either two
35315 halves of a jar or a lump of clay, plurality results from a substance
35316 giving up the state of oneness, and oneness from the giving up of
35317 plurality; hence this point also gives rise to no difficulty.

35318
35319 We now consider the whole Chāndogya-text in connexion. 'Sad eva somyedam
35320 agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam.' This means--That which is Being, i.e. this
35321 world which now, owing to the distinction of names and forms, bears a
35322 manifold shape, was in the beginning one only, owing to the absence of
35323 the distinction of names and forms. And as, owing to the 'Sat' being
35324 endowed with all powers, a further ruling principle is out of the
35325 question, the world was also 'without a second.' This proves the non-
35326 difference of the world from Brahman. In the same way the next clause
35327 also, 'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' which describes the

35328 creation of the world as proceeding from a resolve of the Self to
 35329 differentiate itself into a world consisting of manifold beings movable
 35330 and immovable, viz. Fire, and so on, enables us to determine that the
 35331 effect, i. e. the world, is non-different from the highest cause, i.e.
 35332 the highest Brahman.
 35333
 35334 And as now a further doubt may arise as to how the highest Brahman with
 35335 all its perfections can be designated as one with the world, and how the
 35336 world can be designated as one, without a second, not dependent on
 35337 another guiding principle; and how this thought, i.e. the resolution, on
 35338 the part of the Supreme cause, of differentiating itself into a manifold
 35339 world, and the creation corresponding to that resolution are possible;
 35340 the text continues, 'That deity thought--Let me now enter those three
 35341 beings with this living Self (jīva ātman) and distinguish names and
 35342 forms'--which means, 'Let me make the aggregate of non-sentient things
 35343 (for this is meant by the "three beings") to possess various names and
 35344 forms, by entering into them by means of the gīva, which is of the
 35345 nature of my Self.' The possession of names and forms must thus be
 35346 understood to be effected by the jīva entering into matter as its Self.
 35347 There is another scriptural text also which makes it clear that the
 35348 highest Brahman enters, so as to be their Self, into the world together
 35349 with the jīvas. 'Having sent forth that he entered into it. Having
 35350 entered into it he became sat and tyat (i.e. sentient and non-sentient
 35351 beings). 'And that the entire aggregate of sentient and non-sentient
 35352 beings, gross or subtle, in their effected or their causal state,
 35353 constitutes the body of the highest Brahman, and that on the other hand
 35354 the highest Brahman constitutes their Self--this is proved by the
 35355 antaryāmin-brāhmana and similar texts. This disposes of the doubt raised
 35356 above. Since Brahman abides, as their Self, in all non-sentient matter
 35357 together with the jīvas, Brahman is denoted by the term 'world' in so
 35358 far only as it (i.e. Brahman) has non-sentient and sentient beings for
 35359 its body, and hence utterances such as 'This which is Being only was in
 35360 the beginning one only' are unobjectionable in every way. All change and
 35361 all imperfection belongs only to the beings constituting Brahman's body,
 35362 and Brahman itself is thus proved to be free from all imperfection, a
 35363 treasure as it were of all imaginable holy qualities. This point will be
 35364 further elucidated under II, 1, 22.--The Chândogya-text then further
 35365 teaches that all sentient and non-sentient beings have their Self in
 35366 Brahman 'in that all this has its Self; and further inculcates this
 35367 truth in 'Thou art that.'
 35368
 35369 Texts met with in other sections also teach this same non-difference of
 35370 the general cause and its effect: 'All this indeed is Brahman' (Ch. Up.
 35371 III, 14, 1); 'When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known,
 35372 then all this is known' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 6); 'That Self is all this'
 35373 (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahman indeed is all this' (Mai. Up. IV, 6); 'The
 35374 Self only is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2). Other texts, too, negative
 35375 difference: 'Everything abandons him who looks for anything elsewhere
 35376 than in the Self (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); 'There is not any plurality here'
 35377 (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'From death to death goes he who sees here any
 35378 plurality' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19). And in the same spirit the passage 'For
 35379 where there is duality as it were, one sees the other; but when for him
 35380 the Self has become all, whereby then should he see and whom?' (Bri. Up.
 35381 11,4, 13)--in setting forth that the view of duality belongs to him who
 35382 does not know and the view of non-duality to him who knows--intimates
 35383 that non-difference only is real.
 35384
 35385 It is in this way that we prove, by means of the texts beginning with
 35386 ārambhana, that the world is non-different from the universal cause, i.e.
 35387 the highest Brahman. Brahman only, having the aggregate of sentient and
 35388 non-sentient beings for its body and hence for its modes (prakāra), is
 35389 denoted by all words whatsoever. The body of this Brahman is sometimes
 35390 constituted by sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle state,
 35391 when--just owing to that subtle state--they are incapable of being
 35392 (conceived and) designated as apart from Brahman whose body they form:
 35393 Brahman is then in its so-called causal condition. At other times the
 35394 body of Brahman is constituted by all sentient and non-sentient beings
 35395 in their gross, manifest state, owing to which they admit of being
 35396 thought and spoken of as having distinct names and forms: Brahman then

35397 is in its 'effected' state. The effect, i.e. the world, is thus seen to
35398 be non-different from the cause, i.e. the highest Brahman. And that in
35399 the effected as well as the causal state of Brahman's body as
35400 constituted by sentient and non-sentient beings, and of Brahman embodied
35401 therein, perfections and imperfections are distributed according to the
35402 difference of essential nature between Brahman and its body, as proved
35403 by hundreds of scriptural texts, we have shown above.
35404

35405 Those on the other hand who establish the non-difference of cause and
35406 effect, on the basis of the theory of the effect's non-reality, are
35407 unable to prove what they wish to prove; for the True and the False
35408 cannot possibly be one. If these two were one, it would follow either
35409 that Brahman is false or that the world is real.--Those again who (like
35410 Bhâskara) hold the effect also to be real--the difference of the soul
35411 and Brahman being due to limiting conditions, while their non-difference
35412 is essential; and the difference as well as the non-difference of
35413 Brahman and matter being essential--enter into conflict with all those
35414 texts which declare that the soul and Brahman are distinct in so far as
35415 the soul is under the power of karman while Brahman is free from all
35416 evil, &c., and all those texts which teach that non-sentient matter
35417 undergoes changes while Brahman does not. For as, according to them,
35418 nothing exists but Brahman and the limiting adjuncts, Brahman--as being
35419 indivisible--must be undivided while entering into connexion with the
35420 upâdhis, and hence itself undergoes a change into inferior forms. And if
35421 they say that it is only the power (sakti), not Brahman itself, which
35422 undergoes a change; this also is of no avail since Brahman and its power
35423 are non-different.
35424

35425 Others again (Yâdavaprakâsa) hold that the general cause, i.e. Brahman,
35426 is pure Being in which all distinctions and changes such as being an
35427 enjoying subject, and so on, have vanished, while however it is endowed
35428 with all possible potentialities. During a pralaya this causal substance
35429 abides self-luminous, with all the distinctions of consciousness of
35430 pleasure and pain gone to rest, comparable to the soul of a man held by
35431 dreamless sleep, different however in nature from mere non-sentient
35432 matter. During the period of a creation, on the other hand, just as the
35433 substance called clay assumes the forms of jars, platters, and so on, or
35434 as the water of the sea turns itself into foam, waves, bubbles, and so
35435 on, the universal causal substance abides in the form of a triad of
35436 constituent parts, viz. enjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment, and a
35437 ruler. The attributes of being a ruler, or an object of enjoyment, or an
35438 enjoying subject, and the perfections and imperfections depending on
35439 those attributes, are therefore distributed in the same way as the
35440 attributes of being a jar or pitcher or platter; and the different
35441 effects of these attributes are distributed among different parts of the
35442 substance, clay. The objects of enjoyment, subjects of enjoyment, and
35443 the ruler are one, on the other hand, in so far as 'that which is'
35444 constitutes their substance; just as jars, platters and pitchers are one
35445 in so far as their substance is constituted by clay. It is thus one
35446 substance only, viz. 'that which is,' that appears in different
35447 conditions, and it is in this sense that the world is non-different from
35448 Brahman.--But this theory is really in conflict with all Scripture,
35449 Smriti, Itihâsa, Purâna and Reasoning. For Scripture, Smriti, Itihâsa
35450 and Purâna alike teach that there is one supreme cause, viz. Brahman--a
35451 being that is the Lord of all Lords, all-knowing, all-powerful,
35452 instantaneously realising all its purposes, free of all blemish, not
35453 limited either by place or time, enjoying supreme unsurpassable bliss.
35454 Nor can it be held that above the Lord there is 'pure Being' of which
35455 the Lord is a part only. For 'This which is "being" only was in the
35456 beginning one only, without a second; it thought, may I be many, may I
35457 grow forth' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); 'Verily, in the beginning this was
35458 Brahman, one only. Being one it was not strong enough. It created the
35459 most excellent Kshattrâ, viz. those Kshattras among the Devas--Indra,
35460 Varuna, Soma, Rudra, Parjanya, Yama, Mrityu, îsâna' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 11);
35461 'In the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing
35462 whatsoever else blinking. He thought, shall I send forth worlds' (Ait.
35463 Âr. II, 4, 1, 1, 2); 'There was in truth Nârâyana only, not Brahmâ, not
35464 îsâna, nor heaven and earth, nor the nakshatras, nor the waters, nor
35465 Agni, nor Soma, nor Sûrya. Being alone he felt no delight. Of him merged

35466 in meditation' &c. (Mahânâ. Up. I, 1)--these and other texts prove that
35467 the highest cause is the Lord of all Lords, Nârâyana. For as the terms
35468 'Being,' 'Brahman,' 'Self,' which are met with in sections treating of
35469 the same topic, are in one of those parallel sections particularised by
35470 the term 'Nârâyana,' it follows that they all mean Nârâyana. That the
35471 Lord only is the universal cause is shown by the following text also,
35472 'He the highest great lord of lords, the highest deity of deities--he is
35473 the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him
35474 neither parent nor lord' (Svet. Up. VI, 7, 9). Similarly the Manu Smriti,
35475 'Then the divine Self-existent (Brahmâ)--desirous to produce from his
35476 own body beings of many kind--first with a thought created the waters
35477 and placed his seed in them' (Ma. I, 6-8). Itihâsas and Purânas also
35478 declare the Supreme Person only to be the universal cause, 'Nârâyana, of
35479 whom the world is the body, of infinite nature, eternal, when desirous
35480 to create sent forth from a thousandth part of himself the souls in two
35481 divisions.' 'From Vishnu the world originated and in him it abides.'

35482
35483 Nor is it possible to hold that the Lord is pure 'Being' only, for such
35484 'Being' is admitted to be an element of the Lord; and moreover all
35485 'Being' has difference. Nor can it be maintained that the Lord's
35486 connexion with all his auspicious qualities--knowledge, bliss, and so
35487 on--is occasional (adventitious) merely; it rather is essential and
35488 hence eternal. Nor may you avail yourself of certain texts--viz. 'His
35489 high power (sakti) is revealed as manifold, as essential, and (so) his
35490 knowledge, strength and action' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'He who is all-
35491 knowing, all-cognising' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9), and others--to the end of
35492 proving that what is essential is only the Lord's connexion with the
35493 _potentialities_ (sakti) of knowledge, bliss, and so on. For in the
35494 Svetâsvatara-text the word 'essential' independently qualifies
35495 'knowledge, strength, and action' no less than 'sakti'; and your
35496 explanation would necessitate so-called implication (lakshanâ). Nor
35497 again can it be said that in words such as sarvjña (all-knowing), the
35498 formative suffix expresses potentiality only, as it admittedly does in
35499 other words such as pâkaka (cook); for grammar does not teach that all
35500 these (krit) affixes in general express potentiality or capability only.
35501 It rather teaches (cp. Pânini III, 2, 54) that a few krit-affixes only
35502 have this limited meaning; and in the case of pâkaka and similar words
35503 we must assume capability to be denoted, because there is no other
35504 explanation open to us.--If, moreover, the Lord were held to be only a
35505 part of the Sat it would follow that the Sat, as the whole, would be
35506 superior to the Lord just as the ocean is superior to a wave, and this
35507 would be in conflict with ever so many scriptural texts which make
35508 statements about the Lord, cp. e.g. 'Him the highest great lord of
35509 lords'; 'There is none seen like to him or superior' (Svet. Up. VI, 7,
35510 8). If, moreover, mere Being is held to be the Self of all and the
35511 general whole, and the Lord only a particular part of it, this would
35512 imply the stultification of all those texts which declare the Lord to be
35513 the general Self and the whole of which all beings are parts; for jars
35514 and platters certainly cannot be held to be parts of, and to have their
35515 being in, pitchers (which themselves are only special things made of
35516 clay). Against this you perhaps will plead that as Being in general is
35517 fully present in all its parts, and hence also in that part which is the
35518 Lord, all other things may be viewed as having their Self in and being
35519 parts of, him.--But from your principles we might with equal right draw
35520 the inference that as Being in general is fully present in the jar, the
35521 Lord is a part of the jar and has his Self in that! From enunciations
35522 such as 'the jar is,' 'the cloth is,' it appears that Being is an
35523 attribute of things, and cannot therefore be a substance and a cause. By
35524 the 'being' of a thing we understand the attribute of its being suitable
35525 for some definite practical effect; while its 'non-being' means its
35526 suitability for an effect of an opposite nature.--Should it on the other
35527 hand be held that substances only have being, the (unacceptable)
35528 consequence would be that actions, and so on, are non-existent. And if
35529 (to avoid this consequence) it were said that the being of actions, and
35530 so on, depends on their connexion with substances, it would be difficult
35531 to show (what yet should be shown) that 'being' is everywhere of one and
35532 the same nature. Moreover, if everything were non-different in so far as
35533 'being,' there would be a universal consciousness of the nature of
35534 everything, and from this there would follow a general confusion of all

35535 good and evil (i.e. every one would have conscious experience of
35536 everything) This point we have explained before. For all these reasons
35537 non-difference can only have the meaning set forth by us.--Here the
35538 following doubt may arise. In the case of childhood, youth, and so on,
35539 we observe that different ideas and different terms are applied to
35540 different states of one and the same being; in the case of clay, wood,
35541 gold, &c., on the other hand, we observe that different ideas and terms
35542 are applied to different things. On what ground then do you determine
35543 that in the case of causes and effects, such as e.g. clay and jars, it
35544 is mere difference of state on which the difference of ideas and terms
35545 is based?--To this question the next Sûtra gives a reply.

35546
35547 [FOOTNOTE 434:1. In other words--is the golden ornament originated by
35548 the mere formless substance, gold; or by the form belonging to that
35549 special piece of gold (a coin, a bar, &c.), out of which the ornament is
35550 fashioned; or by the substance, gold, in so far as possessing that
35551 special form? The rukaka of the text has to be taken in the sense of
35552 nishka.]

35553
35554 [FOOTNOTE 455:1. The meaning of the four words constituting the clause
35555 therefore would be, 'On account of speech (i.e. for the sake of the
35556 accomplishment of certain activities such as the bringing of water,
35557 which are preceded by speech), there is touched (by the previously
35558 mentioned substance clay) an effect and a name; i.e. for the sake of, &c.,
35559 clay modifies itself into an effect having a special name.'The
35560 Commentary remarks that 'ârambhanam 'cannot be taken in the sense of
35561 upâdâna; since, on the theory of the unreality of effects, the effect is
35562 originated not by speech but by thought (imagination) only; and on the
35563 parinâma doctrine the effect is likewise not originated by speech but by
35564 Brahman.]

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35568
35569 16. And because (the cause) is perceived in the existence of the effect.

35570
35571 This means--because gold which is the cause is perceived in the
35572 existence of its effects, such as earrings and the like; i.e. on account
35573 of the recognition of gold which expresses itself in the judgment 'this
35574 earring is gold.' We do not on the other hand perceive the presence of
35575 clay, and so on, in gold, and so on. The case of the cause and the
35576 effect is thus analagous to that of the child and the youth: the word
35577 'effect' denotes nothing else but the causal substance which has passed
35578 over into a different condition. He also who holds the effect to be a
35579 new thing acknowledges that the effect is connected with a different
35580 state, and as this different state suffices to account for the
35581 difference of ideas and words, we are not entitled to assume a new
35582 substance which is not perceived. Nor must it be said that the
35583 recognition of the gold in the earring is due to generic nature (the two
35584 _things_ being different, but having the same generic nature); for we
35585 perceive no new substance which could be the abode of the generic
35586 character. What we actually perceive is one and the same substance
35587 possessing the generic characteristics of gold, first in the causal
35588 state and then in the effected state. Nor again can it be said that even
35589 on the supposition of difference of substance, recognition of the cause
35590 in the effect results from the continuity of the so-called intimate
35591 cause (samavâyi-kârainâ). For where there is difference of substances
35592 we do not observe that mere continuity of the abode gives rise to the
35593 recognition (of one substance) in the other substance residing in that
35594 abode.--But in the case of certain effects, as e.g. scorpions and other
35595 vermin which originate from dung, that recognition of the causal
35596 substance, i.e. dung (to which you refer as proving the identity of
35597 cause and effect), is not observed to take place!--You misstate the
35598 case, we reply; here also we _do_ recognise in the effect that substance
35599 which is the primal cause, viz. earth.--But in smoke, which is the
35600 effect of fire, we do not recognise fire!--True! but this does not
35601 disprove our case. Fire is only the operative cause of smoke; for smoke
35602 originates from damp fuel joined with fire. That smoke is the effect of
35603 damp fuel is proved thereby, as well as that both have smell (which

35604 shows them to be alike of the substance of earth).--As thus the identity
35605 of the substance is perceived in the effect also, we are entitled to
35606 conclude that the difference of ideas and terms rests on difference of
35607 state only. The effect, therefore, is non-different from the
35608 cause.--This is so for the following reason also.

35609
35610
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35612
35613 17. And on account of the existence of that which is posterior.

35614
35615 On account of the existence of the posterior, i.e. the effect existing
35616 in the cause--for this reason also the effect is non-different from the
35617 cause. For in ordinary language as well as in the Veda the effect is
35618 spoken of in terms of the cause; as when we say, 'all these things--jars,
35619 platters, &c.--were clay only this morning'; or when the Veda says,
35620 'Being only was this in the beginning.'

35621
35622
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35625 18. If it be said 'not, on account of the designation of the (effect as
35626 the) non-existent; we reply, not so, on account (of such designation
35627 being due to) another attribute, (as appears) from the complementary
35628 passage, from Reasoning, and from another Vedic text.

35629
35630 The assertion that ordinary speech as well as the Veda acknowledges the
35631 existence of the effect in the cause cannot be upheld 'on account of the
35632 designation of (the effect as) the non-existent.' For the Veda says,
35633 'Non-being only was this in the beginning' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1); 'Non-
35634 being indeed was this in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 6. 1); 'In the
35635 beginning truly this was not anything whatever.' And in ordinary
35636 language we say 'In the morning all this--jars, platters, and so on,--
35637 was not.'--This objection the Sûtra proceeds to refute. 'Not so, on
35638 account of such designation being due to another attribute.' The
35639 designation of the effected substance as the non-existent is due to the
35640 effect having at an earlier time a different quality, i.e. a different
35641 constitution; not to its being, as you think, absolutely non-existing.
35642 The quality different from the quality of existence is non-existence;
35643 that is to say, of the world designated as this, the quality of
35644 existence is constituted by name and form, while the quality of non-
35645 existence consists in the subtle state opposed to name and form.--But
35646 how is this known?--'From the complementary passage, from Reasoning, and
35647 from another text.' The complementary passage is the one following on
35648 the last text quoted above, viz. 'that Non-existent formed the resolve
35649 "may I be". The resolve referred to in this complementary text serving
35650 as an inferential sign to determine that the Non-existence spoken of is
35651 other than absolute Non-existence, we, on the basis of the observation
35652 that all the three texts quoted treat of the same matter, conclude that
35653 in the other two texts also the Non-existent has to be understood in the
35654 same sense. 'From Reasoning.' Reasoning shows Being and Non-being to be
35655 attributes of things. The possession, on the part of clay, of a certain
35656 shape, a broad base, a belly-shaped body, and so on, is the cause of our
35657 thinking and saying 'the jar exists,' while the connexion, on the part
35658 of the clay, with a condition opposed to that of a jar is the cause of
35659 our thinking and saying 'the jar does not exist.' A condition of the
35660 latter kind is e. g.--the clay's existing in the form of two separate
35661 halves of a jar, and it is just this and similar conditions of the clay
35662 which account for our saying that the jar does not exist. We do not
35663 perceive any non-existence of the jar different from the kind of non-
35664 existence described; and as the latter sufficiently accounts for all
35665 current ideas and expressions as to non-existence, there is no occasion
35666 to assume an additional kind of non-existence.--And also 'from another
35667 text.' The text meant is that often quoted, 'Being only was this in the
35668 beginning.' For there the view of the absolute non-being of the effect
35669 is objected to, 'But how could it be thus?' &c., and then the decision
35670 is given that from the beginning the world was 'being.' This matter is
35671 clearly set forth in the text 'This was then undistinguished; it became
35672 distinguished by name and form' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7).

35673
35674 The next two Sûtras confirm the doctrine of the non-difference of the
35675 effect from the cause by two illustrative instances.
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35680 19. And like a piece of cloth.
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35682 As threads when joined in a peculiar cross-arrangement are called a
35683 piece of cloth, thus acquiring a new name, a new form, and new functions,
35684 so it is with Brahman also.
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35689 20. And as the different vital airs.
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35691 As the one air, according as it undergoes in the body different
35692 modifications, acquires a new name, new characteristics, and new
35693 functions, being then called prâna, apâna, and so on; thus the one
35694 Brahman becomes the world, with its manifold moving and non-moving
35695 beings.--The non-difference of the world from Brahman, the highest cause,
35696 is thus fully established.
35697

35698 Here terminates the 'ârambhana' adhikarana.
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35703 21. From the designation of the 'other' (as non-different from Brahman)
35704 there result (Brahman's) not creating what is beneficial, and other
35705 imperfections.
35706

35707 'Thou art that'; 'this Self is Brahman'--these and similar texts which
35708 declare the non-difference of the world from Brahman, teach, as has been
35709 said before, at the same time the non-difference from Brahman of the
35710 individual soul also. But an objection here presents itself. If these
35711 texts really imply that the 'other one,' i.e. the soul, is Brahman,
35712 there will follow certain imperfections on Brahman's part, viz. that
35713 Brahman, endowed as it is with omniscience, the power of realising its
35714 purposes, and so on, does not create a world of a nature beneficial to
35715 itself, but rather creates a world non-beneficial to itself; and the
35716 like. This world no doubt is a storehouse of numberless pains, either
35717 originating in living beings themselves or due to the action of other
35718 natural beings, or caused by supernatural agencies. No rational
35719 independent person endeavours to produce what is clearly non-beneficial
35720 to himself. And as you hold the view of the non-difference of the world
35721 from Brahman, you yourself set aside all those texts which declare
35722 Brahman to be different from the soul; for were there such difference,
35723 the doctrine of general non-difference could not be established. Should
35724 it be maintained that the texts declaring difference refer to difference
35725 due to limiting adjuncts, while the texts declaring non-difference mean
35726 essential non-difference, we must ask the following question--does the
35727 non-conditioned Brahman know, or does it not know, the soul which is
35728 essentially non-different from it? If it does not know it, Brahman's
35729 omniscience has to be abandoned. If, on the other hand, it knows it,
35730 then Brahman is conscious of the pains of the soul--which is non-
35731 different from Brahman--as its own pains; and from this there
35732 necessarily follows an imperfection, viz. that Brahman does not create
35733 what is beneficial and does create what is non-beneficial to itself. If,
35734 again, it be said that the difference of the soul and Brahman is due to
35735 Nescience on the part of both, and that the texts declaring difference
35736 refer to difference of this kind, the assumption of Nescience belonging
35737 to the soul leads us to the very alternatives just stated and to their
35738 respective results. Should the ajñana, on the other hand, belong to
35739 Brahman, we point out that Brahman, whose essential nature is self-
35740 illuminedness, cannot possibly be conscious of ajñana and the creation
35741 of the world effected by it. And if it be said that the light of Brahman

35742 is obscured by ajñāna, we point to all the difficulties, previously set
35743 forth, which follow from this hypothesis--to obscure light means to make
35744 it cease, and to make cease the light of Brahman, of whom light is the
35745 essential nature, means no less than to destroy Brahman itself. The view
35746 of Brahman being the cause of the world thus shows itself to be
35747 untenable.--This primā facie view the next Sūtra refutes.

35752 22. But (Brahman is) additional, on account of the declaration of
35753 difference.

35754
35755 The word 'but' sets aside the primā facie view. To the individual soul
35756 capable of connexion with the various kinds of pain there is additional,
35757 i.e. from it there is different, Brahman.--On what ground?--'Owing to
35758 the declaration of difference.' For Brahman is spoken of as different
35759 from the soul in the following texts:--'He who dwells in the Self and
35760 within the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the
35761 body, who rules the Self within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the
35762 immortal' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Knowing as separate the Self and the
35763 Mover, blessed by him he gains Immortality' (Svet. Up. I, 6); 'He is the
35764 cause, the Lord of the lords of the organs' (i.e. the individual souls)
35765 (Svet Up. VI, 9); 'One of them eats the sweet fruit; without eating the
35766 other looks on' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'There are two, the one knowing, the
35767 other not knowing, both unborn, the one a ruler, the other not a ruler'
35768 (Svet. Up. I, 9); 'Embraced by the prājña. Self (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 21);
35769 'Mounted by the prājña. Self' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 35); 'From that the ruler
35770 of māyā sends forth all this, in that the other is bound up through māyā
35771 (Svet. Up. IV, 9); 'the Master of the Pradhāna and the souls, the lord
35772 of the gunas' (Svet. Up. VI, 16); 'the eternal among eternal, the
35773 intelligent among the intelligent, who, one, fulfils the desires of
35774 many' (Svet. Up. VI, 13); 'who moves within the Unevolved, of whom the
35775 Unevolved is the body, whom the Unevolved does not know; who moves
35776 within the Imperishable, of whom the Imperishable is the body, whom the
35777 Imperishable does not know; who moves within Death, of whom Death is the
35778 body, whom Death does not know; he is the inner Self of all beings, free
35779 from evil, the divine one, the one God, Nārāyana'; and other similar
35780 texts.

35785 23. And as in the analogous case of stones and the like, there is
35786 impossibility of that.

35787
35788 In the same way as it is impossible that the different non-sentient
35789 things such as stones, iron, wood, herbs, &c., which are of an extremely
35790 low constitution and subject to constant change, should be one in nature
35791 with Brahman, which is faultless, changeless, fundamentally antagonistic
35792 to all that is evil, &c. &c.; so it is also impossible that the
35793 individual soul, which is liable to endless suffering, and a mere
35794 wretched glowworm as it were, should be one with Brahman who, as we know
35795 from the texts, comprises within himself the treasure of all auspicious
35796 qualities, &c. &c. Those texts, which exhibit Brahman and the soul in
35797 coordination, must be understood as conveying the doctrine, founded on
35798 passages such as 'of whom the Self is the body,' that as the jīva
35799 constitutes Brahman's body and Brahman abides within the jīva as its
35800 Self, Brahman has the jīva for its mode; and with this doctrine the co-
35801 ordination referred to is not only not in conflict but even confirms it--
35802 as we have shown repeatedly, e.g. under Sū. I, 4, 22. Brahman in all its
35803 states has the souls and matter for its body; when the souls and matter
35804 are in their subtle state Brahman is in its causal condition; when, on
35805 the other hand, Brahman has for its body souls and matter in their gross
35806 state, it is 'effected' and then called world. In this way the co-
35807 ordination above referred to fully explains itself. The world is non-
35808 different from Brahman in so far as it is its effect. There is no
35809 confusion of the different characteristic qualities; for liability to
35810 change belongs to non-sentient matter, liability to pain to sentient

35811 souls, and the possession of all excellent qualities to Brahman: hence
35812 the doctrine is not in conflict with any scriptural text. That even in
35813 the state of non-separation-described in texts such as, 'Being only this
35814 was in the beginning'--the souls joined to non-sentient matter persist
35815 in a subtle condition and thus constitute Brahman's body must
35816 necessarily be admitted; for that the souls at that time also persist in
35817 a subtle form is shown under Sûtras II, I, 34; 35. Non-division, at that
35818 time, is possible in so far as there is no distinction of names and
35819 forms. It follows from all this that Brahman's causality is not contrary
35820 to reason.

35821
35822 Those, on the other hand, who explain the difference, referred to in
35823 Sûtra 22, as the difference between the jîva in its state of bondage and
35824 the jîva in so far as free from avidyâ, i.e. the unconditioned Brahman,
35825 implicate themselves in contradictions. For the jîva., in so far as free
35826 from avidyâ, is neither all-knowing, nor the Lord of all, nor the cause
35827 of all, nor the Self of all, nor the ruler of all--it in fact possesses
35828 none of those characteristics on which the scriptural texts found the
35829 difference of the released soul; for according to the view in question
35830 all those attributes are the mere figment of Nescience. Nor again can
35831 the Sûtra under discussion be said to refer to the distinction, from the
35832 individual soul, of a Lord fictitiously created by avidyâ--a distinction
35833 analogous to that which a man in the state of avidyâ makes between the
35834 shell and the silver; for it is the task of the Vedânta to convey a
35835 knowledge of that true Brahman which is introduced as the object of
35836 enquiry in the first Sûtra ('Now then the enquiry into Brahman') and
35837 which is the cause of the origination and so on of the world, and what
35838 they at this point are engaged in is to refute the objections raised
35839 against the doctrine of that Brahman on the basis of Smriti and
35840 Reasoning.--The two Sûtras II, 1, 8; 9 really form a complementary
35841 statement to what is proved in the present adhikarana; for their purport
35842 is to show also that things of different nature can stand to each other
35843 in the relation of cause and effect. And the Sûtra II, 1, 7 has
35844 reference to what is contained in the previous adhikarana.

35845
35846 Here terminates the adhikarana of 'designation of the other.'

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35851 24. Should it be said that (it is) not, on account of the observation of
35852 employment; we say, not so; for as in the case of milk.

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35854 We have so far determined that it is in no way unreasonable to hold that
35855 the highest Brahman, which is all-knowing, capable of realising its
35856 purposes, &c., has all beings, sentient and non-sentient, for its body,
35857 and hence constitutes the Self of all and differs in nature from
35858 everything else. We now proceed to show that it is not unreasonable to
35859 hold that, possessing all those attributes, it is able to effect by its
35860 mere will and wish the creation of this entire manifold Universe.--But,
35861 it may here be said, it is certainly a matter of observation that agents
35862 of limited power are obliged to employ a number of instrumental agencies
35863 in order to effect their purposes; but how should it follow therefrom
35864 that the view of the all-powerful Brahman producing the world without
35865 such instrumental agencies is in any way irrational?--As, we reply, it
35866 is observed in ordinary life that even such agents as possess the
35867 capability of producing certain effects stand in need of certain
35868 instruments, some slow-witted person may possibly imagine that Brahman,
35869 being destitute of all such instruments, is incapable of creating the
35870 world. It is this doubt which we have to dispel. It is seen that potters,
35871 weavers, &c., who produce jars, cloth, and the like, are incapable of
35872 actually producing unless they make use of certain implements, although
35873 they may fully possess the specially required skill. Men destitute of
35874 such skill are not capable of production, even with the help of
35875 implements; those having the capacity produce by means of the
35876 instruments only. This leads to the conclusion that Brahman also,
35877 although possessing all imaginable powers, is not capable of creating
35878 the world without employing the required instrumental agencies. But
35879 before creation there existed nothing that could have assisted him, as

we know from texts such as 'Being only this was in the beginning';
'there was Nârâyana alone.' Brahman's creative agency thus cannot be
rendered plausible; and hence the primâ facie view set forth in the
earlier part of the Sûtra, 'Should it be said that (it is) not; on
account of the observation of employment (of instruments).'

This view is set aside by the latter part of the Sûtra, 'not so; for as
in the case of milk.' It is by no means a fact that every agent capable
of producing a certain effect stands in need of instruments. Milk, e.g.
and water, which have the power of producing certain effects, viz. sour
milk and ice respectively, produce these effects unaided. Analogously
Brahman also, which possesses the capacity of producing everything, may
actually do so without using instrumental aids. The 'for' in the Sûtra
is meant to point out the fact that the proving instances are generally
known, and thus to indicate the silliness of the objection. Whey and
similar ingredients are indeed sometimes mixed with milk, but not to the
end of making the milk turn sour, but merely in order to accelerate the
process and give to the sour milk a certain flavour.

25. And as in the case of the gods and so on, in (their) world.

As the gods and similar exalted beings create, each in his own world,
whatever they require by their mere volition, so the Supreme Person
creates by his mere volition the entire world. That the gods about whose
powers we know from the Veda only (not through perception) are here
quoted as supplying a proving instance, is done in order to facilitate
the comprehension of the creative power of Brahman, which is also known
through the Veda.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the observation of
employment.'

26. Or the consequence of the entire (Brahman entering into the effect),
and stultification of (Brahman's) being devoid of parts.

'Being only was this in the beginning'; 'This indeed was in the
beginning not anything'; 'The Self alone indeed was this in the
beginning'--these and other texts state that in the beginning Brahman
was one only, i.e. without parts--that means: Brahman, in its causal
state, was without parts because then all distinction of matter and
souls had disappeared. This one, non-divided, Brahman thereupon having
formed the resolution of being many divided itself into the aggregate of
material things--ether, air, and so on--and the aggregate of souls from
Brahmâ down to blades of grass. This being so, it must be held that the
entire highest Brahman entered into the effected state; that its
intelligent part divided itself into the individual souls, and its non-
intelligent part into ether, air, and so on. This however stultifies all
those often-quoted texts which declare Brahman in its causal state to be
devoid of parts. For although the cause is constituted by Brahman in so
far as having for its body matter and souls in their subtle state, and
the effect by Brahman invested with matter and souls in their gross
state; the difficulty stated above cannot be avoided, since also that
element in Brahman which is embodied is held to enter into the effect.
If, on the other hand, Brahman is without parts, it cannot become many,
and it is not possible that there should persist a part not entering
into the effected state. On the ground of these unacceptable results we
conclude that Brahman cannot be the cause.--This objection the next
Sûtra disposes of.

27. But on account of Scripture; (Brahman's possession of various
powers) being founded upon the word.

35949 The 'but' sets aside the difficulty raised. There is no
35950 inappropriateness; 'on account of Scripture.' Scripture declares on the
35951 one hand that Brahman is not made up of parts, and on the other that
35952 from it a multiform creation proceeds. And in matters vouched for by
35953 Scripture we must conform our ideas to what Scripture actually says.--
35954 But then Scripture might be capable of conveying to us ideas of things
35955 altogether self-contradictory; like as if somebody were to tell us
35956 'Water with fire'!--The Sûtra therefore adds 'on account of its being
35957 founded on the word.' As the possession, on Brahman's part, of various
35958 powers (enabling it to emit the world) rests exclusively on the
35959 authority of the word of the Veda and thus differs altogether from other
35960 matters (which fall within the sphere of the other means of knowledge
35961 also), the admission of such powers is not contrary to reason. Brahman
35962 cannot be either proved or disproved by means of generalisations from
35963 experience.

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28. And thus in the Self; for (there are) manifold (powers).

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35970 If attributes belonging to one thing were on that account to be ascribed
35971 to other things also, it would follow that attributes observed in non-
35972 sentient things, such as jars and the like, belong also to the
35973 intelligent eternal Self, which is of an altogether different kind. But
35974 that such attributes do not extend to the Self is due to the variety of
35975 the essential nature of things. This the Sûtra expresses in 'for (there
35976 are) manifold (powers).' We perceive that fire, water, and so on, which
35977 are of different kind, possess different powers, viz. heat, and so on:
35978 there is therefore nothing unreasonable in the view that the highest
35979 Brahman which differs in kind from all things observed in ordinary life
35980 should possess innumerable powers not perceived in ordinary things. Thus
35981 Parâsara also--in reply to a question founded on ordinary observation--
35982 viz. 'How can creative energy be attributed to Brahman, devoid of
35983 qualities, pure, &c.?'--declares 'Numberless powers, lying beyond the
35984 sphere of all ordinary thought, belong to Brahman, and qualify it for
35985 creation, and so on; just as heat belongs to fire.' Similarly, Scripture
35986 says, 'what was that wood, what was that tree from which they built
35987 heaven and earth?' &c. (Ri. Samh. X, 81); and 'Brahman was that wood,
35988 Brahman was that tree', and so on.--Objections founded on ordinary
35989 generalisations have no force against Brahman which differs in nature
35990 from all other things.

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29. And on account of the defects of his view also.

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35997 On his view, i.e. on the view of him who holds the theory of the
35998 Pradhâna or something similar, the imperfections observed in ordinary
35999 things would attach themselves to the Pradhâna also, since it does not
36000 differ in nature from those things. The legitimate conclusion therefore
36001 is that Brahman only which differs in nature from all other things can
36002 be held to be the general cause.

36003

36004 The Pradhâna, moreover, is without parts; how then is it possible that
36005 it should give rise to a manifold world, comprising the 'great principle,'
36006 and so on?--But there are parts of the Pradhâna, viz. Goodness,
36007 Passion, and Darkness!--This we reply necessitates the following
36008 distinction. Does the aggregate of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness
36009 constitute the Pradhâna? or is the Pradhâna the effect of those three?
36010 The latter alternative is in conflict with your own doctrine according
36011 to which the Pradhâna is cause only. It moreover contradicts the number
36012 of tattvas (viz. 24) admitted by you; and as those three gunas also have
36013 no parts one does not see how they can produce an effect. On the former
36014 alternative, the gunas not being composed of parts must be held to
36015 aggregate or join themselves without any reference to difference of
36016 space, and from such conjunction the production of gross effects cannot
36017 result.--The same objection applies to the doctrine of atoms being the

36018 general cause. For atoms, being without parts and spatial distinction of
36019 parts, can join only without any reference to such spatial distinction,
36020 and hence do not possess the power of originating effects.
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36025 30. And (the divinity is) endowed with all powers, because that is seen.
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36027 The highest divinity which is different in nature from all other things
36028 is endowed with all powers; for scriptural texts show it to be such,
36029 'His high power is revealed as manifold, as essential, and so his
36030 knowledge, force, and action' (Svet. Up. VI, 8). In the same way another
36031 text first declares the highest divinity to differ in nature from
36032 everything else, 'Free from sin, from old age, from death and grief,
36033 from hunger and thirst', and then goes on to represent it as endowed with
36034 all powers, 'realising all its wishes, realising all its intentions', &c.
36035 (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5). Compare also 'He, consisting of mind, having prana
36036 for his body, whose form is light, who realises his wishes,' &c. (Ch. Up.
36037 III, 14, 2).
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36042 31. Not, on account of the absence of organs; this has been explained
36043 (before).
36044

36045 Although the one Brahman is different from all other beings and endowed
36046 with all powers, we yet infer from the text 'Of him there is known no
36047 effect and no instrument,' that as it is destitute of instruments it
36048 cannot produce any effect.--To this objection an answer has already been
36049 given in II, 1, 27; 28, 'on account of its being founded on the word,'
36050 and 'for there are manifold (powers).' That for which the sacred word is
36051 the only means of knowledge, and which is different from all other
36052 things, is capable of producing those effects also of the instrumental
36053 means of which it is destitute. It is in this spirit that Scripture says
36054 'He sees without eyes, he hears without ears, without hands and feet he
36055 hastens and grasps' (Svet. Up. III, 19).--Here terminates the adhikarana
36056 of 'the consequence of the entire (Brahman).'
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36061 32. (Brahman is) not (the cause); on account of (the world) having the
36062 nature of what depends on a motive.
36063

36064 Although the Lord, who before creation is alone, is endowed with all
36065 kinds of powers since he differs in nature from all other beings, and
36066 hence is by himself capable of creating the world; we all the same
36067 cannot ascribe to him actual causality with regard to the world; for
36068 this manifold world displays the nature of a thing depending on a motive,
36069 and the Lord has no motive to urge him to creation. In the case of all
36070 those who enter on some activity after having formed an idea of the
36071 effect to be accomplished, there exists a motive in the form of
36072 something beneficial either to themselves or to others. Now Brahman, to
36073 whose essential nature it belongs that all his wishes are eternally
36074 fulfilled, does not attain through the creation of the world any object
36075 not attained before. Nor again is the second alternative possible. For a
36076 being, all whose wishes are fulfilled, could concern itself about others
36077 only with a view to benefitting them. No merciful divinity would create
36078 a world so full, as ours is, of evils of all kind--birth, old age, death,
36079 hell, and so on;--if it created at all, pity would move it to create a
36080 world altogether happy. Brahman thus having no possible motive cannot be
36081 the cause of the world.--This primâ facie view is disposed of in the
36082 next Sûtra.
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36087 33. But (it is) mere sport, as in ordinary life.

36088
36089 The motive which prompts Brahman--all whose wishes are fulfilled and who
36090 is perfect in himself--to the creation of a world comprising all kinds
36091 of sentient and non-sentient beings dependent on his volition, is
36092 nothing else but sport, play. We see in ordinary life how some great
36093 king, ruling this earth with its seven dvīpas, and possessing perfect
36094 strength, valour, and so on, has a game at balls, or the like, from no
36095 other motive than to amuse himself; hence there is no objection to the
36096 view that sport only is the motive prompting Brahman to the creation,
36097 sustenance, and destruction of this world which is easily fashioned by
36098 his mere will.

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36103 34. Not inequality and cruelty, on account of there being regard; for so
36104 (Scripture) declares.

36105
36106 It must indeed be admitted that the Lord, who differs in nature from all
36107 other beings, intelligent and non-intelligent, and hence possesses
36108 powers unfathomable by thought, is capable of creating this manifold
36109 world, although before creation he is one only and without parts. But
36110 the assumption of his having actually created the world would lay him
36111 open to the charge of partiality, in so far as the world contains beings
36112 of high, middle, and low station--gods, men, animals, immovable beings;
36113 and to that of cruelty, in so far as he would be instrumental in making
36114 his creatures experience pain of the most dreadful kind.--The reply to
36115 this is 'not so, on account of there being regard'; i.e. 'on account of
36116 the inequality of creation depending on the deeds of the intelligent
36117 beings, gods, and so on, about to be created.'--Sruti and Smṛiti alike
36118 declare that the connexion of the individual souls with bodies of
36119 different kinds--divine, human, animal, and so on--depends on the karman
36120 of those souls; compare 'He who performs good works becomes good, he who
36121 performs bad works becomes bad. He becomes pure by pure deeds, bad by
36122 bad deeds' (Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 5). In the same way the reverend Parāśara
36123 declares that what causes the difference in nature and status between
36124 gods, men, and so on, is the power of the former deeds of the souls
36125 about to enter into a new creation--'He (the Lord) is the operative
36126 cause only in the creation of new beings; the material cause is
36127 constituted by the potentialities of the beings to be created. The being
36128 to be embodied requires nothing but an operative cause; it is its own
36129 potentiality which leads its being into that condition of being (which
36130 it is to occupy in the new creation).' Potentiality here means karman.

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36135 35. If it be said 'not so, on account of non-distinction of deeds'; we
36136 say, 'not so, on account of beginninglessness'; this is reasonable, and
36137 it is also observed.

36138
36139 But before creation the individual souls do not exist; since Scripture
36140 teaches non-distinction 'Being only this was in the beginning.' And as
36141 then the souls do not exist, no karman can exist, and it cannot
36142 therefore be said that the inequality of creation depends on karman.--Of
36143 this objection the Sūtra disposes by saying 'on account of
36144 beginninglessness,' i.e. although the individual souls and their deeds
36145 form an eternal stream, without a beginning, yet non-distinction of them
36146 'is reasonable' (i.e. may reasonably be asserted) in so far as, previous
36147 to creation, the substance of the souls abides in a very subtle
36148 condition, destitute of names and forms, and thus incapable of being
36149 designated as something apart from Brahman, although in reality then
36150 also they constitute Brahman's body only. If it were not admitted (that
36151 the distinctions in the new creation are due to karman), it would
36152 moreover follow that souls are requited for what they have not done, and
36153 not requited for what they have done. The fact of the souls being
36154 without a beginning is observed, viz., to be stated in Scripture, 'The
36155 intelligent one is not born and dies not' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18); so also

the fact of the flow of creation going on from all eternity, 'As the creator formed sun and moon formerly.' Moreover, the text, 'Now all this was then undeveloped. It became developed by form and name' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7), states merely that the names and forms of the souls were developed, and this shows that the souls themselves existed from the beginning. Smṛiti also says, 'Dost thou know both Prakṛiti and the soul to be without beginning?' (Bha. Gī. XIII, 19.)--As Brahman thus differs in nature from everything else, possesses all powers, has no other motive than sport, and arranges the diversity of the creation in accordance with the different karman of the individual souls, Brahman alone can be the universal cause.

36. And because all the attributes are proved (to be present in Brahman).

As all those attributes required to constitute causality which have been or will be shown to be absent in the Pradhāna, the atoms, and so on, can be shown to be present in Brahman, it remains a settled conclusion that Brahman only is the cause of the world. Here terminates the adhikarana of 'that which has the nature of depending on a motive.'

SECOND PĀDA.

1. Not that which is inferred, on account of the impossibility of construction, and on account of activity.

The Sūtras have so far set forth the doctrine that the highest Brahman is the cause of the origination and so on of the world, and have refuted the objections raised by others. They now, in order to safeguard their own position, proceed to demolish the positions held by those very adversaries. For otherwise it might happen that some slow-witted persons, unaware of those other views resting on mere fallacious arguments, would imagine them possibly to be authoritative, and hence might be somewhat shaken in their belief in the Vedic doctrine. Another pāda therefore is begun to the express end of refuting the theories of others. The beginning is made with the theory of Kapila, because that theory has several features, such as the view of the existence of the effect in the cause, which are approved of by the followers of the Veda, and hence is more likely, than others, to give rise to the erroneous view of its being the true doctrine. The Sūtras I, 1, 5 and ff. have proved only that the Vedic texts do not set forth the Sāṅkhya view, while the task of the present pāda is to demolish that view itself: the Sūtras cannot therefore be charged with needless reiteration.

The outline of the Sāṅkhya doctrine is as follows. 'There is the fundamental Prakṛiti, which is not an effect; there are the seven effects of Prakṛiti, viz. the Mahat and so on, and the sixteen effects of those effects; and there is the soul, which is neither Prakṛiti nor effect'--such is the comprehensive statement of the principles. The entity called 'fundamental Prakṛiti' is constituted by the three substances called Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, (when) in a state of complete equipoise, none of the three being either in defect or in excess; the essential nature of those three consists respectively in pleasure, pain, and dullness; they have for their respective effects lightness and illumination, excitement and mobility, heaviness and obstruction; they are absolutely non-perceivable by means of the senses, and to be defined and distinguished through their effects only. Prakṛiti, consisting in the equipoise of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas is one, itself non-sentient but subserving the enjoyment and final release of the many sentient beings, eternal, all-pervading, ever active, not the effect of anything, but the one general cause. There are seven Principles which are the effects of Prakṛiti and the causal substances of everything else; these seven are the Mahat, the ahankāra, the subtle matter (tanmātra) of sound, the subtle matter of touch, the subtle matter of colour, the

36225 subtle matter of taste, and the subtle matter of smell. The ahankâra is
36226 threefold, being either modified (vaikârîka), or active (taijasa), or
36227 the originator of the elements (bhûtâdi).

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36229 The vaikârîka is of sattva-nature and the originator of the sense--
36230 organs; the bhûtâdi is of tamas--nature, and the cause of those subtle
36231 matters (tanmâtra) which in their turn are the cause of the gross
36232 elements; the taijasa is of the nature of ragas, and assists the other
36233 two. The five gross elements are the ether and so on; the five
36234 intellectual senses are hearing and so on; the five organs of action are
36235 speech and so on. With the addition of the internal organ (manas) these
36236 are the sixteen entities which are mere effects.--The soul, not being
36237 capable of any change, is not either the causal matter or the effect of
36238 anything. For the same reason it is without attributes, consisting of
36239 mere intelligence, eternal, non-active, all-pervading, and different in
36240 each body. Being incapable of change and non-active, it can neither be
36241 an agent nor an enjoyer; but although this is so, men in their confusion
36242 of mind, due to the closeness to each other of Prakriti and the soul,
36243 erroneously attribute to Prakriti the intelligence of the soul, and to
36244 the soul the activity of Prakriti--just as the redness of the rose
36245 superimposes itself on the crystal near it,--and thus consider the soul
36246 to be an 'I' and an enjoyer. Fruition thus results from ignorance, and
36247 release from knowledge of the truth. This their theory the Sâmkhyas
36248 prove by means of perception, inference, and authoritative tradition.
36249 Now with regard to those matters which are proved by perception, we
36250 Vedântins have no very special reason for dissenting from the Sâmkhyas;
36251 and what they say about their authoritative tradition, claiming to be
36252 founded on the knowledge of all-knowing persons such as Kapila, has been
36253 pretty well disproved by us in the first adhyâya. If, now, we further
36254 manage to refute the inference which leads them to assume the Pradhâna
36255 as the cause of the--world, we shall have disestablished their whole
36256 theory. We therefore proceed to give this refutation.

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36258 On this point the Sâmkhyas reason as follows. It must necessarily be
36259 admitted that the entire world has one cause only; for if effects were
36260 assumed to originate from several causes we should never arrive at an
36261 ultimate cause. Assume that parts such as e.g. threads produce a whole
36262 (i.e. in the case of threads, a piece of cloth) in the way of their
36263 being joined together by means of their six sides, which are parts of
36264 the threads. You must then further assume that the threads themselves
36265 are in the same way produced by their parts, having a similar
36266 constitution. And these parts again by their parts, until you reach the
36267 atoms; these also must be assumed to produce their immediate effects by
36268 being joined together with their six sides, for otherwise solid
36269 extension (prathiman) could not be brought about. And then the atoms
36270 also as being wholes, consisting of parts [FOOTNOTE 482:1], must be
36271 viewed as produced by their parts, and these again by their parts and so
36272 on, so that we never arrive at an ultimate cause. In order therefore to
36273 establish such an ultimate cause we must have recourse to the hypothesis
36274 of the general cause being constituted by one substance, which possesses
36275 the power of transforming itself in various different ways, without at
36276 the same time forfeiting its own essential nature, and which forms the
36277 general substrate for an infinity of different effects, from the Mahat
36278 downwards. This one general cause is the Pradhâna constituted by the
36279 equipoise of the three gunas. The reasons for the assumption of this
36280 Pradhâna are as follows:--'On account of the limitedness of particular
36281 things; of connexion (anvaya); of activity proceeding from special power;
36282 and of the difference and non-difference of cause and effect--the Non-
36283 evolved (Pradhâna) is the general cause of this many-natured Universe'
36284 (vaisvarûpya) (Sâmkhya Kâ. I, 15; 16).--The term 'vaisvarûpya' denotes
36285 that which possesses all forms, i.e. the entire world with its variously
36286 constituted parts--bodies, worlds, and so on. This world, which on
36287 account of its variegated constitution must be held to be an effect, has
36288 for its cause the Unevolved (avyakta = Prakriti), which is of the same
36289 nature as the world. Why so? Because it is an effect; for we perceive
36290 that every effect is different from its special cause--which has the
36291 same nature as the effect--and at the same time is non-different. Such
36292 effected things as e.g. a jar and a gold ornament are different from
36293 their causes, i.e. clay and gold, which have the same nature as the

effects, and at the same time non-different. Hence the manifold-natured world originates from the Pradhâna which has the same nature, and is again merged in it: the world thus has the Pradhâna alone for its cause. This Pradhâna is constituted by the equipoise of the three gunas, and thus is a cause possessing a nature equal to that of its effect, i.e. the world; for the world is of the nature of pleasure, pain, and dullness, which consist of sattva, rajas, and tamas respectively. The case is analogous to that of a jar consisting of clay; of that also the cause is none other than the substance clay. For in every case observation shows that only such causal substances as are of the same nature as the effects possess that power which is called the origination of the effect. That the general cause can be found only in the unevolved Pradhâna, which consists of the three gunas in a state of equipoise and is unlimited with regard to space as well as time, follows from the limitedness of the particular things, viz. the Mahat, the ahankâra, and so on. These latter things are limited like jars and so on, and hence incapable of originating the entire world. Hence it follows that this world, consisting of the three gunas, has for its only cause the Pradhâna, which is constituted by those three gunas in a state of equipoise.

Against this argumentation the Sûtra says, 'Not that which is inferred, on account of the impossibility of construction, and on account of activity.'--'Inference' means 'that which is inferred,' i.e. the Pradhâna. The Pradhâna postulated by you is not capable of constructing this manifold-natured world, because while itself being non-intelligent it is not guided by an intelligent being understanding its nature. Whatever is of this latter kind is incapable of producing effects; as e. g. wood and the like by themselves are not capable of constructing a palace or a carriage. As it is matter of observation that non-intelligent wood, not guided by an intelligent agent understanding its nature, cannot produce effects; and as it is observed that if guided by such an agent matter does enter on action so as to produce effects; the Pradhâna, which is not ruled by an intelligent agent, cannot be the general cause. The 'and' in the Sûtra is meant to add as a further argument that 'presence' (anvaya) has no proving force. For whiteness present in cows and so on is not invariably accompanied by the quality of being the cause of the class characteristics of cows. Nor must it be said that qualities such as whiteness, although present in the effect, may not indeed be causes, but that substances such as gold and the like which are present in certain effects are invariably accompanied by the quality of being causes, and that hence also the substances called sattva, rajas, and tamas, which are found present in all effects, are proved to be the causes of all those effects. For sattva and so on are attributes of substances, but not themselves substances. Sattva and so on are the causes of the lightness, light, &c.. belonging to substances such as earth and the like, and hence distinctive attributes of the essential nature of those substances, but they are not observed to be present in any effects in a substantial form, as clay, gold, and other substances are. It is for this reason that they are known as 'gunas.' You have further said that the world's having one cause only must be postulated in order that an ultimate cause may be reached. But as the sattva, rajas, and tamas are not one but three, you yourself do not assume one cause, and hence do not manage to arrive at an ultimate cause. For your Pradhâna consists in the equipoise of the three gunas; there are thus several causes, and you have no more an ultimate cause than others. Nor can you say that this end is accomplished through the three gunas being unlimited. For if the three gunas are all alike unlimited, and therefore omnipresent, there is nowhere a plus or minus of any of them, and as thus no inequality can result, effects cannot originate. In order to explain the origination of results it is therefore necessary to assume limitation of the gunas.

Nor is our view confirmed by those cases only in which it is clearly perceived that matter produces effects only when guided by an intelligent principle; other cases also (where the fact is not perceived with equal clearness) are in favour of our view. This the next Sûtra declares.

[FOOTNOTE 482:1. As follows from their having six sides.]

2. If it be said--like milk or water; there also (intelligence guides).

What has been said--the Sāṅkhya rejoins--as to the impossibility of the Pradhāna not guided by an intelligent principle constructing this variously constituted world, is unfounded; for the Pradhāna may be supposed to act in the same way as milk and water do. Milk, when turning into sour milk, is capable of going by itself through a series of changes: it does not therefore depend on anything else. In the same way we observe that the homogeneous water discharged from the clouds spontaneously proceeds to transform itself into the various saps and juices of different plants, such as palm trees, mango trees, wood-apple trees, lime trees, tamarind trees, and so on. In the same way the Pradhāna, of whose essential nature it is to change, may, without being guided by another agent, abide in the interval between two creations in a state of homogeneousness, and then when the time for creation comes modify itself into many various effects due to the loss of equilibrium on the part of the gunas. As has been said '(the Pradhāna acts), owing to modification, as water according to the difference of the abodes of the several gunas' (Sāṅkhya Kā. I, 16). In this way the Unevolved acts independently of anything else.

To this reasoning the Sūtra replies 'there also.' Also, in the instances of milk and water, activity is not possible in the absence of an intelligent principle, for these very cases have already been referred to as proving our position. The Sūtra II, 1, 24 (where the change of milk into sour milk is instanced) meant to prove only that a being destitute of other visible instruments of action is able to produce its own special effect, but not to disprove the view of all agency presupposing an intelligent principle. That even in water and so on an intelligent principle is present is proved by scriptural texts, 'he who dwells in water' and so on.

3. And because from the independence (of the Pradhāna) there would follow the non-existence of what is different (from creation, i.e. of the pralaya condition).

That the Pradhāna which is not guided by an intelligent principle is not the universal cause is proved also by the fact that, if we ascribe to it a power for change independent of the guidance of a Lord capable of realising all his purposes, it would follow that the pralaya state, which is different from the state of creation, would not exist; while on the other hand the guidance of the Pradhāna by a Lord explains the alternating states of creation and pralaya as the effects of his purposes. Nor can the Sāṅkhya retort that our view gives rise to similar difficulties in so far, namely, as the Lord, all whose wishes are eternally accomplished, who is free from all imperfection, &c. &c., cannot be the originator of either creation or pralaya, and as the creation of an unequal world would lay him open to the charge of mercilessness. For, as explained before, even a being perfect and complete may enter on activity for the sake of sport; and as the reason for a particular creation on the part of an all-knowing Lord may be his recognition of Prakṛiti having reached a certain special state, it is the deeds of the individual souls which bring about the inequalities in the new creation.--But if this is so, all difference of states is caused exclusively by the good and evil deeds of the individual souls; and what position remains then for a ruling Lord? Prakṛiti, impressed by the good and evil deeds of the souls, will by herself modify herself on such lines as correspond to the deserts of the individual souls; in the same way as we observe that food and drink, if either vitiated by poison or reinforced by medicinal herbs and juices, enter into new states which render them the causes of either pleasure or pain. Hence all the

36432 differences between states of creation and pralaya, as also the
36433 inequalities among created beings such as gods, men, and so on, and
36434 finally the souls reaching the condition of Release, may be credited to
36435 the Pradhâna, possessing as it does the capability of modifying itself
36436 into all possible forms!--You do not, we reply, appear to know anything
36437 about the nature of good and evil works; for this is a matter to be
36438 learned from the Sastra. The Sastra is constituted by the aggregate of
36439 words called Veda, which is handed on by an endless unbroken succession
36440 of pupils learning from qualified teachers, and raised above all
36441 suspicion of imperfections such as spring from mistake and the like. It
36442 is the Veda which gives information as to good and evil deeds, the
36443 essence of which consists in their pleasing or displeasing the Supreme
36444 Person, and as to their results, viz. pleasure and pain, which depend on
36445 the grace or wrath of the Lord. In agreement herewith the Dramidâkârya
36446 says, 'From the wish of giving rise to fruits they seek to please the
36447 Self with works; he being pleased is able to bestow fruits, this is the
36448 purport of the Sâstra.' Thus Sruti also says, 'Sacrifices and pious
36449 works which are performed in many forms, all that he bears (i.e. he
36450 takes to himself); be the navel of the Universe' (Mahânâr. Up. I, 6).
36451 And in the same spirit the Lord himself declares, 'From whom there
36452 proceed all beings, by whom all this is pervaded--worshipping him with
36453 the proper works man attains to perfection' (Bha. Gî. XVIII, 46); and
36454 'These evil and malign haters, lowest of men, I hurl perpetually into
36455 transmigrations and into demoniac wombs' (Bha. Gî. XVI, 19). The divine
36456 Supreme Person, all whose wishes are eternally fulfilled, who is all-
36457 knowing and the ruler of all, whose every purpose is immediately
36458 realised, having engaged in sport befitting his might and greatness and
36459 having settled that work is of a twofold nature, such and such works
36460 being good and such and such being evil, and having bestowed on all
36461 individual souls bodies and sense-organs capacitating them for entering
36462 on such work and the power of ruling those bodies and organs; and having
36463 himself entered into those souls as their inner Self abides within them,
36464 controlling them as an animating and cheering principle. The souls, on
36465 their side, endowed with all the powers imparted to them by the Lord and
36466 with bodies and organs bestowed by him, and forming abodes in which he
36467 dwells, apply themselves on their own part, and in accordance with their
36468 own wishes, to works either good or evil. The Lord, then, recognising
36469 him who performs good actions as one who obeys his commands, blesses him
36470 with piety, riches, worldly pleasures, and final release; while him who
36471 transgresses his commands he causes to experience the opposites of all
36472 these. There is thus no room whatever for objections founded on
36473 deficiency, on the Lord's part, of independence in his dealings with men,
36474 and the like. Nor can he be arraigned with being pitiless or merciless.
36475 For by pity we understand the inability, on somebody's part, to bear the
36476 pain of others, coupled with a disregard of his own advantage. When pity
36477 has the effect of bringing about the transgression of law on the part of
36478 the pitying person, it is in no way to his credit; it rather implies the
36479 charge of unmanliness (weakness), and it is creditable to control and
36480 subdue it. For otherwise it would follow that to subdue and chastise
36481 one's enemies is something to be blamed. What the Lord himself aims at
36482 is ever to increase happiness to the highest degree, and to this end it
36483 is instrumental that he should reprove and reject the infinite and
36484 intolerable mass of sins which accumulates in the course of beginning
36485 and endless aeons, and thus check the tendency on the part of individual
36486 beings to transgress his laws. For thus he says: 'To them ever devoted,
36487 worshipping me in love, I give that means of wisdom by which they attain
36488 to me. In mercy only to them, dwelling in their hearts, do I destroy the
36489 darkness born of ignorance with the brilliant light of knowledge' (Bha.
36490 Gî. X, 10, 11).--It thus remains a settled conclusion that the Pradhâna,
36491 which is not guided by an intelligent principle, cannot be the general
36492 cause.--Here a further objection is raised. Although Prakriti, as not
36493 being ruled by an intelligent principle, is not capable of that kind of
36494 activity which springs from effort, she may yet be capable of that kind
36495 of activity which consists in mere transformation. For we observe
36496 parallel cases; the grass and water e.g. which are consumed by a cow
36497 change on their own account into milk. In the same way, then, Prakriti
36498 may on her own account transform herself into the world.--To this the
36499 next Sûtra replies.
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4. Nor like grass and so on; because (milk) does not exist elsewhere.

This argumentation does not hold good; for as grass and the like do not transform themselves without the guidance of an intelligent principle, your proving instance is not established.--But why is it not established?-- 'Because it does not exist elsewhere.' If grass, water and so on changed into milk even when consumed by a bull or when not consumed at all, then indeed it might be held that they change without the guidance of an intelligent principle. But nothing of the kind takes place, and hence we conclude that it is the intelligent principle only which turns the grass eaten by the cow into milk.--This point has been set forth above under Sûtra 3; the present Sûtra is meant to emphasise and particularise it.

5. And if you say--as the man and the stone; thus also.

Here the following view might be urged. Although the soul consists of mere intelligence and is inactive, while the Pradhâna is destitute of all power of thought; yet the non-sentient Pradhâna may begin to act owing to the mere nearness of the soul. For we observe parallel instances. A man blind but capable of motion may act in some way, owing to the nearness to him of some lame man who has no power of motion but possesses good eyesight and assists the blind man with his intelligence. And through the nearness of the magnetic stone iron moves. In the same way the creation of the world may result from the connexion of Prakriti and the soul. As has been said, 'In order that the soul may know the Pradhâna and become isolated, the connexion of the two takes place like that of the lame and the blind; and thence creation springs' (Sânkhya Kâ. 21). This means--to the end that the soul may experience the Pradhâna, and for the sake of the soul's emancipation, the Pradhâna enters on action at the beginning of creation, owing to the nearness of the soul.

To this the Sûtra replies 'thus also.' This means--the inability of the Pradhâna to act remains the same, in spite of these instances. The lame man is indeed incapable of walking, but he possesses various other powers--he can see the road and give instructions regarding it; and the blind man, being an intelligent being, understands those instructions and directs his steps accordingly. The magnet again possesses the attribute of moving towards the iron and so on. The soul on the other hand, which is absolutely inactive, is incapable of all such changes. As, moreover, the mere nearness of the soul to the Pradhâna is something eternal, it would follow that the creation also is eternal. If, on the other hand, the soul is held to be eternally free, then there can be no bondage and no release.

6. And on account of the impossibility of the relation of principal (and subordinate) matter.

You Sâmkhyas maintain that the origination of the world results from a certain relation between principal and subordinate entities which depends on the relative inferiority and superiority of the gunas-- 'according to the difference of the abodes of the several gunas' (Sânkhya Kâ. I, 16).

But, as in the pralaya state the three gunas are in a state of equipoise, none of them being superior or inferior to the others, that relation of superiority and subordination cannot then exist, and hence the world cannot originate. Should it, on the other hand, be maintained that even in the pralaya state there is a certain inequality, it would follow therefrom that creation is eternal.

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7. And if another inference be made (the result remains unchanged), on account of (the Pradhâna) being destitute of the power of a knowing subject.

Even if the Pradhâna were inferred by some reasoning different from the arguments so far refuted by us, our objections would remain in force because, anyhow, the Pradhâna is devoid of the power of a cognising subject. The Pradhâna thus cannot be established by any mode of inference.

8. And even if it be admitted; on account of the absence of a purpose.

Even if it were admitted that the Pradhâna is established by Inference, the Sâmkhya theory could not be accepted for the reason that the Pradhâna is without a purpose. For, according to the view expressed in the passage, 'In order that the soul may know the Pradhâna and become isolated' (Sâmkhya Kâ. I, 21), the purpose of the Pradhâna is fruition and final release on the part of the soul; but both these are impossible. For, as the soul consists of pure intelligence, is inactive, changeless, and spotless, and hence eternally emancipated, it is capable neither of fruition which consists in consciousness of Prakriti, nor of Release which consists in separation from Prakriti. If, on the other hand, it be held that the soul constituted as described is, owing to the mere nearness of Prakriti, capable of fruition, i.e. of being conscious of pleasure and pain, which are special modifications of Prakriti, it follows that, as Prakriti is ever near, the soul will never accomplish emancipation.

9. And (it is) objectionable on account of the contradictions.

The Sâmkhya-system, moreover, labours from many internal contradictions.-- The Sâmkhyas hold that while Prakriti is for the sake of another and the object of knowledge and fruition, the soul is independent, an enjoying and knowing agent, and conscious of Prakriti; that the soul reaches isolation through the instrumentality of Prakriti only, and that as its nature is pure, permanent, unchanging consciousness, absence of all activity and isolation belong to that nature; that for this reason the accomplishing of the means of bondage and release and of release belong to Prakriti only; and that, owing to Prakriti's proximity to the unchanging non-active soul, Prakriti, by a process of mutual superimposition (adhyâsa), works towards the creation of a world and subserves the purposes of the soul's fruition and emancipation.--'Since the aggregate of things is for the sake of another; since there is an opposite of the three gunas and the rest; since there is superintendence; since there is an experiencing subject; and since there is activity for the sake of isolation; the soul exists' (Sâmkhya Kâ. 17); 'And from that contrast the soul is proved to be a witness, isolated, neutral, cognising and inactive' (18).--And after having stated that the activity of the Pradhâna is for the purpose of the release of the Self, the text says, 'therefore no (soul) is either bound or released, nor does it migrate; it is Prakriti which, abiding in various beings, is bound and released and migrates' (62). And 'From this connexion therewith (i.e. with the soul) the non-intelligent appears as intelligent; and although all agency belongs to the gunas, the indifferent (soul) becomes an agent. In order that the soul may know the Pradhâna and become isolated, the connexion of the two takes place like that of the lame and the blind; and thence creation springs' (20, 21).--Now to that which is eternally unchanging, non-active and isolated, the attributes of being a witness and an enjoying and cognising agent can in no way belong. Nor also can such a being be subject to error resting on superimposition; for error

36639 and superimposition both are of the nature of change. And, on the other
36640 hand, they also cannot belong to Prakriti, since they are attributes of
36641 intelligent beings. For by superimposition we understand the attribution,
36642 on the part of an intelligent being, of the qualities of one thing to
36643 another thing; and this is the doing of an intelligent being, and
36644 moreover a change. Nor is it possible that superimposition and the like
36645 should take place in the soul only if it is in approximation to Prakriti.--
36646 They may take place just on account of the non-changing nature of the
36647 soul!--Then, we reply, they would take place permanently. And that mere
36648 proximity has no effective power we have already shown under II, 1, 4.
36649 And if it is maintained that it is Prakriti only that migrates, is bound
36650 and released, how then can she be said to benefit the soul, which is
36651 eternally released? That she does so the Sâmkhyas distinctly assert, 'By
36652 manifold means Prakriti, helpful and endowed with the gunas, without any
36653 benefit to herself, accomplishes the purpose of the soul, which is
36654 thankless and not composed of the gunas' (Sâmkhya Kâ. 60).--The Sâmkhyas
36655 further teach that Prakriti, on being seen by any soul in her true
36656 nature, at once retires from that soul--'As a dancer having exhibited
36657 herself on the stage withdraws from the soul, so Prakriti withdraws from
36658 the soul when she has manifested herself to it' (59); 'My opinion is
36659 that there exists nothing more sensitive than Prakriti, who knowing "I
36660 have been seen" does not again show itself to the soul' (61). But this
36661 doctrine also is inappropriate. For, as the soul is eternally released
36662 and above all change, it never sees Prakriti, nor does it attribute to
36663 itself her qualities; and Prakriti herself does not see herself since
36664 she is of non-intelligent nature; nor can she wrongly impute to herself
36665 the soul's seeing of itself as her own seeing of herself, for she
36666 herself is non-intelligent and the soul is incapable of that change
36667 which consists in seeing or knowing.--Let it then be said that the
36668 'seeing' means nothing more than the proximity of Prakriti to the soul!--
36669 But this also does not help you; for, as said above, from that there
36670 would follow eternal seeing, since the two are in eternal proximity.
36671 Moreover, the ever unchanging soul is not capable of an approximation
36672 which does not form an element of its unchanging nature.--Moreover, if
36673 you define the seeing as mere proximity and declare this to be the cause
36674 of Release, we point out that it equally is the cause of bondage--so
36675 that bondage and release would both be permanent.--Let it then be said
36676 that what causes bondage is wrong seeing--while intuition of the true
36677 nature of things is the cause of Release!--But as both these kinds of
36678 seeing are nothing but proximity, it would follow that both take place
36679 permanently. And if, on the other hand, the proximity of Soul and
36680 Prakriti were held not to be permanent, then the cause of such proximity
36681 would have to be assigned, and again the cause of that, and so on _ad
36682 infinitum_.--Let us then, to escape from these difficulties, define
36683 proximity as nothing more than the true nature of soul and Prakriti!--As
36684 the true nature is permanent, we reply, it would follow therefrom that
36685 bondage and release would be alike permanent.--On account of all these
36686 contradictory views the system of the Sâmkhyas is untenable.

36687
36688 We finally remark that the arguments here set forth by us at the same
36689 time prove the untenableness of the view of those who teach that there
36690 is an eternally unchanging Brahman whose nature is pure, non-differenced
36691 intelligence, and which by being conscious of Nescience experiences
36692 unreal bondage and release. For those philosophers can show no more than
36693 the Sâmkhyas do how their Brahman can be conscious of Nescience, can be
36694 subject to adhyâsa, and so on. There is, however, the following
36695 difference between the two theories. The Sâmkhyas, in order to account
36696 for the definite individual distribution of birth, death, and so on,
36697 assume a plurality of souls. The Vedântins, on the other hand, do not
36698 allow even so much, and their doctrine is thus all the more irrational.
36699 The assertion that there is a difference (in favour of the Vedântins)
36700 between the two doctrines, in so far as the Vedântins hold Prakriti to
36701 be something unreal, while the Sâmkhyas consider it to be real, is
36702 unfounded; for pure, homogeneous intelligence, eternally non-changing,
36703 cannot possibly be conscious of anything different from itself, whether
36704 it be unreal or real. And if that thing is held to be unreal, there
36705 arise further difficulties, owing to its having to be viewed as the
36706 object of knowledge, of refutation, and so on.

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36708 Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the impossibility of construction.'

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36713 10. Or in the same way as the big and long from the short and the atomic.

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36715 We have shown that the theory of the Pradhâna being the universal cause
36716 is untenable, since it rests on fallacious arguments, and suffers from
36717 inner contradictions. We shall now prove that the view of atoms
36718 constituting the universal cause is untenable likewise. 'Or in the same
36719 way as the big and long from the short and the atomic' 'Is untenable'
36720 must be supplied from the preceding Sûtra; 'or' has to be taken in the
36721 sense of 'and.' The sense of the Sûtra is--in the same way as the big
36722 and long, i.e. as the theory of ternary compounds originating from the
36723 short and the atomic, i.e. from binary compounds and simple atoms is
36724 untenable, so everything else which they (the Vaiseshikas) maintain is
36725 untenable; or, in other words--as the theory of the world originating
36726 from atoms through binary compounds is untenable, so everything else is
36727 likewise untenable.--Things consisting of parts, as e.g. a piece of
36728 cloth, are produced by their parts, e.g. threads, being joined by means
36729 of the six sides which are parts of those parts. Analogously the atoms
36730 also must be held to originate binary compounds in the way of combining
36731 by means of their six sides; for if the atoms possessed no distinction
36732 of parts (and hence filled no space), a group of even a thousand atoms
36733 would not differ in extension from a single atom, and the different
36734 kinds of extension--minuteness, shortness, bigness, length, &c.--would
36735 never emerge. If, on the other hand, it is admitted that the atoms also
36736 have distinct sides, they have parts and are made up of those parts, and
36737 those parts again are made up of their parts, and so on in infinitum.--
36738 But, the Vaiseshika may object, the difference between a mustard seed
36739 and a mountain is due to the paucity of the constituent parts on the one
36740 hand, and their multitude on the other. If, now, it be held that the
36741 atom itself contains an infinity of parts, the mustard seed and the
36742 mountain alike will contain an infinity of parts, and thus their
36743 inequality cannot be accounted for. We must therefore assume that there
36744 is a limit of subdivision (i.e. that there are real atoms which do not
36745 themselves consist of parts).--Not so, we reply. If the atoms did not
36746 possess distinct parts, there could originate no extension greater than
36747 the extension of one atom (as already shown), and thus neither mustard
36748 seed nor mountain would ever be brought about.--But what, then, are we
36749 to do to get out of this dilemma?--You have only to accept the Vedic
36750 doctrine of the origination of the world.

36751

36752 Others explain the above Sûtra as meant to refute an objection against
36753 the doctrine of Brahman being the general cause. But this does not suit
36754 the arrangement of the Sûtras, and would imply a meaningless iteration.
36755 The objections raised by some against the doctrine of Brahman have been
36756 disposed of in the preceding pâda, and the present pâda is devoted to
36757 the refutation of other theories. And that the world admits of being
36758 viewed as springing from an intelligent principle such as Brahman was
36759 shown at length under II, 1, 4. The sense of the Sûtra, therefore, is
36760 none other than what we stated above.--But what are those other
36761 untenable views to which the Sûtra refers?--To this question the next
36762 Sûtra replies.

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36767 11. On both assumptions also there is no motion, and thence non-being
36768 (of the origination of the world).

36769

36770 The atomic theory teaches that the world is produced by the successive
36771 formation of compounds, binary, ternary, and so on, due to the
36772 aggregation of atoms--such aggregation resulting from the motion of the
36773 atoms. The primary motion of the atoms--which are the cause of the
36774 origination of the entire world--is assumed to be brought about by the
36775 unseen principle (adrishta), 'The upward flickering of fire, the sideway
36776 motion of air, the primary motion on the part of atoms and of the manas

36777 are caused by the unseen principle.'--Is then, we ask, this primary
36778 motion of the atoms caused by an adrishta residing in them, or by an
36779 adrishta residing in the souls? Neither alternative is possible. For the
36780 unseen principle which is originated by the good and evil deeds of the
36781 individual souls cannot possibly reside in the atoms; and if it could,
36782 the consequence would be that the atoms would constantly produce the
36783 world. Nor again can the adrishta residing in the souls be the cause of
36784 motion originating in the atoms.--Let it then be assumed that motion
36785 originates in the atoms, owing to their being in contact with the souls
36786 in which the adrishta abides!--If this were so, we reply, it would
36787 follow that the world would be permanently created, for the adrishta, of
36788 the souls forms an eternal stream.--But the adrishta requires to be
36789 matured in order to produce results. The adrishtas of some souls come to
36790 maturity in the same state of existence in which the deeds were
36791 performed; others become mature in a subsequent state of existence only;
36792 and others again do not become mature before a new Kalpa has begun. It
36793 is owing to this dependence on the maturation of the adrishtas that the
36794 origination of the world does not take place at all times.--But this
36795 reasoning also we cannot admit. For there is nothing whatever to
36796 establish the conclusion that all the different adrishtas which spring
36797 from the manifold actions performed at different times, without any
36798 previous agreement, by the infinite multitude of individual Selfs should
36799 reach a state of uniform maturation at one and the same moment of time
36800 (so as to give rise to a new creation). Nor does this view of yours
36801 account for the fact of the entire world being destroyed at the same
36802 time, and remaining in a state of non-maturation for the period of a
36803 dviparârdha.--Nor can you say that the motion of the atoms is due to
36804 their conjunction with (souls whose) adrishta possesses certain specific
36805 qualities imparted to them by the will of the Lord; for by mere
36806 inference the existence of a Lord cannot be proved, as we have shown
36807 under I, 1. The origin of the world cannot, therefore, be due to any
36808 action on the part of the atoms.

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36813 12. And because owing to the acknowledgment of samavâya, there results a
36814 _regressus in infinitum_ from equality.

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36816 The Vaiseshika doctrine is further untenable on account of the
36817 acknowledgment of samavâya.--Why so?--Because the samavâya also, like
36818 part, quality, and generic characteristics, requires something else to
36819 establish it, and that something else again requires some further thing
36820 to establish it--from which there arises an infinite regress. To explain.
36821 The Vaiseshikas assume the so-called samavâya relation, defining it as
36822 'that connexion which is the cause of the idea "this is here," in the
36823 case of things permanently and inseparably connected, and standing to
36824 each other in the relation of abode and thing abiding in the abode.' Now,
36825 if such a samavâya relation is assumed in order to account for the fact
36826 that things observed to be inseparably connected--as, e.g., class
36827 characteristics are inseparably connected with the individuals to which
36828 they belong--are such, i.e. inseparably connected, a reason has also to
36829 be searched for why the samavâya, which is of the same nature as those
36830 things (in so far, namely, as it is also inseparably connected with the
36831 things connected by it), is such; and for that reason, again, a further
36832 reason has to be postulated, and so on, _in infinitum_. Nor can it be
36833 said that inseparable connexion must be assumed to constitute the
36834 essential nature of samavâya (so that no further reason need be demanded
36835 for its inseparable connexion); for on this reasoning you would have to
36836 assume the same essential nature for class characteristics, qualities,
36837 and so on (which would render the assumption of a samavâya needless for
36838 them also). Nor is it a legitimate proceeding to postulate an unseen
36839 entity such as the samavâya is, and then to assume for it such and such
36840 an essential nature.--These objections apply to the samavâya whether it
36841 be viewed as eternal or non-eternal. The next Sûtra urges a further
36842 objection against it if viewed as eternal.

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13. And because (the world also) would thus be eternal.

The samavâya is a relation, and if that relation is eternal that to which the relation belongs must also be eternal, so that we would arrive at the unacceptable conclusion that the world is eternal.

14. And on account of (the atoms) having colour and so on, the reverse (takes place); as it is observed.

From the view that the atoms of four kinds--viz. of earth or water or fire or air--possess colour, taste, smell, and touch, it would follow that the atoms are non-eternal, gross, and made up of parts--and this is the reverse of what the Vaiseshikas actually teach as to their atoms, viz. that they are eternal, subtle, and not made up of parts. For things possessing colour, e.g. jars, are non-eternal, because it is observed that they are produced from other causes of the same, i.e. non-eternal nature, and so on. To a non-perceived thing which is assumed in accordance with what is actually perceived, we may not ascribe any attributes that would be convenient to us; and it is in accordance with actual experience that you Vaiseshikas assume the atoms to possess colour and other qualities. Hence your theory is untenable.--Let it then, in order to avoid this difficulty, be assumed that the atoms do not possess colour and other sensible qualities. To this alternative the next Sûtra refers.

15. And as there are objections in both cases.

A difficulty arises not only on the view of the atoms having colour and other sensible qualities, but also on the view of their being destitute of those qualities. For as the qualities of effected things depend on the qualities of their causes, earth, water, and so on, would in that case be destitute of qualities. And if to avoid this difficulty, it be held that the atoms do possess qualities, we are again met by the difficulty stated in the preceding Sûtra. Objections thus arising in both cases, the theory of the atoms is untenable.

16. And as it is not accepted, it is altogether disregarded.

Kapila's doctrine, although to be rejected on account of it's being in conflict with Scripture and sound reasoning, yet recommends itself to the adherents of the Veda on some accounts--as e.g. its view of the existence of the effect in the cause. Kanâda's theory, on the other hand, of which no part can be accepted and which is totally destitute of proof, cannot but be absolutely disregarded by all those who aim at the highest end of man.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the big and long'.

17. Even on the aggregate with its two causes, there is non-establishment of that.

We so far have refuted the Vaiseshikas, who hold the doctrine of atoms constituting the general cause. Now the followers of Buddha also teach that the world originates from atoms, and the Sûtras therefore proceed to declare that on their view also the origination, course, and so on, of the world cannot rationally be accounted for. These Bauddhas belong to four different classes. Some of them hold that all outward things, which are either elements (bhûta) or elemental (bhautika), and all

36915 inward things which are either mind (kitta) or mental (kaitta),--all
36916 these things consisting of aggregates of the atoms of earth, water, fire
36917 and air--are proved by means of Perception as well as Inference. Others
36918 hold that all external things, earth, and so on, are only to be inferred
36919 from ideas (vijñāna). Others again teach that the only reality are ideas
36920 to which no outward things correspond; the (so-called) outward things
36921 are like the things seen in dreams. The three schools mentioned agree in
36922 holding that the things admitted by them have a momentary existence only,
36923 and do not allow that, in addition to the things mentioned, viz.
36924 elements and elemental things, mind and mental things, there are certain
36925 further independent entities such as ether, Self, and so on.--Others
36926 finally assert a universal void, i.e. the non-reality of everything.

36927
36928 The Sûtras at first dispose of the theory of those who acknowledge the
36929 real existence of external things. Their opinion is as follows. The
36930 atoms of earth which possess the qualities of colour, taste, touch and
36931 smell; the atoms of water which possess the qualities of colour, taste
36932 and touch; the atoms of fire which possess the qualities of colour and
36933 touch; and the atoms of air which possess the quality of touch only,
36934 combine so as to constitute earth, water, fire and air; and out of the
36935 latter there originate the aggregates called bodies, sense-organs, and
36936 objects of sense-organs. And that flow of ideas, which assumes the form
36937 of the imagination of an apprehending agent abiding within the body, is
36938 what constitutes the so-called Self. On the agencies enumerated there
36939 rests the entire empiric world.--On this view the Sûtra remarks, 'Even
36940 on the aggregate with its two causes, there is non-establishment of
36941 that'. That aggregate which consists of earth and the other elements and
36942 of which the atoms are the cause; and that further aggregate which
36943 consists of bodies, sense-organs and objects, and of which the elements
36944 are the cause--on neither of these two aggregates with their twofold
36945 causes can there be proved establishment of that, i.e. can the
36946 origination of that aggregate which we call the world be rationally
36947 established. If the atoms as well as earth and the other elements are
36948 held to have a momentary existence only, when, we ask, do the atoms
36949 which perish within a moment, and the elements, move towards combination,
36950 and when do they combine? and when do they become the 'objects of states
36951 of consciousness'? and when do they become the abodes of the activities
36952 of appropriation, avoidance and so on (on the part of agents)? and what
36953 is the cognising Self? and with what objects does it enter into contact
36954 through the sense-organs? and which cognising Self cognises which
36955 objects, and at what time? and which Self proceeds to appropriate which
36956 objects, and at what time? For the sentient subject has perished, and
36957 the object of sensation has perished; and the cognising subject has
36958 perished, and the object cognised has perished. And how can one subject
36959 cognise what has been apprehended through the senses of another? and how
36960 is one subject to take to itself what another subject has cognised? And
36961 should it be said that each stream of cognitions is one (whereby a kind
36962 of unity of the cognising subject is claimed to be established), yet
36963 this affords no sufficient basis for the ordinary notions and activities
36964 of life, since the stream really is nothing different from the
36965 constituent parts of the stream (all of which are momentary and hence
36966 discrete).--That in reality the Ego constitutes the Self and is the
36967 knowing subject, we have proved previously.

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36972 18. If it be said that (this) is to be explained through successive
36973 causality; we say 'no,' on account of their not being the causes of
36974 aggregation.

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36976 'If it be said that through the successive causality of Nescience and so
36977 on, the formation of aggregates and other matters may be satisfactorily
36978 accounted for.' To explain. Although all the entities (acknowledged by
36979 the Bauddhas) have a merely momentary existence, yet all that is
36980 accounted for by avidyâ. Avidyâ means that conception, contrary to
36981 reality, by which permanency, and so on, are ascribed to what is
36982 momentary, and so on. Through avidyâ there are originated desire,
36983 aversion, &c., which are comprised under the general term 'impression'

36984 (samskāra); and from those there springs cognition (vijñāna) which
36985 consists in the 'kindling' of mind; from that mind (kitta) and what is
36986 of the nature of mind (kaiṭṭa) and the substances possessing colour, and
36987 so on, viz. earth, water, &c. From that again the six sense-organs,
36988 called 'the six abodes'; from that the body, called 'touch' (sparsa);
36989 from that sensation (vedanā), and so on. And from that again avidyā, and
36990 the whole series as described; so that there is an endlessly revolving
36991 cycle, in which avidyā, and so on, are in turn the causes of the links
36992 succeeding them. Now all this is not possible without those aggregates
36993 of the elements and elemental things which are called earth, and so on;
36994 and thereby the rationality of the formation of those aggregates is
36995 proved.

36996
36997 To this the second half of the Sūtra replies 'Not so, on account of
36998 (their) not being the causes of aggregation'.--This cannot rationally be
36999 assumed, because avidyā, and so on, cannot be operative causes with
37000 regard to the aggregation of earth and the other elements and elemental
37001 things. For avidyā, which consists in the view of permanency and so on,
37002 belonging to what is non-permanent, and desire, aversion and the rest,
37003 which are originated by avidyā cannot constitute the causes of (other)
37004 momentary things entering into aggregation; not any more than the
37005 mistaken idea of shell-silver is the cause of the aggregation of things
37006 such as shells. Moreover, on the Bauddha doctrine, he who views a
37007 momentary thing as permanent himself perishes at the same moment; who
37008 then is the subject in whom the so-called samskāras, i.e. desire,
37009 aversion, and so on, originate? Those who do not acknowledge one
37010 permanent substance constituting the abode of the samskāras have no
37011 right to assume the continuance of the samskāras.

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37016 19. And on account of the cessation of the preceding one on the
37017 origination of the subsequent one.

37018
37019 For the following reason also the origination of the world cannot be
37020 accounted for on the view of the momentariness of all existence. At the
37021 time when the subsequent momentary existence originates, the preceding
37022 momentary existence has passed away, and it cannot therefore stand in a
37023 causal relation towards the subsequent one. For if non-existence had
37024 causal power, anything might originate at any time at any place.--Let it
37025 then be said that what constitutes a cause is nothing else but existence
37026 in a previous moment.--But, if this were so, the previous momentary
37027 existence of a jar, let us say, would be the cause of all things
37028 whatever that would be met with in this threefold world in the
37029 subsequent moment--cows, buffaloes, horses, chairs, stones, &c!--Let us
37030 then say that a thing existing in a previous moment is the cause only of
37031 those things, existing in the subsequent moment, which belong to the
37032 same species.--But from this again it would follow that one jar existing
37033 in the previous moment would be the cause of all jars, to be met with in
37034 any place, existing in the following moment!--Perhaps you mean to say
37035 that one thing is the cause of one subsequent thing only. But how then
37036 are we to know which thing is the cause of which one subsequent thing?--
37037 Well then I say that the momentarily existing jar which exists in a
37038 certain place is the cause of that one subsequent momentary jar only
37039 which exists at the very same place!--Very good, then you hold that a
37040 place is something permanent! (while yet your doctrine is that there is
37041 nothing permanent).--Moreover as, on your theory, the thing which has
37042 entered into contact with the eye or some other sense-organ does no
37043 longer exist at the time when the idea originates, nothing can ever be
37044 the object of a cognition.

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37049 20. There not being (a cause), there results contradiction of the
37050 admitted principle; otherwise simultaneousness.

37051
37052 If it be said that the effect may originate even when a cause does not

exist, then--as we have pointed out before--anything might originate anywhere and at any time. And not only would the origination of the effect thus remain unexplained, but an admitted principle would also be contradicted. For you hold the principle that there are four causes bringing about the origination of a cognition, viz. the adhipati-cause, the sahakâri-cause, the âlambhana-cause, and the samanantara-cause. The term adhipati denotes the sense-organs.--And if, in order to avoid opposition to an acknowledged principle, it be assumed that the origination of a further momentary jar takes place at the time when the previous momentary jar still exists, then it would follow that the two momentary jars, the causal one and the effected one, would be perceived together; but as a matter of fact they are not so perceived. And, further, the doctrine of general momentariness would thus be given up. And should it be said that (this is not so, but that) momentariness remains, it would follow that the connexion of the sense-organ with the object and the cognition are simultaneous.

21. There is non-establishment of pratisankhyâ and apratisankhyâ destruction, on account of non-interruption.

So far the hypothesis of origination from that which is not has been refuted. The present Sûtra now goes on to declare that also the absolute (niranvaya) destruction of that which is cannot rationally be demonstrated. Those who maintain the momentariness of all things teach that there are two kinds of destruction, one of a gross kind, which consists in the termination of a series of similar momentary existences, and is capable of being perceived as immediately resulting from agencies such as the blow of a hammer (breaking a jar, e.g.); and the other of a subtle kind, not capable of being perceived, and taking place in a series of similar momentary existences at every moment. The former is called pratisankhyâ-destruction; the latter apratisankhyâ-destruction.--Both these kinds of destruction are not possible.--Why?--On account of the non-interruption, i.e. on account of the impossibility of the complete destruction of that which is. The impossibility of such destruction was proved by us under II, 1, 14, where we showed that origination and destruction mean only the assumption of new states on the part of one and the same permanent substance, and therefrom proved the non-difference of the effect from the cause.--Here it may possibly be objected that as we see that a light when extinguished passes away absolutely, such absolute destruction may be inferred in other cases also. But against this we point out that in the case of a vessel of clay being smashed we perceive that the material, i.e. clay, continues to exist, and that therefrom destruction is ascertained to be nothing else but the passing over of a real substance into another state. The proper assumption, therefore, is that the extinguished light also has passed over into a different state, and that in that state it is no longer perceptible may be explained by that state being an extremely subtle one.

22. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case.

It has been shown that neither origination from nothing, as held by the advocates of general momentariness, is possible; nor the passing away into nothing on the part of the thing originated. The acknowledgment of either of these views gives rise to difficulties. If the effect originates from nothing, it is itself of the nature of nothing; for it is observed that effects share the nature of what they originate from. Pitchers and ornaments, e.g. which are produced from clay and gold respectively, possess the nature of their causal substances. But you hold yourself that the world is not seen to be of the nature of nothingness; and certainly it is not observed to be so.--Again, if that which is underwent absolute destruction, it would follow that after one moment the entire world would pass away into nothingness; and

subsequently the world again originating from nothingness, it would follow that, as shown above, it would itself be of the nature of nothingness (i.e. there would no longer be a real world).--There being thus difficulties on both views, origination and destruction cannot take place as described by you.

23. And in the case of space also, on account of there being no difference.

In order to prove the permanency of external and internal things, we have disproved the view that the two forms of destruction called pratisankhyâ and apratisankhyâ mean reduction of an existing thing to nothing. This gives us an opportunity to disprove the view of Ether (space) being likewise a mere irrational non-entity, as the Bauddhas hold it to be. Ether cannot be held to be a mere irrational non-entity, because, like those things which are admitted to be positive existences, i.e. earth, and so on, it is proved by consciousness not invalidated by any means of proof. For the formation of immediate judgments such as 'here a hawk flies, and there a vulture,' implies our being conscious of ether as marking the different places of the flight of the different birds. Nor is it possible to hold that Space is nothing else but the non-existence (abhâva) of earth, and so on; for this view collapses as soon as set forth in definite alternatives. For whether we define Space as the antecedent and subsequent non-existence of earth, and so on, or as their mutual non-existence, or as their absolute non-existence--on none of these alternatives we attain the proper idea of Space. If, in the first place, we define it as the antecedent and subsequent non-existence of earth, and so on, it will follow that, as the idea of Space can thus not be connected with earth and other things existing at the present moment, the whole world is without Space.

If, in the second place, we define it as the mutual non-existence of earth, and so on, it will follow that, as such mutual non-existence inheres in the things only which stand towards each other in the relation of mutual non-existence, there is no perception of Space in the intervals between those things (while as a matter of fact there is). And, in the third place, absolute non-existence of earth, and so on, cannot of course be admitted. And as non-existence (abhâva) is clearly conceived as a special state of something actually existing, Space even if admitted to be of the nature of abhâva, would not on that account be a futile non-entity (something 'tukcha' or 'nirupâkhya').

24. And on account of recognition.

We return to the proof of the, previously mooted, permanence of things. The 'anusmriti' of the Sûtra means cognition of what was previously perceived, i.e. recognition. It is a fact that all things which were perceived in the past may be recognised, such recognition expressing itself in the form 'this is just that (I knew before).' Nor must you say that this is a mere erroneous assumption of oneness due to the fact of the thing now perceived being similar to the thing perceived before, as in the case of the flame (where a succession of flames continually produced anew is mistaken for one continuous flame); for you do not admit that there is one permanent knowing subject that could have that erroneous idea. What one person has perceived, another cannot judge to be the same as, or similar to, what he is perceiving himself. If therefore you hold that there is an erroneous idea of oneness due to the perception of similarity residing in different things perceived at different times, you necessarily must acknowledge oneness on the part of the cognising subject. In the case of the flame there is a valid means of knowledge to prove that there really is a succession of similar flames, but in the case of the jar, we are not aware of such a means, and we therefore have no right to assume that recognition is due to the

similarity of many successive jars.---Perhaps you will here argue as follows. The momentariness of jars and the like is proved by Perception as well as Inference. Perception in the first place presents as its object the present thing which is different from non-present things, in the same way as it presents the blue thing as different from the yellow; it is in this way that we know the difference of the present thing from the past and the future. Inference again proceeds as follows--jars and the like are momentary because they produce effects and have existence (sattva); what is non-momentary, such as the horn of a hare, does not produce effects and does not possess existence. We therefore conclude from the existence of the last momentary jar that the preceding jar-existences also are perishable, just because they are momentary existences like the existence of the last jar.--But both this perception and this inference have already been disproved by what was said above about the impossibility of momentary existences standing to one another in the relation of cause and effect. Moreover, that difference of the present object from the non-present object which is intimated by Perception does not prove the present object to be a different thing (from the past object of Perception), but merely its being connected with the present time. This does not prove it to be a different thing, for the same thing can be connected with different times. The two reasons again which were said to prove the momentariness of jars are invalid because they may be made to prove just the contrary of what they are alleged to prove. For we may argue as follows--From existence and from their having effects it follows that jars, and so on, are permanent; for whatever is non-permanent, is non-existent, and does not produce effects, as e.g. the horn of a hare. The capacity of producing effects can in fact be used only to prove non-momentariness on the part of jars, and so on; for as things perishing within a moment are not capable of acting, they are not capable of producing effects. Further, as it is seen in the case of the last momentary existence that its destruction is due to a visible cause (viz. the blow of a hammer or the like), the proper conclusion is that also the other momentary jars (preceding the last one) require visible causes for their destruction; and (as no such causes are seen, it follows that) the jar is permanent and continuous up to the time when a destructive cause, such as the blow of a hammer, supervenes. Nor can it be said that hammers and the like are not the causes of destruction, but only the causes of the origination of a new series of momentary existences dissimilar to the former ones--in the case of the jar, e.g. of a series of momentary fragments of a jar; for we have proved before that the destruction of jars, and so on, means nothing but their passing over into a different condition, e.g. that of fragments. And even if destruction were held to be something different from the origination of fragments, it would yet be reasonable to infer, on the ground of immediate succession in time, that the cause of the destruction is the blow of the hammer.

Hence it is impossible to deny in any way the permanency of things as proved by the fact of recognition. He who maintains that recognition which has for its object the oneness of a thing connected with successive points of time has for its objects different things, might as well say that several cognitions of, let us say, blue colour have for their object something different from blue colour. Moreover, for him who maintains the momentariness of the cognising subject and of the objects of cognition, it would be difficult indeed to admit the fact of Inference which presupposes the ascertainment and remembrance of general propositions. He would in fact not be able to set forth the reason required to prove his assertion that things are momentary; for the speaker perishes in the very moment when he states the proposition to be proved, and another person is unable to complete what has been begun by another and about which he himself does not know anything.

25. Not from non-entity, this not being observed.

So far we have set forth the arguments refuting the views of the Vaibhāshikas as well as the Sautrāntikas--both which schools maintain

the reality of external things.--Now the Sautrântika comes forward and opposes one of the arguments set forth by us above, viz. that, on the view of general momentariness, nothing can ever become an object of cognition, since the thing which enters into connexion with the sense-organ is no longer in existence when the cognition originates.--It is not, he says, the persistence of the thing up to the time of cognition which is the cause of its becoming an object of cognition. To be an object of cognition means nothing more than to be the cause of the origination of cognition. Nor does this definition imply that the sense-organs also are the objects of cognition. For a cause of cognition is held to be an object of cognition only in so far as it imparts to the cognition its own form (and this the sense-organs do not). Now even a thing that has perished may have imparted its form to the cognition, and on the basis of that form, blue colour, and so on, the thing itself is inferred. Nor can it be said (as the Yogâkâras do) that the form of subsequent cognitions is due to the action of previous cognitions (and not to the external thing); for on this hypothesis it could not be explained how in the midst of a series of cognitions of blue colour there all at once arises the cognition of yellow colour. The manifold character of cognitions must therefore be held to be due to the manifold character of real thing.--To this we reply 'not from non-entity; this not being observed.' The special forms of cognition, such as blue colour, and so on, cannot be the forms of things that have perished, and therefore are not in Being, since this is not observed. For it is not observed that when a substrate of attributes has perished, its attributes pass over into another thing. (Nor can it be said that the thing that perished leaves in cognition a reflection of itself, for) reflections also are only of persisting things, not of mere attributes. We therefore conclude that the manifoldness of cognitions can result from the manifoldness of things only on the condition of the thing persisting at the time of cognition.--The Sûtras now set forth a further objection which applies to both schools.

26. And thus there would be accomplishment on the part of non-active people also.

Thus, i.e. on the theory of universal momentariness, origination from the non-existent, causeless cognition, and so on, it would follow that persons also not making any efforts may accomplish all their ends. It is a fact that the attainment of things desired and the warding off of things not desired is effected through effort, and so on. But if all existences momentarily perish, a previously existing thing, or special attributes of it, such as after-effects (through which Svarga and the like are effected) or knowledge (through which Release is effected) do not persist, and hence nothing whatever can be accomplished by effort. And as thus all effects would be accomplished without a cause, even perfectly inert men would accomplish all the ends to be reached in this and in the next life, including final release. Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the aggregates.'

27. Not non-existence, on account of consciousness.

Here now come forward the Yogâkâras, who hold that cognitions (ideas) only are real. There is no reasonable ground, they say, for the view that the manifoldness of ideas is due to the manifoldness of things, since ideas themselves--no less than the things assumed by others--have their distinct forms, and hence are manifold. And this manifold nature of ideas is sufficiently explained by so-called vâsanâ. Vâsanâ means a flow of ideas (states of consciousness--pratyaya) of different character. We observe, e.g., that a cognition which has the form of a jar (i.e. the idea of a jar) gives rise to the cognition of the two halves of a jar, and is itself preceded and produced by the cognition of a jar, and this again by a similar cognition, and so on; this is what we call a stream

37329 or flow of ideas.--But how, then, is it that internal cognitions have
37330 the forms of external things, mustard-grains, mountains, and so on?--
37331 Even if real things are admitted, the Yogākāra replies, their becoming
37332 objects of thought and speech depends altogether on the light of
37333 knowledge, for otherwise it would follow that there is no difference
37334 between the objects known by oneself and those known by others. And that
37335 cognitions thus shining forth to consciousness have forms (distinctive
37336 characteristics) must needs be admitted; for if they were without form
37337 they could not shine forth. Now we are conscious only of one such form,
37338 viz. that of the cognition; that this form at the same time appears to
37339 us as something external (i.e. as the form of an outward thing) is due
37340 to error. From the general law that we are conscious of ideas and things
37341 together only, it follows that the thing is not something different from
37342 the idea.

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37344 As, moreover, the fact of one idea specially representing one particular
37345 thing only, whether it be a jar or a piece of cloth or anything else,
37346 requires for its explanation an equality in character of the idea and
37347 the thing, those also who hold the existence of external things must
37348 needs assume that the idea has a form similar to that of the thing; and
37349 as this suffices for rendering possible practical thought and
37350 intercourse, there is nothing authorising us to assume the existence of
37351 things in addition to the ideas. Hence cognitions only constitute
37352 reality; external things do not exist.

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37354 To this the Sūtra replies, 'Not non-existence, on account of
37355 consciousness.' The non-existence of things, apart from ideas, cannot be
37356 maintained, because we are conscious of cognitions as what renders the
37357 knowing subject capable of thought and intercourse with regard to
37358 particular things. For the consciousness of all men taking part in
37359 worldly life expresses itself in forms such as 'I know the jar.'
37360 Knowledge of this kind, as everybody's consciousness will testify,
37361 presents itself directly as belonging to a knowing subject and referring
37362 to an object; those therefore who attempt to prove, on the basis of this
37363 very knowledge, that Reality is constituted by mere knowledge, are fit
37364 subjects for general derision. This point has already been set forth in
37365 detail in our refutation of those crypto-Bauddhas who take shelter under
37366 a pretended Vedic theory.--To maintain, as the Yogākāras do, that the
37367 general rule of idea and thing presenting themselves together proves the
37368 non-difference of the thing from the idea, implies a self-contradiction;
37369 for 'going together' can only be where there are different things. To
37370 hold that it is a general rule that of the idea--the essential nature of
37371 which is to make the thing to which it refers capable of entering into
37372 common thought and intercourse--we are always conscious together with
37373 the thing, and then to prove therefrom that the thing is not different
37374 from the idea, is a laughable proceeding indeed. And as, according to
37375 you, cognitions perish absolutely, and do not possess any permanently
37376 persisting aspect, it is rather difficult to prove that such cognitions
37377 form a series in which each member colours or affects the next one
37378 (vāsanā); for how is the earlier cognition, which has absolutely
37379 perished, to affect the later one, which has not yet arisen? We conclude
37380 therefore that the manifoldness of cognitions is due solely to the
37381 manifoldness of things. We are directly conscious of cognitions (ideas)
37382 as rendering the things to which they refer capable of being dealt with
37383 by ordinary thought and speech, and the specific character of each
37384 cognition thus depends on the relation which connects it with a
37385 particular thing. This relation is of the nature of conjunction
37386 (samyoga), since knowledge (cognition) also is a substance. Just as
37387 light (prabhā), although a substance, stands to the lamp in the relation
37388 of an attribute (guna), so knowledge stands in the relation of an
37389 attribute to the Self, but, viewed in itself, it is a substance.--From
37390 all this it follows that external things are not non-existent.

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37392 The next Sūtra refutes the opinion of those who attempt to prove the
37393 baselessness of the cognitions of the waking state by comparing them to
37394 the cognitions of a dreaming person.

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28. And on account of difference of nature (they are) not like dreams.

Owing to the different nature of dream-cognitions, it cannot be said that, like them, the cognitions of the waking state also have no things to correspond to them. For dream-cognitions are originated by organs impaired by certain defects, such as drowsiness, and are moreover sublated by the cognitions of the waking state; while the cognitions of the waking state are of a contrary nature. There is thus no equality between the two sets.--Moreover, if all cognitions are empty of real content, you are unable to prove what you wish to prove since your inferential cognition also is devoid of true content. If, on the other hand, it be held to have a real content, then it follows that no cognition is devoid of such content; for all of them are alike cognitions, just like the inferential cognition.

29. The existence (is) not, on account of the absence of perception.

The existence of mere cognitions devoid of corresponding things is not possible, because such are nowhere perceived. For we nowhere perceive cognitions not inherent in a cognising subject and not referring to objects. That even dream-cognitions are not devoid of real matter we have explained in the discussion of the different khyâtis (above, p. 118).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'perception.'

30. And on account of its being unproved in every way.

Here now come forward the Mādhyamikas who teach that there is nothing but a universal Void. This theory of a universal Nothing is the real purport of Sugata's doctrine; the theories of the momentariness of all existence, &c., which imply the acknowledgment of the reality of things, were set forth by him merely as suiting the limited intellectual capacities of his pupils.--Neither cognitions nor external objects have real existence; the Void (the 'Nothinj') only constitutes Reality, and final Release means passing over into Non-being. This is the real view of Buddha, and its truth is proved by the following considerations. As the Nothing is not to be proved by any argument, it is self-proved. For a cause has to be assigned for that only which is. But what is does not originate either from that which is or that which is not. We never observe that which is to originate from Being; for things such as jars, and so on, do not originate as long as the lump of clay, &c., is non-destroyed. Nor can Being originate from Non-being; for if the jar were supposed to originate from Non-being, i.e. that non-being which results from the destruction of the lump of clay, it would itself be of the nature of Non-being. Similarly it can be shown that nothing can originate either from itself or from anything else. For the former hypothesis would imply the vicious procedure of the explanation presupposing the thing to be explained; and moreover no motive can be assigned for a thing originating from itself. And on the hypothesis of things originating from other things, it would follow that anything might originate from anything, for all things alike are other things. And as thus there is no origination there is also no destruction. Hence the Nothing constitutes Reality: origination, destruction, Being, Non-being, and so on, are mere illusions (bhrânti). Nor must it be said that as even an illusion cannot take place without a substrate we must assume something real to serve as a substrate; for in the same way as an illusion may arise even when the defect, the abode of the defect, and the knowing subject are unreal, it also may arise even when the substrate of the illusion is unreal. Hence the Nothing is the only reality.--To this the Sûtra replies, 'And on account of its being in everyway unproved'--the theory of general Nothingness which you hold cannot stand. Do you hold that everything is being or non-being, or anything else? On none of these views the Nothingness maintained by you

can be established. For the terms being and non-being and the ideas expressed by them are generally understood to refer to particular states of actually existing things only. If therefore you declare 'everything is nothing,' your declaration is equivalent to the declaration, 'everything is being,' for your statement also can only mean that everything that exists is capable of abiding in a certain condition (which you call 'Nothing'). The absolute Nothingness you have in mind cannot thus be established in any way. Moreover, he who tries to establish the tenet of universal Nothingness can attempt this in so far only as,--through some means of knowledge, he has come to know Nothingness, and he must therefore acknowledge the truth of that means. For if it were not true it would follow that everything is real. The view of general Nothingness is thus altogether incapable of proof.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'unprovedness in every way.'

31. Not so, on account of the impossibility in one.

The Bauddhas have been refuted. As now the Jainas also hold the view of the world originating from atoms and similar views, their theory is reviewed next.--The Jainas hold that the world comprises souls (jīva), and non-souls (ajīva), and that there is no Lord. The world further comprises six substances (dravya), viz. souls (jīva), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), bodies (pudgala), time (kāla), and space (ākāśa). The souls are of three different kinds-bound (in the state of bondage), perfected by Yoga (Yogasiddha), and released (mukta). 'Merit' is that particular world-pervading substance which is the cause of the motion of all things moving; 'demerit' is that all-pervading substance which is the cause of stationariness, 'Body' is that substance which possesses colour, smell, taste, and touch. It is of two kinds, atomic or compounded of atoms; to the latter kind belong wind, fire, water, earth, the bodies of living creatures, and so on. 'Time' is a particular atomic substance which is the cause of the current distinction of past, present, and future. 'Space' is one, and of infinite extent. From among these substances those which are not atomic are comprehended under the term 'the five astikāyas (existing bodies)'--the astikāya of souls, the astikāya of merit, the astikāya of demerit, the astikāya of matter, the astikāya of space. This term 'astikāya' is applied to substances occupying several parts of space.--They also use another division of categories which subserves the purpose of Release; distinguishing souls, non-souls, influx (āsrava), bondage, nijara, samvara, and Release. Release comprises the means of Release also, viz. perfect knowledge, good conduct, and so on. The soul is that which has knowledge, seeing, pleasure, strength (vīrya) for its qualities. Non-soul is the aggregate of the things enjoyed by the souls. 'Influx' is whatever is instrumental towards the souls having the fruition of objects, viz. the sense-organs, and so on.--Bondage is of eight different kinds, comprising the four ghātikarman, and the four aghātikarman. The former term denotes whatever obstructs the essential qualities of the soul, viz. knowledge, intuition, strength, pleasure; the latter whatever causes pleasure, pain, and indifference, which are due to the persistence of the wrong imagination that makes the soul identify itself with its body.--'Decay' means the austerities (tapas), known from the teaching of the Arhat, which are the means of Release.--Samvara is such deep meditation (Samādhi) as stops the action of the sense-organs.--Release, finally, is the manifestation of the Self in its essential nature, free from all afflictions such as passion, and so on.--The atoms which are the causes of earth and the other compounds, are not, as the Vaiseshikas and others hold, of four different kinds, but have all the same nature; the distinctive qualities of earth, and so on, are due to a modification (parināma) of the atoms. The Jainas further hold that the whole complex of things is of an ambiguous nature in so far as being existent and non-existent, permanent and non-permanent, separate and non-separate. To prove this they apply their so-called sapta-bhaṅgī-nyāya ('the system of the seven paralogisms')--'May be, it is'; 'May be, it is not'; 'May be, it is and is not'; 'May be, it is not predicable'; 'May be, it is and is not predicable'; 'May be, it is not, and is not predicable'; 'May be, it

is and is not, and is not predicable.' With the help of this they prove that all things--which they declare to consist of substance (dravya), and paryâya--to be existing, one and permanent in so far as they are substances, and the opposite in so far as they are paryâyas. By paryâya they understand the particular states of substances, and as those are of the nature of Being as well as Non-being, they manage to prove existence, non-existence, and so on.--With regard to this the Sûtra remarks that no such proof is possible, 'Not so, on account of the impossibility in one'; i.e. because contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing, not any more than light and darkness. As a substance and particular states qualifying it--and (by the Jainas), called paryâya--are different things (padârtha), one substance cannot be connected with opposite attributes. It is thus not possible that a substance qualified by one particular state, such as existence, should at the same time be qualified by the opposite state, i. e. non-existence. The non-permanency, further, of a substance consists in its being the abode of those particular states which are called origination and destruction; how then should permanency, which is of an opposite nature, reside in the substance at the same time? Difference (bhinnatva) again consists in things being the abodes of contradictory attributes; non-difference, which is the opposite of this, cannot hence possibly reside in the same things which are the abode of difference; not any more than the generic character of a horse and that of a buffalo can belong to one animal. We have explained this matter at length, when--under Sûtra I, 1--refuting the bhedâbheda-theory. Time we are conscious of only as an attribute of substances (not as an independent substance), and the question as to its being and non-being, and so on, does not therefore call for a separate discussion. To speak of time as being and non-being in no way differs from generic characteristics (jâti), and so on, being spoken of in the same way; for--as we have explained before--of jâti and the like we are conscious only as attributes of substances.--But (the Jaina may here be supposed to ask the Vedântin), how can you maintain that Brahman, although one only, yet at the same time is the Self of all?--Because, we reply, the whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the body of the Supreme Person, omniscient, omnipotent, and so on. And that the body and the person embodied and their respective attributes are of totally different nature (so that Brahman is not touched by the defects of his body), we have explained likewise.--Moreover, as your six substances, soul, and so on, are not one substance and one paryâya, their being one substance, and so on, cannot be used to prove their being one and also not one, and so on.--And if it should be said that those six substances are such (viz. one and several, and so on), each owing to its own paryâya and its own nature, we remark that then you cannot avoid contradicting your own theory of everything being of an ambiguous nature. Things which stand to each other in the relation of mutual non-existence cannot after all be identical.--Hence the theory of the Jainas is not reasonable. Moreover it is liable to the same objections which we have above set forth as applying to all theories of atoms constituting the universal cause, without the guidance of a Lord.

33. And likewise non-entireness of the Self.

On your view there would likewise follow non-entireness of the Self. For your opinion is that souls abide in numberless places, each soul having the same size as the body which it animates. When, therefore, the soul previously abiding in the body of an elephant or the like has to enter into a body of smaller size, e. g. that of an ant, it would follow that as the soul then occupies less space, it would not remain entire, but would become incomplete.--Let us then avoid this difficulty by assuming that the soul passes over into a different state--which process is called paryâya,--which it may manage because it is capable of contraction and dilatation.--To this the next Sûtra replies.

34. Nor also is there non-contradiction from paryâya; on account of change, and so on.

Nor is the difficulty to be evaded by the assumption of the soul assuming a different condition through contraction or dilatation. For this would imply that the soul is subject to change, and all the imperfections springing from it, viz. non-permanence, and so on, and hence would not be superior to non-sentient things such as jars and the like.

35. And on account of the endurance of the final (size), and the (resulting) permanency of both; there is no difference.

The final size of the soul, i.e. the size it has in the state of Release, is enduring since the soul does not subsequently pass into another body; and both, i.e. the soul in the state of Release and the size of that soul, are permanent (nitya). From this it follows that that ultimate size is the true essential size of the soul and also belongs to it previously to Release. Hence there is no difference of sizes, and the soul cannot therefore have the size of its temporary bodies. The Ârghata theory is therefore untenable.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the impossibility in one.'

36. (The system) of the Lord (must be disregarded), on account of inappropriateness.

So far it has been shown that the doctrines of Kapila, Kanâda, Sugata, and the Arhat must be disregarded by men desirous of final beatitude; for those doctrines are all alike untenable and foreign to the Veda. The Sûtras now declare that, for the same reasons, the doctrine of Pasupati also has to be disregarded. The adherents of this view belong to four different classes--Kâpâlas, Kâlâmukhas, Pâsupatas, and Saivas. All of them hold fanciful theories of Reality which are in conflict with the Veda, and invent various means for attaining happiness in this life and the next. They maintain the general material cause and the operative cause to be distinct, and the latter cause to be constituted by Pasupati. They further hold the wearing of the six so-called 'mudrâ' badges and the like to be means to accomplish the highest end of man.

Thus the Kâpâlas say, 'He who knows the true nature of the six mudrâs, who understands the highest mudrâ, meditating on himself as in the position called bhagâsana, reaches Nirvâna. The necklace, the golden ornament, the earring, the head-jewel, ashes, and the sacred thread are called the six mudrâs. He whose body is marked with these is not born here again.'--Similarly the Kâlâmukhas teach that the means for obtaining all desired results in this world as well as the next are constituted by certain practices--such as using a skull as a drinking vessel, smearing oneself with the ashes of a dead body, eating the flesh of such a body, carrying a heavy stick, setting up a liquor-jar and using it as a platform for making offerings to the gods, and the like. 'A bracelet made of Rudrâksha-seeds on the arm, matted hair on the head, a skull, smearing oneself with ashes, &c.'--all this is well known from the sacred writings of the Saivas. They also hold that by some special ceremonial performance men of different castes may become Brâhmanas and reach the highest âsrama: 'by merely entering on the initiatory ceremony (dikshâ) a man becomes a Brâhmana at once; by undertaking the kâpâla rite a man becomes at once an ascetic.'

With regard to these views the Sûtra says 'of pati, on account of inappropriateness.' A 'not' has here to be supplied from Sûtra 32. The system of Pasupati has to be disregarded because it is inappropriate, i.

e. because the different views and practices referred to are opposed to one another and in conflict with the Veda. The different practices enumerated above, the wearing of the six mudrās and so on, are opposed to each other; and moreover the theoretical assumptions of those people, their forms of devotion and their practices, are in conflict with the Veda. For the Veda declares that Nârâyana who is the highest Brahman is alone the operative and the substantial cause of the world, 'Nârâyana is the highest Brahman, Nârâyana is the highest Reality, Nârâyana is the highest light, Nârâyana is the highest Self'; 'That thought, may I be many, may I grow forth' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); 'He desired, may I be many, may I grow forth' (Taitt. Up. II, 6, 1), and so on. In the same way the texts declare meditation on the Supreme Person, who is the highest Brahman, to be the only meditation which effects final release; cp. 'I know that great Person of sunlike lustre beyond the darkness. A man who knows him passes over death; there is no other path to go' (Svet. Up. III, 8). And in the same way all texts agree in declaring that the works subserving the knowledge of Brahman are only those sacrificial and other works which the Veda enjoins on men in the different castes and stages of life: 'Him Brâhmanas seek to know by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting. Wishing for that world only, mendicants wander forth from their homes' (Bri. Up. XI, 4, 22). In some texts enjoining devout meditation, and so on, we indeed meet with terms such as Prajâpati, Siva, Indra, Âkâsa, Prâna, &c., but that these all refer to the supreme Reality established by the texts concerning Nârâyana--the aim of which texts it is to set forth the highest Reality in its purity--we have already proved under I, 1, 30. In the same way we have proved under Sû. I, 1, 2 that in texts treating of the creation of the world, such as 'Being only this was in the beginning,' and the like, the words Being, Brahman, and so on, denote nobody else but Nârâyana, who is set forth as the universal creator in the account of creation given in the text, 'Alone indeed there was Nârâyana, not Brahmâ, not Isâna--he being alone did not rejoice' (Mahopanishad I).--As the Pasupati theory thus teaches principles, meditations and acts conflicting with the Veda, it must be disregarded.

37. And on account of the impossibility of rulership.

Those who stand outside the Veda arrive through inference at the conclusion that the Lord is a mere operative cause. This being so, they must prove the Lord's being the ruler (of the material cause) on the basis of observation. But it is impossible to prove that the Lord is the ruler of the Pradhâna in the same way as the potter e.g. is the ruler of the clay. For the Lord is without a body, while the power of ruling material causes is observed only in the case of embodied beings such as potters. Nor may you have recourse to the hypothesis of the Lord being embodied; for--as we have shown under I, 1, 3--there arise difficulties whether that body, which as body must consist of parts, be viewed as eternal or as non-eternal.

38. If you say, as in the case of the organs; we deny this, on account of enjoyment and so on.

It may possibly be said that, in the same way as the enjoying (individual) soul, although in itself without a body, is seen to rule the sense-organs, the body, and so on, the great Lord also, although without a body, may rule the Pradhâna. But this analogy cannot be allowed 'on account of enjoyment,' and so on. The body's being ruled by the soul is due to the unseen principle in the form of good and evil works, and has for its end the requital of those works. Your analogy would thus imply that the Lord also is under the influence of an unseen principle, and is requited for his good and evil works.--The Lord cannot therefore be a ruler.

39. Finiteness or absence of omniscience.

'Or' here has the sense of 'and.' If the Lord is under the influence of the adrishta, it follows that, like the individual soul, he is subject to creation, dissolution, and so on, and that he is not omniscient. The Pasupati theory cannot therefore be accepted.--It is true that the Sûtra, 'but in case of conflict (with Scripture) it is not to be regarded' (Pû. Mî. Sû. I, 3, 3), has already established the non-acceptability of all views contrary to the Veda; the present adhikarana, however, raises this question again in order specially to declare that the Pasupati theory is contrary to the Veda. Although the Pâsupata and the Saiva systems exhibit some features which are not altogether contrary to the Veda, yet they are unacceptable because they rest on an assumption contrary to the Veda, viz. of the difference of the general, instrumental and material causes, and imply an erroneous interchange of higher and lower entities.-- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'Pasupati.'

40. On account of the impossibility of origination.

The Sûtras now proceed to refute a further doubt, viz. that the Pañkarâtra tantra--which sets forth the means of attaining supreme beatitude, as declared by the Lord (Bhagavat)--may also be destitute of authority, in so far, namely, as belonging to the same class as the tantras of Kapila and others. The above Sûtra raises the doubt.

The theory of the Bhâgavatas is that from Vâsudeva, who is the highest Brahman and the highest cause, there originates the individual soul called Sankarshana; from Sankarshana the internal organ called Pradyumna; and from Pradyumna the principle of egoity called Aniruddha. Now this theory implies the origination of the individual soul, and this is contrary to Scripture. For scriptural texts declare the soul to be without a beginning--cp. 'the intelligent one is not born and does not die' (Ka. Up. II, 18), and other texts.

41. And there is not (origination) of the instrument from the agent.

'The internal organ called Pradyumna originates from Sankarshana,' i. e. the internal organ originates from the individual soul which is the agent. But this is inadmissible, since the text 'from him there is produced breath, mind, and all sense-organs' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3) declares that the mind also springs from none else but the highest Brahman. As the Bhâgavata doctrine thus teaches things opposed to Scripture, its authoritativeness cannot be admitted.--Against these objections the next Sûtra declares itself.

42. Or, if they are of the nature of that which is knowledge and so on, there is no contradiction to that (i.e. the Bhâgavata doctrine).

The 'or' sets aside the view previously maintained. By 'that which is knowledge and so on' [FOOTNOTE 524:1] we have to understand the highest Brahman. If Sankarshana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha are of the nature of the highest Brahman, then truly there can be no objection to a body of doctrine which sets forth this relation. The criticism that the Bhâgavatas teach an inadmissible origination of the individual soul, is made by people who do not understand that system. What it teaches is that the highest Brahman, there called Vâsudeva, from kindness to those devoted to it, voluntarily abides in a fourfold form, so as to render

37812 itself accessible to its devotees. Thus it is said in the Paushkara-
37813 samhitâ, 'That which enjoins that Brahmanas have to worship, under its
37814 proper names, the fourfold nature of the Self; that is the authoritative
37815 doctrine.' That this worship of that which is of a fourfold nature means
37816 worship of the highest Brahman, called Vâsudeva, is declared in the
37817 Sâtvata-samhitâ, 'This is the supreme sâstra, the great Brahmopanishad,
37818 which imparts true discrimination to Brahmanas worshipping the real
37819 Brahman under the name of Vâsudeva.' That highest Brahman, called
37820 Vâsudeva, having for its body the complete aggregate of the six
37821 qualities, divides itself in so far as it is either the 'Subtle'
37822 (sûkshma), or 'division' (vyûha), or 'manifestation' (vibhava), and is
37823 attained in its fulness by the devotees who, according to their
37824 qualifications, do worship to it by means of works guided by knowledge.
37825 'From the worship of the vibhava-aspect one attains to the vyûha, and
37826 from the worship of the vyûha one attains to the "Subtile" called
37827 Vâsudeva, i.e. the highest Brahman'--such is their doctrine. By the
37828 'vibhava' we have to understand the aggregate of beings, such as Rama,
37829 Krishna, &c., in whom the highest Being becomes manifest; by the 'vyûha'
37830 the fourfold arrangement or division of the highest Reality, as Vâsudeva,
37831 Sankarshana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha; by the 'Subtle' the highest
37832 Brahman itself, in so far as it has for its body the mere aggregate of
37833 the six qualities--as which it is called 'Vâsudeva.' Compare on this
37834 point the Paushkara, 'That body of doctrine through which, by means of
37835 works based on knowledge, one fully attains to the imperishable highest
37836 Brahman, called Vâsudeva,' and so on, Sankarshana, Pradyumna, and
37837 Aniruddha are thus mere bodily forms which the highest Brahman
37838 voluntarily assumes. Scripture already declares, 'Not born he is born in
37839 many ways,' and it is this birth--consisting in the voluntary assumption
37840 of bodily form, due to tenderness towards its devotees--which the
37841 Bhâgavata system teaches; hence there lies no valid objection to the
37842 authoritativeness of that system. And as Sankarshana, Pradyumna, and
37843 Aniruddha are the beings ruling over the individual souls, internal
37844 organs and organs of egoity, there can be no objection to their being
37845 themselves denoted by those latter terms, viz. individual soul, and so
37846 on. The case is analogous to that of Brahman being designated, in some
37847 texts, by terms such as ether, breath, and the like.

37848
37849 [FOOTNOTE 524:1. Or 'by that which is knowledge and cause.']
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37851
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37854 43. And on account of contradiction.
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37856 The origination of the jîva is, moreover, distinctly controverted in the
37857 books of the Bhâgavatas also. Thus in the Parama-samhitâ 'The nature of
37858 Prakriti consists therein that she is non-sentient, for the sake of
37859 another, eternal, ever-changing, comprising within herself the three
37860 gunas and constituting the sphere of action and experience for all
37861 agents. With her the soul (purusha) is connected in the way of
37862 inseparable association; that soul is known to be truly without
37863 beginning and without end.' And as all Samhitas make similar statements
37864 as to the eternity of the soul, the Pañkarâtra doctrine manifestly
37865 controverts the view of the essential nature of the jîva being something
37866 that originates. How it is possible that in the Veda as well as in
37867 common life the soul is spoken of as being born, dying, &c., will be
37868 explained under Sû. II, 3, 17. The conclusion, therefore, is that the
37869 Bhâgavata system also denies the origination of the soul, and that hence
37870 the objections raised on this ground against its authoritativeness are
37871 without any force. Another objection is raised by some. Sândilya, they
37872 argue, is said to have promulgated the Pañkarâtra doctrine because he
37873 did not find a sure basis for the highest welfare of man in the Veda and
37874 its auxiliary disciplines, and this implies that the Pañkarâtra is
37875 opposed to the Veda.--his objection, we reply, springs from nothing else
37876 but the mere unreasoning faith of men who do not possess the faintest
37877 knowledge of the teachings of the Veda, and have never considered the
37878 hosts of arguments which confirm that teaching. When the Veda says,
37879 'Morning after morning those speak untruth who make the Agnihotra
37880 offering before sunrise,' it is understood that the censure there passed

37881 on the offering before sunrise is really meant to glorify the offering
37882 after sunrise. We meet with a similar case in the 'bhûma-vidyâ' (Ch. Up.
37883 VII, 2). There at the beginning Nârada says, 'I know the Rig-veda, the
37884 Yajur-veda, the Sâma-veda, the Âtharvana as the fourth, the Itihâsa-
37885 purâna as the fifth,' and so on, enumerating all the various branches of
37886 knowledge, and finally summing up 'with all this I know the mantras only,
37887 I do not know the Self.' Now this declaration of the knowledge of the
37888 Self not being attainable through any branch of knowledge except the
37889 knowledge of the Bhûman evidently has no other purpose but to glorify
37890 this latter knowledge, which is about to be expounded. Or else Nârada's
37891 words refer to the fact that from the Veda and its auxiliary disciplines
37892 he had not obtained the knowledge of the highest Reality. Analogous to
37893 this is the case of Sândilya's alleged objection to the Veda. That the
37894 Bhâgavata doctrine is meant to facilitate the understanding of the sense
37895 of the Veda which by itself is difficult of comprehension, is declared
37896 in the Paramasamhita, 'I have read the Vedas at length, together with all
37897 the various auxiliary branches of knowledge. But in all these I cannot
37898 see a clear indication, raised above all doubt, of the way to
37899 blessedness, whereby I might reach perfection'; and 'The wise Lord Hari,
37900 animated by kindness for those devoted to him, extracted the essential
37901 meaning of all the Vedânta-texts and condensed it in an easy form.' The
37902 incontrovertible fact then is as follows. The Lord who is known from the
37903 Vedânta-texts, i.e. Vâsudeva, called there the highest Brahman--who is
37904 antagonistic to all evil, whose nature is of uniform excellence, who is
37905 an ocean, as it were, of unlimited exalted qualities, such as infinite
37906 intelligence, bliss, and so on, all whose purposes come true--perceiving
37907 that those devoted to him, according as they are differently placed in
37908 the four castes and the four stages of life, are intent on the different
37909 ends of life, viz. religious observances, wealth, pleasure, and final
37910 release; and recognising that the Vedas--which teach the truth about his
37911 own nature, his glorious manifestations, the means of rendering him
37912 propitious and the fruits of such endeavour--are difficult to fathom by
37913 all beings other than himself, whether gods or men, since those Vedas
37914 are divided into Rik, Yajus, Sâman, and Atharvan; and being animated by
37915 infinite pity, tenderness, and magnanimity; with a view to enable his
37916 devotees to grasp the true meaning of the Vedas, himself composed the
37917 Pañkarâtra-sâstra. The author of the Sûtras (Vyâsa)--who first composed
37918 the Sûtras, the purport of which it is to set forth the arguments
37919 establishing the Vedânta doctrine, and then the Bhârata-samhitâ (i.e.
37920 the Mahâbhârata) in a hundred thousand slokas in order to support
37921 thereby the teaching of the Veda--himself says in the chapter called
37922 Mokshadharma, which treats of knowledge, 'If a householder, or a
37923 Brahmakârin, or a hermit, or a mendicant wishes to achieve success, what
37924 deity should he worship?' and so on; explains then at great length the
37925 Pañkarâtra system, and then says, 'From the lengthy Bhârata story,
37926 comprising one hundred thousand slokas, this body of doctrine has been
37927 extracted, with the churning-staff of mind, as butter is churned from
37928 curds--as butter from milk, as the Brahmana from men, as the Âranyaka
37929 from the Vedas, as Amrita from medicinal herbs.--This great Upanishad,
37930 consistent with the four Vedas, in harmony with Sâmkhya and Yoga, was
37931 called by him by the name of Pañkarâtra. This is excellent, this is
37932 Brahman, this is supremely beneficial. Fully agreeing with the Rik, the
37933 Yajus, the Sâman, and the Atharvân-giras, this doctrine will be truly
37934 authoritative.' The terms Sâmkhya and Yoga here denote the concentrated
37935 application of knowledge and of works. As has been said, 'By the
37936 application of knowledge on the part of the Sâmkhya, and of works on the
37937 part of the Yogins.' And in the Bhîshmaparvan we read, 'By Brahmanas,
37938 Kshattriyas, Vaisyas and Sûdras, Mâdhava is to be honoured, served and
37939 worshipped--he who was proclaimed by Sankarshana in agreement with the
37940 Sâtvata law.'--How then could these utterances of Bâdarâyana, the
37941 foremost among all those who understand the teaching of the Veda, be
37942 reconciled with the view that in the Sûtras he maintains the non-
37943 authoritativeness of the Sâtvata doctrine, the purport of which is to
37944 teach the worship of, and meditation on, Vâsudeva, who is none other
37945 than the highest Brahman known from the Vedânta-texts?

37946
37947 But other passages in the Mahâbhârata, such as 'There is the Sâmkhya,
37948 the Yoga, the Pañkarâtra, the Vedas, and the Pasupata doctrine; do all
37949 these rest on one and the same basis, or on different ones?' and so on,

37950 declare that the Sāṅkhya and other doctrines also are worthy of regard,
37951 while yet in the Sārīraka Sūtras those very same doctrines are formally
37952 refuted. Why, therefore, should not the same hold good in the case of
37953 the Bhāgavata doctrine?--Not so, we reply. In the Mahābhārata also
37954 Bādarayana applies to the Sāṅkhya and other doctrines the same style of
37955 reasoning as in the Sūtras. The question, asked in the passage quoted,
37956 means 'Do the Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, the Pāsupata, and the Pāṅkarātra set
37957 forth one and the same reality, or different ones? If the former, what
37958 is that reality? If the latter, they convey contradictory doctrines, and,
37959 as reality is not something which may be optionally assumed to be either
37960 such or such, one of those doctrines only can be acknowledged as
37961 authoritative, and the question then arises which is to be so
37962 acknowledged?'--The answer to the question is given in the passage
37963 beginning, 'Know, O royal Sage, all those different views. The
37964 promulgator of the Sāṅkhya is Kapila,' &c. Here the human origin of the
37965 Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and Pāsupata is established on the ground of their having
37966 been produced by Kapila, Hiranyagarbha, and Pasupati. Next the clause
37967 'Aparāntatamas is said to be the teacher of the Vedas' intimates the non-
37968 human character of the Vedas; and finally the clause 'Of the whole
37969 Pāṅkarātra, Nārāyaṇa himself is the promulgator' declares that Nārāyaṇa
37970 himself revealed the Pāṅkarātra doctrine. The connected purport of these
37971 different clauses is as follows. As the systems of human origin set
37972 forth doctrines mutually contradictory, and, moreover, teach what is in
37973 conflict with the matter known from the Veda--which, on account of its
37974 non-human character, is raised above all suspicion of error and other
37975 imperfections--they cannot be accepted as authoritative with regard to
37976 anything not depending on human action and choice. Now the matter to be
37977 known from the Veda is Nārāyaṇa, who is none other than the highest
37978 Brahman. It hence follows that the entities set forth in those different
37979 systems--the pradhāna, the soul (puruṣa), Pasupati, and so on--have to
37980 be viewed as real only in so far as Nārāyaṇa, i.e. the highest Brahman,
37981 as known from the Vedānta-texts, constitutes their Self. This the text
37982 directly declares in the passage, 'In all those doctrines it is seen, in
37983 accordance with tradition and reasoning, that the lord Narayana is the
37984 only basis.' This means--'To him who considers the entities set forth in
37985 those systems with the help of argumentation, it is evident that
37986 Nārāyaṇa alone is the basis of all those entities.' In other words, as
37987 the entities set forth in those systems are not Brahman, any one who
37988 remembers the teaching of texts such as 'all this indeed is Brahman,'
37989 'Nārāyaṇa is all,' which declare Brahman to be the Self of all, comes to
37990 the conclusion that Nārāyaṇa alone is the basis of those entities. As
37991 thus it is settled that the highest Brahman, as known from the Vedānta-
37992 texts, or Nārāyaṇa, himself is the promulgator of the entire Pāṅkarātra,
37993 and that this system teaches the nature of Nārāyaṇa and the proper way
37994 of worshipping him, none can disestablish the view that in the
37995 Pāṅkarātra all the other doctrines are comprised. For this reason the
37996 Mahābhārata says, 'Thus the Sāṅkhya-yoga and the Veda and the Āraṇyaka,
37997 being members of one another, are called the Pāṅkarātra,' i.e. the
37998 Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, the Vedas, and the Āraṇyakas, which are members of
37999 one another because they are one in so far as aiming at setting forth
38000 one Truth, together are called the Pāṅkarātra.--The Sāṅkhya explains the
38001 twenty-five principles, the Yoga teaches certain practices and means of
38002 mental concentration, and the Āraṇyakas teach that all the subordinate
38003 principles have their true Self in Brahman, that the mental
38004 concentration enjoined in the Yoga is a mode of meditation on Brahman,
38005 and that the rites and works which are set forth in the Veda are means
38006 to win the favour of Brahman--thus giving instruction as to Brahman's
38007 nature. Now all these elements, in their inward connexion, are clearly
38008 set forth in the Pāṅkarātra by the highest Brahman, i.e. Nārāyaṇa,
38009 himself. The Sārīraka Sāstra (i.e. the Vedānta) does not disprove the
38010 principles assumed by the Sāṅkhyas, but merely the view of their not
38011 having Brahman for their Self; and similarly in its criticism on the
38012 Yoga and Pāsupata systems, it merely refutes the view of the Lord being
38013 a mere instrumental cause, the erroneous assumptions as to the relative
38014 position of higher and lower entities, and certain practices not
38015 warranted by the Veda; but it does not reject the Yoga itself, nor again
38016 the lord Pāsupati. Hence Smṛiti says, 'The Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, the
38017 Pāṅkarātra, the Vedas, and the Pāsupata doctrine--all these having their
38018 proof in the Self may not be destroyed by arguments.' The essential

38019 points in all these doctrines are to be adopted, not to be rejected
38020 absolutely as the teaching of Jina. or Sugata is to be rejected. For, as
38021 said in the Smṛiti text quoted above, in all those doctrines it is seen,
38022 according to tradition and reasoning, that the lord Nârâyana is the only
38023 basis.'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the impossibility of
38024 origination.'

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38029 THIRD PĀDA.

38030
38031 1. Not Ether; on account of the absence of scriptural statement.
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38033 We have demonstrated that the Sāṅkhya-system and other systems standing
38034 outside the Veda are untenable since they rest on fallacious reasoning
38035 and are self-contradictory. In order to prove that our own view is
38036 altogether free from all objections of this kind, we shall now explain
38037 in detail the mode in which this world, with all its sentient and non-
38038 sentient beings, is produced by Brahman, whom we hold to be the general
38039 creator.

38040
38041 The first doubt here presenting itself is whether Ether be something
38042 produced or not.--The Pûrvapakshin maintains that it is not produced,
38043 since there is no scriptural statement to that effect. A scriptural
38044 statement may be expected with regard to what is possible; but what is
38045 impossible--as e.g. the origination of a sky-flower or of Ether--cannot
38046 possibly be taught by Scripture. For the origination of Ether, which is
38047 not made up of parts and is all pervasive, cannot be imagined in any way.
38048 For this very reason, i.e. the impossibility of the thing, the Chandogya,
38049 in its account of creation, mentions the origination of fire, water, &c.
38050 only (but not of Ether)--'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,'
38051 'It sent forth fire,' and so on. When therefore the Taittirîya, the
38052 Atharvana, and other texts tell us that Ether did originate--'From that
38053 Self sprang Ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'From him is born breath, mind,
38054 and all organs of sense, Ether, air, light, water,' &c. (Mu. Up. II, 1,
38055 4)--such statements are contrary to sense, and hence refute themselves.--
38056 To this the Sûtra replies.

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38062 2. But there is.

38063 But there is origination of Ether. For Scripture, which is concerned
38064 with matters transcending sense perception, is able to establish the
38065 truth even of the origination of Ether, although this be not proved by
38066 other means of knowledge. And in a matter known from Scripture a
38067 contradictory inference, such as that Ether cannot originate because it
38068 is without parts, is not of sufficient force. That the non-
38069 originatedness of the Self also does not rest on its being without parts
38070 will be shown further on.--Here the Pûrvapakshin raises an objection.

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38075 3. It has a secondary sense, on account of impossibility and of the text.

38076
38077 It is reasonable to assume that in passages such as 'From that Self
38078 there sprang Ether.' the origination of Ether is not to be taken in its
38079 literal sense; for according to the Chândogya-text 'it sent forth fire.'
38080 Brahman engaged in creation first produces fire, and fire thus having
38081 the first place, the text cannot possibly mean to say that Ether also
38082 was produced. Moreover, there is another text, viz. 'Vâyu and antariksha
38083 (i.e. Ether), this is the Immortal,' according to which Ether is
38084 immortal, i. e. non-produced.--But how can one and the same word viz. it
38085 'sprang' (i.e. originated), be taken in a metaphorical sense with
38086 reference to Ether, and in its literal sense with reference to fire, and
38087 so on?--To this the next Sûtra replies.

4. There may be (a double sense) of the one (word), as in the case of the word 'Brahman.'

Since in the clause 'from that Self there sprang Brahman,' the word 'sprang' cannot be taken in its literal sense, it may be used there in a secondary sense; while the same word as connected with the subsequent clauses 'from Vāyu Agni,' &c., may have its primary sense. This would be analogous to the use of the word Brahman in Mu. Up. I, 1. There in the clause 'From him is born that Brahman, name, form, and matter' (9). the word Brahman is used in a secondary sense, i.e. denotes the Pradhāna; while in the same chapter, in the clause 'Brahman swells by means of brooding' (8), the same word denotes Brahman in its primary sense. It is true indeed that in this latter case the word 'Brahman' occurs twice; while in the Taitt. text the word 'sambhūta' occurs once only, and has to be carried over from the first clause into the subsequent ones; but this makes no difference, for, in the case of such carrying over of a word, no less than in the case of actual repetition, the general denotation of the word is repeated.--The next Sūtra refutes this objection.

5. The non-abandonment of the promissory statement (results) from non-difference.

It is not appropriate to assume, from deference to the Chândogya-text, a secondary meaning for those other texts also which declare Ether to have originated. For the Chândogya itself virtually admits the origination of Ether; in so far, namely, as the clause 'that by which the non-heard is heard,' &c., declares that through the knowledge of Brahman everything is known. This declaration is not abandoned, i.e. is adhered to, only if the Ether also is an effect of Brahman and thus non-different from it.

6. (As follows also) from (other) texts.

That Ether is an originated thing follows from other clauses also in the Chândogya: 'Being only this was in the beginning, one without a second' affirms the oneness of everything before creation, and 'In that all this has its Self implies that everything is an effect of, and hence non-different from, Brahman.--Nor does the statement as to the creation of fire, 'it sent forth fire,' exclude the creation of Ether. For the first place which there is assigned to fire rests only thereon that no mention is made of the creation of Ether, and this has no force to negative the creation of Ether as positively stated in other texts.

7. But the division (origination) extends over all effects; as in ordinary life.

The 'but' has the sense of 'and.' As the clause 'In that all this has its Self' and similar ones directly state that Ether also is a creation of Brahman, the division, i.e. the origination of Ether from Brahman, is implicitly declared thereby. As in ordinary life. When in ordinary life somebody has said 'all these men are the sons of Devadatta,' it is known that any particulars which may afterwards be given about the descent of some of them are meant to apply to all.--In accordance with this our conclusion we interpret the text 'Air and Ether, this is the Immortal,' as asserting only that air and Ether continue to exist for a long time, as the Devas do.

8. Hereby air is explained.

The same argumentation explains the origination of air also. That a special Sûtra is devoted to the origination of air--instead of disposing in one Sûtra of Ether and air--is for the sake of Sûtra 10, which states that 'hence (i.e. from air) there originated fire.'

9. But there is non-origination of that which is (only); on account of impossibility.

The 'but' has an affirmative sense. There is non-origination of that which is, i.e. of Brahman only; of whatever is different from Brahman non-origination cannot possibly be established. This means--the origination of Ether and air has been proved only in order to illustrate a general truth. Only that which is, i.e. Brahman, which is the general cause, cannot originate. Whatever is other than Brahman, i. e. the entire world comprising the Unevolved, the great principle (mahat), ahankâra, the tanmâtras, the sense-organs, the Ether, the air, and so on, cannot possibly be shown to be non-originated, since its being an effect is proved by the text declaring that everything is known through one thing, and in other ways.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the Ether.'

10. Fire (is produced) thence, for thus Scripture declares.

It has been stated that everything different from Brahman is the effect of Brahman. The doubt now arises whether the more remote effects of Brahman originate, each of them, only from that substance which is their immediately antecedent cause or from Brahman in the form of that substance.--The decision is that they originate from those substances only; for the text 'from air fire' directly states the origination of fire from air.

11. Water (from fire).

Water also originates 'thence,' i. e. from fire; for so the texts declare 'From fire water' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'that sent forth water' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3).

12. Earth (from water).

Earth originates from water; for so the texts declare 'From water earth' (Taitt Up. II. 1, 1). 'It (water) sent forth food' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3). But how can the word 'food' denote earth?--To this the next Sûtra replies.

13. Earth on account of the subject-matter, the colour, and other texts.

That the word 'food' denotes the earth is to be inferred from the fact that the section in which the word occurs has for its subject-matter the creation of the elements; as everything eatable is a product of the

38226 earth, the term denoting the effect is there applied to denote the cause.
38227 In the same chapter, where the colour of the elements is mentioned ('The
38228 red colour of a flame is the colour of fire, the white one that of water,
38229 the black one that of food '), the collocation of words clearly shows
38230 that 'food' means something of the same kind as fire and water, viz. the
38231 elements of earth. And there are other texts also which treat of the
38232 same topic and declare the origination of earth from water, cp. Taitt.
38233 Up. II, 1, 'from fire sprang water, from water earth.' All this proves
38234 that the term 'food' denotes earth, and that hence earth originates from
38235 water.

38236
38237 Fire and the other substances, the origination of which has been
38238 detailed, are mentioned merely as instances, and it must be understood
38239 that also other entities, such as the 'Mahat,' and so on, originate only
38240 from the immediately preceding cause, in agreement with scriptural
38241 statements. And texts such as 'From him is born breath, mind, and all
38242 organs of sense, ether, air, light, water, and the earth, the support of
38243 all' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3); 'From him is born that Brahman, name, form, and
38244 food' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'From that Self there sprang ether' (Taitt. Up.
38245 II, 1, 1); 'It (i.e. that which is) sent forth fire' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3)--
38246 (which seems to teach the direct origination from Brahman of the
38247 different elements, and so on)--may be interpreted on the understanding
38248 of Brahman being their mediate cause also.--This primâ facie view the
38249 next Sûtra disposes of.

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38254 14. But he; from the inferential mark supplied by their reflection.
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38256 The 'but' indicates the setting aside of the primâ facie view raised. Of
38257 all effected things, the Mahat, and so on, the highest Person himself,
38258 in so far as embodied in the immediately preceding substance, is the
38259 direct cause.--How is this known?--'From the inferential mark supplied
38260 by the reflection of them.' By 'reflection' the Sûtra means the resolve
38261 expressed in the recurring phrase, 'May I be many'; 'That fire thought,
38262 may I be many'; 'That water thought, may I be many' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3;
38263 4). As these texts declare that there was thought in the form of a
38264 resolve of self-multiplication--which thought can belong to a Self only,
38265 we conclude that also the Mahat, the ahankâra, the Ether, and so on,
38266 accomplish the sending forth of their respective effects only after
38267 similar thought, and such thought can belong only to the highest Brahman
38268 embodied in the Mahat, ahankâra, and so on. That the highest Brahman is
38269 embodied in all beings and constitutes their Self, is directly stated in
38270 the antaryâmin-brâhmana, 'He who abiding in the earth; abiding in water;
38271 abiding in fire,' &c. &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 3 ff.); and likewise in the
38272 Subâla-Up, 'Whose body is the earth,' &c. &c., up to 'Whose body is the
38273 Unevolved.' The Pûrvapakshin had maintained that the creation, from
38274 Brahman, of breath, and so on, which is declared in texts such as 'From
38275 him are born breath, mind,' &c., may be understood as a mediate creation.
38276 This point is taken up by the next Sûtra.

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38281 15. But the order of succession (which is stated) in reverse order (of
38282 the true one) is possible, (only if the origination of all effects is)
38283 thence (i.e. from Brahman).
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38285 The 'but' has an asseverative sense. The direct origination from Brahman
38286 of all effects--which in passages such as the one quoted by the
38287 Pûrvapakshin is stated in a form the reverse of the (true) order of
38288 origination according to which the Unevolved, the Mahat, the ahankâra,
38289 Ether, and so on, succeed each other--is possible only on the
38290 supposition of the origination of each effect being really from Brahman
38291 itself in the form of a special causal substance. To understand the
38292 causality of Brahman as a merely mediate one would be to contradict all
38293 those statements of immediate origination. Texts such as the one quoted
38294 thus confirm the conclusion that everything originates from Brahman

38295 directly.

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38300 16. If it be said that knowledge and mind (which are mentioned) between
38301 (breath and the elements) (are stated) in order of succession, owing to
38302 an inferential mark of this; we say, not so, on account of non-
38303 difference.

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38305 'Knowledge' in the Sûtra denotes the means of knowledge, i.e. the sense-
38306 organs.--An objection is raised against the conclusion arrived at under
38307 the preceding Sûtra. We cannot, the opponent says, admit the conclusion
38308 that the passage from the Mundka Up. 'from him is born breath, mind,' &c.,
38309 declares the immediate origination from Brahman of all things, and that
38310 hence the passage confirms the view, first suggested by the inferential
38311 mark of 'thought' (see above, Sû. 14), that everything springs from
38312 Brahman direct. For the purport of the text is to state a certain order
38313 of succession, and we hence conclude that all the beings mentioned were
38314 successively created. In the second half of the text we recognise the
38315 series of ether, air, fire, &c., which is known to us from other texts,
38316 and from the fact of their being exhibited in one and the same text we
38317 conclude that knowledge and mind--which are mentioned between breath on
38318 the one side and the elements on the other--must be viewed as created in
38319 that order. The text therefore in no way confirms the direct origination
38320 of everything from Brahman. To this the Sûtra replies, 'Not so, on
38321 account of non-difference.' The first words of the text 'from him is
38322 born' connect themselves equally with breath, and knowledge, and mind,
38323 and the series of elements beginning with ether; and the meaning of the
38324 whole therefore is to declare that all the entities spring directly from
38325 Brahman, not to teach the order of succession in which they are produced.
38326 It moreover cannot have the purport of teaching a certain order of
38327 succession, because the order stated contradicts the order established
38328 by other scriptural passages; such as the one beginning 'the earth is
38329 merged in water,' and ending 'darkness becomes one.' We hence hold to
38330 the conclusion that all effects originate from Brahman only, in so far
38331 as embodied in the Unevolved, and so on, and that the terms 'fire' and
38332 so on denote Brahman, which is the Self of all those substances.--But to
38333 interpret all these words as denoting Brahman is to set aside their
38334 special denotative power as established by etymology!--To this objection
38335 the next Sûtra replies.

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38340 17. But that which abides in the things movable and immovable, i.e. the
38341 terms denoting those things, are non-secondary (i.e. of primary
38342 denotative power, viz. with regard to Brahman); since (their denotative
38343 power) is effected by the being of that (i.e. Brahman).

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38345 The 'but' sets aside the objection raised. (The primâ facie view here is
38346 as follows.) As Brahman, which has all things for its modes, is not the
38347 object of Perception and the other means of knowledge which give rise to
38348 the apprehension of the things only which are Brahman's modes, and as
38349 hence, previously to the study of the Vedânta-texts, the idea of that to
38350 which the modes belong (i.e. of Brahman) does not arise, and as the
38351 knowledge of all words finally denoting Brahman depends on the existence
38352 of the idea of that to which the modes belong (i. e. Brahman); all the
38353 individual words are used in worldly language only separately to denote
38354 special things. In other words, as the terms 'fire' and so on have
38355 denotative power with regard to particular things only, their denotative
38356 power with regard to Brahman is secondary, indirect only.--Of this view
38357 the Sûtra disposes by saying 'that which abides in the moving and the
38358 non-moving,' &c. The meaning is--the terms which abide in, i.e. are
38359 connected with, the different moving and non-moving things, and hence
38360 denote those things, possess with regard to Brahman a denotative power
38361 which is not 'bhâkta,' i.e. secondary or figurative, but primary and
38362 direct. 'Why so?' Because the denotative power of all words is dependent
38363 on the being of Brahman. For this we know from the scriptural passage

38364 which tells how names and forms were evolved by Brahman.--Here
38365 terminates the adhikarana of 'fire.'

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38370 18. Not the Self, on account of scriptural statement, and on account of
38371 the eternity (which results) from them.

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38373 The Sûtras so far have stated that this entire world, from Ether
38374 downwards, originates from the highest Brahman. It now becomes a matter
38375 for discussion whether the individual soul also originates in the same
38376 way or not.--It does so originate, the Pûrvapakshin maintains. For on
38377 this assumption only the scriptural statement as to the cognition of all
38378 things through the cognition of one thing holds good, and moreover
38379 Scripture declares that before creation everything was one. Moreover,
38380 there are texts directly stating that the soul also was produced in the
38381 same way as Ether and other created things.

38382
38383 'Prajâpati sent forth all creatures'; 'All these creatures have their
38384 root in the True, they abide in the True, they rest on the True' (Ch. Up.
38385 VI, 8, 6); 'From whence these beings are produced' (Taitt. Up. III, 1,
38386 1). As these passages declare the origination of the world inclusive of
38387 sentient beings, we conclude that the souls also originate. Nor must
38388 this be objected to on the ground that from the fact that Brahman is
38389 eternal, and the other fact that texts such as 'That art thou' teach the
38390 soul to be of the nature of Brahman, it follows that the soul also is
38391 eternal. For if we reasoned in this style we should have to admit also
38392 that the Ether and the other elements are eternal, since texts such as
38393 'in that all this has its Self' and 'all this indeed is Brahman
38394 intimate them also to be of the nature of Brahman. Hence the individual
38395 soul also originates no less than Ether and the rest.--To this the Sûtra
38396 replies, 'Not the Self, on account of scriptural statement.' The Self is
38397 not produced, since certain texts directly deny its origination; cp.
38398 'the intelligent one is not born nor does he die' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18);
38399 'There are two unborn ones, one intelligent and strong, the other non-
38400 intelligent and weak' (Svet. Up. I, 9). And the eternity of the soul is
38401 learned from the same texts, cp. 'There is one eternal thinker,' &c. (Ka.
38402 Up. II, 5, 13); 'Unborn, eternal, everlasting is that ancient one; he is
38403 not killed though the body is killed' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18).--For these
38404 reasons the soul is not produced.

38405
38406 But how then about the declaration that through the cognition of one
38407 thing everything is known?--There is no difficulty here, since the soul
38408 also is an effect, and since effect and cause are non-different.--But
38409 this implies that the soul is an originated thing just like Ether and so
38410 on!--Not so, we reply. By a thing being an effect we mean its being due
38411 to a substance passing over into some other state; and from this point
38412 of view the soul also is an effect. There is, however, the difference,
38413 that the 'other condition' which is represented by the soul is of a
38414 different kind from that which constitutes non-sentient things, such as
38415 Ether and so on. The 'otherness' on which the soul depends consists in
38416 the contraction and expansion of intelligence; while the change on which
38417 the origination of Ether and so on depends is a change of essential
38418 nature. And change of the latter kind is what we deny of the soul. We
38419 have shown that there are three entities of distinct nature, viz.
38420 objects of fruition, enjoying subjects, and a Ruler; that origination
38421 and so on which are characteristic of the objects do not belong to the
38422 subjects, and that the latter are eternal; that the characteristic
38423 qualities of the objects and likewise those of the subjects--viz.
38424 liability to pain and suffering--do not belong to the Ruler; that the
38425 latter is eternal, free from all imperfections, omniscient, immediately
38426 realising all his purposes, the Lord of the lords of the organs, the
38427 highest Lord of all; and that sentient and non-sentient beings in all
38428 their states constitute the body of the Lord while he constitutes their
38429 Self. While Brahman thus has for its modes (prakâra) the sentient and
38430 non-sentient beings in which it ever is embodied, during certain periods
38431 those beings abide in so subtle a condition as to be incapable of
38432 receiving designations different from that of Brahman itself; Brahman

38433 then is said to be in its causal state. When, on the other hand, its
38434 body is constituted by all those beings in their gross state, when they
38435 have separate, distinct names and forms, Brahman is said to be in its
38436 effected condition. When, now, Brahman passes over from the causal state
38437 into the effected state, the aggregate of non-sentient things which in
38438 the causal state were destitute of name and form undergoes an essential
38439 change of nature--implying the possession of distinct names and so on--
38440 so as to become fit to constitute objects of fruition for sentient
38441 beings; the change, on the other hand, which the sentient beings (the
38442 souls) undergo on that occasion is nothing more than a certain expansion
38443 of intelligence (or consciousness), capacitating them to experience the
38444 different rewards or punishments for their previous deeds. The ruling
38445 element of the world, i.e. the Lord, finally, who has the sentient and
38446 non-sentient beings for his modes, undergoes a change in so far as he is,
38447 at alternating periods, embodied in all those beings in their
38448 alternating states. The two modes, and he to whom the modes belong, thus
38449 undergo a common change in so far as in the case of all of them the
38450 causal condition passes over into a different condition.

38451
38452 It is with reference to this change undergone by one substance in
38453 passing over into a different state that the Chandogya says that through
38454 the knowledge of one thing everything is known, and illustrates this by
38455 the case of the lump of clay (knowing which we know all things made of
38456 clay). Texts such as 'Prajâpati sent forth the creatures,' which declare
38457 the origination of the soul, really mean only to state that the souls
38458 are by turns associated with or dissociated from bodies--the effect of
38459 which is that their intelligence is either contracted or expanded. Texts
38460 again which deny the origination of the soul and affirm its permanency
38461 ('He is not born and does not die,' &c.) mean to say that the soul does
38462 not, like the non-sentient element of creation, undergo changes of
38463 essential nature. And finally there are texts the purport of which it is
38464 to declare the absence of change of essential nature as well as of
38465 alternate expansion and contraction of intelligence--cp. 'That is the
38466 great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV,
38467 4, 25); 'the eternal thinker,' &c. (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13); such texts have
38468 for their subject the highest Lord.--All this also explains how Brahman,
38469 which is at all times differentiated by the sentient and non-sentient
38470 beings that constitute its body, can be said to be one only previous to
38471 creation; the statement is possible because at that time the
38472 differentiation of names and forms did not exist. That that which makes
38473 the difference between plurality and unity is the presence or absence of
38474 differentiation through names and forms, is distinctly declared in the
38475 text, 'Now all this was undifferentiated. It became differentiated by
38476 form and name' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7).--Those also who hold that the
38477 individual soul is due to Nescience; and those who hold it to be due to
38478 a real limiting adjunct (upâdhi); and those who hold that Brahman, whose
38479 essential nature is mere Being, assumes by itself the threefold form of
38480 enjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment, and supreme Ruler; can all of
38481 them explain the unity which Scripture predicates of Brahman in the
38482 pralaya state, only on the basis of the absence of differentiation by
38483 names and forms; for according to them also (there is no absolute unity
38484 at any time, but) either the potentiality of Nescience, or the
38485 potentiality of the limiting adjunct, or the potentialities of enjoying
38486 subjects, objects of enjoyment, and supreme Ruler persist in the pralaya
38487 condition also. And, moreover, it is proved by the two Sûtras, II, 1, 33;
38488 35, that the distinction of the several individual souls and the stream
38489 of their works are eternal.

38490
38491 There is, however, the following difference between those several views.
38492 The first-mentioned view implies that Brahman itself is under the
38493 illusive influence of beginningless Avidyâ. According to the second view,
38494 the effect of the real and beginningless limiting adjunct is that
38495 Brahman itself is in the state of bondage; for there is no other entity
38496 but Brahman and the adjunct. According to the third view, Brahman itself
38497 assumes different forms, and itself experiences the various unpleasant
38498 consequences of deeds. Nor would it avail to say that that part of
38499 Brahman which is the Ruler is not an experiencing subject; for as
38500 Brahman is all-knowing it recognises the enjoying subject as non-
38501 different from itself, and thus is itself an enjoying subject.--

38502 According to our view, on the other hand, Brahman, which has for its
38503 body all sentient and non-sentient beings, whether in their subtle or
38504 their gross state, is always--in its effected as well as in its causal
38505 condition free from all shadow of imperfection, and a limitless ocean as
38506 it were of all exalted qualities. All imperfections, and suffering, and
38507 all change belong not to Brahman, but only to the sentient and non-
38508 sentient beings which are its modes. This view removes all difficulties.--
38509 Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the Self.'

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38514 19. For this very reason (the individual soul is) a knower.

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38516 It has been shown that, different therein from Ether and the rest, the
38517 soul is not produced. This leads to the consideration of the soul's
38518 essential nature. Is that essential nature constituted by mere
38519 intelligence as Sugata and Kapila hold; or is the soul as Kanâda thinks,
38520 essentially non-intelligent, comparable to a stone, while intelligence
38521 is merely an adventitious quality of it; or is it essentially a knowing
38522 subject?--The soul is mere intelligence, the Pûrvapakshin maintains; for
38523 the reason that Scripture declares it to be so. For in the antaryâmin-
38524 brâhmana the clause which in the Mâdhyandina-text runs as follows, 'he
38525 who abides in the Self,' is in the text of the Kânvas represented by the
38526 clause 'he who abides in knowledge.' Similarly the text 'knowledge
38527 performs the sacrifice and all sacred acts' (Taitt. Up. II, 5, I) shows
38528 that it is knowledge only which is the true nature of the active Self.
38529 And Smriti texts convey the same view, as e.g. 'it in reality is of the
38530 nature of absolutely spotless intelligence.' A second Pûrvapakshin
38531 denies the truth of this view. If, he says, we assume that the Self's
38532 essential nature consists either in mere knowledge or in its being a
38533 knowing subject, it follows that as the Self is omnipresent there must
38534 be consciousness at all places and at all times. On that doctrine we,
38535 further, could not account for the use of the instruments of cognition
38536 (i.e. the sense-organs, &c.); nor for the fact that in the states of
38537 deep sleep, swoon and so on, the Self although present is not observed
38538 to be conscious, while on the other hand consciousness is seen to arise
38539 as soon as the conditions of the waking state are realised. We therefore
38540 conclude that neither intelligence or consciousness, nor being a knowing
38541 agent, constitutes the essence of the soul, but that consciousness is a
38542 mere adventitious or occasional attribute. And the omnipresence of the
38543 Self must needs be admitted since its effects are perceived everywhere.
38544 Nor is there any valid reason for holding that the Self moves to any
38545 place; for as it is assumed to be present everywhere the actual
38546 accomplishment of effects (at certain places only) may be attributed to
38547 the moving of the body only.--Scripture also directly declares that in
38548 the state of deep sleep there is no consciousness, 'I do not indeed at
38549 the present moment know myself, so as to be able to say "that am I," nor
38550 do I know those beings.' Similarly Scripture declares the absence of
38551 consciousness in the state of final release, 'when he has departed there
38552 is no consciousness' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 12); where the Self is spoken of
38553 as having knowledge for its essential nature, the meaning only is that
38554 knowledge constitutes its specific quality, and the expression is
38555 therefore not to be urged in its literal sense.

38556

38557 Against all this the Sûtra declares 'for this very reason a knower.'
38558 This Self is essentially a knower, a knowing subject; not either mere
38559 knowledge or of non-sentient nature.--Why?--'For this very reason,' i.e.
38560 on account of Scripture itself. 'For this reason' refers back to the 'on
38561 account of Scripture' in the preceding Sûtra. For in the Chândogya,
38562 where the condition of the released and the non-released soul is
38563 described, the text says 'He who knows, let me smell this, he is the
38564 Self--with the mind seeing those pleasures he rejoices--the devas who are
38565 in the world of Brahman--whose desires are true, whose purposes are true--
38566 not remembering the body into which he was born' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 4-5;
38567 1, 5; 12, 3). And elsewhere 'The seer does not see death' (Ch. Up. VII,
38568 26, 2). Similarly we read in the Vâjasaneyaka, in reply to the question
38569 'Who is that Self?'--'He who is within the heart, surrounded by the
38570 Prânas, the person of light, consisting of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 3,

7); 'By what should one know the knower?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'That person knows.' And 'for he is the knower, the hearer, the smeller, the taster, the perceiver, the thinker, the agent--he the person whose Self is knowledge'; and 'thus these sixteen parts of that seer' (Pra. Up. IV, 9; VI, 5). To the objection that if being a cognising subject constituted the essential nature of the Self it would follow that as the Self is omnipresent, there would be consciousness always and everywhere, the next Sûtra replies.

20. On account of (its) passing out, moving and returning.

The Self is not omnipresent, but on the contrary, of atomic size (anu).--How is this known?--Since Scripture says that it passes out, goes and returns. Its passing out is described in the following passage 'by that light this Self departs, either through the eye, or through the skull, or through other parts of the body' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2). Its going in the following text 'all those who pass away out of this world go to the moon,' and its returning in the text 'from that world he comes again into this world, for action.' All this going, and so on, cannot be reconciled with the soul being present everywhere.

21. And on account of the latter two (being effected) through the Self.

The 'and' has affirming power. The 'passing out' might somehow be reconciled with a non-moving Self (such as the omnipresent Self would be) if it were taken in the sense of the Self separating from the body; but for the going and returning no analogous explanation is possible. They, therefore, must be taken as effected by the Self itself (which, then, cannot be omnipresent and non-moving).

22. If it be said that (the soul) is not atomic, on account of scriptural statement of (what is) not that; we say no, on account of the other one being the topic.

The passage 'He who is within the heart, surrounded by the Prânas, the person consisting of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7) introduces as the topic of discussion the personal Self, and further on in the same chapter we read 'the unborn Self, the great one' (IV, 4, 22). The personal Self, being expressly called great, cannot, therefore, be atomic!--Not so, we reply. 'Since the other one is the topic.' In the second text quoted that Self which is other than the personal Self--i.e. the highest Self (prâjña) constitutes the topic. In the beginning of the chapter, indeed, the individual Self is introduced, but later on, between the two texts quoted, the instruction begins to concern itself with the highest Self, 'he by whom there is known the Self of intelligence' (pratibuddha âtmâ; IV, 4, 13). It is this latter Self which, in 22 is called great, not the individual Self.

23. And on account of the very word, and of measure.

Scripture directly applies the word 'anu' to the individual Self, 'By thought is to be known that atomic Self into which Breath has entered fivefold' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 9).--By the term 'unmâna' in the Sûtra we have to understand measurement by selection of comparative instances. Scripture declares the minuteness of the individual Self by reference to things which are like atoms in size, 'The individual soul is to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair divided a hundred

times, and yet it is to be infinite' (Svet. Up. V, 9); 'that lower one is seen of the measure of the point of a goad' (V, 8). For these reasons also the individual Self must be viewed as atomic.--But this conflicts with the fact that sensation extends over the whole body!--This objection the next Sûtra refutes by means of an analogous instance.

24. There is no contradiction, as in the case of sandal-ointment.

As a drop of sandal-ointment, although applied to one spot of the body only, yet produces a refreshing sensation extending over the whole body; thus the Self also, although dwelling in one part of the body only, is conscious of sensations taking place in any part of the body.

25. Should it be said (that this is not so) on account of specialisation of abode; we say no, on account of the acknowledgment (of a place of the Self), viz. in the heart.

There is a difference. The drop of ointment can produce its effect as at any rate it is in contact with a definite part of the body. But we know of no such part in the case of the soul!--Not so, we reply. Scripture informs us that the Self abides in a definite part of the body, viz. the heart. 'For that Self is in the heart, there are a hundred and one veins.' And in reply to the question 'What is that Self?' the text has 'He who is within the heart, surrounded by the Prânas, the Person of light, consisting of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7).--The parallel case of the sandal-ointment is referred to in order to point out that the Self abides in some particular part of the body; while the ointment is not bound to any special place.--In the next Sûtra the Sûtrakâra proceeds to state how, according to his own view, the Self, although abiding in one spot only, gives rise to effects extending over the whole body.

26. Or on account of its quality as light.

The 'or' is meant to set aside the view previously stated. The Self extends through the whole body by means of its quality, viz. knowledge or consciousness. 'As light.' As the light of things abiding in one place--such as gems, the sun, and so on--is seen to extend to many places, so the consciousness of the Self dwelling in the heart pervades the entire body. That the knowledge of the knowing subject may extend beyond its substrate, as the light of a luminous body does, we have already explained under the first Sûtra.--But it has been said that the Self is mere knowledge; how then can knowledge be said to be a quality--which is something different from the essential nature of a thing?--This the next Sûtra explains.

27. There is distinction as in the case of smell; and thus Scripture declares.

Just as smell, which is perceived as a quality of earth, is distinct from earth; thus knowledge of which we are conscious as the quality of a knowing subject--which relation expresses itself in judgments such as 'I know'--is different from the knowing subject. Scriptural texts also prove this relation, as e.g. 'This Person knows.'

38709 28. On account of the separate statement.
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38711 Scripture even states quite directly that knowledge is something
38712 distinct from the knowing subject, viz. in the passage 'For there is not
38713 known any intermission of the knowing of the knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 3,
38714 30).--It has been said that in passages such as 'he who abiding in
38715 knowledge' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Knowledge performs the sacrifice'
38716 (Taitt. Up. II, 5, 1); 'having knowledge for its nature, absolutely free
38717 from stain,' Scripture speaks of the Self as being mere knowledge (not a
38718 knower). This point the next Sûtra elucidates.
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38723 29. But (the Self) is designated as that because it has that quality
38724 (viz. knowledge) for its essential quality; as in the case of the
38725 intelligent (prâjña) Self.
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38727 The 'but' discards the objection. Because that quality, viz. the quality
38728 of knowledge, is the essential quality, therefore the Self is, in the
38729 passages quoted, designated as knowledge. For knowledge constitutes the
38730 essential quality of the Self. Similarly, the intelligent highest Self
38731 is occasionally called 'Bliss,' because bliss is its essential quality.
38732 Compare 'If that bliss existed not in the ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, 1);
38733 'He perceived that bliss is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6, 1). That bliss
38734 is the essential attribute of Brahman is proved by texts such as 'That
38735 is one bliss of Brahman'; 'He who knows the bliss of Brahman is afraid
38736 of nothing' (Taitt. Up. II, 4, 1).--Or else the analogous case to which
38737 the Sûtra refers may be that of the intelligent Brahman being designated
38738 by the term 'knowledge,' in texts such as 'Truth, knowledge, the
38739 Infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1). That knowledge is the essential
38740 quality of Brahman is known from passages such as 'together with the
38741 intelligent Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'He who is all-knowing' (Mu.
38742 Up. I, 1, 9).
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38747 30. And there is no objection, since (the quality of knowledge) exists
38748 wherever the Self is; this being observed.
38749

38750 Since knowledge is an attribute which is met with wherever a Self is,
38751 there is no objection to the Self being designated by that attribute.
38752 Similarly we observe that special kinds of cows, as e.g. hornless ones,
38753 are designated by the term 'cow,' since the quality of possessing the
38754 generic character of cows is met with everywhere in connexion with the
38755 essential character of such animals with mutilated horns; since in fact
38756 that quality contributes to define their essential character. The 'and'
38757 of the Sûtra is meant to suggest a further argument, viz. that to apply
38758 to the Self the term 'knowledge' is suitable for that reason also that
38759 like knowledge the Self is self-illuminated. The objection that
38760 knowledge or consciousness cannot be an attribute inseparably connected
38761 with the essential nature of the Self as there is no consciousness in
38762 deep sleep and similar states is taken up in the next Sûtra.
38763
38764
38765
38766

38767 31. Since there may be manifestation of that which exists; as in the
38768 case of virile power and so on.
38769

38770 The 'but' is meant to set the raised objection aside. The case may be
38771 that while consciousness is present also in deep sleep, and so on, it is
38772 manifested in the waking state only; whence there would be no objection
38773 to viewing consciousness as an essential attribute of the Self. 'As in
38774 the case of virile power and the like.' Special substances such as the
38775 virile element are indeed present in the male child already, but then
38776 are not manifest, while later on they manifest themselves with advancing
38777 youth; but all the same the possession of those substances is essential

38778 to the male being, not merely adventitious. For to be made up of seven
38779 elementary substances (viz. blood, humour, flesh, fat, marrow, bone, and
38780 semen) is an essential, property of the body. That even in deep sleep
38781 and similar states the 'I' shines forth we have explained above.
38782 Consciousness is always there, but only in the waking state and in
38783 dreams it is observed to relate itself to objects. And that to be a
38784 subject of cognition, and so on, are essential attributes of the Self,
38785 we have also proved before. The conclusion, therefore, is that to be a
38786 knowing subject is the essential character of the Self. And that Self is
38787 of atomic size. The text 'when he has departed there is no
38788 consciousness' (samjñā; Bri. Up. II, 4, 12) does not declare that the
38789 released Self has no consciousness; but only that in the case of that
38790 Self there is absent that knowledge (experience) of birth, death, and so
38791 on, which in the Samsāra state is caused by the connexion of the Self
38792 with the elements--as described in the preceding passage, 'that great
38793 being having risen from out these elements again perishes after them.'
38794 For the text as to the absence of samjñā after death must be interpreted
38795 in harmony with other texts describing the condition of the released
38796 soul, such as 'the seeing one does not see death nor illness nor pain;
38797 the seeing one sees everything and obtains everything everywhere' (Ch.
38798 Up. VII, 25, 2); 'not remembering that body into which he was born--
38799 seeing these pleasures with the mind he rejoices' (VIII, 12, 3; 5).

38800
38801 The Sūtras now proceed to refute the doctrine of the Self being (not a
38802 knower) but mere knowledge, and being omnipresent.

38803
38804
38805
38806
38807 32. There would result permanent consciousness or non-consciousness, or
38808 else limitative restriction to either.

38809
38810 On the other view, i.e. on the view of the Self being omnipresent and
38811 mere knowledge, it would follow either that consciousness and also non-
38812 consciousness would permanently take place together everywhere; or else
38813 that there would be definite permanent restriction to either of the two,
38814 i.e. either permanent consciousness or permanent non-consciousness.--If
38815 the omnipresent Self, consisting of mere knowledge only, were the cause
38816 of all that actual consciousness and non-consciousness on the part of
38817 Selfs which takes place in the world, it might be conceived either as
38818 the cause of both--i.e. consciousness and non-consciousness--and this
38819 would mean that there is everywhere and at all times simultaneous
38820 consciousness and non-consciousness. If, on the other hand, it were the
38821 cause of consciousness only, there would never and nowhere be
38822 unconsciousness of anything; and if it were the cause of non-
38823 consciousness only, there would never and nowhere be consciousness of
38824 anything. On our view, on the other hand, the actually perceived
38825 distribution of consciousness and non-consciousness explains itself,
38826 since we hold the Self to abide within bodies only, so that naturally
38827 consciousness takes place there only, not anywhere else.--The view,
38828 finally (held by the Vaiseshikas), of the consciousness of the Self
38829 depending on its organs (mind, senses, &c.; while the omnipresent Self
38830 is, apart from those organs, non-sentient, jada), results in the same
38831 difficulties as the view criticised above; for as all the Selfs are
38832 omnipresent they are in permanent conjunction with all organs; and
38833 moreover it would follow that the adrishtas (due to the actions of the
38834 different bodies) could not thus be held apart (but would cling to all
38835 Selfs, each of which is in contact with all bodies).

38836
38837 Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the _knower_.'

38838
38839
38840
38841
38842 33. (The soul is) an agent, on account of Scripture (thus) having a
38843 purport.

38844
38845 It has been shown that the individual Self is a knowing subject and
38846 atomic. Now the question arises whether that Self is an agent or, being

itself non-active, erroneously ascribes to itself the activity of the non-sentient gunas. The primâ facie answer is that the individual Self is not an agent, since the sacred texts concerned with the Self declare that the Self does not act, while the gunas do act. Thus, e.g. in the Kathavallî, where the text at first denies of the individual Self all the attributes of Prakriti, such as being born, ageing and dying ('he is not born, he does not die'), and then also denies that the Self is the agent in acts such as killing and the like, 'If the slayer thinks that he slays, if the slain thinks that he is slain, they both do not understand; for this one does not slay, nor is that one slain' (I, 2, 19). This means--if one thinks the Self to be the slayer one does not know the Self. And the Lord himself teaches that non-agency is the essential nature of the individual soul, and that it is mere delusion on the Self's part to ascribe to itself agency. 'By the attributes (guna) of Prakriti, actions are wrought all round.' He who is deluded by self-conceit thinks 'I am the agent'; 'when the seer beholds no other agent than the gunas'; 'Prakriti is said to be the cause of all agency of causes and effects, whilst the soul is the cause of all enjoyment of pleasure and pain' (Bha. Gî. III, 27; XIV, 19; XIII, 20).--The soul, therefore, is an enjoyer only, while all agency belongs to Prakriti--To this the Sûtra replies, 'an agent, on account of Scripture thus having a meaning.' The Self only is an agent, not the gunas, because thus only Scripture has a meaning. For the scriptural injunctions, such as 'he who desires the heavenly world is to sacrifice,' 'He who desires Release is to meditate on Brahman,' and similar ones, enjoin action on him only who will enjoy the fruit of the action--whether the heavenly world, or Release, or anything else. If a non-sentient thing were the agent, the injunction would not be addressed to another being (viz. to an intelligent being--to which it actually is addressed). The term 'sâstra' (scriptural injunction) moreover comes from sâs, to command, and commanding means impelling to action. But scriptural injunctions impel to action through giving rise to a certain conception (in the mind of the being addressed), and the non-sentient Pradhâna cannot be made to conceive anything. Scripture therefore has a sense only, if we admit that none but the intelligent enjoyer of the fruit of the action is at the same time the agent. Thus the Pûrva Mimamsa declares 'the fruit of the injunction belongs to the agent' (III, 7, 18). The Pûrvapakshin had contended that the text 'if the slayer thinks, &c.,' proves the Self not to be the agent in the action of slaying; but what the text really means is only that the Self as being eternal cannot be killed. The text, from Smriti, which was alleged as proving that the gunas only possess active power, refers to the fact that in all activities lying within the sphere of the samsara, the activity of the Self is due not to its own nature but to its contact with the different gunas. The activity of the gunas, therefore, must be viewed not as permanent, but occasional only. In the same sense Smriti says 'the reason is the connexion of the soul with the guwas, in its births, in good and evil wombs' (Bha. Gî. XIII, 21). Similarly it is said there (XVIII, 16) that 'he who through an untrained understanding looks upon the isolated Self as an agent, that man of perverted mind does not see'; the meaning being that, since it appears from a previous passage that the activity of the Self depends on five factors (as enumerated in sl. 16), he who views the isolated Self to be an agent has no true insight.

34. On account of taking and the declaration as to its moving about.

The text beginning 'And as a great king,' &c., declares that 'the Self taking the pranas moves about in its own body, according to its pleasure' (Bri. Up. II, 1, 18), i.e. it teaches that the Self is active in taking to itself the prânas and moving about in the body.

35. And on account of the designation (of the Self as the agent) in actions. If not so, there would be change of grammatical expression.

Because in the text 'Knowledge performs the sacrifice, it performs all works' (Taitt. Up. II, 5) the Self is designated as the agent in all worldly and Vedic works, for this reason also the Self must be held to be an agent. And should it be said that the word 'knowledge' in that text denotes not the Self, but the internal organ or buddhi, we point out that in that case there would be a change of grammatical expression, that is to say, as the buddhi is the instrument of action, the text would exhibit the instrumental case instead of the nominative case 'by knowledge, and so on' (vijñānena instead of vijñānam).

36. (There would be) absence of definite rule, as in the case of consciousness.

The Sūtra points out a difficulty which arises on the view of the Self not being an agent. Sūtra 32 has declared that if the Self were all-pervading it would follow that there would be no definite determination with regard to consciousness. Similarly, if the Self were not an agent but all activity belonged to Prakriti it would follow that as Prakriti is a common possession of all souls, all actions would result in enjoyment (experience) on the part of all souls, or else on the part of none; for as each Self is held to be omnipresent, they are all of them in equal proximity to all parts of the Pradhāna. For the same reason it could not be maintained that the distribution of results between the different souls depends on the different internal organs which are joined to the souls; for if the souls are omnipresent, no soul will be exclusively connected with any particular internal organ.

37. On account of the inversion of power.

If the internal organ were the agent, then--since it is impossible that a being other than the agent should be the enjoyer of the fruit of the action--the power of enjoyment also would belong to the internal organ, and would consequently have to be denied of the Self. But if this were so, there would be no longer any proof for the existence of the Self; for they expressly teach that 'the person (i.e. the soul) exists, on account of the fact of enjoyment.'

38. And on account of the absence of samādhi.

If the internal organ were the agent, it would be such even in that final state of meditation, called samādhi, which is the instrument of Release. But that state consists therein that the meditating being realises its difference from Prakriti, and this is a conception which Prakriti itself (of which the internal organ is only a modification) cannot form. The Self alone, therefore, is the agent. But this would imply that the activity of the Self is never at rest! Of this difficulty the next Sūtra disposes.

39. And as the carpenter, in both ways.

The Self, although always provided with the instruments of action, such as the organ of speech, and so on, acts when it wishes to do so, and does not act when it does not wish to do so. Just as a carpenter, although having his axe and other implements ready at hand, works or does not work just as he pleases. If the internal organ, on the contrary, were essentially active, it would constantly be acting, since as a non-

38985 intelligent being it could not be influenced by particular reasons for
38986 action, such as the desire for enjoyment.

38987
38988 Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the agent.'

38989
38990
38991
38992
38993 40. But from the highest, this being declared by Scripture.

38994
38995 Is the activity of the individual soul independent (free), or does it
38996 depend on the highest Self? It is free; for if it were dependent on the
38997 highest Self, the whole body of scriptural injunctions and prohibitions
38998 would be unmeaning. For commandments can be addressed to such agents
38999 only as are capable of entering on action or refraining from action,
39000 according to their own thought and will.

39001
39002 This primâ facie view is set aside by the Sûtra. The activity of the
39003 individual soul proceeds from the highest Self as its cause. For
39004 Scripture teaches this. 'Entered within, the ruler of creatures, the
39005 Self of all'; 'who dwelling in the Self is different from the Self, whom
39006 the Self does not know, whose body the Self is, who rules the Self from
39007 within, he is thy Self, the inward ruler, the immortal one.' Smriti
39008 teaches the same, 'I dwell within the heart of all; memory and knowledge
39009 as well as their loss come from me' (Bha. Gî. XV, 15); 'The Lord, O
39010 Arjuna, dwells in the heart of all creatures, whirling, by his
39011 mysterious power, all creatures as if mounted on a machine' (Bha. Gî.
39012 XVIII, 61).--But this view implies the meaninglessness of all scriptural
39013 injunctions and prohibitions!--To this the next Sûtra replies.

39014
39015
39016
39017
39018 41. But with a view to the efforts made (the Lord makes the soul act) on
39019 account of the (thus resulting) non-meaninglessness of injunctions and
39020 prohibitions and the rest.

39021
39022 The inwardly ruling highest Self promotes action in so far as it regards
39023 in the case of any action the volitional effort made by the individual
39024 soul, and then aids that effort by granting its favour or permission
39025 (anumati); action is not possible without permission on the part of the
39026 highest Self. In this way (i.e. since the action primarily depends on
39027 the volitional effort of the soul) injunctions and prohibitions are not
39028 devoid of meaning. The 'and the rest' of the Sûtra is meant to suggest
39029 the grace and punishments awarded by the Lord.--The case is analogous to
39030 that of property of which two men are joint owners. If one of these
39031 wishes to transfer that property to a third person he cannot do so
39032 without the permission of his partner, but that that permission is given
39033 is after all his own doing, and hence the fruit of the action (reward or
39034 anything) properly belongs to him only.--That, in the case of evil
39035 actions, allowance of the action on the part of one able to stop it does
39036 not necessarily prove hardheartedness, we have shown above when
39037 explaining the Sâmkhya doctrine.--But there is a scriptural text.--'He
39038 (the Lord) makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a
39039 good deed, and the same makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these
39040 worlds do a bad deed' (Kau. Up. III, 8)--which means that the Lord
39041 himself causes men to do good and evil actions, and this does not agree
39042 with the partial independence claimed above for the soul.--The text
39043 quoted, we reply, does not apply to all agents, but means that the Lord,
39044 wishing to do a favour to those who are resolved on acting so as fully
39045 to please the highest Person, engenders in their minds a tendency
39046 towards highly virtuous actions, such as are means to attain to him;
39047 while on the other hand, in order to punish those who are resolved on
39048 lines of action altogether displeasing to him, he engenders in their
39049 minds a delight in such actions as have a downward tendency and are
39050 obstacles in the way of the attainment of the Lord. Thus the Lord
39051 himself says, 'I am the origin of all, everything proceeds from me;
39052 knowing this the wise worship me with love. To them ever devoted,
39053 worshipping me in love, I give that means of wisdom by which they attain

39054 to me. In mercy only to them, dwelling in their hearts, do I destroy the
39055 darkness born of ignorance, with the brilliant light of knowledge' (Bha.
39056 Gî. X, 8; 10-11). And further on the Lord--after having described
39057 'demoniac' people, in the passus beginning 'they declare the world to be
39058 without a Truth, without a resting-place, without a Ruler,' and ending
39059 'malignantly hating me who abides in their own bodies and those of
39060 others'--declares, 'These evil and malign haters, most degraded of men,
39061 I hurl perpetually into transmigrations and into demoniac wombs' (XVI, 8-
39062 19).

39063
39064 Here terminates the adhikarana of 'that which depends on the Highest.'

39065
39066
39067
39068
39069 42. (The soul is) a part, on account of the declarations of difference
39070 and otherwise; some also record (that Brahman is of) the nature of
39071 slaves, fishermen, and so on.

39072
39073 The Sûtras have declared that the individual soul is an agent, and as
39074 such dependent on the highest Person. The following question now arises--
39075 Is the individual soul absolutely different from Brahman? or is it
39076 nothing else than Brahman itself in so far as under the influence of
39077 error? or is it Brahman in so far as determined by a limiting adjunct
39078 (upâdhi)? or is it a part (amsa) of Brahman?--The doubt on this point is
39079 due to the disagreement of the scriptural texts.--But this whole matter
39080 has already been decided under Sû. II, 1, 22.--True. But as a difficulty
39081 presents itself on the ground of the conflicting nature of the texts--
39082 some asserting the difference and some the unity of the individual soul
39083 and Brahman--the matter is here more specially decided by its being
39084 proved that the soul is a part of Brahman. As long as this decision
39085 remains unsettled, the conclusions arrived at under the two Sûtras
39086 referred to, viz. that the soul is non-different from Brahman and that
39087 Brahman is 'additional' to the soul, are without a proper basis.

39088
39089 Let it then first be said that the soul is absolutely different from
39090 Brahman, since texts such as 'There are two, the one knowing, the other
39091 not knowing, both unborn, the one strong, the other weak' (Svet. Up. I,
39092 9) declare their difference. Texts which maintain the non-difference of
39093 a being which is knowing and another which is not knowing, if taken
39094 literally, convey a contradiction--as if one were to say, 'Water the
39095 ground with fire'!--and must therefore be understood in some secondary
39096 metaphorical sense. To hold that the individual soul is a part of
39097 Brahman does not explain matters; for by a 'part' we understand that
39098 which constitutes part of the extension of something. If, then, the soul
39099 occupied part of the extension of Brahman, all its imperfections would
39100 belong to Brahman. Nor can the soul be a part of Brahman if we take
39101 'part' to mean a piece (khanda); for Brahman does not admit of being
39102 divided into pieces, and moreover, the difficulties connected with the
39103 former interpretation would present themselves here also. That something
39104 absolutely different from something else should yet be a part of the
39105 latter cannot in fact be proved.

39106
39107 Or else let it be said that the soul is Brahman affected by error
39108 (bhrama). For this is the teaching of texts such as 'Thou art that';
39109 'this Self is Brahman.' Those texts, on the other hand, which declare
39110 the difference of the two merely restate what is already established by
39111 perception and the other means of knowledge, and therefore are shown, by
39112 those texts the purport of which it is to teach non-duality not
39113 established by other means, to lie--like perception and the other means
39114 of knowledge themselves--within the sphere of Nescience.

39115
39116 Or let it be assumed, in the third place, that the individual soul is
39117 Brahman as determined by a beginningless limiting adjunct (upâdhi). For
39118 it is on this ground that Scripture teaches the Self to be Brahman. And
39119 that upâdhi must not be said to be a mere erroneous imagination, for on
39120 that view the distinction of bondage, release, and so on, would be
39121 impossible.

39122

39123 Against all these views the Sûtra declares that the soul is a part of
39124 Brahman; since there are declarations of difference and also 'otherwise,'
39125 i.e. declarations of unity. To the former class belong all those texts
39126 which dwell on the distinction of the creator and the creature, the
39127 ruler and the ruled, the all-knowing and the ignorant, the independent
39128 and the dependent, the pure and the impure, that which is endowed with
39129 holy qualities and that which possesses qualities of an opposite kind,
39130 the lord and the dependent. To the latter class belong such texts as
39131 'Thou art that' and 'this Self is Brahman.' Some persons even record
39132 that Brahman is of the nature of slaves, fishermen, and so on. The
39133 Âtharvanikas, that is to say, have the following text, 'Brahman are the
39134 slaves. Brahman are these fishers,' and so on; and as Brahman there is
39135 said to comprise within itself all individual souls, the passage teaches
39136 general non-difference of the Self. In order, then, that texts of both
39137 these classes may be taken in their primary, literal sense, we must
39138 admit that the individual soul is a part of Brahman. Nor is it a fact
39139 that the declarations of difference refer to matters settled by other
39140 means of knowledge, such as perception and so on, and on that account
39141 are mere reiterations of something established otherwise (in consequence
39142 of which they would have no original proving force of their own, and
39143 would be sublated by the texts declaring non-duality). For the fact that
39144 the soul is created by Brahman, is ruled by it, constitutes its body, is
39145 subordinate to it, abides in it, is preserved by it, is absorbed by it,
39146 stands to it in the relation of a meditating devotee, and through its
39147 grace attains the different ends of man, viz. religious duty, wealth,
39148 pleasure and final release--all this and what is effected thereby, viz.
39149 the distinction of the soul and Brahman, does not fall within the
39150 cognisance of perception and the other means of proof, and hence is not
39151 established by something else. It is therefore not true that the texts
39152 declaring the creation of the world, and so on, are mere reiterations of
39153 differences established by other means of authoritative knowledge, and
39154 hence have for their purport to teach things that are false.--[Nor will
39155 it do to say that the texts declaring duality teach what indeed is not
39156 established by other means of knowledge but is erroneous.] 'Brahman
39157 conceives the thought of differentiating itself, forms the resolution of
39158 becoming many, and accordingly creates the ether and the other elements,
39159 enters into them as individual soul, evolves all the different forms and
39160 names, takes upon himself all the pleasures and pains which spring from
39161 experiencing the infinite multitude of objects thus constituted, abides
39162 within and inwardly rules all beings, recognises itself in its jîva-
39163 condition to be one with the universal causal Brahman, and finally
39164 accomplishes its release from the samsâra and the body of sacred
39165 doctrine by which this release is effected'--all this the Veda indeed
39166 declares, but its real purport is that all this is only true of a
39167 Brahman under the influence of an illusion, and therefore is unreal!--
39168 while at the same time Brahman is defined as that the essential nature
39169 of which is absolutely pure intelligence! Truly, if such were the
39170 purport of the Veda, what more would the Veda be than the idle talk of a
39171 person out of his mind!

39172
39173 Nor finally is there any good in the theory of the soul being Brahman in
39174 so far as determined by a limiting adjunct. For this view also is in
39175 conflict with the texts which distinguish Brahman as the ruling and the
39176 soul as the ruled principle, and so on. One and the same Devadatta does
39177 not become double as it were--a ruler on the one hand and a ruled
39178 subject on the other--because he is determined by the house in which he
39179 is, or by something else.

39180
39181 In order to be able to account for the twofold designations of the soul,
39182 we must therefore admit that the soul is a part of Brahman.

39183
39184
39185
39186
39187 43. And on account of the mantra.

39188
39189 'One part (quarter) of it are all beings, three feet (quarters) of it
39190 are the Immortal in heaven' (Ch. Up. III, 12, 6)--on account of this
39191 mantra also the soul must be held to be a part of Brahman. For the word

'foot' denotes a part. As the individual souls are many the mantra uses the plural form 'all beings.' In the Sûtra (42) the word 'part' is in the singular, with a view to denote the whole class. For the same reason in II, 3, 18 also the word 'atman' is in the singular. For that the individual Selfs are different from the Lord, and are many and eternal, is declared by texts such as 'He who, eternal and intelligent, fulfils the desires of many who likewise are eternal and intelligent' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13). Since thus the plurality of the eternal individual Selfs rests on good authority, those who have an insight into the true nature of Selfs will discern without difficulty different characteristics distinguishing the individual Selfs, although all Selfs are alike in so far as having intelligence for their essential nature. Moreover the Sûtra II, 3, 48 directly states the plurality of the individual Selfs.

44. Moreover it is so stated in Smriti.

Smriti moreover declares the individual soul to be a part of the highest Person, 'An eternal part of myself becomes the individual soul (jîva) in the world of life' (Bha. Gî. XV, 7). For this reason also the soul must be held to be a part of Brahman.

But if the soul is a part of Brahman, all the imperfections of the soul are Brahman's also! To this objection the next Sûtra replies.

45. But as in the case of light and so on. Not so is the highest.

The 'but' discards the objection. 'Like light and so on.' The individual soul is a part of the highest Self; as the light issuing from a luminous thing such as fire or the sun is a part of that body; or as the generic characteristics of a cow or horse, and the white or black colour of things so coloured, are attributes and hence parts of the things in which those attributes inhere; or as the body is a part of an embodied being. For by a part we understand that which constitutes one place (desa) of some thing, and hence a distinguishing attribute (viseshna) is a part of the thing distinguished by that attribute. Hence those analysing a thing of that kind discriminate between the _distinguishing_ clement or part of it, and the _distinguished_ element or part. Now although the distinguishing attribute and the thing distinguished thereby stand to each other in the relation of part and whole, yet we observe them to differ in essential character. Hence there is no contradiction between the individual and the highest Self--the former of which is a viseshana of the latter--standing to each other in the relation of part and whole, and their being at the same time of essentially different nature. This the Sûtra declares 'not so is the highest,' i.e. the highest Self is not of the same nature as the individual soul. For as the luminous body is of a nature different from that of its light, thus the highest Self differs from the individual soul which is a part of it. It is this difference of character--due to the individual soul being the distinguishing clement and the highest Self being the substance distinguished thereby--to which all those texts refer which declare difference. Those texts, on the other hand, which declare non-difference are based on the circumstance that attributes which are incapable of separate existence are ultimately bound to the substance which they distinguish, and hence are fundamentally valid. That in declarations such as 'Thou art that' and 'this Self is Brahman,' the words _thou_ and _Self_, no less than the words _that_ and _Brahman_, denote Brahman in so far as having the individual souls for its body, and that thus the two sets of words denote fundamentally one and the same thing, has been explained previously.

39261 46. And Smṛiti texts declare this.

39262
39263 That the world and Brahman stand to each other in the relation of part
39264 and whole, the former being like the light and the latter like the
39265 luminous body, or the former being like the power and the latter like
39266 that in which the power inheres, or the former being like the body and
39267 the latter like the soul; this Parāśara also and other Smṛiti writers
39268 declare, 'As the light of a fire which abides in one place only spreads
39269 all around, thus this whole world is the power (śakti) of the highest
39270 Brahman.' The 'and' in the Sūtra implies that scriptural texts also ('of
39271 whom the Self is the body' and others) declare that the individual Self
39272 is a part of Brahman in so far as it is its body.

39273
39274 But if all individual souls are equal in so far as being alike parts of
39275 Brahman, alike actuated by Brahman, and alike knowing subjects, what is
39276 the reason that, as Scripture teaches, some of them are allowed to read
39277 the Veda and act according to its injunctions, while others are excluded
39278 therefrom; and again that some are to see, feel, and so on, while others
39279 are excluded from these privileges?--This question is answered by the
39280 next Sūtra.

39281
39282
39283
39284
39285 47. Permission and exclusion (result) from connexion with a body; as in
39286 the case of light and so on.

39287
39288 Although all souls are essentially of the same nature in so far as they
39289 are parts of Brahman, knowing subjects and so on, the permissions and
39290 exclusions referred to are possible for the reason that each individual
39291 soul is joined to some particular body, pure or impure, whether of a
39292 Brāhmaṇa or Kṣhatṛiya or Vaisya or Sūdra, and so on. 'As in the case of
39293 fire and so on.' All fire is of the same kind, and yet one willingly
39294 fetches fire from the house of a Brāhmaṇa, while one shuns fire from a
39295 place where dead bodies are burnt. And from a Brāhmaṇa one accepts food
39296 without any objection, while one refuses food from a low person.

39297
39298
39299
39300
39301 48. And on account of non-connectedness there is no confusion.

39302
39303 Although the souls, as being parts of Brahman and so on, are of
39304 essentially the same character, they are actually separate, for each of
39305 them is of atomic size and resides in a separate body. For this reason
39306 there is no confusion or mixing up of the individual spheres of
39307 enjoyment and experience. The Sūtrakāra introduces this reference to an
39308 advantage of his own view of things, in order to intimate that the views
39309 of the soul being Brahman deluded or else Brahman affected by a limiting
39310 adjunct are on their part incapable of explaining how it is that the
39311 experiences of the individual Self and the highest Self, and of the
39312 several individual Selves, are not mixed up.

39313
39314 But may not, on the view of the soul being Brahman deluded, the
39315 distinction of the several spheres of experience be explained by means
39316 of the difference of the limiting adjuncts presented by Nescience?--This
39317 the next Sūtra negatives.

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39319
39320
39321
39322 49. And it is a mere apparent argument.

39323
39324 The argumentation by which it is sought to prove that that being whose
39325 nature is constituted by absolutely uniform light, i.e. intelligence, is
39326 differentiated by limiting adjuncts which presuppose an obscuration of
39327 that essential nature, is a mere apparent (fallacious) one. For, as we
39328 have shown before, obscuration of the light of that which is nothing but
39329 light means destruction of that light.--If we accept as the reading of

the Sûtra 'âbhâsâh' (in plural) the meaning is that the various reasons set forth by the adherents of that doctrine are all of them fallacious. The 'and' of the Sûtra is meant to point out that that doctrine, moreover, is in conflict with texts such as 'thinking himself to be different from the Mover' (Svet. Up. I, 6); 'there are two unborn ones, one a ruler, the other not a ruler' (I, 9); 'of those two one eats the sweet fruit' (V, 6); and others. For even if difference is due to upâdhis which are the figment of Nescience, there is no escaping the conclusion that the spheres of experience must be mixed up, since the theory admits that the thing itself with which all the limiting adjuncts connect themselves is one only.

But this cannot be urged against the theory of the individual soul being Brahman in so far as determined by real limiting adjuncts; for on that view we may explain the difference of spheres of experience as due to the beginningless adrishtas which are the cause of the difference of the limiting adjuncts!--To this the next Sûtra replies.

50. On account of the non-determination of the adrishtas.

As the adrishtas also which are the causes of the series of upâdhis have for their substrate Brahman itself, there is no reason for their definite allotment (to definite individual souls), and hence again there is no definite separation of the spheres of experience. For the limiting adjuncts as well as the adrishtas cannot by their connexion with Brahman split up Brahman itself which is essentially one.

51. And it is thus also in the case of purposes and so on.

For the same reason there can be no definite restriction in the case of purposes and so on which are the causes of the, different adrishtas. (For they also cannot introduce plurality into Brahman that is fundamentally one.)

52. Should it be said (that that is possible) owing to the difference of place; we deny this, on account of (all upâdhis) being within (all places).

Although Brahman is one only and not to be split by the several limiting adjuncts with which it is connected, yet the separation of the spheres of enjoyment is not impossible since the places of Brahman which are connected with the upâdhis are distinct.--This the Sûtra negatives on the ground that, as the upâdhis move here and there and hence all places enter into connexion with all upâdhis, the mixing up of spheres of enjoyment cannot be avoided. And even if the upâdhis were connected with different places, the pain connected with some particular place would affect the whole of Brahman which is one only.--The two Sûtras II, 3, 32 and 37 have stated an objection against those who, without taking their stand on the Veda, held the view of an all-pervading soul. The Sûtras II, 3, 50 and ff., on the other hand, combat the view of those who, while basing their doctrine on the Veda, teach the absolute unity of the Self.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the part.'

FOURTH PÂDA.

1. Thus the prânas.

39399 After having taught that Ether and all the other elements are effects,
39400 and hence have originated, the Sûtras had shown that the individual soul,
39401 although likewise an effect, does not originate in the sense of
39402 undergoing a change of essential nature; and had in connexion therewith
39403 clearly set forth wherein the essential nature of the soul consists.
39404 They now proceed to elucidate the question as to the origination of the
39405 instruments of the individual soul, viz. the organs and the vital breath.

39406
39407 The point here to be decided is whether the organs are effects as the
39408 individual soul is an effect, or as ether and the other elements are. As
39409 the soul is, thus the prânas are, the Pûrvapakshin maintains. That means--
39410 as the soul is not produced, thus the organs also are not produced--For
39411 the latter point no less than the former is directly stated in Scripture;
39412 the wording of the Sûtra 'thus the prânas' being meant to extend to the
39413 case of the prânas also, the authority of Scripture to which recourse
39414 was had in the case of the soul.--But what is the scriptural text you
39415 mean?

39416
39417 'Non-being, truly this was in the beginning. Here they say, what was
39418 that? Those Rishis indeed were that Non-being, thus they say. And who
39419 were those Rishis? The prânas indeed were those Rishis.' This is the
39420 passage which declares that before the origination of the world the
39421 Rishis existed. As 'prânâh' is in the plural, we conclude that what is
39422 meant is the organs and the vital air. Nor can this text be interpreted
39423 to mean only that the prânas exist for a very long time (but are not
39424 uncreated); as we may interpret the texts declaring Vâyu and the
39425 atmosphere (antariksha) to be immortal: 'Vâyu and the atmosphere are
39426 immortal'; 'Vâyu is the deity that never sets' (Bri. Up. II, 3, 3; I, 5,
39427 22). For the clause 'Non-being indeed was this in the beginning'
39428 declares that the prânas existed even at the time when the entire world
39429 was in the pralaya state. Those texts, then, which speak of an
39430 origination of the prânas must be explained somehow, just as we did with
39431 the texts referring to the origination of the individual soul.

39432
39433 To this the Siddhântin replies, 'the prânas also originate in the same
39434 way as ether, and so on.'--Why?--Because we have scriptural texts
39435 directly stating that before creation everything was one, 'Being only
39436 this was in the beginning,' 'The Self only was this in the beginning.'
39437 And moreover, the text 'from that there is produced the prâna and the
39438 mind and all organs' (Mu. Up. II, 3, 1) declares that the organs
39439 originated; they therefore cannot have existed before creation. Nor is
39440 it permissible to ascribe a different meaning to the texts which declare
39441 the origination of the sense-organs--as we may do in the case of the
39442 texts declaring the origination of the soul. For we have no texts
39443 directly denying the origination of the sense-organs, or affirming their
39444 eternity, while we have such texts in the case of the individual soul.
39445 In the text quoted by the Pûrvapakshin, 'Non-being indeed was this in
39446 the beginning,' &c., the word prâna can denote the highest Self only;
39447 for from texts such as 'All these beings indeed enter into breath alone,
39448 and from breath they arise' (Ch. Up. I, 11, 5), the word prâna is known
39449 to be one of the designations of the highest Self. And as to the clause
39450 'the prânas indeed are those Rishis,' we remark that the term Rishi may
39451 properly be applied to the all-seeing highest Self, but not to the non-
39452 intelligent organs.

39453
39454 But how then is the plural form 'the Rishis are the prânas' to be
39455 accounted for? This the next Sûtra explains.

39456
39457
39458
39459
39460 2. (The scriptural statement of the plural) is secondary, on account of
39461 impossibility; and since (the highest Self) is declared before that.

39462
39463 The plural form exhibited by the text must be taken (not in its literal,
39464 but) in a secondary figurative sense, since there is no room there for a
39465 plurality of things. For Scripture declares that previous to creation
39466 the highest Self only exists.

39467

39468
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39470
39471 3. On account of speech having for its antecedent that.
39472

39473 For the following reason also the word 'prâna,' in the text quoted, can
39474 denote Brahman only. Speech, i.e. the names which have for their object
39475 all things apart from Brahman, presupposes the existence of the entire
39476 universe of things--ether, and so on--which is the object of speech. But,
39477 as according to the text 'this was then non-differentiated; it was
39478 thereupon differentiated by names and forms,' then (i.e. before the
39479 differentiation of individual things), no things having name and form
39480 existed, there existed also no effects of speech and the other organs of
39481 action and sensation, and hence it cannot be inferred that those organs
39482 themselves existed.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the origination
39483 of the prânas.'
39484

39485
39486
39487
39488 4. (They are seven) on account of the going of the seven and of
39489 specification.
39490

39491 The question here arises whether those organs are seven only, or eleven--
39492 the doubt on this point being due to the conflicting nature of
39493 scriptural texts.--The Pûrvapakshin maintains the former alternative.--
39494 On what grounds?--'On account of going, and of specification.' For the
39495 text refers to the 'going,' i.e. to the moving about in the different
39496 worlds, together with the soul when being born or dying, of seven prânas
39497 only, 'seven are these worlds in which the prânas move which rest in the
39498 cave, being placed there as seven and seven' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 8)--where
39499 the repetition 'seven and seven' intimates the plurality of souls to
39500 which the prânas are attached. Moreover those moving prânas are
39501 distinctly specified in the following text, 'when the five instruments
39502 of knowledge stand still, together with the mind (manas), and when the
39503 buddhi does not move, that they call the highest "going"' (gati--Ka. Up.
39504 II, 6, 10). The 'highest going' here means the moving towards Release,
39505 all movement within the body having come to an end. As thus the text
39506 declares that at the time of birth and death seven prânas only accompany
39507 the soul, and as, with regard to the condition of final concentration,
39508 those prânas are distinctly specified as forms of knowledge (jñânâni),
39509 we conclude that the prânas are the seven following instruments of the
39510 soul--the organs of hearing, feeling, seeing, tasting and smelling, the
39511 buddhi and the manas. In various other passages indeed, which refer to
39512 the prânas, higher numbers are mentioned, viz. up to fourteen, speech,
39513 the hands, the feet, the anus, the organ of generation, the ahankâra and
39514 the kitta being added to those mentioned above; cp. e.g. 'there are
39515 eight grahas' (Bri. Up. III, 2, i); 'Seven are the prânas of the head,
39516 two the lower ones' (Taitt. Samh. V, 3, 2, 5). But as the text says
39517 nothing about those additional organs accompanying the soul, we assume
39518 that they are called prânas in a metaphorical sense only, since they all,
39519 more or less, assist the soul.--This view the next Sûtra sets aside.
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39521
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39523
39524 5. But the hands and so on also; (since they assist the soul) abiding
39525 (in the body). Hence (it is) not so.
39526

39527 The organs are not seven only, but eleven, since the hands and the rest
39528 also contribute towards the experience and fruition of that which abides
39529 in the body, i.e. the soul, and have their separate offices, such as
39530 seizing, and so on. Hence it is not so, i.e. it must not be thought that
39531 the hands and the rest are not organs. Buddhi, ahankâra and kitta, on
39532 the other hand, are (not independent organs but) mere designations of the
39533 manas, according as the latter is engaged in the functions of deciding
39534 (adhyavasâya), or misconception (abhimâna), or thinking (kintâ). The
39535 organs therefore are eleven. From this it follows that in the passage
39536 'Ten are these prânas in man, and Âtman is the eleventh' (Bri. Up. II, 4,

ii), the word *Ātman* denotes the *manas*. The number eleven is confirmed by scriptural and *Smṛiti* passages, cp. 'the ten organs and the one' (*Bhā. Gī. XIII, 5*); 'ten are the *vaikārika* beings, the *manas* is the eleventh,' and others. Where more organs are mentioned, the different functions of the *manas* are meant; and references to smaller numbers are connected with special effects of the organs, such as accompanying the soul, and the like.--Here terminates the *adhikarāṇa* of 'the going of the seven.'

6. And (they are) minute.

As the text 'these are all alike, all infinite' (*Bṛi. Up. I, 5, 13*), declares speech, mind, and breath to be infinite, we conclude that the *prāṇas* are all-pervading.--To this the *Sūtra* replies, that they are minute; for the text 'when the vital breath passes out of the body, all the *prāṇas* pass out after it' (*Bṛi. Up. V, 4, 2*), proves those *prāṇas* to be of limited size, and as when passing out they are not perceived by bystanders, they must be of minute size--The text which speaks of them as infinite is a text enjoining meditation ('he who meditates on them as infinite'), and infinity there means only that abundance of activities which is an attribute of the *prāṇa* to be meditated on.

7. And the best.

By 'the best' we have to understand the chief vital air (*mukhya prāṇa*), which, in the colloquy of the *prāṇas*, is determined to be the best because it is the cause of the preservation of the body. This chief vital air the *Pūrvapakshin* maintains to be something non-created, since Scripture (*Ri. Samh. V, 129, 2*), 'By its own law the One was breathing without wind,' shows that an effect of it, viz. the act of breathing, existed even previously to creation, at the time of a great *pralaya*; and because texts declaring it to have been created--such as 'from him is born breath' (*Mu. Up. II, 1, 3*)--may be interpreted in the same way as the texts declaring that the soul is something created (*sec p. 540 ff.*)--To this the reply is that, since this view contradicts scriptural statements as to the oneness of all, previous to creation; and since the *Mundaka*-text declares the *prāṇa* to have been created in the same way as earth and the other elements; and since there are no texts plainly denying its createdness, the chief vital air also must be held to have been created. The words 'the One was breathing without wind' by no means refer to the vital breath of living creatures, but intimate the existence of the highest *Brahman*, alone by itself; as indeed appears from the qualification 'without wind.'--That the vital breath, although really disposed of in the preceding *Sūtras*, is specially mentioned in the present *Sūtra*, is with a view to the question next raised for consideration.--Here terminates the *adhikarāṇa* of 'the minuteness of the *prāṇas*.'

8. Neither air nor function, on account of its being stated separately.

Is this main vital breath nothing else but air, the second of the elements? Or is it a certain motion of the air? Or is it air that has assumed some special condition?--The first alternative may be adopted, on account of the text '*prāṇa* is air.'--Or, since mere air is not called breath, while this term is generally applied to that motion of air which consists in inhalation and exhalation, we may hold that breath is a motion of air.--Of both these views the *Sūtra* disposes by declaring 'not so, on account of separate statement.' For in the passage 'From him there is produced breath, mind, and all sense-organs, ether and air,' &c, breath and air are mentioned as two separate things. For the same reason breath also cannot be a mere motion or function of air; for the text

39606 does not mention any functions of fire and the other elements, side by
39607 side with these elements, as separate things (and this shows that breath
39608 also cannot, in that text, be interpreted to denote a function of air).
39609 The text 'prâna is air,' on the other hand, intimates (not that breath
39610 is identical with air, but) that breath is air having assumed a special
39611 form, not a thing altogether different from it, like fire. In ordinary
39612 language, moreover, the word breath does not mean a mere motion but a
39613 substance to which motion belongs; we say, 'the breath moves to and fro
39614 in inhalation and exhalation.'

39615
39616 Is breath, which we thus know to be a modification of air, to be
39617 considered as a kind of elementary substance, like fire, earth, and so
39618 on? Not so, the next Sûtra replies.

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39622
39623 9. But like the eye and the rest, on account of being taught with them,
39624 and for other reasons.

39625
39626 Breath is not an element, but like sight and the rest, a special
39627 instrument of the soul. This appears from the fact that the texts
39628 mention it together with the recognised organs of the soul, the eye, and
39629 so on; so e.g. in the colloquy of the prânas. And such common mention is
39630 suitable in the case of such things only as belong to one class.--The
39631 'and for other reasons' of the Sûtra refers to the circumstance of the
39632 principal breath being specially mentioned among the organs comprised
39633 under the term 'prâna'; cp. 'that principal breath' (Ch. Up. I, 2, 7);
39634 'that central breath' (Bri. Up. I, 5, 21).--But if the chief breath is,
39635 like the eye and the other organs, an instrument of the soul, there must
39636 be some special form of activity through which it assists the soul, as
39637 the eye e.g. assists the soul by seeing. But no such activity is
39638 perceived, and the breath cannot therefore be put in the same category
39639 as the organs of sensation and action!--To this objection the next Sûtra
39640 replies.

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39642
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39644
39645 10. And there is no objection on account of its not having an activity
39646 (karana); for (Scripture) thus declares.

39647
39648 The karana of the Sûtra means kriyâ, action. The objection raised on the
39649 ground that the principal breath does not exercise any form of activity
39650 helpful to the soul, is without force, since as a matter of fact
39651 Scripture declares that there is such an activity, in so far as the
39652 vital breath supports the body with all its organs. For the text (Ch. Up.
39653 V, 1, 7 ff.) relates how on the successive departure of speech, and so
39654 on, the body and the other organs maintained their strength, while on
39655 the departure of the vital breath the body and all the organs at once
39656 became weak and powerless.--The conclusion therefore is that the breath,
39657 in its fivefold form of prâna, apâna, and so on, subserves the purposes
39658 of the individual soul, and thus occupies the position of an instrument,
39659 no less than the eye and the other organs.

39660
39661 But as those five forms of breath, viz. prâna, udâna, &c., have
39662 different names and functions they must be separate principles (and
39663 hence there is not one principal breath)! To this the next Sûtra
39664 replies.

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39666
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39668
39669 11. It is designated as having five functions like mind.

39670
39671 As desire, and so on, are not principles different from mind, although
39672 they are different functions and produce different effects--according to
39673 the text, 'Desire, purpose, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness,
39674 absence of firmness, shame, reflection, fear--all this is mind' (Bri. Up.

I, 5, 3); so, on the ground of the text, 'prâna, apâna, vyâna, udâna, samâna--all this is prâna' (ibid.), apâna and the rest must be held to be different functions of prâna only, not independent principles.--Here terminates the adhikarana of what is 'a modification of air.'

12. And (it is) minute.

This prâna also is minute, since as before (i.e. as in the case of the organs) the text declares it to pass out of the body, to move, and so on, 'him when he passes out the prâna follows after' (Bri. Up. V, 4, 2). A further doubt arises, in the case of prâna, owing to the fact that in other texts it is spoken of as of large extent, 'It is equal to these three worlds, equal to this Universe' (Bri. Up. I, 3, 22); 'On prâna everything is founded'; 'For all this is shut up in prâna.' But as the texts declaring the passing out, and so on, of the prâna, prove it to be of limited size, the all-embracingness ascribed to prâna in those other texts must be interpreted to mean only that the life of all living and breathing creatures depends on breath.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the minuteness of the best.'

13. But the rule (over the prânas) on the part of Fire and the rest, together with him to whom the prâna belong (i.e. the soul), is owing to the thinking of that (viz. the highest Self); on account of scriptural statement.

It has been shown that the prânas, together with the main prâna, originate from Brahman, and have a limited size. That the prânas are guided by Agni and other divine beings has also been explained on a previous occasion, viz. under Sû. II, 1, 5. And it is known from ordinary experience that the organs are ruled by the individual soul, which uses them as means of experience and fruition. And this is also established by scriptural texts, such as 'Having taken these prânas he (i.e. the soul) moves about in his own body, according to his pleasure' (Bri. Up. II, 1, 18). The question now arises whether the rule of the soul and of the presiding divine beings over the prânas depends on them (i.e. the soul and the divinities) only, or on some other being.--On them only, since they depend on no one else!--Not so, the Sûtra declares. The rule which light, and so on, i.e. Agni and the other divinities, together with him to whom the prânas belong i.e. the soul, exercise over the prânas, proceeds from the thinking of that, i.e. from the will of the highest Self.--How is this known?--'From scriptural statement.' For Scripture teaches that the organs, together with their guiding divinities and the individual soul, depend in all their doings on the thought of the highest Person. 'He, who abiding within Fire, rules Fire from within.--He, who abiding within the air--within the Self--within the eye, and so on' (Bri. Up. III, 7); 'From fear of it the wind blows, from fear of it the sun rises, from fear of it Agni and Indra, yea Death runs as the fifth' (Taitt. Up. II, 8, 1); 'By the command of that Imperishable one, sun and moon stand, held apart' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 9).

14. And on account of the eternity of this.

As the quality, inhering in all things, of being ruled by the highest Self, is eternal and definitely fixed by being connected with his essential nature, it is an unavoidable conclusion that the rule of the soul and of the divinities over the organs depends on the will of the highest Self. The text, 'Having sent forth this he entered into it, having entered into it he became sat and tyat' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), shows that the entering on the part of the highest Person into all things, so as to be their ruler, is connected with his essential nature. Similarly

39744 Smriti says, 'Pervading this entire Universe by a portion of mine I do
39745 abide' (Bha. Gî. X, 42).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the rule of
39746 Fire and the rest.'

39751 15. They, with the exception of the best, are organs, on account of
39752 being so designated.

39754 Are all principles called prânas to be considered as 'organs'
39755 (indriyâni), or is the 'best,' i.e. the chief prâna, to be excepted?--
39756 All of them, without exception, are organs; for they all are called
39757 prânas equally, and they all are instruments of the soul.--Not so, the
39758 Sûtra replies. The 'best' one is to be excepted, since only the prawas
39759 other than the best are designated as organs. Texts such as 'the organs
39760 are ten and one' (Bha. Gî. XIII, 5) apply the term 'organ' only to the
39761 senses of sight and the rest, and the internal organ.

39766 16. On account of scriptural statement of difference, and on account of
39767 difference of characteristics.

39769 Texts such as 'from him is born prâna, and the internal organ, and all
39770 organs' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3) mention the vital breath separately from the
39771 organs, and this shows that the breath is not one of the organs. The
39772 passage indeed mentions the internal organ (manas) also as something
39773 separate; but in other passages the manas is formally included in the
39774 organs, 'the (five) organs with mind as the sixth' (Bha. Gî. XV, 7).
39775 That the vital breath differs in nature from the organ of sight and the
39776 rest, is a matter of observation. For in the state of deep sleep the
39777 function of breath is seen to continue, while those of the eye, and so
39778 on, are not perceived. The work of the organs, inclusive of the manas,
39779 is to act as instruments of cognition and action, while the work of
39780 breath is to maintain the body and the organs. It is for the reason that
39781 the subsistence of the organs depends on breath, that the organs
39782 themselves are called prânas. Thus Scripture says, 'they all became the
39783 form of that (breath), and therefore they are called after him prânas'
39784 (Bri. Up. I, 5, 21). 'They became its form' means--they became its body,
39785 their activity depended on it.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the
39786 _organs_.'

39791 17. But the making of names and forms (belongs) to him who renders
39792 tripartite, on account of scriptural teaching.

39794 The Sûtras have shown that the creation of the elements and organs in
39795 their collective aspect (samashti) and the activity of the individual
39796 souls proceed from the highest Self; and they have also further
39797 confirmed the view that the rule which the souls exercise over their
39798 organs depends on the highest Self. A question now arises with regard to
39799 the creation of the world in its discrete aspect (vyashti), which
39800 consists in the differentiation of names and forms (i.e. of individual
39801 beings). Is this latter creation the work of Hiranyagarbha only, who
39802 represents the collective aggregate of all individual souls; or,
39803 fundamentally, the work of the highest Brahman having Hiranyagarbha for
39804 its body--just as the creation of water e.g. is the work of the highest
39805 Brahman having sire for its body?--The Pûrvapakshin maintains the former
39806 alternative. For, he says, the text 'Having entered with this living-
39807 soul-self (anena jîvenât-manâ), let me differentiate names and forms'
39808 (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2), declares the jîva-soul to be the agent in
39809 differentiation. For the resolve of the highest deity is expressed, not
39810 in the form 'let me differentiate names and forms by myself (svena
39811 rūpena), but 'by this soul-self,' i.e. by a part of the highest Self, in
39812 the form of the individual soul.--But on this interpretation the first

39813 person in 'vyâkaravâni' (let me enter), and the grammatical form of
39814 'having entered,' which indicates the agent, could not be taken in their
39815 literal, but only in an implied, sense--as is the case in a sentence
39816 such as 'Having entered the hostile army by means of a spy, I will
39817 estimate its strength' (where the real agent is not the king, who is the
39818 speaker, but the spy).--The cases are not analogous, the Pûrvapakshin
39819 replies. For the king and the spy are fundamentally separate, and hence
39820 the king is agent by implication only. But in the case under discussion
39821 the soul is a part, and hence contributes to constitute the essential
39822 nature of, the highest Self; hence that highest Self itself enters and
39823 differentiates in the form of the soul. Nor can it be said that the
39824 instrumental case ('with this soul-self') has the implied meaning of
39825 association ('together with this soul-self'); for if a case can be taken
39826 in its primary sense, it is not proper to understand it in a sense which
39827 has to be expressed by means of a preposition. But the third case,
39828 jîvena, cannot here be understood even in its primary sense, i.e. that
39829 of the instrument of the action; for if Brahman is the agent in the acts
39830 of entering and differentiating, the soul is not that which is most
39831 suitable to accomplish the end of action (while yet grammar defines the
39832 _instrumental_ case--karana--on this basis). Nor can it be said that the
39833 activity of the soul comes to an end with the entering, while the
39834 differentiation of names and forms is Brahman's work, for the past
39835 participle (pravisiya) indicates (according to the rules of grammar) that
39836 the two actions--of entering and differentiating--belong to the same
39837 agent. And although the soul as being a part of the highest Self shares
39838 in its nature, yet in order to distinguish it from the highest Self, the
39839 text by means of the clause 'with _that_ living Self refers to it as
39840 something outward (not of the nature of the Self). The agent in the
39841 action of differentiation of names and forms therefore is Hiranyagarbha.
39842 Smriti texts also ascribe to him this activity; cp. 'he in the beginning
39843 made, from the words of the Veda, the names and forms of beings, of the
39844 gods and the rest, and of actions.'

39845
39846 Against this view the Sûtra declares itself. The differentiation of
39847 names and forms belongs to him who renders tripartite, i.e. the highest
39848 Brahman; since it is assigned by Scripture to the latter only. For the
39849 text 'That divinity thought, let me, having entered these three beings
39850 with this living-soul-self, differentiate names and forms--let me make
39851 each of these three tripartite,' shows that all the activities mentioned
39852 have one and the same agent. But the rendering tripartite cannot belong
39853 to Brahma (Hiranyagarbha), who abides within the Brahma-egg, for that
39854 egg itself is produced from fire, water, and earth, only after these
39855 elements have been rendered tripartite; and Smriti says that Brahmâ
39856 himself originated in that egg, 'in that egg there originated Brahmâ,
39857 the grandfather of all the worlds.' As thus the action of rendering
39858 tripartite can belong to the highest Brahman only, the differentiation
39859 of names and forms, which belongs to the same agent, also is Brahman's
39860 only.--But how then does the clause 'with that living-soul-self' fit in?--
39861 The co-ordination 'with that soul, with the Self,' shows that the term
39862 'soul' here denotes the highest Brahman as having the soul for its body;
39863 just as in the clauses 'that fire thought'; 'it sent forth water';
39864 'water thought,' and so on, what is meant each time is Brahman having
39865 fire, water, and so on, for its body. The work of differentiating names
39866 and forms thus belongs to the highest Brahman which has for its body
39867 Hiranyagarbha, who represents the soul in its aggregate form. On this
39868 view the first person (in 'let me differentiate') and the agency
39869 (conveyed by the form of 'pravisiya') may, without any difficulty, be
39870 taken in their primary literal senses; and the common agency, implied in
39871 the connexion of pravisiya and vyâkaravâni, is accounted for. The view
39872 here set forth as to the relation of Brahman and Hiranyagarbha also
39873 explains how the accounts of Hiranyagarbha's (Brahmâ's) creative
39874 activity can say that he differentiated names and forms.

39875
39876 The whole passus beginning 'that divinity thought,' therefore has the
39877 following meaning--'Having entered into those three beings, viz. Fire,
39878 Water, and Earth, with my Self which is qualified by the collective soul
39879 (as constituting its body), let me differentiate names and forms, i.e.
39880 let me produce gods and all the other kinds of individual beings, and
39881 give them names; and to that end, since fire, water, and earth have not

39882 yet mutually combined, and hence are incapable of giving rise to
39883 particular things, let me make each of them tripartite, and thus fit
39884 them for creation.'--The settled conclusion then is, that the
39885 differentiation of names and forms is the work of the highest Brahman
39886 only.

39887
39888 But, an objection is raised, the fact that the differentiation of names
39889 and forms must be due to the same agent as the rendering tripartite,
39890 does not after all prove that the former is due to the highest Self. For
39891 the rendering tripartite may itself belong to the individual soul. For
39892 the text relates how, after the creation of the cosmic egg, a process of
39893 tripartition was going on among the individual living beings created by
39894 Brahmā. 'Learn from me, my friend, how those three beings having reached
39895 man become tripartite, each of them. The earth when eaten is disposed of
39896 in three ways; its grossest portion becomes feces, its middle portion
39897 flesh, its subtlest portion mind,' and so on. Similarly, in the
39898 preceding section, it is described how the process of tripartition goes
39899 on in the case of fire, sun, moon, and lightning, which all belong to
39900 the world created by Brahmā, 'the red colour of burning fire is the
39901 colour of fire,' &c. And the text moreover states the original
39902 tripartition to have taken place after the differentiation of names and
39903 forms: 'That divinity having entered into these three beings
39904 differentiated names and forms. Each of these (beings) it rendered
39905 tripartite.'--To this objection the next Sūtra replies.

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39907
39908
39909
39910 18. Flesh is of earthy nature; in the case of the two others also
39911 according to the text.

39912
39913 The view that the description of tripartition, given in the passage
39914 'each of these he made tripartite,' refers to a time subsequent to the
39915 creation of the mundane egg and to the gods created by Brahmā, cannot be
39916 upheld. For from it there would follow that, as in the passage 'earth
39917 when eaten is disposed of in three ways,' &c., flesh is declared to be
39918 more subtle than feces, and mind yet subtler, it would have to be
39919 assumed--in agreement with the nature of the causal substance--that
39920 flesh is made of water and manas of fire [FOOTNOTE 581:1]. And similarly
39921 we should have to assume that urine--which is the grossest part of
39922 water drunk (cp. VI, 5, 2)--is of the nature of earth, and breath, which
39923 is its subtlest part, of the nature of fire. But this is not admissible;
39924 for as the text explicitly states that earth when eaten is disposed of
39925 in three ways, flesh and mind also must be assumed to be of an earthy
39926 nature. In the same way we must frame our view concerning 'the two
39927 others,' i.e. water and fire, 'according to the text.' That means--the
39928 three parts into which water divides itself when drunk, must be taken to
39929 be all of them modifications of water, and the three parts of fire when
39930 consumed must be held to be all of them modifications of fire. Thus
39931 feces, flesh and mind are alike transformations of earth; urine, blood
39932 and breath transformations of water; bones, marrow and speech
39933 transformations of fire.

39934
39935 This moreover agrees with the subsequent statement (VI, 5, 4), 'For,
39936 truly, mind consists of earth, breath of water, speech of fire.' The
39937 process of tripartition referred to in VI, 3, 4, is not therefore the
39938 same as the one described in the section that tells us what becomes of
39939 food when eaten, water when drunk, &c. Were this (erroneous) assumption
39940 made, and were it thence concluded that mind, breath and speech--as
39941 being the subtlest created things--are made of fire, this would flatly
39942 contradict the complementary text quoted above ('mind consists of earth,'
39943 &c.). When the text describes how earth, water and fire, when eaten,
39944 are transformed in a threefold way, it refers to elements which had
39945 already been rendered tripartite; the process of tripartition must
39946 therefore have taken place before the creation of the cosmic egg.
39947 Without such tripartition the elements would be incapable of giving rise
39948 to any effects; such capability they acquire only by being mutually
39949 conjoined, and that is just the process of tripartition. In agreement
39950 herewith Smṛiti says, 'Separate from each other, without connexion,

39951 those elements with their various powers were incapable of producing
39952 creatures. But having combined completely, entered into mutual
39953 conjunction, abiding one within the other, the principles--from the
39954 highest Mahat down to individual things--produced the mundane egg.'--
39955 When the text therefore says (VI, 3, 3) 'The divinity having entered
39956 into those three beings with that soul-self differentiated names and
39957 forms; he made each of these tripartite,' the order in which the text
39958 mentions the activities of differentiation and tripartition is refuted
39959 by the order demanded by the sense [FOOTNOTE 583:1].--The text then
39960 proceeds to exemplify the process of tripartition, by means of burning
39961 fire, the sun and lightning, which indeed are things contained within
39962 the mundane egg (while yet the tripartition of elements took place
39963 before the egg, with all its contents, was created); but this is done
39964 for the information of Svetaketu, who himself is a being within the
39965 mundane egg, and has to be taught with reference to things he knows.
39966

39967 But, a final objection is raised, as on this view of the matter the
39968 elements--earth, water and fire--which are eaten and drunk, are already
39969 tripartite, each of them containing portions of all, and thus are of a
39970 threefold nature, how can they be designated each of them by a simple
39971 term--_earth_, _water_, _fire_?--To this the next Sûtra replies.
39972

39973 [FOOTNOTE 581:1. I.e. if the tripartition of earth (i. e. solid food)
39974 when eaten, which is described in VI, 5, 1, were the same tripartition
39975 which is described in VI, 3, 3-4, we should have to conclude that the
39976 former tripartition consists, like the latter, in an admixture to earth
39977 of water and fire.]
39978

39979 [FOOTNOTE 583:1. That means--in reality the tripartition of the elements
39980 came first, and after that the creation of individual beings.]
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39985 19. But on account of their distinctive nature there is that designation,
39986 that designation.
39987

39988 Each element indeed is of a threefold nature, owing to the primary
39989 tripartition; but as in each mixed element one definite element prevails--
39990 so that each element has a distinctive character of its own--a definite
39991 designation is given to each.--The repetition (of 'that designation') in
39992 the Sûtra indicates the completion of the adhyâya.--Here terminates the
39993 adhikarana of 'the fashioning of names and forms.'
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39998 THIRD ADHYÂYA.
39999

40000 FIRST PÂDA.
40001

40002 1. In obtaining another of that, it goes enveloped, (as appears) from
40003 question and explanation.
40004

40005 That the Vedânta-texts establish as the proper object of meditation, on
40006 the part of all men desirous of Release, the highest Brahman, which is
40007 the only cause of the entire world, which is not touched by even a
40008 shadow of imperfection, which is an ocean, as it were, of supremely
40009 exalted qualities, and which totally differs in nature from all other
40010 beings--this is the point proved in the two previous adhyâyas; there
40011 being given at the same time arguments to disprove the objections raised
40012 against the Vedânta doctrine on the basis of Smṛiti and reasoning, to
40013 refute the views held by other schools, to show that the different
40014 Vedânta-texts do not contradict each other, and to prove that the Self
40015 is the object of activities (enjoined in injunctions of meditation, and
40016 so on). In short, those two adhyâyas have set forth the essential nature
40017 of Brahman. The subsequent part of the work now makes it its task to
40018 enquire into the mode of attaining to Brahman, together with the means
40019 of attainment. The third adhyâya is concerned with an enquiry into

40020 meditation--which is the means of attaining to Brahman; and as the
40021 motive for entering on such meditation is supplied by the absence of all
40022 desire for what is other than the thing to be obtained, and by the
40023 desire for that thing, the points first to be enquired into are the
40024 imperfections of the individual soul--moving about in the different
40025 worlds, whether waking or dreaming or merged in dreamless sleep, or in
40026 the state of swoon; and those blessed characteristics by which Brahman
40027 is raised above all these imperfections. These are the topics of the
40028 first and second pādas of the adhyāya.

40029
40030 The first question to be considered is whether the soul, when moving
40031 from one body into another, is enveloped by those subtle rudiments of
40032 the elements from which the new body is produced, or not. The
40033 Pûrvapakshin maintains the latter alternative; for, he says, wherever
40034 the soul goes it can easily provide itself there with those rudiments.
40035 Other reasons supporting this primâ facie view will be mentioned and
40036 refuted further on.--The Sûtra states the view finally accepted, 'In
40037 obtaining another "of that" it goes enveloped.' The 'of that' refers
40038 back to the form, i.e. body, mentioned in II, 4, 17. The soul when
40039 moving towards another embodiment goes enveloped by the rudiments of the
40040 elements. This is known 'from question and explanation,' i.e. answer.
40041 Question and answer are recorded in the 'Knowledge of the five fires'
40042 (Ch. Up. V, 3-10), where Pravâhana, after having addressed to Svetaketu
40043 several other questions, finally asks 'Do you know why in the fifth
40044 libation water is called man?' In answer to this last question the text
40045 then explains how the Devas, i.e. the prânas attached to the soul, offer
40046 into the heavenly world, imagined as a sacrificial fire, the oblation
40047 called sraddhâ; how this sraddhâ changes itself into a body consisting
40048 of amrita, which body is called moon; how the same prânas offer this
40049 body of amrita in Parjanya, imagined as a fire, whereupon the body so
40050 offered becomes rain; how the same prânas throw that rain on to the
40051 earth, also imagined as a sacrificial fire, whereupon it becomes food;
40052 how this food is then offered into man, also compared to fire, where it
40053 becomes seed; and how, finally, this seed is offered into woman, also
40054 compared to a fire, and there becomes an embryo. The text then goes on,
40055 'Thus in the fifth oblation water becomes purushavakas,' i.e. to be
40056 designated by the term _man_. And this means that the water which, in a
40057 subtle form, was throughout present in the previous oblations also, now,
40058 in that fifth oblation, assumes the form of a man.--From this question
40059 and answer it thus appears that the soul moves towards a new embodiment,
40060 together with the subtle rudiments from which the new body springs.--But
40061 the words, 'water becomes purushavakas,' only intimate that water
40062 assumes the form of a man, whence we conclude that water only invests
40063 the soul during its wanderings; how then can it be held that the soul
40064 moves invested by the rudiments of all elements?--To this question the
40065 next Sûtra replies.

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40067
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40069
40070 2. But on account of (water) consisting of the three elements; on
40071 account of predominance.

40072
40073 Water alone could not produce a new body; for the text Ch. Up. VI, 3, 4,
40074 'Each of these he made tripartite,' shows that all the elements were'
40075 made tripartite to the end of producing bodies. That the text under
40076 discussion mentions water only, is due to the predominance of water; and
40077 that among the elements giving rise to a new body water predominates, we
40078 infer from the fact that blood and the other humours are the
40079 predominating element in the body.

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40081
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40084 3. And on account of the going of the prânas.

40085
40086 That the soul goes embedded in the subtle rudiments of the elements
40087 follows therefrom also that when passing out of the old body it is said
40088 to be followed by the prânas, 'when he thus passes out, the chief prâna

40089 follows after him,' &c. (Bri. Up. V, 4, 2). Compare also Smṛiti: 'It
40090 draws to itself the organs of sense, with the mind for the sixth. When
40091 the Ruler (soul) obtains a new body, and passes out of another, he takes
40092 with him those organs and then moves on, as the wind takes the odours
40093 from their abodes (the flowers)' (Bha. Gī. XV, 8). But the prāṇas cannot
40094 move without a substrate, and hence we must admit that the rudiments of
40095 the elements--which are their substrate--are also moving.
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40100 4. If it be said (that it is not so) on account of scriptural statement
40101 as to going to Agni and the rest; we say no, on account of the secondary
40102 nature (of the statement).
40103

40104 But the text, 'when the speech of the dead person enters into fire,' &c.
40105 (Bri. Up. III, 2, 13). declares that when a person dies his organs go
40106 into fire, and so on; they cannot therefore accompany the soul. Hence
40107 the text which asserts the latter point must be explained in some other
40108 way!--Not so, the Sūtra replies. The text stating that the organs go to
40109 fire, and so on, cannot be taken in its literal sense; for it continues,
40110 'the hairs of the body enter into herbs, the hair of the head into
40111 trees' (which manifestly is not true, in its literal sense). The going
40112 of speech, the eye, and so on, must therefore be understood to mean that
40113 the different organs approach the divinities (Agni and the rest) who
40114 preside over them.
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40119 5. Should it be said, on account of absence of mention in the first
40120 (reply); we say no, for just that (is meant), on the ground of fitness.
40121

40122 An objection is raised to the conclusion arrived at under III, 1, 1; on
40123 the ground that in the first oblation, described in Ch. Up. V, 4, 2, as
40124 being made into the heavenly world, water is not mentioned at all as the
40125 thing offered. The text says, 'on that altar the gods offer sraddhâ';
40126 and by sraddhâ (belief) everybody understands a certain activity of mind.
40127 Water therefore is not the thing offered.--Not so, we reply. It is
40128 nothing else but water, which there is called sraddhâ. For thus only
40129 question and answer have a sense. For the question is, 'Do you know why
40130 in the fifth libation water is called man?' and at the outset of the
40131 reply sraddhâ is mentioned as constituting the oblation made into the
40132 heavenly world viewed as a fire. If here the word sraddhâ did not denote
40133 water, question and answer would refer to different topics, and there
40134 would be no connexion. The form in which the final statement is
40135 introduced (iti tu pañkamyâm, &c., 'but thus in the fifth oblation,' &c.),
40136 moreover, also intimates that sraddhâ means water. The word 'iti,'
40137 _thus_, here intimates that the answer is meant to dispose of the
40138 question, 'Do you know _how_?' &c. Sraddhâ becomes moon, rain, food,
40139 seed, embryo in succession, and _thus_ the water comes to be called man.
40140 Moreover, the word sraddhâ is actually used in the Veda in the sense of
40141 'water'; 'he carries water, sraddhâ indeed is water' (Taitt. Samh. I, 6,
40142 8, 1). And what the text says as to king Soma (the moon) originating
40143 from sraddhâ when offered, also shows that sraddhâ must mean water.
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40148 6. 'On account of this not being stated by Scripture'; not so, on
40149 account of those who perform sacrifices and so on being understood.
40150

40151 But, a further objection is raised, in the whole section under
40152 discussion no mention at all is made of the soul; the section cannot
40153 therefore prove that the soul moves, enveloped by water. The text speaks
40154 only of different forms of water sraddhâ and the rest.--This, the Sūtra
40155 points out, is not so, on account of those who perform sacrifices being
40156 understood. For further on in the same chapter it is said, that those
40157 who, while destitute of the knowledge of Brahman, practise sacrifices,

useful works and alms, reach the heavenly world and become there of the essence of the moon (somarâjânah); whence, on the results of their good works being exhausted, they return again and enter on a new embryonic state (Ch. Up. V, 10). Now in the preceding section (V, 9) it is said that they offer sraddhâ in the heavenly world, and that from that oblation there arises the king Soma--an account which clearly refers to the same process as the one described in V, 10. We herefrom infer that what is meant in V, 9 is that that being which was distinguished by a body of sraddhâ, becomes a being distinguished by a body of the nature of the moon. The word body denotes that the nature of which it is to be the attribute of a soul, and thus extends in its connotation up to the soul. The meaning of the section therefore is that it is the soul which moves enveloped by water and the other rudimentary elements.--But the phrase 'him the gods eat' (V, 10, 4) shows that the king Soma cannot be the soul, for that cannot be eaten!--To this the next Sûtra replies.

7. Or it is metaphorical, on account of their not knowing the Self. For thus Scripture declares.

He who performs sacrifices, and so on, and thus does not know the Self, is here below and in yonder world a mere means of enjoyment for the devas. He serves them here, by propitiating them with sacrifices, and so on; and when the gods, pleased with his service, have taken him up into yonder world, he there is a common means of enjoyment for them (since they are gratified by the presence of a faithful servant). That those not knowing the Self serve and benefit the gods, Scripture explicitly declares, 'He is like a beast for the devas' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10). Smriti also declares, that while those who know the Self attain to Brahman, those who do not know it are means of enjoyment for the devas, 'To the gods go the worshippers of the gods, and they that are devoted to me go to me' (Bha. Gî. VII, 23). When Scripture speaks of the soul being eaten by the gods, it therefore only means that the soul is to them a source of enjoyment. That eating the soul means no more than satisfaction with it, may also be inferred from the following scriptural passage, 'The gods in truth do not eat nor do they drink; by the mere sight of that amrita they are satisfied.'--It thus remains a settled conclusion that the soul moves enveloped by the subtle rudiments of the elements.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the obtaining of another body.'

8. On the passing away of the works, with a remainder, according to Scripture and Smriti; as it went and not so.

The text declares that those who only perform sacrifices and useful works ascend by the road of the fathers, and again return to the earth when they have fully enjoyed the fruit of their works, 'having dwelt there yâvat sampâtam, they return by the same way' (Ch. Up. V, 10, 5). The question here arises whether the descending soul carries a certain remainder (anusaya) of its works or not.--It does not, since it has enjoyed the fruit of all its works. For by 'anusaya' we have to understand that part of the karman which remains over and above the part retributively enjoyed; but when the fruit of the entire karman has been enjoyed, there is no such remainder. And that this is so we learn from the phrase 'yâvat sampâtam ushitvâ,' which means 'having dwelt there as long as the karman lasts' (sampatanty anena svargalokam iti sampâtah). Analogously another text says, 'Having obtained the end of whatever deed he does on earth, he again returns from that world to this world to action' (Bri. Up. V, 4, 6).--Against this primâ facie view the Sûtra declares 'with a remainder he descends, on account of what is seen, i.e. scriptural text, and Smriti.' The scriptural text is the one 'Those whose conduct has been good' (V, 10, 7), which means that among the souls that have returned, those whose karman is good obtain a good birth as Brâhmanas or the like, while those whose karman is bad are born again as low creatures--dogs, pigs, Kândâlas, and the like. This shows that the

souls which have descended are still connected with good or evil karman. Smṛiti also declares this: 'Men of the several castes and orders, who always stand firm in the works prescribed for them, enjoy after death the rewards of their works, and by virtue of a remnant (of their works) they are born again in excellent countries, castes and families, endowed with beauty, long life, learning in the Vedas, wealth, good conduct, happiness and wisdom. Those who act in a contrary manner perish' (Gautama Dha. Sū. XI, 29); 'Afterwards when a man returns to this world he obtains, by virtue of a remainder of works, birth in a good family, beauty of form, beauty of complexion, strength, aptitude for learning, wisdom, wealth, and capacity for fulfilling his duties. Therefore, rolling like a wheel (from the one to the other), in both worlds he dwells in happiness' (Āpast. Dha. Sū. II, 1, 2, 3). The clause 'as long as his works last' (yâvat-sampâtam) refers to that part of his works only which was performed with a view to reward (as promised for those works by the Veda); and the same holds true with regard to the passage 'whatever work man does here on earth' (Bṛi. Up. V, 4, 6). Nor is it possible that works, the fruit of which has not yet been enjoyed, and those the result of which has not been wiped out by expiatory ceremonies, should be destroyed by the enjoyment of the fruits of other works. Hence those who have gone to that world return with a remnant of their works, 'as they went and not so'--i.e. in the same way as they ascended and also in a different way. For the ascent takes place by the following stages--smoke, night, the dark half of the moon, the six months of the sun's southern progress, the world of the fathers, ether, moon. The descent, on the other hand, goes from the place of the moon, through ether, wind, smoke, mist, cloud. The two journeys are alike in so far as they pass through ether, but different in so far as the descent touches wind, and so on, and does not touch the world of the fathers, and other stages of the ascent.

9. 'On account of conduct'; not so, since (karana) connotes works; thus Kârshnâjini thinks.

In the phrases 'those whose works were good' (ramanîya-karanâh), and 'those whose works were bad' (kapûyâ-karanâh), the word karana does not denote good and evil works (i.e. not such works as the Veda on the one hand enjoins as leading to certain rewards, and on the other prohibits, threatening punishment), for, in Vedic as well as ordinary language, the term karana is generally used in the sense of âkâra, i.e. general conduct. In ordinary speech such words as âkâra, sîla, vṛitta are considered synonymous, and in the Veda we read 'whatever works (karmâni) are blameless, those should be regarded, not others. Whatever our good conduct (su-karitâni) was, that should be observed by thee, nothing else' (Taitt. Up. I, 11, 2)--where 'works' and 'conduct' are distinguished. Difference in quality of birth therefore depends on conduct, not on the remainder of works performed with a view to certain results.--This primâ facie view the Sûtra sets aside, 'not so, because the scriptural term karana connotes works; thus the teacher Kârshnâjini thinks.' For mere conduct does not lead to experiences of pleasure and pain; pleasure and pain are the results of _works_ in the limited sense.

10. 'There is purposelessness'; not so, on account of the dependence on that.

But if conduct has no result, it follows that good conduct, as enjoined in the Smṛitis, is useless!--Not so, we reply; for holy works enjoined by the Veda depend on conduct, in so far as a man of good conduct only is entitled to perform those works. This appears from passages such as the following: 'A man who is not pure is unfit for all religious work,' and 'Him who is devoid of good conduct the Vedas do not purify.' Kârshnâjini's view thus is, that the karana of the text implies karman.

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40299 11. But only good and evil works, thus Bâdari thinks.
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40301 As the verb â-kar takes karman for its object (punyam karmâ karati, &c.),
40302 and as the separate denotation (i.e. the use of apparently equivalent
40303 words, viz. âkar and karman) can be accounted for on the ground that one
40304 of them refers to works established by manifest texts, and the other to
40305 texts inferred from actually existing rules of good conduct; and as,
40306 when the primary meaning is possible, no secondary meaning must be
40307 adopted; nothing else but good and evil works (in the Vedic sense) are
40308 denoted by the word karana: such is the opinion of the teacher Bâdari.
40309 This opinion of Bâdari, the author of the Sûtra states as representing
40310 his own. On the other hand, he adopts the view of Kârshnajini in so far
40311 as he considers such items of virtuous _conduct_ as the Sandhyâ--which
40312 are enjoined by scriptural texts, the existence of which is inferred on
40313 the basis of conduct as enjoined by Smriti--to have the result of
40314 qualifying the agent for the performance of other works.--The conclusion
40315 therefore is that the souls descend, carrying a remnant of their works.--
40316 Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the passing of works.'
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40321 12. Of those also who do not perform sacrifices (the ascent) is declared
40322 by Scripture.
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40324 It has been said that those who perform only sacrifices, and so on, go
40325 to the moon and thence return with a remainder of their works. The
40326 question now arises whether those also who do not perform sacrifices go
40327 to the moon. The phrase 'who do not perform sacrifices' denotes evil-
40328 doers of two kinds, viz. those who do not do what is enjoined, and those
40329 who do what is forbidden.--These also go to the moon, the Pûrvapakshin
40330 maintains; for the text contains a statement to that effect, 'All who
40331 depart from this world go to the moon' (Ka. Up. I, 2)--where it is said
40332 that all go, without any distinction. So that those who perform good
40333 works and those who perform evil works, equally go to the moon.--This
40334 the next Sûtra negatives.
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40339 13. But of the others having enjoyed in Samyamana, there is ascent and
40340 descent; as such a course is declared.
40341

40342 Of the others, i.e. those who do not perform sacrifices, and so on,
40343 there is ascent to the moon and descent from there, only after they have
40344 in the kingdom of Yama suffered the punishments due to their actions.
40345 For the text declares that evil-doers fall under the power of Yama, and
40346 have to go to him, 'He who thinks, this is the world there is no other,
40347 falls again and again under my sway' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 6); 'the son of
40348 Vivasvat, the gathering place of men' (Rik Samh. X, 14, 1); 'King Yama,'
40349 and other texts.
40350
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40354 14. Smriti texts also declare this.
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40356 That all beings are under the sway of Yama, Parâsara also and other
40357 Smriti writers declare, 'And all these pass under the sway of Yama.'
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40362 15. Moreover there are seven.
40363

40364 The Smritis moreover declare that there are seven hells, called Raurava,

40365 and so on, to which evil-doers have to go.--But how do they, if moving
40366 about in those seven places, reach the palace of Yama?

40371 16. On account of his activity there also, there is no contradiction.

40372
40373 As their going to those seven places also is due to the command of Yama,
40374 there is no contradiction.--Thus those also who do not perform
40375 sacrifices, and so on, after having gone to the world of Yama, and there
40376 undergone punishments according to the nature of their works, later on
40377 ascend to the moon and again descend from there.--Of this conclusion the
40378 next Sûtra disposes.

40382
40383 17. But, of knowledge and work--as these are the leading topics.

40384
40385 The 'but' sets aside the view developed so far. It cannot be admitted
40386 that those also who do not perform sacrifices, and so on, reach the moon;
40387 because the path of the gods and the path of the fathers are meant for
40388 the enjoyment of the fruits 'of knowledge and work.' That is to say--as
40389 those who do not perform sacrifices cannot ascend by the path of the
40390 gods, since they are destitute of knowledge; so they also cannot go by
40391 the path of the fathers, since they are destitute of meritorious works.
40392 And that these two paths are dependent respectively on knowledge and
40393 works, we know from the fact that these two are the leading topics. For
40394 knowledge forms the leading topic with regard to the path of the gods,
40395 'Those who know this, and those who in the forest follow faith and
40396 austerities, go to light,' &c.; and works have the same position with
40397 regard to the path of the fathers, "they who living in a village perform
40398 sacrifices, &c. go to the smoke," &c. The text, 'all those who depart
40399 from this world go to the moon,' must therefore be interpreted to mean
40400 'all those who perform sacrifices go to the moon.'--But if evil-doers do
40401 not go to the moon, the fifth oblation cannot take place, and no new
40402 body can be produced. For the text says, 'In the fifth oblation water is
40403 called man,' and, as we have shown, that fifth oblation presupposes the
40404 soul's going to the moon. In order, therefore, to understand how in
40405 their case also a new embodiment is possible, it must needs be admitted
40406 that they also ascend to the moon.--To this the next Sûtra replies.

40407
40408
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40410
40411 18. Not in the case of the third (place), as it is thus perceived.

40412
40413 The third 'place' does not, for the origination of a new body, depend on
40414 the fifth oblation. The term, 'the third place,' denotes mere evil-doers.
40415 That these do not, for the origination of a new body, depend on the
40416 fifth oblation, is seen from Scripture. For, in answer to the question
40417 'Do you know why that world never becomes full?' the text says, 'On
40418 neither of these two ways are those small creatures continually
40419 returning, of whom it may be said, Live and die. This is the third place.
40420 Therefore that world never becomes full.' As this passage states that in
40421 consequence of 'the third place' (i.e. the creatures forming a third
40422 class) not ascending to and descending from the heavenly world that
40423 world never becomes full, it follows that that third place does not, for
40424 the origination of bodies, depend on the fifth oblation. The clause, 'in
40425 the fifth oblation,' moreover, merely states that the connexion of water
40426 with the fifth fire is the cause of the water 'being called man' (i. e.
40427 becoming an embryo), but does not deny the origination of embryos in
40428 other ways; for the text contains no word asserting such a limitation.

40429
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40431
40432
40433 19. It moreover is recorded, in the world.

Smriti, moreover, states that the bodies of some specially meritorious persons, such as Draupadî, Dhṛishtadyumna and others, were formed independently of the fifth oblation' (i.e. sexual union).

20. And on account of its being seen.

And it is seen in Scripture also, that the bodies of some beings originate independently of the fifth oblation: 'Of all beings there are indeed three origins only, that which springs from an egg, that which springs from a living being, that which springs from a germ' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 1). It is observed that from among these beings those springing from a germ and those springing from heat originate without that fifth oblation.--But the text quoted does not refer to the creatures springing from heat; for it says that there are three origins only!--To this the next Sûtra replies.

21. The third term includes that which springs from heat.

Creatures sprung from heat are included in the third term--viz. that which springs from a germ--which is exhibited in the text quoted. The settled conclusion therefore is that the evil-doers do not go to the moon.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'those who do not perform sacrifices.'

22. There is entering into similarity of being with those, there being a reason.

The text describes the manner in which those who perform sacrifices, and so on, descend from the moon as follows: 'They return again that way as they came, to the ether, from the ether to the air. Then having become air they become smoke, having become smoke they become mist,' &c. The doubt here arises whether the soul when reaching ether, and so on, becomes ether in the same sense as here on earth it becomes a man or other being, or merely becomes similar to ether, and so on.--The former view is the true one; for as the soul in the sraddhâ state becomes the moon, so it must likewise be held to become ether, and so on, there being no reason for a difference in the two cases.--This primâ facie view the Sûtra sets aside. The descending soul enters into similarity of being with ether, and so on; since there is a reason for this. When the soul becomes a man or becomes the moon, there is a reason for that, since it thereby becomes capacitated for the enjoyment of pain and pleasure. But there is no similar reason for the soul becoming ether, and so on, and hence the statement that the soul becomes ether, and so on, can only mean that, owing to contact with them, it becomes similar to them.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'entering into similarity of being.'

23. Not very long; on account of special statement.

Does the soul in its descent through ether, and so on, stay at each stage for a not very long time, or is there nothing to define that time?--It stays at each stage for an indefinite time, there being nothing to define the time.--

Not so, the Sûtra decides. For there is a special statement, i.e. the text says that when the soul has become rice or grain or the like, the

passing out of that stage is beset with difficulties. From this we infer that as there is no such statement concerning the earlier stages, the soul stays at each of them for a short time only.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the not very long time.'

24. Into (plants) animated by other souls, because the statement is as in the previous cases.

The text declares that 'he descending souls are born as rice, corn,' &c., 'they are born here as rice, corn, herbs, trees,' &c. The question here is whether the souls cling to plants animated by other souls which have those plants for their bodies; or whether the descending souls themselves are born with those plants for their bodies.--The latter view is the right one; for the text says, 'they are born as rice, grain,' and so on, and this expression is of the same kind as when we say 'he is born as a man, as a deva,' and so on. The text therefore means that the souls are embodied in the different plants.--This view the Sûtra rejects. The souls merely cling to those plants which constitute the bodies of other souls; 'since the statement is as in the previous cases,' i.e. because the text only says that the souls become plants as it had previously been said that they become ether, and so on. Where the text means to say that the soul enters on the condition of an enjoying soul (i.e. of a soul assuming a new body for the purpose of retributive enjoyment), it refers to the deeds which lead to such enjoyment; so e. g. in the passage, 'Those whose works have been good obtain a good birth,' & c. But in the text under discussion there is no such reference to karman. For those works--viz. sacrifices and the like--which were undertaken with a view to reward, such as enjoyment of the heavenly world, are, in the case of the descending souls, completely wiped out by the enjoyment of the heavenly world (which precedes the descent of the souls); and those works on the other hand, the action of which has not yet begun, lead to the embodiments mentioned further on ('Those whose works are good'). And in the interval between those two conditions no new karman originates. When, therefore, the text says that the souls are born as plants, the statement cannot be taken in its literal sense.

25. It is unholy. Not so, on the ground of Scripture.

The conclusion arrived at above cannot be accepted, since there is a reason why the descending soul should enter on the condition of an enjoying soul. Such works as sacrifices, the fruit of which is the enjoyment of the heavenly world, are mixed with evil, for they imply injury to living beings as in the case of the goat offered to Agnîshomau. And such injury is evil as it is forbidden by texts such as 'let him not harm any creature.' Nor can it be said that the injunctions of sacrificing animals constitute exceptions to the general rule of not harming any creature.--For the two injunctions refer to different things. The injunction to kill the goat for Agnîshomau intimates that the killing of the animal subserves the accomplishment of the sacrifice, while the injunction not to 'harm' teaches that such harming has disastrous consequences. Should it be said that the prohibition of harming does not refer to such actions as the sacrifice of the goat which proceed on the basis of scriptural injunction, but only to such actions as spring from natural passion or desire (râga); we remark that in the case of sacrifices also the action is equally prompted by natural desire. Injunctions such as 'He who desires the heavenly world is to sacrifice', teach that sacrifices are to be undertaken by persons desirous of certain pleasant results, and such persons having thus learned by what means the result is to be accomplished proceed to action from the natural desire of the result. This applies to the killing of the goat also which is offered to Agnîshomau; man learns from Scripture that such actions help to accomplish the sacrifice which effects the result, and then performs those actions from natural desire. The case in

no way differs from that of harm done in ordinary life--where the agent always is prompted by natural desire, having somehow arrived at the conclusion that his action will accomplish something aimed at by himself. The same holds good with regard to works of permanent obligation. Men learn from Scripture that through the performance of the special duties of their caste they attain happiness of the highest kind, and then apply themselves to their duties from a natural desire of such happiness, and therefore such works also are mixed with evil. Hence the souls of those who have performed sacrifices, and so on, which contain an element of evil, at first experience in the heavenly world that result which is to be enjoyed there, and then embodying themselves in non-moving things such as plants, experience the fruit of that part of their actions which is of a harmful nature. That embodiment in non-moving beings is the result of evil deeds Smṛiti declares: 'Owing to those defects of work which are due to the body, a man becomes a non-moving being.' From all this it follows that the souls embody themselves in plants to the end of enjoying the fruits of their works.--To this the Sūtra replies--it is not so, on account of scriptural statement. For Scripture declares that the killing of sacrificial animals makes them to go up to the heavenly world, and therefore is not of the nature of harm. This is declared in the text, 'The animal killed at the sacrifice having assumed a divine body goes to the heavenly world'; 'with a golden body it ascends to the heavenly world.' An action which is the means of supreme exaltation is not of the nature of harm, even if it involves some little pain; it rather is of beneficial nature.--With this the mantra also agrees: 'Thou dost not die, thou goest to the gods on easy paths; where virtuous men go, not evil-doers, there the divine Savitri may lead thee.' An act which has a healing tendency, although it may cause a transitory pain, men of insight declare to be preservative and beneficial.

26. After that conjunction with him who performs the act of generation.

The declaration that the descending souls become rice plants, and so on, cannot be taken literally for that reason also, that the text afterwards declares them to become those who perform the act of generation: 'Whoever the being may be that eats the food and begets offspring, that being he (i.e. the soul that has descended) becomes.' Now the meaning of this latter text can only be that the soul enters into conjunction with the creature which eats the grain; and hence we have to interpret the previous text, as to the soul's becoming a plant, in the same way.

27. From the yoni the body.

Only after having reached a yoni the soul, affected with a remnant of its works, obtains a new body, and only in a body there can be the enjoyment of pleasure and pain. When, therefore, previous to that the soul is said to reach ether, wind, and so on, this can only mean that it enters into conjunction with them.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'that animated by another soul.'

SECOND PĀDA.

1. In the intermediate sphere the creation (is effected by the soul); for (Scripture) says (so).

So far it has been shown that the soul in the waking state suffers affliction since, in accordance with its deeds, it goes, returns, is born, and so on. Next an enquiry is instituted into its condition in the state of dream. With reference to the state of dreaming Scripture says,

40641 'There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads; then he
40642 creates chariots, horses and roads. There are no blessings, no happiness,
40643 no joys; then he himself creates blessings, happiness, joys, and so on.
40644 For he is the creator' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 10). A doubt here arises whether
40645 this creation of chariots and the rest is accomplished by the individual
40646 soul, or by the Lord.--'The creation in the intermediate state' is due
40647 to the individual soul only. 'The intermediate state' means the sphere
40648 of dreams, in agreement with the passage 'There is a third intermediate
40649 state, the place of dreams' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 1). And that creation is
40650 effected by the soul only; for what is referred to in the passages 'he
40651 creates,' 'For he is the maker,' is none other but the dreaming soul.

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40656 2. And some (state the soul to be) the shaper; and sons, and so on.

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40658 And the followers of one sâkhâ state in their text that the dreaming
40659 soul is the shaper of its desires: 'He, the person who is awake in those
40660 who sleep, shaping one desired thing (kâma) after the other.' The term
40661 'kâma' there denotes not mere desires, but such things as sons and the
40662 like which are objects of desire. For sons and so on are introduced as
40663 'kâmas' in previous passages: 'Ask for all kâmas according to thy wish';
40664 'Choose sons and grandsons living a hundred years' (Ka. Up. I, 1, 25;
40665 23). The individual soul thus creates chariots, and so on, in its dreams.
40666 That the soul has the power of realising all its wishes is known from
40667 the declaration of Prajâpati. It is therefore able to create, even in
40668 the absence of special instruments.--This view is set aside by the next
40669 Sûtra.

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40674 3. But it is mere Mâyâ; on account of the true nature (of the soul) not
40675 being fully manifested.

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40677 The things appearing in dreams-chariots, lotus tanks, and so on--are
40678 absolute Mâyâ, i.e. things created by the Supreme Person. For the term
40679 'Mâyâ' denotes wonderful things, as appears from passages such as 'She
40680 was born in the race of Janaka, appearing like the wonderful power of
40681 the divine being in bodily shape' (devamâyâ). The sense of the passage
40682 'there are no chariots,' &c. then is--there are no chariots and horses
40683 to be perceived by any other person but the dreaming one; and then 'he
40684 creates chariots,' &c.--i. e. the Supreme Person creates things to be
40685 perceived by the dreamer and persisting for a certain time only. Those
40686 things therefore are of a wonderful nature (but not illusions). And the
40687 creation of such wonderful things is possible for the Supreme Person who
40688 can immediately realise all his wishes; but not for the individual soul.
40689 The latter also, indeed, fundamentally possesses that power; but as in
40690 the Samsâra state the true nature of the soul is not fully manifested,
40691 it is then incapable of accomplishing such wonderful creations. The text
40692 'the person shaping one desired thing after the other' declares the
40693 Supreme Person to be the creator, for the clauses immediately preceding
40694 and following that text (viz. 'He who is awake in those who sleep'; and
40695 'that is the Bright, that is Brahman, that alone is called the Immortal;
40696 all worlds are contained in it and no one goes beyond'--Ka. Up. II, 5,
40697 8) mention attributes distinctively characteristic of the Supreme Person.
40698 And the Bri. Up. text, 'For he is the maker,' must therefore, in
40699 agreement with the Katha-text, also be understood as declaring that it
40700 is the Supreme Person only that creates the things seen in a dream.--But
40701 if it is the true nature of the soul to be free from all imperfections,
40702 and so on, why then does this not manifest itself?--To this the next
40703 Sûtra replies.

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40707
40708 4. But owing to the wish of the highest it is hidden; for from that are
40709 its bondage and the opposite state.

The but sets the objection aside. Owing to the wish of the highest, i. e. the Supreme Person, the essential nature of the individual soul is hidden. The Supreme Person hides the true, essentially blessed, nature of the soul which is in a state of sin owing to the endless chain of karman. For this reason we find it stated in Scripture that the bondage and release of the soul result from the wish of the Supreme Person only 'when he finds freedom from fear and rest in that invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported; then he has gone to fearlessness'; 'for he alone causes blessedness'; 'from fear of it the wind blows' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, 8).

5. Or that (results) also from connexion with the body.

The obscuration of the soul's true nature results either from the soul's connexion with the body or from its connexion with the power of matter in a subtle state. As long as the creation lasts, the soul is obscured by its connexion with matter in the form of a body; at the time of a pralaya, on the other hand, by its connexion with matter of so exceedingly subtle a kind as not to admit of differentiation by means of name and form. As thus its true nature is not manifest, the soul is unable to create, in dreams, chariots, lotus tanks, and so on, by its mere wish. And what the texts say about a being that is awake in those who sleep and is the abode of all worlds ('in that all the worlds abide, and no one goes beyond it'--Ka. Up. II, 4, 9) can apply to the Supreme Person only. The things seen by an individual soul in its dreams therefore are specially created by the Supreme Person, and are meant by him to be a retribution--whether reward or punishment--for deeds of minor importance: they therefore last for the time of the dream only, and are perceived by that one soul only.

6. And it is suggestive, according to Scripture; this the experts also declare.

The things seen in dreams are not created by the wish of the individual soul for this reason also, that according to Scripture dreams are prophetic of future good or ill fortune. 'When a man engaged in some work undertaken for some special wish sees a woman in his dream, he may infer success from his dream vision.' Those also who understand the science of dreams teach that dreams foreshadow good and evil fortune. But that which depends on one's own wish can have no prophetic quality; and as ill fortune is not desired the dreamer would create for himself only such visions as would indicate good fortune. Hence the creation which takes place in dreams can be the Lord's work only.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the intermediate state.'

7. The absence of that takes place in the nâdis and in the Self, according to scriptural statement.

Next the state of deep dreamless sleep is enquired into. Scripture says, 'When a man is asleep, reposing and at perfect rest, so that he sees no dream, then he lies asleep in those nâdis' (Ch. Up. VIII, 6, 3); 'When he is in profound sleep and is conscious of nothing, there are seventy-two thousand veins called hita which from the heart spread through the pericardium. Through them he moves forth and rests in the pericardium' (Bri. Up. II, 1, 19). 'When a man sleeps here, he becomes united with the True' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 1). These texts declare the veins, the pericardium, and Brahman to be the place of deep sleep; and hence there is a doubt whether each of them in turns, or all of them together, are that place. There is an option between them, since they are not in

mutual dependence, and since the sleeping soul cannot at the same time be in several places!--To this the Sûtra replies--the absence of dreams, i.e. deep sleep takes place in the veins, in the pericardium, and in the highest Self together; since these three are declared by Scripture. When different alternatives may be combined, on the ground of there being different effects in each case, it is improper to assume an option which implies sublation of some of the alternatives. And in the present case such combination is possible, the veins and the pericardium holding the position of a mansion, as it were, and a couch within the mansion, while Brahman is the pillow, as it were. Thus Brahman alone is the immediate resting-place of the sleeping soul.

8. Hence the awaking from that.

Since Brahman alone directly is the place of deep sleep, Scripture is able to declare that the souls awake from that, i.e. Brahman; compare 'Having come back from the True they do not know that they come from the True' (Ch. Up. VI, 10, 2), and other texts.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the absence of that.'

9. But the same, on account of work, remembrance, text, and injunction.

Does the same person who had gone to sleep rise again at the time of waking, or a different one?--Since the soul in deep sleep frees itself from all limiting adjuncts, unites itself with Brahman, and thus being in no way different from the released soul, is no longer in any way connected with its previous body, organs, and so on; the person rising from sleep is a different one.--This view the Sûtra sets aside, saying 'but the same.' For there remains the work, i.e. the good and evil deeds previously done by the sleeper, for which the same person has to undergo retribution before the knowledge of truth arises. There is next remembrance--'I, the waking person, am the same as I who was asleep.' Scripture also declares this: 'Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or tiger, or wolf, &c., that they become again' (Ch. Up. VI, 10, 2). And, lastly, the injunctions which enjoin certain acts for the sake of final Release would be purportless if the person merged in deep sleep attained Release. Nor can it be said that the sleeping soul is free from all limiting adjuncts and manifests itself in its true nature (so as not to be different from the released soul). For with regard to the sleeping person the text says, 'In truth he thus does not know himself that he is I, nor does he know anything that exists. He is gone to utter annihilation. I see no good in this' (Ch. Up. VIII, ii, 1); while, on the other hand, the texts, 'Having approached the highest light he manifests himself in his true nature; he moves about there laughing, playing, delighting himself; 'He becomes a Self-ruler; he moves about in all the worlds according to his wish'; 'The seeing one sees everything, and attains everything everywhere' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3; VII, 25, 2; 26, 2), declare that the released soul is all-knowing, and so on. What is true about the sleeping person is that he is still comprised within the Samsâra, but for the time having put off all instruments of knowledge and action and become incapable of knowledge and enjoyment repairs to the place of utter rest, i.e. the highest Self, and having there refreshed himself, again rises to new enjoyment of action.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'work, remembrance, text, and injunction.'

10. In the swooning person there is half-combination; this being the remaining (hypothesis).

With regard to a person lying in a swoon or stunned, the question arises

whether that state of swoon is one of the other states, viz. deep sleep and so on, or whether it is a special condition of its own.--The former alternative must be accepted. For the term 'swoon' may be explained as denoting either deep sleep or some other acknowledged state, and there is no authority for assuming an altogether different new state.--This view the Sûtra sets aside. The condition of a swooning person consists in reaching half, viz. of what leads to death; for this is the only hypothesis remaining. A swoon cannot be either dreaming or being awake; for in a swoon there is no consciousness. And as it is different in character as well as in the occasions giving rise to it from deep sleep and death, it cannot be either of those two states; for there are special circumstances occasioning a swoon, such as a blow on the head. The only possible alternative then is to view a swoon as a state in which there is made a half-way approach to death. For while death consists in the complete cessation of the soul's connexion with the body or organs of any kind, a swoon consists in the soul's remaining connected with the subtle body and organs only. Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the swooning person.'

11. Not on account of place even (is there any imperfection) of the Highest; for everywhere (it is described) as having twofold characteristics.

The different states of the individual soul have been discussed, to the end that an insight into their imperfections may give rise to indifference towards all worldly enjoyments. Next now, in order to give rise to the desire of attaining to Brahman, the Sûtras proceed to expound how Brahman's nature is raised above all imperfections and constituted by mere blessed qualities. The following point requires to be considered first. Do those imperfections which cling to the individual soul in consequence of its different states--viz. the waking state, dreams, deep sleep, swoon, departure from the body--affect also the highest Brahman which as its inner Ruler abides within the soul in those different states, or not?--They do affect it, since Brahman abides within the bodies which are in those different states.--But Sûtras such as I, 2, 8 have already declared that the highest Brahman, because not subject to the influence of karman, is free from all imperfections; how then can imperfections cling to it for the reason that it is connected with this or that place?--In the following way. As was shown under III, 2, 6, works give rise to imperfection and suffering in so far as they cause the connexion of the soul with a body. The efficient cause therein is the imperfection inherent in the connexion with a body; for otherwise the works themselves would directly give rise to pain, and what then would be the use of the connexion with a body? Hence, even in the case of a being not subject to karman, its connexion with various unholy bodies will cause imperfection and suffering. And even when such a being voluntarily enters into such bodies in order to rule them, connexion with imperfections is unavoidable; no less than to be immersed in blood and purulent matter, even if done voluntarily, will make a man unclean. Although therefore Brahman is the sole cause of the world and a treasure-house of all blessed qualities, yet it is affected by the imperfections springing therefrom that, as declared by Scripture, it abides within matter, bodies, and their parts, and thus is connected with them (cp. 'he who abides within earth, within the soul, within the eye, within the seed,' &c., Bri. Up. III, 7, 3).

Of this primâ facie view the Sûtra disposes by saying--'Not even from place, such as earth, soul, &c., is there possible for the highest Self a shadow even of imperfection; since everywhere in Scripture as well as Smriti Brahman is described as having characteristics of a double kind; viz. on the one hand freedom from all imperfections, and on the other possession of all blessed qualities. For Scripture says that the Supreme Person is free from evil, free from old age, free from death, free from grief, free from hunger and thirst; that all his wishes realise themselves, that all its purposes realise themselves' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5)--And Smriti says, 'He comprises within himself all blessed qualities,

by a particle of his power the whole mass of beings is supported. In him there are combined energy, strength, might, wisdom, valour, and all other noble qualities. He is the Highest of the high, no pain or other imperfections affect him, the Lord of all, high or low. From all evil he is free, he whose name is Vishnu, the highest abode.' These and other passages teach that Brahman possesses the double characteristics stated above.

12. Should it be said 'on account of difference'; not so, because with reference to each the text says what is not that.

But, an objection is raised, we observe, that the individual soul also, although in reality possessing the same twofold attributes, viz. freedom from all evil and so on, as we learn from the teaching of Prajâpati (Ch. Up. VIII, 7), yet is affected with imperfections owing to the fact that it is connected with bodies, divine, human, and so on, and thus undergoes a variety of conditions. Analogously we cannot avoid the conclusion that the inner Ruler also, although in reality possessing those same twofold attributes, is also affected by imperfection, because through its connexion with those different bodies it likewise undergoes a variety of conditions.--This objection the Sûtra sets aside in the words, 'not so, because with reference to each the text says what is not that,' i.e. what is contrary. For where the text says that the inner Ruler dwells within the earth, within the soul, within the eye, and so on, it concludes each clause by saying, 'that is thy Self, the inner Ruler, the immortal one,' i.e. declares the inner Ruler to be immortal, and thus denies of him any imperfections due to his connexion with the bodies which he voluntarily enters in order to rule them. The true (perfect) nature of the individual soul, on the other hand, is obscured as long as it is connected with a body, as we have explained under III, 2, 5.--But, as the Pûrvapakshin has pointed out, even if the highest Self voluntarily enters into bodies, it cannot escape connexion with the imperfections which depend on the essential nature of those bodies.--Not so, we reply. The fact is, that not even non-sentient things are, essentially or intrinsically, bad; but in accordance with the nature of the works of those beings which are under the rule of karman, one thing, owing to the will of the Supreme Person, causes pain to one man at one time and pleasure at another time, and causes pleasure or pain to one person and the opposite to another person. If the effects of things depended on their own nature only, everything would at all times be productive for all persons, either of pleasure only or of pain only. But this is not observed to be the case. In agreement herewith Smṛiti says, 'Because one and the same thing causes pain and pleasure and envy and wrath, the nature of a thing cannot lie in itself. As the same thing which erst gave rise to love causes pain later on, and that which once caused anger now causes satisfaction, nothing is in itself of the nature either of pleasure or of pain.' To the soul therefore which is subject to karman the connexion with different things is the source of imperfection and suffering, in agreement with the nature of its works; while to the highest Brahman, which is subject to itself only, the same connexion is the source of playful sport, consisting therein that he in various ways guides and rules those things.

13. Some also (teach) thus.

Moreover, the followers of one sâkhâ explicitly teach that the connexion with one and the same body is for the individual soul a source of disadvantage, while for the highest Brahman it is nothing of the kind, but constitutes an accession of glory in so far as it manifests him as a Lord and Ruler, 'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1).--But the text, 'Having entered by means of that jîva-self I will differentiate names and forms,' teaches that the

40986 differentiation of names and forms depends on the entering into the
40987 elements of the jīva-soul whose Self is Brahman, and this implies that
40988 Brahman also, as the Self of the individual soul, possesses definite
40989 shapes, divine, human, and so on, and is to be denominated by the
40990 corresponding names. Brahman thus falls within the sphere of beings to
40991 which injunctions and prohibitions are addressed--such as 'a Brāhmaṇa is
40992 to sacrifice'--and hence necessarily is under the power of karman.--To
40993 this the next Sūtra replies.

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40998 14. For (Brahman is) without form merely, since it is the principal
40999 agent with regard to that.

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41001 Brahman, although by entering into bodies, human, divine, and so on, it
41002 becomes connected with various forms, yet is in itself altogether devoid
41003 of form, and therefore does not share that subjection to karman which in
41004 the case of the soul is due to its embodiedness.--Why?--Because as it is
41005 that which brings about names and forms it stands to them in the
41006 relation of a superior (pradhāna). For the text, 'The Ether (Brahman)
41007 indeed is the accomplisher of names and forms; that which is without
41008 these two is Brahman,' teaches that Brahman, although entering into all
41009 beings, is not touched by name and form, but is that which brings about
41010 name and form.--But, an objection is raised, if Brahman is the inner
41011 ruler of beings in so far as he has them for its body, how can it be
41012 said that it is altogether destitute of form?--There is a difference, we
41013 reply. The individual soul is connected with the shape of the body in
41014 which it dwells because it participates in the pleasures and pains to
41015 which the body gives rise; but as Brahman does not share those pleasures
41016 and pains, it has no shape or form. And the scriptural injunctions and
41017 prohibitions apply to those only who are under the power of karman. The
41018 highest Brahman therefore is like a being without form, and hence,
41019 although abiding within all things, free from all imperfection and
41020 endowed with all blessed qualities.

41021
41022 But, an objection is raised, texts such as 'the True, knowledge,
41023 infinite is Brahman' suggest a Brahman whose nature is constituted
41024 exclusively by non-differentiated light; while at the same time a
41025 Brahman endowed with qualities--such as omniscience, being the cause of
41026 the world, being the inner Self of all, having the power of immediately
41027 realising its wishes and purposes--is expressly negated by texts such
41028 as 'not so, not so' (Bri. Up. II, 3, 6), and therefore must be held to
41029 be false. How then can it be maintained that Brahman possesses the
41030 'twofold characteristics' mentioned under Sūtra 11?--To this the next
41031 Sūtra replies.

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41036 15. And in the same way as (a Brahman) consisting of light; (the texts
41037 thus) not being devoid of meaning.

41038
41039 In order that texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'
41040 may not be devoid of meaning, we have to admit that light (intelligence)
41041 constitutes the essential nature of Brahman. But analogously we have
41042 also to admit that Brahman possesses the 'twofold characteristics'; for
41043 otherwise the texts declaring it to be free from all imperfections, all-
41044 knowing, the cause of the world, and so on, would in their turn be
41045 devoid of meaning.

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41050 16. And (the text) says so much only.

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41052 Moreover the text 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' only
41053 teaches that Brahman has light for its essential nature, and does not
41054 negative those other attributes of Brahman--omniscience, being the cause

of the world, &c.--which are intimated by other texts. What is the object of the negation in 'not so, not so' will be shown further on.

17. (This Scripture) also shows, and it is also stated in Smṛiti.

That Brahman is a treasure as it were of all blessed qualities and free from all imperfections, the whole body of Vedānta-texts clearly declares: 'That highest great lord of lords, that highest deity of deities'; 'He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord'; 'There is no effect and no cause known of him, no one is seen like unto him or higher. His high power is revealed as manifold, as essential action of knowledge and strength' (Svet. Up. VI, 7-9); 'He who is all-knowing, whose brooding consists of knowledge' (Mu. I, 1,9); 'From fear of him the wind blows, from fear of him the sun moves'; 'That is one bliss of Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 8); 'That from which all speech with the mind turns away, not having reached it, knowing the bliss of that Brahman man fears nothing' (Taitt. Up. II, 9); 'He who is without parts, without action, tranquil, without fault, without taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19).--And Smṛiti: 'He who knows me to be unborn and without a beginning, the Supreme Lord of the worlds'; 'Pervading this entire universe, by one part of mine I do abide'; 'With me as supervisor Prakṛiti brings forth the universe of the movable and the immovable, and for this reason the world does ever move round'; 'But another is the Supreme Person, who is called the Supreme Spirit, who pervading the three worlds supports them--the eternal Lord' (Bha. Gī. X, 3; 42; IX, 10; XV, 17); 'The all-working, all-powerful one, rich in knowledge and strength, who becomes neither less nor more, who is self-dependent, without beginning, master of all; who knows neither weariness nor exhaustion, nor fear, wrath and desire; the blameless one, raised above all, without support, imperishable.'--As thus Brahman in whatever place it may abide has the 'twofold characteristics,' the imperfections dependent on those places do not touch it.

18. For this very reason comparisons, such as reflected images of the sun and the like.

Because Brahman, although abiding in manifold places, ever possesses the twofold characteristics, and hence does not share the imperfections due to those places, scriptural texts illustrate its purity in the midst of inferior surroundings by comparing it to the sun reflected in water, mirrors, and the like. Compare e.g., 'As the one ether is rendered manifold by jars and the like, or as the one sun becomes manifold in several sheets of water; thus the one Self is rendered manifold by abiding in many places. For the Self of all beings, although one, abides in each separate being and is thus seen as one and many at the same time, as the moon reflected in water.'

19. But because it is not apprehended like water, there is no equality.

The 'but' indicates an objection.--The highest Self is not apprehended in earth and other places in the same way as the sun or a face is apprehended in water or a mirror. For the sun and a face are erroneously apprehended as abiding in water or a mirror; they do not really abide there. When, on the other hand, Scripture tells us that the highest Self dwells in the earth, in water, in the soul, &c., we apprehend it as really dwelling in all those places. That the imperfections caused by water and mirrors do not attach themselves to the sun or a face is due to the fact that the sun and the face do not really abide in the water and the mirror. Hence there is no real parallelism between the thing compared (the highest Self) and the thing to which it is compared (the

41124 reflected image).

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41129 20. The participation (on Brahman's part) in increase and decrease, due
41130 to its abiding within (is denied); on account of the appropriateness of
41131 both (comparisons), and because thus it is seen.

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41133 The comparison of the highest Self to the reflected sun and the rest is
41134 meant only to deny of the Self that it participates in the imperfections--
41135 such as increase, decrease, and the like--which attach to the earth and
41136 the other beings within which the Self abides.--How do we know this?--
41137 From the circumstance that on this supposition both comparisons are
41138 appropriate. In the scriptural text quoted above Brahman is compared to
41139 ether, which although one becomes manifold through the things--jars and
41140 so on--within it; and to the sun, which is multiplied by the sheets of
41141 water in which he is reflected. Now the employment of these comparisons--
41142 with ether which really does abide within the jars and so on, and with
41143 the sun which in reality does not abide in the water--is appropriate
41144 only if they are meant to convey the idea that the highest Self does not
41145 participate in the imperfections inherent in earth and so on. Just as
41146 ether, although connecting itself separately with jars, pots, and so on,
41147 which undergo increase and decrease, is not itself touched by these
41148 imperfections; and just as the sun, although seen in sheets of water of
41149 unequal extent, is not touched by their increase and decrease; thus the
41150 highest Self, although abiding within variously-shaped beings, whether
41151 non-sentient like earth or sentient, remains untouched by their various
41152 imperfections--increase, decrease, and so on--remains one although
41153 abiding in all of them, and ever keeps the treasure of its blessed
41154 qualities unsullied by an atom even of impurity.--The comparison of
41155 Brahman with the reflected sun holds good on the following account. As
41156 the sun is not touched by the imperfections belonging to the water,
41157 since he does not really abide in the water and hence there is no reason
41158 for his sharing those imperfections, thus the highest Self, which really
41159 abides within earth and the rest, is not affected by their imperfections;
41160 for as the nature of the highest Self is essentially antagonistic to all
41161 imperfection, there is no reason for its participating in the
41162 imperfection of others.--'And as this is seen.' This means--Since we
41163 observe in ordinary life also that comparisons are instituted between
41164 two things for the reason that although they do not possess all
41165 attributes in common, they yet have some attribute in common. We say, e.
41166 g. 'this man is like a lion.'--The conclusion from all this is that the
41167 highest Self, which is essentially free from all imperfections and a
41168 treasure as it were of all blessed qualities, in no way suffers from
41169 dwelling within the earth and the rest.

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41171 An objection is raised. In the Brihad-âraṇyaka, in the chapter beginning
41172 'There are two forms of Brahman, the material and the immaterial,' the
41173 whole material world, gross and subtle, is at first referred to as
41174 constituting the form of Brahman, and next a special form of Brahman is
41175 mentioned: 'And what is the form of that Person? Like a saffron-coloured
41176 raiment,' &c. But thereupon the text proceeds, 'Now follows the teaching--
41177 not so, not so; for there is not anything else higher than this "not so."
41178 " 'This passage, referring to all the previously mentioned forms of
41179 Brahman by means of the word 'so,' negatives them; intimating thereby
41180 that Brahman is nothing else than pure Being, and that all distinctions
41181 are mere imaginations due to Brahman not knowing its own essential
41182 nature. How then can Brahman possess the twofold characteristics?--To
41183 this the next Sûtra replies.

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41188 21. For the text denies the previously declared so-muchness; and
41189 declares more than that.

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41191 It is impossible to understand the text 'not so, not so' as negating
41192 those distinctions of Brahman which had been stated previously. If the

text meant that, it would be mere idle talk. For none but a person not in his right mind would first teach that all the things mentioned in the earlier part of the section are distinctive attributes of Brahman--as which they are not known by any other means of proof--and thereupon deliberately negative his own teaching. Although among the things mentioned there are some which, in themselves, are known through other means of proof, yet they are not thus known to be modes of Brahman, and others again are known neither in themselves nor as modes of Brahman. The text therefore cannot merely refer to them as things otherwise known, but gives fundamental instruction about them. Hence the later passage cannot be meant as a sheer negation, but must be taken as denying the previously described 'so-muchness' of Brahman; i.e. the passage denies that limited nature of Brahman which would result from Brahman being viewed as distinguished by the previously stated attributes only. The word so refers to that limited nature, and the phrase not so therefore means that Brahman is not distinguished by the previously stated modes only. This interpretation is further confirmed by the fact that after that negative phrase further qualities of Brahman are declared by the text: 'For there is not anything higher than this not so. Then comes the name, the True of the True; for the prānas are the True, and he is the True of them.' That means: Than that Brahman which is expressed by the phrase 'not so' there is no other thing higher, i.e. there is nothing more exalted than Brahman either in essential nature or in qualities. And of that Brahman the name is the 'True of the True.' This name is explained in the next clause, 'for the prānas,' &c. The term prānas here denotes the individual souls, so called because the prānas accompany them. They are the 'True' because they do not, like the elements, undergo changes implying an alteration of their essential nature. And the highest Self is the 'True of the True' because while the souls undergo, in accordance with their karman, contractions and expansions of intelligence, the highest Self which is free from all sin knows of no such alternations. He is therefore more eminently true than they are. As thus the complementary passage declares Brahman to be connected with certain qualities, the clause 'not so, not so' (to which that passage is complementary) cannot deny that Brahman possesses distinctive attributes, but only that Brahman's nature is confined to the attributes previously stated.--Brahman therefore possesses the twofold characteristics. That the clause 'not so' negatives Brahman's being fully described by the attributes previously mentioned, was above proved on the ground that since Brahman is not the object of any other means of proof, those previous statements cannot refer to what is already proved, and that the final clause cannot therefore be meant to deny what the previous clauses expressly teach. The next Sūtra now confirms this circumstance of Brahman not lying within the sphere of the other means of proof.

22. That (is) unmanifested; for (this Scripture) declares.

Brahman is not manifested by other means of proof; for Scripture says, 'His form is not to be seen, no one beholds him with the eye' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 9); 'He is not apprehended by the eye nor by speech' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 8).

23. Also in perfect conciliation, according to Scripture and Smṛiti.

Moreover, it is only in the state of perfect conciliation or endearment, i.e. in meditation bearing the character of devotion, that an intuition of Brahman takes place, not in any other state. This Scripture and Smṛiti alike teach. 'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda, nor by understanding, nor by much learning. He whom the Self chooses by him the Self can be gained. The Self chooses him as his own' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23); 'When a man's nature has become purified by the serene light of knowledge, then he sees him, meditating on him as without parts' (Mu. Up.

III, 1, 9). Smṛiti: 'Neither by the Vedas, nor austerities, nor gifts, nor by sacrifice, but only by exclusive devotion, may I in this form be known and beheld in truth and also entered into' (Bha. Gī. XI, 53,54). The scriptural text beginning 'Two are the forms of Brahman,' which declares the nature of Brahman for the purposes of devout meditation, cannot therefore refer to Brahman's being characterised by two forms, a material and an immaterial, as something already known; for apart from Scripture nothing is known about Brahman.

24. And there is non-difference (of the intention of Brahman's distinguishing attributes), as in the case of light; and the light (is) intuited as constituting Brahman's essential nature by repetition of the practice (of meditation).

That the clause 'not so' negatives not Brahman's possessing two forms, a material and an immaterial one, but only Brahman's nature being restricted to those determinations, follows therefrom also that in the vision of Vāmadeva and others who had attained to intuition into Brahman's nature, the fact of Brahman having all material and immaterial beings for its attributes is apprehended in non-difference, i.e. in the same way as the fact of light (i.e. knowledge) and bliss constituting Brahman's essential nature. Compare the text 'Seeing this the Rishi Vāmadeva understood, I am Manu and the sun' (Bṛi. Up. I, 4, 10). And that light and bliss constitute Brahman's nature was perceived by Vāmadeva and the rest through repeated performance of the practice of devout meditation. In the same way then, i.e. by repeated meditation, they also became aware that Brahman has all material and immaterial things for its distinguishing modes.--The next Sūtra sums up the proof of Brahman's possessing twofold characteristics.

25. Hence (Brahman is distinguished) by what is infinite; for thus the characteristics (hold good).

By the arguments stated it is proved that Brahman is distinguished by the infinite multitude of blessed qualities. And this being so, it follows that Brahman possesses the twofold characteristics.--Here terminates the adhikarāṇa of 'that which has twofold characteristics.'

26. But on account of twofold designation, as the snake and its coils.

It has been shown in the preceding adhikarāṇa that the entire non-sentient universe is the outward form of Brahman. For the purpose of proving Brahman's freedom from all imperfection, an enquiry is now begun into the particular mode in which the world may be conceived to constitute the form of Brahman. Is the relation of the two like that of the snake and its coils; or like that of light and the luminous body, both of which fall under the same genus; or like that of the individual soul and Brahman, the soul being a distinguishing attribute and for that reason a part (amsa) of Brahman?--On the assumption of this last alternative, which is about to be established here, it has been already shown under two preceding Sūtras (I, 4, 23; II, 1, 14), that from Brahman, as distinguished by sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle form, there originates Brahman as distinguished by all those beings in their gross form.

Which then of the alternatives stated above is the true one?--The material world is related to Brahman as the coils to the snake, 'on account of twofold designation.' For some texts declare the identity of the two: 'Brahman only is all this'; 'The Self only is all this.' Other texts again refer to the difference of the two: 'Having entered into

these three deities with this jīva-self, let me differentiate names and forms.' We therefore consider all non-sentient things to be special forms or arrangements of Brahman, as the coils are of a coiled-up snake or a coiled-up rope.

27. Or else like light and its abode, both being fire.

The or sets aside the other two alternatives. If Brahman itself only appeared in the form of non-sentient things--as the snake itself only constitutes the coils--both sets of texts, those which declare difference as well as those which declare the unchangeableness of Brahman, would be contrary to sense. We therefore, adopting the second alternative, hold that the case under discussion is analogous to that of light and that in which it abides, i.e. the luminous body. The two are different, but at the same time they are identical in so far as they both are fire (tejas). In the same way the non-sentient world constitutes the form of Brahman.

28. Or else in the manner stated above.

The but sets aside the two preceding alternatives. One substance may indeed connect itself with several states, but the former of the two alternatives implies that Brahman itself constitutes the essential nature of non-sentient matter, and thus there is no escape from the objections already stated under Sūtra 27. Let then the second alternative be adopted according to which Brahma-hood (brahmatva) constitutes a genus inhering in Brahman as well as in non-sentient matter, just as fire constitutes the common genus for light and luminous bodies. But on this view Brahman becomes a mere abstract generic character inhering in the Lord (isvara), sentient souls and non-sentient matter, just as the generic character of horses (asvatva) inheres in concrete individual horses; and this contradicts all the teaching of Sruti and Smṛiti (according to which Brahman is the highest concrete entity). We therefore hold that non-sentient matter stands to Brahman in the same relation as the one previously proved for the individual soul in Sūtra II, 3, 43; 46; viz. that it is an attribute incapable of being realised apart from Brahman and hence is a part (amsa) of the latter. The texts referring to the two as non-different may thus be taken in their primary sense; for the part is only a limited place of that of which it is a part. And the texts referring to the two as different may also be taken in their primary sense; for the distinguishing attribute and that to which the attribute belongs are essentially different. Thus Brahman's freedom from all imperfection is preserved.--Lustre is an attribute not to be realised apart from the gem, and therefore is a part of the gem; the same relation also holds good between generic character and individuals having that character, between qualities and things having qualities, between bodies and souls. In the same way souls as well as non-sentient matter stand to Brahman in the relation of parts.

29. And on account of denial.

Texts such as 'This is that great unborn Self, undecaying, undying' (Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 25), 'By the old age of the body that does not age' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5), deny of Brahman the properties of non-sentient matter. From this it follows that the relation of the two can only be that of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished, and hence of part and whole. Brahman distinguished by sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle state is the cause; distinguished by the same beings in their gross state is the effect: the effect thus is non-different from the cause, and by the knowledge of the causal Brahman the effect is

likewise known. All these tenets are in full mutual agreement. Brahman's freedom from defects also is preserved; and this and Brahman's being the abode of all blessed qualities prove that Brahman possesses the 'twofold characteristics.'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the coils of the snake.'

30. (There is something) higher than that; on account of the designations of bridge, measure, connexion, and difference.

The Sûtras now proceed to refute an erroneous view based on some fallacious arguments, viz. that there is a being higher even than the highest Brahman, the supreme cause, material as well as operative, of the entire world--a refutation which will confirm the view of Brahman being free from all imperfections and a treasure as it were of countless transcendently exalted qualities.--There is some entity higher than the Brahman described so far as being the cause of the world and possessing the twofold characteristics. For the text 'That Self is a bank (or bridge), a boundary' (Ch. Up. VIII, 4, 1) designates the Self as a bank or bridge (setu). And the term 'setu' means in ordinary language that which enables one to reach the other bank of a river; and from this we conclude that in the Vedic text also there must be meant something to be reached. The text further says that that bridge is to be crossed: 'He who has crossed that bridge, if blind,' &c.; this also indicates that there must be something to be reached by crossing. Other texts, again, speak of the highest Brahman as something measured, i.e. limited. 'Brahman has four feet (quarters), sixteen parts.' Such declarations of Brahman being something limited suggest the existence of something unlimited to be reached by that bridge. Further there are texts which declare a connexion of the bridge as that which is a means towards reaching, and a thing connected with the bridge as that to be reached: 'the highest bridge of the Immortal' (Svet. Up. VI, 19); 'he is the bridge of the Immortal' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 5). For this reason also there is something higher than the Highest.--And other texts again expressly state that being beyond the Highest to be something different: 'he goes to the divine Person who is higher than the Highest' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8); 'by this Person this whole universe is filled; what is higher than that is without form and without suffering' (Svet. Up. III, 9-10). All this combined shows that there is something higher than the highest Brahman.--The next Sûtra disposes of this view.

31. But on account of resemblance.

The 'but' sets aside the pûrvapaksha. There is no truth in the assertion that from the designation of the Highest as a bridge (or bank) it follows that there is something beyond the Highest. For Brahman in that text is not called a bank with regard to something to be reached thereby; since the additional clause 'for the non-confounding of these worlds' declares that it is compared to a bridge or bank in so far as it binds to itself (setu being derived from si, to bind) the whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient things without any confusion. And in the clause 'having passed beyond that bridge' the passing beyond means reaching; as we say, 'he passes beyond the Vedanta,' meaning 'he has fully mastered it.'

32. It subserves the purpose of thought; as in the case of the feet.

Where the texts speak of Brahman as having four quarters, and sixteen parts, or say that 'one quarter of him are all these beings' (Ch. Up. III, 12, 6), they do so for the purpose of thought, i.e. meditation, only. For as texts such as 'the Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'

41469 teach Brahman, the cause of the world, to be unlimited, it cannot in
41470 itself be subject to measure. The texts referring to measure therefore
41471 aim at meditation only, in the same way as texts such as 'Speech is one
41472 foot (quarter) of him, breath another, the eye another, the mind
41473 another' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 2).--But how can something that in itself is
41474 beyond all measure, for the purpose of meditation, be spoken of as
41475 measured? To this the next Sûtra replies.

41480 33. Owing to difference of place, as in the case of light, and so on.

41481
41482 Owing to the difference of limiting adjuncts constituted by special
41483 places, such as speech, and so on, Brahman in so far as connected with
41484 these adjuncts may be viewed as having measure; just as light and the
41485 like although spread everywhere may be viewed as limited, owing to its
41486 connexion with different places--windows, jars, and so on.

41491 34. And on account of possibility.

41492
41493 Nor is there any truth in the assertion that, because texts such as 'he
41494 is the bridge of the Immortal' intimate a distinction between that which
41495 causes to reach and the object reached, there must be something to be
41496 reached different from that which causes to reach; for the highest Self
41497 may be viewed as being itself a means towards itself being reached; cp.
41498 'The Self cannot be reached by the Veda, and so on; he whom the Self
41499 chooses by him the Self can be gained' (Ch. Up. I, 2, 23).

41504 35. Thus, from the denial of anything else.

41505
41506 Nor can we allow the assertion that there is something higher than the
41507 highest because certain texts ('the Person which is higher than the
41508 highest'; 'beyond the Imperishable there is the highest,' &c.) refer to
41509 such a difference. For the same texts expressly deny that there is
41510 anything else higher than the highest--'than whom there is nothing else
41511 higher, than whom there is nothing smaller or larger' (Svet. Up. III, 9).
41512 So also other texts: 'For there is nothing else higher than this "not
41513 so"' (i.e. than this Brahman designated by the phrase 'not so'; Bri. Up.
41514 II, 3, 6); 'Of him none is the Lord, his name is great glory' (Mahânâr.
41515 Up. I, 10).

41516
41517 But what then is the entity referred to in the text 'tato yad
41518 uttarataram '? (Svet. Up. III, 10)?--The passage immediately preceding
41519 (8), 'I know that great person, &c.; a man who knows him passes over
41520 death,' had declared that the knowledge of Brahman is the only way to
41521 immortality; and the clause (9), 'Higher than whom there is nothing else,'
41522 had confirmed this by declaring that Brahman is the Highest and that
41523 there is no other thing higher. In agreement herewith we must explain
41524 stanza 10 as giving a reason for what had been said, 'Because that which
41525 is the highest (uttarataram), viz. the Supreme Person is without form
41526 and without suffering, therefore (tatah) those who know him become
41527 immortal,' &c. On any other explanation stanza 10 would not be in
41528 harmony with stanza 8 where the subject is introduced, and with what is
41529 declared in stanza 9.--Analogously in the text 'He goes to the divine
41530 Person who is higher than the highest' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8) 'the highest'
41531 means the aggregate soul (samashâ-purusha), which in a previous passage
41532 had been said to be 'higher than the high Imperishable' (II, 1, 2); and
41533 the 'higher' refers to the Supreme Person, with all his transcendent
41534 qualities, who is superior to the aggregate soul.

36. The omnipresence (possessed) by that, (understood) from the declaration of extent.

That omnipresence which is possessed 'by that,' i.e. by Brahman, and which is known 'from declarations of extent,' and so on, i.e. from texts which declare Brahman to be all-pervading, is also known from texts such as 'higher than that there is nothing.' Declarations of extent are e.g. the following: 'By this Person this whole Universe is filled' (Svet. Up. III. 9); 'whatever is seen or heard in this world, is pervaded inside and outside by Nârâyana' (Mahânâr. Up.); 'The eternal, pervading, omnipresent, which the Wise consider as the source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 6). The 'and the rest' in the Sâtra comprises passages such as 'Brahman indeed is all this,' 'The Self indeed is all this,' and the like. The conclusion is that the highest Brahman is absolutely supreme.-- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the Highest.'

37. From thence the reward; on account of possibility.

It has been shown, for the purpose of giving rise to a desire for devout meditation, that the soul in all its states is imperfect, while the Supreme Person to be reached by it is free from imperfections, the owner of blessed qualities and higher than everything else. Being about to investigate the nature of meditation, the Sûtrakâra now declares that the meditating devotee receives the reward of meditation, i.e. Release, which consists in attaining to the highest Person, from that highest Person only: and that analogously the rewards for all works prescribed by the Veda--whether to be enjoyed in this or the next world--come from the highest Person only. The Sûtra therefore says generally, 'from thence the reward.'--'Why so?'--'Because that only is possible.'

For it is he only--the all-knowing, all-powerful, supremely generous one--who being pleased by sacrifices, gifts, offerings, and the like, as well as by pious meditation, is in a position to bestow the different forms of enjoyment in this and the heavenly world, and Release which consists in attaining to a nature like his own. For action which is non-intelligent and transitory is incapable of bringing about a result connected with a future time.

38. And on account of scriptural declaration.

That he bestows all rewards--whether in the form of enjoyment or Release--Scripture also declares 'This indeed is the great, the unborn Self, the eater of food, the giver of wealth' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 24); and 'For he alone causes delight' (Taitt. Up. II, 7).--Next a primâ facie view is stated.

39. For the same reasons Jaimini (thinks it to be) religious action.

For the same reasons, viz. possibility and scriptural declaration, the teacher Jaimini thinks that religious works, viz. sacrifices, gifts, offerings, and meditation, of themselves bring about their rewards. For we observe that in ordinary life actions such as ploughing and the like, and charitable gifts and so on, bring about their own reward, directly or indirectly. And although Vedic works do not bring about their rewards immediately, they may do so mediately, viz. by means of the so-called apûrva. This follows also from the form of the Vedic injunctions, such as 'He who is desirous of the heavenly world is to sacrifice.' As such injunctions enjoin sacrifices as the means of bringing about the object desired to be realised, viz. the heavenly world and the like, there is

41607 no other way left than to assume that the result (which is seen not to
41608 spring directly from the sacrifice) is accomplished by the mediation of
41609 the apûrva.

41610
41611
41612
41613
41614 40. But the former, Bâdarâyana (thinks), on account of the designation
41615 (of deities) as the cause.

41616
41617 The reverend Bâdarâyana maintains the previously declared awarding of
41618 rewards by the Supreme Person since the scriptural texts referring to
41619 the different sacrifices declare that the deities only, Agni, Vâyu, and
41620 so on, who are propitiated by the sacrifices--which are nothing else but
41621 means to propitiate deities--are the cause of the rewards attached to
41622 the sacrifices. Compare texts such as 'Let him who is desirous of
41623 prosperity offer a white animal to Vâyu. For Vâyu is the swiftest god.
41624 The man thus approaches Vâyu with his proper share, and Vâyu leads him
41625 to prosperity.' And the whole instruction which the texts give, as to
41626 the means by which men desirous of certain results are to effect those
41627 results, is required on account of the injunctions only, and hence it
41628 cannot be doubted that it has reference to the injunctions. The
41629 apparatus of means to bring about the results thus being learnt from the
41630 text only, no person acquainted with the force of the means of proof
41631 will assent to that apparatus, as stated by the text, being set aside
41632 and an apûrva about which the text says nothing being fancifully assumed.
41633 And that the imperative verbal forms of the injunctions denote as the
41634 thing to be effected by the effort of the sacrificer, only that which on
41635 the basis of the usage of language and grammatical science is recognised
41636 as the meaning of the root-element of such words as 'yajeta,' viz. the
41637 sacrifice (yâga), which consists in the propitiation of a divine being,
41638 and not some additional supersensuous thing such as the apûrva, we have
41639 already proved above (p. 153 ff.). Texts such as 'Vâyu is the swiftest
41640 god' teach that Vâyu and other deities are the bestowers of rewards. And
41641 that it is fundamentally the highest Self--as constituting the inner
41642 Self of Vâyu and other deities--which is pleased by offerings, and
41643 bestows rewards for them is declared by texts such as 'Offerings and
41644 pious works, all this he bears who is the nave of the Universe. He is
41645 Agni and Vâyu, he is Sun and Moon' (Mahânâr. Up. I, 6, 7). Similarly in
41646 the antaryâmin-brâhmana, 'He who dwells in Vâyu, of whom Vâyu is the
41647 body'; 'He who dwells in Agni,' &c. Smṛiti expresses itself similarly,
41648 'Whatsoever devotee wishes to worship with faith whatsoever divine form,
41649 of him do I make that faith unshakable. Endued with such faith he
41650 endeavours to propitiate him and obtains from him his desires--those
41651 indeed being ordained by me' (Bha. Gî. VII, 21-22); 'For I am the
41652 enjoyer and the Lord of all sacrifices' (IX, 24)--where Lord means him
41653 who bestows the reward for the sacrifices. 'To the gods go the
41654 worshippers of the gods, and those devoted to me go to me' (VII, 23). In
41655 ordinary life men, by agriculture and the like, acquire wealth in
41656 various forms, and by means of this propitiate their king, either
41657 directly or through his officials and servants; and the king thereupon
41658 is seen to reward them in a manner corresponding to the measure of their
41659 services and presents. The Vedânta-texts, on the other hand, give
41660 instruction on a subject which transcends the sphere of all the other
41661 means of knowledge, viz. the highest Person who is free from all shadow
41662 even of imperfection, and a treasure-house as it were of all exalted
41663 qualities in their highest state of perfection; on sacrifices, gifts,
41664 oblations, which are helpful towards the propitiation of that Person; on
41665 praise, worship, and meditation, which directly propitiate him; and on
41666 the rewards which he, thus propitiated, bestows, viz. temporal happiness
41667 and final Release.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'reward.'

41668
41669
41670
41671
41672 THIRD PÂDA.

41673
41674 1. What is understood from all the Vedânta-texts (is one), on account of
41675 the non-difference of injunction and the rest.

The Sûtras have stated whatever has to be stated to the end of rousing the desire of meditation--concluding with the fact that Brahman bestows rewards. Next the question is introduced whether the vidyâs (i.e. the different forms of meditation on Brahman which the Vedânta-texts enjoin) are different or non-different, on the decision of which question it will depend whether the qualities attributed to Brahman in those vidyâs are to be comprised in one act of meditation or not.--The first subordinate question arising here is whether one and the same meditation--as e.g. the vidyâ of Vaisvânara--which is met with in the text of several sâkhâs, constitutes one vidyâ or several.--The vidyâs are separate, the Pûrvapakshin maintains; for the fact that the same matter is, without difference, imparted for a second time, and moreover stands under a different heading--both which circumstances necessarily attend the text's being met with in different sâkhâs--proves the difference of the two meditations. It is for this reason only that a restrictive injunction, such as the one conveyed in the text, 'Let a man tell this science of Brahman to those only who have performed the rite of carrying fire on their head' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 10)--which restricts the imparting of knowledge to the Âtharvanikas, to whom that rite is peculiar--has any sense; for if the vidyâs were one, then the rite mentioned, which is a part of the vidyâ, would be valid for the members of other sâkhâs also, and then the restriction enjoined by the text would have no meaning.--This view is set aside by the Sûtra, 'What is understood from all the Vedânta-texts' is one and the same meditation, 'because there is non-difference of injunction and the rest.' By injunction is meant the injunction of special activities denoted by different verbal roots--such as upâsîta 'he should meditate,' vidyât 'he should know.' The and the rest' of the Sûtra is meant to comprise as additional reasons the circumstances mentioned in the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ-sûtras (II, 4, 9). Owing to all these circumstances, non-difference of injunction and the rest, the same vidyâ is recognised in other sâkhâs also. In the Chândogya (V, 12, 2) as well as in the Vâjasaneyaka we meet with one and the same injunction (viz. 'He should meditate on Vaisvânara'). The form (character, rūpa) of the meditations also is the same, for the form of a cognition solely depends on its object; and the object is in both cases the same, viz. Vaisvânara. The name of the two vidyâs also is the same, viz. the knowledge of Vaisvânara. And both vidyâs are declared to have the same result, viz. attaining to Brahman. All these reasons establish the identity of vidyâs even in different sâkhâs.--The next Sûtra refers to the reasons set forth for his view by the Pûrvapakshin and refutes them.

2. If it be said (that the vidyâs are not one) on account of difference, we deny this, since even in one (vidyâ there may be repetition).

If it be said that there is no oneness of vidyâ, because the fact of the same matter being stated again without difference, and being met with in a different chapter, proves the object of injunction to be different; we reply that even in one and the same vidyâ some matter may be repeated without any change, and under a new heading (in a different chapter); if, namely, there is difference of cognising subjects. Where the cognising person is one only, repetition of the same matter under a new heading can only be explained as meaning difference of object enjoined, and hence separation of the two vidyâs. But where the cognising persons are different (and this of course is eminently so in the case of different sâkhâs), the double statement of one and the same matter explains itself as subserving the cognition of those different persons, and hence does not imply difference of matter enjoined.--The next Sûtra refutes the argument founded on a rite enjoined in the Mundaka.

3. For (the sirovrata) concerns the mode of the study of the Veda; also on account of (that rite) being a heading in the samâkâra; and the

41745 restriction is like that of the libations.

41746
41747 What the text says as to a restriction connected with the 'vow of the
41748 head,' does not intimate a difference of vidyās. For that vow does not
41749 form part of the vidyā. The restriction refers only to a peculiarity of
41750 the study of the Veda on the part of the Âtharvanikas, being meant to
41751 establish that they should possess that special qualification which the
41752 rite produces; but it does not affect the vidyā itself. This is proved
41753 by the subsequent clause, 'a man who has not performed that rite may not
41754 read the text,' which directly connects the rite with the studying of
41755 the text. And it is further proved by the fact that in the book of the
41756 Âtharvanikas, called 'sāmākara,' that rite is referred to as a rite
41757 connected with the Veda (not with the special vidyā set forth in the
41758 Mundaka), viz. in the passage, 'this is explained already by the Veda-
41759 observance' (which extends the details of the sirovrata, there called
41760 veda-vrata, to other observances). By the knowledge of Brahman
41761 (referred to in the Mundaka-text 'let a man tell this science of Brahman
41762 to those only,' &c.), we have therefore to understand knowledge of the
41763 Veda in general. And that restriction is 'like that of the
41764 libations'--i. e. it is analogous to the restriction under which the
41765 sava-libations, beginning with the Saptasûrya-libation, and terminating
41766 with the Sataudana-libation, are offered in the one fire which is used
41767 by the followers of the Atharvan, and not in the ordinary three fires.
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41772 4. Scripture also declares this.

41773
41774 Scripture also shows that (identical) meditation is what all the Vedânta-
41775 texts intimate. The Chândogya (VIII, 1, 1 ff.) declares that that which
41776 is within the small space in the heart is to be enquired into, and then
41777 in reply to the question what the thing to be enquired into is, says
41778 that it is the highest Self possessing the eight attributes, freedom
41779 from all evil and the rest, which is to be meditated upon within the
41780 heart. And then the Taittiriya-text, referring to this declaration in
41781 the Chândogya, says, 'Therein is a small space, free from all grief;
41782 what is within that is to be meditated upon' (Mahânâr. Up. X, 23), and
41783 thus likewise enjoins meditation on the highest Self possessing the
41784 eight qualities. And this is possible only if, owing to unity of vidya,
41785 the qualities mentioned in the first text are included also in the
41786 meditation enjoined in the second text.--Having thus established the
41787 unity of meditations, the Sûtras proceed to state the practical effect
41788 of such unity.
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41793 5. (Meditation) thus being equal, there is combination (of gunas); on 41794 account of non-difference of purport in the case of what subserves 41795 injunction.

41796
41797 The meditation in all Vedânta-texts thus being the same, the qualities
41798 mentioned in one text are to be combined with those mentioned in another;
41799 'on account of non-difference of purport in the case of what subserves
41800 injunction.' We find that in connexion with certain injunctions of
41801 meditation--such as the meditation on Vaisvânara, or the small ether
41802 within the heart--the text of some individual Vedânta-book mentions
41803 certain secondary matters (qualities, guna) which subserve that
41804 meditation; and as these gunas are connected with the meditation they
41805 are to be comprised in it, so that they may accomplish their aim, i.e.
41806 of subserving the meditation. For the same reason therefore we have to
41807 enclose in the meditation gunas mentioned in other Vedânta-texts; for
41808 being also connected with the meditation they subserve it in the same
41809 way.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'what is intimated by all
41810 Vedânta-texts.
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6. If it be said that there is difference on account of the text; we say no; on account of non-difference.

So far it has been shown that the non-difference of injunction, and so on, establishes the unity of meditations, and that owing to the latter the special features of meditation enjoined in different texts have to be combined. Next, an enquiry is entered upon whether in the case of certain particular meditations there actually exists, or not, that non-difference of injunction which is the cause of meditations being recognised as identical. A meditation on the Udgîtha is enjoined in the text of the Chandogas, as well as in that of the Vâjasaneyins (Ch. Up. I, 2; Bri. Up. I, 3); and the question arises whether the two are to be viewed as one meditation or not. The Pûrvapakshin maintains the former alternative. For, he says, there is no difference of injunction, and so on, since both texts enjoin as the object of meditation the Udgîtha viewed under the form of Prâna; since there is the same reward promised in both places, viz. mastering of one's enemies; since the form of meditation is the same, the Udgîtha being in both cases viewed under the form of Prâna; since the injunction is the same, being conveyed in both cases by the same verbal root (vid, to know); and since both meditations have the same technical name, viz. udgîtha-vidyâ. The Sûtra states this view in the form of the refutation of an objection raised by the advocate of the final view. We do not admit, the objector says, the unity maintained by you, since the texts clearly show a difference of form. The text of the Vâjasaneyins represents as the object of meditation that which is the agent in the act of singing out the Udgîtha; while the text of the Chandogas enjoins meditation on what is the object of the action of singing out (i. e. the Udgîtha itself). This discrepancy establishes difference in the character of the meditation, and as this implies difference of the object enjoined, the mere non-difference of injunction, and so on, is of no force, and hence the two meditations are separate ones.--This objection the Pûrvapakshin impugns, 'on account of non-difference.' For both texts, at the outset, declare that the Udgîtha is the means to bring about the conquest of enemies (Let us overcome the Asuras at the sacrifices by means of the Udgîtha' (Bri. Up.); 'The gods took the Udgîtha, thinking they would with that overcome the Asuras'--Ch. Up.). In order therefore not to stultify this common beginning, we must assume that in the clause 'For them that breath sang out' (Bri. Up.), the Udgîtha, which really is the object of the action of singing, is spoken of as the agent. Otherwise the term udgîtha in the introductory passage ('by means of the Udgîtha') would have to be taken as by implication denoting the agent (while directly it indicates the instrument).--Hence there is oneness of the two vidyâs.--Of this view the next Sûtra disposes.

7. Or not, on account of difference of subject-matter; as in the case of the attribute of being higher than the high, and so on.

There is no unity of the two vidyâs, since the subject-matter of the two differs. For the tale in the Chândogya-text, which begins 'when the Devas and the Asuras struggled together,' connects itself with the pranava (the syllable Om) which is introduced as the object of meditation in Chând. I, 1, 1, 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om as the Udgîtha'; and the clause forming part of the tale, 'they meditated on that chief breath as Udgîtha.' therefore refers to a meditation on the pranava which is a part only of the Udgîtha. In the text of the Vâjasaneyins; on the other hand, there is nothing to correspond to the introductory passage which in the Chândogya-text determines the subject-matter, and the text clearly states that the meditation refers to the whole Udgîtha (not only the pranava). And this difference of leading subject-matter implies difference of matter enjoined, and this again difference of the character of meditation, and hence there is no unity of vidyâs. Thus the object of meditation for the Chandogas is the pranava viewed under the form of Prâna; while for the Vâjasaneyins it is the Udgâtri (who sings the Udgîtha), imaginatively identified with Prâna.

Nor does there arise, on this latter account, a contradiction between the later and the earlier part of the story of the Vâjasaneyins. For as a meditation on the Udgâtri necessarily extends to the Udgîtha, which is the object of the activity of singing, the latter also helps to bring about the result, viz. the mastering of enemies.--There is thus no unity of vidyâ, although there may be non-difference of injunction, and so on.-- 'As in the case of the attribute of being higher than the high,' &c. In one and the same sâkhâ there are two meditations, in each of which the highest Self is enjoined to be viewed under the form of the pranava (Ch. Up. I, 6; I, 9), and in so far the two vidyâs are alike. But while the former text enjoins that the pranava has to be viewed under the form of a golden man, in the latter he has to be viewed as possessing the attributes of being higher than the high, and owing to this difference of attributes the two meditations must be held separate (a fortiori, then, those meditations are separate which have different objects of meditation).

8. If that be declared on account of name; (we object, since) that is also (where the objects of injunction differ).

If the oneness of the vidyâs be maintained on the ground that both have the same name, viz. udgîtha-vidyâ, we point out that oneness is found also where the objects enjoined are different. The term agnihotra is applied equally to the permanent agnihotra and to that agnihotra which forms part of the sacrifice called 'Kundapâyinâm ayanam'; and the term udgîtha is applied equally to the many different meditations described in the first prapâthaka of the Chândogya.

9. And (this is) appropriate, on account of the extension.

Since the pranava, which is a part of the udgîtha, is introduced as the subject of meditation in the first prapâthaka of the Chândogya, and extends over the later vidyâs also, it is appropriate to assume that also in the clause 'the gods took the udgîtha'--which stands in the middle--the term udgîtha denotes the pranava. Expressions such as 'the cloth is burned' show that frequently the whole denotes the part.--The conclusion from all this is that in the Chândogya the object of meditation is constituted by the pranava--there termed udgîtha--viewed under the form of prâna; while in the Vâjasaneyaka the term udgîtha denotes the whole udgîtha, and the object of meditation is he who produces the udgîtha, i.e. the udgâtri, viewed under the form of prâna. And this proves that the two vidyâs are separate.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'difference.'

10. On account of non-difference of everything, those elsewhere.

The Chândogya and the Vajasaneyaka alike record a meditation on Prana; the object of meditation being Prana as possessing the qualities of being the oldest and the best, and also as possessing certain other qualities such as being the richest, and so on (Ch. Up. V, 1; Bri. Up. VI, 1). In the text of the Kaushîtakins, on the other hand, there is a meditation on Prâna which mentions the former qualities ('being the best' and 'being the oldest'), but not the latter ('being the richest,' and so on). This, the Pûrvapakshin maintains, constitutes a difference between the objects of meditation, and hence between the meditations themselves.--This view the Sûtra sets aside 'on account of non-difference of everything, those elsewhere.' There is no difference of meditation. Those qualities, viz. being the richest, and so on, are to be meditated upon in the other place also, viz. in the meditation on Prâna of the Kaushîtakins; 'since there is non-difference of everything,'

i.e. since the text of the Kaushîtakins also exhibits the very same method, in all its details, for proving what it is undertaken to prove, viz. that Prâna is the oldest and best. And for that proof it is required that Prâna should be viewed as possessing also the quality of being the richest, and so on, and these qualities therefore have to be comprised in the meditation of the Kaushîtakins also. Hence there is no difference of meditation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-difference of everything.'

In the same way as the meditation on Prâna as the oldest and best cannot be accomplished without Prâna being also meditated upon as the richest, and so on, and as hence these latter qualities have to be comprised in the meditation on Prâna of the Kaushîtakins, although they are not expressly mentioned there; thus those qualities of Brahman also, without which the meditation on Brahman cannot be accomplished, must be included in all meditations on Brahman--this is the point to be proved next.

11. Bliss and other qualities, as belonging to the subject of the qualities.

The point to be decided here is whether, or not, the essential qualities of Brahman are to be included in all meditations on the highest Brahman.-- Since there is no valid reason for including in a meditation those qualities which are not expressly mentioned in the section containing that meditation, only those qualities which are thus expressly mentioned should be included!--This primâ facie view is negated by the Sûtra. The clause, 'on account of non-difference,' has to be carried on from the preceding Sûtra. As the 'subject of the qualities,' i.e. Brahman is the same in all meditations, the qualities which do not exist apart from their subject, viz. bliss, and so on, are to be comprised in all meditations.--But for the same reason then such qualities as 'having joy for its head' (Taïtt. Up. II, 5) would also have to be included in all meditations on Brahman!--This the next Sûtra negatives.

12. Such qualities as having joy for its head, and so on, are not established, for if there were difference (of members) there would be increase and decrease.

The declaration that the essential qualities of Brahman are established for all meditations, does not imply that such attributes as 'having joy for its head' are equally established. For the latter are not qualities of Brahman, since they are mere elements in a figurative representation of Brahman under the form of an animal body. Otherwise, i.e. if Brahman really possessed different members, such as head, wings, and so on, it would be liable to increase and decrease, and this would be in conflict with texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.'--But if this reasoning holds good, then all the infinite qualities belonging to Brahman such as lordly power, generosity, compassion, and so on--all of which are incapable of existing apart from the subject to which they belong--would have to be comprehended in all those meditations on Brahman where they are not expressly mentioned; and this could not possibly be done, as those qualities are infinite in number.--This difficulty the next Sûtra removes.

13. But the others, on account of equality with the thing.

Those other qualities which are 'equal to the thing,' i. e. which are attributes determining the essential character of the thing, and therefore necessarily entering into the idea of the thing, must be included in all meditations, no less than the thing itself. To this

class belong qualities such as true being, knowledge, bliss, purity, infinity, and so on. For of Brahman--which by texts such as 'that from which all these beings,' &c. had been suggested as the cause of the world--the essential definition is given in texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'; 'bliss is Brahman,' and others; and hence, in order that a true notion may be formed of Brahman as the object of meditation, such qualities as true being, bliss, and so on, have to be included in all meditations on Brahman. Such additional qualities, on the other hand, as e.g. compassion, which indeed cannot exist apart from the subject to which they belong, but are not necessary elements of the idea of Brahman, are to be included in those meditations only where they are specially mentioned.

But, an objection is raised, if 'having joy for its head' and the like are not qualities of Brahman, but merely serve the purpose of a figurative representation of Brahman, for what purpose then is this representation introduced? For if something is represented as something else, there must be some motive for doing so. Where, e.g. the sacred text compares the meditating devotee to a charioteer, its body and organs to a chariot, and so on, it does so for the purpose of assisting the subjection to the Self of the means of meditation, i.e. the body, the senses, and so on. But in the present case no such purpose is to be discerned, and hence it must needs be admitted that having joy for its head, and so on, are real qualities of Brahman.--The next Sûtra disposes of this difficulty.

14. For meditation, owing to the absence of purpose.

As no other purpose can be assigned, the text must be supposed to represent Brahman as having joy for its head, and so on, for the purpose of meditation. In order to accomplish the meditation on Brahman which is enjoined in the text 'he who knows (i.e. meditates on) Brahman reaches the Highest,' the text represents the Brahman consisting of bliss as made up of joy, satisfaction, &c., and compares these to the head, the wings, and so on. The Self of bliss, which is the inmost of all the Selves mentioned in the text, is by this means represented to the mind in a definite shape; just as in the preceding sections the Self of food, the Self of breath, and the rest had similarly been represented in definite shapes, consisting of head, wings, and so on. As thus the qualities of having joy for its head, &c. are merely secondary marks of the Self of bliss, they are not necessarily included in each meditation that involves the idea of that Self.

15. And on account of the term 'Self.'

That this is so further follows from the fact that in the clause 'different from this is the inner Self consisting of bliss' the term 'Self' is used. For as the Self cannot really possess a head, wings, and tail, its having joy for its head, and so on, can only be meant in a metaphorical sense, for the sake of easier comprehension.--But, in the preceding sections, the term Self had been applied to what is not of the nature of Self--the text speaking of the Self of breath, the Self of mind, and so on; how then are we able to determine that in the phrase 'the Self of bliss' the term Self denotes a true Self?--To this the next Sûtra replies.

16. There is reference to the Self, as in other places; on account of the subsequent passage.

In the clause, 'different from that is the Self of bliss,' the term Self

can refer to the highest Self only; 'as in other cases,' i.e. as in other passages--'the Self only was this in the beginning; it thought, let me send forth the worlds,' and similar ones--the term 'Self denotes the highest Self only.--But whereby is this proved?--'By the subsequent passagel, i.e. by the passage, 'he desired, may I be many, may I grow forth,'--which refers to the Self of bliss.

17. If it be said 'on account of connexion'; it may be so, on account of ascertainment.

But as in the preceding sections the term Self is seen to be connected with what is not of the nature of the Self, such as the Self of breath, and so on, it is not possible to draw a valid conclusion from the subsequent passage!--It is possible, the Sûtra replies, 'on account of ascertainment.' For the previous clause, 'from that Self there originated the Ether,' settles in the mind the idea of the highest Self, and that idea then is transferred in succession to the (so-called) Self of breath, the Self of mind, and so on, until it finally finds rest in the Self of bliss, beyond which there is no other Self; while at the same time the subsequent clause 'he desired' confirms the idea of the highest Self. The term Self thus connects itself from the beginning with things which are not true Selves, because the highest Self is as it were viewed in them.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'bliss and the rest.'

18. The new (thing is enjoined); on account of the statement of what has to be done.

The Sûtra discusses an additional question connected with the meditation on breath. Both texts--the Chândogya as well as the Vâjasaneyaka-declare that water constitutes a dress for prana, and refer to the rinsing of the mouth with water. The doubt here arises whether what the texts mean to enjoin is the rinsing of the mouth, or a meditation on prâna as having water for its dress.--The Pûrvapakshin maintains the former view; for, he says, the Vâjasaneyaka uses the injunctive form 'he is to rinse,' while there is no injunctive form referring to the meditation; and what the text says in praise of the breath thus not being allowed to remain naked may be taken as a mere glorification of the act of rinsing. And as ordinary rinsing of the mouth, subsequent to eating, is already established by Smriti and custom, we must conclude that the text means to enjoin rinsing of the mouth of a different kind, viz. as auxiliary to the meditation on prâna.--To this the Sûtra replies that what the text enjoins is the new' thing, i.e. the previously non-established meditation on water as forming the dress of prâna. 'On account of the statement of what has to be done,' i.e. on account of the statement of what is not established--for only on the latter condition Scripture has a meaning. The beginning as well as the end of the Vâjasaneyaka-text clearly refers to a meditation on the water used for rinsing as forming a dress for prâna; and as rinsing is already established by Smriti and custom, we naturally infer that what the text enjoins is a meditation on breath as having the water used in rinsing for its dress. This also explains why the Chândogya-text does not mention the rinsing at all, but merely the clothing of breath with water.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the statement of what has to be done.'

19. And (the qualities) thus being equal, on account of non-difference.

In the book of the Vâjasaneyaka, called Agnirahasya, we meet with a meditation on Brahman called Sândilyavidyâ; and there is also a Sândilya-vidyâ in the Brihadâraṇyaka. The Pûrvapakshin holds that these two meditations are different since the latter text mentions qualities--such

as Brahman being the lord of all--which are not mentioned in the former; the objects of meditation thus being different, the meditations themselves are different.--This the Sûtra negatives. The object of meditation is 'equal,' for both texts state the same qualities, such as 'consisting of mind,' and so on; and the additional qualities stated in the Brihad-âraṇyaka, such as the rulership of Brahman, 'do not differ' from those equally stated by both texts, such as Brahman realising all its purposes, and so on. Thus the objects of meditation do not differ in character.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'what is equal.'

20. On account of connexion, thus elsewhere also.

In the Brihad-âraṇyaka (V, 5) it is said that Brahman is to be meditated upon as abiding within the orb of the sun and within the right eye; and then the text mentions two secret names of Brahman--aham and ahar. Here the Pûrvapakshin holds that both these names are to be comprehended in each of the two meditations 'On account of connexion,' i.e. on account of the object of meditation, i.e. Brahman being one only, although connected with different abodes, it is 'thus elsewhere also,' i.e. the same conclusion which had been arrived at in the case of the Sândilya-vidyâs, has to be accepted with regard to Brahman abiding in the sun and in the eye. The meditation is one only, and hence the two secret names apply to Brahman in both its abodes.--This view the next Sûtra negatives.

21. Or not so, on account of difference.

This is not so, for as Brahman is to be meditated upon in two different abodes, the meditations are separate. In both the Sândilya-vidyâs, on the other hand, Brahman is to be meditated upon as abiding within the heart.

22. The text also declares this.

That the qualities of that which abides within the sun and that which abides in the eye are not to be combined, the text itself moreover shows by specially stating that the characteristics of the one are those of the other. For such a special transfer of qualities is needed only where the qualities are not of themselves established, i.e. where the two things are naturally different.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'connexion,'

23. And for the same reason the holding together and the pervading the sky.

In the Taittiriya and in the khilas of the Rânâyanîyas we have the following passage: 'Gathered together are the powers among which Brahman is the oldest; Brahman as the oldest in the beginning stretched out the sky. Brahman was born as the first of all beings; who may rival that Brahman?' which declares that Brahman gathered together all the most ancient powers, that it pervades the sky, and so on. And as these attributes are not stated in connexion with any special meditation, we must infer that they are to be included in all meditations whatever on Brahman.--This primâ facie view is controverted by the Sûtra. The holding together of all powers, &c., although not mentioned in connexion with any special meditation, is not to be included in all meditations whatever, but to be connected with particular meditations 'on the same

ground,' i.e. according to difference of place. Where those qualities have to be included must be decided on the ground of feasibility. The attribute of pervading the whole heaven cannot be included in a meditation on Brahman as abiding within a small place such as the heart, and hence the other attributes also which are stated together with the attribute mentioned cannot be included in those meditations. And when we find that in meditations on Brahman as abiding within a small place it is said that Brahman is greater than the earth, or that the ether within the heart is as great as the universal ether, these attributes cannot be taken in their literal sense and hence included in those meditations, but must be viewed as merely meant to glorify the object proposed for meditation.--Herewith terminates the adhikarana of 'holding together.'

24. And although (they both be) meditations on man; on account of others not being recorded.

In the Taittirīyaka as well as the Chândogya we meet with a meditation on man (purusha-vidyâ), in which parts of the sacrifice are fancifully identified with the parts of the human body.--Here the Pûrvapakshin maintains that these two meditations are identical; for, he says, both meditations have the same name (purusha-vidyâ), and the same character as stated above; and as the Taittirīyaka mentions no fruit of the meditation, the fruit declared in the Chândogya holds good for the Taittirīyaka also, and thus there is no difference of fruit.--This view the Sûtra negatives. Although both meditations are meditations on man, yet they are separate 'on account of the others not being recorded,' i.e. on account of the qualities recorded in one sâkhâ not being recorded in the other. For the Taittirīyaka mentions the three libations, while the Chândogya does not, and so on. The character of the two meditations thus differs. And there is a difference of result also. For an examination of the context in the Taittirīyaka shows that the purusha-vidyâ is merely a subordinate part of a meditation on Brahman, the fruit of which the text declares to be that the devotee reaches the greatness of Brahman; while the Chândogya meditation is an independent one, and has for its reward the attainment of long life. The two meditations are thus separate, and hence the details of one must not be included in the other.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the meditation on man.'

25. On account of the difference of sense of piercing and so on.

The text of the Âtharvanikas exhibits at the beginning of their Upanishad some mantras, 'Pierce the sukra, pierce the heart.' The followers of the Sâma-veda read at the beginning of their rahasya-brâhmana 'O God Savitri, promote the sacrifice.' The Kâthakas and the Taittirīyakas have 'May Mitra be propitious to us, may Varuna be propitious.' The Sâtyâyanins have 'Thou art a white horse, a tawny and a black one!' The Kaushîtakins have a Brâhmana referring to the Mahâvrata-ceremony, 'Indra having slain Vritra became great.' The Kaushîtakins also have a Mahâvrata-brâhmana. 'Prajâpati is the year; his Self is that Mahâvrata.' The Vâjasaneyins have a Brâhmana referring to the Pravargya, 'The gods sat down for a sattra-celebration.' With reference to all this a doubt arises whether these mantras and the sacrificial works referred to in the Brâhmana texts form parts of the meditations enjoined in the Upanishads or not.--The Pûrvapakshin affirms this, on the ground that as the mantras and works are mentioned in the immediate neighbourhood of the meditations the idea of their forming parts of the latter naturally presents itself. Such mantras as 'pierce the heart' and works such as the pravargya may indeed--on the basis of direct statement (sruti), inferential mark (linga), and syntactical connexion (vâkya), which are stronger than mere proximity--be understood to be connected with certain actions; but, on the other hand, mantras such as 'May Varuna be propitious' have no application elsewhere, and are suitable introductions to meditations. We therefore take them to be parts of the

42297 meditations, and hence hold that those mantras are to be included in all
42298 meditations.--This view the Sûtra sets aside 'on account of the
42299 difference of sense of piercing, and so on.' The inferential marks
42300 contained in texts such as 'pierce the sukra, pierce the heart'; 'I
42301 shall speak the right, I shall speak the true,' show that the mantras
42302 have an application in connexion with certain magical practices, or else
42303 the study of the Veda, and the like, and do not therefore form part of
42304 meditations. That is to say--in the same way as the mantra 'pierce the
42305 heart' enables us to infer that also the mantra 'pierce the sukra'
42306 belongs to some magical rite, so we infer from the special meaning of
42307 mantras such as 'I shall speak the right,' &c., that also mantras such
42308 as 'May Mitra be propitious' are connected with the study of the Veda,
42309 and do not therefore form part of meditations. That mantras of this kind
42310 and Brâhmana passages relative to the Pravargya and the like are placed
42311 at the beginning of Upanishads is owing to their having, like the latter,
42312 to be studied in the forest.--Herewith terminates the adhikarana of
42313 'piercing and the like.'

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42317
42318 26. But in the case of the getting rid of (it has to be combined with
42319 the obtaining), as it is supplementary to statements of obtaining; as in
42320 the case of the kusas, the metres, the praise, and the singing. This has
42321 been explained.

42322
42323 The Chandogas read in their text 'Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes
42324 his hair, and shaking off the body as the moon frees herself from the
42325 mouth of Râhu, I obtain the world of Brahman' (Ch. Up. VIII, 13). The
42326 Âtharvanikas have 'He who knows, shaking off good and evil, free from
42327 passion, reaches the highest oneness.' The Sâtyâyanins have 'His sons
42328 obtain his inheritance, his friends the good, his enemies the evil he
42329 has done.' The Kaushîtakins 'He shakes off his good and his evil deeds.
42330 His beloved relatives obtain the good, his unbeloved relatives the evil
42331 he has done.' Two of these texts mention only the shaking off, on the
42332 part of him who knows, of his good and evil works; one mentions only the
42333 obtainment of these works, on the part of friends and enemies; and one
42334 mentions both these occurrences.--Now both the occurrences, although
42335 mentioned in several meditations, must be considered elements of all
42336 meditations: for whoever, on the basis of a knowledge of Brahman,
42337 reaches Brahman, necessarily leaves behind all his good and evil works,
42338 and those works unless thus left behind cannot be obtained by others.
42339 Meditation on those two matters therefore enters as an element into all
42340 meditations. The doubtful point, however, is whether there is option
42341 between the meditation on the abandonment of works, and that on the
42342 obtainment of works by others, and that on both these events; or whether
42343 in each case all these meditations are to be combined.--There is option,
42344 the Pûrvapakshin holds; for the reason that the texts make different
42345 declarations on this point. For, if the meditations had to be combined,
42346 there would be in each case meditation on both the matters mentioned;
42347 and as such double meditation is established by the Kaushitakin text, it
42348 would follow that the statements of the other texts are without meaning.
42349 Thus the only motive for the declarations made in different places can
42350 be to allow option. Nor must this conclusion be controverted on the
42351 ground that declarations of the same matter, made in different places,
42352 are made with reference to the difference of students severally reading
42353 the several texts; for this holds good in those cases only where
42354 identical statements are made in different texts; while in the case
42355 under discussion two sâkhâs mention the abandonment of works, and one
42356 their passing over to other persons. Nor can you account for the
42357 difference of statement on the ground of difference of vidyâs; for you
42358 yourself maintain that the meditations in question form part of all
42359 meditations.--This view the Sûtra impugns, 'but where the getting rid of
42360 is mentioned,' &c. Where a text mentions either the abandonment only of
42361 works or only their being obtained by others, both these matters must
42362 necessarily be combined, since the statement as to the works being
42363 obtained forms a supplement to the statement of their being abandoned.
42364 For the former statement declares the place to which the good and evil
42365 works, got rid of by him who knows Brahman, are transferred.--This

supplementary relation of two statements the Sûtra illustrates by some parallel cases. A clause in the text of the Sâtyâyanins, 'the kusas are the children of the udumbara tree,' forms a defining supplement to a more general statement in the text of the Kaushîtakins, 'the kusas are the children of the tree.' The clause, 'the metres of the gods are prior,' defines the order of the metres which in other texts mentioning 'the metres of the gods and Asuras' had been left undefined, and therefore forms a supplement to those texts. Analogous is the relation of the clause, 'he assists the stotra of the shodasin when the sun has half risen,' to the less definite statement 'he assists with gold the stotra of the shodasin;' and the relation of the clause, 'the adhvaryu is not to sing,' to the general injunction 'all the priests join in the singing.' Unless we admit that one statement, which defines some other more general statement, may stand to the latter in a supplementary relation, we are driven to assume an optional proceeding, and this is objectionable as long as there is any other way open; according to a principle laid down in the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ (X, 8, 15). As the clauses referring to the abandonment of the works, and those referring to their being taken up by others, thus form one connected whole, there is no such thing as mere abandonment and mere taking up, and hence there can be no option between the two. That the text of the Kaushîtakins mentions both thus explains itself, on the ground that the several declarations of what is really only one and the same matter are directed to different hearers.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'getting rid of.'

27. At departing; there being nothing to be reached. For thus others (also declare).

The further question arises whether the putting off of all good and evil deeds takes place only at the time when the soul leaves the body, or also after it has departed and is on its journey to the world of Brahman. The Pûrvapakshin holds the latter view, for, he says, the texts declare both. The Kaushîtakins say that the soul shakes off its good and evil deeds when it crosses the river Virajā in the world of Brahman; while the Tândins say 'Shaking off all evil, and shaking off the body,' &c., which shows that the deeds are shaken off at the time when the soul leaves the body. And when the Sâtyâyanaka says that 'his sons obtain his inheritance, his friends his good deeds,' and so on, this also intimates that the deeds are shaken off at the time when the soul leaves the body. We therefore must conclude that a part of the deeds is left behind at the moment of death, and the remainder on the journey to the world of Brahman.--This view the Sûtra controverts. All the good and evil deeds of the dying man are left behind, without remainder, at the time when the soul parts from the body. For after the soul of him who knows has departed from the body, 'there is nothing to be reached,' i.e. there are no further pleasures and pains to be enjoyed as the result of good and evil deeds, different from the obtaining of Brahman, which is the fruit of knowledge. Thus others 'also declare that, subsequently to the soul's departure from the body, there is no enjoyment of any pain or pleasure different from the obtaining of Brahman. 'But when he is free of the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touches him'; 'Thus does that serene being, rising from this body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1; 3); 'For him there is delay only so long as he is not freed (from the body); then he will be perfect' (VI, 14, 2).

28. As it is desired; on account of there being no contradiction of either.

The time when good and evil deeds are left behind thus having been determined on the basis of the reason of the thing, the several words of the passages must be construed as it is desired, i.e. so as not to contradict either, i.e. either the declaration of scripture or the

reason of the thing. Thus in the text of the Kaushîtakins the later clause, 'he shakes off his good and evil deeds,' must be taken as coming before the earlier passage 'having entered on that path of the gods.'-- Here the Pûrvapakshin raises a new objection.

29. There is meaning of the soul's going (only) on the twofold hypothesis; for otherwise there is contradiction.

It is only on the hypothesis of a part of the good and evil works being left behind at the time of the soul's departure from the body, and another part later on, and the effacement of works thus taking place in a double way, that a sense can be found in the scriptural declaration of the soul proceeding on the path of the gods. For otherwise there would be a contradiction. For if all the works perished at the time of the soul's departure from the body, the subtle body also would perish, and if this were so, no going on the part of the mere Self would be possible. It is not therefore possible that at the time of the soul's departure from the body all works should perish without a remainder.--To this the next Sûtra replies.

30. (That assumption) is justified; on account of the perception of things which are marks of that; as in ordinary experience.

The assumption of all the works perishing at the time of 'departure' involves no contradiction; since we perceive, in the sacred texts, matters which are marks of connexion with a body even on the part of the soul which has divested itself of all its works and become manifest in its true nature. Compare 'Having approached the highest light he manifests himself in his true form'; 'He moves about there laughing, playing, and rejoicing'; 'He becomes a self-ruler, he moves about in all worlds according to his will'; 'He becomes one, he becomes three,' &c. (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3; VII, 25, 2; 26, 2). All these texts refer to the soul's connexion with a body. The soul therefore, joined to the subtle body, may proceed on the path of the gods, even after all its works have passed away. But how can the subtle body persist, when the works which originate it have passed away? Through the power of knowledge, we reply. Knowledge does not indeed by itself originate the subtle body, but it possesses the power of making that body persist, even after the gross body--which is the instrument for the experience of all ordinary pains and pleasures--and all works have passed away, so as thereby to make the soul capable of moving on the path of the gods, and thus to obtain Brahman which is the fruit of knowledge. 'As in ordinary life.' As in ordinary life, a tank, which may have been made with a view to the irrigation of rice-fields and the like, is maintained and used for the purpose of drawing drinking-water, and so on, even after the intentions which originally led to its being made have passed away.--Here an objection is raised. It may be admitted, that at the time when a man possessing true knowledge dies, all his works pass away without a remainder, and that the subtle body only remains, enabling him to move towards Brahman; but it cannot be held that the soul in that state does not experience pain and pleasure; for we know from sacred tradition that Vasishtha, Avântara-tamas, and others, who had reached intuition of the highest truth, entered after death on other embodiments, and experienced pain and pleasure due to the birth of sons, various calamities, and so on.--To this the next Sûtra replies.

31. Of those who have a certain office there is subsistence (of their works) as long as the office lasts.

We do not maintain that all those who have reached true knowledge divest

themselves at the time of death of all their good and evil works; we limit our view to those who immediately after death attain to moving on the path, the first stage of which is light. Persons like Vasishtha, on the other hand, who are entrusted with certain offices, do not immediately after death attain to moving on the path beginning with light, since the duties undertaken by them are not completely accomplished. In the case of beings of this kind, who owing to particular deeds have been appointed to particular offices, the effect of the works which gave rise to the office does not pass away before those offices are completely accomplished; for the effect of a work is exhausted only through the complete enjoyment of its result. In the case of those persons, therefore, the effects of the works which gave rise to their office continue to exist as long as the office itself, and hence they do not after death enter on the path beginning with light.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'passing away.'

32. There is no restriction (since) all (have to go on that path). (Thus) there is non-contradiction of sacred text and Smṛiti.

The question here is whether Brahman is to be reached on the path of the gods by those only who take their stand on those meditations which, like the Upakosala-vidyā, describe that path, or by all who practise any of the meditations on Brahman. The Pūrvapakshin holds the former view, since there is no proof to show that in other vidyās the going on that path is not mentioned, and since those other vidyās--such as the texts 'and those who in the forest meditate on faith and austerities,' and 'those who in the forest worship faith, the True' (Ch. Up. V, 10, 1; Bri. Up. VI, 2, 15)--suggest to the mind the idea of the knowledge of Brahman. This the Sūtra negatives. There is no restriction to that limited class of devotees, since all who carry on meditations have to go on that path. For on this latter assumption only text and inference, i.e. scripture and authoritative tradition, are not contradicted. As to scripture, the Chândogya and the Vâjāsaneyaka alike, in the Pañkāgni-vidyā, declare that all those who practise meditation go on that path. In the Vâjāsaneyaka the words 'who know this' refer to those who practise the meditation on the five fires, while the following words 'those who in the forest meditate on faith and the True' refer to those who meditate on Brahman; and the text then goes on to say that all those devotees go to Brahman, on the path of the gods. Texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' and 'the True must be enquired into,' prove that the term 'the True' denotes Brahman; and as in the Chândogya the term 'tapas' occurs in the corresponding place, we conclude that both these terms, viz. _the True_ and tapas, denote nothing else but Brahman. Meditation on Brahman, preceded by faith, is mentioned elsewhere also; in the text which begins 'The True must be enquired into' we read further on 'Faith must be enquired into' (Ch. Up. VII, 18, 16; 19). Smṛiti also declares that all those who know Brahman proceed on the path of the gods, 'Fire, the light, the day, the bright fortnight, the six months of the sun's northern progress--proceeding by that road those who know Brahman go to Brahman' (Bha. Gî. VIII, 24). And there are many other Sruti and Smṛiti passages of this kind. The conclusion therefore is that the Upakosalavidyā and similar texts merely refer to that going of the soul which is common to all vidyās.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-restriction.'

33. But the conceptions of the Imperishable are to be comprised (in all meditations). There being equality (of the Brahman to be meditated on) and (those conceptions) existing (in Brahman); as in the case of what belongs to the upasāda. This has been explained.

We read in the Brihad-âraṇyaka (III, 8, 9), 'O Gârgî, the Brâhmanas call that the Akshara. It is neither coarse nor fine,' and so on. And in the Atharvāna (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5) we have 'The higher knowledge is that by

which the Akshara is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor seized,' &c. The doubt here arises whether all the qualities there predicated of Brahman--called akshara, i.e. the Imperishable--and constituting something contrary in nature to the apparent world, are to be included in all meditations on Brahman, or only those where the text specially mentions them. The Pûrvapakshin advocates the latter view; for, he says, there is no authority for holding that the qualities which characterise one meditation are characteristic of other meditations also; and such negative attributes as are mentioned in those two texts do not--as positive qualities such as bliss do--contribute to the apprehension of the true nature of Brahman. What those two texts do is merely to deny of Brahman, previously apprehended as having bliss, and so on, for its essential qualities, certain qualities belonging to the empirical world, such as grossness, and so on; for all negation must refer to an established basis.--This view the Sûtra refutes. The ideas of absence of grossness, and so on, which are connected with Brahman viewed as the Akshara, are to be included in all meditations on Brahman. For the imperishable (akshara) Brahman is the same in all meditations, and qualities such as non-grossness enter into the conception of its essential nature. The apprehension of a thing means the apprehension of its specific character. But mere bliss, and so on, does not suggest the specific character of Brahman, since those qualities belong also to the individual soul. What is specifically characteristic of Brahman is bliss, and so on, in so far as fundamentally opposed to all evil and imperfection. The individual soul, on the other hand, although fundamentally free from evil, yet is capable of connexion with evil. Now being fundamentally opposed to evil implies having a character the opposite of grossness and all similar qualities which belong to the empirical world, material and mental. He therefore who thinks of Brahman must think of it as having for its essential nature bliss, knowledge, and so on, in so far as distinguished by absence of grossness and the like, and those qualities, being no less essential than bliss, and so on, must therefore be included in all meditations on Brahman.--The Sûtra gives an instance illustrating the principle that qualities (secondary matters) follow the principal matter to which they belong. As the mantra 'Agnir vai hotram vetu,' although given in the Sâma-veda, yet has to be recited in the Yajur-veda style, with a subdued voice, because it stands in a subordinate relation to the upasad-offerings prescribed for the four-days 'sacrifice called Jamadagnya; those offerings are the principal matter to which the subordinate matter--the mantra--has to conform. This point is explained in the first section, i.e. in the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ-sûtras III, 3, 9.--But this being admitted, it would follow that as Brahman is the principal matter in all meditations on Brahman, and secondary matters have to follow the principal matter, also such qualities as 'doing all works, enjoying all odours and the like,' which are mentioned in connexion with special meditations only, would indiscriminately have to be included in all meditations.--With reference to this the next Sûtra says.

34. So much; on account of reflection.

Only so much, i.e. only those qualities which have to be included in all meditations on Brahman, without which the essential special nature of Brahman cannot be conceived, i.e. bliss, knowledge, and so on, characterised by absence of grossness and the like. Other qualities, such as doing all works and the like, although indeed following their substrate, are explicitly to be meditated on in special meditations only.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the idea of the Imperishable.'

35. Should it be said that (the former reply refers) to that Self to which the aggregate of material things belongs (since) otherwise the difference (of the two replies) could not be accounted for; we say--no; as in the case of instruction

42642
42643 In the Brihad-aranyaka (III, 4; 5) the same question is asked twice in
42644 succession ('Tell me the Brahman which is visible, not invisible, the
42645 Self who is within all'), while Yājñavalkya gives a different answer to
42646 each ('He who breathes in the upbreathing,' &c.; 'He who overcomes
42647 hunger and thirst,' &c.). The question here is whether the two
42648 meditations, suggested by these sections, are different or not. They are
42649 different, since the difference of reply effects a distinction between
42650 the two vidyās. The former reply declares him who is the maker of
42651 breathing forth, and so on to be the inner Self of all; the latter
42652 describes him as free from hunger, thirst, and so on. It thence appears
42653 that the former passage refers to the inner (individual) Self which is
42654 different from body, sense-organs, internal organ and vital breath;
42655 while the latter refers to that which again differs from the inner Self,
42656 viz. the highest Self, free from hunger, thirst, and so on. As the
42657 individual soul is inside the aggregate of material things, it may be
42658 spoken of as being that inner Self of all. Although this kind of
42659 inwardness is indeed only a relative one, we nevertheless must accept it
42660 in this place; for if, desirous of taking this 'being the inner Self of
42661 all' in its literal sense, we assumed the highest Self to be meant, the
42662 difference of the two replies could not be accounted for. The former
42663 reply evidently refers to the individual soul, since the highest Self
42664 cannot be conceived as breathing forth, and so on; and the latter reply,
42665 which declares the Self to be raised above hunger, &c., evidently refers
42666 to the highest Self. This is expressed in the earlier part of the Sūtra:
42667 'The former reply refers to the Self to which there belongs the
42668 aggregate of material things, i.e. the individual soul as being the
42669 inner Self of all; otherwise we could not account for the difference of
42670 the two replies.'--The last words of the Sūtra negative this--'not so,'
42671 i.e. there is no difference of vidyās, since both assertions and replies
42672 refer to the highest Self. The question says in both places, 'the
42673 Brahman which is visible, not invisible, the Self who is within all,'
42674 and this clearly refers to the highest Self only. We indeed observe that
42675 in some places the term Brahman is, in a derived sense, applied to the
42676 individual soul also; but the text under discussion, for distinction's
42677 sake, adds the qualification 'the Brahman which is manifest' (sākshāt).
42678 The quality of 'aparokshatva' (i.e. being that which does not transcend
42679 the senses but lies openly revealed) also, which implies being connected
42680 with all space and all time, suits Brahman only, which from texts such
42681 as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' is known to be infinite.
42682 In the same way the attribute of being the inner Self of all can belong
42683 to the highest Self only, which texts such as 'He who dwelling within
42684 the earth,' &c., declare to be the inner ruler of the universe. The
42685 replies to the two questions likewise can refer to Brahman only. The
42686 unconditional causal agency with regard to breath, declared in the
42687 clause 'he who breathes in the upbreathing,' &c., can belong to the
42688 highest Self only, not to the individual soul, since the latter
42689 possesses no such causal power when in the state of deep sleep. Ushasta
42690 thereupon, being not fully enlightened, since causality with regard to
42691 breathing may in a sense be attributed to the individual soul also,
42692 again asks a question, in reply to which Yājñavalkya clearly indicates
42693 Brahman, 'Thou mayest not see the seer of sight,' &c., i.e. thou must
42694 not think that my previous speech has named as the causal agent of
42695 breathing the individual soul, which is the causal agent with regard to
42696 those activities which depend on the sense-organs, viz. seeing, hearing,
42697 thinking, and knowing; for in the state of deep sleep, swoon, and so on,
42698 the soul possesses no such power. And moreover another text also--'Who
42699 could breathe if that bliss existed not in the ether?' (Taitt. Up. II,
42700 7)--declares that the highest Self only is the cause of the breathing of
42701 all living beings. In the same way the answer to the second question can
42702 refer to the highest Self only, which alone can be said to be raised
42703 above hunger, thirst, and so on. For this reason also both replies wind
42704 up with the same phrase, 'Everything else is of evil.' The iteration of
42705 question and reply serves the purpose of showing that the same highest
42706 Brahman which is the cause of all breathing is beyond all hunger, thirst,
42707 and so on.--The Sūtra subjoins a parallel instance. 'As in the case of
42708 instruction.' As in the vidyā of that which truly is (Ch. Up. VI, 1 ff.),
42709 question and reply are iterated several times, in order to set forth the
42710 various greatness and glory of Brahman.--Thus the two sections under

discussion are of the same nature, in so far as setting forth that the one Brahman which is the inner Self of all is the cause of all life and raised beyond all imperfections; and hence they constitute one meditation only.--To this a new objection is raised. The two sections may indeed both refer to the highest Brahman; nevertheless there is a difference of meditation, as according to the one Brahman is to be meditated upon as the cause of all life, and according to the other as raised above all defects; this difference of character distinguishes the two meditations. And further there is a difference of interrogators; the first question being asked by Ushasta, the second by Kahola.

36. There is interchange (of ideas), for the texts distinguish; as in other cases.

There is no difference of vidyâ because both questions and answers have one subject-matter, and because the one word that possesses enjoining power proves the connexion of the two sections. Both questions have for their topic Brahman viewed as the inner Self of all; and in the second question the word 'eva' ('just,' 'very') in 'Tell me just that Brahman,' &c., proves that the question of Kahola has for its subject the Brahman, to the qualities of which the question of Ushasta had referred. Both answers again refer to the one Brahman, viewed as the Self of all. The idea of the injunction of the entire meditation again is suggested in the second section only, 'Therefore a Brahmana, after he has done with learning, is to wish to stand by real strength.' The object of meditation being thus ascertained to be one, there must be effected a mutual interchange of the ideas of Ushasta and Kahola, i.e. Ushasta's conception of Brahman being the cause of all life must be entertained by the interrogating Kahola also; and vice versa the conception of Kahola as to Brahman being beyond hunger, thirst, and so on, must be entertained by Ushasta also. This interchange being made, the difference of Brahman, the inner Self of all, from the individual soul is determined by both sections. For this is the very object of Yâjñavalkya's replies: in order to intimate that the inner Self of all is different from the individual soul, they distinguish that Self as the cause of all life and as raised above hunger, thirst, and so on. Hence Brahman's being the inner Self of all is the only quality that is the subject of meditation; that it is the cause of life and so on are only means to prove its being such, and are not therefore to be meditated on independently.--But if this is so, to what end must there be made an interchange, on the part of the two interrogators, of their respective ideas?--Brahman having, on the ground of being the cause of all life, been ascertained by Ushasta as the inner Self of all, and different from the individual soul, Kahola renews the question, thinking that the inner Self of all must be viewed as different from the soul, on the ground of some special attribute which cannot possibly belong to the soul; and Yâjñavalkya divining his thought thereon declares that the inner Self possesses an attribute which cannot possibly belong to the soul, viz. being in essential opposition to all imperfection. The interchange of ideas therefore has to be made for the purpose of establishing the idea of the individual nature of the object of meditation.--'As elsewhere,' i. e. as in the case of the knowledge of that which truly is, the repeated questions and replies only serve to define one and the same Brahman, not to convey the idea of the object of meditation having to be meditated on under new aspects.--But a new objection is raised--As there is, in the Sad-vidyâ also, a difference between the several questions and answers, how is that vidyâ known to be one?--To this question the next Sûtra replies.

37. For one and the same (highest divinity), called the 'truly being,' and so on (is the subject of that meditation).

For the highest divinity, called there _that which is_--which was

introduced in the clause 'that divinity thought,' &c.--is intimated by all the following sections of that chapter. This is proved by the fact that the attributes--'that_ which truly_is' and so on--which were mentioned in the first section and confirmed in the subsequent ones, are finally summed up in the statement, 'in that all this has its Self, that is the True, that is the Self.'

Some interpreters construe the last two Sûtras as constituting two adhikaranas. The former Sûtra, they say, teaches that the text, 'I am thou, thou art I,' enjoins a meditation on the soul and the highest Self as interchangeable. But as on the basis of texts such as 'All this is indeed Brahman,' 'all this has its Self in Brahman,' 'Thou art that,' the text quoted is as a matter of course understood to mean that there is one universal Self, the teaching which it is by those interpreters assumed to convey would be nothing new; and their interpretation therefore must be rejected. The point as to the oneness of the individual and the highest Self will moreover be discussed under IV, I, 3. Moreover, there is no foundation for a special meditation on Brahman as the individual soul and the individual soul as Brahman, apart from the meditation on the Self of all being one.--The second Sûtra, they say, declares the oneness of the meditation on the True enjoined in the text, 'whosoever knows this great wonderful first-born as the True Brahman' (_Bri_. Up. V, 4), and of the meditation enjoined in the subsequent passage (V, 5. 2), 'Now what is true, that is the Âditya, the person that dwells in yonder orb, and the person in the right eye.' But this also is untenable. For the difference of abode mentioned in the latter passage (viz. the abode in the sun and in the eye) establishes difference of vidyâ, as already shown under Sû. III, 3, 21. Nor is it possible to assume that the two meditations comprised in the latter text which have a character of their own in so far as they view the True as embodied in syllables, and so on, and which are declared to be connected with a special result ('he who knows this destroys evil and leaves it'), should be identical with the one earlier meditation which has an independent character of its own and a result of its own ('he conquers these worlds'). Nor can it be said that the declaration of a fruit in 'he destroys evil and leaves it' refers merely to the fruit (not of the entire meditation but) of a subordinate part of the meditation; for there is nothing to prove this. The proof certainly cannot be said to lie in the fact of the vidyâs being one; for this would imply reasoning in a circle, viz. as follows--it being settled that the vidyâs are one, it follows that the fruit of the former meditation only is the main one, while the fruits of the two later meditations are subordinate ones; and--it being settled that those two later fruits are subordinate ones, it follows that, as thus there is no difference depending on connexion with fruits, the two later meditations are one with the preceding one.--All this proves that the two Sûtras can be interpreted only in the way maintained by us.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'being within.'

38. Wishes and the rest, here and there; (as is known from the abode, and so on).

We read in the Chândogya (VIII, I, 1), 'There is that city of Brahman, and in it the palace, the small lotus, and in it that small ether,' &c.; and in the Vâjasaneyaka, 'He is that great unborn Self who consists of knowledge,' and so on. A doubt here arises whether the two texts constitute one meditation or not.--The two meditations are separate, the Pûrvapakshin maintains; for they have different characters. The Chândogya represents as the object of meditation the ether as distinguished by eight different attributes, viz. freedom from all evil and the rest; while, according to the Vâjasaneyaka, the being to be meditated on is he who dwells within that ether, and is distinguished by attributes such as lordship, and so on.--To this we reply that the meditations are not distinct, since there is no difference of character. For desires and so on constitute that character 'here and there,' i.e. in both texts nothing else but Brahman distinguished by attributes, such as having true wishes, and so on, forms the subject of meditation. This

42849 is known 'from the abode and so on,' i.e. the meditation is recognised
42850 as the same because in both texts Brahman is referred to as abiding in
42851 the heart, being a bridge, and so on. Lordship and the rest, which are
42852 stated in the Vâjasaneyaka, are special aspects of the quality of being
42853 capable to realise all one's purposes, which is one of the eight
42854 qualities declared in the Chândogya, and as such prove that all the
42855 attributes going together with that quality in the Chândogya are valid
42856 for the Vâjasaneyaka also. The character of the two vidyâs therefore
42857 does not differ. The connexion with a reward also does not differ, for
42858 it consists in both cases in attaining to Brahman; cp. Ch. Up. VIII, 12,
42859 3 'Having approached the highest light he is manifested in his own form,'
42860 and Bri. Up. V, 4, 24 'He becomes indeed the fearless Brahman.' That,
42861 in the Chândogya-text, the term ether denotes the highest Brahman, has
42862 already been determined under I, 3, 14. As in the Vâjasaneyaka, on the
42863 other hand, he who abides in the ether is recognised as the highest Self,
42864 we infer that by the ether in which he abides must be understood the
42865 ether within the heart, which in the text 'within there is a little
42866 hollow space (sushira)' (Mahânâr. Up. XI, 9) is called sushira. The two
42867 meditations are therefore one. Here an objection is raised. It cannot be
42868 maintained that the attributes mentioned in the Chândogya have to be
42869 combined with those stated in the Vâjasaneyaka (lordship, rulership, &c.
42870), since even the latter are not truly valid for the meditation. For the
42871 immediately preceding passage, 'By the mind it is to be perceived that
42872 there is here no plurality: from death to death goes he who sees here
42873 any plurality; as one only is to be seen that eternal being, not to be
42874 proved by any means of proof,' as well as the subsequent text, 'that
42875 Self is to be described by No, no,' shows that the Brahman to be
42876 meditated upon is to be viewed as devoid of attributes; and from this we
42877 infer that the attributes of lordship and so on, no less than the
42878 qualities of grossness and the like, have to be denied of Brahman. From
42879 this again we infer that in the Chândogya also the attributes of
42880 satyakâmatva and so on are not meant to be declared as Brahman's true
42881 qualities. All such qualities--as not being real qualities of Brahman--
42882 have therefore to be omitted in meditations aiming at final release.--
42883 This objection the next Sûtra disposes of.

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42888 39. On account of emphasis there is non-omission.

42889

42890 Attributes, such as having the power of immediately realising one's
42891 purposes, and so on, which are not by other means known to constitute
42892 attributes of Brahman, and are in the two texts under discussion, as
42893 well as in other texts, emphatically declared to be attributes of
42894 Brahman, as constituting the object of meditations undertaken with a
42895 view to final release, cannot be omitted from those meditations, but
42896 must be comprised within them. In the Chândogya. the passage, 'Those who
42897 depart from hence, after having cognised the Self and those self-
42898 realising desires, move about at will in all those worlds,' enjoins the
42899 knowledge of Brahman as distinguished by the power of realising its
42900 desires and similar qualities, while the text, 'Those who depart from
42901 here not having cognised the Self, &c., do not move about at will,' &c.,
42902 finds fault with the absence of such knowledge, and in this way
42903 emphasises the importance of the possession of it. In the same way the
42904 repeated declarations as to Brahman's ruling power ('the lord of all,
42905 the king of all beings,' &c.) show that stress is to be laid upon the
42906 quality indicated. It truly cannot be held that Scripture, which in
42907 tender regard to man's welfare is superior to a thousand of parents,
42908 should, deceitfully, give emphatic instruction as to certain qualities--
42909 not known through any other means of knowledge--which fundamentally
42910 would be unreal and hence utterly to be disregarded, and thus throw men
42911 desirous of release, who as it is are utterly confused by the
42912 revolutions of the wheel of Samsâra, into even deeper confusion and
42913 distress. That the text, 'there is not any diversity here; as one only
42914 is to be seen that eternal being,' teaches a unitary view of the world
42915 in so far as everything is an effect of Brahman and thus has Brahman for
42916 its Self, and negatives the view of plurality--established antecedently
42917 to Vedic teaching--as excluding Brahman's being the universal Self, we

have explained before. In the clause 'not so, not so' the so refers back to the world as established by other means of proof, and the clause thus declares that Brahman who is the Self of all is different in nature from the world. This is confirmed by the subsequent passage, 'He is incomprehensible, for he is not comprehended, he is undecaying,' &c.; which means--as he is different in nature from what is comprehended by the other means of proof he is not grasped by those means; as he is different from what suffers decay he does not decay, and so on. And analogously, in the Chandogya, the text 'by the old age of the body he does not age' &c. first establishes Brahman's being different in nature from everything else, and then declares it to be satyakâma, and so on.--But, an objection is raised, the text, 'Those who depart from hence, having cognised the Self and those true desires, move about at will in all worlds. Thus he who desires the world of the fathers,' &c., really declares that the knowledge of Brahman as possessing the power of immediately realising its wishes has for its fruit something lying within the sphere of transmigratory existence, and from this we infer that for him who is desirous of release and of reaching Brahman the object of meditation is not to be found in Brahman in so far as possessing qualities. The fruit of the highest knowledge is rather indicated in the passage, 'Having approached the highest light it manifests itself in its own form'; and hence the power of realising its wishes and the rest are not to be included in the meditation of him who wishes to attain to Brahman.--To this objection the next Sûtra replies.

40. In the case of him who has approached (Brahman); just on that account, this being declared by the text.

When the soul, released from all bonds and manifesting itself in its true nature, has approached, i.e. attained to Brahman; then just on that account, i.e. on account of such approach, the text declares it to possess the power of moving about at will in all worlds. 'Having approached the highest light he manifests himself in his true form. He is the highest Person. He moves about there laughing, playing,' &c. This point will be proved in greater detail in the fourth adhyâya. Meanwhile the conclusion is that such qualities as satyakâmatva have to be included in the meditation of him also who is desirous of release; for the possession of those qualities forms part of the experience of the released soul itself.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'wishes and the rest'

41. There is non-restriction of determination, because this is seen; for there is a separate fruit, viz. non-obstruction.

There are certain meditations connected with elements of sacrificial actions; as e.g. 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om as udgîtha.' These meditations are subordinate elements of the sacrificial acts with which they connect themselves through the udgîtha and so on, in the same way as the quality of being made of parna wood connects itself with the sacrifice through the ladle (made of parna wood), and are to be undertaken on that very account. Moreover the statement referring to these meditations, viz. 'whatever he does with knowledge, with faith, with the Upanishad, that becomes more vigorous,' does not allow the assumption of a special fruit for these meditations (apart from the fruit of the sacrificial performance); while in the case of the ladle being made of parna wood the text mentions a special fruit ('he whose ladle is made of parna wood does not hear an evil sound'). The meditations in question are therefore necessarily to be connected with the particular sacrificial performances to which they belong.--This view the Sûtra refutes, 'There is non-restriction with regard to the determinations.' By 'determination' we have here to understand the definite settling of the mind in a certain direction, in other words, meditation. The meditations on the udgîtha and so on are not definitely

connected with the sacrificial performances; 'since that is seen,' i.e. since the texts themselves declare that there is no such necessary connexion; cp. the text, 'therefore both perform the sacrificial work, he who thus knows it (i. e. who possesses the knowledge implied in the meditations on the sacrifice), as well as he who does not know'--which declares that he also who does not know the meditations may perform the work. Were these meditations auxiliary elements of the works, there could be no such absence of necessary connexion (as declared in this text). It thus being determined that they are not auxiliary elements, a special result must be assigned to the injunction of meditation, and this we find in the greater strength which is imparted to the sacrifice by the meditation, and which is a result different from the result of the sacrifice itself. The greater strength of the performance consists herein, that its result is not impeded, as it might be impeded, by the result of some other performance of greater force. This result, viz. absence of obstruction, is something apart from the general result of the action, such as the reaching of the heavenly world, and so on. This the Sûtra means when saying, 'for separate is non-obstruction.' As thus those meditations also which refer to auxiliary members of sacrifices have their own results, they may or may not be combined with the sacrifices, according to wish. Their case is like that of the godohana vessel which, with the view of obtaining a certain special result, may be used instead of the kamasa.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-restriction of determination.'

42. Just as in the case of the offerings. This has been explained.

In the daharavidyâ (Ch. Up. VIII, 1 ff.) the text, 'those who depart having known here the Self, and those true desires,' declares at first a meditation on the small ether, i.e. the highest Self, and separately therefrom a meditation on its qualities, viz. true desires, and so on. The doubt here arises whether, in the meditation on those qualities, the meditation on the highest Self--as that to which the qualities belong--is to be repeated or not.--It is not to be repeated, the Pûrvapakshin maintains; for the highest Self is just that which is constituted by the qualities--freedom from all evil, and so on--and as that Self so constituted can be comprised in one meditation, there is no need of repeating the meditation on account of the qualities.--This view the Sûtra sets aside. The meditation has to be repeated. The highest Self indeed is that being to which alone freedom from evil and the other qualities belong, and it forms the object of the first meditation; yet there is a difference between it as viewed in its essential being and as viewed as possessing those qualities; and moreover, the clause 'free from evil, from old age,' &c. enjoins a meditation on the Self as possessing those qualities. It is therefore first to be meditated on in its essential nature, and then there takes place a repetition of the meditation on it in order to bring in those special qualities. The case is analogous to that of 'the offerings.' There is a text 'He is to offer a purodâsa on eleven potsherds to Indra the ruler, to Indra the supreme ruler, to Indra the self-ruler.' This injunction refers to one and the same Indra, possessing the qualities of rulership and so on; but as, through connexion with those several qualities, the aspects of Indra differ, the oblation of the purodâsa has to be repeated. This is declared in the Sâmkarshana, 'The divinities are different on account of separation.'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'offerings.'

43. On account of the plurality of indicatory marks; for that (proof) is stronger. This also is declared (in the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ).

The Taittirîyaka contains another daharavidyâ, 'The thousand-headed god, the all-eyed one,' &c. (Mahânâr. Up. XI). Here the doubt arises whether this vidyâ, as being one with the previously introduced vidyâ, states qualities to be included in the meditation enjoined in that vidyâ, or

43056 qualities to be included in the meditations on the highest Self as
 43057 enjoined in all the Vedānta-texts.--The former is the case, the
 43058 Pûrvapakshin holds, on account of the leading subject-matter. For in the
 43059 preceding section (X) the meditation on the small ether is introduced as
 43060 the subject-matter. 'There is the small lotus placed in the middle of
 43061 the town (of the body), free from all evil, the abode of the Highest;
 43062 within that there is a small space, free from sorrow--what is within
 43063 that should be meditated upon' (Mahânâr. Up. X, 23). Now, as the lotus
 43064 of the heart is mentioned only in section X, the 'Nârâyana-section'
 43065 ('the heart resembling the bud of a lotus, with its point turned
 43066 downwards,' XI, 6), we conclude that that section also is concerned with
 43067 the object of meditation to which the daharavidyâ refers.--Against this
 43068 view the Sûtra declares itself, 'on account of the majority of
 43069 indicatory marks'; i.e. there are in the text several marks proving that
 43070 that section is meant to declare characteristics of that which
 43071 constitutes the object of meditation in all meditations on the highest
 43072 being. For that being which in those meditations is denoted as the
 43073 Imperishable, Siva, Sambhu. the highest Brahman, the highest light, the
 43074 highest entity, the highest Self, and so on, is here referred to by the
 43075 same names, and then declared to be Nârâyana. There are thus several
 43076 indications to prove that Nârâyana is none other than that which is the
 43077 object of meditation in all meditations on the Highest, viz. Brahman,
 43078 which has bliss and the rest for its qualities. By 'linga' (inferential
 43079 mark) we here understand clauses (vākya) which contain a specific
 43080 indication; for such clauses have, according to the Pûrva Mīmāṃsā,
 43081 greater proving power than leading subject-matter (prakarana). The
 43082 argumentation that the clause 'the heart resembling the bud of a lotus
 43083 flower,' &c., proves that section to stand in a dependent relation to
 43084 the daharavidyâ, is without force; for it being proved by a stronger
 43085 argument that the section refers to that which is the object of
 43086 meditation in all meditations, the clause mentioned may also be taken as
 43087 declaring that in the daharavidyâ also the object of meditation is
 43088 Nârâyana. Nor must it be thought that the accusatives with which the
 43089 section begins (sahasrasirsham, &c.) are to be connected with the
 43090 'meditating' enjoined in the previous section; for the 'meditating' is
 43091 there enjoined by a gerundive form ('tasmin yad antas tad upâsitavyam'),
 43092 and with this the subsequent accusatives cannot be construed. Moreover,
 43093 the subsequent clause ('all this is Nârâyana,' &c., where the nominative
 43094 case is used) shows that those accusatives are to be taken in the sense
 43095 of nominatives.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the plurality of
 43096 indicatory marks.'
 43097
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 43100

43101 44. There is option with regard to what precedes (i.e. the altar made of
 43102 bricks) on account of subject-matter, and hence there is action; as in
 43103 the case of the mânasa cup.
 43104

43105 In the Vâjasaneyaka, in the Agnirahasya chapter, there are references to
 43106 certain altars built of mind, 'built of mind, built of speech,' &c. The
 43107 doubt here arises whether those structures of mind, and so on, which
 43108 metaphorically are called fire-altars, should be considered as being of
 43109 the nature of action, on account of their connexion with a performance
 43110 which itself is of the nature of action; or merely of the nature of
 43111 meditation, as being connected with an activity of the nature of
 43112 meditation. The Sûtra maintains the former view. Since those things
 43113 'built of mind, and so on,' are, through being built (or piled up),
 43114 constituted as fire-altars, they demand a performance with which to
 43115 connect themselves; and as in immediate proximity to them no performance
 43116 is enjoined, and as the general subject-matter of the section is the
 43117 fire-altar built of bricks--introduced by means of the clause 'Non-being
 43118 this was in the beginning'---which is invariably connected with a
 43119 performance of the nature of outward action, viz. a certain sacrificial
 43120 performance--we conclude that the altars built of mind, &c., which the
 43121 text mentions in connexion with the same subject-matter, are themselves
 43122 of the nature of action, and as such can be used as alternatives for the
 43123 altar built of bricks.[FOOTNOTE 668:1]. An analogous case is presented
 43124 by the so-called mental cup. On the tenth, so-called avivākya, day of

the Soma sacrifice extending over twelve days, there takes place the mental offering of a Soma cup, all the rites connected with which are rehearsed in imagination only; the offering of that cup is thus really of the nature of thought only, but as it forms an auxiliary element in an actual outward sacrificial performance it itself assumes the character of an action.

[FOOTNOTE 668:1. So that for the actual outward construction of a brick altar there may optionally be substituted the merely mental construction of an imaginary altar.]

45. And on account of the transfer.

That the altar built of thought is an optional substitute for the altar built of bricks, and of the nature of an action, appears therefrom also that the clause 'of these each one is as great as that previous one,' explicitly transfers to the altars of mind, and so on, the powers of the previous altar made of bricks. All those altars thus having equal effects there is choice between them. The altars of mind, and so on, therefore are auxiliary members of the sacrificial performance which they help to accomplish, and hence themselves of the nature of action.--Against this view the next Sûtra declares itself.

46. But it is a meditation only, on account of assertion and what is seen.

The altars built of mind, and so on, are not of the nature of action, but of meditation only, i.e. they belong to a performance which is of the nature of meditation only. For this is what the text asserts, viz. in the clauses 'they are built of knowledge only,' and 'by knowledge they are built for him who thus knows.' As the energies of mind, speech, sight, and so on, cannot be piled up like bricks, it is indeed a matter of course that the so-called altars constructed of mind, and so on, can be mental constructions only; but the text in addition specially confirms this by declaring that those altars are elements in an activity of purely intellectual character, and hence themselves mere creatures of the intellect. Moreover there is seen in the text a performance consisting of thought only to which those fires stand in a subsidiary relation, 'by the mind they were established on hearths, by the mind they were built up, by the mind the Soma cups were drawn thereat; by the mind they chanted, and by the mind they recited; whatever rite is performed at the sacrifice, whatever sacrificial rite there is, that, as consisting of mind, was performed by the mind only, on those (fire-altars) composed of mind, built up of mind.' From this declaration, that whatever sacrificial rite is actually performed in the case of fire-altars built of bricks is performed mentally only in the case of altars built of mind, it follows that the entire performance is a mental one only, i.e. an act of meditation.--But, an objection is raised, as the entire passus regarding the altars of mind does not contain any word of injunctive power, and as the text states no special result (from which it appears to follow that the passus does not enjoin a new independent performance), we must, on the strength of the fact that the leading subject-matter is an actual sacrificial performance as suggested by the altars built of brick, give up the idea that the altars built of mind, &c., are mental only because connected with a performance of merely mental nature.--This objection the next Sûtra refutes.

47. And on account of the greater strength of direct statement, and so on, there is no refutation.

The weaker means of proof, constituted by so-called leading subject-matter, cannot refute what is established by three stronger means of proof--direct statement, inferential mark, and syntactical connexion--viz. that there is an independent purely mental performance, and that the altars made of mind are parts of the latter. The direct statement is contained in the following passage, 'Those fire-altars indeed are built of knowledge,'--which is further explained in the subsequent passage, 'by knowledge alone these altars are built for him who knows this'--the sense of which is: the structures of mind, and so on, are built in connexion with a performance which consists of knowledge (i.e. meditation).--The inferential mark is contained in the passage, 'For him all beings at all times build them, even while he is asleep.' And the syntactical connexion (vākya) consists in the connexion of the two words evamvide (for him who knows this), and kinvanti (they build)--the sense being: for him who accomplishes the performance consisting of knowledge all beings at all times build those altars. The proving power of the passage above referred to as containing an indicatory mark (linga) lies therein that a construction mentally performed at all times by all beings cannot possibly connect itself with a sacrificial performance through the brick-altar, which is constructed by certain definite agents and on certain definite occasions only, and must therefore be an element in a mental performance, i.e. a meditation.--The next Sûtra disposes of the objection that the text cannot possibly mean to enjoin a new mental performance, apart from the actual performance, because it contains no word of injunctive force and does not mention a special result.

48. On account of connexions and the rest, as in the case of the separateness of other cognitions. And this is seen (elsewhere also); as declared (in the Pûrva Mīmāṃsā).

That the text enjoins a meditative performance different from the actual performance of which the brick-altar is a constituent element, follows from the reasons proving separation, viz. the connexions. i.e. the things connected with the sacrifice, such as the Soma cups, the hymns, the recitations, and so on. What is meant is that the special mention of the cups, and so on, made in the passage 'by the mind the Soma cups were drawn thereat,' proves the difference of the performance.--The 'and the rest' of the Sûtra comprises the previously stated arguments, viz. direct statement, and so on. 'As other meditations,' i.e. the case is analogous to that of other meditations such as the meditation on the small ether within the heart, which are likewise proved by textual statement, and so on, to be different and separate from actual outward sacrificial performances.--The existence of a separate meditative act having thus been ascertained, the requisite injunction has to be construed on the basis of the text as it stands.

Such construction of injunctions on the basis of texts of arthavâda character is seen in other places also; the matter is discussed in Pû. Mî. Sûtras III, 5, 21.--The result of the meditative performance follows from the passage 'of these (altars made of mind, and so on) each is as great as that former one (i.e. the altar built of bricks)'--for this implies that the same result which the brick-altar accomplishes through the sacrifice of which it forms an element is also attained through the altars made of mind, and so on, through the meditations of which they form parts.--The next Sûtra disposes of the argumentation that, as this formal transfer of the result of the brick-altar to the altars built of mind, and so on, shows the latter to possess the same virtues as the former, we are bound to conclude that they also form constituent elements of an actual (not merely meditative) performance.

49. Not so, on account of this being observed on account of similarity also; as in the case of Death; for (the person in yonder orb) does not occupy the worlds (of Death).

From a transfer or assimilation of this kind it does not necessarily follow that things of different operation are equal, and that hence those altars of mind, and so on, must connect themselves with an actual outward performance. For it is observed that such assimilation rests sometimes on a special point of resemblance only; so in the text, 'The person in yonder orb is Death indeed,'--where the feature of resemblance is the destroying power of the two; for the person within yonder orb does certainly not occupy the same worlds, i.e. the same place as Death. Analogously, in the case under discussion, the fact that the altars made of mind are treated as, in a certain respect, equivalent to the altar built of bricks, does not authorise us to connect those altars with the sacrificial performance to which the altar of bricks belongs. When the text says that the altar made of mind is as great as the altar of bricks, this only means that the same result which is attained through the brick-altar in connexion with its own sacrificial performance is also attained through the altar of mind in connexion with the meditational performance into which it enters.

50. And by a subsequent (Brâhmana) also the 'being of such a kind' of the word (is proved). But the connexion is on account of plurality.

The subsequent Brâhmana (Sat. Br. X, 5, 4) also proves that the text treating of the altars made of mind, and so on, enjoins a meditation only. For that Brâhmana (which begins 'This brick-built fire-altar is this world; the waters are its enclosing-stones,' &c.) declares further on 'whosoever knows this thus comes to be that whole Agni who is the space-filler,' and from this it appears that what is enjoined there is a meditation with a special result of its own. And further on (X, 6) there is another meditation enjoined, viz. one on Vaisvânara. All this shows that the Agnirahasya book (Sat. Br. X) is not solely concerned with the injunction of outward sacrificial acts.--But what then is the reason that such matters as the mental (meditative) construction of fire-altars which ought to be included in the Brihad-âraṇyaka are included in the Agnirahasya?--'That connexion is on account of plurality,' i.e. the altars made of mind, and so on, are, in the sacred text, dealt with in proximity to the real altar made of bricks, because so many details of the latter are mentally to be accomplished in the meditation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'option with the previous one.'

51. Some, on account of the existence of a Self within a body.

In all meditations on the highest Self the nature of the meditating subject has to be ascertained no less than the nature of the object of meditation and of the mode of meditation. The question then arises whether the meditating Self is to be viewed as the knowing, doing, and enjoying Self, subject to transmigration; or as that Self which Prajâpati describes (Ch. Up. VIII, 1), viz. a Self free from all sin and imperfection.--Some hold the former view, on the ground that the meditating Self is within a body. For as long as the Self dwells within a body, it is a knower, doer, enjoyer, and so on, and it can bring about the result of its meditation only as viewed under that aspect. A person who, desirous of the heavenly world or a similar result, enters on some sacrificial action may, after he has reached that result, possess characteristics different from those of a knowing, doing, and enjoying subject, but those characteristics cannot be attributed to him as long as he is in the state of having to bring about the means of accomplishing those ends; in the latter state he must be viewed as an ordinary agent, and there it would be of no use to view him as something different. And the same holds equally good with regard to a person engaged in meditation.--But, an objection is raised, the text 'as the thought of a man is in this world, so he will be when he has departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1) does declare a difference (between the

43332 agent engaged in sacrificial action, and the meditating subject), and
43333 from this it follows that the meditating Self is to be conceived as
43334 having a nature free from all evil, and so on.--Not so, the Pûrvapakshin
43335 replies; for the clause, 'howsoever they meditate on him,' proves that
43336 that text refers to the equality of the object meditated upon (not of
43337 the meditating subject).--To this the next Sûtra replies.

43342 52. But this is not so, (but rather) difference; since it is of the
43343 being of that; as in the case of intuition.

43345 It is not true that the meditating subject must be conceived as having
43346 the ordinary characteristics of knowing, acting, &c.; it rather
43347 possesses those characteristic properties--freedom from evil, and so on--
43348 which distinguish the state of Release from the Samsâra state. At the
43349 time of meditation the Self of the devotee is of exactly the same nature
43350 as the released Self. 'For it is of the being of that,' i.e. it attains
43351 the nature of that--as proved by the texts, 'as the thought of a man is
43352 in this world, so he will be when he has departed,' and 'howsoever he
43353 meditate on him, such he becomes himself.' Nor can it be maintained that
43354 these texts refer only to meditation on the highest Self (without
43355 declaring anything as to the personal Self of the devotee); for the
43356 personal Self constitutes the body of Brahman which is the object of
43357 meditation, and hence itself falls under the category of object of
43358 meditation. The character of such meditation, therefore, is that it is a
43359 meditation on the highest Self as having for its body the individual
43360 Self, distinguished by freedom from evil and the other qualities
43361 mentioned in the teaching of Prajâpati. And hence the individual Self is,
43362 in such meditation, to be conceived (not as the ordinary Self, but)
43363 under that form which it has to attain (i.e. the pure form which belongs
43364 to it in the state of Release). 'As in the case of intuition'--i.e. as
43365 in the case of intuition of Brahman. As the intuition of Brahman has for
43366 its object the essential nature of Brahman, so the intuition of the
43367 individual soul also has for its object its permanent essential nature.
43368 In the case of sacrificial works the conception of the true nature of
43369 the Self forms an auxiliary factor. An injunction such as 'Let him who
43370 is desirous of the heavenly world sacrifice,' enjoins the performance of
43371 the sacrifice to the end of a certain result being reached; while the
43372 conception of the Self as possessing characteristics such as being a
43373 knowing subject, and so on--which are separate from the body--has the
43374 function of proving its qualification for works meant to effect results
43375 which will come about at some future time. So much only (i.e. the mere
43376 cognition of the Self as something different from the body) is required
43377 for works (as distinguished from meditations).--Here terminates the
43378 adhikarana of 'being in the body.'

43383 53. But those (meditations) which are connected with members (of
43384 sacrifices) are not (restricted) to (particular) sâkhâs, but rather
43385 (belong) to all sâkhâs.

43387 There are certain meditations connected with certain constituent
43388 elements of sacrifices--as e.g. 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om
43389 (as) the Udgîtha' (Ch. Up. I, 1, 1); 'Let a man meditate on the fivefold
43390 Saman as the five worlds' (Ch. Up. II, 2, 1), &c. The question here
43391 arises whether those meditations are restricted to the members of those
43392 sâkhâs in whose texts they are mentioned; or to be connected with the
43393 Udgîtha, and so on, in all sâkhâs. There is here a legitimate ground for
43394 doubt, in so far as, although the general agreement of all Vedânta-texts
43395 is established, the Udgîtha, and so on, are different in each Veda since
43396 the accents differ in the different Vedas--The Pûrvapakshin declares
43397 that those meditations are limited each to its particular sâkhâ; for, he
43398 says, the injunction 'Let him meditate on the Udgîtha' does indeed,
43399 verbally, refer to the Udgîtha in general; but as what stands nearest to
43400 this injunction is the special Udgîtha of the sâkhâ, in whose text this

injunction occurs, and which shares the peculiarities of accent characteristic of that sâkhâ, we decide that the meditation is enjoined on members of that sâkhâ only.--The Sûtra sets this opinion aside. The injunction of meditations of this type is valid for all sâkhâs, since the text expressly connects them with the Udgîtha in general. They therefore hold good wherever there is an Udgîtha. The individual Udgîthas of the several sâkhâs are indeed distinguished by different accentuation; but the general statement, 'Let him meditate on the Udgîtha.' suggests to the mind not any particular Udgîtha, but _the_ Udgîtha in general, and hence there is no reason to restrict the meditation to a particular sâkhâ. From the principle moreover that all sâkhâs teach the same doctrine, it follows that the sacrifice enjoined in the different sâkhâs is one only; and hence there is no reason to hold that the Udgîtha suggested by the injunction of the meditation is a particular one. For the Udgîtha is only an element in the sacrifice, and the sacrifice is one and the same. The meditations are not therefore limited to particular sâkhâs.

54. Or there is no contradiction as in the case of mantras and the rest.

The 'or' here has the sense of 'and.' The 'and the rest' comprises generic characteristics, qualities, number, similarity, order of succession, substances, and actions. As there is nothing contrary to reason in mantras and the rest, although mentioned in the text of one sâkhâ only, finding, on the basis of such means of proof as direct statement, and so on, their application in all sâkhâs, since the sacrifice to which they belong is one and the same in all sâkhâs; so there is likewise no contradiction in the meditations under discussion being undertaken by members of all sâkhâs.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'what is connected with constituent elements of the sacrifice.'

55. There is pre-eminence of plenitude, as in the case of the sacrifice; for thus Scripture shows.

The sacred text (Ch. Up. V, 12 ff.) enjoins a meditation on Vaisvânara, the object of which is the highest Self, as having for its body the entire threefold world, and for its limbs the heavenly world, the sun, the wind, and so on. The doubt here arises whether separate meditations have to be performed on the highest Being in its separate aspects, or in its aggregate as well as in its distributed aspect, or in its aggregate aspect only.--In its separate aspects, the Pûrvapakshin maintains; since at the outset a meditation of that kind is declared. For on the Rishis in succession telling Asvapati the objects of their meditation, viz. the sky, the sun, and so on, Asvapati explains to them that these meditations refer to the head, eye, and so on, of the highest Being, and mentions for each of these meditations a special fruit. And the concluding explanation 'he who worships Vaisvânara as a span long, &c.,' is merely meant to gather up into one, as it were, the preceding meditations on the parts of Vaisvânara.--Another Pûrvapakshin holds that this very concluding passage enjoins a further meditation on Vaisvânara in his collective aspect, in addition to the previously enjoined meditations on his limbs; for that passage states a separate result, 'he eats food in all worlds,' &c. Nor does this destroy the unity of the whole section. The case is analogous to that of the meditation on 'plenitude' (bhûman; Ch. Up. VII, 23). There, in the beginning, separate meditations are enjoined on name, and so on, with special results of their own; and after that a meditation is enjoined on bhûman, with a result of its own, 'He becomes a Self-ruler,' &c. The entire section really refers to the meditation on bhûman; but all the same there are admitted subordinate meditations on name, and so on, and a special result for each.--These views are set aside by the Sûtra, 'There is pre-eminence of plenitude,' i.e. there is reason to assume that

Vaisvânara in his fulness, i.e. in his collective aspect, is meant; since we apprehend unity of the entire section. From the beginning of the section it is manifest that what the Rishis desire to know is the Vaisânara Self; it is that Self which Asvapati expounds to them as having the Universe for his body, and in agreement therewith the last clause of his teaching intimates that the intuition of Brahman (which is none other than the Vaisvânara Self)--which is there characterised as the food of all worlds, all beings, all Selves--is the fruit of the meditation on Vaisvânara. This summing up proves the whole section to deal with the same subject. And on the basis of this knowledge we determine that what the text says as to meditations on the separate members of the Vaisânara Self and their special results is merely of the nature of explanatory comment (anuvâda) on parts of the meditation on the collective Self.--This decision is arrived at as in the case of the sacrifice. For to the injunction of certain sacrifices--such as 'Let a man, on the birth of a son, offer a cake on twelve potsherds to Vaisvânara'--the text similarly adds remarks on parts of the oblation, 'there is an oblation on eight potsherds,' and so on.--The meditation therefore has to be performed on the entire Vaisvânara Self only, not on its parts. This, moreover, Scripture itself intimates, in so far, namely, as declaring the evil consequences of meditation on parts of the Self only, 'your head would have fallen off if you had not come to me'; 'you would have become blind,' and so on. This also shows that the reference to the text enjoining meditations on name, &c., proves nothing as to our passage. For there the text says nothing as to disadvantages connected with those special meditations; it only says that the meditation on plenitude (bhûman) has a more excellent result. The section, therefore, although really concerned with enjoining the meditation on the bhûman, at the same time means to declare that the special meditations also are fruitful; otherwise the meditation on the bhûman could not be recommended, for the reason that it has a more excellent result than the preceding meditations.--The conclusion, therefore, is that the text enjoins a meditation on the collective Vaisvânara Self only.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the pre-eminence of plenitude.'

56. (The meditations are) separate, on account of the difference of words, and so on.

The instances coming under this head of discussion are all those meditations on Brahman which have for their only result final Release, which consists in attaining to Brahman--such as the meditation on that which is, the meditation on the bhûman, the meditation on the small space within the heart, the Upakosala meditation, the Sândilya meditation, the meditation on Vaisvânara, the meditation on the Self of bliss, the meditation on the Imperishable, and others--whether they be recorded in one sâkhâ only or in several sâkhâs. To a different category belong those meditations which have a special object such as Prâna, and a special result.--The doubt here arises whether the meditations of the former class are all to be considered as identical, or as separate--The Pûrvapakshin holds that they are all one; for, he says, they all have one and the same object of meditation, viz. Brahman. For the nature of all cognition depends on the object cognised; and the nature of the meditations thus being one, the meditations themselves are one.--This view the Sûtra controverts. The meditations are different, on account of the difference of terms and the rest. The 'and the rest' comprises repetition (abhyâsa), number (samkhyâ), quality (guna), subject-matter (prakriyâ), and name (nâmadheya; cp. Pû. Mî. Sû. II, 2, 1 ff.). We meet in those meditations with difference of connexion, expressing itself in difference of words, and so on; which causes difference on the part of the meditations enjoined. The terms enjoining meditation, 'he knows,' 'he is to meditate' (veda; upâsîta), and so on, do indeed all of them denote a certain continuity of cognition, and all these cognitions have for their object Brahman only, but all the same those cognitions differ in so far as they have for their object Brahman, as variously qualified by special characteristics mentioned in the meditation; in one meditation he is spoken of as the sole cause of the world, in another as

free from all evil, and so on. We therefore arrive at the decision that clauses which describe special forms of meditation having for their result the attainment to Brahman, and are complete in themselves, convey the idea of separate independent meditations, and thus effect separation of the vidyās. This entire question was indeed already decided in the Pūrva Mimāṃsa-sūtras (II, 2, 1), but it is here argued again to the end of dispelling the mistaken notion that the Vedānta-texts aim at knowledge only, and not at the injunction of activities such as meditation. The meditations, therefore, are separate ones.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'difference of words and the rest.'

57. Option, on account of the non-difference of result.

It has been proved that the meditation on that which truly is, the meditation on the small ether within the heart, and so on--all of which have for their result the attainment to Brahman--are separate meditations. The question now arises whether all these meditations should be combined by each meditating devotee, on account of such combination being useful to him; or whether, in the absence of any use of such combination, they should be undertaken optionally.--They may be combined, the Pūrvapakshin holds; since it is observed that different scriptural matters are combined even when having one and the same result. The Agnihotra, the Daisapūrnāmāsa oblation, and other sacrifices, all of them have one and the same result, viz. the possession of the heavenly world; nevertheless, one and the same agent performs them all, with a view to the greater fulness of the heavenly bliss aimed at. So the different meditations on Brahman also may be cumulated with a view to greater fulness of intuition of Brahman.--This view the Sūtra rejects. Option only between the several meditations is possible, on account of the non-difference of result. For to all meditations on Brahman alike Scripture assigns one and the same result, viz. intuitive knowledge of Brahman, which is of the nature of supreme, unsurpassable bliss. 'He who knows Brahman attains the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1), &c. The intuitive knowledge of Brahman constitutes supreme, unsurpassable bliss; and if such intuition may be reached through one meditation, of what use could other meditations be? The heavenly world is something limited in respect of place, time, and essential nature, and hence a person desirous of attaining to it may cumulate works in order to take possession of it to a greater extent, and so on. But an analogous proceeding cannot be resorted to with regard to Brahman, which is unlimited in every sense. All meditations on Brahman tend to dispel Nescience, which stands in the way of the intuition of Brahman, and thus equally have for their result the attaining to Brahman; and hence there is option between them. In the case, on the other hand, of those meditations which aim at other results than Brahman, there may either be choice between the several meditations, or they may be cumulated--as one may also do in the case of sacrifices aiming at the attainment of the heavenly world;--for as those results are not of an infinite nature one may aim at realising them in a higher degree. This the next Sūtra declares.

58. But meditations aiming at objects of desire may, according to one's liking, be cumulated or not; on account of the absence of the former reason.

The last clause means--on account of their results not being of an infinite nature.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'option.'

59. They belong to the constituent members, as the bases.

A doubt arises whether meditations such as the one enjoined in the text, 'Let him meditate on the syllable Om as the Udgîtha,' which are connected with constituent elements of the sacrifice such as the Udgîtha, contribute towards the accomplishment of the sacrifice, and hence must be performed at the sacrifice as part of it; or whether they, like the godohana vessel, benefit the agent apart from the sacrifice, and therefore may be undertaken according to desire.--But has it not been already decided under III, 3, 42 that those meditations are generally beneficial to man, and not therefore restricted to the sacrifices?--True; it is just for the purpose of further confirming that conclusion that objections are now raised against it on the ground of some inferential marks (linga) and reasoning. For there it was maintained on the strength of the text 'therefore he does both' that those meditations have results independent of the sacrifice. But there are several reasons favouring the view that those meditations must be connected with the sacrifices as subordinate members, just as the Udgîtha and the rest to which the meditations refer.

Their case is by no means analogous to that of the godohana vessel, for, while in the case of the latter, the text expressly declares the existence of a special result, 'For him who is desirous of cattle he is to bring water in a godohana,' the texts enjoining those meditations do not state special results for them. For clauses such as 'he is to meditate on the Udgîtha' intimate only that the Udgîtha is connected with the meditation; while their connexion with certain results is known from other clauses, such as 'whatever he does with knowledge, with faith, with the Upanishad, that is more vigorous' (according to which the result of such meditations is only to strengthen the result of the sacrifices). And when a meditation of this kind has, on the ground of its connexion with the Udgîtha or the like--which themselves are invariably connected with sacrifices--been cognised to form an element of a sacrifice, some other passage which may declare a fruit for that meditation can only be taken as an arthavâda; just as the passage which declares that he whose sacrificial ladle is made of parna wood does not hear an evil sound. In the same way, therefore, as the Udgîtha and so on, which are the bases of those meditations, are to be employed only as constituent parts of the sacrifices, so the meditations also connected with those constituent parts are themselves to be employed as constituent parts of the sacrifices only.

60. And on account of injunction.

The above conclusion is further confirmed by the fact of injunction, i.e. thereby that clauses such as 'he is to meditate on the Udgîtha' enjoin the meditation as standing to the Udgîtha in the relation of a subordinate member. Injunctions of this kind differ from injunctions such as 'he is to bring water in the godohana vessel for him who desires cattle'; for the latter state a special qualification on the part of him who performs the action, while the former do not, and hence cannot claim independence.

61. On account of rectification.

The text 'from the seat of the Hotri he sets right the wrong Udgîtha' shows that the meditation is necessarily required for the purpose of correcting whatever mistake may be made in the Udgîtha. This also proves that the meditation is an integral part of the sacrificial performance.

62. And on account of the declaration of a quality being common (to all the Vedas).

The text 'By means of that syllable the threefold knowledge proceeds. With _Om_ the Adhvaryu gives orders, with _Om_ the Hotri recites, with _Om_ the Udgâtri sings,' which declares the pranava--which is a 'quality' of the meditation, in so far as it is its basis--to be common to the three Vedas, further shows that the meditation has to be employed in connexion with the sacrifice. For the meditation is connected with the Udgîtha, and the Udgîtha is an integral part of all sacrificial performances whatever.

Of the primâ facie view thus far set forth the next Sûtra disposes.

63. Rather not, as the text does not declare their going together.

It is not true that the meditations on the Udgîtha and the rest are bound to the sacrifices in the same way as the Udgîtha, and so on, themselves are; for Scripture does not declare that they go together with, i.e. are subordinate constituents of the Udgîtha, and so on. The clause 'Let him meditate on the Udgîtha' does not indeed itself state another qualification on the part of the agent (i.e. does not state that the agent in entering on the meditation is prompted by a motive other than the one prompting the sacrifice); but the subsequent clause, 'whatever he does with knowledge, with faith, with the Upanishad, that becomes more vigorous,' intimates that knowledge is the means to render the sacrificial work more efficacious, and from this it follows that the meditation is enjoined as a means towards effecting a result other than the result of the sacrifice. And hence the meditation cannot be viewed as a subordinate member of the Udgîtha, which itself is a subordinate member of the sacrifice. It rather has the Udgîtha for its basis only. He only indeed who is qualified for the sacrifice is qualified for the meditation, since the latter aims at greater efficaciousness of the sacrifice; but this does not imply that the meditation necessarily goes with the sacrifice. By the greater vigour of the sacrifice is meant its non-obstruction by some other sacrificial work of greater strength, its producing its effect without any delay.--The case of a statement such as 'he whose ladle is of parna wood hears no evil sound' is different. There the text does not declare that the quality of consisting of parna wood is the direct means of bringing about the result of no evil sound being heard; hence there is no valid reason why that quality should not be subordinate to the ladle, which itself is subordinate to the sacrifice; and as it is not legitimate to assume for the mere subordinate constituents of a sacrifice special fruits (other than the general fruit of the sacrifice), the declaration as to no evil sound being heard is to be viewed as a mere arthavâda (i.e. a mere additional statement meant further to glorify the result of the sacrifice--of which the ladle made of parna wood is a subordinate instrument).

64. And because (Scripture) shows it.

A scriptural text, moreover, shows that the meditation is necessary for, and restricted to, the sacrificial performance. For the text 'A Brahman priest who knows this saves the sacrifice, the sacrificer, and all the officiating priests'--which declares that all priests are saved through the knowledge of the Brahman--has sense only on the understanding that that knowledge is not restricted to the Udgâtri, and so on (i.e. not to those priests who are engaged in carrying out the details of the sacrifices which are the 'bases' of the meditations).--The conclusion, therefore, is that those meditations are not restricted to the sacrifices, subordinate members of which serve as their 'bases.'--This terminates the adhikarana of 'like the bases.'

43746
43747 FOURTH PĀDA.
43748

43749 1. The benefit to man results from thence, on account of scriptural
43750 statement; thus Bâdarâyana thinks.
43751

43752 We have concluded the investigation into the oneness or diverseness of
43753 meditations--the result of which is to indicate in which cases the
43754 special points mentioned in several meditations have to be combined, and
43755 in which not. A further point now to be investigated is whether that
43756 advantage to the meditating devotee, which is held to accrue to him from
43757 the meditation, results from the meditation directly, or from works of
43758 which the meditations are subordinate members.--The Reverend Bâdarâyana
43759 holds the former view. The benefit to man results from thence, i.e. from
43760 the meditation, because Scripture declares this to be so. 'He who knows
43761 Brahman reaches the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'I know that great
43762 Person of sun-like lustre beyond the darkness. A man who knows him truly
43763 passes over death; there is no other path to go' (Svet. Up. III, 8); 'As
43764 the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, losing their name and their
43765 form, thus a man who possesses knowledge, freed from name and form, goes
43766 to the divine Person who is greater than the great' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8).--
43767 Against this view the Pûrvapakshin raises an objection.
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43772 2. On account of (the Self) standing in a complementary relation, they
43773 are arthavâdas, as in other cases; thus Jaimini opines.
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43775 What has been said as to Scripture intimating that a beneficial result
43776 is realised through the meditations by themselves is untenable. For
43777 texts such as 'he who knows Brahman reaches the Highest' do not teach
43778 that the highest aim of man is attained through knowledge; their purport
43779 rather is to inculcate knowledge of Truth on the part of a Self which is
43780 the agent in works prescribed. Knowledge, therefore, stands in a
43781 complementary relation to sacrificial works, in so far as it imparts to
43782 the acting Self a certain mystic purification; and the texts which
43783 declare special results of knowledge, therefore, must be taken as mere
43784 arthavâdas. 'As in the case of other things; so Jaimini thinks,' i.e. as
43785 Jaimini holds that in the case of substances, qualities, and so on, the
43786 scriptural declaration of results is of the nature of arthavâda.--But it
43787 has been shown before that the Vedânta-texts represent as the object to
43788 be attained, by those desirous of Release, on the basis of the knowledge
43789 imparted by them, something different from the individual Self engaged
43790 in action; cp. on this point Sû. I, 1, 15; I, 3, 5; I, 2, 3; I, 3, 18.
43791 And Sû. II, 1, 22 and others have refuted the view that Brahman is to be
43792 considered as non-different from the personal soul, because in texts
43793 such as 'thou art that' it is exhibited in co-ordination with the latter.
43794 And other Sûtras have proved that Brahman must, on the basis of numerous
43795 scriptural texts, be recognised as the inner Self of all things material
43796 and immaterial. How then can it be said that the Vedânta-texts merely
43797 mean to give instruction as to the true nature of the active individual
43798 soul, and that hence all meditation is merely subservient to sacrificial
43799 works?--On the strength of numerous inferential marks, the Pûrvapakshin
43800 replies, which prove that in the Vedânta-texts all meditation is really
43801 viewed as subordinate to knowledge, and of the declarations of co-
43802 ordination of Brahman and the individual soul (which must be taken to
43803 imply that the two are essentially of the same nature), we cannot help
43804 forming the conclusion that the real purport of the Vedânta-texts is to
43805 tell us of the true nature of the individual soul in so far as different
43806 from its body.--But, again it is objected, the agent is connected no
43807 less with ordinary worldly works than with works enjoined by the Veda,
43808 and hence is not invariably connected with sacrifices (i.e. works of the
43809 latter type); it cannot, therefore, be maintained that meditations on
43810 the part of the agent necessarily connect themselves with sacrifices in
43811 so far as they effect a purification of the sacrificer's mind!--There is
43812 a difference, the Pûrvapakshin rejoins. Worldly works can proceed also
43813 if the agent is non-different from the body; while an agent is qualified
43814 for sacred works only in so far as he is different from the body, and of

an eternal non-changing nature. Meditations, therefore, properly connect themselves with sacrifices, in so far as they teach that the agent really is of that latter nature. We thus adhere to the conclusion that meditations are constituents of sacrificial actions, and hence are of no advantage by themselves.--But what then are those inferential marks which, as you say, fully prove that the Vedânta-texts aim at setting forth the nature of the individual soul?--To this the next Sûtra replies.

3. On account of (such) conduct being seen.

It is seen, viz in Scripture, that those who knew Brahman busied themselves chiefly with sacrifices.--Asvapati Kaikeya had a deep knowledge of the Self; but when three Rishis had come to him to receive instruction regarding the Self, he told them 'I am about, to perform a sacrifice, Sirs' (Ch. Up. V, II). Similarly we learn from Smṛiti that Janaka and other princes deeply versed in the knowledge of Brahman applied themselves to sacrificial works, 'By works only Janaka and others attained to perfection'; 'He also, well founded in knowledge, offered many sacrifices.' And this fact--that those who know Brahman apply themselves to works chiefly--shows that knowledge (or meditation) has no independent value, but serves to set forth the true nature of the active Self, and thus is subordinate to work.--An even more direct proof is set forth in the next Sûtra.

4. On account of direct scriptural statement.

Scripture itself directly declares knowledge to be subordinate to works, 'whatever he does with knowledge, with faith, with the Upanishad, that is more vigorous'. Nor can it be said that this text refers, on the ground of leading subject-matter (prakaraṇa), to the Udgîtha only; for direct scriptural statement (suti) is stronger than subject-matter, and the words 'whatever he does with knowledge' clearly refer to knowledge in general.

5. On account of the taking hold together.

The text 'then both knowledge and work take hold of him' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2) shows that knowledge and work go together, and this going together is possible only if, in the manner stated, knowledge is subordinate to work.

6. On account of injunction for such a one.

That knowledge is subordinate to works follows therefrom also that works are enjoined on him only who possesses knowledge. For texts such as 'He who has learnt the Veda from a family of teachers,' &c. (Ch. Up. VIII, 15), enjoin works on him only who has mastered the sacred texts so as fully to understand their meaning--for this is the sense of the term 'learning' (adhyayana). Hence the knowledge of Brahman also is enjoined with a view to works only: it has no independent result of its own.

7. On account of definite rule.

Another argument for our conclusion is that the text 'Doing works here let a man desire to live a hundred years,' &c. (Is. Up. II), expressly

enjoins lifelong works on him who knows the Self. The general conclusion, therefore, is that knowledge (meditation) is merely auxiliary to works. Of this view the next Sûtra finally disposes.

8. But on account of the teaching of the different one, Badarâyana's (view is valid); as this is seen.

Knowledge by itself benefits man; since Scripture teaches that the object of knowledge is the highest Brahman which, as it is of an absolutely faultless and perfect nature, is other than the active individual soul.

Badarâyana, therefore, holds that knowledge has an independent fruit of its own. Let the inferential marks (referred to by the Pûrvapakshin) be; the direct teaching of the texts certainly refers to a being different from the Self that acts; for we clearly see that their object is the highest creative Brahman with all its perfections and exalted qualities, which cannot possibly be attributed to the individual Self whether in the state of Release or of bondage: 'Free from evil, free from old age,' &c. &c. In all those texts there is not the slightest trace of any reference to the wretched individual soul, as insignificant and weak as a tiny glow-worm, implicated in Nescience and all the other evils of finite existence. And the fruit of that knowledge of the highest Person the texts expressly declare, in many places, to be immortality--which consists in attaining to Him. The view of knowledge by itself benefitting man therefore is well founded.--The Sûtras proceed to dispose of the so-called inferential marks.

9. But the declarations are equal.

The argument that knowledge must be held subordinate to work because we learn from Scripture that those who know Brahman perform sacrificial works, will not hold good; since, on the other hand, we also see that men knowing Brahman abandoned all work; cp. texts such as 'The Rishis descended from Kavasha said: For what purpose should we study the Veda? for what purpose should we sacrifice?' As it thus appears that those who know Brahman give up works, knowledge cannot be a mere auxiliary to works.--But how can it be accounted for that those who know Brahman both do and do not perform works?--Works may be performed in so far as sacrifices and the like, if performed by one not having any special wish, stand in subordinate relation to the knowledge of Brahman; hence there is no objection to texts enjoining works. And as, on the other hand, sacrifices and such-like works when aiming at results of their own are opposed to the knowledge of Brahman which has Release for its only result, there is all the less objection to texts which suggest the non-performance of works. If, on the other hand, knowledge were subordinate to works, works could on no account be dispensed with.--Against the assertion that Scripture directly declares knowledge to be subordinate to works the next Sûtra declares itself.

10. (It is) non-comprehensive.

The scriptural declaration does not refer to all meditations, but only to the meditation on the Udgîtha. In the clause 'what he does with knowledge,' the 'what' is in itself indefinite, and therefore must be defined as connecting itself with the Udgîtha mentioned in the previous clause, 'Let him meditate on the Udgîtha.' The sentence cannot be construed to mean 'whatever he does is to be done with knowledge,' but means 'that which he does with knowledge becomes more vigorous,' and _that which is_ done with knowledge that is the Udgîtha. The next Sûtra

43953 refutes the argument set forth in Sûtra 5.

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43958 11. There is distribution, as in the case of the hundred.

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43960 As knowledge and work have different results, the text 'of him knowledge
43961 and work lay hold' must be understood in a distributive sense, i.e. as
43962 meaning that knowledge lays hold of him to the end of bringing about its
43963 own particular result, and that so likewise does work. 'As in the case
43964 of a hundred,' i.e. as it is understood that, when a man selling a field
43965 and a gem is said to receive two hundred gold pieces, one hundred are
43966 given for the field and one hundred for the gem.

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43971 12. Of him who has merely read the Veda.

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43973 Nor is there any force in the argument that knowledge is only auxiliary
43974 to work because works are enjoined on him who possesses knowledge. For
43975 the text which refers to the man 'who has read the Veda' enjoins works
43976 on him who has merely read the texts, and reading there means
43977 nothing more than the apprehension of the aggregate of syllables called
43978 Veda, without any insight into their meaning. A man who has thus
43979 mastered the words of the Veda apprehends therefrom that it makes
43980 statements as to works having certain results, and then on his own
43981 account applies himself to the enquiry into the meaning of those
43982 declarations; he who is desirous of work applies himself to the
43983 knowledge of works; he who is desirous of Release applies himself to the
43984 knowledge of Brahman. And even if the injunction of reading were
43985 understood as prompting to the understanding of the text also, all the
43986 same, knowledge would not be a subsidiary to works. For knowledge, in
43987 the sense of the Upanishads, is something different from mere cognition
43988 of sense. In the same way as the performance of such works as the
43989 Jyotishtoma sacrifice is something different from the cognition of the
43990 true nature of those works; so that vidyâ, which effects the highest
43991 purpose of man, i. e. devout meditation (dhyâna, upâsanâ), is something
43992 different from the mere cognition of the true nature of Brahman.

43993 Knowledge of that kind has not the most remote connexion even with works.

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13. Not so, on account of non-specification.

Nor is it true that the text 'Doing works here,' &c., is meant to divert him who knows the Self from knowledge and restrict him to works. For there is no special reason to hold that that text refers to works as independent means of a desirable result: it may as well be understood to refer to works merely subordinate to knowledge. As he who knows the Self has to practise meditation as long as he lives, he may also have to practise, for the same period, works that are helpful to meditation. Having thus refuted the objection on the ground of the reason of the matter, the Sûtrakâra proceeds to give his own interpretation of the text.

14. Or the permission is for the purpose of glorification.

The or has assertive force. The introductory words of the Upanishad, 'Hidden in the Lord is all this,' show knowledge to be the subject-matter; hence the permission of works can aim only at the glorification of knowledge. The sense of the text therefore is--owing to the power of knowledge a man although constantly performing works is not stained by

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44027 15. Some also, by proceeding according to their liking.

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44029 In some sâkhâs, moreover, we read that he who possesses the knowledge of
44030 Brahman may, according to his liking, give up the state of a householder,
44031 'What shall we do with offspring, we who have this Self and this world?'
44032 (Bri. Up. V, 4, 22.) This text also proves knowledge not to be
44033 subsidiary to works; for if it were so subsidiary, it would not be
44034 possible for him who knows Brahman to give up householdership (with all
44035 the works obligatory on that state) according to his liking.

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44040 16. And destruction.

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44042 There is moreover a Vedânta-text which declares the knowledge of Brahman
44043 to destroy work-good and evil--which is the root of all the afflictions
44044 of transmigratory existence: 'The knot of the heart is broken, all
44045 doubts are solved, all his works perish when He has been beheld who is
44046 high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). This also contradicts the view of
44047 knowledge being subordinate to works.

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44052 17. And of him who is chaste; for in Scripture (this is declared).

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44054 The knowledge of Brahman belongs to those who have to observe chastity,
44055 and men living in that state have not to perform the Agnihotra, the
44056 Darsapûrnamâsa, and similar works. For this reason also knowledge cannot
44057 be subsidiary to works.--But, it may be objected, there is no such
44058 condition of life; for texts such as 'he is to perform the Agnihotra as
44059 long as he lives,' declare men to be obliged to perform sacrifices and
44060 the like up to the end of their lives, and Smṛiti texts contradicting
44061 Scripture have no authority.--To meet this the Sûtra adds 'for in
44062 Scripture.' The three stages of life are recognised in Scripture only;
44063 cp. texts such as 'Those who in the forest practise penance and faith'
44064 (Ch. Up. V, 10, 1); 'Wishing for that world only mendicants wander forth
44065 from their homes' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22). The text as to the lifelong
44066 obligatoriness of the Agnihotra is valid for those only who do not
44067 retire from worldly life.

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44072 18. A reference (only) Jaimini (holds them to be), on account of absence
44073 of injunction; for (Scripture) forbids.

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44075 The argument for the three stages of life, founded on their mention in
44076 Vedic texts, has no force, since all those references are only of the
44077 nature of anuvâda. For none of those texts contain injunctive forms. The
44078 text 'There are three branches of sacred observance,' &c. (Ch. Up. II,
44079 23, 1), is meant to glorify the previous meditation on Brahman under the
44080 form of the pranava, as appears from the concluding clause 'he who is
44081 firmly grounded in Brahman obtains immortality'; it therefore cannot
44082 mean to enjoin the three conditions of life as valid states. In the same
44083 way the text 'And those who in the forest practise penance and faith'
44084 refers to the statements previously made as to the path of the gods, and
44085 cannot therefore be meant to make an original declaration as to another
44086 condition of life. Scripture moreover expressly forbids that other
44087 condition, 'a murderer of men is he who removes the fire,' &c. There are
44088 therefore no conditions of life in which men are bound to observe
44089 chastity. This is the opinion of the teacher Jaimini.

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19. It is to be accomplished, Bâdarayana holds, on account of scriptural statement of equality.

Bâdarâyana is of opinion that, in the same way as the condition of householdership, those other conditions of life also are obligatory; since in the section beginning 'there are three branches of sacred duty' all the three conditions of life are equally referred to, with a view to glorifying him who is firmly grounded in Brahman. The reference there made to the condition of the householder necessarily presupposes that condition to be already established and obligatory, and the same reasoning then holds good with regard to the other conditions mentioned. Nor must it be said that the special duties mentioned at the beginning of the section--sacrifice, study, charity, austerity, Brahmakarya--all of them belong to the state of the householder (in which case the text would contain no reference to the other conditions of life); for on that supposition the definite reference to a threefold division of duties, 'Sacrifice, &c. are the first, austerity the second, Brahmakarya the third,' would be unmeaning. The proper explanation is to take the words 'sacrifice, study, and charity' as descriptive of the condition of the householder; the word 'austerity' as descriptive of the duties of the Vaikhâṇasa and the wandering mendicant, who both practise mortification; and the word 'Brahmakarya' as referring to the duties of the Brahmakarin. The term 'Brahmasamstha' finally, in the concluding clause, refers to all the three conditions of life, as men belonging to all those conditions may be founded on Brahman. Those, the text means to say, who are destitute of this foundation on Brahman and only perform the special duties of their condition of life, obtain the worlds of the blessed; while he only who at the same time founds himself on Brahman attains to immortality.--In the text 'and those who in the forest,' &c. the mention made of the forest shows that the statement as to the path of the gods has for its presupposition the fact that that stage of life which is especially connected with the forest is one generally recognised.--So far it has been shown that the other stages of life are no less obligatory than that of the householder, whether we take the text under discussion as containing merely a reference to those stages (as established by independent means of proof) or as directly enjoining them. The next Sûtra is meant to show that the latter view is after all the right one.

20. Or an injunction, as in the case of the carrying.

As the second part of the text 'Let him approach carrying the firewood below the ladle; for above he carries it for the gods' (which refers to a certain form of the Agnihotra), although having the form of an anuvâda, yet must be interpreted as an injunction, since the carrying of firewood above is not established by any other injunction; so the text under discussion also must be taken as an injunction of the different stages of life (which are not formally enjoined elsewhere). No account being taken of the text of the Jâbâlas, 'Having completed his studentship he is to become a householder,' &c., it is thus a settled conclusion that the texts discussed, although primarily concerned with other topics, must at the same time be viewed as proving the validity of the several conditions of life. From this it follows that the text enjoining the performance of the Agnihotra up to the end of life, and similar texts, are not universally binding, but concern those only who do not retire from worldly life.--The final conclusion therefore is that as the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined on those who lead a life of austerity (which does not require the performance of sacrifices and the like), it is not subordinate to works, but is in itself beneficial to man.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'benefit to man.'

21. If it be said that they are mere glorification, on account of their reference; not so, on account of the newness.

The following point is next enquired into. Are texts such as 'That Udgîtha is the best of all essences, the highest, holding the supreme place, the eighth' (Ch. Up. I, 1, 3) meant to glorify the Udgîtha as a constituent element of the sacrifice, or to enjoin a meditation on the Udgîtha as the best of all essences, and so on? The Pûrvapakshin holds the former view, on the ground that the text declares the Udgîtha to be the best of all essences in so far as being a constituent element of the sacrifice. The case is analogous to that of texts such as 'the ladle is this earth, the âhavanîya is the heavenly world,' which are merely meant to glorify the ladle and the rest as constituent members of the sacrifice.--This view the latter part of the Sûtra sets aside 'on account of newness.' Texts, as the one referring to the Udgîtha, cannot be mere glorifications; for the fact of the Udgîtha being the best of essences is not established by any other means of proof, and the text under discussion cannot therefore be understood as a mere anuvâda, meant for glorification. Nor is there, in proximity, any injunction of the Udgîtha on account of connexion with which the clause declaring the Udgîtha to be the best of all essences could naturally be taken as an anuvâda (glorifying the thing previously enjoined in the injunctive text); while there is such an injunction in connexion with the (anuvâda) text 'The ladle is this earth,' and so on. We thus cannot but arrive at the conclusion that the text is meant to enjoin a meditation on the Udgîtha as being the best of all essences, and so on--the fruit of such meditation being an increase of vigour and efficacy on the part of the sacrifice.

22. And on account of the words denoting becoming.

That the texts under discussion have an injunctive purport also follows from the fact that they contain verbal forms denoting becoming or origination--'he is to meditate' and the like; for all such forms have injunctive force. All these texts therefore are meant to enjoin special forms of meditation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of mere glorification.'

23. Should it be said that (the stories told in the Upanishads) are for the purpose of the Pâriplava; not so, since (certain stories) are specified.

We meet in the Vedânta-texts with certain stories such as 'Pratardana the son of Divodâsa came to the beloved abode of Indra,' &c., and similar ones. The question here arises whether the stories are merely meant to be recited at the Asvamedha sacrifice or to convey knowledge of a special kind.--The Pûrvapakshin maintains that as the text 'they tell the stories' declares the special connexion of those stories with the so-called pâriplava performance, they cannot be assumed to be mainly concerned with knowledge.--This view the Sûtra negatives, on the ground that not all stories of that kind are specially connected with the pâriplava. The texts rather single out special stories only as suitable for that performance; on the general injunction quoted above there follows an injunction defining _which_ stories are to be told, 'King Manu, the son of Vivasvat,' &c. The stories told in the Vedânta-texts do not therefore form parts of the pâriplava performance, but are connected with injunctions of meditations.

24. This follows also from the textual connexion (of those stories with

44229 injunctions).

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44231 That those stories subserve injunctions of meditation is proved thereby
44232 also that they are exhibited in textual connexion with injunctions such
44233 as 'the Self is to be seen,' and so on. Their position therefore is
44234 analogous to that of other stories told in the texts, which somehow
44235 subserve injunctions of works, and are not merely meant for purposes of
44236 recitation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the pâriplava.'

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44241 25. For this very reason there is no need of the lighting of the fire
44242 and so on.

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44244 The Sûtras return, from their digression into the discussion of two
44245 special points, to the question as to those whose condition of life
44246 involves chastity. The above Sûtra declares that as persons of that
44247 class are referred to by Scripture as specially concerned with
44248 meditation ('He who is founded on Brahman reaches immortality;' 'those
44249 who in the forest,' &c.), their meditation does not presuppose a
44250 knowledge of the kindling of fire and so on, i.e. a knowledge of the
44251 Agnihotra, the Darsapûrnamâsa, and all those other sacrifices which
44252 require the preliminary establishment of the sacred fires, but a
44253 knowledge of those works only which are enjoined for their special
44254 condition of life.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the kindling of
44255 the fire.'

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44260 26. And there is need of all (works), on account of the scriptural
44261 statement of sacrifices and the rest; as in the case of the horse.

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44263 If knowledge (meditation), without any reference to sacrifices and the
44264 like, is able to bring about immortality, it must be capable of
44265 accomplishing this in the case of householders also; and the mention
44266 made of sacrifices and the rest in texts such as 'Brâhmanas seek to know
44267 him by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts' (Bri. Up. IV, 4,
44268 22), does not prove sacrifices and so on to be auxiliary to knowledge,
44269 since the stress there lies (not on the sacrifices and so on, but) on
44270 the desire of knowledge.--Of this view the Sûtra disposes. In the case
44271 of householders, for whom the Agnihotra and so on are obligatory,
44272 knowledge presupposes all those works, since scriptural texts such as
44273 the one quoted directly state that sacrifices and the like are auxiliary
44274 to knowledge. 'They seek to know by means of sacrifices' can be said
44275 only if sacrifices are understood to be a means through which knowledge
44276 is brought about; just as one can say 'he desires to slay with a sword,'
44277 because the sword is admitted to be an instrument wherewith one can kill.
44278 What we have to understand by knowledge in this connexion has been
44279 repeatedly explained, viz. a mental energy different in character from
44280 the mere cognition of the sense of texts, and more specifically denoted
44281 by such terms as dhyâna or upâsana, i.e. meditation; which is of the
44282 nature of remembrance (i.e. representative thought), but in intuitive
44283 clearness is not inferior to the clearest presentative thought
44284 (pratyaksha); which by constant daily practice becomes ever more perfect,
44285 and being duly continued up to death secures final Release. Such
44286 meditation is originated in the mind through the grace of the Supreme
44287 Person, who is pleased and conciliated by the different kinds of acts of
44288 sacrifice and worship duly performed by the Devotee day after day. This
44289 is what the text 'they seek to know through the sacrifice' really means.
44290 The conclusion therefore is that in the case of householders knowledge
44291 has for its pre-requisite all sacrifices and other works of permanent
44292 and occasional obligation. 'As a horse.' As the horse, which is a means
44293 of locomotion for man, requires attendants, grooming, &c., so knowledge,
44294 although itself the means of Release, demands the co-operation of the
44295 different works. Thus the Lord himself says, 'The work of sacrifice,
44296 giving, and austerities is not to be relinquished, but is indeed to be
44297 performed; for sacrifices, gifts, and austerities are purifying to the

thoughtful.' 'He from whom all beings proceed and by whom all this is pervaded--worshipping Him with the proper works man attains to perfection' (Bha. Gî. XVIII, 5; 46).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the need of all.'

27. But all the same he must be possessed of calmness, subjection of the senses, &c., since those are enjoined as auxiliaries to that, and must necessarily be accomplished.

The question is whether the householder also must practise calmness and so on, or not. The Pûrvapakshin says he must not, since the performance of works implies the activity of the outer and inner organs of action, and since calmness and so on are of an exactly opposite nature.--This view the Sûtra sets aside. The householder also, although engaged in outward activity, must, in so far as he possesses knowledge, practise calmness of mind and the rest also; for these qualities or states are by Scripture enjoined as auxiliaries to knowledge, 'Therefore he who knows this, having become calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and collected, should see the Self in Self (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23). As calmness of mind and the rest are seen, in so far as implying composure and concentration of mind, to promote the origination of knowledge, they also must necessarily be aimed at and practised. Nor can it be said that between works on the one side and calmness and so on on the other, there is an absolute antagonism; for the two have different spheres of application. Activity of the organs of action is the proper thing in the case of works enjoined; quiescence in the case of works not enjoined and such as have no definite purpose. Nor also can it be objected that in the case of works implying the activity of organs, calmness of mind and so on are impossible, the mind then being necessarily engrossed by the impressions of the present work and its surroundings; for works enjoined by Scripture have the power of pleasing the Supreme Person, and hence, through his grace, to cause the destruction of all mental impressions obstructive of calmness and concentration of mind. Hence calmness of mind and the rest are to be aimed at and practised by householders also.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'calmness' and so on.

28. And there is permission of all food in the case of danger of life; on account of this being seen.

In the meditation on prâna, according to the Vâjasaneyins and the Chândogas, there is a statement as to all food being allowed to him who knows the prâna. 'By him there is nothing eaten that is not food' (Bri. Up. VI, 1, 14; and so on). A doubt here arises whether this permission of all food is valid for him who possesses the knowledge of prâna, in all circumstances, or only in the case of life being in danger.--The Pûrvapakshin holds the former view, on account of no special conditions being stated in the text.--This the Sûtra sets aside 'in the case of danger to life'; for the reason that, as the text shows, the eating of food of all kinds is permitted even for those who know Brahman itself--the knowledge of which of course is higher than that of prâna--only when their life is in danger. The text alluded to is the one telling how Ushasta Kâkrâyana, who was well versed in the knowledge of Brahman, once, when in great distress, ate unlawful food. We therefore conclude that what the text says as to all food being lawful for him who knows prâna, can refer only to occasions when food of any kind must be eaten in order to preserve life.

29. And on account of non-sublation.

The conclusion above arrived at is confirmed by the consideration that

thus only those texts are not stultified which enjoin, for those who know Brahman, purity in matters of food with a view to the origination of knowledge of Brahman. Cp.' when the food is pure the mind becomes pure' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2).

30. This is said in Smriti also.

That for those as well who know Brahman, as for others, the eating of food of any kind is lawful only in case of extreme need, Smriti also declares, 'He who being in danger of his life eats food from anywhere is stained by sin no more than the lotus leaf by water.'

31. And hence also a scriptural passage as to non-proceeding according to liking.

The above conclusion is further confirmed by a scriptural passage prohibiting licence of conduct on the part of any one. The text meant is a passage in the Samhitâ of the Kathas, 'Therefore a Brahmawa does not drink spirituous liquor, thinking "may I not be stained by sin."--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the allowance of all food.'

32. The works of the âsramas also, on account of their being enjoined.

It has been said that sacrifices and other works are auxiliary to the knowledge of Brahman. The doubt now arises whether those works are to be performed by him also who merely wishes to fulfil the duties of his âsrama, without aiming at final Release, or not. They are not, the Pûrvapakshin holds, for that things auxiliary to knowledge should stand in subordinate relation to a certain state of life would imply the contradiction of permanent and non-permanent obligation.--Of this view the Sûtra disposes, 'The works of the âsramas also.' The works belonging to each âsrama have to be performed by those also who do not aim at more than to live according to the âsrama; for they are specifically enjoined by texts such as as long as life lasts he is to offer the Agnihotra'; this implies a permanent obligation dependent on life. And that the same works are also to be performed as being auxiliary to knowledge appears from the texts enjoining them in that aspect, 'Him they seek to know by the study of the Veda' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22); this the next Sûtra declares.

33. And on account of co-operativeness.

These works are to be performed also on account of their being co-operative towards knowledge in so far, namely, as they give rise to the desire of knowledge; and their thus being enjoined for a double purpose does not imply contradiction any more than the double injunctions of the Agnihotra, which one text connects with the life of the sacrificer and another text with his desire to reach the heavenly world.--Nor does this imply a difference of works--this the next Sûtra declares.

34. In any case they are the same, on account of twofold inferential signs.

There is no radical difference of works; but in any case, i.e. whether

they be viewed as duties incumbent on the âsrama or as auxiliary to knowledge, sacrifices and other works are one and the same. For Scripture, in enjoining them in both these aspects, makes use of the same terms, so that we recognise the same acts, and there is no means of proof to establish difference of works.

35. And Scripture also declares (knowledge) not to be overpowered.

Texts such as 'By works of sacred duty he drives away evil' declare that sacrifices and similar works have the effect of knowledge 'not being overpowered,' i.e. of the origination of knowledge not being obstructed by evil works. Sacrifices and similar works being performed day after day have the effect of purifying the mind, and owing to this, knowledge arises in the mind with ever increasing brightness. This proves that the works are the same in either case.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the being enjoined' (of sacrifices, and so on).

36. Also in the case of those outside, as this is seen.

It has been declared that the members of the four âsramas have a claim to the knowledge of Brahman, and that the duties connected with each âsrama promote knowledge. A doubt now arises whether those men also who, on account of poverty and so on, stand outside the âsramas are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman, or not.--They are not, the Pûrvapakshin holds, since such knowledge is to be attained in a way dependent on the special duties of each âsrama; while those who do not belong to an âsrama are not concerned with âsrama duties.--This view the Sûtra rejects. Those also who do not stand within any âsrama are qualified for knowledge, 'because that is seen,' i.e. because the texts declare that men such as Raikva, Bhîshma, Samvarta and others who did not belong to âsrama were well grounded in the knowledge of Brahman. It can by no means be maintained that it is âsrama duties only that promote knowledge; for the text 'by gifts, by penance, by fasting, and so on' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22) distinctly declares that charity also and other practices, which are not confined to the âsramas, are helpful towards knowledge. In the same way as in the case of those bound to chastity--who, as the texts show, may possess the knowledge of Brahman--knowledge is promoted by practices other than the Agnihotra and the like, so--it is concluded--in the case of those also who do not belong to any âsrama knowledge may be promoted by certain practices not exclusively connected with any âsrama, such as prayer, fasting, charity, propitiation of the divinity, and so on.

37. Smriti also states this.

Smriti also declares that men not belonging to an âsrama grow in knowledge through prayer and the like. 'Through prayer also a Brâhmana may become perfect. May he perform other works or not, one who befriends all creatures is called a Brâhmana' (Manu Smri. II, 17).

38. And there is the promotion (of knowledge) through special acts (of duty).

The above conclusion is founded not only on Reasoning and Smriti; but Scripture even directly states that knowledge is benefited by practices not exclusively prescribed for the âsramas, 'By penance, abstinence, faith, and knowledge he is to seek the Self (Pr. Up. I, 10).

39. But better than that is the other also on account of an inferential mark.

Better than to be outside the âsramas is the condition of standing within an âsrama. The latter state may be due to misfortune; but he who can should be within an âsrama, which state is the more holy and beneficial one. This follows from inference only, i.e. Smriti; for Smriti says, 'A Brâhmana is to remain outside the âsramas not even for one day.' For one who has passed beyond the stage of Brahmakarya, or whose wife has died, the impossibility to procure a wife constitutes the misfortune (which prevents him from belonging to an âsrama).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'widowers.'

40. But of him who has become that there is no becoming not that, according to Jaimini also, on account of (Scripture) restraining from the absence of the forms of that.

The doubt here arises whether those also who have fallen from the state of life of a Naishthika, Vaikhâṇasa or Pârivrâjaka are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman or not.--They are so, since in their case, no less than in that of widowers and the like, the growth of knowledge may be assisted by charity and other practices not confined to âsramas.--This primâ facie view the Sûtra sets aside. 'He who has become that,' i.e. he who has entered on the condition of a Naishthika or the like 'cannot become not that,' i.e. may not live in a non-âsrama condition; since scriptural texts restrain men who once have entered the Naishthika, &c., state 'from the absence of the forms of that,' i.e. from the discontinuance of the special duties of their âsrama. Compare texts such as 'He is to go into the forest, and is not to return from thence'; 'Having renounced the world he is not to return.' And hence persons who have lapsed from their âsrama are not qualified for meditation on Brahman. This view of his the Sûtrakâra strengthens by a reference to the opinion of Jaimini.--But cannot a Naishthika who, through some sin, has lapsed from his duties and position, make up for his transgression by some expiatory act and thus again become fit for meditation on Brahman?--To this point the next Sûtra refers.

41. Nor the (expiatory performance) described in the chapter treating of qualification; that being impossible on account of the Smriti referring to such lapse.

Those expiatory performances which are described in the chapter treating of qualification (Pû. Mî. Sû. VI) are not possible in the case of him who has lapsed from the condition of a Naishthika; since such expiations do not apply to him, as is shown by a Smriti text referring to such lapse, viz. 'He who having once entered on the duties of a Naishthika lapses from them, for such a slayer of the Self I do not see any expiatory work by which he might become clean.' The expiatory ceremony referred to in the Pûrva Mimâṃsâ therefore applies to the case of other Brahmakârins only.

42. A minor one, thus some; (and hence they hold) the existence (of expiation), as in the case of eating. This has been explained.

Some teachers are of opinion that even on the part of Naishthikas and the rest the lapse from chastity constitutes only a minor offence which

can be atoned for by expiatory observances; in the same way as in the case of the eating of forbidden food the same prâyaskitta may be used by the ordinary Brahmakârin and by Naishthikas and the rest. This has been stated by the Smriti writer, 'For the others also (i.e. the Naishthikas and so on) the same (rules and practices as those for the Upakurvâna) hold good, in so far as not opposed to their âsrama.'

43. But in either case (such men) stand outside; on account of Smriti and custom.

Whether the point under discussion constitutes a minor or a major offence, in any case those who have lapsed stand outside the category of those qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. For Smriti, i.e. the text quoted above, 'I see no expiatory performance by which he, a slayer of Brahman as he is, could become pure again,' declares that expiations are powerless to restore purity. And custom confirms the same conclusion; for good men shun those Naishthikas who have lapsed, even after they have performed prâyaskittas, and do not impart to them the knowledge of Brahman. The conclusion, therefore, is that such men are not qualified for knowing Brahman.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'him who has become that.'

44. By the Lord (of the sacrifice), since Scripture declares a fruit--thus Âtreya thinks.

A doubt arises whether the meditations on such constituent elements of the sacrifice as the Udgîtha, and so on, are to be performed by the sacrificer (for whose benefit the sacrifice is offered), or by the officiating priests. Âtreya advocates the former view; on the ground of Scripture showing that in the case of such meditations as the one on the small ether within the heart, fruit and meditation belong to the same person, and that in the case of such meditations as the one on the Udgîtha the fruit belongs to the sacrificer (whence we conclude that the meditation also is his). Nor can it be said that the sacrificer is not competent for such meditation, for the reason that like the godohana vessel it is connected with an element of the sacrifice (which latter the priests only can perform). For the godohana vessel serves to bring water, and this of course none else can do but the Adhvaryu; while a meditation on the Udgîtha as being the essence of all essences can very well be performed by the Sacrificer--true though it be that the Udgîtha itself can be performed by the Udgâtri priest only.--Against this view the next Sûtra declares itself.

45. (They are) the priest's work, Audulomi thinks; since for that he is engaged.

The teacher Audulomi is of opinion that the meditation on the Udgîtha and the like is the work of the priest, since it is he who is engaged for the purpose of performing that which gives rise to the fruit, i.e. of the entire sacrifice with all its subordinate parts. Injunctions referring to the performance of the sacrifices such as 'he chooses the priests; he gives to the priests their fee' indicate that the entire sacrificial performance is the work of the priests, and that hence all activities comprised within it--mental as well as bodily--belong to the priests. Capability or non-capability does not constitute the criterion in this case. For although the meditations in question aim directly at the benefit of man (not at the greater perfection of the sacrifice), yet since they fall within the sphere of qualification of those who are qualified for the sacrifice, and since the sacrifice with all its subordinate elements has to be performed by the priests, and since the

44643 text 'whatever he does with knowledge that becomes more vigorous'
44644 declares knowledge to belong to the same agent as the works which are
44645 benefited by such knowledge, we conclude that those meditations also are
44646 the exclusive duty of the priests. In the case of the meditations on the
44647 small ether, &c., on the other hand, the text says nothing as to their
44648 having to be performed by priests, and we therefore assume in accordance
44649 with the general principle that 'the fruit belongs to the performer,'
44650 that the agent there is the person to whom Scripture assigns the fruit.--
44651 Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the lord (of the sacrifice).'

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44656 46. There is injunction of other auxiliary means for him who is such, as
44657 in the case of injunction and so on; (the term mauna denoting)
44658 according to an alternative meaning a third something.

44659

44660 'Therefore let a Brâhmana after he has done with learning wish to stand
44661 by a childlike state; and after having done with the childlike state and
44662 learning (he is) a Muni' (Bri. Up. III, 5). A doubt arises whether this
44663 text enjoins Muni-hood in the same way as it enjoins learning and the
44664 childlike state, or merely refers to it as something already established.--
44665 The Purvapakshin holds the latter view on the ground that as 'Muni-hood'
44666 and 'learning' both connote knowledge, the word 'Muni' merely refers
44667 back to the knowledge already enjoined in the phrase 'after he has done
44668 with learning.' For the text presents no word of injunctive force with
44669 regard to Muni-hood.--This view the Sûtra controverts. 'For him who is
44670 such,' i.e. for those who possess knowledge, 'there is an injunction of
44671 a different co-operative factor' 'in the same way as injunctions and
44672 the rest.' By the injunctions in the last clause we have to understand
44673 the special duties of the different âsramas, i.e. sacrifices and the
44674 like, and also such qualifications as quietness of mind and the like;
44675 and by the 'and the rest' is meant the learning of and pondering on the
44676 sacred texts. Stated at length, the meaning of the Sûtra then is as
44677 follows--in the same way as texts such as 'him Brâhmanas seek to know
44678 through the reciting of the Veda, through sacrifices and charity, and so
44679 on,' and 'Quiet, subdued,' &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23) enjoin sacrifices
44680 and so on, and quietness of mind and the like, as helpful towards
44681 knowledge; and as texts such as 'the Self is to be heard, to be pondered
44682 upon' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5) mention hearing and pondering as helpful
44683 towards knowledge; thus the text under discussion enjoins learning, a
44684 childlike state of mind, and Muni-hood as three further different
44685 auxiliaries of knowledge.--'Muni-hood' does not denote the same thing
44686 as 'learning'--this the Sûtra intimates by the clause 'alternatively a
44687 third,' i.e. as the word muni is observed alternatively to denote
44688 persons such as Vyâsa distinguished by their power of profound
44689 reflection (manana), the abstract term munihood denotes a third thing
44690 different from learning and the 'childlike state.' Hence, although the
44691 phrase 'then a Muni' does not contain a word of directly injunctive
44692 power, we must all the same understand it in an injunctive sense, viz.
44693 'then let him be or become a Muni'; for Muni-hood is not something
44694 previously established. Such munihood is also something different from
44695 mere reflection (manana); it is the reiterated representation before
44696 the mind of the object of meditation, the idea of that object thus
44697 becoming more and more vivid. The meaning of the entire text therefore
44698 is as follows. A Brâhmana is at first fully to master knowledge, i.e. he
44699 is to attain, by means of hearing and pondering, to the knowledge of
44700 Brahman in all its fulness and perfection. This is to be effected
44701 through the growth of purity of mind and heart, due to the grace of the
44702 Lord; for this Smriti declares, 'Neither by the Vedas nor by austerities,
44703 and so on, can I be so seen--; but by devotion exclusive I may be known'
44704 (Bha. Gî. XI, 53-54); and Scripture also says, 'Who has the highest
44705 devotion for God' (Svet. Up. VI, 23), and 'That Self cannot be gained by
44706 the study of the Veda,' &c. 'He whom the Self chooses by him the Self is
44707 to be attained' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23). After that 'he is to stand by a
44708 childlike state'; what this means will be explained further on. And
44709 after that he is to be a Muni, i.e. he is to fix his thoughts so
44710 exclusively and persistently on Brahman as to attain to the mode of
44711 knowledge called meditation. Having by the employment of these three

means reached true knowledge he--the text goes on to say--having done with amauna and mauna is a Brâhmana. Amauna, i.e. non-mauna, denotes all the auxiliaries of knowledge different from mauna: employing these and mauna as well he reaches the highest goal of knowledge. And, the text further says, there is no other means but those stated whereby to become such, i.e. a true Brâhmana. The entire text thus evidently means to enjoin on any one standing within any âsrama learning, a childlike state, and mauna as auxiliary means of knowledge, in addition to sacrifices and the other special duties of the âsramas.--But, an objection is raised, if knowledge, aided by pânditya, and so on, and thus being auxiliary to the action of the special duties of the âsramas, is thus declared to be the means of attaining to Brahman; how then are we to understand the Chândogya's declaring that a man, in order to attain to Brahman, is throughout his life to carry on the duties of a householder [FOOTNOTE 711: 1]?--To this the next Sûtra replies.

[FOOTNOTE 711:1. Ch. Up. VIII, 13.]

47. But on account of the existence (of knowledge) in all, there is winding up with the householder.

As knowledge belongs to the members of all âsramas it belongs to the householder also, and for this reason the Upanishad winds up with the latter. This winding up therefore is meant to illustrate the duties (not of the householder only, but) of the members of all âsramas. Analogously in the text under discussion (Bri. Up. III, 5) the clause 'A Brâhmana having risen above the desire for sons, the desire for wealth, and the desire for worlds, wanders about as a mendicant,' intimates duties belonging exclusively to the condition of the wandering beggar, and then the subsequent clause 'therefore let a Brâhmana having done with learning,' &c., enjoins pânditya, bâlya, and mauna (not as incumbent on the pârivrâjaka only, but) as illustrating the duties of all âsramas.--This the next Sûtra explicitly declares.

48. On account of the others also being taught, in the same way as the condition of the Muni.

The injunction, on him who has passed beyond all desire, of mauna preceded by pârivrâjya (wandering about as a mendicant), is meant to illustrate the duties of all âsramas. For the duties of the other âsramas are taught by Scripture no less than those of the Muni (and the householder). Similarly it was shown above that in the text 'There are three branches of sacred duty--he who is founded on Brahman goes to immortality,' the term 'founded on Brahman' applies equally to members of all âsramas.--It therefore remains a settled conclusion that the text under discussion enjoins pânditya, bâlya, and mauna as being auxiliaries to knowledge in the same way as the other duties of the âsramas, such as sacrifices and the rest.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the injunction of other auxiliaries.'

49. Not manifesting itself; on account of the connexion.

In the text discussed above we meet with the word 'bâlya,' which may mean either 'being a child' or 'being and doing like a child.' The former meaning is excluded, as that particular age which is called childhood cannot be assumed at will. With regard to the latter meaning, however, a doubt arises, viz. whether the text means to say that he who aims at perfect knowledge is to assume all the ways of a child, as e.g. its wilful behaviour, or only its freedom from pride and the like.--The former, the Pûrvapakshin maintains. For the text gives no specification,

and texts enjoining restraints of different kinds (on the man desirous of knowledge) are sublated by this specific text which enjoins him to be in all points like a child.--This view the Sûtra disposes of. 'Not manifesting itself.' That aspect of a child's nature which consists in the child not manifesting its nature (viz. in pride, arrogance, and so on), the man aiming at true knowledge is to make his own. 'On account of connexion,' i.e. because thus only the 'balya' of the text gives a possible sense. The other characteristic features of 'childhood' the texts declare to be opposed to knowledge, 'He who has not turned away from wicked conduct, who is not tranquil and attentive, or whose mind is not at peace, he can never attain the Self by knowledge' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 24); 'When food is pure, the whole nature becomes pure' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2), and so on.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-manifestation.'

50. What belongs to this world, there being no obstruction at hand; as this is seen.

Knowledge, as enjoined by Scripture, is twofold, having for its fruit either exaltation within the sphere of the Samsâra, or final Release. With regard to the former the question arises whether it springs up only immediately subsequent to the good works which are the means to bring it about; or, indefinitely, either subsequent to such works or at some later time.--The Pûrvapakshin holds the former view. A man reaches knowledge through his good deeds only, as the Lord himself declares, 'Four kinds of men doing good works worship me,' &c. (Bha. Gî. VII, 16); and when those works have been accomplished there is no reason why the result, i.e. knowledge, should be delayed.--This view the Sûtra disposes of. 'What is comprised in this world,' i.e. meditation, the result of which is worldly exaltation, springs up immediately after the works to which it is due, in case of there being no other works of greater strength obstructing the rise of knowledge; but if there is an obstruction of the latter kind, knowledge springs up later on only. 'For this is seen,' i.e. Scripture acknowledges the effects of such obstruction; for a statement such as 'what he does with knowledge, with faith, with the Upanishad that is more vigorous,' means that works joined with the knowledge of the Udgîtha, and so on, produce their results without obstruction (which implies that the action of other works is liable to be obstructed).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'what belongs to this world.'

51. In the same way there is non-determination with regard to what has Release for its result; that condition being ascertained, that condition being ascertained.

So likewise in the case of the origination, through works of very great merit, of such knowledge as has for its result final Release, the time is not definitely fixed; for here also there is ascertained the same condition, viz. the termination of the obstruction presented by other works. A further doubt might in this case be raised on the ground that such works as give rise to knowledge leading to final Release are stronger than all other works, and therefore not liable to obstruction. But this doubt is disposed of by the reflection that even in the case of a man knowing Brahman there may exist previous evil deeds of overpowering strength.--The repetition of the last words of the Sûtra indicates the completion of the adhyâya.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'what has Release for its result.'

FOURTH ADHYÂYA

FIRST PÂDA.

1. Repetition, on account of the text teaching (what has to be done more than once).

The third adhyâya was concerned with the consideration of meditation, together with its means. The Sûtras now enter on a consideration of the results of meditation, after a further preliminary clearing up of the nature of meditation. The question here arises whether the act of knowledge of Brahman inculcated in Vedânta-texts, such as 'He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest,' 'Having known him thus he passes beyond death,' 'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman,' is, in the view of Scripture, to be performed once only, or to be repeated more than once.--Once suffices, the Pûrvapakshin maintains; for as the text enjoins nothing more than knowing there is no authority for a repetition of the act. Nor can it be said that the act of knowing, analogous to the act of beating the rice-grains until they are freed from the husks, is a visible means towards effecting the intuition of Brahman, and hence must, like the beating, be repeated until the effect is accomplished; for knowing is not a visible means towards anything. Such acts as the Jyotishtoma sacrifice and the knowledge inculcated in the Vedânta-texts are alike of the nature of conciliation of the Supreme Person; through whom thus conciliated man obtains all that is beneficial to him, viz. religious duty, wealth, pleasure, and final Release. This has been shown under III, 2, 38. The meaning of Scripture therefore is accomplished by performing the act of knowledge once only, as the Jyotishtoma is performed once.--This view the Sûtra sets aside. The meaning of Scripture is fulfilled only by repeated acts of knowledge 'on account of teaching,' i.e. because the teaching of Scripture is conveyed by means of the term 'knowing' (vedana), which is synonymous with meditating (dhyâna, upâsana). That these terms are so synonymous appears from the fact that the verbs vid, upâs, dhyâi are in one and the same text used with reference to one and the same object of knowledge. A text begins, e. g. 'Let him meditate (upâsita) on mind as Brahman,' and concludes 'he who knows (veda) this shines, warms,' &c. (Ch. Up. III, 18). In the same way the knowledge of Raikva is at first referred to by means of vid, 'He who knows (veda) what he knows is thus spoken of by me,' and further on by means of upâs, 'teach me the deity on which you meditate' (Ch. Up. IV, 1, 2). Similarly texts which have the same meaning as the text 'He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest'--viz. 'the Self should be seen, be heard, be reflected on, be meditated upon (nididhyâsitavya)'--'Then he sees him meditating (dhyâyamâna) on him as without parts' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 8), and others--use the verb dhyâi to express the meaning of vid. Now dhyâi means to think of something not in the way of mere representation (smriti), but in the way of continued representation. And upâs has the same meaning; for we see it used in the sense of thinking with uninterrupted concentration of the mind on one object. We therefore conclude that as the verb 'vid' is used interchangeably with dhyâi and upâs, the mental activity referred to in texts such as 'he knows Brahman' and the like is an often-repeated continuous representation.

2. And on account of an inferential mark.

Inferential mark here means Smriti. Smriti also declares that that knowledge which effects Release is of the nature of continued representation. Meditation therefore has to be repeated.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'repetition.'

3. But as the Self; this (the ancient Devotees) acknowledge (since the texts) make (them) apprehend (in that way).

The following point is now taken into consideration. Is Brahman to be meditated upon as something different from the meditating Devotee, or as the Self of the latter?--The Pûrvapakshin holds the former view. For, he

says, the individual soul is something different from Brahman; as has been proved under II, 1, 22; III, 4, 8; I, 1, 15. And Brahman must be meditated upon as it truly is; for if it is meditated upon under an unreal aspect, the attaining to Brahman also will not be real, according to the principle expressed in the text, 'According as a man's thought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1). This view the Sûtra sets aside. Brahman is rather to be meditated upon as being the Self of the meditating Devotee. As the meditating individual soul is the Self of its own body, so the highest Brahman is the Self of the individual soul--this is the proper form of meditation.--Why? Because the great Devotees of olden times acknowledged this to be the true nature of meditation; compare the text 'Then I am indeed thou, holy divinity, and thou art me.'--But how can the Devotees claim that Brahman which is a different being is their 'Ego'?--Because the texts enable them to apprehend this relation as one free from contradiction. 'He who dwelling within the Self is different from the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who rules the Self from within; he is thy Self, the inner ruler, the immortal one' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 3); 'In the True all these beings have their root, they dwell in the True, they rest in the True;--in that all that exists has its Self' (Kh. Up. VI, 8); 'All this indeed is Brahman' (Kh. Up. III, 14, 1)--all these texts teach that all sentient and non-sentient beings spring from Brahman, are merged in him, breathe through him, are ruled by him, constitute his body; so that he is the Self of all of them. In the same way therefore as, on the basis of the fact that the individual soul occupies with regard to the body the position of a Self, we form such judgments of co-ordination as 'I am a god--I am a man'; the fact of the individual Self being of the nature of Self justifies us in viewing our own Ego as belonging to the highest Self. On the presupposition of all ideas being finally based on Brahman and hence all words also finally denoting Brahman, the texts therefore make such statements of mutual implication as 'I am thou, O holy divinity, and thou art me.' On this view of the relation of individual soul and highest Self there is no real contradiction between two, apparently contradictory, sets of texts, viz. those on the one hand which negative the view of the soul being different from the highest Self, 'Now if a man meditates upon another divinity, thinking "the divinity is one and I another," he does not know'; 'He is incomplete, let him meditate upon Him as the Self'; 'Everything abandons him who views anything apart from the Self' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10; 7-II, 4, 6); and on the other hand those texts which set forth the view of the soul and the highest Self being different entities, 'Thinking of the (individual) Self and the Mover as different' (Svet. Up. I, 6). For our view implies a denial of difference in so far as the individual 'I' is of the nature of the Self; and it implies an acknowledgment of difference in so far as it allows the highest Self to differ from the individual soul in the same way as the latter differs from its body. The clause 'he is incomplete' (in one of the texts quoted above) refers to the fact that Brahman which is different from the soul constitutes the Self of the soul, while the soul constitutes the body of Brahman.--It thus remains a settled conclusion that Brahman is to be meditated upon as constituting the Self of the meditating Devotee.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'meditation under the aspect of Self.'

4. Not in the symbol; for (the symbol) is not that one (i.e. the Self of the Devotee).

'Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 1); 'He who meditates on name as Brahman' (Ch. Up. VII, 15)--with regard to these and similar meditations on outward symbols (pratîka) of Brahman there arises a doubt, viz. whether in them the symbols are to be thought of as of the nature of Self or not. The Pûrvapakshin holds the former view. For, he says, in form those injunctions do not differ from other injunctions of meditation on Brahman, and Brahman, as we have seen, constitutes the Self of the meditating Devotee.--This view the Sûtra sets aside. A pratîka cannot be meditated on as being of the nature of

Self; for the pratîka is not the Self of the meditating Devotee. What, in those meditations, is to be meditated upon is the pratîka only, not Brahman: the latter enters into the meditation only as qualifying its aspect. For by a meditation on a pratîka we understand a meditation in which something that is not Brahman is viewed under the aspect of Brahman, and as the pratîka--the object of meditation--is not the Self of the Devotee it cannot be viewed under that form.--But an objection is raised here also, it is Brahman which is the real object of meditation; for where Brahman may be viewed as the object of meditation, it is inappropriate to assume as objects non-sentient things of small power such as the mind, and so on. The object of meditation therefore is Brahman viewed under the aspect of mind, and so on.--This objection the next Sûtra disposes of.

5. The view of Brahman, on account of superiority.

The view of Brahman may appropriately be superimposed on mind and the like; but not the view of mind, and so on, on Brahman. For Brahman is something superior to mind, and so on; while the latter are inferior to Brahman. To view a superior person, a prince e.g., as a servant would be lowering; while, on the other hand, to view a servant as a prince is exalting.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'symbols.'

6. And the ideas of Âditya and the rest on the member; on account of this being rational.

'He who shines up there let a man meditate on him as the Udgîtha' (Ch. Up. I, 3, 1).--With regard to this and similar meditations connected with subordinate parts of sacrificial performances there arises the doubt whether the idea of Âditya and so on has to be superimposed on the subordinate part of the sacrifice, such as the Udgîtha, or vice versâ (i. e. whether Âditya should be meditated upon under the aspect of the Udgîtha, or vice versâ).--The Pûrvapakshin holds the former view. For the general principle is that the lower being should be viewed under the aspect of the higher, and the Udgîtha and so on, which are parts of the sacrifices through which certain results are effected, are superior to the divinities who do not accomplish any result.--Of this view the Sûtra disposes. The ideas of Âditya and so on are to be superimposed on the 'members,' i.e. the Udgîtha and so on, which are constituent members of the sacrifices; because of the gods only superiority can be established. For it is only through the propitiation of the gods that sacrifices are capable of bringing about their results. The Udgîtha and the rest therefore are to be viewed under the aspect of Âditya and so on.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the ideas of Âditya and so on.'

7. Sitting; on account of possibility.

It has been shown that that special form of cognitional activity which the Vedânta-texts set forth as the means of accomplishing final Release and which is called meditation (dhyâna; upâsana) has to be frequently repeated, and is of the nature of continued representation. A question now arises as to the way in which it has to be carried on.--There being no special restrictive rule, the Pûrvapakshin holds that the Devotee may carry it on either sitting or lying down or standing or walking.--This view the Sûtra sets aside. Meditation is to be carried on by the Devotee in a sitting posture, since in that posture only the needful concentration of mind can be reached. Standing and walking demand effort, and lying down is conducive to sleep. The proper posture is sitting on some support, so that no effort may be required for holding the body up.

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8. And on account of meditation.

Since, as intimated by the text, 'the Self is to be meditated upon,' the mental activity in question is of the nature of meditation, it requires as its necessary condition concentration of mind. For by meditation is understood thought directed upon one object and not disturbed by the ideas of other things.

9. And with reference to immobility.

And it is with reference to their immobility that the earth and other inanimate things--the air, the sky, the waters, the mountains--may be spoken of as thinking, 'the earth thinks (dhyâyati) as it were,' and so on. Movelessness hence is characteristic of the intensely meditating person also, and such movelessness is to be realised in the sitting posture only.

10. And Smriti texts say the same.

Smriti texts also declare that he only who sits can meditate, 'Having placed his steady seat upon a pure spot, there seated upon that seat, concentrating his mind he should practise Yoga' (Bha. Gî. VI, 11-12).

11. Where concentration of mind (is possible), there; on account of there being no difference.

As the texts do not say anything as to special places and times, the only requisite of such places and times is that they should favour concentration of mind. This agrees with the declaration 'Let a man apply himself to meditation in a level and clean place, &c., favourable to the mind' (Svet. Up. II, 10).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the sitting one.'

12. Up to death; for there also it is seen.

The question now arises whether the meditation described which is the means of final Release is to be accomplished within one day, or to be continued day after day, until death.--The view that it is accomplished within one day, as this will satisfy the scriptural injunction, is disposed of by the Sûtra. Meditation is to be continued until death. For Scripture declares that meditation has to take place 'there,' i.e. in the whole period from the first effort after meditation up to death, 'Acting thus as long as life lasts he reaches the world of Brahman.'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'up to death.'

13. On the attainment of this, there result the non-clinging and the destruction of later and earlier sins; this being declared.

Having, so far, elucidated the nature of meditation, the Sûtras now begin to consider the result of meditation. Scripture declares that on the knowledge of Brahman being attained a man's later and earlier sins

do not cling to him but pass away. 'As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to him who knows this' (Ch. Up. IV, 14, 3); 'Having known that he is not sullied by any evil deed' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23); 'As the fibres of the Ishîkâ reed when thrown into the fire are burnt, thus all his sins are burnt' (Ch. Up. V, 24, 3); 'All his works perish when He has been beheld who is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8).--The doubt here arises whether this non-clinging and destruction of all sins is possible as the result of mere meditation, or not.--It is not possible, the Pûrvapakshin maintains; for Scripture declares, 'no work the fruits of which have not been completely enjoyed perishes even in millions of aeons.' What the texts, quoted above, say as to the non-clinging and destruction of works occurs in sections complementary to passages inculcating knowledge as the means of final Release, and may therefore be understood as somehow meant to eulogize knowledge. Nor can it be said that knowledge is enjoined as an expiation of sins, so that the destruction of sins could be conceived as resulting from such expiation; for knowledge--as we see from texts such as 'He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest,' 'He knows Brahman and he becomes Brahman'--is enjoined as a means to reach Brahman. The texts as to the non-clinging and destruction of sins therefore can only be viewed as arthavâda passages supplementary to the texts enjoining knowledge of Brahman.--This view the Sûtra sets aside. When a man reaches knowledge, the non-clinging and destruction of all sins may be effected through the power of knowledge. For Scripture declares the power of knowledge to be such that 'to him who knows this, no evil deed clings,' and so on. Nor is this in conflict with the text stating that no work not fully enjoyed perishes; for this latter text aims at confirming the power of works to produce their results; while the texts under discussion have for their aim to declare that knowledge when once sprung up possesses the power of destroying the capability of previously committed sins to produce their own evil results and the power of obstructing that capability on the part of future evil actions. The two sets of texts thus refer to different matters, and hence are not mutually contradictory. There is in fact no more contradiction between them than there is between the power of fire to produce heat and the power of water to subdue such heat. By knowledge effecting the non-clinging of sin we have to understand its obstructing the origination of the power, on the part of sin, to cause that disastrous disposition on the part of man which consists in unfitness for religious works; for sins committed tend to render man unfit for religious works and inclined to commit further sinful actions of the same kind. By knowledge effecting the destruction of sin, on the other hand, we understand its destroying that power of sin after it has once originated. That power consists, fundamentally, in displeasure on the part of the Lord. Knowledge of the Lord, which, owing to the supreme dearness of its object is itself supremely dear, possesses the characteristic power of propitiating the Lord--the object of knowledge--and thus destroys the displeasure of the Lord due to the previous commission of sins on the part of the knowing Devotee; and at the same time obstructs the origination of further displeasure on the Lord's part, which otherwise would be caused by sins committed subsequently to the origination of such knowledge. What Scripture says about sin not clinging to him who knows can however be understood only with regard to such sins as spring from thoughtlessness; for texts such as 'he who has not turned away from evil conduct' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 24) teach that meditation, becoming more perfect day after day, cannot be accomplished without the Devotee having previously broken himself off from all evil conduct.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the reaching of that.'

14. Of the other also there is thus non-clinging; but at death.

It has been said that, owing to knowledge, earlier and subsequent sins do not cling and are destroyed. The same holds good also with regard to the other, i.e. to good works--they also, owing to knowledge, do not cling and are destroyed; for there is the same antagonism between knowledge and the fruit of those works, and Scripture moreover expressly declares this. Thus we read, 'Day and night do not pass that bank--

neither good nor evil deeds. All sins turn back from it' (Ch. Up. VIII, 4, 1); 'He shakes off his good and evil deeds' (Kau. Up. I, 4). In the former of these texts good works are expressly designated as 'sin' because their fruits also are something not desirable for him who aims at Release; there is some reason for doing this because after all good works are enjoined by Scripture and their fruits are desired by men, and they hence might be thought not to be opposed to knowledge.--But even to him who possesses the knowledge of Brahman, the fruits of good deeds--such as seasonable rain, good crops, &c.--are desirable because they enable him to perform his meditations in due form; how then can it be said that knowledge is antagonistic to them and destroys them?--Of this point the Sûtra disposes by means of the clause 'but on death.' Good works which produce results favourable to knowledge and meditation perish only on the death of the body (not during the lifetime of the Devotee).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the other.'

15. But only those former works the effects of which have not yet begun; on account of that being the term.

A new doubt arises here, viz. whether all previous good and evil works are destroyed by the origination of knowledge, or only those the effects of which have not yet begun to operate.--All works alike, the Pûrvapakshin says; for the texts-as e.g. 'all sins are burned'--declare the fruits of knowledge to be the same in all cases; and the fact of the body continuing to exist subsequently to the rise of knowledge may be accounted for by the force of an impulse once imparted, just as in the case of the revolution of a potter's wheel.--This view the Sûtra sets aside. Only those previous works perish the effects of which have not yet begun to operate; for the text 'For him there is delay as long as he is not delivered from the body' (Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2) expressly states when the delay of the body's death will come to an end (the body meanwhile continuing to exist through the influence of the anârabdhakârya works). There is no proof for the existence of an impetus accounting for the continuance of the body's life, other than the Lord's pleasure or displeasure caused by--good or evil deeds.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the works the operation of which has not yet begun.'

16. But the Agnihotra and the rest, (because they tend) to that effect only; this being seen.

It might here be said that special works incumbent on the several âsramas, as e. g. the Agnihotra, need not be undertaken by those who are not desirous of their results, since these works also fall under the category of good works the result of which does not 'cling.'--This view the Sûtra sets aside. Such works as the Agnihotra must be performed, since there is no possibility of their results not clinging; for him who knows, those works have knowledge for their exclusive effect. This we learn from Scripture itself: 'Him Brâhmanas seek to know by the study of the Veda, by sacrifices, gifts, austerities, and fasting.' This passage shows that works such as the Agnihotra give rise to knowledge, and as knowledge in order to grow and become more perfect has to be practised day after day until death, the special duties of the âsrama also, which assist the rise of knowledge, have daily to be performed. Otherwise, those duties being omitted, the mind would lose its clearness and knowledge would not arise.--But if good works such as the Agnihotra only serve the purpose of giving rise to knowledge, and if good works previous to the rise of knowledge perish, according to the texts 'Having dwelt there till their works are consumed' (Ch. Up. V, 10, 5) and 'having obtained the end of his deeds' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6), to what then applies the text 'His sons enter upon his inheritance, his friends upon his good works'?--This point is taken up by the next Sûtra.

17. According to some (a class of good works) other than these, of both kinds.

The text quoted above from one sâkhâ ('His friends enter upon his good deeds') refers to good works other than the Agnihotra and the rest, the only object of which is to give rise to knowledge, viz. to all those manifold good works, previous or subsequent to the attaining to knowledge, the results of which are obstructed by other works of greater strength. Those texts also which declare works not to cling or to be destroyed through knowledge refer to this same class of works.--The next Sûtra recalls the fact, already previously established, that the results of works actually performed may somehow be obstructed.

18. For (there is the text) 'whatever he does with knowledge.'

The declaration made in the text 'whatever he does with knowledge that is more vigorous,' viz. that the knowledge of the Udgîtha has for its result non-obstruction of the result of the sacrifice, implies that the result of works actually performed may be obstructed. We thus arrive at the conclusion that the text of the Sâtyâyanins, 'his friends enter upon his good works,' refers to those good works of the man possessing knowledge the results of which were somehow obstructed (and hence did not act themselves out during his lifetime, so that on his death they may be transferred to others).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the Agnihotra and the rest.'

19. But having destroyed by fruition the other two sets he becomes one with Brahman.

There now arises the doubt whether the good and evil works other than those the non-clinging and destruction of which have been declared, that is to say those works the results of which have begun to act, come to an end together with that bodily existence in which knowledge of Brahman originates, or with the last body due to the action of the works last mentioned, or with another body due to the action of the anârabdhakârya.--The second of these alternatives is the one to be accepted, for there is a text declaring that works come to an end with the deliverance of the Self from the current bodily existence: 'For him there is delay so long as he is not delivered (from the body), then he will become one with Brahman' (Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2).--This view the Sûtra sets aside. Having destroyed the other good and evil works the results of which had begun to operate by retributive experience he, subsequently to the termination of such retributive enjoyment, becomes one with Brahman. If those good and evil works are such that their fruits may be fully enjoyed within the term of one bodily existence, they come to an end together with the current bodily existence; if they require several bodily existences for the full experience of their results, they come to an end after several existences only. This being so, the deliverance spoken of in the text quoted by the Pûrvapakshin means deliverance from those works when completely destroyed by retributive enjoyment, not deliverance from bodily existence about which the text says nothing. All those works, on the other hand, good and evil, which were performed before the rise of knowledge and the results of which have not yet begun to operate--works which have gradually accumulated in the course of infinite time so as to constitute an infinite quantity--are at once destroyed by the might of the rising knowledge of Brahman. And works performed subsequently to the rise of such knowledge do not 'cling.' And, as Scripture teaches, the friends of the man possessing true knowledge take over, on his death, his good works, and his enemies his evil deeds. Thus there remains no contradiction.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the destruction of the others.'

SECOND PĀDA.

1. Speech with mind, on account of this being seen and of scriptural statement.

The Sūtras now begin an enquiry into the mode of the going to Brahman of him who knows. At first the soul's departure from the body is considered. On this point we have the text, 'When a man departs from hence his speech is combined (sāmpadyate) with his mind, his mind with his breath, his breath with fire, fire with the highest deity' (Ch. Up. VI, 6, 1). The doubt here arises whether the speech's being combined with the mind, referred to in the text, means that the function of speech only is merged in mind, or the organ of speech itself.--The Pūrvapakshin holds the former view; for, he says, as mind is not the causal substance of speech, the latter cannot be merged in it; while the scriptural statement is not altogether irrational in so far as the functions of speech and other organs are controlled by the mind, and therefore may be conceived as being withdrawn into it.--This view the Sūtra sets aside. Speech itself becomes combined with mind; since that is seen. For the activity of mind is observed to go on even when the organ of speech has ceased to act.--But is this not sufficiently accounted for by the assumption of the mere function of speech being merged in mind?--To this the Sūtra replies 'and on account of the scriptural word.' The text says distinctly that speech itself, not merely the function of speech, becomes one with the mind. And when the function of speech comes to an end, there is no other means of knowledge to assure us that the function only has come to an end and that the organ itself continues to have an independent existence. The objection that speech cannot become one with mind because the latter is not the causal substance of speech, we meet by pointing out that the purport of the text is not that speech is merged in mind, but only that it is combined or connected with it.

2. And for the same reason all follow after.

Because speech's becoming one with mind means only conjunction with the latter, not merging within it; there is also no objection to what Scripture says as to all other organs that follow speech being united with mind.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'speech.'

3. That mind in breath, owing to the subsequent clause.

That mind, i.e. mind united with all the organs unites itself with breath; not merely the function of mind. This appears from the clause following upon the text quoted above, 'mind (unites itself) with breath.' Here, however, a further doubt suggests itself. The text 'Mind is made of earth' declares earth to be the causal substance of mind, and the text 'that (viz. water) sent forth earth' declares water to be the causal substance of earth; while the further text 'breath is made of water' shows water to be the causal substance of breath. Considering therefore that in the text 'mind becomes united with breath' the term _breath_ is naturally understood to denote the causal substance of breath, i.e. water, the appropriate sense to be given to the statement that mind is united with water is that mind is completely refunded into its own causal substance--so that the 'being united' would throughout be understood 'as being completely merged.'--The reply to this, however, is, that the clauses 'Mind is made of food, breath is made of water,' only mean that mind and breath are nourished and sustained by food and water, not that food and water are the causal substances of mind and breath. The latter indeed is impossible; for mind consists of ahamkāra,

45402 and as breath is a modification of ether and other elements, the word
45403 _breath_ may suggest water.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'mind.'

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45408 4. That (is united) with the ruler, on account of the going to it, and
45409 so on.

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45411 As from the statements that speech becomes united with mind and mind
45412 with breath it follows that speech and mind are united with mind and
45413 breath only; so we conclude from the subsequent clause 'breath with
45414 fire' that breath becomes united with fire only.--Against this primâ
45415 facie view the Sûtra declares 'that breath becomes united with the ruler
45416 of the organs, i.e. the individual soul, on account of the going to it,
45417 and so on.' That breath goes to the individual soul, the following text
45418 declares, 'At the time of death all the prânas go to the Self of a man
45419 about to expire' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 38), Similarly Scripture mentions the
45420 departure of prâna together with the soul, 'after him thus departing the
45421 prava departs'; and again its staying together with the soul, 'What is
45422 that by whose departure I shall depart, and by whose staying I shall
45423 stay?' (Pr. Up. VI, 3). We therefore conclude that the text 'breath with
45424 fire' means that breath joined with the individual soul becomes united
45425 with fire. Analogously we may say in ordinary life that the Yamuna is
45426 flowing towards the sea, while in reality it is the Yamuna joined with
45427 the Gangâ which flows on.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the ruler.'

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45432 5. With the elements, this being stated by Scripture.

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45434 There arises the further question whether breath joined with the soul
45435 unites itself with fire only or with all the elements combined.--With
45436 fire, so much only being declared by Scripture!--This view the Sûtra
45437 sets aside. Breath and soul unite themselves with all the elements; for
45438 Scripture declares the soul, when moving out, to consist of all the
45439 elements--'Consisting of earth, consisting of water, consisting of fire.
45440 '--But this latter text explains itself also on the assumption of breath
45441 and soul uniting themselves in succession with fire and the rest, one at
45442 a time!--This the next Sûtra negatives.

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45446
45447 6. Not with one; for both declare this.

45448
45449 Not with one; because each element by itself is incapable of producing
45450 an effect. Such incapability is declared by Scripture and tradition
45451 alike. The text 'Having entered these beings with this jîva soul let me
45452 reveal names and forms--let me make each of these three tripartite' (Ch.
45453 Up. VI, 3) teaches that the elements were rendered tripartite in order
45454 to be capable of evolving names and forms; and of similar import is the
45455 following Smriti text, 'Possessing various powers these (elements),
45456 being separate from one another, were unable to produce creatures
45457 without combining. But having entered into mutual conjunction they, from
45458 the Mahat down to individual beings, produce the Brahma egg.' From this
45459 it follows that in the clause 'breath is united with fire' the word _fire_
45460 denotes fire mixed with the other elements. Breath and soul therefore
45461 are united with the aggregate of the elements.--Here terminates the
45462 adhikarana of 'the elements.'

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45467 7. And it is common up to the beginning of the way; and the immortality
45468 (is that which is obtained), without having burned.

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45470 Is this departure of the soul common to him who knows and him who does

not know?--It belongs to him only who does not know, the Pûrvapakshin holds. For Scripture declares that for him who knows there is no departure, and that hence he becomes immortal then and there (irrespective of any departure of the soul to another place), 'when all desires which once dwelt in his heart are undone, then the mortal becomes immortal, then he obtains Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 7). This view the Sûtra sets aside. For him also who knows there is the same way of passing out up to the beginning of the path, i.e. previously to the soul's entering the veins. For another text expressly declares that the soul of him also who knows passes out by way of a particular vein: 'there are a hundred and one veins of the heart; one of them penetrates the crown of the head; moving upwards by that a man reaches immortality, the others serve for departing in different directions' (Ch. Up. VIII, 6, 5). Scripture thus declaring that the soul of him who knows passes out by way of a particular vein, it must of course be admitted that it does pass out; and as up to the soul's entering the vein no difference is mentioned, we must assume that up to that moment the departure of him who knows does not differ from that of him who does not know. A difference however is stated with regard to the stage of the soul's entering the vein, viz. Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2, 'By that light the Self departs, either through the eye, or through the skull, or through other parts of the body.' As this text must be interpreted in agreement with the text relative to the hundred and one veins, the departure by way of the head must be understood to belong to him who knows, while the other modes of departing belong to other persons. The last clause of the Sûtra 'and the immortality, without having burned' replies to what the Pûrvapakshin said as to the soul of him who knows being declared by Scripture to attain to immortality then and there. The immortality referred to in the text 'when all desires of his heart are undone' denotes that non-clinging and destruction of earlier and later sins which comes to him who knows, together with the rise of knowledge, without the connexion of the soul with the body, and the sense-organs being burned, i.e. dissolved at the time.--'He reaches Brahman' in the same text means that in the act of devout meditation the devotee has an intuitive knowledge of Brahman.

8. Since, up to the union with that (i.e. Brahman) the texts describe the Samsâra state.

The immortality referred to must necessarily be understood as not implying dissolution of the soul's connexion with the body, since up to the soul's attaining to Brahman the texts describe the Samsâra state. That attaining to Brahman takes place, as will be shown further on, after the soul--moving on the path the first stage of which is light--has reached a certain place. Up to that the texts denote the Samsâra state of which the connexion with a body is characteristic. 'For him there is delay so long as he is not delivered (from the body); then he will be united' (Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2); 'Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hairs, and as the moon frees herself from the mouth of Râhu; having shaken off the body I obtain self, made and satisfied, the uncreated world of Brahman' (VIII, 13).

9. And the subtle (body persists), on account of a means of knowledge, it being thus observed (in Scripture).

The bondage of him who knows is not, at that stage, dissolved, for this reason also that the subtle body continues to persist.--How is this known?--Through a means of knowledge, viz. because it is thus seen in Scripture. For Scripture states that he who knows, when on the path of the gods, enters into a colloquy with the moon and others, 'he is to reply,' &c. (Kau. Up. I, 3 ff.). This implies the existence of a body, and thence it follows that, at that stage, the subtle body persists. The state of bondage therefore is not yet dissolved.

10. Hence not in the way of destruction of bondage.

It thus appears that the text 'when all desires which once entered his heart are undone, then does the mortal become immortal, then he obtains Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 7), does not mean such immortality as would imply complete destruction of the state of bondage.

11. And to that very (subtle body) (there belongs) the warmth, this only being reasonable.

It is observed that when a man is about to die there is some warmth left in some part or parts of the gross body. Now this warmth cannot really belong to the gross body, for it is not observed in other parts of that body (while yet there is no reason why it should be limited to some part); but it may reasonably be attributed to the subtle body which may abide in some part of the gross body (and into which the warmth of the entire gross body has withdrawn itself). We therefore conclude that this partial perception of warmth is due to the departing subtle body. This confirms the view laid down in Sûtra 7.--The next Sûtra disposes of a further doubt raised as to the departure of the soul of him who knows.

12. If it be said that on account of the denial (it is not so); we deny this. From the embodied soul; for (that one is) clear, according to some.

The contention that the soul of him who knows departs from the body in the same way as other souls do cannot be upheld, since Scripture expressly negatives such departure. For Bri. Up. IV, 4, at first describes the mode of departure on the part of him who does not possess true knowledge ('He taking to himself those elements of light descends into the heart' up to 'after him thus departing the Prâna departs'); then refers to his assuming another body ('he makes to himself another, newer and more beautiful shape'); then concludes the account of him who does not possess true knowledge ('having attained the end of these works whatever he does here, he again returns from that world to this world of action. So much for the man who desires'); and thereupon proceeds explicitly to deny the departure from the body of him who possesses true knowledge, 'But he who does not desire, who is without desire, free from desire, who has obtained his desire, who desires the Self only, of him (tasya) the prânas do not pass forth,--being Brahman only he goes into Brahman.' Similarly a previous section also, viz. the one containing the questions put by Ârtabhâga, directly negatives the view of the soul of him who knows passing out of the body. There the clause 'he again conquers death' introduces him who knows as the subject-matter, and after that the text continues: 'Yâjñavalkya, he said, when that person dies, do the prânas pass out of him (asmât) or not?--No, said Yâjñavalkya, they are gathered up in him (atraiva), he swells, inflated the dead lies' (Bri. Up. III, 2, 10-11). From these texts it follows that he who knows attains to immortality here (without his soul passing out of the body and moving to another place).--This view the Sûtra rejects. 'Not so; from the embodied soul.' What those texts deny is the moving away of the prânas from the embodied individual soul, not from the body. 'Of him (tasya) the prânas do not pass forth'--here the 'of him' refers to the subject under discussion, i.e. the embodied soul which is introduced by the clause 'he who does not desire,' not to the body which the text had not previously mentioned. The sixth case (tasya) here denotes the embodied soul as that which is connected with the prânas ('the prânas belonging to that, i.e. the soul, do not pass out'), not as that from which the passing out takes its start.--But why should the 'tasya' not denote the body as the point of starting ('the prânas

do not pass forth from that (tasya), viz. the body')?--Because, we reply, the soul which is actually mentioned in its relation of connexion with the prânas (as indicated by tasya) suggests itself to the mind more immediately than the body which is not mentioned at all; if therefore the question arises as to the starting-point of the passing forth of the prânas the soul is (on the basis of the text) apprehended as that starting-point also (i.e. the clause 'the prânas of him do not pass forth' implies at the same time 'the prânas do not pass forth from him, i.e. from the soul'). Moreover, as the prânas are well known to be connected with the soul and as hence it would serve no purpose to state that connexion, we conclude that the sixth case which expresses connexion in general is here meant to denote the starting-point in particular. And no dispute on this point is really possible; since 'according to some' it is 'clear' that what the text means to express is the embodied soul as the starting-point of the prânas. The some are the Mâdhyandinas, who in their text of the Brihad-âraṇyaka read 'na tasmât prâna utkrâṁanti'--'the prânas do not pass forth from him' (the 'tasya' thus being the reading of the Kânva Sâkhâ only).--But, an objection is raised, there is no motive for explicitly negating the passing away of the prânas from the soul; for there is no reason to assume that there should be such a passing away (and the general rule is that a denial is made of that only for which there is a presumption).--Not so, we reply. The Chândogya-text 'For him there is delay only as long as he is not delivered (from the body); then he will be united' declares that the soul becomes united with Brahman at the time of its separation from the body, and this suggests the idea of the soul of him who knows separating itself at that very time (i.e. the time of death) from the prânas also. But this would mean that the soul cannot reach union with Brahman by means of proceeding on the path of the gods, and for this reason the Brihad-âraṇyaka ('of him the prânas do not pass forth') explicitly declares that the prânas do not depart from the soul of him who knows, before that soul proceeding on the path of the gods attains to union with Brahman.

The same line of refutation would have to be applied to the arguments founded by our opponent on the question of Ârtabhâga, if that question be viewed as referring to him who possesses true knowledge. The fact however is that that passage refers to him who does not possess that knowledge; for none of the questions and answers of which the section consists favours the presumption of the knowledge of Brahman being under discussion. The matters touched upon in those questions and answers are the nature of the senses and sense objects viewed as graha and atigraha; water being the food of fire; the non-separation of the prânas from the soul at the time of death; the continuance of the fame--there called name--of the dead man; and the attainment, on the part of the soul of the departed, to conditions of existence corresponding to his good or evil deeds. The passage immediately preceding the one referring to the non-departure of the prânas merely means that death is conquered in so far as it is a fire and fire is the food of water; this has nothing to do with the owner of true knowledge. The statement that the prânas of the ordinary man who does not possess true knowledge do not depart means that at the time of death the prânas do not, like the gross body, abandon the jîva, but cling to it like the subtle body and accompany it.

13. Smṛiti also declares this.

Smṛiti also declares that the soul of him who knows departs by means of an artery of the head. 'Of those, one is situated above which pierces the disc of the sun and passes beyond the world of Brahman; by way of that the soul reaches the highest goal' (Yâjñ. Smṛi. III, 167).--Here terminates the adhikârana of 'up to the beginning of the road.'

14. With the Highest; for thus it says.

45678
45679 It has been shown that at the time of departure from the body the soul
45680 together with the organs and prānas unites itself with the subtle
45681 elements, fire and the rest; and the notion that the soul of him who
45682 knows forms an exception has been disposed of. The further question now
45683 arises whether those subtle elements move on towards producing their
45684 appropriate effects, in accordance with the works or the nature of
45685 meditation (of some other soul with which those elements join
45686 themselves), or unite themselves with the highest Self.--The
45687 Pûrvapakshin holds that, as in the case of union with the highest Self,
45688 they could not give rise to their peculiar effects, i.e. the experience
45689 of pleasure and pain, they move towards some place where they can give
45690 rise to their appropriate effects.--Of this view the Sûtra disposes.
45691 They unite themselves with the highest Self; for Scripture declares
45692 'warmth in the highest Being' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 6). And the doings of
45693 those elements must be viewed in such a way as to agree with Scripture.
45694 As in the states of deep sleep and a pralaya, there is, owing to union
45695 with the highest Self, a cessation of all experience of pain and
45696 pleasure; so it is in the case under question also.--Here terminates the
45697 adhikarana of 'union with the Highest.'

45698
45699
45700
45701
45702 15. Non-division, according to statement.

45703
45704 Is this union with the highest Self to be understood as ordinary
45705 'merging,' i.e. a return on the part of the effected thing into the
45706 condition of the cause (as when the jar is reduced to the condition of a
45707 lump of clay), or as absolute non-division from the highest Self, such
45708 as is meant in the clauses preceding the text last quoted, 'Speech is
45709 merged in mind'? &c.--The former view is to be adopted; for as the
45710 highest Self is the causal substance of all, union with it means the
45711 return on the part of individual beings into the condition of that
45712 causal substance.--This view the Sûtra rejects. Union here means non-
45713 division, i.e. connexion of such kind that those subtle elements are
45714 altogether incapable of being thought and spoken of as separate from
45715 Brahman. This the text itself declares, since the clause 'warmth in the
45716 highest Being' is connected with and governed by the preceding clause
45717 'Speech is merged in mind.' This preceding clause intimates a special
45718 kind of connexion, viz. absolute non-separation, and there is nothing to
45719 prove that the dependent clause means to express something different;
45720 nor is there any reason why at the time of the soul's departure those
45721 elements should enter into the causal condition; nor is there anything
45722 said about their again proceeding from the causal substance in a new
45723 creation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-separation.'

45724
45725
45726
45727
45728 16. A lighting up of the point of the abode of that; having the door
45729 illuminated by that (the soul), owing to the power of its knowledge and
45730 the application of remembrance of the way which is an element of that
45731 (viz. of knowledge), being assisted by him who abides within the heart,
45732 (passes out) by way of the hundred and first artery.

45733
45734 So far it has been shown that, up to the beginning of the journey, the
45735 souls of them as well who possess true knowledge as of those who do not,
45736 pass out of the body in the same way. Now a difference is stated in the
45737 case of those who have true knowledge. We have on this point the
45738 following text: 'There are a hundred and one arteries of the heart; one
45739 of them penetrates the crown of the head; moving upwards by that a man
45740 reaches immortality; the others serve for departing in different
45741 directions' (Ch. Up. VIII, 6, 5). The doubt here arises whether he who
45742 knows departs by this hundred and first artery in the top of the head,
45743 while those who do not know depart by way of the other arteries; or
45744 whether there is no definite rule on this point.--There is no definite
45745 rule, the Pûrvapakshin holds. For as the arteries are many and
45746 exceedingly minute, they are difficult to distinguish, and the soul

therefore is not able to follow any particular one. The text therefore (is not meant to make an original authoritative statement as to different arteries being followed by different souls, but) merely refers in an informal way to what is already settled (viz. by the reason of the thing), i.e. the casual departure of any soul by any artery.--This view the Sûtra rejects 'By way of the hundred and first.' The soul of him who possesses true knowledge departs only by way of the hundred and first artery in the crown of the head. Nor is that soul unable to distinguish that particular artery. For, through the power of his supremely clear knowledge which has the effect of pleasing the Supreme Person, and through the application of remembrance of the way--which remembrance is a part of that knowledge--the soul of him who knows wins the favour of the Supreme Person who abides within the heart, and is assisted by him. Owing to this the abode of that, i.e. the heart which is the abode of the soul, is illuminated, lit up at its tip, and thus, through the grace of the Supreme Soul, the individual soul has the door (of egress from the body) lit up and is able to recognise that artery. There is thus no objection to the view that the soul of him who knows passes out by way of that particular artery only.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the abode of that.'

17. Following the rays.

Scripture teaches that the soul of him who knows, after having passed forth from the heart by way of the hundred and first artery, follows the rays of the sun and thus reaches the disc of the sun: 'when he departs from this body he goes upwards by these rays only' (eva) (Ch. Up. VIII, 6, 5). The idea here suggests itself that the going of the soul cannot be exclusively bound' to those rays, since when a man dies during the night it _cannot_ follow the rays of the sun. Hence the text quoted above can refer only to a part of the actual cases.--This view the Sûtra rejects. The soul moves upwards, following the rays only; the text expressly asserting this by means of the 'eva'--which would be out of place were there any alternative. Nor is there any strength in the argument that the soul of him who dies at night cannot follow the rays as there are none. For in summer the experience of heat at night-time shows that there are present rays then also; while in winter, as generally in bad weather, that heat is overpowered by cold and hence is not perceived (although actually present). Scripture moreover states that the arteries and rays are at all times mutually connected: 'As a very long highway goes to two villages, so the rays of the sun go to both worlds, to this one and to the other. They stretch themselves forth from the sun and enter into these arteries'; they stretch themselves forth from these arteries and enter into yonder sun' (Ch. Up. VIII, 6, 2).--As thus there are rays at night also, the souls of those who know reach Brahman by way of the rays only.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the following up the rays.'

18. Should it be said, not in the night; we say, no; because the connexion persists as long as the body does. Scripture also declares this.

It is now enquired into whether the soul of him who, while having true knowledge, dies at night reaches Brahman or not. Although, as solar rays exist at night, the soul may move on at night also following those rays; yet, since dying at night is spoken of in the Sûtras as highly objectionable, we conclude that he who dies at night cannot accomplish the highest end of man, viz. attainment to Brahman. The Sûtras eulogize death occurring in daytime and object to death at night-time: 'Day-time, the bright half of the month and the northern progress of the sun are excellent for those about to die; the contrary times are unfavourable.' According to this, their different nature, dying in day-time may be assumed to lead to a superior state of existence, and dying at night to

an inferior state. He who dies at night cannot therefore ascend to Brahman.--This view the Sûtra refutes: 'Because, in the case of him who knows, the connexion with works exists as long as the body does.' This is to say--since those works which have not yet begun to produce their results and which are the cause of future inferior states of existence are destroyed by the contact with knowledge, while at the same time later works do not 'cling' (also owing to the presence of true knowledge), and those works which have begun to act come to an end with the existence of the last body; there is no reason why he who knows should remain in bondage, and hence he reaches Brahman even if dying at night-time. Scripture also declares this, 'for him there is delay only as long as he is not freed from the body, then he will be united.' The text which praises the advantages of night-time, the light half of the month, &c., therefore must be understood as referring to those who do not possess true knowledge.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'night.'

19. For the same reason also during the southern progress of the sun.

The reasoning stated above also proves that the owner of true knowledge who may happen to die during the southern progress of the sun reaches Brahman. A further doubt, however, arises here. The text 'He who dies during the sun's southern progress reaches the greatness of the Fathers and union with the moon' (Mahânâr. Up. 25) declares that he who dies during the southern progress reaches the moon; and the other text 'when this ceases they return again the same way' (Bri. Up. VI, 2, 16) states that he returns again to the earth. We further know that Bhîshma and others, although fully possessing the knowledge of Brahman, put off their death until the beginning of the northern progress. All this seems to prove that he who dies during the southern progress does not reach Brahman.--This doubt we dispose of as follows. Those only who do not possess true knowledge return from the moon; while he who has such knowledge does not return even after he has gone to the moon. For a complementary clause in the Mahânârâyana Up., 'from there he reaches the greatness of Brahman,' shows that the abode in the moon forms for him, who having died during the southern progress wishes to reach Brahman, a mere stage of rest. And even if there were no such complementary passage, it would follow from the previously stated absence of any reason for bondage that the going of the wise man's soul to the moon in no way precludes his reaching Brahman. Bhîshma and others who through the power of Yoga were able to choose the time of their death put it off until the beginning of the northern progress in order to proclaim before the world the excellence of that season and thus to promote pious faith and practice.--But we also meet with an authoritative statement made with reference to wise men about to die, as to difference of time of death being the cause of a man either returning or not returning to this world, 'I will declare at which time the Yogins departing return not, and also the time at which they return. The sire, the light, the day, the bright fortnight, the six months of the sun's northern progress--the knowers of Brahman departing there go to Brahman. The smoke, the night, the dark fortnight, the six months of the southern progress--the Yogin departing there having reached the light of the moon returns again. These are held to be the perpetual paths of the world--the white and the black; by the one man goes not to return, by the other he returns again' (Bha. Gî. VIII, 23-26).--To this point the next Sûtra refers.

20. And those two (paths) are, with a view to the Yogins, mentioned as to be remembered.

The text quoted does not state an injunction for those about to die, of a special time of death; but there are rather mentioned in it those two matters belonging to Smriti and therefore to be remembered, viz. the two paths--the path of the Gods and the path of the Fathers--with a view to those who know and practise Yoga; the text intimating that Yogins should

daily think of those paths which are included in Yoga meditation. In agreement herewith the text concludes, 'Knowing these two paths no Yogin is ever deluded. Hence in all times, O Arjuna, be engaged in Yoga' (Bha. Gî. VIII, 27). Through the terms 'the fire, the light,' 'the smoke, the night,' &c. the path of the Gods and the path of the Fathers are recognised. Where, in the beginning, the text refers to 'the time when,' the word 'time' must be understood to denote the divine beings ruling time, since Fire and the rest cannot be time. What the Bha. Gî. aims at therefore is to enjoin on men possessing true knowledge the remembrance of that path of the Gods originally enjoined in the text, 'they go to light' (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 10); not to determine the proper time of dying for those about to die.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the southern progress.'

THIRD PÂDA.

1. On the path beginning with light, that being known.

The Sûtras now go on to determine the road which the soul of the wise man follows, after having--assisted by the Person within the heart--passed out of the body by way of one particular artery. Now of that road various accounts are given in Scripture. There is a detailed account in the Chândogya. (IV, 15), 'now whether people perform obsequies for him or not,' &c. Another account is given in the eighth book of the same Upanishad, 'then he moves upwards by those very rays' (VIII, 6, 5).

The Kaushîtakins again give a different account: 'He having reached the path of the Gods comes to the world of Agni,' &c. (Kau. Up. I, 3). Different again in the Brihad-âraṇyaka: 'Those who thus know this and those who in the forest meditate on faith and the True,' &c. (Bri. Up. VI, 2, 15). The same Upanishad, in another place (V, 10), gives a different account: 'When the person goes away from this world he comes to the wind,' &c.--A doubt here arises whether all these texts mean to give instruction as to one and the same road--the first stage of which is light--having to be followed by the soul of the wise man; or whether they describe different roads on any of which the soul may proceed.--The Pûrvapakshin holds the latter view; for he says the roads described differ in nature and are independent one of the other.--This view the Sûtra disposes of. All texts mean one and the same road only, viz. the one beginning with light, and the souls proceed on that road only. For that road is known, i.e. is recognised in all the various descriptions, although it is, in different texts, described with more or less fulness. We therefore have to proceed here as in the case of the details (guna) which are mentioned in different meditations referring to one and the same object, i.e. we have to combine the details mentioned in different places into one whole. The two Chândogya-texts--the one in the Upakosalavidyâ and the one in the Vidyâ of the five fires--describe exactly the same road. And in the Vidyâ of the five fires as given in the Brihad-âraṇyaka the same road, beginning with light, is also described, although there are differences in minor points; we therefore recognise the road described in the Chândogya. And in the other texts also we everywhere recognise the divinities of certain stages of the road, Agni, Âditya, and so on.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'that which begins with light.'

2. From the year to Vâyu; on account of non-specification and specification.

In their description of the path beginning with light the Chandogas mention the year between the months and the sun, 'from the months to the year, from the year to the sun' (Ch. Up. V, 10, 1); while the Vâjasaneyins mention, in that very place, the world of the Gods, 'from the months to the world of the Gods, from the world of the Gods to the

sun' (Bri. Up. VI, 2. 15). Now, as the two paths are identical, we have to supplement each by the additional item given in the other (and the question then arises whether the order of the stages be 1. months, 2. year, 3. world of the Gods, 4. sun; or 1. months, 2. world of the Gods, 3. year, 4. sun). The year and the world of the Gods are equally entitled--to the place after the months in so far as textual declaration goes; for both texts say 'from the months.' But we observe that the advance is throughout from the shorter periods of time to the longer ones ('from the day to the bright fortnight, from the bright fortnight to the six months of the northern progress'), and as therefore the year naturally presents itself to the mind immediately after the six months, we decide that the order is--months, year, world of the Gods, sun.--In another place (Bri. Up. V, 10) the Vâjasaneyins mention the wind as the stage preceding the sun ('the wind makes room for him--he mounts upwards; he comes to the sun'). The Kaushîtakins, on the other hand, place the world of the wind subsequent to light, referred to by them as the world of Agni ('Having entered on the path of the Gods he comes to the world of Agni, to the world of the wind,' &c., Kau. Up. I, 3). Now in this latter text the fact of the world of the wind following upon light is to be inferred only from the succession of the clauses ('to the world of Agni'--'to the world of the wind'), while the 'upwards' in the text of the Vâjasaneyins is a direct statement of succession given by the text itself; and as this latter order of succession has greater force than the former, we have to place, in the series of stages, the world of Vâyu directly before the world of the sun. But above we have determined that the same place (after the year and before the sun) has to be assigned to the world of the Gods also; and hence a doubt arises whether the world of the Gods and Vâyu are two different things--the soul of the wise man passing by them in optional succession--or one and the same thing--the soul coming, after the year, to Vâyu who is the world of the Gods.--They are different things, the Pûrvapakshin says; for they are generally known to be so. And there are definite indications in the text that the world of the Gods as well as Vâyu is to be placed immediately before the sun--this being indicated for Vâyu by the 'upwards' referred to above, and for the world of the Gods by the ablative case (devalokât) in the Chând. text, 'from the world of the Gods he goes to the sun'--and as thus there is no difference between the two, we conclude that the soul passes by them in either order it may choose.--This view the Sûtra negatives: 'From the year to Vâyu.' The soul, having departed from the year, comes to Vâyu. This is proved 'by non-specification and specification.' For the term 'the world of the Gods' is a term of general meaning, and hence can denote Vâyu in so far as being the world of the Gods; while on the other hand the term Vâyu specifically denotes that divine being only. The Kaushîtakins speak of 'the world of Vâyu'; but this only means 'Vâyu who at the same time is a world.' That Vâyu may be viewed as the world of the Gods is confirmed by another scriptural passage, viz. 'he who blows (Vâyu) is the houses of the Gods.' '--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'Vâyu.'

3. Beyond lightning there is Varuna, on account of connexion.

According to the text of the Kaushîtakins the soul goes on to the world of Vâyu, to the world of Varuna, to the world of Indra, to the world of Prajâpati, to the world of Brahman. The doubt here arises whether Varuna and the divinities of the following stages are to be inserted in the series after Vâyu, in agreement with the order of enumeration in the text of the Kaushîtakins; or at the end of the whole series as stated in the Chândogya. Up. (IV, 15, 5), Varuna thus coming after lightning.--The decision is in favour of the latter view because Varuna, the god of waters, is naturally connected with lightning which dwells within the clouds.--This terminates the adhikarana of 'Varuna.'

4. Conductors, this being indicated.

The decision here is that light, Vâyu, and the rest mentioned in the texts as connected with the soul's progress on the path of the Gods are to be interpreted not as mere marks indicating the road, nor as places of enjoyment for the soul, but as divinities appointed by the Supreme Person to conduct the soul along the stages of the road; for this is indicated by what the Chandogya. says with regard to the last stage, viz. lightning, 'There is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman.' What here is said as to that person not human, viz. that he leads the soul, is to be extended to the other beings also, light and the rest.--But if that not human person leads the souls from lightning to Brahman, what then about Varuna, Indra, and Prajâpati, who, as was decided above, are in charge of stages beyond lightning? Do they also lead the soul along their stages?

5. From thence by him only who belongs to lightning, the text stating that.

The only leader from lightning up to Brahman is the not-human person connected with lightning; for the text states this directly. Varuna, Indra, and Prajâpati take part in the work in so far only as they may assist the person connected with lightning.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the conductors.'

6. (Him who meditates on) the effected Brahman, (thus opines) Bâdari; because for him going is possible.

The following question now presents itself for consideration. Does the troop of conducting divinities, Agni and the rest, lead on those who meditate on the effected Brahman, i.e. Hiranyagarbha; or those only who meditate on the highest Brahman; or those who meditate on the highest Brahman and those who meditate on the individual Self as having Brahman for its Self?--The teacher Bâdari is of opinion that the divinities lead on those only who meditate on the effected Brahman. For he only who meditates on Hiranyagarbha can move; while a person meditating on the highest Brahman which is absolutely complete, all-knowing, present everywhere, the Self of all, cannot possibly be conceived as moving to some other place in order to reach Brahman; for him Brahman rather is something already reached. For him the effect of true knowledge is only to put an end to that Nescience which has for its object Brahman, which, in reality, is eternally reached. He, on the other hand, who meditates on Hiranyagarbha may be conceived as moving in order to reach his object, which is something abiding within a special limited place. It is he therefore who is conducted on by Agni and the other escorting deities.

7. And on account of (Brahman) being specified.

The text 'a person not human leads them to the worlds of Brahman' (Bri. Up. VI. 2, 15) by using the word 'world,' and moreover in the plural, determines the specification that the not-human person leads those only who meditate on Hiranyagarbha, who dwells within some particular world. Moreover, the text 'I enter the hall of Prajâpati, the house' (Ch. Up. VIII, 14) shows that he who goes on the path beginning with light aims at approaching Hiranyagarbha. But if this is so, there is a want of appropriate denotation in the clause, 'There is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman'; if Hiranyagarbha is meant, the text should say 'He leads them to Brahmâ (Brahmânam).'

8. But on account of nearness there is that designation.

Hiranyagarbha is the first created being (as declared by the text 'he who creates Brahma'); he thus stands near to Brahman, and therefore may be designated by the same term (viz. Brahman). This explanation is necessitated by the reasons set forth in the preceding Sûtras (which show that the real highest Brahman cannot be meant).--But, if the soul advancing on the path of the Gods reaches Hiranyagarbha only, texts such as 'This is the path of the Gods, the path of Brahman; those who proceed on that path do not return to the life of man' (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 6), and 'moving upwards by that a man reaches immortality' (VIII, 6, 6), are wrong in asserting that that soul attains to immortality and does not return; for the holy books teach that Hiranyagarbha, as a created being, passes away at the end of a dviparârdha-period; and the text 'Up to the world of Brahman the worlds return again' (Bha. Gî. VIII, 16) shows that those who have gone to Hiranyagarbha necessarily return also.

9. On the passing away of the effected (world of Brahma), together with its ruler, (the souls go) to what is higher than that; on account of scriptural declaration.

On the passing away of the effected world of Brahma, together with its ruler Hiranyagarbha, who then recognises his qualification for higher knowledge, the soul also which had gone to Hiranyagarbha attains to true knowledge and thus reaches Brahman, which is higher than that, i.e. higher than the effected world of Brahmâ. This is known from the texts declaring that he who proceeds on the path of light reaches immortality and does not return; and is further confirmed by the text, 'They all, reaching the highest immortality, become free in the world of Brahman (Brahmâ) at the time of the great end' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 6).

10. And on account of Smriti.

This follows from Smriti also, which declares 'when the pralaya has come and the end of the Highest, they all together with Brahman enter the highest place.'--For all these reasons Bâdari holds that the troop of the conducting deities, beginning with Light, leads the souls of those only who meditate on the effected Brahman, i e. Hiranyagarbha.

11. The Highest, Jaimini thinks; on account of primariness of meaning.

The teacher Jaimini is of opinion that those deities lead on the souls of those only who meditate on the highest Brahman. For in the text 'a person not human leads them to Brahman' the word Brahman is naturally taken in its primary sense (i.e. the highest Brahman); the secondary sense (i.e. the effected Brahman) can be admitted only if there are other valid reasons to refer the passage to the effected Brahman. And the alleged impossibility of the soul's going is no such valid reason; for although Brahman no doubt is present everywhere, Scripture declares that the soul of the wise frees itself from Nescience only on having gone to some particular place. That the origination of true knowledge depends on certain conditions of caste, âsrama, religious duty, purity of conduct, time, place, and so on, follows from certain scriptural texts, as e.g. 'Brâhmanas desire to know him through the study of the Veda' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22); in the same way it follows from the text declaring the soul's going to Brahman that the final realisation of that highest knowledge which implies the cessation of all Nescience depends on the soul's going to some particular place. The arguments founded on texts alleged to declare that the soul of the wise does not pass out of

the body at all we have refuted above. The argument that the specification implied in the text which mentions Brahman-worlds clearly points to the effected Brahman, i.e. Hiranyagarbha, is equally invalid. For the compound 'the Brahman-world' is to be explained as 'the world which is Brahman'; just as according to the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ the compound 'Nishâda-sthapati' denotes a sthapati who is a Nishâda (not a sthapati of the Nishâdas). A thing even which is known as one only may be designated by a plural form, as in a mantra one girdle is spoken of as 'the fetters of Aditi.' And as to the case under discussion, we know on the authority of Scripture, Smriti, Itihâsa, and Purâna, that the wonderful worlds springing from the mere will of a perfect and omnipresent being cannot be but infinite.

12. And because Scripture declares it.

And Scripture moreover directly declares that the soul which has departed by way of the artery in the upper part of the head and passed along the path of the Gods reaches the highest Brahman: 'This serene being having risen from the body, having reached the highest light manifests itself in its own shape' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3).--Against the contention that the text 'I enter the hall of Prajâpati, the house' shows that he who proceeds on the path beginning with light aims at the effected Brahman, the next Sûtra argues.

13. And there is no aiming at the effected (Brahman).

The aim of the soul is not at Hiranyagarbha, but at the highest Brahman itself. For the complementary sentence 'I am the glorious among Brâhmanas' shows that what the soul aims at is the condition of the universal Self, which has for its antecedent the putting off of all Nescience. For this appears from the preceding text, 'As a horse shakes his hairs and as the moon frees herself from the mouth of Râhu; having shaken off the body may I obtain--the uncreated Brahman-world' declares that the Brahman-world, which is the thing to be reached, is something non-created, and explicitly states that reaching that world implies freedom from all bondage whatsoever.--It is for these reasons that Jaimini holds that the deities speeding the soul on its way lead on him only who has the highest Brahman for the object of his meditation.

Now the Reverend Bâdarâyana declares his own view, which constitutes the final conclusion in this matter.

14. Those not depending on symbols he leads, thus Bâdarâyana thinks; there being a defect in both cases; and he whose thought is that.

Bâdarâyana is of opinion that the deities lead those not depending on symbols, i.e. all meditating devotees other than those depending on symbols. That is to say, the view that those are led who meditate on the effected Brahman cannot be upheld; nor is there an exclusive rule that those only should be led on who meditate on the highest Brahman. The truth is that those are led who meditate on the highest Brahman, and also those who meditate on the Self (soul) as different from matter (Prakriti) and having Brahman for its true Self. Souls of both these kinds are led on to Brahman. Those on the other hand whose object of meditation is such things as name and so on, which fall within what is a mere effect of Brahman--such things being viewed either under the aspect of Brahman, just as some valiant man may be viewed under the aspect of a lion (which view expresses itself in the judgment 'Devadatta is a lion'); or by themselves (without reference to Brahman)--all those are not led on to Brahman. Why so? Because there is a defect in both cases,' i.

e. in both the views rejected by Bâdarâyana. The view that those are led who meditate on the effected Brahman is in conflict with texts such as 'having risen from this body and reached the highest light' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3)--for the nature of the fruit depends on the nature of the meditation; and the view that those only are led to the highest Brahman who meditate on the highest Brahman, would stultify texts such as the one which expressly declares Agni and the rest of the deities to lead on those who possess the knowledge of the five fires ('Those who know this, viz. the Vidyâ of the five fires, and those who in the forest meditate on faith and austerity go to light--there is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman,' Ch. Up. V, 10). Both these views thus being defective, we adhere to the conclusion that the deities lead on to Brahman the two classes of souls mentioned above.--This the Sûtra further declares in the words 'he whose thought is that' (tatkratuh), the sense of which is that he whose thought is that reaches that, i.e. that the nature of what is reached depends on the nature of the meditation. This argument is founded on the text, 'According to what his thought is (yathâ-kratuh) in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14), which implies the principle that what a soul after death attains is according to its thought and meditation in this life; and moreover we have direct scriptural statements to the effect that those who possess the knowledge of the five fires proceed on the path of the Gods, and that those who proceed on that path reach Brahman and do not return. Analogous reasoning proves that meditation on the soul as free from matter and having Brahman for its true Self also leads to the highest Brahman. In the case of those, on the other hand, who rely on the symbols (in which they meditatively contemplate Brahman), beginning with name and terminating with prâna. ('He who meditates on name as Brahman,' Ch. Up. VII, 1 ff.), the meditation is not proved by texts of the two kinds previously mentioned to lead to Brahman; it rather is contaminated by an element not of the nature of intelligence, and hence--according to the principle that the result of a meditation is the same in nature as the meditation itself--the soul of the inferior devotee practising such meditation does not proceed by the path of light and does not reach Brahman.--That this distinction is declared by Scripture itself, the next Sûtra shows.

15. And Scripture declares the difference.

The text, 'He who meditates on name as Brahman, for him there is movement as he wishes as far as name extends,' &c. (Ch. Up. VII, 1 ff.), declares that those who meditate on the series of symbols beginning with name and ending with prâna attain to a result of limited nature and not depending on any particular path. Those therefore who meditate on the Intelligent either as mixed with the Non-intelligent or by itself, viewing it either under the aspect of Brahman or as separated from Brahman, are not led on by the conducting deities. On the other hand, it remains a settled conclusion that the deities speed on their way those who meditate on the highest Brahman and on the soul as separated from Prakriti and having Brahman for its true Self.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the effected.'

FOURTH PÂDA.

1. (On the soul's) having approached (the highest light) there is manifestation; (as we infer) from the word 'own.'

The Sûtras now proceed to consider the kind of superior existence (aisvaryâ) which the released souls enjoy.--The text says, 'Thus does that serene being, having risen from the body and having approached the highest light, manifest itself in its own form' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3). Does this passage mean that the soul having approached the highest light assumes a new body, to be brought about then, as e.g. the body of a deva;

or that it only manifests its own natural character?--The text must be understood in the former sense, the Pûrvapakshin holds. For otherwise the scriptural texts referring to Release would declare what is of no advantage to man. We do not observe that its own nature is of any advantage to the soul. In the state of dreamless sleep the body and the sense-organs cease to act, and you may say the pure soul then abides by itself, but in what way does this benefit man? Nor can it be said that mere cessation of pain constitutes the well-being of the soul which has approached the highest light, and that in this sense manifestation of its own nature may be called Release; for Scripture clearly teaches that the released soul enjoys an infinity of positive bliss, 'One hundred times the bliss of Prajâpati is one bliss of Brahman and of a sage free from desires'; 'for having tasted a flavour he experiences bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). Nor can it be said that the true nature of the soul is consciousness of the nature of unlimited bliss which, in the Samsâra condition, is hidden by Nescience and manifests itself only when the soul reaches Brahman. For, as explained previously, intelligence which is of the nature of light cannot be hidden; hiding in that case would be neither more nor less than destruction. Nor can that which is mere light be of the nature of bliss; for bliss is pleasure, and to be of the nature of pleasure is to be such as to agree with the Self. But, if the Self is mere light, where is the being by which light is to be apprehended as agreeable to its own nature? (i.e. where is the knowing subject conscious of bliss?) He, therefore, who holds the Self to be mere light, can in no way prove that it is of the nature of bliss. If, moreover, that which the soul effects on approaching the highest light is merely to attain to its own true nature, we point out that that nature is something eternally accomplished, and that hence the declaration that 'it manifests (accomplishes) itself in its own nature' would be purportless. We hence conclude that on approaching the highest light the soul connects itself with a new form only then brought about. On this view the term 'accomplishes itself' is taken in its direct sense, and the expression 'in its own shape' also is suitable in so far as the soul accomplishes itself in a nature specially belonging to it and characterised by absolute bliss.--This view the Sûtra rejects. That special condition into which the soul passes on having, on the path of the Gods, approached the highest light is a manifestation of its own true nature, not an origination of a new character. For this is proved--by the specification implied in the term 'own,' in the phrase 'in its own nature.' If the soul assumed a new body, this specification would be without meaning; for, even without that, it would be clear that the new body belongs to the soul.--Against the assertion that the soul's own true nature is something eternally accomplished, and that hence a declaration of that nature 'accomplishing itself' would be unmeaning, the next Sûtra declares itself.

2. The released one; on account of the promise.

What the text says about the soul accomplishing itself in its own form refers to the released soul which, freed from its connexion with works and what depends thereon, i.e. the body and the rest, abides in its true essential nature.--That essential nature no doubt is something eternally accomplished, but as in the Samsâra state it is obscured by Nescience in the form of Karman; the text refers to the cessation of such obscuration as 'accomplishment.'--How is this known?--'From the promise,' i.e. from the fact that the text promises to set forth such cessation. For Prajâpati when saying again and again, 'I will explain that further to you,' does so with a view to throw light on the individual soul--first introduced in the clause 'that Self which is free from sin, &c.' (VIII, 7, 1)--in so far as freed from all connexion with the three empirical conditions of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep, and released from the body which is due to Karman and the cause of joy and sorrow. When, therefore, he concludes 'that serene being, i.e. the soul, having risen from this body and having approached the highest light accomplishes itself in its true form,' we understand that such 'accomplishment' means the final release, i.e. the cessation of all bondage, which is gained by

the soul, previously connected with Karman, as soon as it approaches the highest light.--The Pûrvapakshin had said that as in the state of deep sleep the manifestation of the true nature of the soul is seen in no way to benefit man, Scripture, if declaring that Release consists in a manifestation of the true nature of the soul, would clearly teach something likewise not beneficial to man; and that hence the 'accomplishment in its own form' must mean the soul's entering on such a new condition of existence as would be a cause of pleasure, viz. the condition of a deva or the like. To this the next Sûtra replies.

3. The Self, on account of subject-matter.

The subject-matter of the whole section shows that by the Self manifesting itself in its own form there is meant the Self as possessing the attributes of freedom from all evil and sin and so on. For the teaching of Prajâpati begins as follows: 'the Self which is free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires and thoughts spontaneously realise themselves.' And that this Self which forms the subject-matter of the entire section is the individual Self we have shown under I, 3, 19. The manifestation of the true nature of the soul when reaching the highest light therefore means the manifestation of that Self which has freedom from sin and so on for its essential attributes--that nature being in the Samsâra state obscured through Nescience. When therefore at the moment of Release those essential qualities assert themselves, the case is one of manifestation of what already exists, not one of origination. Thus the reverend Saunaka says, 'As the lustre of the gem is not created by the act of polishing, so the essential intelligence of the Self is not created by the putting off of imperfections. As the well is not the cause of the production of rain water, but only serves to manifest water which already exists--for whence should that originate which is not?--thus knowledge and the other attributes of the Self are only manifested through the putting off of evil qualities; they are not produced, for they are eternal.' Intelligence, therefore, bliss, and the other essential qualities of the soul which were obscured and contracted by Karman, expand and thus manifest themselves when the bondage due to Karman passes away and the soul approaches the highest light. On this view of 'manifestation' there remains no difficulty.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'on approaching manifestation.'

4. In non-division; because that is seen.

Is the soul, when it has reached the highest light and freed itself from all bondage, conscious of itself as separate from the highest Self or as non-separate in so far as being a mere 'mode' (prakâra) of that Self?--The former view is the right one. For Scriptural and Smriti texts alike declare that the released soul stands to the highest Self in the relation of fellowship, equality, equality of attributes, and all this implies consciousness of separation. Compare 'He attains all desires together with the all-knowing Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'When the seer sees the shining maker, the Lord, the Person who has his source in Brahman; then, possessing perfect knowledge, and shaking off good and evil, free from all passions he reaches the highest equality' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3); 'Taking their stand upon this knowledge they, attaining to an equality of attributes with me, are neither born at the time of a creation nor are they agitated when a pralaya takes place' (Bha. Gî. XIV, 2).--Against this view the Sûtra declares itself 'in non-division.' The released soul is conscious of itself as non-divided from the highest Brahman. 'For this is seen,' i.e. for the soul having reached Brahman and freed itself from the investment of Nescience sees itself in its true nature. And this true nature consists herein that the souls have for their inner Self the highest Self while they constitute the body of that Self and hence are modes (prakâra) of it. This is proved by all

those texts which exhibit the soul and Brahman in co-ordination--'Thou art that' 'this Self is Brahman'; 'In that all this has its Self'; 'All this in truth is Brahman'; and by other texts, such as 'He who dwells within the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body,' &c.; and 'He who abides within, the ruler of creatures, he is thy Self; as explained by us under Sûtra I, 4, 22. The consciousness of the released soul therefore expresses itself in the following form: 'I am Brahman, without any division.' Where the texts speak of the soul's becoming equal to, or having equal attributes with, Brahman, the meaning is that the nature of the individual soul--which is a mere mode of Brahman--is equal to that of Brahman, i.e. that on putting off its body it becomes equal to Brahman in purity. The text declaring that the soul 'attains all its desires together with Brahman' intimates that the soul, together with Brahman of which it is a mode, is conscious of the attributes of Brahman. The different texts are thus in no conflict. Nor, on this view of the soul being non-divided from Brahman in so far as being its mode, is there any difficulty on account of what is said about the soul under Sû. IV, 4, 8; or on account of the doctrines conveyed in II, 1, 22; III, 4, 8.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-division, on account of its being seen.'

5. In (a nature like) that of Brahman, thus Jaimini thinks; on account of suggestion and the rest.

Owing to the fact that different texts give different accounts, the question now arises of what character that essential nature of the Self is in which it manifests itself on reaching Brahman. Is that nature constituted by freedom from evil and sin and the rest (i.e. the attributes enumerated Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); or by mere intelligence (vijñāna); or by both, there being no opposition between intelligence and those other attributes?--The teacher Jaimini holds that the soul manifests itself in its Brahman character, i.e. in a character constituted by freedom from sin, and so on. These latter attributes are, in the text of the 'small lotus,' mentioned as belonging to Brahman (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5), and may hence be referred to as the 'Brahman' character. And that this Brahman character is the character of the released soul also follows from 'suggestion and the rest.' For freedom from all evil and the rest are, in the teaching of Prajâpati, referred to as attributes of the soul (VIII, 7, 1). The 'and the rest' of the Sûtra refers to the activities of the released soul--laughing, playing, rejoicing, and so on (mentioned in VIII, 12, 3)--which depend on the power belonging to the soul in that state to realise all its ideas and wishes. It is for these reasons that Jaimini holds that mere intelligence does not constitute the true nature of the released soul.

6. In the sole nature of intelligence; as that is its Self. Thus Audulomi thinks.

Intelligence (consciousness; kaitanya) alone is the true nature of the soul, and hence it is in that character only that the released soul manifests itself; this is the view of the teacher Audulomi. That intelligence only constitutes the true being of the soul, we learn from the express statement 'As a lump of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste; so this Self has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 13). When, therefore, the text attributes to the soul freedom from evil and the rest, it does not mean to predicate of it further positive qualities, but only to exclude all the qualities depending on avidyâ--change, pleasure, pain, and so on--For these reasons Audulomi holds that the released soul manifests itself as mere intelligence.--Next the teacher Bâdarâyana determines the question by propounding his own view.

7. Thus also, on account of existence of the former qualities (as proved) by suggestion, Bâdarâyana holds absence of contradiction.

The teacher Bâdarâyana is of opinion that even thus, i.e. although the text declares the soul to have mere intelligence for its essential nature, all the same the previously stated attributes, viz. freedom from all sin, and so on, are not to be excluded. For the authority of a definite statement in the Upanishads proves them to exist ('That Self which is free from sin,' &c.); and of authorities of equal strength one cannot refute the other. Nor must you say that the case is one of essential contradiction, and that hence we necessarily must conclude that freedom from sin, and so on (do not belong to the true nature of the soul, but) are the mere figments of Nescience (from which the released soul is free). For as there is equal authority for both sides, why should the contrary view not be held? (viz. that the soul is essentially free from sin, &c., and that the kaitanya is non-essential.) For the principle is that where two statements rest on equal authority, that only which suffers from an intrinsic impossibility is to be interpreted in a different way (i.e. different from what it means on the face of it), so as not to conflict with the other. But while admitting this we deny that the text which describes the Self as a mass of mere knowledge implies that the nature of the Self comprises nothing whatever but knowledge.--But what then is the purport of that text?--The meaning is clear, we reply; the text teaches that the entire Self, different from all that is non-sentient, is self-illuminated, i.e. not even a small part of it depends for its illumination on something else. The fact, vouched for in this text, of the soul in its entirety being a mere mass of knowledge in no way conflicts with the fact, vouched for by other texts, of its possessing qualities such as freedom from sin and so on, which inhere in it as the subject of those qualities; not any more than the fact of the lump of salt being taste through and through--which fact is known through the sense of taste--conflicts with the fact of its possessing such other qualities as colour, hardness, and so on, which are known through the eye and the other sense-organs. The meaning of the entire text is as follows--just as the lump of salt has throughout one and the same taste, while other sapid things such as mangoes and other fruit have different tastes in their different parts, rind and so on; so the soul is throughout of the nature of knowledge or self-illuminatedness.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'that which is like Brahman.'

8. By the mere will; Scripture stating that.

Concerning the released soul Scripture states, 'He moves about there, laughing, playing, rejoicing, be it with women, or chariots, or relatives' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3). The doubt here arises whether the soul's meeting with relatives and the rest presupposes an effort on its part or follows on its mere will--as things spring from the mere will of the highest Person.--An effort is required; for we observe in ordinary life that even such persons as kings and the like who are capable of realising all their wishes do not accomplish the effects desired without some effort.--Against this view the Sûtra says 'by the mere will.' For, in a previous passage, Scripture expressly says, 'He who desires the world of the Fathers, by his mere will the Fathers rise to receive him,' &c. (VIII, 2, 1). And there is no other text declaring the need of effort which would oblige us to define and limit the meaning of the text last quoted.

9. And for this very reason without another ruler.

Since the released soul realises all its wishes, it does not stand under another ruler. For to be under a ruler means to be subject to injunction

and prohibition, and to be such is opposed to being free in the realisation of all one's wishes. Hence Scripture says, 'he is a Self-ruler' (Ch. Up. VII, 25).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'wishes.'

10. The absence, Bâdari holds; for thus Scripture says.

A doubt arises whether the Released has a body and sense-organs, or not; or whether he has them or not just as he pleases. The teacher Bâdari holds that body and sense-organs are absent; since the text declares this. The text--'as long as he is embodied there is no freedom from pleasure and pain; but when he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1)--declares that pleasure and pain are necessarily connected with embodiedness; and the text--'having risen from this body and reached the highest light he manifests himself in his own shape' (VIII, 12, 3)--declares that the Released one is without a body.

11. The presence, Jaimini holds; because the text declares manifoldness.

The teacher Jaimini holds that the Released one has a body and senses; because the text declares manifoldness--'He is onefold, he is threefold, he is fivefold, he is sevenfold' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2). The Self which is one and indivisible cannot be manifold, and the various forms of manifoldness of which the text speaks therefore must depend on the body. The text which speaks of the absence of a body refers to the absence of that body only which is due to Karman; for this latter body only is the cause of pleasure and pain. Next the Reverend Bâdarâyana decides this point by the declaration of his own view.

12. For this reason Bâdarâyana (holds him to be) of both kinds; as in the case of the twelve days' sacrifice.

'For this reason,' i.e. for the reason that the text refers to the wish of the Released, the Reverend Bâdarâyana is of opinion that the Released may, at his liking, be with or without a body. This satisfies both kinds of texts. The case is analogous to that of the twelve days' sacrifice which, on the basis of twofold texts--'Those desirous of prosperity are to celebrate the dvâdasâha,' and 'The priest is to offer the dvâdasâha for him who desires offspring'--belongs, according to difference of wish, either to the sattrâ or the ahîna class of sacrifices.--The next Sûtra declares that the body and the sense-organs of the Released are not necessarily created by the Released himself.

13. In the absence of a body, as in the state of dream; that being possible.

As in the absence of a body and other instruments of enjoyment created by himself, the Released may undergo experiences of pleasure by means of instruments created by the highest Person, the Released, although capable of realising all his wishes, may not himself be creative. As in the state of dream the individual soul has experiences depending on chariots and other implements created by the Lord ('He creates chariots, horses,' &c., Bri. Up. IV, 3, 10); thus the released soul also may have experience of different worlds created by the Lord engaged in playful sport.

14. When there is a body, as in the waking state.

When, on the other hand, the released soul possesses a body created by its own will, then it enjoys its various delights in the same way as a waking man does.--In the same way as the highest Person creates out of himself, for his own delight, the world of the Fathers and so on; so he sometimes creates such worlds for the enjoyment of the released souls. But sometimes, again, the souls using their own creative will-power themselves create their own worlds, which however are included within the sphere of sport of the highest Person (so that the souls in enjoying them do not pass beyond the intuition of Brahman).

But it has been taught that the soul is of atomic size; how then can it connect itself with many bodies?--To this question the next Sûtra replies.

15. The entering is as in the case of a lamp; for thus Scripture declares.

Just as a lamp, although abiding in one place only, enters through the light proceeding from it into connexion with many places; so the soul also, although limited to one place, may through its light-like consciousness enter into several bodies. It may do this as well as in this life the soul, although abiding in one spot of the body only, viz. the heart, pervades the whole body by means of its consciousness and thus makes it its own. There is however the following difference between the two cases. The non-released soul has its intellectual power contracted by the influence of Karman, and hence is incapable of that expansive pervasion without which it cannot identify itself with other bodies. The released soul, on the other hand, whose intellectual power is non-contracted is capable of extending as far as it likes, and thus to make many bodies its own. For Scripture declares, 'That living soul is to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair divided a hundred times, and yet it is capable of infinity' (Svet. Up. V, 9). The non-released soul is ruled by Karman, the released one only by its will--this is the difference.--But, a new difficulty is raised, Scripture declares that when the soul reaches Brahman all its inner and outer knowledge is stopped: 'Embraced by the highest Self the soul knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 21). How then can it be said to know all things?--To this the next Sûtra replies.

16. It refers either to dreamless sleep or to union (sampatti); for this is manifested.

Texts as the one last quoted do not refer to the released soul, but either to deep sleep or to 'union' (sampatti), i.e. the time of dying; the latter in accordance with the text 'then his speech is united (sampadyate) with his mind,--heat with the highest divinity' (Ch. Up. VI, 15, 1). In both those states the soul attains to the highest Self and is unconscious. That in the states of deep sleep and dying the soul is unconscious and that the released soul is all-knowing, Scripture reveals. The text 'In truth he thus does not know himself that he is I, nor does he know anything that exists. He is gone to utter annihilation. I see no good in this' (Ch. Up. VIII, 11, 1) declares that the soul is unconscious in the state of deep sleep; and a subsequent text in the same section declares the released soul to be all-knowing, 'He seeing these pleasures with the divine eye, i.e. the mind, rejoices' (VIII, 12, 5). The same is clearly stated in the text, 'He who sees this sees everything, and obtains everything everywhere' (VII, 2, 6, 2). That at death there is unconsciousness appears from the text, 'having risen from

these elements he vanishes again in them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 13). From all this it follows that the text as to the soul being held in embrace by the prājña Self refers either to deep sleep or death.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-being.'

17. With the exception of world-energy; on account of leading subject-matter and of non-proximity.

The doubt here presents itself whether the power of the released soul is a universal power such as belongs to the Supreme Person, extending to the creation, sustentation, and so on, of the worlds; or is limited to the intuition of the Supreme Person.--The Pûrvapakshin maintains the former view. For he says Scripture declares that the soul reaches equality with the Supreme Person: 'Free from stain he reaches the highest equality' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3); and moreover Scripture ascribes to the released soul the power of realising all its thoughts. And these two conditions are not fulfilled unless the soul possess the special powers of the Lord with regard to the government, &c., of the world.--To this the Sûtra replies, 'with the exception of world-energy.' The released soul, freed from all that hides its true nature, possesses the power of intuitively beholding the pure Brahman, but does not possess the power of ruling and guiding the different forms of motion and rest belonging to animate and inanimate nature.--How is this known?--'From subject-matter.' For it is with special reference to the highest Brahman only that the text mentions ruling and controlling power over the entire world. 'That from whence these beings are born, that through which they live when born, that into which they enter at death, endeavour to know that; that is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 1, 1). If such universal ruling and controlling power belonged to the released soul as well, it would not be used--as the text actually uses it--for defining Brahman; for all definition rests on special individual attributes. Analogously many other texts speak of universal ruling and controlling power with exclusive reference to the Supreme Person--'Being only this was in the beginning, &c.--it thought, may I be many' (Ch. Up. VI, 2); 'In the beginning this was Brahman, one only--it created the most excellent Kshattra,' &c. (Bri. Up. I, 4, 11); 'In the beginning all this was Self, one only--it thought, let me send forth these worlds' (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 1); 'There was Narayana alone, not Brahmâ, and so on.' 'He who dwelling within the earth,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 3).--This also follows 'from non-proximity'; for in all those places which speak of world-controlling power the context in no way suggests the idea of the released soul, and hence there is no reason to ascribe such power to the latter.

18. If it be said that this is not so, on account of direct teaching; we reply not so, on account of the texts declaring that which abides within the spheres of those entrusted with special functions.

But, an objection is raised, certain texts directly declare that the released soul also possesses 'world-energy.' Compare 'He becomes a self-ruler; he moves in all worlds according to his wishes' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'He moves through these worlds, enjoying any food he wishes, and assuming any shape he wishes' (Taitt. Up. III, 10, 5). We cannot therefore accept the restriction laid down in the last Sûtra.--Not so, the latter half of the present Sûtra declares, 'on account of the texts declaring that which abides in the spheres of those entrusted with special functions.' The meaning of the texts quoted is that the released soul participates in the enjoyments connected with the spheres of Hiranyagarbha and other beings which are entrusted with special functions. The soul whose knowledge is no longer obstructed by Karman freely enjoys all the different worlds in which the power of Brahman manifests itself and thus is fully satisfied.--But if the released soul, no less than the soul implicated in the Samsâra, experiences enjoyments

46782 belonging to the sphere of change, it follows that the sum of its
46783 enjoyments is finite and limited, and that hence the released soul is no
46784 better off than the soul in the state of bondage!--Of this doubt the
46785 next Sûtra disposes.

46786
46787
46788
46789
46790 19. That which is not within change; for thus Scripture declares the
46791 abiding (of the soul).

46792
46793 That which is not within change, i.e. the highest Brahman which is free
46794 from all change and of an absolutely perfect and blessed nature--this,
46795 together with the manifestations of its glory, is what forms the object
46796 of consciousness for the released soul. The worlds which are subject to
46797 change thus form objects for that soul's experience, in so far as they
46798 form part of Brahman's manifestation. For Scripture declares that the
46799 released soul thus abides within, i.e. is conscious of the changeless
46800 highest Brahman, 'when he finds freedom from fear and an abode in that
46801 which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he obtains
46802 the fearless' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). And that the world is contained within
46803 Brahman as its manifestation is declared in the text, 'In that all the
46804 worlds abide, and no one goes beyond' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 8). The meaning of
46805 the text stating that the Released freely move in all worlds, and
46806 similar texts, therefore is only that the released soul while conscious
46807 of Brahman with its manifestations experiences also the enjoyments,
46808 lying within the sphere of change, which abide in the world of
46809 Hiranyagarbha and similar beings; not that it possesses the world-
46810 energies--creative, ruling, and so on--which are the distinctive
46811 attribute of the highest Lord.

46812
46813
46814
46815
46816 20. And thus Perception and Inference show.

46817
46818 That the energies connected with the rule of the entire world are
46819 exclusive attributes of the highest Person, Scripture and Smriti alike
46820 declare. Compare scriptural texts such as 'From fear of him the wind
46821 blows,' &c. (Taitt. Up. II, 8, 1); 'By the command of that Imperishable
46822 one sun and moon stand, held apart' (Bri. Up. III, 9); 'He is the lord
46823 of all, the king of all beings, the protector of all beings' (Bri. Up.
46824 IV, 4, 22). And Smriti texts such as 'With me as Supervisor, Prakriti
46825 brings forth the Universe of the movable and the immovable, and for this
46826 reason the world ever moves round'; 'Pervading this entire Universe by a
46827 portion of mine I do abide' (Bha. Gî. IX, 10; X, 42). Scripture and
46828 Smriti likewise declare that of the bliss which is enjoyed by the
46829 released soul the highest Person alone is the cause--'For he alone
46830 causes blessedness' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); 'He who serves me with
46831 unswerving devotion, surpasses these qualities and is fitted for
46832 becoming one with Brahman. For I am the abode of Brahman, of infinite
46833 immortality, of everlasting virtue, and of absolute bliss' (Bha. Gî. XIV,
46834 26-27). The exalted qualities of the soul--freedom from evil and sin and
46835 so on--which manifest themselves in the state of Release no doubt belong
46836 to the soul's essential nature; but that the soul is of such a nature
46837 fundamentally depends on the Supreme Person, and on him also depends the
46838 permanency of those qualities; they are permanent in so far as the Lord
46839 himself on whom they depend is permanent. It is in the same way that all
46840 the things which constitute the means of enjoyment and sport on the part
46841 of the Lord are permanent in so far as the Lord himself is permanent. It
46842 thus appears that the equality to the Lord which the released soul may
46843 claim does not extend to the world-ruling energies.

46844
46845
46846
46847
46848 21. And on account of the indication of the equality of enjoyment only.

46849
46850 The previous conclusion is confirmed by the further fact that the text

directly teaches the released soul to be equal to Brahman in so far only as enjoying direct insight into the true nature of Brahman. 'He reaches all objects of desire, together with the all-knowing Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1).--The conclusion thus is that we have to shape our ideas as to the powers of the released soul in accordance with what the texts say as to the Lord only possessing the power of ruling and controlling the entire world, and that hence the latter power cannot be attributed to the soul.--But if the powers of the released soul altogether depend on the Lord, it may happen that He, being independent in all his doings, may will the released soul to return into the Samsara.--Of this doubt the next Sûtra disposes.

22. Non-return, according to Scripture; non-return, according to Scripture.

We know from Scripture that there is a Supreme Person whose nature is absolute bliss and goodness; who is fundamentally antagonistic to all evil; who is the cause of the origination, sustentation, and dissolution of the world; who differs in nature from all other beings, who is all-knowing, who by his mere thought and will accomplishes all his purposes; who is an ocean of kindness as it were for all who depend on him; who is all-merciful; who is immeasurably raised above all possibility of any one being equal or superior to him; whose name is the highest Brahman. And with equal certainty we know from Scripture that this Supreme Lord, when pleased by the faithful worship of his Devotees--which worship consists in daily repeated meditation on Him, assisted by the performance of all the practices prescribed for each caste and âsrama--frees them from the influence of Nescience which consists of karman accumulated in the infinite progress of time and hence hard to overcome; allows them to attain to that supreme bliss which consists in the direct intuition of His own true nature: and after that does not turn them back into the miseries of Samsâra. The text distinctly teaching this is 'He who behaves thus all his life through reaches the world of Brahman and does not return' (Ch. Up. VIII, 15). And the Lord himself declares 'Having obtained me great-souled men do not come into rebirth, the fleeting abode of misery; for they have reached the highest perfection. Up to the world of Brahma the worlds return again, O Arjuna; but having attained to me, O son of Kunti, there is no rebirth' (Bha. Gi. VIII, 1, 5-16). As, moreover, the released soul has freed itself from the bondage of karman, has its powers of knowledge fully developed, and has all its being in the supremely blissful intuition of the highest Brahman, it evidently cannot desire anything else nor enter on any other form of activity, and the idea of its returning into the Samsâra therefore is altogether excluded. Nor indeed need we fear that the Supreme Lord when once having taken to himself the Devotee whom he greatly loves will turn him back into the Samsâra. For He himself has said, 'To the wise man I am very dear, and dear he is to me. Noble indeed are all these, but the wise man I regard as my very Self. For he, with soul devoted, seeks me only as his highest goal. At the end of many births the wise man goes to me, thinking all is Vâsudeva. Such great-souled men are rarely met with' (Bha. Gi. VII, 17-19).--The repetition of the words of the Sûtra indicates the conclusion of this body of doctrine. Thus everything is settled to satisfaction.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'with the exception of the world-energies.'

Here terminates the fourth pâda of the fourth adhyâya of the commentary on the Sârîraka Mîmâmsâ, composed by the reverend teacher Râmânuja. This completes the fourth adhyâya, and the whole work; and the entire body of doctrine is thus brought to a conclusion.

INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS

amsa, part,

46920
46921 akshara, the Imperishable,
46922
46923 akhyâti, the view that the attribute of one thing appears as that of
46924 another,
46925
46926 Agnirahasya, chapter in the Vâjasaneyaka (Sat. Bra. X),
46927
46928 Agnividya, knowledge of the Fires (i.e. Ch. Up. IV, 11-13),
46929
46930 agnihotra,
46931
46932 aghâtikarman,
46933
46934 anga, subordinate matter,
46935
46936 angin, principal matter,
46937
46938 ajada, intelligent,
46939
46940 ajadatva, intelligence,
46941
46942 ajâ, 'the unborn' principle, goat,
46943
46944 ajñâna, non-knowledge, Nescience,
46945
46946 ajiva, non-soul,
46947
46948 anu, of atomic size,
46949
46950 atigraha,
46951
46952 ativâdin, one who makes a final supreme declaration,
46953
46954 Aditi, the individual soul,
46955
46956 adrishta, supersensuous, transcendental, the unseen principle
46957
46958 advitîya, without a second,
46959
46960 advaita-vâdin,
46961
46962 advaitin, he who holds the view of non-duality,
46963
46964 adharma, demerit,
46965
46966 adhikarana, chapter, passim.
46967
46968 adhipati, sense-organ,
46969
46970 adhyayana, learning,
46971
46972 adhyavasâya, the deciding,
46973
46974 adhyâsa, superimposition,
46975
46976 anavasâda, freedom from dejection,
46977
46978 anâtmatva, absence of selfhood,
46979
46980 anârabdhakârya, (works) the effects of which have not yet begun,
46981
46982 aniruddha, principle of egoity,
46983
46984 anirvakaniyatâ, inexplicability,
46985
46986 anirvakaniyatvâ,
46987
46988 anirvakaniyatâ-vadin,

46989
46990 anîsâ,
46991
46992 anukûla, agreeable,
46993
46994 anuddharsha, absence of exultation,
46995
46996 anupalabdhi, non-perception,
46997
46998 anubhûti, consciousness,
46999
47000 anumati, favour, permission,
47001
47002 anumâna, inference,
47003
47004 anuvâda, reference to what is established by other means, explanatory
47005 comment,
47006
47007 anusaya, remainder,
47008
47009 anusmriti, recognition,
47010
47011 anrita, untrue,
47012
47013 antahkarana, internal organ,
47014
47015 antaram, difference, interval, break,
47016
47017 antariksha, ether, atmosphere,
47018
47019 antaryâmin, the inner Ruler,
47020
47021 antaryami-brâhmana,
47022
47023 anna, food,
47024
47025 anvaya, connexion, presence,
47026
47027 apara, secondary, lowest,
47028
47029 aparokshatva, being that which does not transcend the senses,
47030
47031 apâna,
47032
47033 apurushârtha, non-advantageous,
47034
47035 apûrva, unprecedented, new, the supersensuous result of an action which
47036 later on produces the sensible result,
47037
47038 apratisahkhyâ,
47039
47040 abhâva, absence of something, non-existence,
47041
47042 abhimâna, misconception,
47043
47044 abhivimâna,
47045
47046 abheda, non-distinction,
47047
47048 amûrta, undefined,
47049
47050 amrita,
47051
47052 amauna, non-mauna (see mauna),
47053
47054 arthavâda, an additional statement,
47055
47056 arthâpatti,
47057

47058 avagati, consciousness,
47059
47060 avatâra, incarnation,
47061
47062 avidyâ, Nescience,
47063
47064 avivâkya, (day of Soma sacrifice),
47065
47066 avyakta, the Unevolved,
47067
47068 avyâkritam, unevolved matter,
47069
47070 asvatva, generic character of horses,
47071
47072 asatkârya,
47073
47074 asatkâryavâda, the theory that the effect does not exist before its
47075 origination,
47076
47077 asatkhyâti, the view that the non-existing appears as existing,
47078
47079 asatya, untrue,
47080
47081 astikâya, existing body,
47082
47083 ahamkartri, organ of Egoity,
47084
47085 ahamkâra, the 'I,' egoity,
47086
47087 aham, 'I,' a secret name of Brahman,
47088
47089 ahar, a secret name of Brahman,
47090
47091 ahîna, class of sacrifices,
47092
47093 âkânkshâ, expectancy,
47094
47095 âkâsa, ether,
47096
47097 âkâra, conduct,
47098
47099 âtmakhyâti, the view that the Self appears as a thing,
47100
47101 atman, Self,
47102
47103 âtmabhâva, own being,
47104
47105 Âditya, Sun,
47106
47107 âdesa, instruction,
47108
47109 ânanda, bliss,
47110
47111 ânandamaya, consisting of bliss,
47112
47113 ânumâna, object of inference,
47114
47115 ânumânika, to be inferred,
47116
47117 âbhâsa, appearance,
47118
47119 ârambhana that which is taken or touched,
47120
47121 ârambhana-adhikarana,
47122
47123 Ârhata, a Jaina,
47124
47125 âlambhana,
47126

47127 âsrama, stage of life,
47128
47129 âsrava, influx,
47130
47131 itikartavyatâ, mode of procedure,
47132
47133 indriya, sense-organ,
47134
47135 îksh, to think,
47136
47137 îsvara, the Lord,
47138
47139 utpatti, being originated,
47140
47141 udâna,
47142
47143 udgâtri,
47144
47145 udgîtha,
47146
47147 udgîtha-vidyâ,
47148
47149 unmana, measure,
47150
47151 upakurvâna, a Brahmakârin who has completed his course of study and
47152 becomes a householder,
47153
47154 Upakosala-vidyâ,
47155
47156 upalakshana, secondary mark,
47157
47158 upasad, certain offerings,
47159
47160 upâdâna, material cause,
47161
47162 upâdhi, limiting adjunct,
47163
47164 upâs, to meditate,
47165
47166 upâsana, meditation,
47167
47168 upâsana, meditation,
47169
47170 ûha, a kind of cognitional activity,
47171
47172 rita,
47173
47174 ekavâkyatva, syntactical unity,
47175
47176 aisvarya, lordly power, superior existence,
47177
47178 om, omkâra, the syllable Om, aupâdhika, limiting adjuncts,
47179
47180 karana, instrument, activity, action, the instrumental case,
47181
47182 karmakânda,
47183
47184 karman, action, works, good and evil deeds,
47185
47186 karma-bhâvanâ,
47187
47188 karma-mîmâmsâ,
47189
47190 kalpa, world period,
47191
47192 kalpaka, the shaping agent,
47193
47194 kalpana, formation, i.e. creation,
47195

47196 kalyâna, virtuous conduct,
47197
47198 kâpâla, skull,
47199
47200 kâma, desired thing,
47201
47202 kârya, thing to be done,
47203
47204 kâla, time,
47205
47206 Kundapâyinâm ayanam,
47207
47208 kriti, action,
47209
47210 kaivalya, isolation,
47211
47212 kriyâ, action, works,
47213
47214 kshetrajña, embodied soul,
47215
47216 khanda, a piece,
47217
47218 khyâti,
47219
47220 gati, the going,
47221
47222 guna, quality, attribute, secondary matter, details,
47223
47224 godohana, a sacrificial vessel,
47225
47226 graha,
47227
47228 ghanî-bhûta, concreted,
47229
47230 ghâtikarman,
47231
47232 kfaturmukha, four-faced,
47233
47234 kamasa, cup,
47235
47236 karana, conduct, works,
47237
47238 kitta, mind,
47239
47240 kid-rûpa, essentially intelligent,
47241
47242 kinta, thinking,
47243
47244 kaitanya, intelligence,
47245
47246 kaitta, mental,
47247
47248 gada, non-intelligent,
47249
47250 gâti, generic character,
47251
47252 giva, individual soul,
47253
47254 gîva âtmâ, living Self,
47255
47256 givaghana,
47257
47258 givanmukta, released in this life,
47259
47260 gîvanmukti, release in this life,
47261
47262 gña., knower,
47263
47264 gñâtri, knower,

47265
47266 gñâna., knowledge, consciousness, pl. forms of knowledge,
47267
47268 tajjalan,
47269
47270 tatkratuh, according to what his thought is,
47271
47272 tattva of the Sâmkhyas,
47273
47274 tat tvam asi,
47275
47276 tanu, body,
47277
47278 tan-maya, consisting of that,
47279
47280 tanmâtra, the subtle matter,
47281
47282 tapas, austerity,
47283
47284 tamas, darkness,
47285
47286 tarka, ratiocination,
47287
47288 tukch, futile,
47289
47290 tejas, fire or heat,
47291
47292 taijasa, active,
47293
47294 tyat, that,
47295
47296 dama,
47297
47298 dahara-vidyâ,
47299
47300 daharâkâsa, small ether,
47301
47302 dîkshâ, initiatory ceremony,
47303
47304 devamâyâ,
47305
47306 desa, place,
47307
47308 dosha, imperfection, a».
47309
47310 dravya, substance,
47311
47312 dvâdasâha, the twelve days' sacrifice,
47313
47314 dviparârdha,
47315
47316 dvîpa, island,
47317
47318 dvaita, duality,
47319
47320 dvaitavâdin, (the Vaiseshika) who holds the view of duality,
47321
47322 dharma, attribute,
47323
47324 dhyâna, devout meditation,
47325
47326 dhyana-vidhi,
47327
47328 dhyai, to meditate or to know,
47329
47330 nâdî, vein,
47331
47332 nâda, tone,
47333

47334 nâmadheya, name,
47335
47336 nitya, permanent,
47337
47338 nityânityavastuviveka,
47339
47340 nididhyâsana, meditation,
47341
47342 nididhyâsitavya, to be meditated upon,
47343
47344 nimitta, cause,
47345
47346 niyoga, i.e. apûrva, supersensuous result of an action which later on
47347 products the sensible result,
47348
47349 niranvaya, absolute,
47350
47351 nirupâkhya, non-entity,
47352
47353 nirjara, decay,
47354
47355 nirvikalpaka, non-determinate,
47356
47357 Nishâda-sthapati,
47358
47359 nivâra, wild rice,
47360
47361 naimittika, contingent,
47362
47363 naishhthika, a perpetual religious student observing the vow of
47364 chastity,
47365
47366 pañkaganah, 'five-people,'
47367
47368 pañkâgni-vidyâ,
47369
47370 pada, word,
47371
47372 padârtha, a thing,
47373
47374 para, highest,
47375
47376 paramâtman, higher Self,
47377
47378 paramesara, highest Lord,
47379
47380 parinama, modification,
47381
47382 paryâya, particular states of substances
47383
47384 pân̄ditya, learning,
47385
47386 pâriplava, a performance of the Asvamedha sacrifice,
47387
47388 pârivrajaka, an ascetic,
47389
47390 pârivrâjya, the wandering about as a mendicant,
47391
47392 putika, a plant,
47393
47394 pudgala, body,
47395
47396 purusha soul,
47397
47398 purushavakas, to be designated by the term 'man,'
47399
47400 purusha-vidyâ,
47401
47402 purushottama, the highest Person,

47403
47404 pûrvapaksha, primâ facie view,
47405
47406 pûrvapakshin, he who holds the primâ facie view, passim.
47407
47408 prakarana, leading subject-matter,
47409
47410 prakâra, mode,
47411
47412 prakâs, to shine forth,
47413
47414 prakâsa, light,
47415
47416 prakriti, primeval matter, originating principle, nature,
47417
47418 prakriyâ, subject-matter,
47419
47420 prajñamatrah, subjects,
47421
47422 pranava, the syllable Om,
47423
47424 Prataardana-vidyâ (i.e. Kau. Up III),
47425
47426 pratikûla, disagreeable,
47427
47428 pratījñâ, initial statement,
47429
47430 pratlbuddha atma, the Self of intelligence,
47431
47432 pratisankhya,
47433
47434 pratîka, symbol,
47435
47436 pratyaksha, perception, presentative thought,
47437
47438 pratyakshatâ, immediate presentation,
47439
47440 pratyag-âtman, the individual soul,
47441
47442 pratyaa, consciousness,
47443
47444 pratyâhâra, complete restraining of the senses from receiving external
47445 impressions,
47446
47447 prathiman, solid extension,
47448
47449 pradesa, space,
47450
47451 pradyumna, the internal organ,
47452
47453 pradhâna, principal matter, non-sentient principle,
47454
47455 pradhâna, a superior,
47456
47457 prabhâ, light,
47458
47459 prayojana, final cause,
47460
47461 pralaya, destruction of the world,
47462
47463 prâgña, knowing, conscious, intelligent, the personal Self, the highest
47464 Self,
47465
47466 prâna, breath, breathing out; soul; Breath, a name of Brahman,
47467
47468 prâna, pl. organs and vital breath,
47469
47470 prânamaya, consisting of breath,
47471

47472 prânâgnihotra,
47473 prâdesamâtra,
47474 prâpti, the being obtained,
47475 prâyaskitta, expiatory rite,
47476 prerakatva, prompting quality,
47477 phala, result,
47478 phalavidhi, injunction of results,
47479 bādha, sublation,
47480 bādhita, sublated,
47481 bālya, childlike state,
47482 buddhi, internal organ, intellect,
47483 brimh, root from which 'Brahman' is derived,
47484 brimhana, growth,
47485 brihat, great,
47486 brihattva, greatness,
47487 brahmakarya, chastity,
47488 brahmagignâsâ, enquiry into Brahman,
47489 brahmatva, Brahma-hood,
47490 brahman,
47491 brahma-bhâvanâ,
47492 brahmavidyâ, knowledge of Brahman,
47493 brahmasamstha, founded on Brahman,
47494 bhakti, devotion, devout meditation,
47495 bhagavat, the Lord, then a holy person,
47496 bhagâsana,
47497 bhâkta, secondary or figurative,
47498 bhâva, entity,
47499 bhinna, separate,
47500 bhinnatva, difference,
47501 bhûta, beings,
47502 bhûta, element,
47503 bhûtamâtrâh, objects,
47504 bhûtâdi, originator of the elements,
47505 bhûman, 'muchness,' fulness of bliss,
47506 bhûma-vidyâ (Ch. Up. VII, 2),

47541
47542 bheda, difference,
47543
47544 bhedâbheda, view that there is difference and absence of difference at
47545 the same time,
47546
47547 bhautika, elemental,
47548
47549 bhrama, erroneous cognition, error,
47550
47551 bhrânti, illusion,
47552
47553 madhu, 'honey,' the sun,
47554
47555 madhuividya,
47556
47557 manana, reflection,
47558
47559 manas, internal organ, mind,
47560
47561 mantavya, to be reflected on,
47562
47563 mantra,
47564
47565 -maya, consisting of, made of,
47566
47567 Mahat, the Great Principle (of the Sâmkhya),
47568
47569 mahâvrata-brâhmana,
47570
47571 mâtrâ, mora (metrical unit),
47572
47573 mânasa, mental (offering of a Soma cup),
47574
47575 mâyâ,
47576
47577 mâyin, possessing mâyâ,
47578
47579 mithyâ, false,
47580
47581 mithyâtva, falsehood,
47582
47583 mukta, released,
47584
47585 mukhya prâna, chief vital air,
47586
47587 mudrâ, a badge,
47588
47589 muni,
47590
47591 mûrta, defined,
47592
47593 mauna, Muni-hood, state of a Muni,
47594
47595 yathâkratub, according as his thought is,
47596
47597 yushmad-artha, the objective element,
47598
47599 yoga, mystic concentration of mind,
47600
47601 yogayug, practitioner of Yoga,
47602
47603 yogasiddha, perfected by Yoga,
47604
47605 yogyatâ, compatibility,
47606
47607 yoni, female organ of generation,
47608
47609 rajas, passion,

47610
47611 rahasya-brâhmana,
47612
47613 râga, passion,
47614
47615 rukaka = nishka,
47616
47617 rûpa, form, character,
47618
47619 lakshanâ, implied meaning, implication,
47620
47621 linga, inferential mark,
47622
47623 vastu, substance,
47624
47625 vâkya, syntactical connexion,
47626
47627 vâkyabheda, split of a sentence,
47628
47629 vâyu, wind,
47630
47631 vâasanâ, a flow of ideas, states of consciousness,
47632
47633 vikâra, effected thing, effect,
47634
47635 vikriti, being Modified,
47636
47637 vijñâna, understanding, knowledge, idea,
47638
47639 vijñânāmaya, consisting of understanding, (the soul in deep sleep).
47640
47641 vid, to know or to meditate,
47642
47643 vidyâ, form of meditation on Brahman,
47644
47645 viniyoga, application,
47646
47647 vipaskit, intelligent,
47648
47649 vipaskittva, intelligence,
47650
47651 vibhava, manifestation,
47652
47653 vibhûti, manifestation of power,
47654
47655 vimoka, freeness of mind,
47656
47657 vivrit, to manifest itself,
47658
47659 viveka, abstention,
47660
47661 viseshana, determining attribute,
47662
47663 vishaya, object,
47664
47665 virya, strength,
47666
47667 vritta, conduct,
47668
47669 vedana, knowledge,
47670
47671 vedanâ, sensation,
47672
47673 veda-vrata,
47674
47675 vaikârika, modified,
47676
47677 vaikhâṇasa, hermit,
47678

47679 vaisvarûpya, many-natured universe,
47680
47681 vaisvânara-vidyâ
47682
47683 vyavahâra, speech,
47684
47685 vyashti, discrete aspect (of the world),
47686
47687 vyâna,
47688
47689 vyâvahârîka, conventional,
47690
47691 vyâvrittî, individual difference,
47692
47693 vyûha, division,
47694
47695 sakti, power, potentiality,
47696
47697 sabda, sound,
47698
47699 sama,
47700
47701 sarira, body,
47702
47703 sâkhâ,
47704
47705 Sândilya-vidyâ,
47706
47707 sârira, joined to a body,
47708
47709 sâriraka (doctrine) of the embodied (self),
47710
47711 sâstra, science, scriptural injunction,
47712
47713 sirovrata, vow of (carrying fire on the) head,
47714
47715 sila, conduct,
47716
47717 subhâsraya, perfect object,
47718
47719 sudra (etymology),
47720
47721 sesha, supplementary,
47722
47723 seshin, principal matter to be subserved by other things,
47724
47725 sraddhi, faith, belief,
47726
47727 sravana, hearing,
47728
47729 sruti, scriptural statement, rg,
47730
47731 samyamana,
47732
47733 samyoga, conjunction,
47734
47735 samvara, a kind of deep meditation,
47736
47737 samvargavidyâ
47738
47739 samvid, consciousness,
47740
47741 samsâra,
47742
47743 samskâra, impression,
47744
47745 samskriti, the being made ready,
47746
47747 samkarshana, the individual soul,

47748
47749 samrkhyâ, number,
47750
47751 samjñâ, consciousness,
47752
47753 sat, Being,
47754
47755 satkârya,
47756
47757 sattra class of sacrifices,
47758
47759 sattva, goodness,
47760
47761 satya, true,
47762
47763 satyakâma, realising its desire,
47764
47765 satyakâmatva, power of realising one's desire,
47766
47767 sad-vidyâ, meditation on that which truly is (Kb. Up. VI, i ff.),
47768
47769 sanniclihi, proximity,
47770
47771 sapta-bhangi-nyâya, the system of the seven paralogisms,
47772
47773 samanantara,
47774
47775 samanvaya, connexion,
47776
47777 samavâya, intimate relation, reciprocal inherence,
47778
47779 samavâyi-karana, intimate cause,
47780
47781 samashti, collective aspect (of the world),
47782
47783 samashti-purusha, the aggregate soul,
47784
47785 samâkâra, a book of the Âtharvanikas,
47786
47787 samâdhi, meditation,
47788
47789 samâna,
47790
47791 sarnpatti, union,
47792
47793 sampad, to be combined,
47794
47795 sampâta, yâvat sampâtam,
47796
47797 samprasâda, serenity,
47798
47799 sambhûta,
47800
47801 sayuktvân,
47802
47803 sarvajña, all-knowing,
47804
47805 savikalpaka, determinate,
47806
47807 sahakârin,
47808
47809 sâkshât, manifest,
47810
47811 sâkshâtkâra, immediate presentation,
47812
47813 sâkshin, the witnessing principle,
47814
47815 sâdhya, effected,
47816

47817 sâmnâdhikaranya, co-ordination,
47818
47819 sâyugya, equality,
47820
47821 siddhi, proof, definite well-established knowledge,
47822
47823 sukarita, good conduct,
47824
47825 sushira, a hollow place,
47826
47827 sūkshma, the Subtle,
47828
47829 setu, bank or bridge,
47830
47831 somarâjan,
47832
47833 sparsa, touch,
47834
47835 smriti, representation,
47836
47837 svayamprakâsa, self-proved,
47838
47839 svayamprakâsatva, self-luminousness,
47840
47841 svayamprakâsatâ,
47842
47843 svarga, heaven,
47844
47845 svastika,
47846
47847 svacchya, one's own text,
47848
47849 svâdhyâya, essential, rgr.
47850
47851 Hara,
47852
47853 hita, arteries so called,
47854
47855 hetu, reason,
47856
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47864 *** END OF THE BOOK THE VEDANTA-SUTRAS WITH THE COMMENTARY BY RAMANUJA ***
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